Russian Nuclear Explosion Highlights Need to Reduce Dependence on Moscow’s Rockets

08/29/2019

By Richard Weitz

The August 8 nuclear explosion of the new Russian Burevestniks cruise missile doubly reminds us of the need to end the U.S. dependence on Russian rocket boosters. America’s reliance on Russian rockets presents a major security and safety vulnerability that must be eliminated as soon as possible.

First, the Russian government is openly engaged in an arms race with the United States that extends throughout the globe and into outer space. The Russian military is developing a range of weapons to kill us, including anti-satellite weapons to blind the Pentagon. It is not hard to imagine Moscow suspending the sale of critical components to the U.S. military space program.

Second, the large number of recent Russian military and space accidents should make clear the danger of depending on unreliable Russian space tech. Not only has the Burevestniks repeatedly crashed, but only one day after the missile’s latest mishap, several massive Siberian munitions dumps exploded, forcing thousands of people to flee. Last month, the Russian Navy’s most advanced nuclear spy submarine also suffered an explosion and fire, killing fourteen officers.

Not only are Russian space systems unreliable, but the Russian space industry faces is plagued with corruption, safety problems, and is suffering an exodus of skilled workers, either into retirement or exile.

Steve Jurvetson / Flickr (CC BY 2.0) Reuters

The Congress has cleverly leveraged leading U.S. private sector firms to share the costs with the government. These contractors have been tasked to develop next-generation space rockers that can place military payloads in orbit.

In particular, the Congress has authorized the Air Force’s National Security Space Launch (NSSL) program to provide limited funding to the most competitive U.S. space corporations. The program aims to utilize several capable rocket manufacturers in order to revitalize the U.S. national security space launch fleet.

The process has been proceeding well. In 2019, the Air Force awarded three developmental Launch Service Agreements (LSA). These LSAs provided targeted funding to the U.S. space companies developing launch system prototypes that can best cover all critical orbits.

On May 3, the Air Force initiated Phase 2 of the NSSL program. Its Space and Missile Systems Center, partnering with the National Reconnaissance Office, released a request for proposals for competitive contracts for two domestic launch service providers. These providers would share opportunities for National Security Space payloads over the next five years.

According to the Trump administration, “the national security space launch requirements over the course of five years would optimize warfighter flexibility, minimizes mission risk, and provides exceptional value to the taxpayer.”

This revitalized commercial U.S. space force will work in concert with the new Space Command that will become the Defense Department’s 11th unified combatant command on August 29. Without strong commercial space companies independent from Russian engines, the new Space Command would not have secure satellites critical for its success.

The Air Force has insisted that the NSSL program must remain on schedule to safeguard U.S. national security interests.  Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson, observing that, “We are answering Congress’ 2014 directive to transition off the Russian-made RD-180 rocket engine” by the end of 2022, affirmed that, “We must move forward now.”

However, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 would upend this critical program for achieving U.S. space independence.

Specifically, the Committee’s proposed changes would force the Air Force to reopen the competition for launch contracts late into the development program despite the resulting delays and higher costs to incorporate them.

Another change would earmark half-a-billion dollars for a special “certification and infrastructure” fund to companies that do not receive a Launch Service Agreement with the Pentagon, which would undermine the basis for a fair and open competition.

The HASC version would also require the Air Force to notify Congress in advance of its awards, which risks further politicizing military space issues.

The White House has warned that the HASC language “would increase mission risk for the nation’s national security satellites” because it “would increase per-launch cost while simultaneously introducing risk and costs for some intelligence payloads.”

Russia’s nuclear explosion and other hostile national security acts are but the latest reminder of the danger of relying on Russia as a critical source in the U.S. outer space supply chain. Now is the time to end U.S. dependence on Russian rocket engines by executing the agreed program.

The featured photo shows Russian military police patrolling the city of Achinsk in eastern Siberia’s Krasnoyarsk region following an explosion. The Emergencies Ministry said that 9,533 people were evacuated from the area 20 kilometres from the depot and about 7,000 fled on their own as massive explosions sent plumes of black smoke high into the skies.(Dmitry Dub/Associated Press)

 

 

USAF Training

08/28/2019

The 737th Training Group revamped U.S. Air Force basic military training to inspire and develop MACH-21 Airmen.

In order to achieve this goal, BMT curriculum changes improve all aspects of training across an 8.5-week program that focuses on readiness, lethality, airmanship, fitness and warrior ethos. (U.S. Air Force video by Staff Sgt. Marianique Santos)

The 737th Training Group revamped U.S. Air Force basic military training to inspire and develop MACH-21 Airmen. In order to achieve this goal, BMT curriculum changes improve all aspects of training across an 8.5-week program that focuses on readiness, lethality, airmanship, fitness and warrior ethos.

(U.S. Air Force video by Staff Sgt. Marianique Santos)

Heavy Lift Helo Powrer Projection

08/26/2019

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 361, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 16, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) and Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) 371, Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG) 37, 3rd MAW conduct a Deployment For Training (DFT) at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash., June 17 through July 1, 2019.

The mission of this DFT was to rehearse expeditionary operations at unfamiliar airfields and expeditionary air base set up, consistent with operational employment of expeditionary advanced base operations.

JOINT BASE LEWIS-MCCHORD, WA, UNITED STATES

07.01.2019

Video by Lance Cpl. Juan Anaya

Marine Corps Air Station Miramar / 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing

The Potential Impact of 3D Printing on the Military Supply Chain

08/25/2019

3 D Printing is in its infancy in terms of providing parts for the military.

A challenge for the military is of course the need for parts reliability and ruggedness at very high standards.

This is why the term “military grade” was invented.

But as 3D printing becomes part of the sustainment enterprise, there are very significant impacts to be anticipated.

“Just in time” gets a whole new meaning when one can build parts locally.

This means as well that distribute operations can be facilitated more effectively.

And there is a significant potential reduction on the supply fleet, whether it be by land, sea or air.

What 3D printing can provide is a further enhancement as well of sea basing for an ability to provide parts produced at sea can be stood up.

But we are in early days of such possibilities.

As Michael Gravier noted in an April 12, 2016 article:

The specialization and economic benefits of globalization become outdated in a world where a 3D printer and some spools of wire or other generic inputs can make nearly any desired product relatively quickly.

Generic inputs require far less negotiation and planning. They also do not become obsolete and the quality is standardized, meaning that there’s less need to monitor supplier performance.

Since nearly all value is added by the 3D printer and inputs are relatively low value, standardized commodities, Just in Time Inventory (JIT) and other inventory reduction approaches will be needed less.

And the graphic below highlights how 3D printing will impact the commercial sector and it does not take much imagination to understand how significant such a transition will be for military operations as well.

Supply-Chain-Infographic

What is clear is that 3D printing for the deployed force will be yet another driver for shifting in the United States from the antiquated depot system.

Our closest allies such as the Brits and the Australians have already demonstrated that advanced systems need a very different appraoch to logistics support than the use of the rules and methods of maintaining fixed depots. 3D printing is just the latest driver for change on the U.S. but can the U.S. follow the path of innovation rather than federal sourcing?

Earlier this year, the USAF installed a metallic 3D printed part on an operational F-22.

The 3D aircraft printed part was installed by 574th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron maintainers during depot maintenance at Hill Air Force Base, Utah.

574th AMXS director Robert Lewin said: “One of the most difficult things to overcome in the F-22 community, because of the small fleet size, is the availability of additional parts to support the aircraft.”

The printed part is designed to replace a corrosion-prone aluminium component in the kick panel assembly of the cockpit. With the use of 3D printing, maintainers can now acquire replacement parts within short notice, saving money and aircraft maintenance time.

And in this story published by defenceWeb on August 21, 2019, the USAF use of 3D printing to produce non-structural aircraft parts was highlighted:

The United States Air Force’s 60th Maintenance Squadron has become the first field unit in the Air Force to be certified with an industrial-sized 3D printer that is authorized to produce non-structural aircraft parts.

The US Air Force (USAF) this week said the Stratasys F900 3D printer, which is capable of printing plastic parts up to 91x60x91 cm (36-by-24-by-36 inches), uses a material called Ultem 9085 that is more flexible, dense and stronger than typical plastic.

The printer, which is certified by the Federal Aviation Administration and the Air Force Advanced Technology and Training Center, offers new opportunities to create needed parts while saving time and money, the Air Force said.

“It brings us a capability that we’ve never had before,” said Master Sgt. John Higgs, 60th MXS aircraft metals technology section chief. “There’s so many possibilities available to us right now. We’re just scratching the surface.”

Technicians are able to download blueprints from an online database that the University of Dayton Research Institute has approved.

“The Joint Engineering Data Management Information Control System is where we go to download already approved blueprints,” Higgs said. “Now, the University of Dayton Research Institute is working with the engineers to get those parts they developed into JEDMICS.”

The first approved project was printed on the Stratasys F900 Aug. 12 and will replace latrine covers on the C-5M Super Galaxy. Typically, parts that don’t keep the aircraft from performing their mission don’t have as high as a priority for replacement.

“The latrine covers we just printed usually take about a year from the time they’ve been ordered to the time they’ve been delivered,” Higgs said. “We printed two of the covers in 73 hours.”

Getting the printer operational was no easy task. It took eight months to get the system fully operational.

“There were facility requirements that had to be met, and then installation and certification processes to complete,” Higgs said. “After, we needed to decide who could operate the printer, then have a UDRI instructor certify them.”

Three members from the 60th MXS were chosen to be the first technicians trained in the Air Force for the initial certification. One of them, Tech. Sgt. Rogelio Lopez, 60th MXS assistant aircraft metals technology section chief, has been with the project since its inception.

“UDRI has not trained or certified anyone else at the field level except the three of us here at Travis Air Force Base,” Lopez said. “Now that we’re signed off on our training records, we’re the only ones who can operate, maintain and print on the Stratasys F900.”

Now with parts in production, all the hard work is paying off. There’s a new sense of urgency within the organization.

“It’s exciting because the Air Force is implementing new technology at the field level,” Lopez said. “The Air Force continues to encourage Airmen to be innovative by finding new ways to streamline processes and save resources.”

And since Travis AFB is the only field unit that is currently operational, requests from outside the organization are already coming in.

“We already have a list from the Air Force level to help them print and to backfill some supplies,” Higgs said. “This will ensure other bases can replace items sooner than expected with our help.”

Ultimately, the maintenance shop wants to use the printer for more than just aircraft parts.

“We have the capability to print parts on a production scale for a lot more customers,” Higgs said. “The overall goal is to generate products for every organization to support whatever needs they may have.”

 

 

 

 

The Return of Direct Defense in Europe

We are publishing a book next year with Praeger which focuses on the return of direct defense in Europe.

What follows is our introduction to the book. 

The title of our book is the easy part: The Return of Direct Defense in Europe.  The subtitle: Meeting the Russian Challengeis more difficult, for the challenge is occurring in a very different strategic context than when WESTERN Europe was dealing with the Soviet Union.

It is clear that the challenges posed by the Russians share both commonalities but significant differences to those posed by the Soviet Union.

This is one theme of the book.

But the scope of our book is designed to deal with the question of the direct defense in Europe today, which is broader than that of the Russian challenge alone.

The Russians are clearly playing off of the dynamics of change within Europe and the trans-Atlantic relationships, and those dynamics are not generated by the Russians themselves but provide a rich environment in which to shape enhanced influence and capabilities to provide both direct and indirect threats to individual states as well as to deepen fissures within NATO and the European Union, the two collaborative organizations most central to direct defense.

The Cold War is over; but the Russians are back.

Russia clearly is not the Soviet Union; and Western Europe has been replaced by a new geo-strategic reality – the European Union and NATO have moved eastward.

The strategic shock of Russian actions in 2014 in Crimea, which logically followed from their actions against Georgia in 2008 sent shock waves throughout Europe.  But those shock waves were impacting on an evolving West and the global rise of 21stcentury authoritarian states.

This combination has meant that reshaping rethinking and reframing European defense is not a repeat of the period prior to the fall of the Wall; but is something quite different. And crafting a strategic response to the Russian challenges in Europe will itself need to be quite different; even different from what was done before the coming of President Trump and the various European crises of the past few years.

The return of Russia has occurred in the context of a very different geography than the Soviet Union governed with the Warsaw Pact.

In those days, there was a clear Central Front and the flanks served the battle anticipated if war came to the Central Front. The Soviet leadership planned an air ground assault against Germany, combined with an amphibious assault along the lines of what the Germans did against the Northern Flank in World War II along with holding actions in the Southern Flank, the weakest part of any anticipated Soviet assault.

And large numbers of nuclear weapons with fairly clear distinctions between long and short range were woven into the coming battle; with significant uncertainties with regular to nuclear use within the context of any projected European battle.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russians faced a new geography. But even with this change in Euro-geography, the Russians remained an immense geographic landmass from Europe to Asia.  Remember the last U.S. Administration’s strategic mistake of referring to them as a regional power? Which region were they referring to?

But now Russia had its famous Window to the West, now again St. Petersburg, directly facing newly independent states, and Moscow now facing an independent Poland, with the Ukraine and Belarus as buffer states. 

If you think in classic geopolitical terms, and that is both the strength and weakness of the approach of the current President of Russia, any further movements West of the European Union (EU) and NATO would put a dagger at the heart of Moscow.

From the West’s point of view, the kind of EU and NATO expansion is to be understood in terms of a greater inclusion of states within the two drivers eastward, the German led European Union and the American led European alliance.

Striking into Crimea clearly made sense to Putin in terms of halting any move eastward. But Russian actions came at a time when both the American and German systems of alliances were in the process of fundamental change and significant pressures which were changing both the EU and NATO.

The coming of Brexit and of Trump represents clear visible signs of change.

But intellectually, if you were to combine the analyses done with regard to U.S. strategy done by John Mearsheimer with that done by Sir Paul Lever with regard to Germany and the EU you would get a realistic understanding of two strategic thrusts coming to a halt.

Or put another way, the return of Russia and how they are shaping their efforts to navigate the shoals of Western policies to their benefit are coming at a time of fundamental change in the West itself.

John Mearsheimer in his book published in 2018 entitledThe Great Delusion describes in considerable detail the thrust of U.S. strategic policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S. has pursued a policy of what he refers to as “liberal hegemony,” and one not even in the interest of the U.S. seen from a more realistic geopolitical perspective. The invasion of Iraq and the endless war in Afghanistan fit no concept within a realist understanding of the world. Indeed, the U.S. engaging in an open ended liberal hegemonic effort has undercut American strategic interests.

“Liberal hegemony is an ambitious strategy in which a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself while also promoting an open international economy and building international institutions. In essence, the liberal state seeks to spread its own values far and wide.”1

The U.S. does not have the resources, or capability to remake the countries into which it has inserted itself and in trying to do so has undercut its own geopolitical interests. Or put another way, American diplomatic and military approaches have reshaped U.S. tools to do things like stability operations rather than investing in relevant air and naval systems to defend the U.S. directly and to be able to more effectively compete with a rising China or a resurgent Russia.

As Mearsheimer put it: “Liberals tend to think of every area of the world as a potential battlefield, because they are committed to protecting human rights everywhere and spreading liberal democracy far and wide. They would naturally prefer to achieve these goals peacefully, but they are usually willing to countenance using military force if necessary. In short, while realists place strict limits on where they are willing to employ force, liberals have no such limits. For them, vital interests are everywhere.”2

Even though this quote highlights liberals, the liberal hegemonic approach he is discussing has been at the heart of the last three Administration’s policies, whether driven by neo-cons or liberals. With the Soviet Union gone, and the working assumption that the Chinese were being assimilated into the global order, the U.S. was free to work with its allies to reshape the troublesome Middle East and to deal with “Islamic terrorism” as the key strategic threat.

But with the election of Donald Trump, there has been a clear recognition that this strategic direction is not one which the U.S. can resource, or should pursue.  His Pentagon released a new national security strategy, which focused on the return of Great Power rivalry and the need to reshape U.S. policies and capabilities to make such a strategic shift.

It is an open question of whether the Administration has really been reorganized to do this or whether the U.S. can easily shift course. What is not in question is that the rise of China and the resurgence of Russia have put in play 21stcentury authoritarian powers directly challenging the United States and the liberal democratic allies whose challenges need to be met.

The other key strand of a strategic shift is clearly the disaggregation of the German-led European Union. 

Sir Paul Lever in his brilliant book Berlin Ruleshas analyzed the other element of the twin dynamic of the West confronting a strategic environment different from the past thirty years.  In the German-led European Union, the expansion of liberal Europe East has been crafted with the clear image that the new states will act like the older ones and shape a collaborative political-economic enterprise capable of growing into a leading global power for the new age of globalization.

The resurgence of Russia has called this into question along with the flood of Muslim refugees into Europe and the inability with a European Union magic wand to erase 50 years of history in which Eastern Europe was dominated by Russia.  The oft-noted comment by German politicians and analysts that a number of East Europeans are not pursuing “European values,” is less about whether or not these states are acting normally, but more about the fact that there is little prospect for a single European culture dominating life on the continent.

Lever provides his assessment of Germany’s role within Europe and how it has evolved from the war through to the eve of Brexit. His argument is straightforward – the European Union reflects the values and interests of Germany and weaves seamlessly into the German approach to economic policy.

The founding of the Euro created a key venue for Germany to enforce its core economic approach upon those who entered the Euro zone. And although the gap between Eurozone and non-Eurozone members is an important one within the European Union, the EU has provided the framework for Germany to find its national identity after having it shattered in the flames of defeat in World War II.

He argues that the tensions over migration have introduced a fundamental tension in the European Union, which could trigger more fundamental change, but argues that the German political class simply does not contemplate fundamental change in the European Union even with the departure of the United Kingdom.

The Germans have been able to dominate the European Union because of their economic weight and after unification their size relative to other members. The German political leadership has clearly used the EU to protect German national interests and, indeed, as Lever argues they believe that there is no fundamental disconnect between how Europe should behave economically and what Germany wants.

He focuses as well upon the forces driving change within Europe and relates those forces of change to what might become the evolving German approach. He raises three key questions with regard to how Germans may rethink their approach to Europe and their nation.

“How robust is the German consensus on Europe?

“Will Germany’s politicians continue indefinitely to argue for more integration without having to spell out what exactly this would mean?

“Will its electorate always be willing, even if unenthusiastic to go along with whatever next step is proposed along the road of ever-closer union?”3

The title of the book is a clever one as it highlights to core of German policy – EU rules should reflect German approaches and one rules through a European process heavily influenced by Germany.

But the tensions facing Europe may well disrupt this approach and force German leaders to consider alternative approaches to the way ahead for both Germany and Europe.

“The failure to address the issue of compatibility between different identities, national and European, has been a feature of the way in which all German politicians discuss Europe.

“Because their own country takes no pride in its past, they assume that an EU can be developed which equally has no collective past to be proud of. They even make a virtue of it…

“The underlying assumption is that the nation states of Europe failed in the past to prevent wars and that therefore the nation state is itself inadequate as an instrument of governance.”4

In other words, the twin shocks – Trump and Brexit – are not speed bumps along the path of the ever-expanding liberal order supported by a German-American dynamic; we are facing a strategic turn the outcome of which is not clear.

Brexit and Trump are not speed bumps, but they are not clarion calls for a well-defined and clear new strategic approach or order either.

The resurgence of Russia comes as well accompanied by the rise of new broader authoritarian challenges. Rather than some inexplicable return to the 19thCentury suggested by the former Secretary of State, John Kerry, we are seeing the rise of a fundamental set of challenges posed by authoritarian states, which are combing a diverse set of tools to challenge the viability and strategic direction of the liberal democracies. There are viable 21stcentury authoritarian alternatives, rather than the “end of history.”

The Russians are economically weak but playing a high-risk game of chess with the West. In this game they are inventing new approaches for the use of military power with leveraging new tools of the digital age. The term “hybrid war” has been coined to highlight the approach, but this really is a statement that the liberal democracies are facing a new strategic calculus; and new strategic contest 5

The Russians are allied with the Chinese who have growing global presence and are buying their way into liberal democratic societies, finding new ways to use military power in what analysts call the “gray zone” and are clearly reshaping the nature of Western infrastructure necessary for the security and defense of the liberal democracies.

But the gray zone is an ambiguous term itself. The goal is to reshape the external environment in ways favorable without the need to engage in kinetic operations. In the hybrid war concept, lethal operations are the supporting not the tip of the spear element to achieve what the state actor is hoping to achieve tactically or strategically.

Both gray zone ops and hybrid war ops are part of a broader strategic reality, namely, the challenge of mastering crisis management where the liberal democracies need to deal with the authoritarian states in a ongoing peer-to-peer competition.

And then we have the Turkey of President Erdogan.  Here we have a formerly secular state now becoming aggressively Islamic and directly intervening in the internal politics of Europe and importing Russian equipment in a defiant gesture to all of NATO.

This is the context within which the West or the liberal democracies must reshape their capabilities to provide for their direct defense; and to do so will not look like a legacy NATO approach, but will require significant innovation.

How can we recast the direct defense of Europe in ways that would not simply be a badly resourced replay of the Cold War?

How will the U.S. and the very different sets of allies within Europe address the strategic challenges?

And how will the inevitable inability to have a coherent consensus on what to do be managed?

What tools are available now and how can they be worked in an interactive interoperable way to credibly deter Russia?

And how do we handle the inevitable clash of approaches and differences within Europe in which neither the German nor American approach will determine what states do in a crisis?

What might a more realistic approach to the direct defense look like and one which allows the U.S. and its allies to deal with the global challenge of a China which is clearly seeking to reshape the global order in ways which are not in any way liberal democratic?

Reaper in Northern Strike 19

08/23/2019

An MQ-9 Reaper assigned to the 214th Attack Group, Arizona Air National Guard, joined the skies over Alpena, Mich., flying training sorties in support of Northern Strike 19 at the Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, July 24, 2019. 2019 marked the remotely piloted aircraft’s historical debut at the joint force, multinational combat exercise.

Northern Strike 19 is a National Guard Bureau-sponsored exercise uniting service members from more than 20 states, multiple service branches and numerous coalition countries during the last two weeks of July 2019 at the Camp Grayling Joint Maneuver Training Center and the Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center, both located in northern Michigan and operated by the Michigan National Guard.

The accredited Joint National Training Capability exercise demonstrates the Michigan National Guard’s ability to provide accessible, readiness-building opportunities for military units from all service branches to achieve and sustain proficiency in conducting mission command, air, sea and ground maneuver integration, together with the synchronization of fires in a joint, multinational, decisive action environment.

ALPENA, MI, UNITED STATES

07.25.2019

Video by Tech. Sgt. Lealan Buehrer

182nd Airlift Wing

Reworking the Australian-American Alliance

08/19/2019

It is clear that for Australians, the United States is the key military partner for their own defense efforts. But it is also clear, that reworking the relationship in light of the dynamics of the current and last Administration have put a spotlight on what Australia needs to do to enhance its own flexibility in dealing with threats in the Pacific and to rework the Alliance in part along these lines.

The last Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted some of the key aspects of change required as perceived by Australian strategists and national security officials.

But it is less about whether the United States is reliable enough but much more about shaping Australian benchmarks with regard to what they perceive to be legitimate policy goals which Australia needs to pursue and to encourage their great power ally to consider following as well.

It is a dialogue to be based on enhanced Australian capabilities and Australian actions, to shape a way ahead.

Recently, the new Australian Ambassador to the United States provide an overview on how he viewed the way ahead.

If read carefully, a number of Australian objectives with regard to the United States and its dealings with China are identified as well.

Brendan Nicholson, defence editor of The Strategist has written a very helpful overview on the Ambassador’s recent speech.

Washington’s ambassador to Australia, Arthur Culvahouse, has used a speech to ASPI to stress the strength of the alliance with the United States and to reject suggestions that China and America are involved in a new cold war.

Ambassador Culvahouse said the view of Americans he’d spoken to, including the president, vice president, secretary of state and defense secretary, was that the US commitment to Australia was incredibly strong.

‘Let me assure you that the United States is a Pacific nation that is here to stay, and that our Alliance with Australia is indeed unbreakable,’ he said in an address to an ASPI seminar on Wednesday.

‘We’re Pacific nations. We care deeply about what happens here and we’re here to stay. We’re both continental democracies and champions for the rule of law and human rights. And we’re both nations of strivers and innovators. We believe that everyone deserves a fair go, and that by working hard and playing by the rules, everyone should have a fair shot at prosperity.

‘These are the values that make the US–Australia alliance unbreakable and will carry it into our next century of partnership.’

Culvahouse said Australia could always rely on the US, and so could the rest of the Indo-Pacific region. The pivot to the Pacific was a reality.

He rejected suggestions that the US and China were involved in a new cold war and recalled serving in the Reagan White House and taking part in evacuation drills where he had five minutes to get onto a helicopter in the event of a nuclear attack. That was a ‘long, tough slog, an expensive and dangerous situation’ and anyone who lived through it was not looking for a new cold war at all, the ambassador said.

The US preference was to engage with China but it also had to call out malign conduct where it appeared.

Culvahouse said regional nations were not being asked to choose between the US and China. ‘That’s not how we operate. As the president has made clear, we seek a constructive relationship with China where our prosperity and security grow together, not apart. Indeed, we would welcome China to get onside and join the US, Australia and the other nations in efforts to create the conditions for rules-based growth in the region.’

But the US, Australia and other Pacific nations also agreed it was important to shine a spotlight on bad behaviour, however and wherever it occurred.

‘That includes speaking out in defence of democracy in Hong Kong and calling out the Chinese government’s human rights abuses against its own citizens, including detaining hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs in Xinjiang province.’

It also meant standing up for freedom of navigation and overflight and condemning China’s militarisation and disruptive activities in the South China Sea, including poaching fisheries belonging to others and disrupting longstanding oil and gas projects.

‘And that includes supporting the pressure campaign against North Korea’s nuclear program,’ the ambassador said. ‘The challenges we face call for strong leadership on behalf of the principles we hold dear.’

Australian Defence Force chief Angus Campbell gave a similar response to the cold war question, saying the fact that China was America’s largest trading partner made the situation profoundly different from the post–World War II decades of tense strategic rivalry between the Soviet Union and the West. ‘I think there are a lot of options and a lot of space to see better paths emerge,’ General Campbell told the seminar.

The ambassador said the US welcomed Australia’s expanding leadership role in the region.  ‘That’s not only a good thing for the region, but for the world.’

He said the time was right for the US and Australia to do much more together in the region and beyond. ‘Our Indo-Pacific visions are closely entwined, and we support Prime Minister Morrison’s Pacific Step Up program to help Pacific peoples lift living standards, increase their independence and sovereignty over their economic futures, and improve the wellbeing and stability of the region overall.

‘Australia’s $2 billion infrastructure financing initiative for the Pacific is a great, tangible step forward. The US and Australia want our friends to achieve prosperity through responsible economic development, as well as through fair and reciprocal trade and investment.  We’re committed to creating the conditions for that to happen.’

Cooperation with the US and Australia brought mutual benefits, not zero-sum deals and not ‘payday loan diplomacy’ where one side would win big and the others risked losing big.

The ambassador said that along with what he described as the ‘well-established triad’ of Japan, Australia and the United States, there’d been significant, tangible steps towards the Quad with India and the start of positive conversations with other countries in the region.

During consultations in Washington before coming out, he’d heard a lot about the Quad and other partnerships, only to find that what sounded good in concept had yet to take place in reality.

‘Five months later, as our discussions with our Australian counterparts at AUSMIN made clear, now we find that a network of like-minded countries that share our values, principles and vision for the Indo-Pacific region is taking shape.’

Australia did not get enough credit for its leadership in areas where it was out in front of the US and other countries, the ambassador said. ‘And we all need to follow Australia’s lead in safeguarding our 5G networks and taking a hard look at state-sponsored election interference and what Confucius Institutes are really up to on university campuses.’

Gnarly challenges immediately ahead included working out how to stop foreign fighters returning from Syria and setting up camp in Southeast Asia.

Asked how the United States would react if Australia decided it could no longer rely on the American nuclear umbrella and opted to develop its own nuclear weapons, Culvahouse said that was a matter for Australia.

‘But let me also say that our alliance is unbreakable, our commitments to Australia are solid and profound, and I would not be out here unless I believed that. I would not be giving the speeches I’ve been giving unless I believed that.’

Also, see the following:

https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/key-enablers/4610-us-studies-centre-study-calls-for-greater-australian-indo-pacific-pivot