The International Fighter Conference, 2019: Networked Lethality and Shaping an “Integrated Distributed Force”

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The International Fighter Conference, 2019: Networked Lethality and Shaping an “Integrated Distributed Force”
09/03/2019

Last year’s International Fighter Conference provided a chance for the participants and the attendees to focus on the role of fighters in what we have been calling the strategic shift, namely, the shift from the land wars to operating in higher intensity operations against peer competitors.

It is clear that combat capabilities and operations are being re-crafted across the board with fighters at the center of that shift, and their evolution, of course, being affected as well as roles and operational contexts change.

The baseline assumption for the conference can be simply put: air superiority can no longer be assumed in operations but needs to be created in contested environments.

It is clear that competitors like China and Russia have put and are putting significant effort into shaping concepts of operations and force structure modernization which will allow them to contest the ability of the liberal democracies to establish air superiority and to dominate future crises.

There was a clear consensus on this point, but, of course, working the specifics of how one would defeat such an adversary in an air campaign gets at broader and more specific force design and concepts of operations.

The conference worked from the common assumption rather than focusing on specific options.

But the way ahead was as contested in the presentations and discussions as any considerations for operations in contested airspace.

We argue that what the liberal democracies are working to shape in response to the new strategic environment is something we call building an “integrated distributed force.”

For example, the new Sec Def, Mark Esper, has prioritized defense efforts in the Pacific as a key anchor to the Great Power strategy.  In particular, given the withdrawal from the INF treaty, a key focus is upon the building of new conventional longer-range missiles deployed throughout the US and allied Pacific defense perimeter.

This entails interactive technological, force structure and geographical deployment dynamics.  We have argued that a new basing structure combined with a capability to deploy and operate an integrated distributed force is at the heart of the strategic shift, and not only in the Pacific.1

This is a key part of the effort to shape a full spectrum crisis management capability whose con-ops is shaped to deal with adversary operations within what some call the “gray zone” or within the “hybrid warfare” area.2

The nature of the threat facing the liberal democracies was well put by a senior Finnish official: “The timeline for early warning is shorter; the threshold for the use of force is lower.”

What is unfolding is that capabilities traditionally associated with high end warfare are being drawn upon for lower threshold conflicts, designed to achieve political effect without firing a shot.

This means that not only do the liberal democracies need to shape more effective higher end capabilities but they need to learn how to use force packages which are making up a higher end, higher tempo or higher intensity capability as part of a range of both military operations but proactive engagement to shape peer adversary behavior.

In today’s world, this is what full spectrum crisis management is all about.

It is not simply about escalation ladders; it is about the capability to operate tailored task forces within a crisis setting to dominate and prevail within that crisis. If that stops the level of escalation that is one way of looking at it. But in today’s world, it is not just about that but it is about the ability to operate and prevail within a diversity of crises which might not be located on what one might consider an escalation ladder.

The presence force however small needs to be well integrated but not just in terms of itself but its ability to operate via C2 or ISR connectors to an enhanced capability. But that enhanced capability needs to be deployed in order to be tailorable to the presence force and to provide enhanced lethality and effectiveness appropriate to the political action needed to be taken.

This rests really on a significant rework of C2 in order for a distributed force to have the flexibility to operate not just within a limited geographical area but to expand its ability to operate by reaching beyond the geographical boundaries of what the organic presence force is capable of doing by itself.

This requires multi-domain SA – this is not about the intelligence community running its precious space- based assets and hoarding material. This is about looking for the coming confrontation which could trigger a crisis and the SA capabilities airborne, at sea and on the ground would provide the most usable SA monitoring. This is not “actionable intelligence.” This is about shaping force domain knowledge about anticipation of events.

This requires tailored force packaging and take advantage of what the new military technologies and platforms can provide in terms of multi-domain delivery by a small force rather than a large air-sea enterprise which can only fully function if unleashed in sequential waves.

This is not classic deterrence – it is about pre-crisis and crisis engagement.

The force we are building will have five key interactives capabilities:

  • Enough platforms with allied and US forces in mind to provide significant presence;
  • A capability to maximize economy of force with that presence;
  • Scalability whereby the presence force can reach back if necessary at the speed of light and receive combat reinforcements;
  • Be able to tap into variable lethality capabilities appropriate to the mission or the threat in order to exercise dominance.
  • And to have the situational awareness relevant to proactive crisis management at the point of interest and an ability to link the fluidity of local knowledge to appropriate tactical and strategic decisions.

The new approach is one which can be expressed in terms of a kill web, that is a US and allied force so scalable that if an ally goes on a presence mission and is threatened by a ramp up of force from a Russia or China, that that presence force can reach back to relevant allies as well as their own force structure.

This year’s international fighter conference focuses on a core aspect necessary to be able to be in position to shape an integrated distributed force, namely, namely, what the organizers are calling networked lethality.

The conference will be held from 12-14 November 2019 in Berlin and the program and opportunity to register for the event can be found here:

https://www.defenceiq.com/events-internationalfighter

For a look at some of the arguments and presentations at last year’s conference, see the report below.

International-Fighter-Conference-2018 (wecompress.com)

HMS Queen Elizabeth Sets Sail for the US for Next Phase of Operational Trials

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on HMS Queen Elizabeth Sets Sail for the US for Next Phase of Operational Trials
08/31/2019

While the winds of Brexit pick up speed, HMS Queen Elizabeth heads to the United States for the next phase of its preparations for its first operational engagements in the early 2020s.

According to a story published on the Ministry of Defence website on August 30, 2019, the event was highlighted.

For the first time, UK fighter jets will join this state-of-the-art ship in a significant milestone for the programme.

The deployment, known as ‘WESTLANT 19,’ will see the carrier conduct ‘Operational Testing’, with British F-35B Lightning jets embarking for the first time as she moves closer to her first operational deployment in 2021. The carrier will also spend time in Canada during her four-month travels.

Operational Testing is designed to put the jets, ship and supporting units through their paces. The tests allow the equipment and crew to operate under realistic warfighting scenarios to ready them for their first operational deployment.

From planning campaigns, briefing, preparing and arming the jets and pilots, to flying and sustaining them on their ‘mission,’ the trials ensure that the units can fight as one.

Defence Minister Anne-Marie Trevelyan said:

“HMS Queen Elizabeth is symbolic of the UK’s global reach and power. As she enters this stage of the programme, she will demonstrate her immense engineering, capability and battle readiness.

“As she makes her second voyage across the Atlantic, HMS Queen Elizabeth will also strengthen our special relationship with the US and Canada. Our naval forces will visit Canada then spend the coming months working and training side by side with the US to ensure the UK’s carrier strike is ready for operations in 2021.

“The deployment represents the continued positive relationship between the UK and US. Units from the United States Navy, US Air Force and US Marine Corps will all take part in the ‘WESTLANT 19’ deployment, further demonstrating the close partnership between the two NATO allies.”

While at sea, HMS Queen Elizabeth is accompanied by other units of the Commander UK Carrier Strike Group (COMUKCSG) including a Type-45 destroyer, a Type-23 frigate and air assets from the Carrier Air Wing. This provides vital warfighting skills and training for each element to the Royal Navy’s potent carrier strike capabilities.

RFA Tideforce is providing tanker support to the Strike Group, which will be joined by ships and air assets from other nations throughout the deployment. Lima Company, 42 Commando Royal Marines based in Plymouth and a Role 2 Medical Team Afloat are also embarked on the carrier.

HMS Queen Elizabeth’s Commanding Officer, Capt Steve Moorhouse said:

“To command any warship is a privilege but to be able to command HMS Queen Elizabeth during this pivotal phase of her capability development is a real honour. In addition to my core ship’s company, the fixed and rotary wing air assets, enhanced medical capability, Royal Marines and other force elements from across Defence will enhance HMS Queen Elizabeth and the UK’s Carrier Strike capability on this deployment.

“WESTLANT 19 is a hugely exciting deployment and as we increase the scale and complexity of our training and testing, so the potency of this extraordinary ship continues to grow.”

Commander of UKCSG, Cdre Mike Utley said:

“The success of last years’ deployment during which we embarked and operated the F-35B for the very first time put us ahead of the curve in terms of developmental testing between the jets and ship. We have a significant switch in focus this year, towards operationalising this national defence capability; turning this ship, the jets for which it has been built and all supporting units into a cohesive, agile, efficient force.

“Whether that’s warfighting at one end of the scale, peacekeeping at the other end or delivering humanitarian support across the globe. Our first operational deployment in 2021 is not far away and we will be ready for any eventuality.”

HMS Queen Elizabeth will also host the second Atlantic Future Forum during her time in the US, following on from the inaugural forum held last year in New York. The forum provides a platform for innovators, business leaders and tech entrepreneurs across government and industry to explore emerging cyber, artificial intelligence and space trends, technologies and threats.

The ‘WESTLANT 19’ Strike Group will return to the UK at the end of the year. HMS Queen Elizabeth’s sister ship HMS Prince of Wales is in her final stages of build at Rosyth Dockyard. She is expected to commence her sea trials in the coming weeks.

The featured photo: HMS Queen Elizabeth sets sail from Portsmouth today. Crown copyright.

As we hare argued, the coming of the carrier is an integral part of UK military transformation as well as a redshift of focus on the Northern and Southern Flanks of NATO.

This is about the return of geography in the direct defense of Europe as well as the reshaping of the force.

With the coming of Brexit, there is a natural withdrawal of military attention from what used to be called the Central Front during the Cold War days, and a renewed focus on the flanks. France and Germany have asserted that their defense collaboration will take care of Europe’s defense and providing the maneuver forces and space for the defense of Europe’s new front line in Poland and the Baltics, and the UK’s contribution will be reduced to reinforcing efforts, not leading them in this continental European sector.

The new carrier is a key piece of sovereign real estate around which flank defense will be generated. It is also a focal point for RAF and Royal Navy integration of the sort, which a transformed force will need to deliver to the nation.

During a visit to Portsmouth, England and to RAF Marham in early May 2018, senior Royal Navy and defense personnel involved in the standing up of the UK carrier strike capability highlighted how they saw the new capability fitting into the broader strategic picture.  The new UK carriers are coming at a time when there is a broader UK and allied defense transformation and a strategic shift from counter-insurgency to higher end operations.

The new UK carrier provides a mobile basing capability by being a flexible sea base, which can compliment UK land-based air assets, and provide a flexible asset that can play a role in the Northern Flank or the Mediterranean on a regular deployment basis and over time be used for deployments further away from Europe as well.

The commander of the UK Carrier Strike Group, Commodore Andrew Betton and Colonel Phil Kelly, Royal Marines, COMUKCSG Strike Commander discussed the coming of the new UK aircraft carrier.

Commodore Betton and Col. Kelly both underscored the flexible nature of the HMS Queen Elizabeth.  The UK is building out a 21stcentury version of a carrier strike group, one which can leverage the F-35 as a multi-domain combat system and to do both kinetic and non-kinetic strike based on these aircraft, as well combine them with helicopter assault assets to do an F-35 enabled assault, or if desired, shift to a more traditional heavy helicopter assault strike.

As Commodore Betton put it: “Our new carrier offers a really flexible, integrative capability. The carrier can play host and is intended absolutely to play host to a carrier air wing. At the same time, it can provide something very different inn terms of littoral combat operations, primarily using helicopters.”

They emphasized that the Royal Navy was building new escort ships as well as new submarines and the approach to building a maritime strike group meant that working through the operational launch of the carrier was also about its ability to integrated with and to lead a 21stcentury maritime strike group.

And the new maritime strike group was being built to work with allies but just as importantly to operate in the sovereign interest of the United Kingdom. The F-35B onboard was a key enabler to the entire strike group functions.

Commodore Betton: “The airwing enables us to maneuver to deliver effects in the particular part of the battlespace which we are operating in.  You can have sea control without the airwing. Our air wing can enable us to be able to do that and have sufficient capability to influence the battlespace. You clearly do not simply want to be a self-sustaining force that doesn’t do anything to affect the battlespace decisively. The F-35 onboard will allow us to do that.”

Col. Kelly noted that with the threat to land air bases, it was important to have a sea base to operate from as well, either as an alternative or complement to land bases. “The carriers will be the most protected air base which we will have. And we can move that base globally to affect the area of interest important to us. For example, with regard to Northern Europe, we could range up and down the coastlines in the area and hold at risk adversary forces. I think we can send a powerful message to any adversary.”

Commodore Betton added that the other advantage of the sea base is its ability to be effective on arrival. “If you have to operate off of land, you have to have the local permission.  You have to move assets ashore.  You have to support assets ashore.  And you have to protect the land base.  The sea base has all of that built in.

“And there is nothing austere about our carriers in terms of operating aircraft.” We focused on how the carrier becomes integrated with broader strike picture, for the point is not simply that the carrier itself launches F-35s or helicopters, but how the command post can manage the aircraft they launch with the distributed strike assets in the strike group, which could include land-based air or land based forces as well.”

Col. Kelly emphasized that their position was similar to the evolution of the USMC where “every platform can be a sensor or a shooter” in the battlespace. The C2 onboard the carrier on in the air with the Crow’s nest or the F-35Bs can be part of a distributed CS system to ensure maximum effect from the strike and sensing capability of the task force and its related partners in the battlespace.

And innovations in the missile domain up to and including directed energy weapons have been anticipated in the support structure onboard the carrier. During a visit in 2015 to the Scottish shipyard when the initial Queen Elizabeth carrier was being built, I had a chance to look at the infrastructure onboard the ship to support weapons as well as was briefed on the significant power generation capabilities onboard the ship which clearly allow it to when appropriate technology is available to add directed energy weapons.

In addition, to the longer-range weapons already in train and the ones which will be developed in the decade ahead, the British carriers are being built to be able to handle rolling landing which allow the F-35s to come back onto the ship with weapons which have not been used during the mission.

The second carrier, HMS Prince of Wales is the first of the two carriers to be fitted with this capability which will be further tested when it comes to the United States in a couple of years for its F-35 integration trials as well.

In short, the new carrier is being built with “growthability” in mind, in terms of what it can do organically, and what it can leverage and contribute to the maritime task force, and reach out into the battlespace to work effectively with other national or allied assets operating in the area of interest.

And the carrier is not simply a new asset for the RAF and the Royal Navy – it is coming into its operational life as the post-Brexit alliance structure is being shaped as well.

 

 

 

Reinvigorating the US-Australian Alliance: How Trump and Morrison Could Do More Than Just Have Dinner

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Reinvigorating the US-Australian Alliance: How Trump and Morrison Could Do More Than Just Have Dinner

When President Trump arrived in Japan for the G-20 earlier this summer he had dinner with the newly elected Australian Prime Minister.

He was especially keen to understand how the PM pulled off an upset victory.

Now the President will host the Australian PM for dinner next month in the White House.

“The visit will celebrate our two countries’ close friendship and shared history, and reaffirm our common vision for global peace, security, and prosperity,” the White House said in a statement.

Morrison and his wife will visit the White House on Sept. 20. He will be the second world leader Trump has welcomed for a state dinner, which is typically reserved for close allies. The first was French President Emmanuel Macron in April 2018.

Morrison, who like Trump ran a populist conservative campaign, scored a surprise victory in May to win a three-year term as prime minister amid expectations that his coalition would lose seats.

Trump met with Morrison for a working dinner at the Group of 20 summit last month, where the president highlighted the longstanding relationship between the two countries.

Trade is likely to be a key talking point during the upcoming state visit. The New York Times reported in June that Trump considered placing tariffs on Australia but faced fierce opposition from military and diplomatic officials.

In an article published by ASPI on August 28, 2019, Michael Shoebridge highlighted how the two leaders might recharge the alliance.

Scott Morrison’s upcoming state dinner with Donald Trump in the White House offers a rare opportunity for both leaders to explore ambitious and creative options for the future of US–Australia relations.

This month’s AUSMIN meeting established a strong foundation for future cooperation, with some important new areas of focus—notably, critical minerals, energy and space, and deeper engagement with Southeast Asia. It has also underlined the value of continuing cooperation on maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, implementing the Pacific step-up and countering Islamic State terrorism.

There are two areas, though, in which the prime minister and president might push things beyond their respective bureaucracies’ comfort zones—and that sort of forward-leaning approach would be a healthy thing. Leaders don’t travel intercontinental distances merely to share a nice meal and rehearse earlier agreements.

First, there’s defence cooperation. The US Force Posture Initiatives are going well. They include the deployment of 2,500 marines in Darwin, enhanced cooperation by the Australian Defence Force and the US military in Southeast Asia, and the rotation of US fighter and bomber aircraft through the north, with co-investments by Australia and the US in the facilities to enable these efforts.

A new, imaginative step is needed—and it should be one that accelerates achievement of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy through a more mobile, dispersed US force in the region, while also increasing Australian military power.

Projecting US and Australian naval power from a new set of facilities at the Stirling base near Perth would reset the maritime security agenda in a big, positive way. A major reinvestment well beyond current Australian plans, with some US co-investment, would have a strategic effect beyond previous administrations’ efforts. What’s needed are facilities to support two or more major US naval vessels on permanent rotation alongside Australia’s growing west coast fleet.

US naval forces would have a place to operate from that’s logistically secure and gives them options beyond their bases in Guam, Hawaii and Diego Garcia. And the Australian navy would achieve the growing room it will need in future as well as having their highest-end partner navy right there to train and operate with.

It would be a key part of getting ahead of the growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean and complicate Chinese military planning and projects under the Belt and Road Initiative that are designed to support Chinese forces. It would also provide a platform to accelerate Quad naval cooperation with India and Japan. Combined with the investment by Papua New Guinea, the US and Australia in upgrading the Lombrum base, the WA idea would re-establish US and allied initiative in the Indo-Pacific.

Second, there’s an urgent need to change perceptions on a key issue that will shape everything about the US–Australia partnership for decades to come. Too many commentators—including business leaders—have signed up to the narrative that America is Australia’s security partner, but China is Australia’s economic partner. That’s lazy thinking, and untrue.

Australia’s engagement with the Chinese economy is a trade-based one, and China is indeed our largest trading partner. Our two-way trade was worth some $215 billion in 2018. But China (including Hong Kong) is our fifth-largest source of foreign investment (some $182 billion) after Belgium. The US, by contrast, is our third-largest trading partner (at $74 billion in 2018) but our largest source of foreign investment by far—its $939 billion is followed by second-placed UK at $575 billion. On the flip side, Australian investment into China (including Hong Kong) is a healthy $128 billion, but our investment into the US is more than five times that, at $719 billion.

Statistics won’t win hearts and minds, though. The real opportunity for Trump and Morrison is to show both nations’ peoples and business communities that the US–Australia alliance is an economic one and a strategic one. That means prioritising economic cooperation and then empowering our business leaders to take advantage of those opportunities through policy and regulatory incentives. That’s good economics and good security.

The most obvious priority area for two-way investment is infrastructure renewal. Trump won office promising a huge package to refresh ageing American roads, rail, ports and other critical infrastructure. He’s yet to get a package together and is likely to continue to have difficulty with Congress and with finding the budgetary room for the spending required.

Well, Australia can help. We’re the world’s 13th-largest economy, but we have outsized economic power in our superannuation industry. Our super assets are valued at US$1.9 trillion—the fourth-largest pension assets pool on the planet. Australian pension funds need stable, high-quality returns—and investing to renew the infrastructure that underpins the continued dynamism of the world’s largest economy is a massive opportunity to achieve that.

Whatever the glories of the US–Australia free-trade agreement, Trump and Morrison can supercharge Australian investment in US infrastructure by insisting that their administrations find new incentives and strip back regulatory processes. An infrastructure investment summit with business and government representatives would be a logical first step. Businesses make investment decisions, but governments must lead and create the environment for investment—by reducing regulatory obstacles and giving favourable taxation treatment and investment incentives.

Australia, in turn, can benefit from enhanced US investment in our own critical infrastructure. The Foreign Investment Review Board’s reform to include national security factors more prominently in its approval process shows the way forward. It has led to decisions to reject Chinese entities’ bids in critical areas like electricity networks and east coast gas distribution, where national security is a key element. Applying this logic—and recognising that both security and economics are key to evaluating competing foreign investment bids—US proposals would benefit from a positive national security assessment.

None of this is intended to devalue the AUSMIN package of future cooperation. But if Trump and Morrison want to establish their own agenda for the US–Australia relationship, they can do so by creating a joint Indo-Pacific naval hub on Australia’s west coast and by supercharging two-way investment in each nation’s critical and digital infrastructure. That would portray a forward-leaning alliance ready to address the challenges of a new era.

Michael Shoebridge is director of the defence, strategy and national security program at ASPI.

Cropped image: White House/Flickr.

HIMRS Night Fire

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on HIMRS Night Fire
08/30/2019

Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 182 Field Artillery Regiment, Michigan National Guard, fire the M142 HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) during a live fire training mission at Exercise Northern Strike 19, Camp Grayling Maneuver Training Center, Michigan, on July 24 and 25.

GRAYLING, MI, UNITED STATES

07.25.2019

Video by Cpl. Stephen Wright

142nd Field Artillery Brigade

Russian Nuclear Explosion Highlights Need to Reduce Dependence on Moscow’s Rockets

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Russian Nuclear Explosion Highlights Need to Reduce Dependence on Moscow’s Rockets
08/29/2019

By Richard Weitz

The August 8 nuclear explosion of the new Russian Burevestniks cruise missile doubly reminds us of the need to end the U.S. dependence on Russian rocket boosters. America’s reliance on Russian rockets presents a major security and safety vulnerability that must be eliminated as soon as possible.

First, the Russian government is openly engaged in an arms race with the United States that extends throughout the globe and into outer space. The Russian military is developing a range of weapons to kill us, including anti-satellite weapons to blind the Pentagon. It is not hard to imagine Moscow suspending the sale of critical components to the U.S. military space program.

Second, the large number of recent Russian military and space accidents should make clear the danger of depending on unreliable Russian space tech. Not only has the Burevestniks repeatedly crashed, but only one day after the missile’s latest mishap, several massive Siberian munitions dumps exploded, forcing thousands of people to flee. Last month, the Russian Navy’s most advanced nuclear spy submarine also suffered an explosion and fire, killing fourteen officers.

Not only are Russian space systems unreliable, but the Russian space industry faces is plagued with corruption, safety problems, and is suffering an exodus of skilled workers, either into retirement or exile.

Steve Jurvetson / Flickr (CC BY 2.0) Reuters

The Congress has cleverly leveraged leading U.S. private sector firms to share the costs with the government. These contractors have been tasked to develop next-generation space rockers that can place military payloads in orbit.

In particular, the Congress has authorized the Air Force’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program to provide limited funding to the most competitive U.S. space corporations. The program aims to utilize several capable rocket manufacturers in order to revitalize the U.S. national security space launch fleet.

The process has been proceeding well. In 2019, the Air Force awarded three developmental Launch Service Agreements (LSA). These LSAs provided targeted funding to the U.S. space companies developing launch system prototypes that can best cover all critical orbits.

On May 3, the Air Force initiated Phase 2 of the NSSL program. Its Space and Missile Systems Center, partnering with the National Reconnaissance Office, released a request for proposals for competitive contracts for two domestic launch service providers. These providers would share opportunities for National Security Space payloads over the next five years.

According to the Trump administration, “the national security space launch requirements over the course of five years would optimize warfighter flexibility, minimizes mission risk, and provides exceptional value to the taxpayer.”

This revitalized commercial U.S. space force will work in concert with the new Space Command that will become the Defense Department’s 11th unified combatant command on August 29. Without strong commercial space companies independent from Russian engines, the new Space Command would not have secure satellites critical for its success.

The Air Force has insisted that the NSSL program must remain on schedule to safeguard U.S. national security interests.  Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson, observing that, “We are answering Congress’ 2014 directive to transition off the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine” by the end of 2022, affirmed that, “We must move forward now.”

However, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 would upend this critical program for achieving U.S. space independence.

Specifically, the Committee’s proposed changes would force the Air Force to reopen the competition for launch contracts late into the development program despite the resulting delays and higher costs to incorporate them.

Another change would earmark half-a-billion dollars for a special “certification and infrastructure” fund to companies that do not receive a Launch Service Agreement with the Pentagon, which would undermine the basis for a fair and open competition.

The HASC version would also require the Air Force to notify Congress in advance of its awards, which risks further politicizing military space issues.

The White House has warned that the HASC language “would increase mission risk for the nation’s national security satellites” because it “would increase per-launch cost while simultaneously introducing risk and costs for some intelligence payloads.”

Russia’s nuclear explosion and other hostile national security acts are but the latest reminder of the danger of relying on Russia as a critical source in the U.S. outer space supply chain. Now is the time to end U.S. dependence on Russian rocket engines by executing the agreed program.

The featured photo shows Russian military police patrolling the city of Achinsk in eastern Siberia’s Krasnoyarsk region following an explosion. The Emergencies Ministry said that 9,533 people were evacuated from the area 20 kilometres from the depot and about 7,000 fled on their own as massive explosions sent plumes of black smoke high into the skies.(Dmitry Dub/Associated Press)

 

 

USAF Training

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on USAF Training
08/28/2019

The 737th Training Group revamped U.S. Air Force basic military training to inspire and develop MACH-21 Airmen.

In order to achieve this goal, BMT curriculum changes improve all aspects of training across an 8.5-week program that focuses on readiness, lethality, airmanship, fitness and warrior ethos. (U.S. Air Force video by Staff Sgt. Marianique Santos)

The 737th Training Group revamped U.S. Air Force basic military training to inspire and develop MACH-21 Airmen. In order to achieve this goal, BMT curriculum changes improve all aspects of training across an 8.5-week program that focuses on readiness, lethality, airmanship, fitness and warrior ethos.

(U.S. Air Force video by Staff Sgt. Marianique Santos)