By Robbin Laird

The strategic shift from the land wars of the past two decades to preparing for the high-end fight is having a significant effect on the dynamics of change affecting the very nature of the C2 and ISR needed for operations in the contested battlespace.

An ability to prevail in full spectrum crisis management is highlighting the shift to distributed operations but in such a way that the force is integrateable to achieve the mass necessary to prevail across the spectrum of operations.

Much like the character of C2 and ISR is changing significantly, training is also seeing fundamental shifts as well. 

For the US Navy, training has always been important, and what is occurring in the wake of the changes in the national security strategy might appear to be a replication of what has gone down for the past twenty years; but it is not.

In fact, it is challenging to describe the nature of the shift with regard to training.

Much like the shifts in C2 and ISR which I have discussed with the Navy’s Air Boss in a recent interview, the shifts in training are equally significant.

Indeed, when I visited San Diego last Fall, I had a chance to talk with Vice Admiral Miller about how one might conceptualize the nature of the shift in training for the US Navy.

In that article, the discussion highlighted a number of the changes underway but the target goal was highlighted by the Air Boss as follows: Training is now about shaping domain knowledge for the operational force to ensure that “we can be as good as we can be all of the time.”

With the focus on ensuring the capability of the distributed fleet to deliver the desired effects throughout the spectrum of conflict and crisis management, the goal is for the sailors, operators and leaders of the combat force to have the most appropriate skill sets available for the 21^stcentury fight.

And with the introduction of new technologies into the fleet, ranging from the new capabilities being provided for the integrateable air wing, to the expanded capabilities of the surface fleet with the weapons revolution and the evolution of the maritime remote extenders, to the return to a priority role for ASW with the submarine fleet and the maritime reconnaissance assets working together to deliver enhanced capabilities to deter and to defeat adversarial subsurface assets, the dynamics of training change as well.

For example, with software upgradeable aircraft, the capabilities of the aviation assets you operated with on your last tour are likely to not be the same as you will deploy with in your next tour.

In a visit to Norfolk last Fall, Rear Admiral Peter Garvin, Commander of the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Group (MPRF), we discussed how he saw the training challenge evolving.

There is an obvious return to the anti-submarine mission by the U.S. and allied navies with the growing capabilities of the 21st century authoritarian powers. However, as adversary submarines evolve, and their impact on warfare becomes even more pronounced, ASW can no longer be considered as a narrow warfighting specialty.

This is reflected in Rear Admiral Garvin’s virtuous circle with regard to what he expects from his command, namely, professionalism, agility and lethality. The professionalism which defines and underpins the force is, in part, about driving the force in new innovative directions.  To think and operate differently in the face of an evolving threat. Operational and tactical agility is critical to ensure that the force can deliver the significant combat effect expected from a 21st century maritime reconnaissance and strike force. 

Finally, it is necessary but insufficient to be able to find and fix an adversary. The ability to finish must be realized lest we resign ourselves to be mere observers of a problem.

And it is not simply about organic capabilities on your platform.  The P-3 flew alone and unafraid; the dyad is flying as part of a wider networked enterprise, and one which can be tailored to a threat, or an area of interest, and can operate as a combat cloud empowering a tailored force designed to achieve the desired combat effects.

The information generated by the ‘Family of Systems’ can be used with the gray zone forces such as the USCG cutters or the new Australian Offshore Patrol Vessels. The P-8/Triton dyad is a key enabler of full spectrum crisis management operations, which require the kind of force transformation which the P-8/Triton is a key part of delivering the U.S. and core allies.

How do you train your P-8 team to be to work with the gray zone assets to deliver the kind of crisis management effect you want and need?

Clearly, the training mission is evolving to prepare for the high-end fight, and indeed, preparing to operate across the spectrum of crisis management.

But how best to describe the kind of evolution training for the fleet is undergoing?

To continue further throughout on how best to do so, I had the chance  to visit Norfolk this month to discuss the focus and the challenges with three  admirals who are key players in shaping a way ahead.

My host was Rear Admiral Peter Garvin, and he invited two other admirals as well to the discussion.

The first Rear Admiral John F. Meier, head of the Navy Warfare Development Command, with whom Ed Timperlake and I had met with when he was the CO of the USS Gerald R. Ford.

The second was Rear Admiral Dan Cheever, Commander, Carrier Strike Group FOUR.

The day before Ed and I met with Rear Admiral Gregory Harris, the head of N-98, who introduced into our discussion a key hook into my discussions with the three admirals in Norfolk.

We were discussing the evolving role of Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center at Fallon and the Admiral referred to Carrier Strike Group FOUR as a “mini” Fallon, which was, of course, suggestive of the dynamics of change within training.

We had a wide-ranging discussion about a number of issues, but I will focus here on our discussion about the dynamics of change revolved around the training concept or construct. 

What I will identify are my take-aways from the conversation, which I am not going to attribute to any one admiral, or even suggest that there was a consensus on the points I will identify.

What I am providing are key takeaways from my perspective of how the Navy is addressing the dynamics of training for the high end fight or in my terms, operating across the full spectrum of crisis management.

For me, the ability to operate across the full spectrum of crisis management highlights the central contribution which the Navy-Marine Corps team delivers to the nation.

Operating from global sea-bases, with an ability to deliver a variety of lethal and non-lethal effects, from the insertion of Marines, to delivering strategic strike, from my perspective, in the era we have entered, the capabilities which the Navy-Marine Corps teams, indeed all of the sea services, including the Military Sealift Command and the US Coast Guard, provide essential capabilities for the direct defense of the nation.

One key challenge facing training is the nature of the 21^stcentury authoritarian powers. 

How will they fight?

How will their evolving technologies fit into their evolving concepts of operations?

What will most effective deter or provide for escalation control against them?

There is no simple way to know this.

When I spent my time in the US government and in government think tanks, I did a great deal of work on thinking through how Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces might fight.

That was difficult enough, but now with the Chinese, Russians, and Iranians to mention three authoritarian regimes, it is a challenge to know how they will operate and how to train to deter, dissuade, or defeat them.

A second challenge is our own capabilities.

How will we perform in such engagements?

We can train to what we have in our combat inventory, we can seek to better integrate across joint and coalition forces, but what will prove to be the most decisive effect we can deliver against an adversary?

This means that those leading the training effort have to think through the scope of what the adversary can do and we can do, and to shape the targets of an evolving training approach.

And to do so within the context of dynamically changing technology, both in terms of new platforms, but the upgrading of those platforms, notably as software upgradeability becomes the norm across the force.

The aviation elements of the Marine Corps-Navy team clearly have been in advance of the surface fleet in terms of embracing software upgradeability, but this strategic shift is underway there as well.

The Admirals all emphasized the importance of the learning curve from operations informing training commands, and the training commands enabling more effective next cycle operations.

In this sense training, was not simply replicating skill sets but combat learning reshaping skill sets as well.

Clearly, the Admirals underscored that there was a sense of urgency about the training effort understood in these terms, and no sense of complacency whatsoever about the nature of the challenges the Navy faced in getting it right to deal with the various contingencies of the 21^stcentury fight.

The Navy has laid a solid foundation for working a way ahead and that is based on the forging of an effort to enhance the synergy and cross linkages among the various training commands to work to draw upon each community’s capabilities more effectively.

Specifically, NAWDC (Naval Air Warfare Development Center), SMWDC (Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center), UWDC (Undersea Warfare Development Center), NIWDC (Naval Information Warfare Development Center) and exercise and training commands, notably Carrier Strike Groups FOUR and FIFTEEN, are closely aligned and working through integrated operational approaches and capabilities.

When we visited Fallon in the past, we have seen the evolution not just in terms of naval integration (with surface warfare officers at Fallon) but the working relationships with Nellis (USAF) and MAWTS-1 (USMC).

And given the evolution of the USMC, the Navy teams with Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), Marine Air Ground Task Force Training Command (MAGTAFTC), and Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTGs) in order to train the Navy and Marine Corps Team, notably with regard to the activities of CSG-4/15 for exercises.

Naval Warfare Development center is at the heart of Navy training for their all domain focus and efforts. NWDC isthe key Warfare Development Center which bridges the tactical to the operational and even the strategic level.

The synergy across the training enterprise is at the heart of being able to deliver the integrated distributed force as a core warfighting capability to deal with evolving 21^stcentury threats.

There are a number of key drivers of change as well which we discussed.

One key driver is the evolution of technology to allow for better capabilities to make decisions at the tactical edge.

A second is the challenge of speed, or the need to operate effectively in a combat environment in which combat speed is a key aspect, as opposed to slo mo war evidenced in the land wars.

How to shape con-ops that master C2 at the tactical edge, and rapid decision making in a fluid but high-speed combat environment?

In a way, what we were discussing is a shift from training preparing for the next fight with relatively high confidence that the next one was symmetric with what we know to be a shift to proactive training.

How to shape the skill sets for the fight which is evolving in terms of technologies and concepts of operations for both Red and Blue?

In short, the Navy is in the throes of dealing with changes in the strategic environment and the evolving capabilities which the Navy-Marine Corps team can deploy in that environment.

And to do so requires opening the aperture on the combat learning available to the fleet through its training efforts.

The featured photo shows the Ohio-class fleet guided-missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN 728) transits the Mediterranean Sea, Aug. 27, 2019. Florida, the third of four SSGN platforms, is capable of conducting clandestine strike operations, joint special operation forces operations, battle space preparation and information operations, SSGN/SSN consort operations, carrier and expeditionary strike group operations, battle management and experimentation of future submarine payloads. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jonathan Nelson/Released).

This platform illustrates the opportunity and challenge for US Navy training: how to leverage the wide range of capabilities which this platform can deliver to the force. How to provide its capabilities to the integrated distributed force?

Training across the Navy and the joint force is required to do so.

U.S. Navy Biographies - REAR ADMIRAL DANIEL L. CHEEVER
U.S. Navy Biographies - REAR ADMIRAL JOHN F. OSCAR MEIER
U.S. Navy Biographies - REAR ADMIRAL PETER A. GARVIN

By Robbin Laird

The US Navy over the next decade will reshape its carrier air wing (CVW) with the introduction of a number of new platforms.

If one simply lists the initial operating capabilities of each of these new platforms, and looked at their introduction sequentially, the “air wing of the future” would be viewed in additive terms – what has been added and what has been subtracted and the sum of these activities would be the carrier air wing of the future.

But such a graphic and such an optic would miss the underlying transformation under way, one which is highly interactive with the USMC and the USAF.

A case in point is the coming of the F-35C to the carrier wing.

One could discuss the difference between 4^th and 5^thgeneration aircraft, and the importance of the fifth-generation aircraft, already operating from amphib decks with the USMC, but it is much more than that.

Such a focus would be limited to what I have called F-35 1.0, namely, simply bringing the aircraft to the force and sorting through how to support it.

But the US Navy is focused directly on F-35 2.0 which is how to leverage the aircraft to transform the combat force into the integrated distributed force.

The coming of the F-35 is a trigger point for a significant remake of the CVW.

The entire process is rethinking the building, operations, transformation, and interaction of the F-35 (and not just operating from the carrier but working with other F-35s in the joint and allied forces) with the core Naval combat force to be able to generate concentrated combat power at the point of interest needed in a crisis.

One clearly needs a different optic or perspective than simply taking an additive approach.

And the graphic above highlights a way to think about the process of transformation for the carrier air wing over the next decade.

What is underway is a shift from integrating the air wing around relatively modest and sequential modernization efforts for the core platforms to a robust transformation process in which new assets enter the force and create a swirl of transformation opportunities, challenges, and pressures.

How might we take this new asset and expand the reach and effectiveness of the carrier strike group?

How might it empower maritime, air, and ground forces as we shape a more effective (i.e. a more integratable) force?

During a recent visit to San Diego, I had a chance to discuss such an evolving perspective with the Navy’s Air Boss, Vice Admiral “Bullet” Miller.

We started by discussing the F-35 which for him is a major forcing function change in the CVW.

But his focus is clearly upon not simply introducing the aircraft into the force but ensuring that it is part of the launch of a transformative process for shaping the evolving air wing or what I call F-35 2.0.

The F-35 is coming to the force after a significant investment and work by the US Navy to rebuild its operational capabilities after several years of significant sustainment challenges.

But now the Air Boss is looking to focus his attention on enhanced combat lethality which the fleet can deliver to the maritime services and the joint force.

What is being set in motion is a new approach where each new platform which comes into the force might be considered at the center of a cluster of changes.

The change is not just about integrating a new platform in the flight ops of the carrier.

The change is also about how the new platform affects what one can do with adjacent assets in the CSG or how to integrate with adjacent U.S. or allied combat platforms, forces, and capabilities.

To give an example, the U.S. Navy is replacing the C-2 with the CMV-22 in the resupply role.

But the Navy would be foolish to simply think in terms of strictly C-2 replacement lines and missions.

So how should the Navy operate, modernize, and leverage its Ospreys?

For Miller, the initial task is to get the Osprey onboard the carrier and integrated with CVW operations.

But while doing so, it is important to focus on how the Osprey working within the CVW can provide a more integrated force.

Vice Admiral Miller and his team are looking for the first five-year period in operating the CMV-22 for the Navy to think through the role of the Osprey as a transformative force, rather than simply being a new asset onboard a carrier.

Hence, one can look at the CMV-22 innovation cluster in the following manner:

Such an approach is embedded in the rethink from operating and training an integrated air wing to an integratable air wing.

Vice Admiral Miller provided several other examples of how this shift affects the thinking about new platforms coming onboard the carrier deck.

One such example is the new unmanned tanker, the MQ-25.

The introduction of this new air asset will have an immediate effect in freeing up 4^th gen fighters, currently being used for tanking, to return to their strike role.

Even more importantly from a transformation perspective, the MQ-25 will have operational effects as a platform which will extend the reach and range of the CVW.

But MQ-25 will be a stakeholder in the evolving C2/ISR capabilities empowering the entire combat force, part of what, in my view, is really 6^th generation capabilities, namely enhancing the power to distribute and integrate a force as well as to operate more effectively at the tactical edge.

The MQ-25 will entail changes to the legacy air fleet, changes in the con-ops of the entire CVW, and trigger further changes with regard to how the C2/ISR dynamic shapes the evolution of the CVW and the joint force.

The systems to be put onto the MQ-25 will be driven by overall changes in the C2/ISR force.

These changes are driving significant improvements in size, capability, and integration, so much so that it is the nascent 6^th gen.

This means that the USN can buy into “6^thgen” by making sure that the MQ-25 can leverage the sensor fusion and CNI systems on the F-35 operating as an integrated force with significant outreach.

It is important to realize that a four ship formation of an F-35 operating as an integrated man-machine based sensor fusion aircraft is can operate together as a four ship pack fully integrated through the CNI system, and as such can provide a significant driver of change to the overall combat force.

This affects not only the future of training, but how operations, training, and development affect individual platforms once integrated into the CVW and larger joint force.

This will have a significant impact on Naval Air Warfare Development Center (NAWDC) based at Fallon. 

A key piece in shaping the integratable air wing is building out a new training capability at Fallon and a new set of working relationships with other U.S. and allied training centers.

Later this year, we will visit Fallon and provide more details on the evolving approach.

The head of Fallon, Rear Admiral Richard Brophy, joined the conversation with the Air Boss, and clearly underscored the challenge: “How do we best train the most lethal integrated air wing preparing to deploy, but at same time, prepare for the significant changes which introducing new platforms and concepts of operations can bring to the force?

As the Air Boss put it: “We need to properly train the integratable airwing and we are investing in expanded ranges and new approaches such as Live Virtual Constructive training.

“I often use the quote that ‘your performance in combat never raises to the level of your expectations but rather it falls to the level of your training.’

“This is why the training piece is so central to the development for the way ahead for the integrable training.

“It is not just about learning what we have done; but it is working the path to what we can do.”

Consider the template of training for CVW Integration.

On the one hand, the CVW trained at Fallon needs to prepare to go out into the fleet and deliver the capabilities that are available for today’s fight.

On the other hand, as this template is executed, it is important to shape an evolving vision on how to operate platforms coming to the fleet or how those assets have already been modified by software upgrades.

A software upgradeable fleet, which is at the heart of the 5th gen transition and which lays down the foundation for 6th generation c2/ISR provides a key challenge.

The F-35 which operated from the last carrier cycle, or flew with the P-8 or Triton, all of these assets might well have new capabilities delivered by the software development cycle.

How to make certain that not just the air wing, but the commanders at sea fully understand what has changed. 

The challenge is to shape the template for training today’s fleet; and to ensure that the template being shaped has an open aperture to handle the evolution of the CVW into the evolving integrated and distributed force.

Two measures of the change in the shift from the integrated to the integratable CVW which we discussed are the question of how to measure the readiness of a fifth-generation aircraft and the second is the creation of a new patch in Fallon, which builds upon the lessons learned during the early TOPGUN days.

The first is that aircraft readiness is a key measure of combat preparedness.

Rates of aircraft availability for a combat aircraft, can it fly or not is a baseline indicator of combat availability.

But for VADM Miller, the F-35 needs to be measured by a different standard given its key role in enabling an integratabtle CVW, namely full mission capability.

Can the aircraft fly with its full mission capability today?

This expectation reflects the F-35’s role as a flying combat system, mission manager, and sensor fusion generator for the air wing and strike group.

The second is the creation of the Maritime ISR or MISR patch.

MISR officers are trained as ISR subject matter experts to operate at the fleet or CSG level and to work the sensor fusion for the integratable CVW.

According to the Air Boss: “I think of MISR as additive, not lessening of TOPGUN, but instead akin to a new phase which builds upon our historical experience in the development of TOPGUN in the first place.”

In effect, these are “6^th generation officers” in the sense of working the C2/ISR capabilities which enable an integrated and distributed fleet to have its maximum combat impact.

In short, the fleet is in the throes of significant transition.

The emergence and forcing function of an integrated CVW is at the heart of the transition.

And the emergence of a new patch at NAWDC certainly highlights the change.

Air to air combat skills remain important but now with your wingman miles away in a fifth generation aircraft context, or Aegis operating as your wingman, the C2/ISR revolution is highlighting the evolving capabilities of integration for combat dominance.¹

The featured photo shows Vice Adm. DeWolfe H. Miller III, Commander, Naval Air Forces, speaking at the Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing (COMVRMWING) 1 establishing ceremony on board Naval Air Station North Island (NASNI) Oct. 10. The Navy established its first CMV-22B Osprey squadron (VRM-30) Dec. 14,

Also see the earlier interview with Vice Admiral Miller:

In the Footsteps of Admiral Nimitz: VADM Miller and His Team Focused on 21st Century “Training”

And below is my briefing given at BIDEC 19 in Bahrain this past November on the emergence of the integrated distributed force:

Shaping a Way Ahead to Prepare for 21st Century Conflicts: Payload-Utility Capabilities and the Kill Web