Japanese Face Significant Military Integration Challenge as They Modernize Their Forces

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Japanese Face Significant Military Integration Challenge as They Modernize Their Forces
09/06/2019

The Japanese forces have been classically stoved-piped ones going forward.

Now the Japanese are about to pass their 8th budget in a row increasing defense spending.

The Self-Defense Force wants record spending power next year to help pay for major upgrades to the nation’s defenses, as Tokyo continues to perceive a missile threat from North Korea despite Pyongyang’s promise to abandon nuclear weapons.

The Defense Ministry budget proposal released Friday calls for defense spending to rise 2.1 percent to ¥5.3 trillion ($48 billion) for the year starting April 1.

If approved it will be the seventh straight annual increase, as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reinforces the Self-Defense Forces to respond to any North Korea missile strike and counter China’s growing air and sea power in the waters around Japan.

The proposed defense budget still has to face scrutiny by Finance Ministry officials who may seek to curtail any rise in military outlays to secure funds for the nation’s burgeoning health and welfare spending.

The biggest proposed outlay in the military budget will be on ballistic missile defense, with a request for ¥235 billion for two new powerful ground-based Aegis Ashore radar missile tracking stations built by Lockheed Martin Corp.

Japan’s military also wants funds to buy longer-range Raytheon Co. SM-3 interceptor missiles designed to strike enemy missiles in space, and money to improve the range and accuracy of its PAC-3 missiles batteries that are the last line of defense against incoming warheads.

With the upsurge in defense spending, the Japanese are adding new fifth generation airpower capabilities, new missile defense capabilities, and new tron warfare capabilities.

Underlying the upsurge in acquisition is the challenge of force integration.

How will the Japanese reshape their forces to provide for extended perimeter defense and to do so in way that the force can operated as an integrated distributed force?

Perhaps there evolving relationship with Australia where the ADF is prioritizing force integration might have a major impact.

The United States is in the throes of significant change as well, but continued commitments to the land wars in the Middle East, uncertainty about how the direct defense of Europe is best done in terms of the American contribution, and service conflicts over how to best deliver enhanced deterrence in depth will slow the U.S. con-ops innovations.

But clearly allies like Japan and Australia are major players in the reshaping of the U.S. force development in the Pacific as well.

Virtually all of the press reports surrounding the Japanese budget look like shopping lists; but we are clearly moving rapidly beyond the legitimacy of such an appraoch.

We clearly need to focus on the capabilities for the U.S. and the allies to work together to deliver an effective deterrent force.

The new Sec Def, Mark Esper, has prioritized defense efforts in the Pacific as a key anchor to the Great Power strategy.  In particular, given the withdrawal from the INF treaty, a key focus is upon the building of new conventional longer-range missiles deployed throughout the US and allied Pacific defense perimeter.

This entails interactive technological, force structure and geographical deployment dynamics.  We have argued that a new basing structure combined with a capability to deploy and operate an integrated distributed force is at the heart of the strategic shift, and not only in the Pacific1

This is a key part of the effort to shape a full spectrum crisis management capability whose con-ops is shaped to deal with adversary operations within what some call the “gray zone” or within the “hybrid warfare” area2

The nature of the threat facing the liberal democracies was well put by a senior Finnish official: “The timeline for early warning is shorter; the threshold for the use of force is lower.”

What is unfolding is that capabilities traditionally associated with high end warfare are being drawn upon for lower threshold conflicts, designed to achieve political effect without firing a shot.

Higher end capabilities being developed by China are Russia are becoming tools to achieve political-military objectives throughout the diplomatic engagement spectrum.

This means that not only do the liberal democracies need to shape more effective higher end capabilities but they need to learn how to use force packages which are making up a higher end, higher tempo or higher intensity capability as part of a range of both military operations but proactive engagement to shape peer adversary behavior.

In today’s world, this is what full spectrum crisis management is all about.  It is not simply about escalation ladders; it is about the capability to operate tailored task forces within a crisis setting to dominate and prevail within that crisis. If that stops the level of escalation that is one way of looking at it. But in today’s world, it is not just about that but it is about the ability to operate and prevail within a diversity of crises which might not be located on what one might consider an escalation ladder.

How will the Japanese leverage their new capabilities to shape such a force? 

The featured photo: Service members with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) 2nd Air Defense Missile Group, set up the MIM-104 Patriot missile system during Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) deployment training at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, Aug. 29, 2017. PAC-3 is a surface-to-air missile defense system, which provides a highly reactive hit-to-kill capability in both range and altitude while operating in all environments. This training displays the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance and demonstrates the JASDF’s ability to rapidly deploy multiple defense assets to U.S. military installations across Japan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Aaron Henson)

The video below was published by the Japanese Ministry of Defence and explains their view on the evolution of the SDF:

Dassault’s Perspective on the Way Ahead on European Defense Projects

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Dassault’s Perspective on the Way Ahead on European Defense Projects

By Pierre Tran, Paris

European industry needs much patience as key nations have yet to agree on requirements and budgets for a planned Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and a medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, Dassault Aviation CEO Eric Trappier said Sept 4.

France, Germany and Spain have yet to sign contracts for technology demonstrators for the the New Generation Fighter (NGF), a key element in FCAS which includes remote carrier drones and a command and control network.

“We are very impatient,” Trappier told a press conference on the company’s first half financial results. The partner nations need to agree on specifications and budgets for the FCAS, in which the industrial partners have agreed their respective roles, he added.

“We are ready,” he said. “We submitted our offer.”

There had been hopes for a contract to be announced at the Paris airshow, which ran June 17-23, with prospects slipping to September and the end of the year, he said.  Engineers are keen to work on a prototype rather than proposals, and need to develop their skills.

A prototype is due to fly in 2026, so the program needs to be launched, he said. Trappier declined to give details of the budget.

France and Germany plan to invest an initial €4 billion ($4.4 billion) in the new fighter jet by 2025, with €2.5 billion from Paris, Sky News reported June 17.

France is lead nation on the FCAS project, with Dassault prime contractor for the new fighter, which will replace the French Rafale, German Typhoon and Spanish F-18.

It was important for FCAS and a plan for a new Franco-German tank to be kept entirely separate, Trappier said, adding Dassault is working with Airbus on the former.

“We would really like the two subjects to be firmly kept apart,” he said.

Trappier has previously expressed concern over a potential spill over of a row over German industrial leadership on the tank project, dubbed Main Ground Combat System (MGCS).

“Progress is difficult,” he told May 22 parliamentarians of the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly.

Airbus and Dassault are working on the FCAS aeronautical project, while Rheinmetall is the new entrant in the tank deal, in which KMW and Nexter are partners, he said.

Rheinmetall objects to a proposed 25 percent share in the tank project, equal to the stake for Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, with the former seeking a greater role, financial website La Tribune reported May 15.

The French and German authorities proposed the 25/25 percent share for Rheinmetall and KMW for Germany, with Nexter holding 50 percent for France.

Trappier pointed up to parliamentarians “the slightly symmetrical nature of the FCAS project and the Main Ground Combat System in terms of organization,” adding “the difficulties of one could flow into the other as the same two procurement offices are involved.”

The French procurement office, Direction Générale de l’Armement, represents France in negotiations with Germany, where the parliament has a strong supervisory role.

Alongside the new tank, France and Germany are also pursing planned new artillery, dubbed Common Indirect Fire System (CIFS).

Meanwhile, Airbus, Dassault and Leonardo, are also waiting for contracts on the proposed European MALE UAV. Those are the three key companies on the project backed by France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

Occar, the European procurement office, would manage that program if the four partner nations reach agreement on requirement and budget.

“You have to be resilient, you have to be patient on a large defense program,” even more so when there is cooperation with several countries and other companies, he said, adding that the MALE UAV project will apply for financial backing from the European Defense Fund. Trappier expressed confidence the project would win the contract.

Airbus is prime contractor on the European MALE UAV.

Germany is lead partner on the tank and European UAV cooperative projects, while France leads on FCAS. These projects are part of the pursuit of European defense as evoked by French president Emmanuel Macron.

In exports, Dassault will deliver the first of 36 Rafale to India this month, Trappier said. Now the elections are over in India, talks will resume for further sales of the fighter.

The Indian air force is keen to acquire a further 110 fighters, while the navy seeks 57, financial daily Les Echosreported July 22. Macron invited Indian Prime Minister NarendraModi to dinner a day before the opening of the G7 summit, held Aug. 24-26 at Biarritz, southwest France.

Dassault continues to take part in fighter competitions held by Finland and Switzerland, Trappier said, adding that he was surprised it took so long for Airbus to pull out of the Canadian competition for 88 fighters.

Dassault dropped out of that tender last year, as the terms were seen as unreasonable, particularly security requirements set by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), he said.

On the new generation fighter, Trappier called for Berlin and Paris to agree on terms for export controls as foreign sales would be needed to support the program.

Asked about Britain building its Tempest fighter and competing with the Franco-German combat jet, he said. “It is better to have two than nothing.”

French officials see that industrial capability as underpinning a strategic autonomy and national sovereignty.

The 2010 Lancaster House defense treaty between France and the UK will weather the planned Brexit move, as cooperation will continue, he said. Britain’s pulling out of cooperation on a technology demonstrator for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) may have been for a number of reasons, such as Brexit or budgetary constraint, he said.

France is expected to place an order for 10 Falcon jets, comprising three Falcon 8X, dubbed Arcangel, for electronic warfare, and seven Falcon 2000LS, dubbed Albatros, for maritime patrol. The former will replace an aging two-strong fleet of C-160 Gabriel.

Dassault reported adjusted net profit of €286 million in the first half, up 54 percent from a year ago. Net sales rose to €3.1 billion from €1.71 billion.

Orders rose to €2.9 billion from €2.8 billion, helped by a 10-year service contract with France on the Rafale, based on Dassault’s acting as single prime contractor for maintenance of equipment, except for engines and ejector seats.

Adjusted operating income rose to €250 million from €111 million. The order book eased to €19.2 billion from €19.4 billion.

The cash holding slipped to €4.8 billion from €5.2 billion, with the company forecasting a further fall due to spending on export Rafales, development of two Falcon jet programs and new buildings as part of a modernization plan.

KMW has partnered with Nexter in a Franco-German joint venture, KNDS, which had been assigned as prime contractor for the new tank. Nexter is a French state-owned maker of land weapons, including the Leclerc tank and Caesar artillery.

Bio Eric Trappier - Chairman CEO Dassault Aviation

 

 

Jihadism, Globalization and Reshaping of the Euro-Med Region: A Work in Progress

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Jihadism, Globalization and Reshaping of the Euro-Med Region: A Work in Progress
09/05/2019

By Robbin Laird

When one talks about globalization, its benefits and its challenges, the discussion usually is upon the global economy.

But with globalization has come the opening of borders, legally and not, to the migration of peoples.  In fact, we are experiencing one of the most significant periods of migratory change since the Second World War, the brutality of which also had the effect of dramatically moving peoples globally.

A defining element of globalization since the mid-1990s has been jihadism

With the emergence of Europe “free and whole,” the tableau upon which the jihadism picture has been painted is a Euro-Middle East.

This a region within which the flow of migrants from the Middle East as well as the rise of a more fundamentalist and less integrationist form of Islam has risen in significance within Europe itself.

A key goal Osama bin Laden for the 9/11 attacks in the United States was to encourage the United States to counter attack in the Middle East itself.  He believed that such an engagement would create a recruiting sergeant for al-Queda in its strategic efforts to change the political landscape in the Middle East and bring the Muslim world closer his vision.

This means that from the outset, global jihadism has become a central part of globalization and to the rise of the 21stcentury authoritarian powers and the end of the “end of history” projection of globalization and the dominance of the liberal democracies.

What we are now witnessing is the growing impact of China, Russia, Turkey and jihadism as an ascendant force in global affairs against which the liberal democracies are reacting and in significant conflict about and in many ways in disarray with regard to the best paths ahead for them in such a world.

At the suggestion of Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation, I recently read the book entitled Nine Lives.   He expressed to me that the book should be “required reading in the political domain.”

I rarely have read a book that has provided both a good read as well as providing a way in to understand the nature, challenges and way ahead to deal with the variegated challenges of the West dealing with militant jihad.

The book is truly unique.

To quote the book jacket: “As one of al-Queda’s most respected bomb makers Aimen Dean rubbed shoulders with the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden himself.

“As a double agent at the hear of al-Qaeda’s chemical weapons program, he foiled attacks on civilians and saved countless lives, brushing with death so often that his handlers began to call him their spy with nine lives.”

That opening alone would make one want to read the book.

But what one then discovers when entering the world of the author is a chance to revisit the history of our Western interaction with militant Jihad and the evolution of the Muslim world both in Europe and the Middle East.

In 1995, I wrote an article on the interaction between Europe and the Middle East in which is was clear to me that that we were looking at a dynamic two way street in which both Westernization as well as Islam were interactively challenging one another.

What the life of Aimen Dean and his narrative about militant Jihad underscores is how central this interaction has become to both the future evolution of Europe and the Muslim Middle East.

He goes as a 15 year old Bahraini to Bosnia to defend the Muslims being slaughtered by the Serbs.

In fact, modern militant jihad has its origins in the mid-1990s in Bosnia.

“The conflict would sow bitter fruit.  Two decades later, more than 300 Bosnians would trael to Syria and Iraq to support ISIS, one of the highest number per capita from anywhere in Europe. Bosnia was a crucible for modern jihad.”3

In Dean’s view, as a future member of al-Queda and who would later meet Osama bin Laden and swear an oath of loyalty to him, the future of jihadism was presaged in Bosnia.

“Influential jihadis such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who would just a few years later mastermind the 9/11 attacks, were encouraging the belief that a war of civilizations was inevitable….

He quoted comments made by KSM to him at a wedding:

“Bosnia is a sideshow. America is the true enemy. The Arabs here (in Bosnia) should move to Afghanistan. There is a camp call Khalden in Khost province, where a new force is being built.”4

Over time Europe becomes both a recruitment center and infrastructure for support for the militant jihadists who were generated during the Iraq and Afghan wars, and who then became the foot soldiers for al-Queda and ISIS.

The author describes extensively throughout the book his time in the UK with the jihadists and the key role, which both Britain and Germany have played in providing, recruits to the cause.

After the author becomes an operative of British intelligence but remained a member of al-Queda he witnessed the European-wide operation.

“My employers were beginning to get a sense that Europe had an expanding and multifaceted problem: radicalization, recruitment and fundraising in what was essentially a continent-wide sanctuary.”5

The author quoted a senior leader of the jihadists who had lived extensively in Europe.

“Al-Suri believed Islamists already living in the West should be the shock troops of terrorism in the future. Having himself lived for years I Europe, he believed there was already significant sympathy for the jihadi cause there.

“More than nay other jihadi leader I met, he had an unbridle hatred for European secularism and lassitude,. While bin Laden obsessed about the United State, al-Suri had called on Algerian jihadis to ‘strike deeply in France,’ and he hated Britain just as venomously.”6

He argued toward the end of the book, that the modern period of militant jihad can be understood in terms of a building out of a number of phases of development.

“With the explosion of terror attacks worldwide, jihadism has evolved in my lifetime. I was one of the youngest members of the first generation, which came of age in jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan and among the mountains of Bosnia.

“The second generation emerged during the Iraq War.

“And now there is a third generation of often tech-savvy youngsters, who have grown up amongst the carnage and upheavals unleashed since the Arab Spring and the ruse of far-right anti-Muslim extremism in the West.”7

In the evolving phase, he describes the conflicts between ISIS and al-Queda and the conflicting variants of jihadism as the movement mutates going forward. But the author argues frequently throughout the book, that Westerners have not really grasped the fundamental religious character of these movements, driven by their visions of spiritual redemption.

“So many attempts by outsiders to capture the essence of these groups have underplayed their spiritual underpinnings.  Western analysts tend to study jihadi movements through the prism of their own assumptions, believing that such groups will weigh risks and benefits and act rationally. Al-Qaeda was quite capable of that as the meticulous planning of the 9/11 attacks showed.

“But, ultimately, global jihad is guided by very specific interpretations of the Koran and the hadith.”8

From the perspective of someone inside the standing up and evolution of jihadism, the U.S. generated invasion of Iraq simply led to a very significant upsurge in recruits to the process and led to a rapid acceleration of its globalization.

As the author puts it: “the fiasco of the U.S. occupation of Iraq had become a recruiting sergeant for al-Queda.”9

From my perspective, the book can clearly be read as providing a clear understanding why the ill-fated attempt to do stability operations was clearly not only doomed to failure but enhanced the problem of dealing with the region.

On the one hand, inserting the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan as it has done in the Muslim Middle East has only enhanced recruiting the various radical Islam movements.Being an engaged ally is one thing; appearing as an occupier and organizer of stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is something quite different.

On the other hand, the challenge of militant jihad is clearly an internal Muslim challenge in terms of the war of ideas.

As the author as a devout Muslim argues throughout the book, jihadism is flawed ideology, one at odds with Islam.

And it needs to be challenged in these terms, something clearly not a good domain for players like U.S. forces to even be touching, and what is clearly part of what would be necessary for successful stability outcomes in the Middle East.

He discusses throughout the book but most notably at the end various ways this battle in the domain of ideas can be fought, and won.  But it is clearly, not something I as an American am going to play a central role, to say the least.

The impact of jihadism on Europe is central to the fate and future of Europe and here the battle for the soul and future of Europe is closely entailed with the internal battle against jihadism.

How will the European debate and political resolution of migration and integration of Muslims best proceed?

How to deal with those Muslims living in Europe who have no interest in integration and have little in common with the secular values in Europe?

This means that although for the Middle East, sorting through the way ahead between Shia and Sunnis is central something for Muslims to sort out, the role of Europe and its secular culture will have its impact simply because of the challenge of working the integration challenge for the Muslims living and coming to Europe.

And that was what I argued in my earlier article about France and Islam with regard to the central challenge which secularism poses to the Muslim world.

The rise of Putin coincides as well global jihadism, in this case the war against the Chechens.  To this day, we do not know whether the Russians themselves or terrorists set up the deadly explosions in Moscow, which brought Putin to power.

“Putin may not have ordered or even been aware of the plan to bomb Moscow. But it was a gift – whoever wrapped it – to the new hard man of Russian politics.”10

And in his life after MI-6, the author has worked with various clients to deal with global jihadism.

One of those clients has been the Chinese security services.

“The aftermath of 9/11 has touched every corner of the world; even China was not immune. The Taliban might have been ejected from Kabul, but their continuing resistance had p[provide the Uighurs with an escape route. How ironic that the government of Pakistan had gone with its begging bowl to Beijing seeking investment and trade even as its security services continued helping the Taliban on the quiet,”11

The book is clearly essential reading to understand the dynamics of change in our world, notably with jihadism as a significant global driver of change.  This is an aspect of globalization usually left off the lists of the business-consulting firms when they are promoting the benefits of globalization.

The challenge to the West and liberal democracy is its commitment to secularism.

How does a secular society defend itself against an enemy within while dealing with an explosive force within the Middle East as well?

How can a secular society work its ability to defend itself against the rising authoritarian powers who are also at odds with one another.

Clearly, China and Russia are very concerned with global jihadism, but their actions even when cooperating with the West pursue their own trajectory.

 

 

ITX 5-19

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on ITX 5-19

U.S. Marines with Company C, 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment conduct a platoon-sized attack on range 410A during the Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) 5-19 aboard Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., July. 29, 2019.

The purpose of ITX 5-19 is to create a challenging, realistic training environment that produces combat-ready forces capable of operating as an integrated MAGTF.

TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA, UNITED STATES

07.29.2019

Video by Lance Cpl. Skylar Harris

2nd Marine Division

The International Fighter Conference, 2019: Networked Lethality and Shaping an “Integrated Distributed Force”

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The International Fighter Conference, 2019: Networked Lethality and Shaping an “Integrated Distributed Force”
09/03/2019

Last year’s International Fighter Conference provided a chance for the participants and the attendees to focus on the role of fighters in what we have been calling the strategic shift, namely, the shift from the land wars to operating in higher intensity operations against peer competitors.

It is clear that combat capabilities and operations are being re-crafted across the board with fighters at the center of that shift, and their evolution, of course, being affected as well as roles and operational contexts change.

The baseline assumption for the conference can be simply put: air superiority can no longer be assumed in operations but needs to be created in contested environments.

It is clear that competitors like China and Russia have put and are putting significant effort into shaping concepts of operations and force structure modernization which will allow them to contest the ability of the liberal democracies to establish air superiority and to dominate future crises.

There was a clear consensus on this point, but, of course, working the specifics of how one would defeat such an adversary in an air campaign gets at broader and more specific force design and concepts of operations.

The conference worked from the common assumption rather than focusing on specific options.

But the way ahead was as contested in the presentations and discussions as any considerations for operations in contested airspace.

We argue that what the liberal democracies are working to shape in response to the new strategic environment is something we call building an “integrated distributed force.”

For example, the new Sec Def, Mark Esper, has prioritized defense efforts in the Pacific as a key anchor to the Great Power strategy.  In particular, given the withdrawal from the INF treaty, a key focus is upon the building of new conventional longer-range missiles deployed throughout the US and allied Pacific defense perimeter.

This entails interactive technological, force structure and geographical deployment dynamics.  We have argued that a new basing structure combined with a capability to deploy and operate an integrated distributed force is at the heart of the strategic shift, and not only in the Pacific.1

This is a key part of the effort to shape a full spectrum crisis management capability whose con-ops is shaped to deal with adversary operations within what some call the “gray zone” or within the “hybrid warfare” area.2

The nature of the threat facing the liberal democracies was well put by a senior Finnish official: “The timeline for early warning is shorter; the threshold for the use of force is lower.”

What is unfolding is that capabilities traditionally associated with high end warfare are being drawn upon for lower threshold conflicts, designed to achieve political effect without firing a shot.

This means that not only do the liberal democracies need to shape more effective higher end capabilities but they need to learn how to use force packages which are making up a higher end, higher tempo or higher intensity capability as part of a range of both military operations but proactive engagement to shape peer adversary behavior.

In today’s world, this is what full spectrum crisis management is all about.

It is not simply about escalation ladders; it is about the capability to operate tailored task forces within a crisis setting to dominate and prevail within that crisis. If that stops the level of escalation that is one way of looking at it. But in today’s world, it is not just about that but it is about the ability to operate and prevail within a diversity of crises which might not be located on what one might consider an escalation ladder.

The presence force however small needs to be well integrated but not just in terms of itself but its ability to operate via C2 or ISR connectors to an enhanced capability. But that enhanced capability needs to be deployed in order to be tailorable to the presence force and to provide enhanced lethality and effectiveness appropriate to the political action needed to be taken.

This rests really on a significant rework of C2 in order for a distributed force to have the flexibility to operate not just within a limited geographical area but to expand its ability to operate by reaching beyond the geographical boundaries of what the organic presence force is capable of doing by itself.

This requires multi-domain SA – this is not about the intelligence community running its precious space- based assets and hoarding material. This is about looking for the coming confrontation which could trigger a crisis and the SA capabilities airborne, at sea and on the ground would provide the most usable SA monitoring. This is not “actionable intelligence.” This is about shaping force domain knowledge about anticipation of events.

This requires tailored force packaging and take advantage of what the new military technologies and platforms can provide in terms of multi-domain delivery by a small force rather than a large air-sea enterprise which can only fully function if unleashed in sequential waves.

This is not classic deterrence – it is about pre-crisis and crisis engagement.

The force we are building will have five key interactives capabilities:

  • Enough platforms with allied and US forces in mind to provide significant presence;
  • A capability to maximize economy of force with that presence;
  • Scalability whereby the presence force can reach back if necessary at the speed of light and receive combat reinforcements;
  • Be able to tap into variable lethality capabilities appropriate to the mission or the threat in order to exercise dominance.
  • And to have the situational awareness relevant to proactive crisis management at the point of interest and an ability to link the fluidity of local knowledge to appropriate tactical and strategic decisions.

The new approach is one which can be expressed in terms of a kill web, that is a US and allied force so scalable that if an ally goes on a presence mission and is threatened by a ramp up of force from a Russia or China, that that presence force can reach back to relevant allies as well as their own force structure.

This year’s international fighter conference focuses on a core aspect necessary to be able to be in position to shape an integrated distributed force, namely, namely, what the organizers are calling networked lethality.

The conference will be held from 12-14 November 2019 in Berlin and the program and opportunity to register for the event can be found here:

https://www.defenceiq.com/events-internationalfighter

For a look at some of the arguments and presentations at last year’s conference, see the report below.

International-Fighter-Conference-2018 (wecompress.com)

HMS Queen Elizabeth Sets Sail for the US for Next Phase of Operational Trials

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on HMS Queen Elizabeth Sets Sail for the US for Next Phase of Operational Trials
08/31/2019

While the winds of Brexit pick up speed, HMS Queen Elizabeth heads to the United States for the next phase of its preparations for its first operational engagements in the early 2020s.

According to a story published on the Ministry of Defence website on August 30, 2019, the event was highlighted.

For the first time, UK fighter jets will join this state-of-the-art ship in a significant milestone for the programme.

The deployment, known as ‘WESTLANT 19,’ will see the carrier conduct ‘Operational Testing’, with British F-35B Lightning jets embarking for the first time as she moves closer to her first operational deployment in 2021. The carrier will also spend time in Canada during her four-month travels.

Operational Testing is designed to put the jets, ship and supporting units through their paces. The tests allow the equipment and crew to operate under realistic warfighting scenarios to ready them for their first operational deployment.

From planning campaigns, briefing, preparing and arming the jets and pilots, to flying and sustaining them on their ‘mission,’ the trials ensure that the units can fight as one.

Defence Minister Anne-Marie Trevelyan said:

“HMS Queen Elizabeth is symbolic of the UK’s global reach and power. As she enters this stage of the programme, she will demonstrate her immense engineering, capability and battle readiness.

“As she makes her second voyage across the Atlantic, HMS Queen Elizabeth will also strengthen our special relationship with the US and Canada. Our naval forces will visit Canada then spend the coming months working and training side by side with the US to ensure the UK’s carrier strike is ready for operations in 2021.

“The deployment represents the continued positive relationship between the UK and US. Units from the United States Navy, US Air Force and US Marine Corps will all take part in the ‘WESTLANT 19’ deployment, further demonstrating the close partnership between the two NATO allies.”

While at sea, HMS Queen Elizabeth is accompanied by other units of the Commander UK Carrier Strike Group (COMUKCSG) including a Type-45 destroyer, a Type-23 frigate and air assets from the Carrier Air Wing. This provides vital warfighting skills and training for each element to the Royal Navy’s potent carrier strike capabilities.

RFA Tideforce is providing tanker support to the Strike Group, which will be joined by ships and air assets from other nations throughout the deployment. Lima Company, 42 Commando Royal Marines based in Plymouth and a Role 2 Medical Team Afloat are also embarked on the carrier.

HMS Queen Elizabeth’s Commanding Officer, Capt Steve Moorhouse said:

“To command any warship is a privilege but to be able to command HMS Queen Elizabeth during this pivotal phase of her capability development is a real honour. In addition to my core ship’s company, the fixed and rotary wing air assets, enhanced medical capability, Royal Marines and other force elements from across Defence will enhance HMS Queen Elizabeth and the UK’s Carrier Strike capability on this deployment.

“WESTLANT 19 is a hugely exciting deployment and as we increase the scale and complexity of our training and testing, so the potency of this extraordinary ship continues to grow.”

Commander of UKCSG, Cdre Mike Utley said:

“The success of last years’ deployment during which we embarked and operated the F-35B for the very first time put us ahead of the curve in terms of developmental testing between the jets and ship. We have a significant switch in focus this year, towards operationalising this national defence capability; turning this ship, the jets for which it has been built and all supporting units into a cohesive, agile, efficient force.

“Whether that’s warfighting at one end of the scale, peacekeeping at the other end or delivering humanitarian support across the globe. Our first operational deployment in 2021 is not far away and we will be ready for any eventuality.”

HMS Queen Elizabeth will also host the second Atlantic Future Forum during her time in the US, following on from the inaugural forum held last year in New York. The forum provides a platform for innovators, business leaders and tech entrepreneurs across government and industry to explore emerging cyber, artificial intelligence and space trends, technologies and threats.

The ‘WESTLANT 19’ Strike Group will return to the UK at the end of the year. HMS Queen Elizabeth’s sister ship HMS Prince of Wales is in her final stages of build at Rosyth Dockyard. She is expected to commence her sea trials in the coming weeks.

The featured photo: HMS Queen Elizabeth sets sail from Portsmouth today. Crown copyright.

As we hare argued, the coming of the carrier is an integral part of UK military transformation as well as a redshift of focus on the Northern and Southern Flanks of NATO.

This is about the return of geography in the direct defense of Europe as well as the reshaping of the force.

With the coming of Brexit, there is a natural withdrawal of military attention from what used to be called the Central Front during the Cold War days, and a renewed focus on the flanks. France and Germany have asserted that their defense collaboration will take care of Europe’s defense and providing the maneuver forces and space for the defense of Europe’s new front line in Poland and the Baltics, and the UK’s contribution will be reduced to reinforcing efforts, not leading them in this continental European sector.

The new carrier is a key piece of sovereign real estate around which flank defense will be generated. It is also a focal point for RAF and Royal Navy integration of the sort, which a transformed force will need to deliver to the nation.

During a visit to Portsmouth, England and to RAF Marham in early May 2018, senior Royal Navy and defense personnel involved in the standing up of the UK carrier strike capability highlighted how they saw the new capability fitting into the broader strategic picture.  The new UK carriers are coming at a time when there is a broader UK and allied defense transformation and a strategic shift from counter-insurgency to higher end operations.

The new UK carrier provides a mobile basing capability by being a flexible sea base, which can compliment UK land-based air assets, and provide a flexible asset that can play a role in the Northern Flank or the Mediterranean on a regular deployment basis and over time be used for deployments further away from Europe as well.

The commander of the UK Carrier Strike Group, Commodore Andrew Betton and Colonel Phil Kelly, Royal Marines, COMUKCSG Strike Commander discussed the coming of the new UK aircraft carrier.

Commodore Betton and Col. Kelly both underscored the flexible nature of the HMS Queen Elizabeth.  The UK is building out a 21stcentury version of a carrier strike group, one which can leverage the F-35 as a multi-domain combat system and to do both kinetic and non-kinetic strike based on these aircraft, as well combine them with helicopter assault assets to do an F-35 enabled assault, or if desired, shift to a more traditional heavy helicopter assault strike.

As Commodore Betton put it: “Our new carrier offers a really flexible, integrative capability. The carrier can play host and is intended absolutely to play host to a carrier air wing. At the same time, it can provide something very different inn terms of littoral combat operations, primarily using helicopters.”

They emphasized that the Royal Navy was building new escort ships as well as new submarines and the approach to building a maritime strike group meant that working through the operational launch of the carrier was also about its ability to integrated with and to lead a 21stcentury maritime strike group.

And the new maritime strike group was being built to work with allies but just as importantly to operate in the sovereign interest of the United Kingdom. The F-35B onboard was a key enabler to the entire strike group functions.

Commodore Betton: “The airwing enables us to maneuver to deliver effects in the particular part of the battlespace which we are operating in.  You can have sea control without the airwing. Our air wing can enable us to be able to do that and have sufficient capability to influence the battlespace. You clearly do not simply want to be a self-sustaining force that doesn’t do anything to affect the battlespace decisively. The F-35 onboard will allow us to do that.”

Col. Kelly noted that with the threat to land air bases, it was important to have a sea base to operate from as well, either as an alternative or complement to land bases. “The carriers will be the most protected air base which we will have. And we can move that base globally to affect the area of interest important to us. For example, with regard to Northern Europe, we could range up and down the coastlines in the area and hold at risk adversary forces. I think we can send a powerful message to any adversary.”

Commodore Betton added that the other advantage of the sea base is its ability to be effective on arrival. “If you have to operate off of land, you have to have the local permission.  You have to move assets ashore.  You have to support assets ashore.  And you have to protect the land base.  The sea base has all of that built in.

“And there is nothing austere about our carriers in terms of operating aircraft.” We focused on how the carrier becomes integrated with broader strike picture, for the point is not simply that the carrier itself launches F-35s or helicopters, but how the command post can manage the aircraft they launch with the distributed strike assets in the strike group, which could include land-based air or land based forces as well.”

Col. Kelly emphasized that their position was similar to the evolution of the USMC where “every platform can be a sensor or a shooter” in the battlespace. The C2 onboard the carrier on in the air with the Crow’s nest or the F-35Bs can be part of a distributed CS system to ensure maximum effect from the strike and sensing capability of the task force and its related partners in the battlespace.

And innovations in the missile domain up to and including directed energy weapons have been anticipated in the support structure onboard the carrier. During a visit in 2015 to the Scottish shipyard when the initial Queen Elizabeth carrier was being built, I had a chance to look at the infrastructure onboard the ship to support weapons as well as was briefed on the significant power generation capabilities onboard the ship which clearly allow it to when appropriate technology is available to add directed energy weapons.

In addition, to the longer-range weapons already in train and the ones which will be developed in the decade ahead, the British carriers are being built to be able to handle rolling landing which allow the F-35s to come back onto the ship with weapons which have not been used during the mission.

The second carrier, HMS Prince of Wales is the first of the two carriers to be fitted with this capability which will be further tested when it comes to the United States in a couple of years for its F-35 integration trials as well.

In short, the new carrier is being built with “growthability” in mind, in terms of what it can do organically, and what it can leverage and contribute to the maritime task force, and reach out into the battlespace to work effectively with other national or allied assets operating in the area of interest.

And the carrier is not simply a new asset for the RAF and the Royal Navy – it is coming into its operational life as the post-Brexit alliance structure is being shaped as well.