Celebrating the 77th Anniversary of No. 77 Squadron at RAAF Williamtown

07/06/2019

The Royal Australian Air Force’s Number 77 Squadron conducted a flypast over RAAF Base Williamtown on July 5, 2019 in a ‘double seven’ formation to mark the unit’s 77 years of operations.

The flypast took the 16 F/A-18A Hornets over RAAF Williamtown and well as the Lower Hunter and Port Stephens Council regions.

The aircraft departed the base around 11am and conducted the formation over Nelson Bay, Medowie, Raymond Terrace and Newcastle between 11.20 and 11.40am before returning to base at approximately 11.45am.

Commanding Officer 77 Squadron Wing Commander Jason Easthope said the flying activities played an important role in acknowledging the unit’s proud history, upholding its rich legacy and honouring the sacrifices the squadron has made.

“77SQN is a front-line operational fighter squadron that has supported campaigns in the South Pacific, Korea, Malaysia and most recently in Iraq,” Wing Commander Easthope said.

“We are also nearing the end of an era, where in 18 months, 77 Squadron will cease Hornet operations and transition to the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter.

“The Hornet has served Australia well over the years and this commemorative flypast is also part of acknowledging that.”

Wing Commander Easthope thanked the local community for their ongoing support.

The ‘double seven’ formation was also flown in 1955 using the Gloster Meteor aircraft when the Squadron conducted a return-to-Australia tour at the end of the Korean War.

According to Wikipedia:

No. 77 Squadron is a Royal Australian Air Force(RAAF) squadron headquartered at RAAF Base Williamtown, New South Wales. It is controlled by No. 81 Wing, and equipped with McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornetmulti-role fighters.

The squadron was formed at RAAF Station Pearce, Western Australia, in March 1942 and saw action in the South West Pacific theatre of World War II, operating Curtis P-40 Kittyhawks. After the war, it re-equipped with North American P-51 Mustangsand deployed to Japan as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force.

The squadron was about to return to Australia when the Korean Warbroke out in June 1950, after which it joined United Nationsforces supporting South Korea. It converted from Mustangs to Gloster Meteorjets between April and July 1951 and remained in Korea until October 1954, claiming five MiG-15sand over five thousand buildings and vehicles destroyed during the war for the loss of almost sixty aircraft, mainly to ground fire.

The squadron re-equipped with CAC Sabresat Williamtown in November 1956. Two years later it transferred to RAAF Butterworthin Malayato join the air campaign against communist guerrillas in the last stages of theEmergency.

The squadron remained at Butterworth during the 1960s, providing regional air defence during the Konfrontasibetween Indonesia and Malaysia. It returned to Williamtown in early 1969 to re-equip with Dassault Mirage IIIsupersonic jet fighters. No. 77 Squadron began converting to Hornets in June 1987.

It supplied a detachment of four aircraft to the American base on Diego Garciain 2001–02, supporting the war in Afghanistan, and deployed to the Middle East as part of the military intervention against ISILin 2015–16.

Along with its Hornets, the squadron briefly operated Pilatus PC-9sin the forward air controlrole in the early 2000s.

The RAAF plans to replace its Hornets with Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning IIfighters commencing in 2018, and No. 77 Squadron is scheduled to convert to the new type in 2021.

 

Navy League SeaAirSpace Symposium Showcases Emerging Technologies

07/05/2019

By George Galdorisi

Occurring less than six months after the publication of the U.S. Navy’s latest strategic document, Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority Version 2.0 (Design 2.0), the recent Navy League SeaAirSpace Symposium and Global Maritime Exposition had a strong focus on the document’s three Lines of Efforts (LOE) (Blue: Strengthen Naval Power at and From the Sea, Green: Achieve High Velocity Outcomes and Gold: Strengthen Our Navy Team for the Future).

Of the three, arguably the most “concrete,” and one where the event’s over-15,000 delegates could see the how the Navy intended to meet Design 2.0’s ambitious goals, was Line of Effort Green: Achieve High Velocity Outcomes.

The reason for this was clear, LOE Green has a heavy focus on technology, and the SeaAirSpace Symposium exhibit floor was crowded with booths representing companies large and small displaying various new and emerging technologies that could help all the Sea Services (Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard) prevail in future conflicts against peer competitors.

The Navy’s emphasis on technology isn’t restricted to just Design 2.0, but has been seen in any number of speeches and statements by senior Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard leaders.

Early this year, in his keynote remarks at the U.S. Naval Institute/AFCEA “West” Symposium, Admiral John Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations, put a punctuation mark on the importance of developing new technology and getting to the Fleet when he noted, “Our strategic Achilles Heel is our inability to get new technology into the hands of our warfighters fast enough.”

While there were a wide-range of technologies on display at the SeaAirSpace Symposium, unmanned systems enjoyed an especially prominent place on the exhibit floor.

This is not surprising, as unmanned systems represent some of the most cutting-edge and promising capabilities the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard hope to harness to give them an advantage against determined adversaries.

The reason for this is clear.

Today, one of the most rapidly growing areas of innovative technology adoption by the U.S. military involves unmanned systems.

In the past several decades, the U.S. military’s use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has increased from only a handful to more than 10,000, while the use of unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) has exploded from zero to more than 12,000. The use of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) is also growing, as USVs and UUVs are proving to be increasingly useful for a wide array of military applications.

The exploding use of military unmanned systems (UxS) is already creating strategic, operational, and tactical possibilities that did not exist a decade ago.

This emphasis is on display Design 2.0’s Line of Effort Green: Achieve High Velocity Outcomes.

The first pillar of LOE Green, “Rapidly Acquire Key Platforms and Payloads,” calls out a short list of key procurement objectives. Of the 16 programs identified for special emphasis, a total of seven are air, surface, or subsurface unmanned systems. Clearly, the Navy’s commitment to these systems is strong.

But this goes beyond one document.

The U.S. Navy’s commitment to—and dependence on—unmanned systems is also seen in a series of “Future Fleet Architecture Studies.”

In each of these studies: one by the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, one by the MITRE Corporation, and one by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, the proposed Navy future fleet architecture had large numbers of air, surface, and subsurface unmanned systems as part of the Navy force structure.

More recently, The Congressional Research Service Report, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress, emphasized the critical role unmanned systems would play for the U.S. Navy, noting, in part:

UVs [unmanned vehicles] are one of several new capabilities…that the Navy says it is pursuing to meet emerging military challenges, particularly from China

UVs can be equipped with sensors, weapons, or other payloads, and can be operated remotely, semi-autonomously, or (with technological advancements) autonomously. They can be individually less expensive to procure than manned ships and aircraft because their designs do not need to incorporate spaces and support equipment for onboard human operators.

UVs can be particularly suitable for long-duration missions that might tax the physical endurance of onboard human operators, or missions that pose a high risk of injury, death, or capture of onboard human operators. Consequently UVs are sometimes said to be particularly suitable for so-called “three D” missions, meaning missions that are “dull, dirty, or dangerous.”

At the SeaAirSpace Symposium this year, several industry booths featured unmanned systems of various types. And given that this Navy League event typically has a strong emphasis on ships and the surface Navy, unmanned surface vehicles had a prominent role at the event.

While most of the unmanned systems were displayed as static objects to look at, one hands-on opportunity garnered a great deal of attention – especially from international delegates.

The FLIR Systems exhibit (booth number 2319) offered the symposium delegates a completely different experience. Over the course of the past several years, FLIR Systems has partnered with a Florida unmanned surface vehicle manufacturer, Maritime Tactical Systems (MARTAC) Inc., in a number of military and civilian exercises, experiments and demonstrations. These events have proven the viability of having USVs equipped with high quality sensors perform some of the “dull, dirty and dangerous” work that can put humans in harm’s way.

At the FLIR Systems booth, SeaAirSpace Symposium delegates had the opportunity to control – via a laptop computer – a MANTAS USV operating in the Florida Intracoastal Waterway approximately 650 miles away. Over the course of three days, scores of U.S. and international symposium visitors controlled the catamaran-style hull, modular construction 12-foot MANTAS USV equipped with a FLIR sensor and navigated it up and down the Intracoastal Waterway. A FLIR camera on shore enabled operators to see the MANTAS as it travelled.

In many ways, this demonstration mimicked a recent Bold Alligator Navy-Marine Corps exercise.

Bold Alligator was a live, scenario-driven exercise designed to demonstrate maritime and amphibious force capabilities.

The 2ndMarine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) led the exercise and operated from dock landing ships USS Fort McHenry(LSD-43) and USS Gunston Hall(LSD-44); amphibious transport dock USS Arlington(LPD-24).

During this exercise, the 2ndMarine Expeditionary Brigade used the MANTAS USV, equipped with a Gyro Stabilized SeaFLIR230 EO/IR Camera and a BlueView M900 Forward Looking Imaging Sonar to provide ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) and IPB (intelligence preparation of the battlefield) for the amphibious assault.

Bold Alligator was played out over a wide geographic area. This included a Command Center at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, and operating units employing forces in a wide area of the Atlantic Ocean, North and South Onslow Beach, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, as well as in the Intracoastal Waterway near Camp Lejeune.

During the Long Range Littoral Reconnaissance phase of Bold Alligator, Navy and Marine Corps operators at Naval Station Norfolk were able to remotely control six-foot and twelve-foot MANTAS USVs and drive them off North and South Onslow Beaches as well as in the Intracoastal Waterway. Once positioned, both MANTAS USVs streamed live, high-resolution video and sonar images to the command center at Naval Station Norfolk several hundred miles away.

The latter capability is crucial in amphibious operations in order to ensure that a landing or other craft could successfully navigate a waterway or enter the surf zone without encountering mines or other objects.

Having the ability to view these images in real-time enables decision makers not on-scene to make time-critical go/no go determinations.

The value of providing commanders with real-time ISR and IPB is difficult to overstate, and it is likely that this capability will continue to be examined in other expeditionary exercises going forward.

Importantly, this use of unmanned surface vehicles has a great deal of international interest.

During the SeaAirSpace Symposium, delegates from Australia, Canada, France, Israel, Norway, Sweden and other nations visited the FLIR booth and operated the MANTAS as they clearly saw the benefits of using this type of small USV for their defense and security needs.

The U.S. National Defense Strategy has, as one of its three pillars, the importance of having the U.S. military work more closely with its allies and partners. As the United States embarks on this initiative, sharing common commercial-off-the-shelf technology is an effective way to further cement these relationships.

The U.S. Navy has signaled a commitment to leverage the work industry has already done to field unmanned service vehicles and subject them to thorough “wringing out,” military and civilian exercises, experiments and demonstrations.

Using this commercial-off-the-shelf technology can shave years off the acquisition cycle and get new tools in the hands of our warfighters much faster.

It is little wonder that Captain Peter Small, the Navy’s program manager for unmanned surfaced and subsurface vehicles in the Naval Sea Systems Command (PMS-406) noted during this same SeaAirSpace Symposium that, “We will bring in Navy program of record weapons systems to incorporate into commercially-derived modular craft.”

He also explained how industry has been challenged to design scaled-up versions of current USVs (for example, MARTAC corporation is designing larger – 38 to 50 foot – USVs based on the 12-foot MANTAS) in order to achieve the kind of “Future Combatant Force” concept articulated in the Navy’s Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority Version 2.0.

George Galdorisi is the Director of Strategic Assessments and Technical Future’s for the Naval Information Warfare Center Pacific. Prior to joining the Center, he completed a thirty year career as a naval aviator.

BALTOPS 2019

U.S. Marines train alongside allies and partners to support the interoperability of forces and maintain a close relationship during exercise Baltic Operations 2019 in Palanga, Lithuania, June 16, 2019.

BALTOPS is the premier, annual maritime-focused exercise in the Baltic Region, marking the 47th year of one of the largest exercises in Northern Europe enhancing flexibility and interoperability among allied and partner nations.

LITHUANIA

06.16.2019

Video by Cpl. Leynard Kyle Plazo

II Marine Expeditionary Force

Tabruq Legacy 2019

07/03/2019

U.S. Army Soldiers from C Battery, 1st Battalion, 174th Air Defense Artillery Regiment, participated in a live fire training exercise as part of Tabruq Legacy 2019.

The U.S. Forces demonstrated the ability to rapidly deploy and defend friendly areas with lethality and precision.

USTKA, POLAND

06.18.2019

Video by Sgt. Kyle Larsen

5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

Exercise Steel Pike 19

07/01/2019

U.S. Marines with 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force participate in a large scale air assault during Exercise Steel Pike 19 at Camp Davis, North Carolina, June 11, 2019.

Steel Pike is a joint regimental exercise designed to provide Marine Air Ground Task Force capabilities in order to increase lethality and combat effectiveness to prepare for possible future combat operations

CAMP DAVIS, NC, UNITED STATES

06.11.2019

Video by Sgt. Sylvia Tapia

2nd Marine Division

The Dutch Conduct a Long Range Strike Mission with Their F-35s

06/26/2019

By Andrew McLaughlin

The Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) has conducted a 9,000km rapid reaction deployment training mission from Edwards AFB in California to a range in the Netherlands.

The June 13 strike mission was conducted RNLAF pilots and two F-35As based with the joint 323rd Test and Evaluation Squadron (323rdTES) at Edwards AFB, and was supported by a RNLAF KDC-10 tanker. The mission was a key element of the Dutch operational testing and evaluation (OT&E) program.

“The approach of Rapid Reaction Deployment is that a number of F-35s can be deployed within 24 hours, self-supporting, flexible and worldwide to carry out missions, with support from tanker and transport devices,” a RNLAF release reads. “This can be carried out in an environment with a high threat, day and night and in all weather conditions.”

The two aircraft were delayed on the mission after the first tanker experienced refuelling problems.

But after a replacement joined the mission in Canada, they crossed the Atlantic and dropped two GBU-49 GPS and laser-guided and two GBU-12 laser-guided bombs on a target of four containers on the Vlieland range with support from Dutch ground-based Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTACs).

After the mission, the two aircraft landed at Volkel Air Base in The Netherlands where they took part in an open days event on June 14 and 15.

The mission was supported by a single USAF C-17A with 18 personnel to provide all maintenance, armament, life support and spares support.

This article was first published by Australian Defence Business Review on June 26, 2019.

 

 

 

Post-Global Hawk Shoot-down: Next US Moves With Regard to Iran

By Lt. General (Retired) Deptula

After the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps shot down an unmanned and unarmed U.S. Navy surveillance drone last week, President Trump exercised significant restraint, calling off a planned kinetic strike against the offending surface-to-air missile (SAM) launch site.

Many—including the Iranian leadership—expected to see a retaliatory attack in response to the unprovoked attack. While fully justified and empowered by Article II of the Constitution to take military action to protect important national interests—even without specific prior authorization from Congress—the President did not launch the strike.

To understand the President’s decision, we must put near-term response options in the context of longer-term desired strategic outcomes.

In other words, while the President and his advisers must act one step at a time, they must always be thinking 10 steps ahead.

The U.S. Navy Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Demonstrator (BAMS-D) aircraft is a Navy version of the U.S. Air Force block 10 RQ-4A Global Hawk high-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned, unarmed aircraft used to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. It has a wingspan about the same size as a Boeing 737 airliner.

The BAMS-D is the precursor to the Navy’s MQ-4C “Triton” that is designed to support a wide variety of missions, including maritime ISR patrol, signals intelligence collection, search and rescue, and communications relay.

The Navy BAMS-D aircraft was operating in international airspace, never flying closer than about 34 kilometers from the Iranian coast. After its downing, three BAMS-D aircraft remain in the Navy’s inventory.

The SAM missile system that shot down the BAMS-D aircraft was claimed by Iran to be a domestically-built system known in Iran as the 3rd Khordad transporter erector launcher and radar, a variant of its Raad SAM system.

It appears to be a copy or derivative of the Russian Buk M3 / SA-17 GRIZZLY, similar to the system that the Russians used to shoot down the Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in July 2014.

Iran also claims the system incorporates the Bavar 373 surface to air missile that seems to be a derivative of the Soviet 5V55 / SA-10B with additional controls.

The reason it is important to understand the type of SAM system used in the attack is that while this incident highlights the value of using an unmanned aircraft to expand response options that would be limited if a manned aircraft was involved, it also underlines a very significant point.

Global Hawk/Triton unmanned aircraft are subsonic, non-stealthy platforms that were not designed to operate in areas covered by advanced SAM or air-to-air aircraft threats.

The fact that Iran was able to destroy the BAMS-D Global Hawk illustrates how advanced SAM threats have proliferated, even to second-rate military powers.

More importantly, from a capability perspective, it illustrates why the U.S. military needs to accelerate the fielding of next-generation manned and unmanned stealth aircraft instead of continuing to rely on aging non-stealth 4th generation aircraft that were designed for less lethal environments.

The long-term goal of the U.S. and her allies seeking a peaceful and prosperous Mideast, is to get the leadership in Iran to realize that it is in their best interests to abandon their goal of achieving nuclear weapons.

Contrary to the proclamations of the members of the Obama administration that put it in place, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the “nuclear deal with Iran,” only delayed—rather than prevented—a nuclear-armed Iran.

Through its hostile act against an unarmed reconnaissance aircraft flying in international airspace, Iran is trying to drive a wedge between the United States and her allies, as well as create dissension in American domestic politics by painting President Trump as a warmonger.

His restraint in holding back from rapid military action is therefore prudent; it shows he and his advisors are thinking about the long game.

First, President Trump was right that the significant loss of life that could have resulted from U.S. air and missile strikes would have been a disproportionate response to the shoot-down of an unmanned aircraft.

Second, he left little doubt that additional acts of aggression by Iran will result in a harsh military response. While some may criticize as waffling the President’s decision to withhold a counterstrike, he sent a clear signal that further provocations will not be tolerated while at the same time offering an off-ramp for Iran to seek a different, more peaceful path.

At the same time, it is also important to realize that options involving the use of military force are not binary. This was not a choice over whether or not to go to war.

The use of military force should not be confused with getting into inextricable long wars—that is a matter of choice.

Military force in response to hostile aggression can take a variety of forms without long-term commitment.

For example, President Trump in 2017 and 2018 successfully used air and missile attacks against elements of the Assad regime in Syria to curb Assad’s use of chemical weapons without committing the U.S. to war against Syria. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was reversed in 43 days in 1991 with Operation Desert Storm.

The humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding in Kosovo in 1999 was halted in 79 days with Operation Allied Force.

These were all campaigns where airpower was the key force behind their success.

Military options for dealing with Iran must avoid committing large numbers of U.S. troops on the ground with the intent for direct combat against opposing Iranian forces.

As we have learned only too well in Afghanistan and Iraq, ground-force doctrine leads to occupations and long wars of dubious strategic value. It is instructive to recall that the combination of airpower and a small number of special operations forces accomplished the critical initial U.S. security objectives in Afghanistan in less than three months.

By the end of 2001, we had removed the Taliban from power, helped establish a successor government that was friendly to the U.S. and her allies, and eliminated the Al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Afghanistan.

Those objectives were accomplished so quickly that the planning for the deployment of large numbers of U.S. ground forces had not yet been completed. This was due to an element of the default U.S. military playbook, known as “phased operations.”

That approach presumes large numbers of ground forces in “phase three” or the “dominating activities” phase, are required to succeed in any conflict.

Such assumptions run counter to the premise of actual joint doctrine—the use of the right force, at the right place, at the right time, to achieve the desired effects.

Why did we then pour hundreds of thousands of ground forces into Afghanistan over the next decade plus, after the vital U.S. security objectives were realized?

The answer illustrates the importance of clearly defining U.S. security objectives, and then acting rapidly and effectively with precisely the force necessary to achieve them. Neutering Al Qaeda and eliminating Afghanistan as Al Qaeda’s sanctuary were critical U.S. security objectives.

Attempting to turn Afghanistan into a modern Jeffersonian democracy was not. Critics may insist that early 2002 was too soon to recognize that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan had been neutered, but when we shifted from a strategy of counterterrorism to one of counterinsurgency we shifted from a set of strategic objectives that were vital to the U.S. to a set of objectives that were not.

The main objective regarding Iran is to change its aggressive behavior to achieve a measure of order in the region, and to dissuade its regime from acquiring nuclear weapons.

At some point toward that end, the option of military force application may be required.

Avoiding the mistake of introducing U.S. ground forces as a primary force element will be imperative to any success.

Those military options holding the greatest applicability with respect to achieving our objectives in Iran are airpower and offensive cyber operations; the latter is already being applied.

We need to isolate Iran, not let Iran isolate the U.S.

The response by President Trump to the unprovoked aggression by the Iranian regime this past week put the geopolitical advantage with the United States.

Time is on our side.

It must be used wisely to garner support of nations to contain Iran while remaining prepared to compel Iran to renounce its nuclear weapon aspirations using both continued economic sanctions, and if necessary, smart military options relying on air and sea power.

Finally, and perhaps most important, we must realize that the Iranian leadership views the world through a prism of their fanatical theological-based dogma. Iranian Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is dogmatic to an extreme and cares less about his own people than his own authoritarian well-being.

He may not be compelled by any action others would impose on him to comply with the norms of peaceful international behavior. To Khamenei, compromise is seen as a sign of submission and weakness.

Contrary to the norms of western culture, moral and ethical codes, he will do whatever it takes to remain in power.

Those who crafted the JCPOA may have realized that and designed that deal to buy time to achieve a “natural” or internal politically driven regime change during the course of the period of the agreement. Khamenei may not be interested in any more deals.

Accordingly, one of the options the current administration should have in its set of courses of action is one that encourages the Iranian people to oust their tyrannical leadership and replace them with Iranian leaders that seek a productive relationship inside the community of nations—and a degree of concern for the wellbeing of their own population at least equal to that of themselves.

This article was first published by Forbes on June 25, 2019 and is reprinted with permission of the author.

Crafting Australian Active Defenses: The Israeli Impact

By Max Blenkin

Israel is a nation under constant threat, and has developed very advanced defensive capabilities including an air and missile defence (IAMD) system and that could be of relevance to Australia.

At the lowest level is Iron Dome, a mobile Counter Rocket and Mortar (C-RAM) system, the development of which was headed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in cooperation with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), and declared operational in 2011.

Iron Dome was designed to detect, track and intercept short-range artillery rockets, mortars and also UAVs launched by insurgents in Gaza, and by Hizbollah in Lebanon at Israeli communities. Israel claims a combat success rate of 90 per cent or better in shooting down more than 2,000 rockets judged as posing an actual threat.

As long as Israel has existed, rockets and mortars have been fired from neighbouring nations. But in the 1991 Gulf War, Scud missiles were fired at Israeli cities from Iraq. The US deployed Patriot missile batteries to Israel to protect Israeli citizens but also to help prevent Israel being provoked into attacking Iraq, which would surely have split the delicate US-led coalition.

Since then Israel has worked closely with the US to develop multi-layered air and missile defences able to protect against everything from the persistent rocket and mortar attacks to long-range rockets, which could carry nuclear, chemical or biological warheads.

 

While Israel’s IAMD system is in part what Australia aspires to emulate, it was designed for a very different threat environment. But while many countries possess IAMD systems of various descriptions, none completely match what Australia aspires to create. Consequently, the solution will be uniquely Australian.

Israel is a small nation with land borders and mostly unfriendly neighbours, and remains under constant threat. Consequently Israel maintains 24-hour, 360 degrees radar and sensor coverage, with forces available to respond at very short notice.

Israel may be unique in the magnitude of the threats it faces, but missile technology is proliferating and may one day pose a more immediate threat to the Australian mainland. Additionally, any deployed force will face a likely greater threat of rocket and mortar attack, as did the Australian taskforce in Afghanistan, a threat for which it was initially not well prepared.

As much as Australia might like complete sensor coverage of borders and surrounding oceans, that’s probably not possible nor desirable. The areas of greatest interest lie to the north and west, which is where JORN gazes now.

Certainly Israeli companies are interested, and ADBR talked to representatives of Rafael and IAI at February’s Avalon Airshow. “It is purely an American project at the moment,” said Yacov Bortman, director of marketing for IAI’s Elta Systems. “In the study phase RAND, the research company approached only the four American companies, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon.

“So that’s it, those are the primes,” Bortman said. “So anything we can contribute to this project, should be selected by the primes from us. Everybody talks to everybody. It’s not specifically one or the other.”

He noted that Australian radars made by CEA would be part of the project, but that IAI could contribute to AIR 6500 in many areas. It produces a range of radars in different bands with different capabilities, and it also has considerable expertise in ballistic missile defence (BMD).

“We expect that ballistic missile defence could be one of the things the country will need,” said Bortman. “In this area we have experience since the ‘80s. We started our ballistic missile defence project in the ‘80s and so far the Israeli solution includes four layers.

“The lowest layer is the Iron Dome. Then you have the David’s Sling in the second layer, and then we have the Arrow project up to Arrow 3 which covers the outer space capability. Elta, which represents about quarter of the business of IAI, is the supplier of sensors in all the layers.”

Elta’s director of marketing for its SIGINT (signals intelligence) and communications division, Guy Alon said Israel’s air situation pictures was generated by radar in different bands.

However, in event of a major conflict an adversary will seek to knock out radar systems. There are numerous weapons designed to home on radar emissions and even loiter over a battlefield waiting for a radar to switch on.

Mr Alon said there was an increasing need to add a passive sensor layer using signals intelligence sensors to complement active sensors.

“It is a new concept which is taking more and more grip in the air defence world,” he said. “We hear more and more about it and we provide solutions in this area. It is electronic intelligence. It means passively intercepting signals of the emitters, usually airborne radars of the other side, being able to passively geo-locate them because we only receive, we do not transmit, and classify the different types of radars.

“This is another layer of information for air defence, on top of the radar information. This is another capability we promote. Basically it gives your air situation picture capability the ability to operate in more of a silent mode.”

Mr Alon said Australia now had to figure out how to proceed ion this project. “I would imagine that eventually they will take some kind of a phased approach,” he said. “We believe we can contribute. We believe we have the technical and operational knowledge to contribute in such a project. Obviously, there are some other considerations for the Australian government, but we are here to try and help.”

A node of the new integrated air and missile defence system will be the new Raytheon/KONGSBERG Enhanced NASAMS short-range ground-based air defence (SRGBAD) system being acquired under project LAND 19 Phase 7B.

NASAMS features Raytheon’s AMRAAM, a missile which is also in RAAF service and is regarded as highly effective, but expensive.

Just how expensive isn’t easy to say but the most recent Australian FMS acquisition of AMRAAM announced last month was for 108 of the latest AIM-120C-7 variants for US$240.5 million. That deal also included a range of spares and instrumentation but suggests a missile unit price well in excess of A$1 million.

Rafael says it could complement AMRAAM with its very effective Iron Dome Tamir interceptors which cost around a tenth of the cost of an AMRAAM round.

Joseph Horowitz, deputy general manager for Rafael air and missile defence systems division said the LAND 19 request for proposal sought a counter rocket and mortar (C-RAM) capability, which NASAMS didn’t include, although the KONGSBERG air defence console does have a C-RAM interface.

“What we are doing is offering to do what we are doing in the US, that is to integrate our interceptors to the customer’s own system which, in the Australian case would be as a part of the NASAMS systems,” Horowitz said.

“With the NASAMS battery you have a CEA radar, KONGSBERG command and control and four AMRAAM launchers with 24 missiles. What we are offering is to add another two launchers from Iron dome with an additional 20 missiles ready to fire.”

Mr Horowitz said NASAMS could calculate the best solution for a particular threat. Tamir was very effective for dealing with shorter-range airborne threats, including aircraft and helicopters out to 15km. That would also give NASAMS a CRAM capability, plus an ability to target unmanned systems.

That reduced cost is achieved through a number of innovations. The missile body is aluminium rather than a composite. Control surface actuators are electro-mechanical rather than pneumatic, and feature a unique low-cost RF Software-defined radio (SDR) seeker.

Since most of the cost of a missile is in its seeker, Tamir has passive guidance with inflight updates and an active seeker which only switches on for terminal guidance to the target.

Picking Tamir would involve integrating this missile into the NASAMS, but Rafael says that’s no problem as it’s what they are already doing in conjunction with Raytheon for NASAMS for the US military. The US Army recently announced it is buying two Iron Dome systems to provide an advanced CRAM capability as well as an ability to counter UAS, cruise missiles and aircraft to protect deployed forces.

Rafael said when integrated into NASAMS, Tamir used the NASAMS launcher and radar without modifications. Minor modification are needed in the missiles, and two additional undefined components are required for the NASAMS Fire Direction Control.

Should Australia decide to go with Tamir as a component of NASAMS, the missiles and other components would be built in Australia through Varley Rafael Australia (VRA), the joint venture with Newcastle-based firm Varley. “The most important thing is to bring in the technology that allows VRA to support the Australian Defence Force,” Mr Horowitz said.

This feature article appeared in the March-April 2019 issue of ADBR.