Ukraine (July 7, 2019) Partner nations gather to celebrate Ukraine Navy Day during exercise Sea Breeze 2019 in Odesa, Ukraine, July 7, 2019.
Sea Breeze is a U.S. and Ukraine co-hosted multinational maritime exercise held in the Black Sea, designed to enhance interoperability of participating nations and strengthen maritime security and peace within the region.
ODESA, UKRAINE
07.07.2019
Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Daniel Charest
AFN Naples
In these photos, MV-22B Osprey aircraft are seen flying over the Rockhampton Showground pavilion as a display put on for the Rockhampton Open Day as part of Talisman Sabre 2019.
Talisman Sabre 2019 (TS19) is a bilateral combined Australian and United States (US) training activity.
TS19 is designed to practice our respective military services and associated agencies in planning and conducting Combined and Joint Task Force operations, and improve the combat readiness and interoperability between Australian and US forces.
TS19 will be the eighth iteration of the exercise and consists of a Field Training Exercise incorporating force preparation (logistic) activities, amphibious landings, land force manoeuvre, urban operations, air operations, maritime operations and Special Forces activities.
The featured photo has been digitally altered.
The photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.
Queensland Fire and Emergency Services recently worked with firefighters from No 23 Squadron at RAAF Base Amberley to run through a hazardous material and decontamination exercise.
Key areas of the training included the fitting of appropriate personal protective equipment, product identification, chemical containment and clean up, education on the use of testing kits, casualty removal, medical requirements, and set up and use of the decontamination trailer.
Joint exercises such as this provide significant upgrades and insights for Air Force’s Firefighting capability.
Australian Department of Defence, June 20, 2019.
This year’s Exercise Talisman Sabre started off with a bang, as US Marine Corps and US Army High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HiMARS) demonstrated the firepower they could bring to bear.
The exercise, held on July 8, displayed not only the rapid-deployment capability of the systems, which were deployed by US Air Force and US Marine Corps MC-130s, but also how they integrated with Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon and E-7A Wedgetail aircraft.
It was also the first time Australian personnel had commanded the HiMARS systems.
Commander Forces Command Major General Christopher Field said the exercise was an impressive display of the capability of Australian and US military’s ability to work together.
“As we like to say, we’re combined and joint by nature, but partnered by choice and this was a great opportunity to show the interoperability between our two nations, both in the air and on land,” he said.
“Joint and combined fighting is essential to our two militaries and it’s always wonderful to get out and see soldiers executing their profession.”
The attack was also supported by two US Army AH-64E Apache helicopters, as well as Australian Army S-100 and Royal Australian Navy Scan Eagle unmanned aerial systems.
Australian soldier Corporal Thomas Rowe, of 16th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, said the live-fire exercise was the prelude to an integration with the US Army and Marine Corps he hadn’t previously experienced in his career.
“This was the first time we’d worked with the HiMARS and I’ve never seen a live-fire of that magnitude before,” he said.
“I was really excited to see all of them fire at the same time and it didn’t disappoint.”
Working with the Australians was a “great experience” for US marine Staff Sergeant Juan Cantu.
“This is the first time we’ve integrated the HiMARS with the Australian military, but even though we’ve been writing the book as we go, it has worked really well,” he said.
“We’ve built really good relations with the Australians which has helped smooth the process.
“I look forward to working with them in the future.”
After learning about the HiMARS system, Royal Australian Air Force Flight Lieutenant Alysha Dunn said watching the live-fire put it all into perspective.
“Because the 1st Brigade tactical aircraft control party has an existing relationship with the Marine Rotational Force – Darwin and a lot of our control doctrine is based on the Marine Corps, it’s been really easy to work with them,” she said.
“We’ve spent a lot of time training with simulated HiMARS systems, so it was awesome to actually see them fire – it really put our training into perspective.”
Exercise Talisman Sabre is the Australian Defence Force’s largest exercise, involving up to 34,000 sailors, soldiers and airmen from Australia, the US, UK, Canada, New Zealand and Japan.
https://news.defence.gov.au/international/talisman-sabre-starts-bang
Talisman Sabre 19 (TS19) is a bilateral combined Australian and United States (US) training activity.
TS19 is designed to practice our respective military services and associated agencies in planning and conducting Combined and Joint Task Force operations, and improve the combat readiness and interoperability between Australian and US forces.
TS19 will be the eighth iteration of the exercise and consists of a Field Training Exercise incorporating force preparation (logistic) activities, amphibious landings, land force manoeuvre, urban operations, air operations, maritime operations and Special Forces activities.
Raptors have come to Oz to participate in this year’s exercise.
And given how the F-22 has evolved over time, its ability to support a multi-domain force has been enhanced over the years, and certainly demonstrated in Middle Eastern operations.
According to an Australian Aviation article published on July 11, 2019:
United States Air Force (USAF) F-22 Raptors have flown alongside the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) as part of an Enhanced Air Cooperation (EAC) exercise at Exercise Talisman Sabre 2019.
Group Captain Stephen Chappell, Commander of the Amberley based Australian-US task unit for the exercise, said training with the stealth fighter aircraft supported Australian fifth-generation integration and provided valuable training.
“Talisman Sabre builds on the regular exercises we do at Amberley, in the United States and the key training programs and exchanges with USAF and US Navy that we use to develop our tactics, techniques and procedures,” Group Captain Chappell said in a statement on Wednesday.
“Integration with the fifth-generation platforms like F-22 and F-35 are key to how we will do our job both now and in the future.”
According to an article published by the UK Ministry of Defence on July 9, 2019, the UK is focusing on developing new laser and radio frequency weapons.
The state-of-the-art weapons systems, known as Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), are powered solely by electricity and operate without ammunition.
The systems could be fuelled by a vehicle’s engine or a generator, significantly reducing their operating costs and providing unprecedented flexibility on the frontline.
In a Prior Information Notice (PIN) published this week, the MOD announced it is seeking to develop three new DEW demonstrators to explore the potential of the technology and accelerate its introduction onto the battlefield.
The laser weapons systems deploy high energy light beams to target and destroy enemy drones and missiles. Radio Frequency weapons are designed to disrupt and disable enemy computers and electronics.
Defence Secretary Penny Mordaunt said:
Laser and Radio Frequency technologies have the potential to revolutionise the battlefield by offering powerful and cost-effective weapons systems to our Armed Forces.
This significant investment demonstrates our commitment to ensuring our Armed Forces operate at the forefront of military technology.
The new systems are expected to be trialled in 2023 on Royal Navy ships and Army vehicles but, once developed, both technologies could be operated by all three services. The Armed Forces will use these exercises to get a better understanding of DEW, test the systems to their limits and assess how they could be integrated with existing platforms.
The MOD aims to invest up to £130m in this package of Directed Energy Weapons, including the construction of the demonstrators, the creation of a new Joint Programme Office and the recruitment of personnel to manage the programme.
These demonstrators are part of the MOD’s “Novel Weapons Programme” which is responsible for the trial and implementation of innovative weapons systems to ensure the UK remains a world leader in military technology. They are expected to reach the frontline within 10 years.
The MOD already has plans for initial trials of laser weapons systems, with the Dragonfire demonstrator commissioned by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory to be tested later this year.
The Dragonfire represents a world-first in laser weapons technology, combining multiple laser beams to produce a weapons system that is more powerful than its predecessors and resistant to the most challenging environmental conditions.
The MOD also has over 30 years’ experience in Radio Frequency DEW, during which time the UK has become a world leader in developing new power generation technologies and a global hub for the performance testing and evaluation of these systems.
The graphic shows a Computer Generated Image illustrating the use of DEW on a Wildcat helicopter. Crown copyright.
By Damien Hare
The popular perception of bombing in World War II is of inaccuracy and indiscriminate destruction. Despite early intentions to conduct precision raids in Europe, both the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the United States Army Air Forces found that limitations of technology, training and the elements severely constrained their ability to conduct accurate bombing.
Consequently, they adopted strategic bombing techniques that involved the delivery of explosives from high altitude against targets often defined only as ‘factory complexes’, and frequently with the primary, if unspoken, the aim of simply devastating large areas of German urban development.
However, in an age of air power application renowned for area bombing and circular error probables measured in thousands of feet, Operation Carthage – the 1945 raid on the Gestapo headquarters in Copenhagen – is notable for its remarkable accuracy.1
Operation Carthage demanded a level of precision that a modern audience would typically associate with laser-guided weapons being delivered through windows that first embedded itself in popular consciousness during the 1991 Gulf War.
Moreover, a failure to have successfully done so would have directly endangered the very individuals the raid was, in large part, being conducted to protect.
The ultimate success of the raid was thus a testament to the planning and execution of the operation and a tribute to the remarkable skill and airmanship of those involved.
Despite the precision of the raid, Operation Carthage was bedevilled by the perennial problem of the bombing of pinpoint urban targets in World War II – large-scale collateral damage.
Operating under the constraints of the navigation and target identification technology of the time, some of the raiding crews misidentified their target and delivered their munitions on a nearby school, resulting in the deaths of over one hundred children and teachers.
Operation Carthage thus underscores the influence of the Clausewitzian concept of friction in war: while precision munitions can be shown to have reduced the numbers of non-combatants harmed as a result of air attack, arguments that technology may one day eliminate friction are fallacious. 2
To be fair, arguments for the ability of precision munitions to minimise civilian casualties usually acknowledge that chance, error and friction – normally through human involvement in the use of precision munitions – will continue to exert an influence on adverse outcomes, even if heavily reduced.
However, argumentation in favour of the use of autonomous weapons systems as being ethically sound due to their technology-based precision and their elimination of human-based error suggests there is a potential case for friction to be eventually overcome. 3
For all its accuracy, Operation Carthage demonstrated a problem that remains no less relevant now – that high explosives, once committed to a target, can kill and maim indiscriminately.
If the target itself is wrong – through misidentification in planning, through the confusion in execution, through friction– the precise delivery matters little.
As World War II drew to a close in Europe, members of the Danish Resistance became increasingly concerned that their movement was in danger of being eliminated by the German Gestapo. The Gestapo, operating from their headquarters in the so-called “Shell House” in Copenhagen, held considerable documentary evidence on Resistance activities in the building.
Additionally, they had installed a number of cells where prisoners could be interned and interrogated.
The Danish Resistance, through British operatives in Denmark, had for some time been requesting an RAF attack on Shell House to destroy the Gestapo’s files and remove the threat to their operations.
Complicating their request, however, was their desire that the raid should, in addition to destroying the files contained on the central three floors, leave the upper floor – the location of the prison cells – intact to enable the detainees held there to escape.4
Although initially unwilling, the RAF ultimately agreed to conduct the raid, which its designated Operation Carthage.
Responsibility for the mission was assigned to No. 140 Wing of the RAF’s 2ndTactical Air Force, comprising aircraft from Numbers 21 Squadron RAF, 464 Squadron Royal Australian Air Force, and 487 Squadron Royal New Zealand Air Force, all operating de Havilland Mosquito light bombers.
Assignment of the operation to the 2ndTAF was due less to the nature of the raid in a tactical or strategic sense than to the planned method of execution, which would involve a strike conducted at roof-top level.
No. 140 Wing was the most experienced in such techniques of the RAF’s Mosquito force at the time and thus possessed the capability and means to achieve the accuracy required. 5
Planning for the raid was meticulous.
As one of the raid’s major challenges was the need for crews to identify an individual building in a built-up urban area visually, considerable effort was expended on creating a high-fidelity visual reference for the pilots.
The imagery of the target area was gathered from aerial photography and Danish Resistance members, and a detailed relief model of the Shell House and the surrounding city environs constructed.
The model enabled pilots to get their eyes down to the level at which they would fly their route and visualise the target as they would see it during the attack.6
Further effort was devoted to weapon delivery.
Though scepticism persisted as to whether it would be successful, the Mosquito crews planned their ingress to the target at rooftop level, aiming to deliver their bombs on a flat trajectory, or ‘skipping’ them in to the lower floors of the Shell House, destroying the Gestapo records on these levels while leaving the upper floors undamaged long enough that the prisoners held there would have time to escape. 7
Moreover, the raid was timed to reach the target when the Gestapo would have two shifts present, and the majority of document safes in the building would be reckoned to be open.8
The raid was launched on 21 March 1945. Departing from RAF Fersfield in Norfolk, England, a total of 18 Mosquito bombers from No. 140 Wing were accompanied by 28 Mustang escort fighters and an additional two Mosquitos tasked with filming the mission. The aircraft travelled the 350 miles to Copenhagen over the North Sea and Danish countryside at wave and rooftop height, arriving at the target at approximately 11:00.
Achieving surprise, the first wave of six bombers successfully identified the target and delivered their bombs, fused with a time delay to permit the aircraft to escape, with considerable accuracy.
Their efforts were remarkably successful.
Significant immediate damage was done to the central structure of the Gestapo Headquarters, killing around 150 members of the Gestapo and their Danish collaborators, and destroying the archives stored there. 9
Additionally, though the initial blasts did kill some of the prisoners held in the attic, 18 of the 26 detainees held in the Shell House were able to escape during the raid.10
The Shell House, substantially damaged, ultimately collapsed.
By these results alone, the raid was a success.
However, as they sped from the burning target at rooftop height, the Mosquito crewed by Wing Commander Peter Kleboe, and Flying Officer Reginald Hall clipped a post and building roof, and crashed into the nearby Jeanne d’Arc Catholic School, killing the crew.11
As the second and third waves, each comprising six Mosquitos, approached, several crews misidentified the now-burning school as the actual target.
As a result, seven of the 12 aircraft in the follow-on waves delivered their bombs – with No. 140 Wing’s trademark accuracy – on to the Jeanne d’Arc school, killing 86 children and 18 adults, and injuring over 150 more.12
Speaking of the mission in a film made after the war, Ted Sismore, the master navigator for the raid, noted the irony of the tragedy, observing that, given the success of the initial wave:
[h]ad all the bombs gone into the target [the Shell House], it’s most likely that most of the Danes in the attic would have been killed.
The loss of the children […] affected us very much.’ 13
Three other Mosquitos and two Mustang escorts were lost through enemy action with one Mustang pilot becoming a prisoner, and the remaining seven aircrew killed.14
Carl von Clausewitz described friction in warfare as comprising:
[c]ountless minor incidents – the kind you can never really foresee – [that] combine to lower the general level of performance so that one always falls far short of the intended goal. 15
Moreover, friction ‘is everywhere in contact with chance’, and thus brings about effects in war that cannot be measured and, importantly, reliably predicted.16
Operation Carthage, though objectively a successful military operation, is illustrative of the role of friction in the conduct of war.
Despite thorough planning, well-trained crews, and state-of-the-art equipment, the mission resulted in over 250 civilian casualties, none of whom had been accepted during planning as anticipated victims of the raid. It was chance and friction that placed them in harm’s way.
The limitations of the technology of the day compelled crews to identify targets visually.
The speed and altitude of the approach, necessitated by the need to both maintain surprise, protect them from air defences andidentify the target, gave crews precious little time to line their approach up, select the correct target, and deliver their weapons before beginning evasive manoeuvres and leaving the target area.
Once the smoke from the burning school, located near the actual target, became prominent, the limitations of human capacity in this demanding and stressful environment made misidentification of the target increasingly likely.
The cascading effects of Kleboe and Hall’s Mosquito clipping structures, crashing into a school, igniting a fire, smoke from this fire obscuring the actual target and drawing following crews to identify the school as the Shell House epitomise the concept of friction in war as Clausewitz envisaged it
. Casualties are sustained where they had not been anticipated. Plans lose effectiveness as the course of action deviates from the expected path. Actions are taken that produce unhelpful results.
The simplest things become difficult, as Clausewitz warns, and with this difficulty comes unpredictability and undesired effects. 17
The civilian casualties at the Jeanne d’Arc school were not the result of wayward bombs that missed the Shell House due to poor aim, aerodynamics, or any other vagary of an unguided weapon.
The bombs that hit the school did so because they were aimed at the school; they were delivered precisely at a structure that the crews had identified as their briefed target.
By precisely bombing the wrong target, the Operation Carthage crews highlighted an enduring reality of war that promises offered by enhanced technologies have not yet overcome – and will likely never do so.
With the introduction of precision-guided munitions on a large scale in the 1990s, advocates of the technology argued that their use would make war cleaner, less destructive, and reduce the suffering of non-combatants. Some proponents, such as former Admiral William Owens, former US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that technology, in general, would reduce such a constraint on war to the point where it is militarily insignificant. 18
However, Clausewitz’s notion of friction was not limited to the physical domain and included influential intangible factors that exist in the mental domain. 19
Such factors – fear, stress, confusion, the effects of physical hardship and fatigue, the uncertainty of information and what it may mean – can be influenced by technological aids and solutions, but existing in the non-physical realm the ability to eliminate from the battlefield completely is highly questionable.
While enhanced technology offers greater fidelity in target acquisition, identification and discrimination, and precision munitions provide a high level of confidence in striking a target, the precise effects that precision munitions can attain are contingent on the target being right in the first place.
Here, the non-physical elements of friction can have a significant influence.
During the 1990-91 Gulf War, a civilian defence shelter in the Amiriyah neighbourhood of Baghdad was struck by two laser-guided bombs after it had been incorrectly identified as a command post or military bunker for the Iraqi military.
Over 400 civilians and the incident led to restrictions on further US raids on the Baghdad for the duration of the war. 20
Another case occurred during the 1999 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation bombing campaign against Serbia.
Inexperience, complacency and poor information management combined to lead the Central Intelligence Agency to misidentify the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade as the headquarters of a Serbian arms agency.
Passed to the air planners as a target, the embassy was struck by five satellite-guided bombs Three Chinese nationals were killed, 20 injured, and tensions in the US-China relationship significantly increased. 21
As was the case with the Jeanne d’Arc School, in these examples, the precision munition functioned as designed to, highlighting that where the wrong target is identified, today’s technology simply makes it more likely that the wrong target will be hit precisely.
At the heart of this particular manifestation of friction is the human element in warfare.
During Operation Carthage, as in the case of Baghdad and Belgrade, the involvement of humans in the application of weaponry through misinterpreted or incorrect information was a clear contributing factor to the tragic outcomes.
However, removing the human entirely from the loop itself, as may be promised through the development of autonomous weapons systems, will not completely mitigate the effects of friction either.
An adversary may act, such as countermeasures to ‘spoof’ or jam precision guidance or surveillance systems or may defeat intelligence collection and analysis efforts through deception and concealment. Moreover, technology, regardless of its sophistication or reliability, can fail.
A system designed and constructed by humans remains susceptible to a myriad of human factors, influences and failings, even when the human is no longer involved in the actual operation of the system. Technology itself thus introduces an element of friction, independent to human involvement, and the enduring nature of war as a chaotic, violent act ensures that the influence of this friction can never be completely eliminated.
Technology may promise a cleaner, more precise war, but the effects of friction will continue to be experienced in the application of force.
Unintended consequences will remain an unavoidable fact of conflict in the future as much as they were in 1945.
Operation Carthage was in many respects a triumph of determination, planning, training and courage. It reflected the epitome of human skill in air strikes at the time. The strike foreshadowed the potential of precision munitions nearly a half-century later.
At the same time, it demonstrated the impact of friction in warfare.
The raid was planned and executed with the specific intent of minimising unnecessary casualties; of targeting as precisely as was possible with the technology of the time; and with the explicit aim of avoiding harm to certain individuals and enabling them to escape the subject building.
Tragically, through friction and chance, and their cascading effects on human perception and action, the planning and execution were misapplied, and dozens of non-combatants were killed as a result.
With precision weapons today offering those same potential effects as Operation Carthage sought to achieve – the ability to target precisely and minimise unnecessary suffering – it remains pertinent to recall the outcome of the raid.
War is and remains a human activity, subject to all the limitations and constraints of the human condition.
Friction, and its impact on human actions in war will endure as long as humans continue to have a place – anyplace – in the conduct of conflict.
Wing Commander Damien Hare joined the Royal Australian Air Force as an Aerospace Engineering Officer in 1996 and has worked in a variety of roles, including F-111 maintenance and engineering, Aerial Delivery Certification, Aircraft Accident Investigation and the acquisition of the P-8A Poseidon aircraft.
He holds a Bachelor of Engineering (Aeronautical), a Master of Arts (War Studies) and a Master of Military and Defence Studies, specialising in the Art of War. He is currently posted as Directing Staff at the Australian War College, Canberra.
The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect the views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.
This article was first published by Central Blue on June 23, 2018.
by Master Sgt. Austin May
ORLAND AIR BASE, Norway – For the first time outside the U. S., Norwegian and American F-35 Lightning II maintainers worked together on their aircraft June 17, 2019.
A team of five maintainers and four pilots from the 421st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron deployed to Norway for the historic cross-servicing event, during which the maintenance teams received and turned two American F-35As after their arrival from Finland.
The Norwegian air force already operates a fleet of 12 F-35s at Orland Air Base, and plans to eventually employ 52 of the fifth-generation aircraft throughout Norway. The visit was the first time American F-35s have landed in Norway.
“All firsts are special,” said Royal Norwegian Air Force Lt. Col. Eirik Guldvog, 132nd Air Wing executive officer and chief of staff. “For Norway and our European allies, who are entering the fifth-generation fighter era, it’s important to both have the U.S. on board and to train with the other partners around the North Sea.
“To have multinational cooperation within these nations and to have a significant F-35-capable force in the North Atlantic, of course that is important,” Guldvog continued. “This is the first step.”
While the visit was short, it was an opportunity to practice seamless integration in preparation for future deployments.
“Air operations are often multinational, so it’s important that we train together and find every opportunity to interact on a normal basis,” Guldvog said.
According to U.S. Air Force Capt. Brett Burnside, 421st EFS F-35 pilot, the entire endeavor felt familiar and without any significant challenges.
“Even though they are from a different country and speak a different language, they are fighter pilots as we are,” Burnside said. “We simply connected with them on our F-35 datalink and it was just like working with any U.S. F-35 unit.”
Burnside said because Norway is a partner in the F-35 program, it’s extremely important to continue to foster this relationship. Additionally, he said Norway’s geographic location is immensely strategic as they have a large responsibility in quick reaction alert to scramble fighters to intercept hostile aircraft in the arctic region if necessary.
The now-proven ability of RNorAF’s Lightning II maintainers to successfully catch and turn American F-35s is a huge milestone for the country.
“F-35s will be the most important combat element within the Norwegian defense agencies,” Guldvog said. “Not just the air force. It will be the most potent offensive capability in Norway.”
A fleet of F-35As is currently deployed to Europe as part of the European Deterrence Initiative, which enables the U. S. to enhance a deterrence posture, increase the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, support the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and bolster the security and capacity of U.S. partners.
52nd Fighter Wing Public Affairs
Story by Master Sgt. Austin May
Monday, June 17, 2019