By Richard Weitz

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treatyhas officially died, as both the Russian Federation and the United States have executed their previously announced withdrawals.

The two immediate causes for the treaty’s demise were Moscow’s cheating on the accord and Beijing’s growing land-based intermediate-range (500-5500km) missile arsenal. The United States would not have withdrawn from the treaty if Moscow had not violated it. Nonetheless, the Trump Administration will not sign a new INF-type agreement that does not also include China.

The underlying reasons for the INF’s death originate in the dramatic changes that have occurred in the strategic context since 1987. These transformations transpired outside the treaty’s narrow limits on Russian and U.S. ground-launch missiles.

Whereas the Soviet Union and the United States had a near-monopoly on ground-launched intermediate-range missiles at the time the treaty was negotiated, dozens of additional countries (including Iran and North Korea) have obtained these missiles since then.

Moreover, new military capabilities have arisen since 1987 that can have comparable strategic effects to INF-range missile systems, such as strike drones that can fly 500km, attack a target, but then return to a base to prepare for additional strikes.

In theory, new intermediate-missile limitations could apply either in a narrow or in a broad framework.

A narrower treaty would limit a country’s possession of some types of missiles, such as those armed with nuclear abilities but not conventional warheads, or restrain missile activity in a particular geographic area.

A broader treaty would limit all types of missiles having ranges over 500km, including both INF- and strategic-range missiles, with possible sub-ceilings.

The SALT/START series of strategic arms reductions treaties have regularly limited the number of both long-range missiles and strategic bombers, with various sub-ceilings on heavy or deployed missiles.

Of course, this START series may also be on its last legs. Even if extended in 2021, the latest iteration, the New START Treaty adopted in 2011, could only last until 2026. The Trump Administration insists that future treaties encompass China in some capacity—a stance Beijing strongly opposes.

Pending the improvement in trilateral relations that might allow for such stronger limits on Russian, Chinese, and U.S. nuclear forces, which would be welcome, their near-term trilateral collaboration could focus on reducing risks of nuclear war as well as preventing other countries and non-state actors from acquiring WMD arsenals.

From this perspective of reducing the risks of miscalculation or accidents that could precipitate or escalate major conflicts between the three great powers, several long-supported arms-control proposals decline in value.

These proposals include unenforceable and reversible “no first use” pledges, simple declarations that a nuclear war should never be fought, and calls for extensive strategic de-alerting of nuclear forces that could worsen crisis stability since the massive and rapid re-alerting of nuclear forces in an emergency creates incentives for preemptive strikes.

Instead, the three countries need to take more concrete measures to avoid catastrophe. For example, they must avert provocative measures like deploying nuclear-armed missiles near one another’s territories, which would generate preemption incentives and crisis instabilities due to these first-strike anxieties.

Moscow, Beijing, and Washington could also benefit from enhanced strategic stability dialogues between governments as well as NGO representatives.

They could devote these talks to developing concrete measures to address the destabilizing potential of new weapons, limit the proliferation of nuclear and other strategic offensive arms, and avert dangerous operational practices.

More rigorous agreements to promote transparency are also needed to narrow the gap between the more accessible U.S. data and the less transparent Russian and Chinese programs.

Furthermore, the three countries could design joint initiatives targeting the non-nuclear weapons states, especially by coordinating their defense of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which anchors the global rules and norms against nuclear proliferation,at next year’s Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is likely to be contentious.

Meanwhile, non-governmental security experts can help prepare the conceptual framework necessary to address the novel arms control and defense policies necessitated by the advent of new strategic weaponry and the proliferation of these potentially destabilizing new military technologies–such as anti-space weaponry, hypersonic weaponry, cyber strikes, and artificial intelligence–towards other countries.

For instance, they should develop a concept for effective multilateral strategic arms control, answering such questions as when and how to include China and perhaps other countries in an enlarged arms control agreement, what military capabilities to cover in any such multilateral accords, and what means of verification would be needed.

Another priority research task is determining how to distinguish better between nuclear- and conventionally armed delivery and command “dual-use” systems since their commingling could result in an easier descent from a non-nuclear conflict into nuclear escalation. National leaders may not be able to determine if a missile heading toward them has a conventional rather than a nuclear warhead and could presume the worst.

Additionally, militaries may attack command, control, communications, intelligence and other assets (such as space satellites and command posts) in a conventional war even though these networks might support countries’ nuclear deterrents—generating pressures for those attacked before their deterrent assets suffer severe degradation.

As noted, some useful arms control agreements might apply only to nuclear-armed systems, but they would have to be assuredly distinguished from non-nuclear weapons. For example, Russia has warned that it would respond to the perceived deployment of U.S. nuclear-armed missiles in Europe by placing the continental United States under similar imminent threat. The United States and NATO have affirmed that they only envisage placing non-nuclear missiles in Europe, though would need some means to allow Moscow to confirm this.

In addition, we should ask whether some of the improving non-nuclear strategic capabilities could be made to enhance mutual deterrence, notwithstanding the problems they might cause for escalation control due to the complications they would add to any first-strike planning. Even if they complicated crisis management, novel military technologies might also have the potential to enhance crisis instability by discouraging states from starting wars.

We should likewise consider how these additional means of non-nuclear strategic attack might give us a greater margin of safety against treaty circumvention or miscalculations due to the more complex factors shaping the balance of mutual deterrence. If the size of the nuclear arsenals governed by an arms control arrangement remain large, and new non-nuclear technologies provide supplementary means of retaliation, then the significance of one side’s having a few extra warheads could decrease.

If this is true, then the verification requirements of agreements could also decline. Following the same logic, arguments against strategic defenses (like missile interceptors) and concerns about the potential for “uploading” (loading additional warheads onto strategic missiles in a crisis) possibly negating mutual deterrence similarly weaken.

Finally, the NGO community should more actively explore the opportunities created by the new U.S. initiative on Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament. Launched by the United States in 2017, the initiative aims to identify the “real-word” global and regional impediments to nuclear disarmament and generate possible measures to remove these obstacles.

Recently, the Secretary General of NATO visited Australia.

The visit followed one by the US Secretaries of Defense and of State.

Australia has expanded its reach with its new air and maritime capabilities and has been involved significantly in participating in alliance activities dealing with global threats.

They are also increasingly focused on the direct defense of Australia and the kind of military capabilities required for this core defense activity.

What the broader engagement means will be defined by future developments and actions.

But one aspect is very clear — Australia is both influencing the evolution of political-military capabilities in the defense reset in Europe as well as broadening its alliance relationships beyond that of the United States itself.

With both Britain and France, Australia is working a rebuild of its maritime capabilities, for example.

And the United States under President Trump is clearly working to rebuild the US military in ways to make it more effective in dealing with conflicts beyond those for which the US military development was focused upon during the past two administrations, namely on the Middle East land wars.

This is a work in progress, and one in which Australia seeks to be a key stakeholder, and more than that a shaper of what might emerge as the broader transformation of alliance capabilities as well.

It might also be noted that the Australian government, whatever concerns they might have about President Trump and his various proclivities, understands that the United States remains Australia’s key allies.

And unlike some governments who have seemed to be more preoccupied in sending critical cables, are finding ways to work with the US President and to shape beneficial outcomes for both countries.

It is interesting to note that the first foreign leader with whom President Trump spent time during the G-20 was the Australian Prime Minister with whom he had dinner, and the President was quite interested in how the PM had pulled off such an unexpected electoral victory.

The Sec Gen visit to Australia was highlighted in this August 9, 2019 story published by the Australian Department of Defence:

The strong bond between Australia and NATO has been reinforced during NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s visit to Australia from August 6 to 8.

The key point of the visit was to renew an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program agreement on HMAS Hobart in Sydney. The Minister for Defence, Linda Reynolds, described the agreement as a “reinforcement of our relationship”.

Mr. Stoltenberg also visited the Australian War Memorial in Canberra with Senator Reynolds and met the Secretary of Defence, Greg Moriarty, and the Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Vice Admiral David Johnston, at Russell Offices.

Senator Reynolds said the agreement with NATO indicated “we are working very closely together, but now we have new challenges we’re both facing and we need to work more closely”.

“We’re saying not only what we have been doing is important but, in light of our discussions, we are looking at new areas to work together in the Indo-Pacific,” she said.

We have new challenges we’re both facing and we need to work more closely. – Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds

Mr. Stoltenberg said the agreement “creates the framework for concrete cooperation”.

“Australia is a highly valued partner for the alliance and we are extremely grateful for the support you provide to different NATO missions and operations,” he said.

“To be on board this ship, the Hobart, and see the naval capabilities of your country, is something which is of great importance for me. I think it is also the best possible platform to sign the agreement.”

While Australia and NATO were far apart geographically, the agreement showed “we are the closest of partners”.

Mr. Moriarty said he was pleased to meet the NATO Secretary General. 

“It was a valuable opportunity to deepen engagement on shared strategic interests, including security issues in the Indo-Pacific region and our contribution to the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan,” Mr. Moriarty said.

Vice Admiral Johnston also highlighted the depth of the partnership with NATO.

“Defence is working alongside NATO to maintain the rules-based international order and address shared challenges such as crisis and conflict management,” he said.

Editor’s Note: Insights into how the Australians are working with President Trump and his Administration is contained in this article published by The Australian on July 27, 2019.

The article focuses on Australia’s Ambassador to the United States, Joe Hockey, and how he learned to deal with a U.S. president who’s torn up the rule book.

The article concludes with regard to his retiring from public service in the following words:

“Whatever Hockey does next, it is unlikely to rival the challenge and the adrenalin of holding Australia’s most important diplomatic post with the most maverick and unusual  American President in living memory.”