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NG reported a six percent rise in 2019 net attributable profit to €188 million ($204 million) from a year ago, on sales of €3.7 billion, up three percent.
Operating profit rose six percent to €282 million, with an operating profit margin of 7.6 percent of sales, up 0.2 percentage points.
The company won orders worth €5.3 billion, up 44 percent, bringing the order book to €15 billion, up nine percent.
The orders were boosted by a joint order for 12 minehunters from Belgium and the Netherlands. NG seeks a sale of the minehunters to France.
The book-to-bill ratio, or ratio of orders to sales, was 1.4.
NG has €1.2 billion in shareholders equity, and invested €480 million of own funds for research and development.
Export deals accounted for 38 percent of 2019 orders, and accounted for 29 percent of sales.
Those exports are needed to maintain NG between domestic orders for warships, submarines and service, said Hervé Guillou, executive chairman of the French shipbuilder, who gave a broad review of the company’s financial progress, programs, and employees over the last five years, a period covering the period of his stewardship.
One of the financial oddities was France covering the cost of building two Mistral helicopter carriers for Russia but only after NG’s pursuit of the finance ministry for payment, after Paris cancelled the controversial sale to Moscow.
However, the company was unable to recover an estimated €100 million of profit from the ministry, an executive said.
Egypt, which later bought those helicopter carriers, is considering buying two multimission frigates from Italy, in a €1.2 billion deal which would thwart DN’s offer of two Gowind corvettes, website La Tribune has reported.
Cairo’s reported preference for a warship deal with Rome stems from French president Emmanuel Macron’s call for human rights during a visit to Egypt last year.
DN continues its sales effort to Egypt, until a sale to Italy is completed, a second executive said.
And Guillou addressed the issue of Naval Group’s Australian engagement as well.
Naval Group is looking for strong local participation in Australia’s plans to build a fleet of attack submarines, contrary to Australian media reports, Hervé Guillou, said Feb. 21 at the Press Conference.
Australian media reports on NG’s lack of support for local industry were “groundless” and marked by “spitefulness,” he told a news conference on Naval Group’s 2019 financial results, effectively his media swan song before he takes his retirement March 24.
Guillou was commenting on a Feb. 12 report in The Australian, a daily newspaper, based on an interview with John Davis, chief executive of Naval Group’s Australian unit.
That report pointed up what NG saw as a shortage of local capability in building the 12-strong submarine fleet and a lack of commitment to assign half the work to Australian firms.
The remarks by the NG senior executive were “reported out of context,” Guillou said.
The new boats will have more local content than the Collins submarines, which have some 60 percent of Australian content, he said. There will be extensive transfer of technology, in a long and complex program backed by Australian industrial associations and the government.
Australia and Naval Group made a Feb. 13 joint statement pointing up cooperation with local industry, he said.
“Sovereign control over the Attack class submarine fleet and maximising Australian industry involvement throughout all phases of the Attack class submarine program are contracted objectives in the Strategic Partnering Agreement between Defence and Naval Group,” the Australian department of defence and NG said in the statement.
More than 137 local companies and associations have signed up as subcontractors on the present preliminary design phase, and that list would be extended, the statement said.
No value was given on those contracts. Naval Group receives payment in stages, as the company completes a phase in the design work. Building the submarine is due to start in 2023 in the Adelaide shipyard, southern Australia.
Such was the impact of the media report, the Australian and French defense ministers, respectively Lindsay Reynolds and Florence Parly, made a Feb. 14 statement which underlined a commitment to Australian industry.
“Today we have reviewed the implementation of the Strategic Partnering Agreement that underpins Australia’s Future Submarine Program,” the ministers said.
“Both of us reaffirmed our full commitment to the program, in particular with respect to schedule and Australian industry capacity.”
There will be a ministerial assessment of the project every three months this year, with the first meeting in France in April and the following mid-year meeting in Australia, the ministers said.
“We acknowledge the Future Submarine Program is key for both our countries and our strategic partnership.
“We are committed to work together to make it a success,” the ministers said.
The ministers met at the high-level Munich security council.
The featured photo is of Naval Group chief executive Herve Guillou at IDEX 19 and is by Khushnum Bhandari for The National.
For an overview on Naval Group and its activities and challenges over the past year, see our special report:
U.S. service members take part in the static displays and aerial demonstrations during Singapore Airshow 2020 at Changi Exhibition Center, Republic of Singapore, Feb. 15, 2020.
U.S. Marines with 2nd Radio Battalion, II Marine Expeditionary Force Information Group, conduct a simulated Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel in an urban environment on Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Nov. 6, 2019.
The training was conducted using a Wolfhound, a handheld radio frequency threat warning and direction finding system, in order to maintain high response time and proficiency in an urban environment.
The US Navy over the next decade will reshape its carrier air wing (CVW) with the introduction of a number of new platforms.
If one simply lists the initial operating capabilities of each of these new platforms, and looked at their introduction sequentially, the “air wing of the future” would be viewed in additive terms – what has been added and what has been subtracted and the sum of these activities would be the carrier air wing of the future.
But such a graphic and such an optic would miss the underlying transformation under way, one which is highly interactive with the USMC and the USAF.
A case in point is the coming of the F-35C to the carrier wing.
One could discuss the difference between 4th and 5thgeneration aircraft, and the importance of the fifth-generation aircraft, already operating from amphib decks with the USMC, but it is much more than that.
Such a focus would be limited to what I have called F-35 1.0, namely, simply bringing the aircraft to the force and sorting through how to support it.
But the US Navy is focused directly on F-35 2.0 which is how to leverage the aircraft to transform the combat force into the integrated distributed force.
The coming of the F-35 is a trigger point for a significant remake of the CVW.
The entire process is rethinking the building, operations, transformation, and interaction of the F-35 (and not just operating from the carrier but working with other F-35s in the joint and allied forces) with the core Naval combat force to be able to generate concentrated combat power at the point of interest needed in a crisis.
One clearly needs a different optic or perspective than simply taking an additive approach.
And the graphic above highlights a way to think about the process of transformation for the carrier air wing over the next decade.
What is underway is a shift from integrating the air wing around relatively modest and sequential modernization efforts for the core platforms to a robust transformation process in which new assets enter the force and create a swirl of transformation opportunities, challenges, and pressures.
How might we take this new asset and expand the reach and effectiveness of the carrier strike group?
How might it empower maritime, air, and ground forces as we shape a more effective (i.e. a more integratable) force?
During a recent visit to San Diego, I had a chance to discuss such an evolving perspective with the Navy’s Air Boss, Vice Admiral “Bullet” Miller.
We started by discussing the F-35 which for him is a major forcing function change in the CVW.
But his focus is clearly upon not simply introducing the aircraft into the force but ensuring that it is part of the launch of a transformative process for shaping the evolving air wing or what I call F-35 2.0.
The F-35 is coming to the force after a significant investment and work by the US Navy to rebuild its operational capabilities after several years of significant sustainment challenges.
But now the Air Boss is looking to focus his attention on enhanced combat lethality which the fleet can deliver to the maritime services and the joint force.
What is being set in motion is a new approach where each new platform which comes into the force might be considered at the center of a cluster of changes.
The change is not just about integrating a new platform in the flight ops of the carrier.
The change is also about how the new platform affects what one can do with adjacent assets in the CSG or how to integrate with adjacent U.S. or allied combat platforms, forces, and capabilities.
To give an example, the U.S. Navy is replacing the C-2 with the CMV-22 in the resupply role.
But the Navy would be foolish to simply think in terms of strictly C-2 replacement lines and missions.
So how should the Navy operate, modernize, and leverage its Ospreys?
For Miller, the initial task is to get the Osprey onboard the carrier and integrated with CVW operations.
But while doing so, it is important to focus on how the Osprey working within the CVW can provide a more integrated force.
Vice Admiral Miller and his team are looking for the first five-year period in operating the CMV-22 for the Navy to think through the role of the Osprey as a transformative force, rather than simply being a new asset onboard a carrier.
Hence, one can look at the CMV-22 innovation cluster in the following manner:
Such an approach is embedded in the rethink from operating and training an integrated air wing to an integratable air wing.
Vice Admiral Miller provided several other examples of how this shift affects the thinking about new platforms coming onboard the carrier deck.
One such example is the new unmanned tanker, the MQ-25.
The introduction of this new air asset will have an immediate effect in freeing up 4th gen fighters, currently being used for tanking, to return to their strike role.
Even more importantly from a transformation perspective, the MQ-25 will have operational effects as a platform which will extend the reach and range of the CVW.
But MQ-25 will be a stakeholder in the evolving C2/ISR capabilities empowering the entire combat force, part of what, in my view, is really 6th generation capabilities, namely enhancing the power to distribute and integrate a force as well as to operate more effectively at the tactical edge.
The MQ-25 will entail changes to the legacy air fleet, changes in the con-ops of the entire CVW, and trigger further changes with regard to how the C2/ISR dynamic shapes the evolution of the CVW and the joint force.
The systems to be put onto the MQ-25 will be driven by overall changes in the C2/ISR force.
These changes are driving significant improvements in size, capability, and integration, so much so that it is the nascent 6th gen.
This means that the USN can buy into “6thgen” by making sure that the MQ-25 can leverage the sensor fusion and CNI systems on the F-35 operating as an integrated force with significant outreach.
It is important to realize that a four ship formation of an F-35 operating as an integrated man-machine based sensor fusion aircraft is can operate together as a four ship pack fully integrated through the CNI system, and as such can provide a significant driver of change to the overall combat force.
This affects not only the future of training, but how operations, training, and development affect individual platforms once integrated into the CVW and larger joint force.
This will have a significant impact on Naval Air Warfare Development Center (NAWDC) based at Fallon.
SAN DIEGO (Oct. 10, 2019) Vice Adm. DeWolfe H. Miller III, Commander, Naval Air Forces, speaks at the Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing (COMVRMWING) 1 establishing ceremony on board Naval Air Station North Island (NASNI) Oct. 10. The Navy established its first CMV-22B Osprey squadron (VRM-30) Dec. 14, 2018 at NASNI. The Navy’s transition from the C-2A Greyhound to the CMV-22B Osprey is expected complete by 2028. U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chelsea D. Meiller
A key piece in shaping the integratable air wing is building out a new training capability at Fallon and a new set of working relationships with other U.S. and allied training centers.
Later this year, we will visit Fallon and provide more details on the evolving approach.
The head of Fallon, Rear Admiral Richard Brophy, joined the conversation with the Air Boss, and clearly underscored the challenge: “How do we best train the most lethal integrated air wing preparing to deploy, but at same time, prepare for the significant changes which introducing new platforms and concepts of operations can bring to the force?
As the Air Boss put it: “We need to properly train the integratable airwing and we are investing in expanded ranges and new approaches such as Live Virtual Constructive training.
“I often use the quote that ‘your performance in combat never raises to the level of your expectations but rather it falls to the level of your training.’
“This is why the training piece is so central to the development for the way ahead for the integrable training.
“It is not just about learning what we have done; but it is working the path to what we can do.”
Consider the template of training for CVW Integration.
On the one hand, the CVW trained at Fallon needs to prepare to go out into the fleet and deliver the capabilities that are available for today’s fight.
On the other hand, as this template is executed, it is important to shape an evolving vision on how to operate platforms coming to the fleet or how those assets have already been modified by software upgrades.
A software upgradeable fleet, which is at the heart of the 5th gen transition and which lays down the foundation for 6th generation c2/ISR provides a key challenge.
The F-35 which operated from the last carrier cycle, or flew with the P-8 or Triton, all of these assets might well have new capabilities delivered by the software development cycle.
How to make certain that not just the air wing, but the commanders at sea fully understand what has changed.
The challenge is to shape the template for training today’s fleet; and to ensure that the template being shaped has an open aperture to handle the evolution of the CVW into the evolving integrated and distributed force.
Two measures of the change in the shift from the integrated to the integratable CVW which we discussed are the question of how to measure the readiness of a fifth-generation aircraft and the second is the creation of a new patch in Fallon, which builds upon the lessons learned during the early TOPGUN days.
The first is that aircraft readiness is a key measure of combat preparedness.
Rates of aircraft availability for a combat aircraft, can it fly or not is a baseline indicator of combat availability.
But for VADM Miller, the F-35 needs to be measured by a different standard given its key role in enabling an integratabtle CVW, namely full mission capability.
Can the aircraft fly with its full mission capability today?
This expectation reflects the F-35’s role as a flying combat system, mission manager, and sensor fusion generator for the air wing and strike group.
The second is the creation of the Maritime ISR or MISR patch.
MISR officers are trained as ISR subject matter experts to operate at the fleet or CSG level and to work the sensor fusion for the integratable CVW.
According to the Air Boss: “I think of MISR as additive, not lessening of TOPGUN, but instead akin to a new phase which builds upon our historical experience in the development of TOPGUN in the first place.”
In effect, these are “6th generation officers” in the sense of working the C2/ISR capabilities which enable an integrated and distributed fleet to have its maximum combat impact.
In short, the fleet is in the throes of significant transition.
The emergence and forcing function of an integrated CVW is at the heart of the transition.
And the emergence of a new patch at NAWDC certainly highlights the change.
Air to air combat skills remain important but now with your wingman miles away in a fifth generation aircraft context, or Aegis operating as your wingman, the C2/ISR revolution is highlighting the evolving capabilities of integration for combat dominance.1
The featured photo shows Vice Adm. DeWolfe H. Miller III, Commander, Naval Air Forces, speaking at the Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing (COMVRMWING) 1 establishing ceremony on board Naval Air Station North Island (NASNI) Oct. 10. The Navy established its first CMV-22B Osprey squadron (VRM-30) Dec. 14,
Also see the earlier interview with Vice Admiral Miller:
Welcome to what the Russian Government owned international news network “Sputnik” is calling the “New Technological Cold War. “
In November last year Huawei launched an Artificial Intelligence (AI ) backed cloud service in Brazil.
Quin Dan the CEO of Huawei Cloud Brazil said at the launch ceremony in São Paulo: “We have the technology, experience, security and support so our clients can transform and expand their businesses.” Erick Schanz, the company’s business manager, said that Huawei Cloud is set up to compete in Brazil, Latin America’s largest economy, with U.S. companies that provide similar services such as Microsoft, Amazon and Google.
Huawei noted in a statement that “another important benefit of cloud is that it is linked to the development in Brazil of 5G technology.”
The company also presented its Huawei Cloud Partner Network (HCPN) which has 291 partners in Latin America and 80 in Brazil. An auction is expected this year for frequency space in Brazil.
The Brazilian 5G auction will be among the largest spectrum sales ever and telecom companies from all over the world are expected to compete for the contract.
The recent UK decision by the Boris Johnson government over Huawei and 5G, which would restrict Huawei to 35% participation in the periphery of the network which connects devices and equipment to mobile phone masts, and exclude it from sensitive core areas such as nuclear installations and military bases, has already had an impact in Brazil which sees the British model as one to follow.
In Britain the potential competitors to Huawei, Ericsson of Sweden and Nokia of Finland, and Samsung, would delay 5G technology rollout and increase costs.
Which is why in the British case the use of Huawei for 5G is supported by Vodafone and BT, both of which have already embedded Chinese telecom technology in their telecom systems.
Most components come from Southeast Asia, principally from China.
Yao Wei, the outgoing President of Huawei in January 2020 met with the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro at the palácio do planalto in Brasilia. He was following up on the two meetings between Bolsonaro and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing during a state visit to China in October and at the BRICS summit in Brasília in November.
Bolsonaro had said that “China should be buying in Brazil, not buying Brazil.”
But pressure from the Brazilian agro-business sector had persuaded him to modify his tone.
He sent his Vice President, general Hamilton Mourão, to China in May where he met with Huawei technology company’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, and discussed Huawei plans to build a 5G network in Brazil.
The Chinese have been lobbying General Hamilton Mourão and the minister of science, technology, innovation and communication (MCTIC), Marcos Pontes since then, and Huawei has been dangling the possibility of a major US$800 million investment in a factory in São Paulo to manufacture smart phones according to João Doria, the governor of São Paulo.
There are major issues at stake here beyond 5G and Artificial intelligence services. In recent years China has been rapidly expanding its influence in Brazil and in Latin American more broadly.
Most significantly China is Brazil’s most important trading partner.
The coronavirus crisis in China has had an immediate impact on Brazilian trade. Brazilian exports to China falling by 3.5% over the first weeks after the crisis hit according to the Brazilian Association of External Commerce. Brazil’s dependence on commodity exports makes it especially vulnerable to any decrease in Chinese demand. China is a major importer of Brazilian beef and soy. Powerful Agro-business interests in Brazil, major political supported of Jair Bolsonaro’s Government, have a huge stake in the preservation of good commercial relations with China.
Brazil is a major part of China food security strategy.
Soy is China’s main food commodity which it imports to feed its pigs. Chinese state companies invest directly in Brazil’s supply chain and China buys 70 to 80% of Brazilian soy and has in Brazil some 7,500 employees. The Chinese pledged an investment of US$100 billion in Brazil at the last BRICS summit in Brasília, and have committed US$ 3.1 billion to two BRI (belt and road) Projects in Brazil.
A high voltage transmission system for the belo monte dam in Mato Grosso, and toward the expansion of the port of São Luís in Maranhão, and possibly on support the construction of a new railroad link from Mato Grosso to bring soya to the ports on the Amazonian Tapajos river.
The replacement of tropical rain forest by cattle and soy in the inevitable consequence of Chinese commodities demand.
China has become a major in investor in Brazil’s pre-salt petroleum and takes two thirds of the Brazil’s total petroleum output. The Chinese offshore oil engineering company (CODEC) has constructed floating production, storage and offloading platforms for Brazil, due to bottlenecks in Brazilian yards. One of these platforms, Petrobras P-70, broke from it’s moorings in a storm in Rio de Janeiro’s Guanabara Bay off Niterói at the end of January this year having just arrived from China.
The platform was due to move to the Petrobras operated Atapu pre-salt field and is designed to produce 150,000 barrels of oil a day and day 6 million cubic meters of natural gas and employ 160 people and be operational for 25 years.
President Donald Trump in an “apoplectic” phone call to Boris Johnson criticised his Huawei decision, and his Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo has also expressed his alarm and opposition to Boris Johnson’s Huawei and 5G decision, and both have also pressured Jair Bolsonaro over his potential decision over Huawei and 5G in Brazil.
Boris Johnson and Jair Bolsonaro are soul mates of Donald Trump to be sure, but material interest are pulling them in an opposite direction.
Featured Image: Friso Gentsch/picture alliance via Getty Images.
Also, see the following excellent overview on 5G in a strategic context:
Exercise Mobility Guardian is Air Mobility Command’s flagship exercise for large-scale Rapid Global Mobility operations.
As AMC’s largest enterprise-wide training event, the biennial, service-level exercise constitutes the command’s most deliberate validation opportunity for the state of the Mobility Air Force’s readiness.
Exercise Mobility Guardian 2019 executes from Sept. 8-28, 2019 at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, and exercise operations occur at multiple air bases and military training locations throughout the Pacific Northwest.
More than 4,000 personnel participate in or observe Exercise Mobility Guardian, including Total Force Airmen, Joint, Combat Air Forces, and International Partners.
Exercise training is based on realistic mobility operations scenarios including enabling air base opening, executing joint forcible entry, conducting aeromedical evacuation operations, and support to global strike operations.
09.09.2019
Video by Jamie Chapman, Senior Airman DaQuan Hurt, Staff Sgt. Jarrod Vickers and Trevor Wood
