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According to recent statements by senior representatives of the Japanese military as well as local defence analysts, Japan is steadily continuing along its path of active defence with the development of a new national defence budget for 2020.
According to statements by the official spokesperson for the Japanese Defence Minister Takeshi Iwaya, the new budget will allow Japan to significantly strengthen its military potential over the next several years – to protect its geopolitical interests in the region and to counter potential threats from China and North Korea.
The cost of programs in the defence budget is estimated at 5,5 trillion yen (about US$50 billion), which makes it the largest military budget in the modern history of Japan, since the end of WWII.
In fact, Japanese defence spending has been growing for the second year in a row. In 2019, its defence budget reached 5.3 Trillion yen (US$ 47.4 billion) or about 1% of Japan’s national GDP. Some local analysts believe these figures will continue to grow in the coming years and may reach 3-5% of its GDP within the next decade. That will be comparable to the volume of defence spending that has been recommended by NATO to its members.
One notable aspect of the new program involves resuming the building of aircraft carriers. The use of such ships will mark the first for Japan since the end of World War II. The design of these new aircraft carriers will be based on Izumo-Class multi-purpose destroyers (which were originally ordered as helicopter carriers by the Japanese Defence Ministry) and will serve as a base for F-35B aircraft.
Some Japanese military analysts have noted that Izumo-Class ships may prove useful during potential regional military conflicts, for example, with China over the disputed Senkaku islands.
In the meantime, the plan also provides for gradual replacement of Japan’s Hyūga Class naval helicopter destroyers. The design process for their modern analogues has already begun.
Military Aviation
Japan’s modernization and recapitalization plan included a massive renewal of its fleet of combat aircraft. Since the early 2000s, Japan has held its status as the second largest buyer of U.S. F-35 aircraft (behind the U.S. itself). These aircraft successfully replaced Japan’s F-15J / DJ Eagle models and have resulted in significantly raising the potential of the Japanese Air Force.
As for new purchases, by the end of 2019 at least nine more Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters will be supplied for the needs of the Japanese Air Force. Overall, by 2023, Tokyo plans to purchase up to 20 such aircraft (which are priced at US$130 million each) plus several F-35B short take-off and vertical landing units.
Particular attention will go towards continuing development of the 5th generation fighter. That will take place in cooperation with Lockheed Martin, although Tokyo intends to use its own technologies as much as possible. Some of these technologies will be provided by the Technical Research and Design Institute of the Japanese Ministry of Defense as well as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Corporation, which will also take part in the project.
According to some Japanese media reports, the total cost of the project may exceed 1.5 trillion yen (US$14 billion).
Deliveries of the new aircraft to the Japanese Air Force are scheduled to begin after 2030. They will completely replace the 90 F-2 aircraft currently in the Japanese military aviation fleet. Its armament will include cruise missiles capable of hitting ships with high efficiency.
Most Japanese military analysts consider this project as the most significant advance of Japan’s capabilities in the last several decades.
At the same time, in addition to the new fighter, will be design of specialized Electronic Warfare aircraft that will be capable of suppressing air defence and enemy communications. The use of such aircraft is intended to deter and prevent the launch of enemy missiles on Japanese military targets.
Defending Space Assets
Japan already has a strong civilian space programme and has successfully launched a number of satellites into orbit, and lately, the Prime Minister has been advocating for a special space-defence force to protect its satellites from possible targeting.
To that end, the proposed budget includes funds for a significant strengthening of Japan’s military space assets. The ministry has asked for 52.4 billion yen (US$484 million) to strengthen its outer space capability, including the establishment of a space operations unit within the structure of the Japanese Armed Forces.
Confirming the focus on strengthening defence capabilities in outer space, Prime Minister Abe confirmed on 17 September 2019, that Japan’s existing Air Defence Force may “evolve into the Air and Space SDF” in the future.
As the Japanese Yomiuri business paper recently reported, the space unit will be formed by 2020 and will include a highly sensitive radar, an optical telescope. and a special tracking system. The unit will be located on the Japanese Air Force base in the city of Fuchū, located in the western Tokyo Metropolis.
According to an official spokesman of the Japanese Ministry of Defence, the main task of the newly established military space unit will be to counter possible attacks of Japanese military targets by foreign satellites and to prevent collisions of Japanese spacecrafts with space debris.
The Japanese Ministry of Defence considers strengthening its space assets as one of its most important tasks in the field of defence, particularly given recent efforts by the United States, China, and Russia for more active use of outer space for military intelligence.
Land Forces
The new State Defence Program includes the establishment of a special electronic warfare unit for the land forces – using electromagnetic waves for army purposes. A new unit, consisting of 80 people, will be deployed at the end of 2020 at the Japanese Kangun base in Kumamoto. It will primarily focus on the monitoring of the activities of Chinese troops.
Budget Approval
Japan’s Defence Budget 2020 is expected to be approved by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinz¯o Abe after consultations with the Ministry of Finance.
Eugene Gerden is a FrontLine correspondent who specializes in military and defence.
In the United States, we have tweeting Trump and the impeaching House of Representatives; in Europe they have Macronite.
We have had and continue to have a significant deluge of comments on President Trump and his approach to foreign policy with little that has a positive tinge to it; but what about Macronite?
How positive or significant is this for shaping the second creation of the West?
The first creation was lead by the United States after World War II with the laying down of the rules based order; the Post-Cold War period was more or less acting on the belief that the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed those rules of the game to be extended East.
But in fact, little noticed was the rise of 21st century authoritarian capitalist powers who were key anchors of globalization and have woven themselves into the fabric of the liberal democratic societies.
With the 21st century authoritarian powers working to write the rules of the game going forward rather than reinforcing the rules based order, what should and can the Western liberal democracies do?
In his recent interview with The Economist, the President of the Republic provided his answer and having done so, he deserves a serious examination of whether or not that resets the effort in a manner that can lead the way ahead.
He certainly has provided a wide ranging analysis of the current situation; but does the Macronite approach going forward provide a realistic way ahead to deal with the current crises?
Let us navigate through his interview and highlight some of his core points to get a sense of how he sees the challenge and gauge his approach to guiding the West to its next phase.
Europe was built on this notion that we would pool the things we had been !ghting over: coal and steel.
It then structured itself as a community, which is not merely a market, it’s a political project.
But a series of phenomena have left us on the edge of a precipice…. A market is not a community.
A community is stronger: it has notions of solidarity, of convergence, which we’ve lost, and of political thought.
What he underscores is the importance of Europe thinking of itself as a community and focus on its common destiny, rather than simply thinking of itself as a trading bloc.
But the challenge facing this core point is rather straightforward: is the European Union with the Commission as its driving force for integration really a custodian for the broader sense of community?
Does Europe need to recast even significantly how the nations can work together to shape community, rather than face a bureaucratic machine which is driving bureaucratically mandated commonality?
And notability, with the expansion of the European Union, there is no way that Western Europe with a 50 year period of working together has as much in common with the “new” states who have been under a 50 year domination by Communism.
This is proving to be a mix which may be more oil and water than providing strands for a single community.
Perhaps there is no single community?
Perhaps we are looking at clusters of states which pursue specific interests in common on particular issues; Rather than thinking of Europe as a community of forced unity.
Maronite is generated by a Europe first policy whereby the Americans are looking elsewhere in the world.
And the current American president is seen to be abandoning the European project.
And with the rise of China, and the preoccupation of the United States with the Pacific, America is focused elsewhere. Of course, there is the largely ignored question of how significant Chinese engagement economically with Europe has become, and whether or not Europe, either individually on the national level or collectively on the European Union level is providing a counter balance to what China has been able to do within Europe itself.
He very clearly focuses on the challenge which the 21st century authoritarian powers pose to Europe while the Americans reduce their commitment to the European project.
So, f!rstly, Europe is gradually losing track of its history; secondly, a change in American strategy is taking place; thirdly, the rebalancing of the world goes hand in hand with the rise—over the last 15 years—of China as a power, which creates the risk of bipolarisation and clearly marginalises Europe.
And add to the risk of a United States/China “G2” the re-emergence of authoritarian powers on the fringes of Europe, which also weakens us very signi!cantly.
This re-emergence of authoritarian powers, essentially Turkey and Russia, which are the two main players in our neighbourhood policy, and the consequences of the Arab Spring, creates a kind of turmoil.
It is hard to disagree with much in his analyses of the world but this is where it gets interesting.
Let us apply some Macronite to the challenges.
His first step: regain military sovereignty.
To do this, he argues for the reenforcement of the European project and having a more realistic assessment of dealing with a “brain dead NATO.”
Europe must become autonomous in terms of military strategy and capability. And secondly, we need to reopen a strategic dialogue, without being naive and which will take time, with Russia. Because what all this shows is that we need to reappropriate our neighbourhood policy, we cannot let it be managed by third parties who do not share the same interests
The problem with this can be put simply — it ignores the reality which he has painted earlier.
There is no common European defense because European defense threats are not seen the same way and there is a reverse trend — clusters of states focusing on their specific approaches within an umbrella set of institutions — NATO and the EU.
Does anyone believe that the Nordic states are waiting for France or Germany to defend them?
Hardly.
They have enhanced their own cooperation and have deepened their working relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom and have done so in large part by embracing the latest US military technologies, something which Macron clearly rails against
But as Secretary Wynne once said — “Being the second best air force in a conflict is not where you want to be.”
And the United States still offers the best opportunity to not be a second best air force, for example.
And as for his working relationship with Berlin, given that Germany has no real commitment to its own direct defense, there is a question of whether France and Germany could defend a central front if challenged by the Russians.
NATO is only as strong as its member states.
This is certainly true and why Article III of the NATO Treaty is the bedrock for any Article V commitments.
But then we are back to a key question: how convergent is French defense policy with other European states to contribute and to manage the common defense?
Is it actually more convergent than is the United States itself?
He notes: I think that the interoperability of NATO works well.
But we now need to clarify what the strategic goals we want to pursue within NATO are.
But the first may be what the European alliances can provide; whereas the second is really left up to the cluster of nations willing to work on specific strategic lines.
Take the case of cyber offense, where France has nothing at all in common with Germany.
Indeed, as a leading French analyst put it to me when I asked him the question: Who are France’s allies in cyber offense?
“The Dutch lead the pack because they recognize that the Russians declared war on them with the shoot-down of the Malaysian airliner. Also crucial are the UK, Sweden and the Baltic states.”
He then goes on to mischaracterize what the Trump Administration is actually doing for European defense.
Even though the current Administration has significantly stepped up its operational commitments to deal with the Russians, this is what Macron has to say.
In the eyes of President Trump, and I completely respect that, NATO is seen as a commercial project. He sees it as a project in which the United States acts as a sort of geopolitical umbrella, but the trade-o$ is that there has to be commercial exclusivity, it’s an arrangement for buying American products. France didn’t sign up for that.
This is an indirect comment getting at the “F-35 threat” to Europe which is treated as strategic as the seizure of Crimea by many French analysts.
And hence we see the brith of the Future Combat System and the coming fighter in 2040.
But as one German analyst put it: “I hope we have agreement with the Russians for avoiding conflict until 2040.”
In my opinion some elements must only be European.
This is where the Macronite impact could be signifiant, if Europe follows the Finnish approach.
Notably with regard to infrastructure, Europe has allowed the 21st century authoritarian powers to own significant infrastructure elements in Europe.
They are not alone.
This can lead to what John Blackburn, the Australian analyst, to a condition where “we are losing without fighting.”
How to control our supply chains and infrastructure to the point whereby the authoritarian powers can not disrupt our capabilities in a conflict is a clear challenge.
And significant focus within Europe on this problem could follow from the Macronite impulse.
Of course, the Finns lead the way on this and not the French.
The underlying idea is that if we’re all linked by business, all will be !ne, we won’t hurt each other. In a way, that the inde!nite opening of world trade is an element of making peace.
Except that, within a few years, it became clear that the world was breaking up again, that tragedy had come back on stage, that the alliances we believed to be unbreakable could be upended, that people could decide to turn their backs, that we could have diverging interests.
And that at a time of globalisation, the ultimate guarantor of world trade could become protectionist.
Major players in world trade could have an agenda that was more an agenda of political sovereignty, or of adjusting the domestic to the international, than of trade.
The question of the future of globalization is clearly a key one to sort through at the second creation.
And here Macron talks both European values and national sovereignty and assumes that the two blend together — but that is precisely the nexus of the challenge — they do not.
To re design globalization to work with trusted partners, to reshape manufacturing, to shorten supply chains, to deal with the political challenge of the 21st century authoritarian states, certainly starts with national solutions, but ones which recognize the semi-sovereign situation in which the modern democratic state finds itself.
Maron highlights the challenge in his interview, but the question is how best to deal with national sovereignty in a semi sovereign world in which 21st century authoritarian powers are on the ascendancy?
And this is his trajectory with regard to one of the key authoritarian powers, Russia.
If we want to build peace in Europe, to rebuild European strategic autonomy, we need to reconsider our position with Russia. That the United States is really tough with Russia, it’s their administrative, political and historic superego. But there’s a sea between the two of them.
It’s our neighbourhood, we have the right to autonomy, not just to follow American sanctions, to rethink the strategic relationship with Russia, without being the slightest bit naive and remaining just as tough on the Minsk process and on what’s going on in Ukraine.
It’s clear that we need to rethink the strategic relationship. We have plenty of reasons to get angry with each other. There are frozen conflicts, energy issues, technology issues, cyber, defence, etc.
What I’ve proposed is an exercise that consists of stating how we see the world, the risks we share, the common interests we could have, and how we rebuild what I’ve called an architecture of trust and security.
And when asked how the Poles and Balts feel about this approach, he highlights that indeed there are “European” differences.
Having a strategic vision of Europe means thinking about its neighbourhood and its partnerships. Which is something we haven’t yet done. During the debate over enlargement, it was clear that we are thinking about our neighbourhood above all in terms of access to the European Union, which is absurd.
Macronite is about driving European solutions to its common neighborhood, but the challenge for France is that the Europe envisaged by the French president may not be the realistic project or outcome.
As former Admiral James Stavridis commented after the release of The Economist interview:
NATO is far from brain dead, but it is suffering from the fallout of centrifugal forces pulling Europe apart. NATO has key missions in deterring Russia, the Arctic, cyber, and the Med — all directly affecting USA.
For the full Economist interview, see the following:
A week after the completion of the October 24, 2019 Williams Foundation Seminar, I had a chance to talk with Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown about the main findings from the Seminar and the way ahead for the Seminar series.
Question: What do you consider the main findings from the seminar?
Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown: We looked at how one could achieve fifth generation manoeuvre and one of the key issues is how the industrial working relationship could best support these efforts.
One of the key ideas was linking the industrial labs together in order to achieve better force integration development and support. And to get industry involved earlier in the process of building programs.
There are many key issues to work out but it is clearly important to shape a more effective collaborative working set of arrangements to get the kind of integrated force which we need.
Another key takeaway is that we already have a command operating as an integrated force which allows us to maximize our influence.
The Maritime Border Command has been able to achieve the kind of inter-agency cooperation which gives you the kind of capability which you want to have to maximize your effectiveness and enhance the probably of a good result.
Question: Where do we go from here?
Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown: We need to relook at how we can integrate manned and unmanned platforms into integrated operations.
With our manpower limitations, we clearly need to find effective ways to incorporate remotes into the combat force.
And for the seminar after that we are looking to focus on cyber operations, and to do so from the standpoint of their integration into the ADF, not simply just as a specialized skill set.
We need to look at the incorporation of cyber into operations rather than as a stove piped activity dominated by the intelligence community.
We then discussed various case studies which might be the best way to get at the manned-unmanned teaming efforts.
Clearly, there are two key areas where the ADF is focused.
The first is the loyal wingman for the Air Force, and maritime remotes for the Navy.
Both might prove to be good areas for further exploration at the next seminar.
I am in Berlin today for the International Fighter Conference 2019 which starts tomorrow.
I took the opportunity to revisit Checkpoint Charlie.
It is now a museum, but also a testament to the will of the West to defend liberal democracy against the Soviet Union.
I often visited West Germany in the 1980s when the political warfare over Euromissiles was a dominant reality.
The U.S. President was hardly popular and when you visit the Checkpoint Charlie museum it is easier to find remembrance of JFK’s visit than the historical moment when President Reagan challenged the Soviet leaders to “teardown that wall.”
I set up a working group in the mid-1980s at the Institute for Defense Analysis to discuss the prospects and how to shape a possible German reunification.
It was not a widely attended effort, but did prepare the way for the historical events.
The key agreement of the group was that if the new Germany was not part of the Western institutions, the European Union and NATO, then any agreement with the Soviets would not be worth the effort.
The concept in those days was that only an agreement that yielded a real outcome which could fit into the values of the liberal democracies really mattered.
Simply having an agreement to look like progress was being made was the wrong way to go because it would only help the authoriarians working to undercut consensus in our societies.
Seems a long time ago.
There was no desire to have a Soviet veto power over the future of Germany.
The Russians frequently insist that they had promises with regard to the fate of sovereign states in Europe; that somehow they had a veto power over which states could work with the West and which could not.
That simply is not true.
And that brings us to Berlin, East and West.
West Berlin was a fragment of liberal democracy in a sea of Soviet and East German authoritarianism.
The Stasi was a prevalent force and provided the atmosphere for any Western visitors to the “workers paradise” which could could be seen in East Berlin.
My first job in the Pentagon was to work for a man who had just served as the Brigade Commander in Berlin.
“The Berlin Brigade of the United States Army was a separate brigade based in Berlin. Its shoulder sleeve insignia was the U.S. Army Europe patch with a Berlin tab, later incorporated.”
I functioned as his tutor on things Soviet and we had many discussions about his time in Berlin.
What impressed the most was the dedication of the Brigade.
As the General put it: “We are a speed bump which would be crushed as the Soviets prepared to move against the inner German border. But we need to do so in a way that would remind them that the United States was not going to yield an inch of German territory without a fight.”
Put in simple terms: “We are going all to die in a conflict; we need to do so with and for a purpose.”
That kind of courage and dedication can be forgotten when visiting Berlin today.
Turning Checkpoint Charlie into a museum is clearly a reminder of what U.S. servicemen and women contributed to the future of Germany.
But turning it into a museum and remembering the 30 year anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall also recalls the lessons learned from the Armistice Day being remembered in Europe.
The “war to end all wars” didn’t.
And the Fall of the Berlin Wall did not end to the East-West conflict.
And the 2008 and 2014 territorial seizures by Russia are clearly a reminder, that there are no wars that end all wars.
Checkpoint Charlie may be a museum; but it is a reminder that the East-West conflict is hardly over.
2014 is as significant as 1914 but simply has not been recognized as such.
An end of course video featuring the highlights of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-20 in Yuma, Arizona, Oct. 28, 2019.
WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), which emphasizes operational integration of the six functions of Marine Corps aviation in support of a Marine Air Ground Task Force.
WTI also provides standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.
As John Blackburn has put it recently, if we do not pay much closer focus and care with regard to our supply chains, both civilian and military, we could find ourselves in the position of “losing with fighting.”
Air Vice Marshal (Retired) has focused much of his research and public efforts in Australia on dealing with supply chain vulnerabilities.
In a forthcoming interview, we discussed with him the concept of being in the position whereby the liberal democracies can lose without fighting to the 21st century authoritarian capitalist powers.
And apparently, the US Secretary of the Navy shares his concerns.
“The US navy secretary has warned that the “fragile” American supply chain for military warships means the Pentagon is at risk of having to rely on adversaries such as Russia and China for critical components.
Richard Spencer, the US navy’s top civilian, told the Financial Times he had ordered a review this year that found many contractors were reliant on single suppliers for certain high-tech and high-precision parts, increasing the likelihood they would have to be procured from geostrategic rivals.
Mr Spencer said the US was engaged in “great power competition” with other global rivals and that several of them — “primarily Russia and China” — were “all of a sudden in your supply chain, [which is] not to the best interests of what you’re doing” through military procurement….”
“In an effort to convince the private sector to invest in the US industrial base, Mr Spencer recently launched a “trusted capital” programme where he invited large private equity firms to bid on failing or non-existent supply needs in areas from ship maintenance to weapons manufacturing.”
One of the ironies of the current debate about how Australia should adjust its military strategy in light of the changing great-power balance in the Indo-Pacific is that many of the participants—regardless of their views on the future of US military power—make similar recommendations, namely, that Australia should seek greater defence self-reliance.
This would be achieved by capability solutions based largely on ‘more of the same’. That is, to meet an increasingly uncertain strategic environment, our future force structure should be built around more of the things we already have, or are getting, such as F-35A joint strike fighters and submarines (even if some advocate different submarines from the ones we’ll eventually get under the current plan).
So it’s important to understand those systems and their limitations to see what additional capability more of them would provide. Since Australia and its region are geographically far-flung, and we have only a small number of military assets, we’ll focus on their ability to maintain a presence over large distances. The key question is, to what extent do the capabilities the Australian Defence Force is acquiring enable Australia to project power and what would further enhance that power projection?
We’ll start with the F-35A.
Defence is in the process of acquiring 72, with potentially some more down the track. The F-35A is now a very capable aircraft, but it still faces the old problem that, no matter how good a military platform is, it can’t be in two places at once. And due to the inherent limitations of fighter aircraft, there are a lot of places they can’t be at any time.
Most Australians’ experience of aviation involves getting on a passenger jet in a major Australian airport and getting off on another continent, say in Los Angeles, Dubai or Tokyo. But those kinds of ranges are vastly greater than what modern fighter aircraft can achieve. This is a characteristic of all fighters; the F-35A has pretty good range in comparison to its peers.
The air force’s website lists the F-35A range at 2,200 kilometres, which is how far it can fly in a straight line. That doesn’t get the aircraft from the RAAF’s main fighter base at Williamtown in NSW to Perth (3,363 km) or Darwin (3,108 km). But since you want the pilot and aircraft to get home from the mission, its combat radius of 1,093 km is a more meaningful number than range.
There are three radii that are useful to consider in the context of the F-35A: they are (roughly) 500 km, 1,000 km and 1,500 km. The one that is most appropriate depends on the mission and how many resources Defence is able to apply to achieve it.
The ‘owner’s manual’ radius of the F-35A is essentially 1,000 km with a little margin built in to take into account real-world factors.
What does that look like in the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific or the blue continent of the South Pacific?
The map below is based on one developed by my ASPI colleague Malcolm Davis.
The red rings represent the F-35A’s combat radius operating from the six mainland airbases in Australia’s north: Darwin, Townsville, Amberley, the bare bases at Curtin and Learmonth in Western Australia, and Scherger on Queensland’s Cape York Peninsula.
1,000-kilometre combat radius from northern Australian bases
So, 1,000 km doesn’t project very far out into the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific. It doesn’t even get very far out into our South Pacific backyard.
At least from our northern bases we can cover our immediate approaches. However, the RAAF couldn’t operate all those rings simultaneously with the three squadrons on order (and a fourth made up of the Super Hornet, or whatever replaces it).
But 1,000 km doesn’t include fuel to stay on station, so while it may be helpful for understanding range for a strike mission (fly out, launch ordnance, fly home), it’s not a useful number for missions where the aircraft have to loiter—for example, protecting a deployed maritime or amphibious task force, or providing close air support to land forces.
The more time on station, the less range.
Moreover 1,000 km isn’t necessarily a representative number for air-to-air combat in which fuel consumption increases exponentially as the aircraft accelerates to combat speed or uses afterburners.
In short, an F-35A that flies out 1,000 km and fights enemy aircraft probably isn’t going to make it home, so a 500 km combat radius might be more accurate when it comes to an air defence role or one that requires some time on station.
500-kilometre combat radius from northern Australian bases
That makes a big difference.
There are now gaps between the red rings, even if we could operate in each of those rings simultaneously.
And the longer you want the aircraft to loiter on station, the smaller that radius becomes.
Moreover, it’s difficult for the F-35A to sustain a continuous presence over any land mass outside of the continent, which means a maritime task force could only be protected if it was operating very close to the Australian mainland, or, in the case of an amphibious task force, if it was seeking to deploy its land component actually on Australian soil.
Air-to-Air Refuelling
Of course, this analysis doesn’t take air-to-air refuelling into account.
Tankers can substantially increase fighters’ time on station (that is, how long they can stay out). But they can’t extend the jets’ combat range indefinitely. There are several reasons for this. The first is that generally pilots want to have enough fuel on board to get home alone, just in case the tanker they were planning to refuel from isn’t there (due to mechanical problems, being shot down or driven off station by enemy aircraft, or just running dry).
In a region like the Middle East, this risk can be mitigated by having fallback airfields to divert to in an emergency, but in the Pacific (and indeed in Australia itself) there are very few fallback options, particularly ones that you can safely land a conventional fighter on.
That means once an F-35A flies out roughly 1,000 kilometres, it needs to tank before it can go any further. But that load of fuel only allows it to go a further 500 km because at that point it will still need to have 1,500 km of fuel reserves on board to get home. And that doesn’t give any time on station or give it fuel to fight. So, it would need to tank again to stay on station.
But, theoretically, a combat range of around 1,500 km is achievable.
That would look something like the red ring in Figure 3.
1,500-kilometre combat radius from Darwin
I’ve included only one ring, and that’s because of the second reason that tankers can’t extend a fighter’s range indefinitely—air-to-air refuelling to keep fighters on station is very resource intensive.
If a commander wanted to keep F-35As on station around 1,500 km out from mainland airbases (potentially protecting an amphibious task force, a lodged land force, or a naval task force patrolling choke points), planners would likely need to set up two refuelling circuits—one to enable the fighters to reach their station, and then one a few hundred kilometres behind the fighters’ station so they can pull back, refuel and return to station with fuel to fight.
In that scenario, keeping just two F-35As on station would take at least eight F-35As in the air at one time around the clock (two heading out, four cycling between their station and the refueller, and two heading home). Each of them would need to fly an eight-hour mission, potentially tanking four or five times. Taking aircraft maintenance and unserviceability into account (which will increase as the operation continues), that would potentially require at least 12 to 16 aircraft to sustain. But since pilots can fly that mission only once per day, the cycle needs a minimum of 24 pilots (and more to account for ‘unserviceability’ of pilots as the operation grinds into the future).
But more is needed.
The whole concept of a fifth-generation air force relies on superior situational awareness, so to fully exploit the F-35A’s capabilities the package would need to include an E-7A Wedgetail early warning and control aircraft flying a circuit a hundred kilometres or so behind the fighters to detect enemy aircraft. The RAAF has six, and fewer than that will be available for operations, and fewer again serviceable for missions.
Therefore, sustaining that one combat air patrol will likely require all the Wedgetails.
Keeping them on station will likely draw on some of the tankers’ fuel.
But the biggest stressor on the viability of the mission is tanker capacity.
The air force now has seven KC-30A air-to-air refuellers after recently acquiring an additional two.
It’s hard to see more than five being available, and fewer will be serviceable on any given day. One tanker, engaged in continuously refuelling fighters on the combat air patrol, can’t stay on station for more than four to six hours before needing to refuel.
Sustaining two refuelling stations (one to get the fighters out to the patrol area and one to sustain them on station) with a force of only four or five tankers would likely exceed any responsible commander’s risk tolerance by creating a single catastrophic point of failure. One unserviceable tanker, accident or combat loss would cause the entire cycle to collapse, potentially with pilots and aircraft unable to make it home.
Keeping the fuel flowing to the tankers would also be challenging. Even exercises such as Pitch Black have taxed fuel supplies at permanent bases. The kind of scenario outlined here would require well in excess of 500 tonnes of fuel per day (visualise around 20 semi-trailers, or over the course of a month something roughly commensurate with the Northern Territory’s total average monthly aviation fuel consumption).
Getting that reliably to remote bare bases such as RAAF Scherger on Cape York would be a demanding task, although the challenge could be mitigated by flying the tankers out of permanent air bases.
A 1,500 km sustained presence over a hypothetical task force in the Bismarck Sea would look something like the smaller of the two rings in Figure 4.
F-35A combat air patrol at 1,500 kilometres
That would consume all of the RAAF’s enabling capabilities. It’s possible that enough fighter pilots and jets would be left over to conduct air defence of one other location (indicated here by the ring based on Darwin), but they’d be doing it without early warning aircraft or tankers.
Pulling the patrol back into 1,000 km would destress the cycle, potentially by allowing the commander to manage with just one air-to-air refuelling circuit, thereby requiring fewer KC-30As. But that gets us back to our starting point—air-to-air refuelling doesn’t help that much with increasing the F-35A’s combat range.
Would more of the same help?
The short answer is, it can’t extend range much beyond 1,500 km as that limit derives from the nature of the F-35A.
But more enablers would make the system robust. Andrew Davies recently gave a concise list of what these would be, ranging from greater fuel storage to tankers.
People are key—not just pilots, but also maintainers, ordnance handlers, and air combat officers in the back of Wedgetails, to name a few essential categories—but all will be taxed in a scenario of sustained operations. Even mundane things like concrete hard stands would be in high demand, because the limited space of the bare bases would quickly be overwhelmed. In short, the F-35As themselves are just the tip of the iceberg.
If the enemy has long-range standoff strike weapons or special forces that can destroy fuel farms, that’s another point of failure, as is a strike that craters the runway and shuts down operations. A favourite special forces tactic in exercises is to sneak in at night and ‘kill’ all the pilots.
So ‘more of the same’ would also need to include defensive capabilities such as ground-based air defence missiles, air defence guards, and maybe even a combat air patrol over the base itself (requiring more F-35As, more pilots and more fuel).
More fighters could allow the RAAF to operate simultaneously from multiple airbases, partially mitigating the risk posed by an enemy strike on any individual base, but those bases would also need the rest of the logistics chain.
With the sticker price just for tankers around $300 million each, building robustness is a very expensive proposition.
Operational Implications
If Australia is willing to invest heavily in more enablers like the KC-30A tanker, we could probably project airpower out to around 1,500 kilometres from one mainland base, but we probably couldn’t sustain a presence much beyond 1,000 km.
And, due to the number of aircraft the Royal Australian Air Force possesses, we could likely only do it in one place at a time.
If you’re a member of the school of strategic thought that believes the Australian Defence Force should be operating beyond our continent itself and out in the region, then this analysis shows how difficult it would be to provide air support for a deployed task force, for either air defence or close air support for troops engaged on the ground.
What this means is that if the RAAF devoted its entire effort to the task, deployed forces could hope for two F-35As providing sustained combat air patrols over Timor-Leste or mainland Papua New Guinea.
Sustaining airpower over Christmas Island (around 1,600 km from the nearest airbase) would be challenging, as it would over a near neighbour such as New Caledonia (1,500 km) or the planned joint naval base on Manus Island (1,300 km).
Sustaining any presence over key chokepoints such as the Sunda Strait (1,900 km) is probably not achievable.
Certainly, the task becomes easier if the commander is willing to accept more risk and if it’s decided that air support doesn’t have to continuous. But that means it may not be there when needed. And reaching relatively near neighbours like Fiji (2,700 km) can’t be done at all from mainland Australia.
Those who subscribe to the ‘defence of Australia’ school of strategic thought might argue that these scenarios are irrelevant because we shouldn’t be deploying task forces, particularly amphibious ones, in the first place. They would say our key missions will be either air defence of key mainland sites or strikes on bases our adversary is trying to establish in our near region or on maritime forces approaching Australia. They’d argue that with situational awareness and accurate predictions of the enemy’s movements, we should be able to fly missions only when we need to or at times of our choosing, and therefore we don’t need to keep aircraft constantly in the air a long way from their bases.
However, the problem with waiting behind a moat on the mainland was highlighted recently by Richard Dunley: ‘For the [defensive sea denial] strategy to work, the denying force needs to be stronger than its enemy everywhere (within the region of operations) all of the time. It’s no good being able to defend half of your coastline, or to do so whenever your forces are deployable.’
As explained earlier in the article, flying from mainland airbases to defend Australian cities, key infrastructure or potential enemy landing zones could still require ranges of well over 1,000 km.
Because of the size of our continent, conducting operations within Australia is essentially a form of expeditionary warfare that could require the same enablers as projecting power from Australia. From a pilot’s perspective, the Australian mainland is no different from the South Pacific—airbases are simply tiny islands in a vast brown continent rather than a blue one.
And, theoretically, you’d need to defend all of it all of the time. That means providing for the defence of Australia is at least as big a resource problem as the scenario outlined earlier.
If, however, we see the defence of Australia as essentially an anti-access/area-denial task aimed at striking the enemy as far from Australia as possible, the problem is somewhat different.
Conducting strike missions allows the commander to prioritise range over endurance.
If the commander is willing to take some risk (it is the defence of the homeland after all) and has a lot of tankers, they could push the range of the strike package out to 1,500 km.
A future F-35A-launched strike missile could potentially add around 500 km to that range, making the strike radius ring pretty big (see Figure 5).
2,000-kilometre range rings from northern Australian bases
It includes most of the island chain to our northeast and key choke points through the archipelago to our northwest.
But even in this role, the F-35A itself is just the tip of the iceberg.
The RAAF can assemble a potent strike force including Wedgetail early-warning aircraft for battlespace awareness and Growlers to jam enemy air-defence radars—and will soon have Peregrine aircraft to map the electronic warfare landscape.
But all of those assets are limited in number, so we could probably only conduct that task in one place at one time.
The most important element of a fifth-generation air force is highly capable intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets.
For Australia that means the yet-to-be-deployed Triton long-range drones, the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar network, and space-based capabilities to locate the enemy far from our shores, as well as the ‘hidden’ targeting infrastructure necessary to support long-range strike capabilities.
Such a capability would complicate an adversary’s plans to establish forward operating bases or to conduct operations directly against Australia.
That means they’ll be doing everything possible to strike our airbases before our aircraft take off. Granted, if an adversary was using fighters, they would themselves face the same challenges we’ve been looking at.
But a major power would have a lot of other assets at its disposal, such as bombers, medium-range ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles, all of which outrange the F-35A. So, building a resilient strike system around that jet still requires the rest of the iceberg outlined earlier, including ground-based air defence and redundant fuel storage.
The starting point of this article was the concern that we will not be able to rely as heavily on US military power in the future and consequently we will need to be more self-reliant in some contingencies.
Using the example of air combat power, this series has argued that greater self-reliance requires not simply additional F-35As but a broad range of expensive enabling capabilities.
Even then there are critical points of failure.
Even if one assesses that a self-reliant defence-of-Australia scenario is an extremely remote possibility in any credible future and that the most likely task for the ADF is to continue to deploy in US-led coalitions, the problem of limited fighter range in the vast Indo-Pacific is a pervasive one.
There’s also the challenge that the US itself is grappling with of how to operate in the western Pacific when its fighters are substantially outranged by Chinese missiles.
That means the issues raised here are relevant not just for a defence-of-Australia situation.
Virtually any operations in the Indo-Pacific will face the same challenges.
Operating from Offshore Bases
While aerial refuelling can increase a fighter’s time on station, there are limits on how much it can increase range. Even with tanker support the maximum achievable range for the F-35A is between 1,000 and 1,500 kilometres.
Moreover, the number of F-35As that can be kept on station at those ranges is extremely small—sustaining just two fighters on station at 1,500 km would likely consume the Royal Australian Air Force’s current enabling capabilities.
One way to address these limitations would be to operate from airfields away from the Australian mainland.
But it can’t be just any airfield.
A minimum runway length of 8,000 feet, or almost 2.5 kilometres, is required to safely operate the F-35A.
A shorter runway could be used, but then ordnance or fuel may need to be sacrificed to reduce the take-off weight and, as we have seen, fuel is crucial.
In addition, lots of pavement is required for the aircraft to stand on while they are maintained, refuelled and armed. A 2002 RAND Corporation study determined that a squadron of fighters required around 12,000 square metres of ramp space. Runway and pavement size requirements increase substantially if large aircraft like tankers and early-warning aircraft are also operating from the base, as does the required pavement strength. There’s also the need for substantial fuel reserves.
Gaining access to existing military airbases helps, as at least some of those things are already available. The risk with foreign airbases, of course, is that access is always at the owner’s discretion.
Fortunately, Australia has a couple of airfields of its own that could help at Christmas Island and at the Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
The latter has an 8,000-foot runway that supports the P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, which has recently retired from RAAF service.
According to Defence’s Integrated Investment Program, the runway is being upgraded to support the larger P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. In June, Defence released a tender for works to strengthen and widen the runways, taxiways and aprons at an estimated cost of $200 million.
No improvements to support fighter operations appear to be planned.
1,500-kilometre range ring from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands
From the Cocos Islands, the F-35A could conduct strike operations in the vicinity of the strategic Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra at its extreme range of 1,500 km, assuming it had access either to air-to-air refuellers (potentially operating out of a mainland base) and/or a long-range strike missile.
But maintaining a sustained presence would not be possible. Any operations over the Malacca Strait would be improbable, and they would be impossible over the South China Sea.
To project further north, Australia would need to rely on bases like Malaysia’s Butterworth that Australia has access to through an arrangement with the Malaysian government.
Butterworth puts the entire Strait of Malacca inside the F-35A’s unrefuelled range. It doesn’t get the F-35A very far into the South China Sea, although extending its range to 1,500 km through air-to-air refuelling would help.
Of course, in a contingency Malaysia might not feel that hosting Australian air combat operations was in its interests. The other big disadvantage is that Butterworth is within range of Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
A 2017 report by the US Center for a New American Security argued that such weapons have the ability to ‘devastate’ US forces in Asia and the Pacific as they are sufficiently precise to target runways, aircraft hardstands and fuel depots. Currently Australia has no ability to defeat such a threat.
1,000-kilometre range ring from Butterworth, Malaysia, and 3,000-kilometre range ring from Hainan, China
And there’s the rub.
The further north we operate, the further inside China’s anti-access/area-denial zone we get.
Of course, it’s hard to imagine a scenario where Australia would be operating so far from home without being part of a coalition with the US.
But even the US is facing the same challenge presented by Chinese capabilities—its fighters are out-ranged by Chinese missiles and its defences could be overwhelmed.
Airfields will be even more critical to any contingencies in the South Pacific. Just as operations in World War II in the Pacific were focused on gaining or denying access to airfields, so they will be in any future conflict.
But runways 8000 feet long are in short supply in the South Pacific. Those that do exist are international airports, not military airbases.
While the US military built many airfields across the region during the war, they were made for the aircraft of that time. Consequently, they are only 5,000–6,000 feet (1.5–1.8 km) in length and have very limited pavement. Many are in poor condition.
Manus Island in Papua New Guinea shows the potential advantages and disadvantages of offshore airbases in the South Pacific. Australia is currently working with PNG to upgradethe naval base at Lombrum on Manus.
There’s also an airport on Manus at Momote, originally established as a WWII airbase. As the figure below suggests, air combat operations from Momote would close the gap between PNG and the US forces based at Guam.
In a worst-case scenario in which US power in the western Pacific had been severely weakened and China sought to physically isolate Australia from the US (essentially a key element of Japanese strategy in WWII), airpower based at Momote could interdict any Chinese attempts to project force into the southwest Pacific.
If China does have intentions to establish military bases in countries like Vanuatu, Momote would in turn isolate them from China.
1,000-kilometre range ring from Manus Island, Papua New Guinea
However, the runway at Momote is only about 6,000 feet long. Upgrading air combat operations will take a lot of concrete for runway extensions and aprons as well as fuel and munitions storage, particularly if larger aircraft will be operating from there. If just strengthening and widening the Cocos runway is set to cost $200 million, upgrading Momote to support air combat operations will cost many times more.
While China has demonstrated its ability to lay a lot of concrete on islands quickly, it’s not something that the Australian Defence Force can do overnight. If it’s something we think is important, we’ll need to build it well in advance of any contingency. As with all offshore bases, partners’ interests and sensitivities need to be heeded at both the local and national levels.
Depending on the threat, many other assets would need to be deployed to protect the airbase, such as ground-based air defence and other land forces. This would bring Defence’s amphibious capabilities into play. Fuel may need to be delivered by the navy’s tankers. Protection and supply elements could need more F-35As and the navy’s major surface ships to protect them en route.
While offshore airbases could help project Australian power further forward, they would likely require substantial infrastructure investment well in advance of their military use and, potentially, the deployment of a substantial joint force to sustain and protect them.
Marcus Hellyer is ASPI’s senior analyst for defence economics and capability.
This article was published by ASPI in four parts which we have combined into a single article on Second Line of Defense.
Editor’s Note: This excellent article by Hellyer highlights the challenges of any tactical fighter and its range operating within a strictly national force. But the F-35 is not a traditional fighter and operates with reach not simply range because of its ability to operate with coalition F-35s to extend the reach of its combat information.
It is also clear that Australia needs to consider longer range strike assets as well as has been raised by the last two heads of the RAAF in a recent piece which appeared in The Australian.
As they argued in that piece:
“The force that we used to carry out nation-building in the Middle East cannot defend our sea lines of communication or prevent the lodgment of hostile power in the Indo-Pacific region,’’ Air Marshal Davies told The Australian. “But without a reset we will keep developing it against an outdated set of strategic circumstances.”
Air Marshal Brown, who led the RAAF from 2011 to 2015, called for a major increase in air power, saying that, as the strategic outlook changed, the air force, not the army, was likely to be the service of “first resort’’.
“As an advanced technological nation about to get deeply into space we should be playing to our strengths,’’ he told The Australian. “Investment in air crew and technology is actually incredibly efficient for a small nation with an educated population.”
The former air chiefs’ rare contributions to the debate come at a time of strategic upheaval, with the increasingly assertive role played by China forcing defence planners to rethink the country’s force posture.
And Hellyer’s focus on operating from forward bases, also raises the question of why Australia should consider adding F-35Bs to the fleet as well as operating F-35As but we will address these issues in a future article.
We have written about the shaping of a maritime domain awareness enterprise in the North Atlantic to deal with the Russian challenge and the fourth battle of the North Atlantic.
From this piece, which we published on Breaking Defense in 2017:
In effect, an MDA highway being built from Lossie and the F-35 reach from the UK to Northern Europe are about shaping common, convergent capabilities that will allow for expanded joint and combined operational capabilities.At this is not an add on, but built from the ground up.
Flying the same ISR/C2/strike aircraft, will pose a central challenge with regard to how best to share combat data in a fluid situation demanding timely and effective decision-making?
The UK is clearly a key player in shaping the way ahead on both the P-8 and F-35 enterprises, not just by investing in both platforms, but building the infrastructure and training a new generation of operators and maintainers as well. At the heart of this learning process are the solid working relationships among the professional military in working towards innovative concepts of operations. This is a work in progress that requires infrastructure, platforms, training and openness in shaping evolving working relationships.
We are now in November 2019, and can take note of recent developments which highlight shaping the way ahead for the MDA enterprise being shaped by the United States and its core allies.
Given the brains involved on the planes, and in the enterprise, this might suggest that NATO is not exactly “brain dead” as one Western leader recently asserted.
RAAF Poseidon Arrives in the Middle East
In a recent speech given by the head of the 5th Fleet at the BIDEC 19 conference, he focused on the need for expanding the ISR capabilities of the allied forces facing the diversity of threats in the region.
A RAAF P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft has arrived in the Middle East to conduct operations in support of the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC).
That’s the US-initiated mission prompted by escalating tensions with Iran amid rising concerns that a tanker war in the Straits of Hormuz could global oil supplies.
As well as the P-8A, Australia has also agreed to provide a warship, the Anzac frigate HMAS Toowoomba, which begins its deployment in January.
Defence Minister Linda Reynolds said the P-8A’s advanced surveillance capabilities will provide a modest but meaningful contribution.
“The P-8A will work alongside our coalition partners to ensure the safe passage of merchant vessels through the region, boost security and provide an advanced maritime patrol and surveillance capability,” she said.
“This is the first time the P-8A aircraft has operated in the Middle East and its deployment will support freedom of navigation in the region, which is a fundamental right of all states under international law.”
Although, no RAAF Poseidon has operated in this area, the RAAF has plenty of experience, flying AP-3C Orion aircraft – predecessor to Poseidon – deployed to the Middle east between 2003 and 2012.
The government says the P-8A Poseidon aircraft will provide an advanced maritime patrol and surveillance capability, to support the safe transit of naval and merchant vessels.
A RAAF P-8A Poseidon supports sea trials for the NUSHIP Hobart in the Gulf St Vincent off the coast of Adelaide.
That’s a brief deployment, running to the end of November 2019
The government hasn’t identified the P-8A’s operational base but it’s most like Australia’s longstanding support facility at the al-Minhad Air Base (AMAB) in the United Arab Emirates.
A small number of Australian Defence Force personnel are also serving in the IMSC’S Middle East headquarters in Bahrain.
Australia was an early backer of IMSC whose contributors are the US, UK, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, with, according to a report from Israel, some Israeli intelligence support.
Europe has a strong interest in maintaining uninterrupted oil supplies through the Straits of Hormuz. Although invited to contribute to IMSC, no European nation has yet signed on, apparently out of concern at being dragged into the US row with Iran.
RAF Gets its First Poseidon Aircraft
According to a UK Ministry of Defence article published on October 31, 2019:
The MOD is investing £3 billion in nine state-of-the-art jets which will enhance the UK’s tracking of hostile maritime targets, protect the British continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent and play a central role in NATO missions across the North Atlantic.
Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said:
“The arrival of the world-class Poseidon aircraft marks a step-change in the UK’s maritime patrol capability.
“Using the world’s most advanced sensors and operating for long periods, these aircraft will transform the quality of intelligence available to our armed forces and protect our vital nuclear deterrent.”
Image shows the first RAF P-8A Poseidon landing at NAS Jacksonville. The first submarine-hunting Poseidon MRA1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) has been delivered to the Royal Air Force. The MOD is investing £3 billion in nine state-of-the-art jets which will enhance the UK’s tracking of hostile maritime targets, protect the British continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent, and play a central role in NATO missions across the North Atlantic. The aircraft left Boeing Field, Seattle, flying under the callsign POSIDN1, flying across the United States of America, before touching down at Naval Air Station Jacksonville where Air Officer Commanding Number 1 Group, Air Vice-Marshal Harv Smyth, took delivery of the first Royal Air Force P-8A Poseidon.
Following an unveiling ceremony in Seattle, the aircraft was flown to Naval Air Station Jacksonville in Florida where RAF personnel are being trained to operate the aircraft.
On arrival Michelle Sanders, DE&S Delivery Team Leader, signed the paperwork to formally transfer the aircraft, named Pride of Moray, to UK ownership.
Air Chief Marshal Mike Wigston, Chief of the Air Staff, said:
“Poseidon is a game-changing maritime patrol aircraft, able to detect, track and if necessary destroy the most advanced submarines in the world today.
“With Poseidon MRA1, I am delighted and very proud that the Royal Air Force will once again have a maritime patrol force working alongside the Royal Navy, securing our seas to protect our nation.”
First Sea Lord, Admiral Tony Radakin, said:
“Poseidon marks a superb upgrade in the UK’s ability to conduct anti-submarine operations. This will give the UK the ability to conduct long range patrols and integrate seamlessly with our NATO allies to provide a world-leading capability.
“This will maintain operational freedom for our own submarines, and apply pressure to those of our potential foes. I look forward to working with the RAF and our international partners on this superb capability.”
The Poseidon MRA1 is designed to carry out extended surveillance missions at both high and low altitudes. The aircraft is equipped with cutting-edge sensors which use high-resolution area mapping to find both surface and sub-surface threats.
The aircraft can carry up to 129 sonobuoys, small detection devices which are dropped from the aircraft into the sea to search for enemy submarines. The systems survey the battlespace under the surface of the sea and relay acoustic information via radio transmitter back to the aircraft.
The aircraft will also be armed with Harpoon anti-surface ship missiles and Mk 54 torpedoes capable of attacking both surface and sub-surface targets.
Michelle Sanders, DE&S Delivery Team Leader, said:
“Seeing the first Poseidon MRA1 handed over to the Royal Air Force is an incredibly proud moment for all of the team at DE&S.
“Close, collaborative working with colleagues in Air Capability, the US Navy and industry has helped us deliver this very capable aircraft.”
As leading members of NATO, the UK has signed agreements with both the US and Norwegian militaries to cooperate closely on operating their Poseidon fleets across the North Atlantic.
In August this year, Defence Minister Anne Marie-Trevelyan hosted Norwegian State Secretary Tone Skogen at RAF Lossiemouth to deepen the two country’s partnership on the Poseidon programme.
To maintain the skills required to deliver this vital capability, the RAF has embedded aircrew within MPA squadrons in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA.
The first aircraft will arrive in Scotland in early 2020, with the fleet to be based at RAF Lossiemouth in Moray. All nine aircraft will be delivered by November 2021.
The aircraft will be flown initially by 120 Squadron which was originally stood up on 1 January 1918 and was the leading anti-submarine warfare squadron in WWII. 201 Squadron will also join the programme in due course.
The Poseidon MRA1 programme is bringing significant economic benefits to the communities near RAF Lossiemouth. A total of £460 million is being invested in the station to prepare for the arrival of the new aircraft, including the construction of a £132 million strategic facility for the fleet to be completed next year.
The programme will also bring around 700 additional personnel to Moray, taking the total number of employees there to approximately 2,500.
Norway, the UK and the Maritime Domain Awareness Enterprise
In a story published on August 15, 2019 on the Norwegian Ministry of Defence website, the collaboration between the UK and Norway was highlighted in the MDA area.
The UK is investing £3 billion in nine new Boeing Poseidon P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, with Norway committing to a further five. The aircraft are sophisticated submarine-hunters designed to scout complex undersea threats.
The aircraft will work together, and with NATO allies, to combat a range of intensifying threats in the North Atlantic, including increased hostile submarine activity.
Defence Minister Anne-Marie Trevelyan and Norwegian State Secretary Tone Skogen Credit: UK MOD
Defence Minister Anne-Marie Trevelyan said:
“The UK’s maritime patrol aircraft programme demonstrates our ongoing commitment to working with international allies in the North Atlantic, strengthening our alliances with valued partners such as Norway.
“Our two nations share basing facilities, undergo cold weather training together and patrol the seas and skies side-by-side allowing us to successfully face down the growing threats from adversaries in the North Atlantic region.”
During the visit, the defence ministers experienced a demonstration flight in a US Navy Poseidon P-8A aircraft.
Norwegian State Secretary Tone Skogen said:
“The UK and Norway have a long history of cooperation on maritime surveillance and operations. This close relationship will only improve now that we will operate the same type of MPA, the P-8 Poseidon. UK and Norwegian priorities are aligned in the North Atlantic, and we look forward to a close and integrated partnership in meeting common challenges within the realm of maritime security.”
Recently, the Williams Foundation held its latest seminar on fifth generation force development.
In preparation for the seminar, Squadron Leader Melissa Houston, a P-8A tactical co-ordinator and flight commander in the Royal Australian Air Force, provided her perspective on what the Poseidon and ultimately what the Triton will bring to the fight.
What does fifth-generation manoeuvre mean in the context of airborne anti-submarine warfare? Fifth-generation, a term typically applied to fighters, encompasses highly integrated net-enabled systems within a high-performance stealth airframe. The P-8A Poseidon, the Royal Australian Air Force’s (RAAF) only maritime patrol aircraft, lacks the stealth and manoeuvrability of a fifth-generation fighter but arguably holds fifth-generation ‘systems equivalence’ due to its advanced avionics, sensors and extensive communications suite. The P-8A is designed to engage in underwater warfare, where submarines are the primary threat. In order for the submarine threat to be defeated, however, the P-8A must successfully integrate with the broader Australian Defence Force (ADF). This post will describe the strategic value the Poseidon brings to the ADF, outline the critical roles of the P-8A, and identify some of the critical challenges faced in realising that potential.
The Australian government acknowledges the array of challenges to national security created by a contested maritime environment. The 2016 Defence White Paper sets a requirement to secure Australia’s northern approaches and proximate sea lines of communication, while also securing the near region, encompassing maritime South East Asia and the South Pacific. Understanding the P-8A’s value in meeting these requirements require a dive beneath the surface to analyse subsurface strategic value.
A secure Australia depends upon protection from attack or coercion. Submarines play a vital role on both sides of this equation. Uncertainty as to the location and purpose of Australia’s submarines acts as a critical deterrent to a potential adversary. The reverse is true of potential opponents’ submarines. Anti-submarine warfare limits an adversary submarine’s ability to achieve sea denial, conduct intelligence activities, insert land forces or conduct missile strikes. Critically, friendly anti-submarine warfare enhances the effectiveness of friendly submarines by disrupting opposing submarine operations. The maintenance of an effective anti-submarine warfare capability allows the ADF to detect and disrupt a key threat to Australia while enhancing the potency of its undersea deterrent.
The P-8A makes a unique contribution to Australia’s joint anti-submarine warfare capability as the ADF’s only fixed-wing aircraft that can find, fix, track, and attack an underwater target. The P-8A’s speed and range – it can operate over 2000 kilometres from its base – complement the persistence and presence of Australia’s surface and sub-surface anti-submarine capabilities. Range and responsiveness are particularly valuable when considering the reach of the world’s leading submarines.
The P-8A’s ability to operate at range while maintaining real-time communication with various agencies, combined with its sensor and data feeds, makes it an extremely valuable asset. The P-8A acoustics system has four times the processing capability of the recently retired AP-3C Orion. The P-8A can, therefore, provide four times the coverage or four times the security in an anti-submarine warfare search. The use of advanced sensors and processing are critical elements of the P-8A’s fifth-generation potential.
However, the P-8A’s lack of stealth, low speed, and limited defensive systems leave it vulnerable to increasingly sophisticated threats in the maritime domain. The P-8A has demonstrated performance in congested environments but has yet to be employed in contested environments.
Importantly, congestion in 2019 is more than a problem of dense shipping on the ocean’s surface. The P-8A faces emerging challenges in a competitive and cluttered electromagnetic spectrum, resulting in global positioning system interference, radar interference and jamming. As the P-8A’s performance is optimised as part of a highly networked fifth-generation force, disruption in the electromagnetic spectrum has the potential to reduce mission effectiveness significantly. Accordingly, the RAAF must continue to evolve how the P-8A is employed.
There are several challenges facing the P-8A fleet in exploiting its potential. Resolving issues in human factors, technical integration, and command and control will help the ADF realise the Poseidon’s potential.
There is little benefit in P-8A sensors and communications suites integrating with other platforms if operators are not adequately trained to exploit the data being received and know where it must feed. When it comes to fifth-generation manoeuvre, people often get excited by the high-end warfare integration components, sometimes at the expense of basic concepts. Integration is first and foremost about co-operating safely and becoming fifth-generation does not remove the threat of fratricide or accident. Understanding other platform limitations is key to successful (and safe) operations in a congested and contested environment.
We must remain cognizant of the current limitations of our successful integration across ADF platforms. We must continue to develop, test and adjust joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. In an increasingly complex subsurface environment, the safe and successful prosecution P-8A’s missions, especially anti-submarine tasks, must be joint actions.
Improved understanding and integration of joint combat and support systems will enable the development of a joint concept of operations. The age of information means that aircrew is more likely to be overwhelmed with the amount of information they are being fed in real-time by various agencies. This hyper-connectivity can lead to poor prioritisation and breakdowns in situational awareness. The ADF must understand the limitations of our autonomous systems – but also that of our people. Fifth-generation operators must have more discipline and self-awareness than ever before.
A key component of success in fifth-generation manoeuvre is real-time, net-enabled operations. The ADF’s machines must understand one another’s data language for net-enabled operations to be feasible, just as much as the people on board need to understand each other. An example from recent exercise is the requirement for further development of joint procedures across RAAF and Royal Australian Navy elements ensure that datalink messages are transmitted and received as intended. This is paramount in targeting and employing net-enabled weapons. There is no fifth-generation force if the fifth-generation platforms cannot communicate assuredly across the force.
Importantly, with the rise of challenges in the electromagnetic spectrum, ADF systems and people must become adept at operating in analogue or degraded communications modes. Building trust and confidence in systems, in people, and in systems of systems is key to exploiting the Poseidon’s potential.
Finally, with the P-8A’s ability to be re-tasked for any number of missions, command and control is more complicated than ever. Assets can be reassigned in real-time, and aircrew must have a clear understanding of their C2 arrangements, particularly where an asset is dually assigned or where it has separate operational and tactical control arrangements.
The P-8A will absorb the AP-3C’s legacy tasking, stretched across air power roles while integrating seamlessly with civilian agencies in search and rescue roles and ADF and coalition partners across the maritime and land domains. Real-time intelligence updates also mean that the P-8A can act and react in response to the evolving threat environment. Evolution of tasking processes and authorities must evolve to a fifth-generation way of thinking to exploit, rather than limit, the potential of advanced systems.
The P-8A Poseidon brings new potential to the ADF, particularly in its primary underwater warfare role. A fifth-generation maritime patrol aircraft optimises its sensors, communications, and crew as part of an integrated force, and leverages those resources to be more effective and efficient in disrupting adversary submarines and enhancing friendly operations.
Australia’s P-8A fleet has already demonstrated performance in congested environments and gained experience in several operational theatres. P-8A operations, as part of a fifth-generation force, must continue to evolve to achieve the Poseidon’s fifth-generation potential. The ADF must work through challenges in human factors, technical integration, and C2 to unlock Poseidon’s potency.
The featured photo shows an Australian KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) from 33SQN, operated by the Aircraft Research and Development Unit, conducts aerial refueling compatibility flight testing over the Atlantic Ocean with a United States Navy P-8A Poseidon from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Two Zero.
