China and Cyber Theft

12/12/2019

Debalina Ghoshal

Cyber theft committed by China is not new and the country continues to violate commitment that it had made with the United States that it would not indulge in any cyber thefts.

These thefts not only include intellectual properties but also crucial weapon systems to name a few thus becoming a threat to the United States. in 2009, when the US oil companies like Marathon Oil and Exxon Mobil were victims of cyber espionage, it was assumed that the possible culprit could have been China or Russia.

As late as the June 2018 reports, China continues to steal intellectual property and trade secrets from the United States companies for its own economic development. China in the past has made attempts to hack information on US nuclear warheads.

Most recently, in June 2018, it has been reported that China has gained access to secret information of US project ‘Sea Dragon’ that would provide them crucial information on US submarines and anti-ship missiles- crucial for deterrence and developing counter-measures especially as China and the United States are involved in the South China Sea confrontation.

According to reports, China stole 614 gigabytes worth information relating to sensors, submarine cryptographic systems along with information on Sea Dragon project. In February 2019, there were reports that Iran and China have renewed their cyber-attacks against the United States.

The US also accuses China of attempting to steal crucial information on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (a reason why it is believed China was able to develop the indigenous Chengdu J-20) as well as the Patriot air and missile defence systems.

Other than this, the United States also accuses China of infiltrating an organisation with connections the THAAD missile defence system in South Korea- a move by the United States that China vehemently opposes. Such cyber thefts would enable China to develop counter measures against these weapon systems by studying the weapon systems of the United States in detail.

They are also accused of obtaining designs for several other weapon systems like Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence System, Littoral Combat Ship and also electromagnetic rail guns.

China’s medium of cyber theft includes- stealing secrets including computer software source codes, chemical formulas, and technology can be used in weapon systems. Other than this, technological \know-how is gained by joint ventures and purchases of companies, academic and research partnerships and front companies that “obscure the hand of Chinese government.”

As regards China’s hacking of crucial weapons systems, according to Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments.

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, “China utilised its intelligence services and employed other illicit approaches that involve violations of U.S. laws and exports to obtain key national security technologies, controlled equipment and other materials not readily obtainable through commercial means or academia.” The same year, the Obama Administration had also confrontedPresident Jinping on the issue of cyber espionage conducted by China. In 2014, some People’s Liberation of Army (PLA) officials were accused of stealing trade secrets from Westinghouse, U.S. steel and other companies.

Despite the hue and cry of the United States, China continues to violate the 2015 bilateral accord with the United States and such cyber thefts have been reported even in November 2018. The bilateral agreement was signed by China after coercion by the United States in which Beijing agreed to not to steal each other’s intellectual property for commercial gain. The bilateral agreement of 2015 between the United States and China became a much needed arrangement especially as in 2013, the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property estimated that 50-80 percent of the cyber thefts were performed by China.

Not only the United States, but China inked similar bilateral deals with Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. However, owing to the recent trade war between the United States and China, China has resumed hacking of US confidential information and this level of hacking has only become more sophisticated and stealthier.

According to US senior adviser for cyber security strategy at the National Security Agency (NSA), Rob Joyce, “it is clear they were well beyond the bounds of the agreement today” that was forged between the two countries.

Though Chinese have denied this allegation, private sector cyber security firms have confirmed that China’s cyber theft activities have increased over the years especially since the Trump administration came into power and since China and the United States have been mired into trade war.

This increase in cyber thefts occurred despite Chinese President Xi Jinping’s positive view of the bilateral agreement and in 2015 he stated, “China and the United States are two major cyber countries, and we should strengthen dialogue and cooperation. Confrontation and friction are not the right choice for both sides.”

One of the reasons why China is so capable of tactfully performing cyber espionage is due to the government’s effort in concentrating on development of science and technology, and research and development.

This is no surprise as China’s assassin mace weapon strategy whereby it aims to defeat greater powers with both offensive and defensive technologies.

Cyber operations form a major component of China’s assassin mace weapon strategy to strengthen its deterrence vis-à-vis the United States.

Like always, China continues to deny these allegations of cyber espionage. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Lu Kang, the accusations are “purely out of ulterior motive that some companies and individuals in the United States use so-called cyber theft to blame China for no reason.”

US Counter Measures

The United States on the other hand, has come out with a new cyber security strategy in 2018 that would include the strategy of strengthening the organisations that include‘ critical infrastructure.’

Imposing sanctions on Chinese hackers and hacking agencies is another way that the United States is making an effort to deter China.

Not only this, its strategy also includes ‘naming and shaming’ those cyber attackers as well as the countries supporting such activities.

Organisations like the Department of Defence and NSA can counter attack overseas sources of attacks with greater ease now according to the strategy.

The military division has also started with Twitter account that discloses the malwares they have discovered in order to deter hackers from hacking critical information.

Conclusion

Despite the cyber security strategy that the United States has adopted, there is little doubt that the US is vulnerable constantly to Chinese cyber-attacks and espionage. Its weapon systems and intellectual property are under constant threat jeopardising its security.

Debalina Ghoshal is a Non Resident Fellow, Council on International Policy, Canada and an Asia Pacific Fellow, EastWest Institute

The featured image comes from the following source:

china-information-warfare-dod-report.aspx

South Africa and Egypt: Strengthening Defense Cooperation

By defenceWeb

The South African defence industry is cultivating closer ties with the Egyptian market, with the South African Aerospace, Maritime, and Defence Export Council (SAAMDEC) holding discussions with Egypt’s Minister of State for Military Production.

Dr Mohamed Said Al-Assar met with members from the South African Aerospace, Maritime and Defence (AMD) Industries Association on Saturday along with representatives from a number of South African companies to discuss defence cooperation.

The Egyptian Ministry of Military Production outlined its role and requirements, particularly regarding ammunition, weapons and equipment. According to Egyptian media, the two sides discusses aspects of cooperation and willingness to enhance this.

AMD representatives highlighted the fact that South African companies are willing to work with Egyptian companies and praised the Egyptian side for encouraging foreign companies to invest in Egyptian projects.

South African interest could be seen in the participation by South African companies in the first EDEX defence exhibition in Cairo in December 2018, with AMD encouraging other companies to take part in the next edition in 2020.

“The two sides agreed to form working groups to study the tracks that will be agreed upon to develop future partnership and cooperation,” Egyptian media reported.

SAAMDEC CEO Sandile Ndlovu, speaking at the end of the weeklong outward trade and investment mission in Egypt, said the North African country is a big market for the South African defence industry as it spends over $4 billion on arms a year.

He said the first step to entering the Egyptian defence market is to formally introduce the South African defence industry to the market and acknowledge the efforts of individual companies that have been interacting already. Secondly, areas of cooperation in the defence space need to be identified.

“Our first interactions with the Egyptian private sector occurred during a defence exhibition that was held in Egypt last year [EDEX 2018]. We interacted again this time around and have found that there is a lot of interest to cooperate with us, specifically on the promotion and marketing of our products in the private sector.

“What we have agreed on doing between ourselves and the Egyptian defence authorities is to streamline discussions by identifying specific areas where we could cooperate.

“In the meantime, because Egypt has such a huge buying capacity, they have also made an undertaking that they would forward more inquiries of their requirements to South Africa.

“Over and above the co-producing and co-developing, we will begin to assist the Egyptians with their defence requirements in areas where South Africa has solutions,” said Ndlovu.

South African companies that have already participated in the Egyptian defence market include Rheinmetall Denel Munition (RDM), which commissioned a Universal Filling Plant for Egypt in 2017.

This has the capability to fill a variety of munition products, including medium and large calibre ammunition through to aircraft bombs. It was established over a four year period.

Denel Dynamics, meanwhile, is looking to sell Egypt up to 96 Umkhonto-R surface-to-air missiles in a potential R4.5 billion deal. These would equip the Egyptian Navy’s new ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) Meko A200 frigates. Denel is also hoping to sell 32 infrared-guided versions of its Umkhonto missile to Egypt, according to a Mail & Guardian report.

In early September, in presentation to Parliament, Denel said its “largest export contract” was “imminent” with an advance payment of R1.5 billion. The presentation said the contract would boost Denel’s production portfolio and cover equipment fit for TKMS vessels for the Egyptian Navy.

Elsewhere, South African engineers from SAKSA Technologies developed the ST-100 and ST-500 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) for Egypt’s International Marathon United Technology Group (IMUT), which were unveiled in 2018 and are in production for the Egyptian military.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, South Africa supplied 14 Mamba APCs to Egypt in 2014.

This article was published by defenceWeb on December 9, 2019.

The featured photo shows an Egyptian Crotale missile. This weapon was originally developed in South Africa.

 

Type Commander’s Amphibious Training (TCAT) 20-1

12/11/2019

U.S. Marines with 2nd Transportation Support Battalion, Combat Logistics Regiment 2, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, work with Sailors from Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) 69 and 53, assigned to Assault Craft Unit 4, to load equipment on to the LCAC during Type Commander’s Amphibious Training (TCAT) 20-1 at Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, Oct. 25, 2019.

The purpose of TCAT is to increase naval integration and preparation for real-world contingency operations.

CAMP LEJEUNE, NC, UNITED STATES

10.25.2019

Video by Lance Cpl. Fatima Villatoro

2nd Marine Logistics Group

International Fighter Conference, 2018 and 2019: Fighters in the New Strategic Context

12/10/2019

It’s clear that combat capabilities and operations are being recrafted across the globe and, as operational contexts change, the evolution of the role of fighters is at the center of that shift.

The 2018 International Fighter Conference held in Berlin provided a chance to focus on the role of fighters in the strategic shift from land wars to higher intensity operations.

The baseline assumption for the conference can be simply put: air superiority can no longer be assumed, and needs to be created in contested environments.

Competitors like China and Russia are putting significant effort into shaping concepts of operations and modernizing force structures which will allow them to challenge the ability of liberal democracies to establish air superiority and to dominate future crises.

There was a clear consensus on this point, but, of course, working the specifics of defeating such an adversary brings in broader concepts of force design and operations.

While the air forces of liberal democracies all face the common threat of operating in contested airspace, the preferred solutions vary greatly from one nation to another, so the conference worked from that common assumption rather than focusing on specific solutions.

Among some of the key questions addressed during IFC 2018 were the foillowing:

Where is sensor fusion done?

Where will decisions be taken?

Who will deliver them?

How will different air forces connect in distributed operations in contested airspace?

With what systems and means?

As multi-domain operations (the ability to deliver effects throughout the entire combat force with fighters playing various roles, C2, ISR, strike) come to dominate, will platforms be designed to enhance overall capabilities of the combat force?

Put another way, how will legacy aircraft evolve to the challenge of dealing with contested airspace while also contributing to multi-domain operations that is becoming a primary driver of change for the air combat force?

International Fighter Conference 2019 picked up from the discussion last year, to focus notably on the second and third questions: how will fighters evolve within the air combat force to deliver multi-domain effects in a contested environment?

The conference focused on the role of fighters within the evolution of networked lethality.

The key point is that fighters are not what they once were.

They are now key players in multi-mission and multi-domain operations.

Some of the themes which clearly emerged from the conference, include but are not limited to the following:

What progress has the Future Combat Air System program of the French, Germans and, now the Spanish made in the past year?

How the manned-unmanned teaming part of FCAS could enter the market in the next decade?

How convergent are the projected French Rafale and the German Eurofighter modernization programs? Is it more a case of parallel efforts or cross cutting ones?

How has the coming of the F-35 affected rethinking about air combat operations? How to better connect fifth generation concepts and thinking with the overall dynamics of change in what I call the shaping of an integrated distributed force?

How are countries directly threatened by the 21st century authoritarian powers addressing the role of air power in their self-defense?

How best to train a multi-domain fighter pilot?

How does the telescoping of generations of fighter aircraft shape the “next” generation fighter?

How to best address the challenge of affordable capability, remembering Secretary Wynne’s core point: You don’t win anything being the second-best air force?

Is the combat cloud the best way to think about the new C2/ISR infrastructure which is being crafted, created and shaped for the advanced air forces?

In short, the fighter conference is a place to be for those who are thinking about the evolution of the multi-domain combat environment and how best to prepare those flying fighters to prevail in that environment.

For the International Fighter Conference 2018, see the following:

International-Fighter-Conference-2018

For the International Fighter Conference 2019, see the following:

International Fighter Conference 2019: Special Report

 

 

 

The Upward Trend of Global Arms Sales 2018

By defenceWeb

Sales of arms and military services by the sector’s largest 100 companies (excluding those in China) were up by 4.6% in 2018 compared to the previous year, totalling $420 billion, according to a new report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The new data from SIPRI’s Arms Industry Database shows that sales of arms and military services by companies listed in the Top 100 have increased by 47 per cent since 2002 (the year from which comparable data is first available). The database excludes Chinese companies due to the lack of data to make a reliable estimate, SIPRI said on Monday.

For the first time since 2002, the top five spots in the ranking are held exclusively by arms companies based in the United States: Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and General Dynamics. These five companies alone accounted for $148 billion and 35% of total Top 100 arms sales in 2018. Total arms sales of US companies in the ranking amounted to $246 billion, equivalent to 59% of all arms sales by the Top 100. This is an increase of 7.2% compared with 2017, according to SIPRI data.

A key development in the US arms industry in 2018 was the growing trend in consolidations among some of the largest arms producers. For example, two of the top five, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics, made multibillion-dollar acquisitions in 2018.

“US companies are preparing for the new arms modernization programme that was announced in 2017 by President Trump,” said Aude Fleurant, Director of SIPRI’s Arms and Military Expenditure Programme. “Large US companies are merging to be able to produce the new generation of weapon systems and therefore be in a better position to win contracts from the US Government.”

The combined arms sales of the ten Russian companies in the 2018 ranking were $36.2 billion—a marginal decrease of 0.4% on 2017. Their share of total Top 100 arms sales fell from 9.7% in 2017 to 8.6% in 2018. This can be explained by the higher Top 100 total in 2018 due to the substantial growth in the combined arms sales of US and European companies.

Among the 10 Russian companies listed in the Top 100, the trends are mixed: five companies recorded an increase in arms sales, while the other five showed a decrease. Russia’s largest arms producer, Almaz-Antey, was the only Russian company ranked in the top 10 (at 9th position) and accounted for 27% of the total arms sales of Russian companies in the Top 100. Almaz-Antey’s arms sales rose by 18% in 2018, to $9.6 billion.

The combined arms sales of the 27 European companies in the Top 100 increased marginally in 2018, to $102 billion. Arms sales by companies based in the UK fell by 4.8%, to $35.1 billion, but remained the highest in Europe. BAE Systems (ranked 6th) is the world’s largest arms producer outside of the USA. Its arms sales dropped by 5.2% in 2018, to $21.2 billion.

The combined arms sales of French companies in the Top 100 were the second highest in Europe, at $23.2 billion. “The overall growth in arms sales of the six French companies in the SIPRI Top 100 was mainly the result of a 30% increase in sales by combat aircraft producer Dassault Aviation,” said Diego Lopes da Silva, Researcher for SIPRI’s Arms and Military Expenditure Programme.

The total combined sales of the four German arms-producing companies in the ranking fell by 3.8%. “An increase in deliveries of military vehicles by Rheinmetall, the largest arms company based in Germany, were offset by a drop in sales by shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp,” said Pieter D. Wezeman, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Arms and Military Expenditure Programme.

Eighty of the 100 top arms producers in 2018 were based in the USA, Europe and Russia. Of the remaining 20, six were based in Japan, three in Israel, India and South Korea, respectively, two in Turkey and one each in Australia, Canada and Singapore.

The combined arms sales of the six Japanese companies remained relatively stable in 2018. At $9.9 billion, they accounted for 2.4% of the Top 100 total.

The three Israeli companies’ arms sales of $8.7 billion accounted for 2.1% of the Top 100 total. Elbit Systems, Israel Aerospace Industries and Rafael all increased their arms sales in 2018.

The combined arms sales of the three Indian arms companies listed in the Top 100 were $5.9 billion in 2018—a decrease of 6.9% on 2017. The decline is mainly a result of Indian Ordnance Factory’s significant 27% drop in arms sales.

The three companies based in South Korea had combined arms sales of $5.2 billion in 2018, equivalent to 1.2% of the Top 100 total. Their collective arms sales in 2018 were 9.9% higher than in 2017. Bucking the trend, however, was LIG Nex1, whose sales fell by 17% in 2018. The shipbuilder DSME, which was ranked in 2017, dropped out of the Top 100 in 2018.

Arms sales by Turkish companies listed in the Top 100 increased by 22% in 2018, to $2.8 billion. Turkey aims to develop and modernize its arms industry and Turkish companies continued to benefit from these efforts in 2018.

This article was published by defenceWeb on December 9, 2019.

The featured photo shows Ex-US RG33s heading to Egypt.

 

 

President Macron’s Economist Interview: Reactions and Implications

12/09/2019

In the United States, we have tweeting Trump and the impeaching House of Representatives; in Europe they have Macronite.

We have had and continue to have a significant deluge of comments on President Trump and his approach to foreign policy with little that has a positive tinge to it; but what about Macronite?

How positive or significant is this for shaping the second creation of the West?

The first creation was lead by the United States after World War II with the laying down of the rules based order; the Post-Cold War period was more or less acting on the belief that the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed those rules of the game to be extended East.

But in fact, little noticed was the rise of 21st century authoritarian capitalist powers who were key anchors of globalization and have woven themselves into the fabric of the liberal democratic societies.

With the 21st century authoritarian powers working to write the rules of the game going forward rather than reinforcing the rules based order, what should and can the Western liberal democracies do?

In his recent interview with The Economist,the President of the Republic provided his answer and having done so, he deserves a serious examination of whether or not that resets the effort in a manner that can lead the way ahead.

He certainly has provided a wide-ranging analysis of the current situation; but does the Macronite approach going forward provide a realistic way ahead to deal with the current crises?

For a report looking at the Macron in interview and some of the issues raised by the President in his wide-ranging interview, see the following:

President Macron

For an e-book version of the report, see the following:

 

Robotic Systems

Two autonomous Australian Army M113 AS4 armoured vehicles conducted fire and manoeuvre training demonstrations alongside crewed vehicles, UAS and ground robots to Department of Defence senior leadership at the Majura Training Area, ACT, on Thursday 31 October 2019.

The demonstration showcased the potential for robotic and autonomous systems to enhance Army’s capabilities on operations.

Australian Department of Defence

November 1, 2019

Remembering Finnish Independence Day: December 6

12/08/2019

We want to remember our Finnish allies and their day of independence.

And that allows a chance to remember that most remarkable of Finns, C.G.E. Mannerheim.

In an article by Timo Vihavainen, a Finnish historian and professor emeritus of Russian Studies at the University of Helsinki, first published in February 2005, updated June 2017, the career of Mannerheim was reviewed.

C.G.E. Mannerheim (1867–1951) charted the course of Finnish history and was voted greatest Finn of all time.

He served in the Russian Imperial Army for decades, and later became a war hero in his home country of Finland. He was the symbol of the Finnish struggle against Soviet Russia during the Winter War of 1939–1940. He was hailed as a champion of liberty throughout the Western world during those 105 days of stubborn resistance against a vastly superior enemy.

This was not the first time that the stately representative of Finland’s Swedish-speaking aristocracy had been supreme commander in a war against Russia.

The War of Liberation in 1918 – later also called the Civil War – had been fought against Soviet Russia and against its allies, the Finnish “Reds.” And the Winter War was not the last war Mannerheim fought against Russia, either.

The period of combat known as the Continuation War, 1941 to 1944, during which German forces fought alongside the Finnish army, exacted a much heavier toll on Finland and Russia than the Winter War had.

Moreover, during the Continuation War, Finnish forces even advanced into Russian territory with the intention of annexing Eastern Karelia, a region which had never belonged to Finland.

Admittedly, Finnish policy towards the Russians and Finland’s methods of warfare substantially differed from those of the Germans. Finland declined to launch a ground attack or a bombing attack on Leningrad, despite German pressure to do so.

Mannerheim spent no less than 30 years in Russia, mostly in Saint Petersburg, serving in the Russian Imperial Army.

During this period he not only reached the rank of lieutenant general and was appointed commander of the Cavalry Corps of the Imperial Army, he was also known personally to the emperor and became a member of his suit

Mannerheim’s record as a soldier was impressive. He fought for Russia on the battle front in both the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 and in the First World War between 1914 and 1917. General Mannerheim was decorated with the St George’s Cross for gallantry and was famous for his military skill and efficacy.

Mannerheim was also an able sportsman whose horsemanship won prizes. This was evidently one of the reasons why he was chosen for the formidable task of undertaking a reconnaissance mission, on horseback through Asia, that lasted two years.

You could add courteous manners to the list of Mannerheim’s merits. This contributed to the progress of the young cavalry officer in high society and at the imperial court itself.

A non-Russian officer in the Imperial Army was no rarity. In fact, there were thousands of them. Many of these inorodtsy or “non-orthodox” subjects of the emperor serving in the Russian army came from the Baltic provinces, spoke German as their mother tongue and were Lutheran by religion, as was Mannerheim.

However, Mannerheim’s background differed from that of his Baltic brother officers. He came from the Grand Duchy of Finland, which sent more than 4,000 officers to serve in the Russian army between 1809 and 1917. Almost 400 of them reached the rank of general or admiral.

Most of the officers from Finland spoke Swedish as their mother tongue, Finnish being used mainly as a second language, if they knew it at all. Mannerheim’s Finnish before 1917 was far from fluent.

However, in common with the Baltic German officers, the Finnish officers served the emperor impeccably. In fact, there are no records of disloyalty among the Finns, even during the period from 1899 to 1917 when Russia began to pressure Finland by undermining its juridical status. In lieu of disloyalty, some of the officers chose to retire from active service.

Mannerheim did not retire. He remained a faithful soldier even though he privately deplored the emperor’s policies, which he regarded as unwise. Even when his own brother was exiled to Sweden, Mannerheim’s loyalty to the emperor remained unshaken. His relatives understood his position.

It was only when the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 crushed the old order that Mannerheim realised his ties of loyalty to Russia had been cut. After the revolution he became a champion of the White Finnish cause.

His loyalty towards his native land was now total and he always respected its democratic institutions even though he was hardly a true democrat by conviction.

Mannerheim’s career in the service of two states is an intriguing story that excites curiosity. To Russians, Mannerheim is above all the cultivated young officer of the Chevalier Guards who stood by Nicholas II during coronation procession.

In Finnish eyes Mannerheim stands tall as the elderly marshal, a man of honour and a fatherly figure whose moral integrity and intelligence could always be trusted

And in an article we published last year prior to the Trump/Putin meeting in Helsinki, we looked back at Finnish history and what lessons these two leaders might take away from that history.

Presidents Putin and Trump will meet soon in Helsinki.  At a time of uncertainty in the US-Russia relationship, the meeting is an important step forward in clarifying that relationship, one that should be not reduced to a Trump tweet or a Putin chess move.

Where it is being held is significant. Helsinki was part of the Russian empire for a century. It is now a century since the Finns have been independent, but always in the context of East-West realities. During the Cold War, “Finlandization” became a term of art for how smaller country could retain its independence on internal matters by bowing to a larger neighbor on international affairs.

Finland become independent as a result of World War I and the Russian revolution. If one visits Helsinki, the similarities to Saint Petersburg — just five hours away by car (or tank) — are obvious. And in the wake of the Russian revolution, Finland had its own civil war, its own clash of “Whites” against the “Reds,” with legendary Finnish leader Carl Mannerheimcommanding the German-backed Whites.

After withdrawing from Finnish politics, General Mannerheim would return to lead the fight in the famous “Winter War” against the invading Russians, who poured in more forces than the Western allies later did on D-Day. Amazingly, the Finns not only resisted but destroyed the initial forces which invaded Finland.  As the Western Alliance would fail to stop the Nazis, however, they would fail Finland as well.

And when the Nazis took Western Europe, including Norway, the Finns bowed to realpolitik and worked with them to do a dangerous dance with them to keep the Russians at bay.  What Finns call the Continuation War followed the Winter War, and the core ally of Finland in the Continuation War was Nazi Germany.

But the American leaders, working behind the scenes with Mannerheim and the Finnish leadership, de facto cut a deal with the Finns to not attack the supply lines coming through the North into Russia.  While the UK declared war on Finland, the US did not.  This was an enlightened move which provided flexibility for both the United States and Finland going forward.

The letter which Mannerheim sent to Adolf Hitler when leaving the war in fall 1944 highlights a core principle important to Finns and to any nation worthy of calling itself a nation – emphasized the absolute imperative to preserve the Finnish people and the Finnish nation. It read in part:

“In this hour of hard decisions, I’m impelled to inform you that I’ve arrived at the conviction that the salvation of my nation makes it my duty to find a means of ending the war…

“The Russian’s great assaults in June exhausted our reserves. We cannot expose ourselves to another such bloodletting without the whole future of the small Finnish nation being jeopardized.

“I wish specially to emphasize that Germany will live on even if fate should not crown your arms with victory. Nobody could give such assurance regarding Finland. If that nation of barely four million were militarily defeated, there can be little doubt that will be driven into exile or exterminated. I cannot expose my people to such a fate.”

It is clear that the Finns have not forgotten their history and are seeking today to protect themselves against the Russian actions in Europe.  To do so, they are pursuing a strong relationship with Europe through the European Union, which it joined in 1995, adopting the common currency in 1999; enhanced regional cooperation with their Nordic neighbors, as we’ve covered in depth before; increased cooperation with NATO, contributing to operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan; and strong relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom, even as both countries faced significant domestic change.

What might President Putin learn from the Finns?

Above all, stop threatening the Baltic States for all that does is drive the Finns and the Nordics into a closer relationship both with each other and with NATO.  The Russians complain about Finnish and Nordic action, but they have only themselves to thank.

President Putin might stand in front of the famous statue to Alexander II in the center of Helsinki and remember the Finns erected it, not simply to remember an important reformer, but to protest the reactionary policies of his successor Alexander III.  The Russians cast a long shadow, and Putin may be trying to make Russia Great Again through old-fashioned hardball tactics, but it is at the expense of fundamental interests which could be better served by Russian reform and reworking his relationship with the West.

For his part, President Trump might reflect on his meeting with the Finnish President when he butchered his name, while the Finns did not care in their happiness that that their President met the US President.  He might learn from the Finns that European security is not simply Germany and defense spending percentages; it is about the professional working relationship among the militaries and how Western solidarity has been built despite political differences.  He might learn as well that for smaller countries, organizations like the European Union play an important role alongside NATO.

As the Finns consider how to augment their defense capabilities, it is important for President Trump to consider how a smaller nation looks at their strategic position. He would do well to learn from the subtler approach followed by Secretary Hall and President Roosevelt during World War II.

As I stood in front of the Finnish defense ministry this past February, I know what I learned looking at the very powerful statue honoring the Finnish people for their resistance to Stalin and his dictatorship: The Finns love their nation and will risk their lives to defend it. Both Putin and Trump need to remember that.

This article was published by Breaking Defense on July 11, 2018.