A Coast Guard aircrew aboard an MH-60 Jayhawk flies over flooded areas in Avon and Elizabeth City, North Carolina, Sept. 6, 2019.
The flooding was observed in the wake of hurricane Dorian.
ELIZABETH CITY, NC, UNITED STATES
09.06.2019
Video by Petty Officer 1st Class Stephen Lehmann
U.S. Coast Guard District 5
Recently, the Royal Australian Navy’s latest support tanker was launched in a ceremony in Ferrol, Spain where the tanker was built.
According to the Australian Department of Defence:
The Royal Australian Navy is another step closer to welcoming its new fleet of support tankers into service, following the successful launch of NUSHIP Stalwart at today’s ceremony in Ferrol, Spain.
The delivery into service of the Supply class replenishment vessels from next year will provide the Navy with vital afloat logistics support to enable our ships to remain at sea longer.
Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Michael Noonan AO, RAN said the Supply class AOR vessels will enable Navy to maintain a long-term presence at sea and provide combat support to our frigates, destroyers and combatants wherever they operate in the world. NUSHIPs Stalwart and Supply will replace the current replenishment tankers HMAS Sirius and ex-HMAS Success, which was decommissioned on 29 June 2019.
According to another article, the core aspect of sustainability, namely fuel and provisions was highlighted as well.
Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds said the launch of the second Supply-class auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) vessel marked an important milestone in Australia’s $90 billion investment in the largest regeneration of Navy since the Second World War.
“The delivery into service of the Supply-class replenishment vessels from next year will provide Navy with vital afloat logistics support to enable our ships to remain at sea longer,” Minister Reynolds said.
“These ships will ensure Navy can make sustained and long-term contributions to regional and international security in support of our national interest, and further our strong relationships with countries across Southeast Asia and the Pacific.
“These ships will be a force multiplier for our Navy’s capability in support of sustained operations across the Indo-Pacific region.”
Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Michael Noonan said NUSHIP Stalwart’s launch would support Navy’s readiness to conduct sustained operations at sea and position Navy as an agile, resilient and lethal fighting force.
“The Supply-class AOR vessels will enable Navy to maintain a long-term presence at sea and provide combat support to our frigates, destroyers and combatants wherever they operate in the world,” Vice Admiral Noonan said.
“NUSHIPs Stalwart and Supply will extend our warships’ endurance and operational range by providing bulk fuels, potable water, stores and explosive ordnance to naval vessels operating at sea.”
NUSHIPs Stalwart and Supply will replace the current replenishment tankers HMAS Sirius and ex-HMAS Success, which was decommissioned on 29 June 2019.
RAN TankerLaunch of NUSHIP Stalwart from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.
Also, see the following:
Expanding the Aperture of Sustainability for the Force: The Case of the NUSHIP Stalwart
By Ulas Yildirim
“[A]lthough one would clearly want to have superior technology, the most important competition is not in the technological but the intellectual one. The main task is to find the most innovative concept of operations and organisations, and to fully exploit the existing and the emerging technologies”
Dima Adamsky1
What is a profession?
What does it mean to be in the profession of arms?
What is professional mastery?
Is professional mastery in the military a concept that is applicable to combat arms only?
Within this context, how should the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) as the most technical branch of the military view itself within the profession of arms?
More importantly, how should the RAAF develop future air power strategists capable of operating in an integrated and joint force to meet the Australian governments’ needs?
Such questions have occupied the minds of scholars and practitioners since at least Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State, published in 1957.2
While Huntington’s proposed model was aimed at providing a broad framework for civil-military relations, his narrow interpretation of Carl von Clausewitz ignored the dynamic nature of professions in general which are continually competing for jurisdiction. This struggle for the link between a profession and its work requires professions to evolve and find ways to remain relevant.3
In this light, the RAAF participates in the jurisdictional competition of protecting the nation’s interests through the use of complex air materiel, operated by a specialised workforce in which exposure to combat risks is typically confined to a very small proportion of the force.
The RAAF has won its jurisdictional competition of protecting the nation’s interests by training, educating and promoting specialists. This investment in specialists has enabled the RAAF to remain efficient by using a smaller workforce and retain its position as a policy device of choice for the civil executive.
However, this approach has seen workforce disengagement from the military profession due to strong connections with their specialisation. A symptom of this is the lack of importance RAAF personnel place on professional military education (PME) outside their specialisation.
To articulate this argument requires an overview of the debates surrounding the military profession to show that an analysis of ‘the system of professions as a whole’ through the lens of jurisdictions provides a more accurate interpretation of the military profession, within which the RAAF adapts to remain effective and relevant.
Second, a discussion of the RAAF’s training, education, promotion and employment continuum reveals that in its efforts to maintain its jurisdiction through the aerospace domain, the RAAF is developing specialists disconnected from the military profession.
Finally, the rapidly changing Indo-Pacific region is shown to mean that the RAAF and its workforce concurrently must re-prioritise PME to remain effective and relevant.
Huntington began Part I of The Soldier and the State with the assertion that ‘[t]he professional officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer is a professional man.”4Huntington then compared military officers to physicians and lawyers, while contrasting them from the warriors of the past through his model of professions.5
In this model, Huntington argued that “[t]he distinguishing characteristics of a profession as a special type of vocation are its expertise, responsibility and corporateness.”6
Huntington argued that officership is fundamentally a profession, despite acknowledging that no vocation meets the ideal, and officership falls shorter than most.7
Huntington stated that the central expertise of officership is ‘management of violence’ with responsibility beyond gaining personal advantage, and corporateness defined as a sense of unity with its members and distinction from the laymen. 8
Huntington was attempting to frame civil-military relations for a military profession based on his perceptions of an idealised Prussian military and a narrow interpretation of Clausewitz’s principle that war as an extension of policy is the only means to exert one’s will over another.9
He was responding to the US’s political and military context during the Cold War and arguing for an idealised objective civilian control of the military.10
In doing so, he used Harold Lasswell’s definition of the role of the military to be the management of violence viewed through the lens of the United States’ military’s experiences during the First and Second World Wars.11
Christopher Gibson explained that despite the idiosyncrasies and flaws of Huntington’s model, it was widely accepted and shaped the way several militaries saw themselves, even to this day.12
In 1960, Morris Janowitz published The Professional Soldier as a response to Huntington’s objective civilian control of the military and characterisation of the military professional.13
In his book, Janowitz argues for a subjective civilian control of the military while describing the military establishment as “a struggle between heroic leaders, who embody traditionalism and glory, and military “managers,” who are concerned with scientific and rational conduct of war.”14
He argued that the increased complexity of military materiel led to the rise of military technologists and engineers.However,”[n]either heroic leaders nor military managers perform as military engineers or technologists.”15
Akin to Huntington, Janowitz provided a characterisation of military professionals based on their expertise, lengthy education, group identity, ethics and standards of performance.16
However, a stark difference from Huntington is Janowitz’s recognition of the evolving nature of the military profession ‘as a dynamic bureaucratic organisation which changes over time in response to changing conditions’ beyond the management of violence.17
Extending Janowitz’s observations on the dynamic nature of the military profession, Charles Moskos suggested a pluralistic model to define the military profession encompassing a variety of units that exhibit divergence and convergence from civilian society.18
Moskos argued that divergence from civil society was apparent in parts of the military that value traditional military roles and emphasised the heroic leader, such as combat units. Conversely, convergence with civil society would be observed in military roles such as education and medicine, where the task is not unique to the military.19
The observations of Janowitz and Moskos were in response to the effects of the Cold War and the Vietnam War during a time of great upheaval within the American political and military cadre. This led to criticism that their models created two militaries in response to a crisis unique to the US, and potentially diluted the professionalism of the military.20
In response, Moskos suggested a redefinition of the military profession representative of the current context may be required while recognising that any such definition faced a similar fate as Huntington’s due to the profession’s dynamic nature.21
Arguably the models developed by Huntington, Janowitz and Moskos represented snapshots of the military’s role and position within society observed through the perceived characteristics of professions. These have led to considerable disagreement and misperceptions due to a lack of a consistent approach in assessing the military profession, further complicating debate.
Recognising this problem within the study of professions in general, Andrew Abbott proposed an analysis of ‘the system of professions as a whole.’22
Abbot provided a more compelling interpretation of an ever-changing nature of the military profession, continually adapting to new contexts and demands to remain effective and relevant, akin to any other profession.23
Abbott’s analysis focused on the work performed by professions rather than their characteristics and demonstrated that professions evolve in similar fashions for acceptance by society or become obsolete.24
He argued that by developing an abstract knowledge system, professions could redefine their ‘problems and tasks, defend them from interlopers, and seize new problems’ because professions conducting similar work are in constant competition over what he terms jurisdictions —‘the link between a profession and its work.’ 25
Abbott argued that:
“[P]rofessions develop when jurisdictions become vacant, which may happen because they are newly created or because an earlier tenant has left them altogether or lost its firm grip on them. If an already existing profession takes over a vacant jurisdiction, it may in turn vacate another of its jurisdictions or retain merely supervisory control of it.”26
The creation of the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force (RAF) is a case in point. The RAF partially won its post-First World War jurisdictional competition of defending the nation and its interests by arguing that it was able to conduct various roles including strategic bombing and colonial policing better and cheaper than the British Army and Royal Navy.27
The RAF’s jurisdictional control and role within the military and society were reinforced at the start of the Second World War when the fear of German bomber aircraft redefined the problem of defending the nation.28
Post-war debates over the efficacy of air power during the war and the validity of air power theories did not affect the RAF’s jurisdictional control, as its role was redefined again with the introduction of nuclear and precision bombs.
The RAAF’s operations since World War Two fit well with Abbott’s observations that it is in continuous jurisdictional competitions. Furthermore, it can be seen that the RAAF has evolved beyond the management of violence to remain relevant due to the military profession’s changing context as identified by Beatrice Heuser, who stated:
“[C]onflict management is not enough, and it is not sufficient to impose one’s will on the enemy merely temporarily, through a successful military campaign… in order to be effective and lasting, a victory has to be built on military success, but has to contain a very large admixture of politics.”29
For example, the RAAF’s participation in Operations Catalyst and Slipper highlighted the RAAF’s response to this changing context.
The RAAF provided two C-130 Hercules aircraft for air mobility support as part of these operations during the period between 2003 and 2008.30
Although these aircraft represented only 3 per cent of the Coalition Hercules fleet, they had carried 16 per cent of the cargo lifted by all Hercules in theatre.’31
During this period, the RAAF was not engaged in the direct application of violence, indicating that the RAAF has evolved beyond the management of violence.Furthermore, this evidence also highlighted that the RAAF’s efforts during this period ensured it was able to extend its jurisdiction over the air mobility domain.
Air mobility support could have been obtained from coalition partners, but at least two RAAF C-130 aircraft was in theatre for an extended period of time.Nevertheless, the RAAF’s small commitment demonstrated its evolution to maintain its jurisdiction and remain a trusted policy device for the government.
The Government’s subsequent decisions to expand the RAAF’s air mobility fleet through the acquisition of C-17A Globemaster and C-27J Spartan aircraft highlighted the RAAF’s success.
Multiple initiatives are currently in motion to transform the RAAF into a fifth-generation force able to apply air and space effects as part of an integrated joint force.32
Several of these initiatives focus on people and promote professional and technical mastery within the RAAF.33
These initiatives assert the importance of positive leadership, PME and the study of history while promoting the RAAF’s technologically-advanced capabilities and the need for innovation.34
The RAAF routinely provides courses and seminars to its workforce on both the military profession, and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. Further education and professional development within specialist trades appear to be enthusiastically pursued.
Well established funding and education programs support personnel in gaining specialist training, which is deemed to provide tangible benefits to the RAAF and the individual’s promotion prospects. These programs include overseas opportunities, Australian Defence Force Academy post-graduate courses and professional development programs that allow personnel to access specialist training and education easily.
Moreover, multiple specialisations incorporate specialist education and development into career continuums from an early stage, so the link between professional development and individual progression is clear and compelling.
In contrast, the workforce as a whole appears indifferent towards more general PME. Since 2009, RAAF PME has been delivered as part of promotion courses with a relatively less clear articulation of the benefits to the broader workforce in enabling the RAAF to conduct its everyday role. PME has been something individuals have to do to be promoted, not something people want to do because it will make them better at their job.
This is evidenced by communication from multiple senior leaders that large numbers of personnel remain deficient in meeting their mandatory PME requirements.
Accordingly, a policy of ‘no PME, no promotion’ was implemented but has reinforced the perception that PME is a compliance requirement rather than a value-adding activity.
The disconnect from PME is an outcome of the RAAF’s use of a small workforce to employ complex hardware in the air domain and to prevail in its jurisdictional competition as an instrument of government.
High levels of efficiency are generated through specialist-focused training, education, promotion, and employment continuums. After initial entry training, personnel are employed and managed within their specialist trades, including officers until promoted into the General List as Group Captains.
A small number of officers and warrant officers are selected to attend command and staff courses or capability management courses. A still smaller number of Group Captains are also selected to attend the Defence and Strategic Studies Course and gain the necessary knowledge and skills to operate at the strategic level. Before and following these courses, personnel continue to be employed within their specialist categorisations.
The value of specialist knowledge is reinforced by individual promotions (up to the rank of group captain) being determined within specialisations, rather than across the RAAF workforce as a whole.
Officers promoted into the General List as Group Captains are selected from across the officer corps but continue to be employed in roles associated with their specialisations. This process has considerable strengths but creates inherent weaknesses which will be discussed in the next paragraphs.
The RAAF’s emphasis on specialisation has enabled it to reliably and efficiently operate highly complex hardware in the air domain despite numerous challenges.
For example, in 1991, when the Australian Government implemented the Commercial Support Program (CSP), the RAAF’s workforce was reduced from approximately 22,000 to below 13,500 personnel by 2001.35
During the same period, the workforce was undergoing other changes due to a spate of fatal aircraft accidents attributed to operational and technical errors.[7] Despite an almost 40% workforce reduction, the RAAF continued to perform reliably, contributing to domestic and global operations while improving its safety and technical performance to establish a world-class aviation safety management framework.
Hence, through the use of a highly-specialised workforce, the RAAF absorbed CSP personnel reductions, implemented an aviation safety management system, and contributed to government-directed activities – preserving and enhancing its reputation as a trusted policy device.36
When faced with similar workforce reduction pressures, the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force (RAF) adopted an approach with less emphasis on specialisation, which has been cited as contributing to adverse outcomes. The investigation into the loss of an RAF Nimrod aircraft and 14 crew over Afghanistan in 2006 illustrated the apparent costs of a less specialised model.
The report judged the principal factors at work included the creation of a larger ‘purple’ and ‘through life’ structures as well as ‘the imposition of unending cuts and change” from 1998-2006 which ‘led to a dilution of its safety and airworthiness regime and culture.’37
Furthermore, the report identified the RAAF’s airworthiness framework as an exemplar airworthiness management model.38
Notably, a result of the accident and subsequent report was the establishment of the British Ministry of Defence Military Aviation Authority. This single regulatory authority is headed by a three-star Director-General responsible for the oversight of British Defence aviation activities akin to the role conducted by Australia’s Defence Aviation Safety Authority.
The RAF’s experience highlighted the benefits offered by a highly-specialised workforce in technical areas, including maintaining the trust of governments as a safe and reliable operator of complex equipment.
While there are strengths associated with a highly-specialised workforce, there are also weaknesses. In a study of the United States Air Force officer corps, Frank Wood argued convincingly that air force personnel associate with their specialisation more than the military profession.39
Charles Moskos’s work on the military profession in the United States also argued that due to the nature of complex hardware they employ, air forces are becoming more civilianised to attract those with specialised training. Moskos argued that those personnel ‘will be attracted to the service in a civilian rather than a military capacity and will gauge military employment in terms of marketplace standards’ within which factors such as remuneration and location stability play a bigger role.40
Applying Mosko’s theory, the RAAF’s culture of specialisation attracts personnel inclined towards specialisation and then reinforces linkages to similar civilian specialists throughout a member’s military career, enabling ready disengagement from the military profession.
The workforce efficiencies created through specialisation further reinforce this trend as a smaller workforce lacks the depth to address specialisation and broader PME. The perceived low priority afforded to PME by the RAAF personnel appears to be a symptom of their disconnection from the military profession.
However, this disconnect arises from the Service’s preference for a highly-specialised workforce as a means of prevailing in its jurisdictional competition.
Australia’s strategic circumstances and choices have become more difficult.41
Emerging challenges include traditional state on state threats due to the continued rise of China, Sino-Indian power competition and the re-balancing of American priorities within the Indo-Pacific. 42
The rise of non-traditional threats adds another layer of complexity to Australia’s strategic choices. The impacts of globalisation, energy security, minority group extremism, terrorism and the effects of climate change mean that Australia’s national security is no longer bounded simply by the need to defend Australia’s geographical sovereignty but also ‘the security of Australia’s society and its citizens.’43
As highlighted in the 2016 Defence White Paper, Australia’s technological edge is diminishing.44
This suggests that the RAAF’s historical preference for a highly-specialised workforce to maximise its technological edge may not be appropriate for future challenges.
Of note, the Chief of Air Force’s 2017 commander’s intent and intent for learning explicitly recognised the importance of effective employment of technology by personnel who combine their technical expertise with a good understanding of the profession of arms.
This can only be achieved through the marriage of engaging PME and a thorough knowledge of specialist skills. This has been a consistent message from senior leaders for several years and appears to underpin recent PME reform efforts.
The RAAF’s highly-specialised approach has performed well during its operations since the Second World War. However, these operations have been relatively limited in scale and intensity, with other partners bearing the burden of higher-levels of strategy and operational planning. As a result, the RAAF’s specialised workforce was able to operate in its comfort zone and was not stretched to the point of being exposed.
During these operations, the RAAF’s technological edge over its adversaries enabled its workforce to remain within its specialist stovepipes without needing to consider the impact of tactical decisions in the strategic arena which could be necessary against a possible near-peer enemy.
Hence, a need arises to look externally to judge the effects of a highly specialised but professionally disengaged military workforce in other contexts, including high-intensity conflicts. Dima Adamsky’s observations on the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are a useful starting point due to the IDF’s size, alliance with the United States, strong focus on workforce specialisation, and ongoing exposure to conflicts.[19]
Adamsky observed that following its successes of 1949, 1956, and 1967, the IDF developed ‘a total disinterest in the art of war.’ The effects of this were that ‘[p]roblems were resolved in an isolated and sequential manner as if they were not interconnected.’ Further, Adamsky observed that the IDF General Staff continually chose to provide pragmatic but technically narrow solutions to problems because ‘[w]ith no formal professional education IDF officers thought and operated in tactical terms concentrating on giving ad hoc piecemeal solutions to immediate problems.’45
Israel’s Iron Dome defence system is a case in point. RAND Corporation analyst Elizabeth M. Bartels argued that while the Iron Dome achieved tactical success by mitigating the risks from missiles, it was a strategic failure changing “strategic and political prosecution of the campaign in ways that may have denied Israel decisive victories.”
Although these observations should be qualified, noting that the IDF uses a conscription model and their conflicts have arguably been against enemies not as professional, a strong focus on specialists within the general staff has demonstrably resulted in a lack of strategic perspective.
Adamsky’s observations highlight that a disengaged workforce, such as the RAAF’s, is less able to grasp the complexities of problems at the strategic level and will instead opt to focus on generating tactical solutions to immediate problems.
Adamsky’s analysis of the IDF indicates that without greater emphasis on PME, the RAAF’s current focus on specialisation is likely to adversely affect its jurisdictional competitiveness as Australia confronts a more challenging environment. This logic underpins current initiatives such as Plan Wirraway, The Runway professional development portal, and a new PME continuum. There is clear top-down direction to balance technical and professional mastery as part of transforming the RAAF into a fifth-generation force.
These PME initiatives must be complemented by adjustments to the RAAF’s promotion and employment continuum in order to emphasise the importance of PME in enabling the Air Force to conduct its roles and missions, with links to everyday duties.
Without this immediate and tangible reinforcement of PME’s value, inertia will see RAAF personnel drift towards perfecting their specialisation and remain disinterested in air power and the military profession in broad terms. More importantly, it must be recognised that compliance-centric attempts to change the workforce’s behaviour through methods such as ‘no PME, no promotion’ will not address the root cause.
While the organisation can reorient PME incentives, RAAF personnel also have a personal responsibility to seek a philosophical understanding of airpower. Despite the hierarchical nature of military organisations, Elliot Cohen’s analysis of military transformation demonstrated that assuming that change will happen following senior leader direction is false and outdated. Cohen stated “[t]hroughout most of military history, to include the current period, change tends to come more from below, from the spontaneous interactions between military people, technology and particular tactical circumstances.” 46
It is naïve to assume that initiatives implemented from the top with sporadic injections of PME throughout RAAF personnel’s careers will enable them to fully exploit the benefits offered by the study of air power.
Therefore, unless the workforce positively engages with their profession beyond top-down direction, the changes required are unlikely to succeed during crises.
While a great deal of responsibility rests with the implementation of top-down initiatives, without positive engagement by RAAF personnel and an equal focus on PME, they will not be successful.
Professions, including the military profession, continually evolve and are in constant jurisdictional competitions with others. This forces them to adapt to new contexts to ensure their survival.
The RAAF has successfully participated in a jurisdictional competition of protecting the nation’s interests by using a highly-specialised workforce to operate complex hardware in the air domain. The RAAF’s emphasis on training, educating and promoting specialists comes with considerable strengths, including high levels of proficiency and efficiency.
However, it has come at the cost of widespread disengagement from the military profession, including disengagement from broad PME.
This highly-specialised approach appears to be ill-suited to a world undergoing profound changes and presenting serious challenges to Australia’s security. Accordingly, the RAAF must prioritise PME to maintain its effectiveness and relevance as a policy device.
This will require changes to the RAAF’s training, education, promotion and employment continuum to emphasise and value PME. Top-down direction is necessary, but genuine change also requires a cultural shift in the workforce to value PME and professional development. In a rapidly changing world, the RAAF must adapt lest its historically successful methods become its undoing.
Squadron Leader Ulas ‘Ulie’ Yildirim is an officer in the Royal Australian Air Force.
The opinions expressed are his alone and do not reflect the views of the Royal Australian Air Force, the Australian Defence Force, or the Australian Government.
This article was published by Central Blue in two parts.
The first one on July 21, 2019 and the second one on August 4th, 2019.
The original title of the two part article was “First class people for a fifth generation Air Force.”
The Japanese forces have been classically stoved-piped ones going forward.
Now the Japanese are about to pass their 8th budget in a row increasing defense spending.
The Self-Defense Force wants record spending power next year to help pay for major upgrades to the nation’s defenses, as Tokyo continues to perceive a missile threat from North Korea despite Pyongyang’s promise to abandon nuclear weapons.
The Defense Ministry budget proposal released Friday calls for defense spending to rise 2.1 percent to ¥5.3 trillion ($48 billion) for the year starting April 1.
If approved it will be the seventh straight annual increase, as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reinforces the Self-Defense Forces to respond to any North Korea missile strike and counter China’s growing air and sea power in the waters around Japan.
The proposed defense budget still has to face scrutiny by Finance Ministry officials who may seek to curtail any rise in military outlays to secure funds for the nation’s burgeoning health and welfare spending.
The biggest proposed outlay in the military budget will be on ballistic missile defense, with a request for ¥235 billion for two new powerful ground-based Aegis Ashore radar missile tracking stations built by Lockheed Martin Corp.
Japan’s military also wants funds to buy longer-range Raytheon Co. SM-3 interceptor missiles designed to strike enemy missiles in space, and money to improve the range and accuracy of its PAC-3 missiles batteries that are the last line of defense against incoming warheads.
With the upsurge in defense spending, the Japanese are adding new fifth generation airpower capabilities, new missile defense capabilities, and new tron warfare capabilities.
Underlying the upsurge in acquisition is the challenge of force integration.
How will the Japanese reshape their forces to provide for extended perimeter defense and to do so in way that the force can operated as an integrated distributed force?
Perhaps there evolving relationship with Australia where the ADF is prioritizing force integration might have a major impact.
The United States is in the throes of significant change as well, but continued commitments to the land wars in the Middle East, uncertainty about how the direct defense of Europe is best done in terms of the American contribution, and service conflicts over how to best deliver enhanced deterrence in depth will slow the U.S. con-ops innovations.
But clearly allies like Japan and Australia are major players in the reshaping of the U.S. force development in the Pacific as well.
Virtually all of the press reports surrounding the Japanese budget look like shopping lists; but we are clearly moving rapidly beyond the legitimacy of such an appraoch.
We clearly need to focus on the capabilities for the U.S. and the allies to work together to deliver an effective deterrent force.
The new Sec Def, Mark Esper, has prioritized defense efforts in the Pacific as a key anchor to the Great Power strategy. In particular, given the withdrawal from the INF treaty, a key focus is upon the building of new conventional longer-range missiles deployed throughout the US and allied Pacific defense perimeter.
This entails interactive technological, force structure and geographical deployment dynamics. We have argued that a new basing structure combined with a capability to deploy and operate an integrated distributed force is at the heart of the strategic shift, and not only in the Pacific15
This is a key part of the effort to shape a full spectrum crisis management capability whose con-ops is shaped to deal with adversary operations within what some call the “gray zone” or within the “hybrid warfare” area17
The nature of the threat facing the liberal democracies was well put by a senior Finnish official: “The timeline for early warning is shorter; the threshold for the use of force is lower.”
What is unfolding is that capabilities traditionally associated with high end warfare are being drawn upon for lower threshold conflicts, designed to achieve political effect without firing a shot.
Higher end capabilities being developed by China are Russia are becoming tools to achieve political-military objectives throughout the diplomatic engagement spectrum.
This means that not only do the liberal democracies need to shape more effective higher end capabilities but they need to learn how to use force packages which are making up a higher end, higher tempo or higher intensity capability as part of a range of both military operations but proactive engagement to shape peer adversary behavior.
In today’s world, this is what full spectrum crisis management is all about. It is not simply about escalation ladders; it is about the capability to operate tailored task forces within a crisis setting to dominate and prevail within that crisis. If that stops the level of escalation that is one way of looking at it. But in today’s world, it is not just about that but it is about the ability to operate and prevail within a diversity of crises which might not be located on what one might consider an escalation ladder.
How will the Japanese leverage their new capabilities to shape such a force?
The featured photo: Service members with the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) 2nd Air Defense Missile Group, set up the MIM-104 Patriot missile system during Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) deployment training at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, Aug. 29, 2017. PAC-3 is a surface-to-air missile defense system, which provides a highly reactive hit-to-kill capability in both range and altitude while operating in all environments. This training displays the strength of the U.S.-Japan alliance and demonstrates the JASDF’s ability to rapidly deploy multiple defense assets to U.S. military installations across Japan. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Aaron Henson)
The video below was published by the Japanese Ministry of Defence and explains their view on the evolution of the SDF:
By Pierre Tran, Paris
European industry needs much patience as key nations have yet to agree on requirements and budgets for a planned Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and a medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, Dassault Aviation CEO Eric Trappier said Sept 4.
France, Germany and Spain have yet to sign contracts for technology demonstrators for the the New Generation Fighter (NGF), a key element in FCAS which includes remote carrier drones and a command and control network.
“We are very impatient,” Trappier told a press conference on the company’s first half financial results. The partner nations need to agree on specifications and budgets for the FCAS, in which the industrial partners have agreed their respective roles, he added.
“We are ready,” he said. “We submitted our offer.”
There had been hopes for a contract to be announced at the Paris airshow, which ran June 17-23, with prospects slipping to September and the end of the year, he said. Engineers are keen to work on a prototype rather than proposals, and need to develop their skills.
A prototype is due to fly in 2026, so the program needs to be launched, he said. Trappier declined to give details of the budget.
France and Germany plan to invest an initial €4 billion ($4.4 billion) in the new fighter jet by 2025, with €2.5 billion from Paris, Sky News reported June 17.
France is lead nation on the FCAS project, with Dassault prime contractor for the new fighter, which will replace the French Rafale, German Typhoon and Spanish F-18.
It was important for FCAS and a plan for a new Franco-German tank to be kept entirely separate, Trappier said, adding Dassault is working with Airbus on the former.
“We would really like the two subjects to be firmly kept apart,” he said.
Trappier has previously expressed concern over a potential spill over of a row over German industrial leadership on the tank project, dubbed Main Ground Combat System (MGCS).
“Progress is difficult,” he told May 22 parliamentarians of the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly.
Airbus and Dassault are working on the FCAS aeronautical project, while Rheinmetall is the new entrant in the tank deal, in which KMW and Nexter are partners, he said.
Rheinmetall objects to a proposed 25 percent share in the tank project, equal to the stake for Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, with the former seeking a greater role, financial website La Tribune reported May 15.
The French and German authorities proposed the 25/25 percent share for Rheinmetall and KMW for Germany, with Nexter holding 50 percent for France.
Trappier pointed up to parliamentarians “the slightly symmetrical nature of the FCAS project and the Main Ground Combat System in terms of organization,” adding “the difficulties of one could flow into the other as the same two procurement offices are involved.”
The French procurement office, Direction Générale de l’Armement, represents France in negotiations with Germany, where the parliament has a strong supervisory role.
Alongside the new tank, France and Germany are also pursing planned new artillery, dubbed Common Indirect Fire System (CIFS).
Meanwhile, Airbus, Dassault and Leonardo, are also waiting for contracts on the proposed European MALE UAV. Those are the three key companies on the project backed by France, Germany, Italy and Spain.
Occar, the European procurement office, would manage that program if the four partner nations reach agreement on requirement and budget.
“You have to be resilient, you have to be patient on a large defense program,” even more so when there is cooperation with several countries and other companies, he said, adding that the MALE UAV project will apply for financial backing from the European Defense Fund. Trappier expressed confidence the project would win the contract.
Airbus is prime contractor on the European MALE UAV.
Germany is lead partner on the tank and European UAV cooperative projects, while France leads on FCAS. These projects are part of the pursuit of European defense as evoked by French president Emmanuel Macron.
In exports, Dassault will deliver the first of 36 Rafale to India this month, Trappier said. Now the elections are over in India, talks will resume for further sales of the fighter.
The Indian air force is keen to acquire a further 110 fighters, while the navy seeks 57, financial daily Les Echosreported July 22. Macron invited Indian Prime Minister NarendraModi to dinner a day before the opening of the G7 summit, held Aug. 24-26 at Biarritz, southwest France.
Dassault continues to take part in fighter competitions held by Finland and Switzerland, Trappier said, adding that he was surprised it took so long for Airbus to pull out of the Canadian competition for 88 fighters.
Dassault dropped out of that tender last year, as the terms were seen as unreasonable, particularly security requirements set by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), he said.
On the new generation fighter, Trappier called for Berlin and Paris to agree on terms for export controls as foreign sales would be needed to support the program.
Asked about Britain building its Tempest fighter and competing with the Franco-German combat jet, he said. “It is better to have two than nothing.”
French officials see that industrial capability as underpinning a strategic autonomy and national sovereignty.
The 2010 Lancaster House defense treaty between France and the UK will weather the planned Brexit move, as cooperation will continue, he said. Britain’s pulling out of cooperation on a technology demonstrator for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) may have been for a number of reasons, such as Brexit or budgetary constraint, he said.
France is expected to place an order for 10 Falcon jets, comprising three Falcon 8X, dubbed Arcangel, for electronic warfare, and seven Falcon 2000LS, dubbed Albatros, for maritime patrol. The former will replace an aging two-strong fleet of C-160 Gabriel.
Dassault reported adjusted net profit of €286 million in the first half, up 54 percent from a year ago. Net sales rose to €3.1 billion from €1.71 billion.
Orders rose to €2.9 billion from €2.8 billion, helped by a 10-year service contract with France on the Rafale, based on Dassault’s acting as single prime contractor for maintenance of equipment, except for engines and ejector seats.
Adjusted operating income rose to €250 million from €111 million. The order book eased to €19.2 billion from €19.4 billion.
The cash holding slipped to €4.8 billion from €5.2 billion, with the company forecasting a further fall due to spending on export Rafales, development of two Falcon jet programs and new buildings as part of a modernization plan.
KMW has partnered with Nexter in a Franco-German joint venture, KNDS, which had been assigned as prime contractor for the new tank. Nexter is a French state-owned maker of land weapons, including the Leclerc tank and Caesar artillery.
Bio Eric Trappier - Chairman CEO Dassault Aviation
By Robbin Laird
When one talks about globalization, its benefits and its challenges, the discussion usually is upon the global economy.
But with globalization has come the opening of borders, legally and not, to the migration of peoples. In fact, we are experiencing one of the most significant periods of migratory change since the Second World War, the brutality of which also had the effect of dramatically moving peoples globally.
A defining element of globalization since the mid-1990s has been jihadism
With the emergence of Europe “free and whole,” the tableau upon which the jihadism picture has been painted is a Euro-Middle East.
This a region within which the flow of migrants from the Middle East as well as the rise of a more fundamentalist and less integrationist form of Islam has risen in significance within Europe itself.
A key goal Osama bin Laden for the 9/11 attacks in the United States was to encourage the United States to counter attack in the Middle East itself. He believed that such an engagement would create a recruiting sergeant for al-Queda in its strategic efforts to change the political landscape in the Middle East and bring the Muslim world closer his vision.
This means that from the outset, global jihadism has become a central part of globalization and to the rise of the 21stcentury authoritarian powers and the end of the “end of history” projection of globalization and the dominance of the liberal democracies.
What we are now witnessing is the growing impact of China, Russia, Turkey and jihadism as an ascendant force in global affairs against which the liberal democracies are reacting and in significant conflict about and in many ways in disarray with regard to the best paths ahead for them in such a world.
At the suggestion of Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman of the Williams Foundation, I recently read the book entitled Nine Lives. He expressed to me that the book should be “required reading in the political domain.”
I rarely have read a book that has provided both a good read as well as providing a way in to understand the nature, challenges and way ahead to deal with the variegated challenges of the West dealing with militant jihad.
The book is truly unique.
To quote the book jacket: “As one of al-Queda’s most respected bomb makers Aimen Dean rubbed shoulders with the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks and swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden himself.
“As a double agent at the hear of al-Qaeda’s chemical weapons program, he foiled attacks on civilians and saved countless lives, brushing with death so often that his handlers began to call him their spy with nine lives.”
That opening alone would make one want to read the book.
But what one then discovers when entering the world of the author is a chance to revisit the history of our Western interaction with militant Jihad and the evolution of the Muslim world both in Europe and the Middle East.
In 1995, I wrote an article on the interaction between Europe and the Middle East in which is was clear to me that that we were looking at a dynamic two way street in which both Westernization as well as Islam were interactively challenging one another.
What the life of Aimen Dean and his narrative about militant Jihad underscores is how central this interaction has become to both the future evolution of Europe and the Muslim Middle East.
He goes as a 15 year old Bahraini to Bosnia to defend the Muslims being slaughtered by the Serbs.
In fact, modern militant jihad has its origins in the mid-1990s in Bosnia.
“The conflict would sow bitter fruit. Two decades later, more than 300 Bosnians would trael to Syria and Iraq to support ISIS, one of the highest number per capita from anywhere in Europe. Bosnia was a crucible for modern jihad.”47
In Dean’s view, as a future member of al-Queda and who would later meet Osama bin Laden and swear an oath of loyalty to him, the future of jihadism was presaged in Bosnia.
“Influential jihadis such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who would just a few years later mastermind the 9/11 attacks, were encouraging the belief that a war of civilizations was inevitable….
He quoted comments made by KSM to him at a wedding:
“Bosnia is a sideshow. America is the true enemy. The Arabs here (in Bosnia) should move to Afghanistan. There is a camp call Khalden in Khost province, where a new force is being built.”48
Over time Europe becomes both a recruitment center and infrastructure for support for the militant jihadists who were generated during the Iraq and Afghan wars, and who then became the foot soldiers for al-Queda and ISIS.
The author describes extensively throughout the book his time in the UK with the jihadists and the key role, which both Britain and Germany have played in providing, recruits to the cause.
After the author becomes an operative of British intelligence but remained a member of al-Queda he witnessed the European-wide operation.
“My employers were beginning to get a sense that Europe had an expanding and multifaceted problem: radicalization, recruitment and fundraising in what was essentially a continent-wide sanctuary.”49
The author quoted a senior leader of the jihadists who had lived extensively in Europe.
“Al-Suri believed Islamists already living in the West should be the shock troops of terrorism in the future. Having himself lived for years I Europe, he believed there was already significant sympathy for the jihadi cause there.
“More than nay other jihadi leader I met, he had an unbridle hatred for European secularism and lassitude,. While bin Laden obsessed about the United State, al-Suri had called on Algerian jihadis to ‘strike deeply in France,’ and he hated Britain just as venomously.”50
He argued toward the end of the book, that the modern period of militant jihad can be understood in terms of a building out of a number of phases of development.
“With the explosion of terror attacks worldwide, jihadism has evolved in my lifetime. I was one of the youngest members of the first generation, which came of age in jihad against the Russians in Afghanistan and among the mountains of Bosnia.
“The second generation emerged during the Iraq War.
“And now there is a third generation of often tech-savvy youngsters, who have grown up amongst the carnage and upheavals unleashed since the Arab Spring and the ruse of far-right anti-Muslim extremism in the West.”51
In the evolving phase, he describes the conflicts between ISIS and al-Queda and the conflicting variants of jihadism as the movement mutates going forward. But the author argues frequently throughout the book, that Westerners have not really grasped the fundamental religious character of these movements, driven by their visions of spiritual redemption.
“So many attempts by outsiders to capture the essence of these groups have underplayed their spiritual underpinnings. Western analysts tend to study jihadi movements through the prism of their own assumptions, believing that such groups will weigh risks and benefits and act rationally. Al-Qaeda was quite capable of that as the meticulous planning of the 9/11 attacks showed.
“But, ultimately, global jihad is guided by very specific interpretations of the Koran and the hadith.”52
From the perspective of someone inside the standing up and evolution of jihadism, the U.S. generated invasion of Iraq simply led to a very significant upsurge in recruits to the process and led to a rapid acceleration of its globalization.
As the author puts it: “the fiasco of the U.S. occupation of Iraq had become a recruiting sergeant for al-Queda.”53
From my perspective, the book can clearly be read as providing a clear understanding why the ill-fated attempt to do stability operations was clearly not only doomed to failure but enhanced the problem of dealing with the region.
On the one hand, inserting the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan as it has done in the Muslim Middle East has only enhanced recruiting the various radical Islam movements.Being an engaged ally is one thing; appearing as an occupier and organizer of stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq is something quite different.
On the other hand, the challenge of militant jihad is clearly an internal Muslim challenge in terms of the war of ideas.
As the author as a devout Muslim argues throughout the book, jihadism is flawed ideology, one at odds with Islam.
And it needs to be challenged in these terms, something clearly not a good domain for players like U.S. forces to even be touching, and what is clearly part of what would be necessary for successful stability outcomes in the Middle East.
He discusses throughout the book but most notably at the end various ways this battle in the domain of ideas can be fought, and won. But it is clearly, not something I as an American am going to play a central role, to say the least.
The impact of jihadism on Europe is central to the fate and future of Europe and here the battle for the soul and future of Europe is closely entailed with the internal battle against jihadism.
How will the European debate and political resolution of migration and integration of Muslims best proceed?
How to deal with those Muslims living in Europe who have no interest in integration and have little in common with the secular values in Europe?
This means that although for the Middle East, sorting through the way ahead between Shia and Sunnis is central something for Muslims to sort out, the role of Europe and its secular culture will have its impact simply because of the challenge of working the integration challenge for the Muslims living and coming to Europe.
And that was what I argued in my earlier article about France and Islam with regard to the central challenge which secularism poses to the Muslim world.
The rise of Putin coincides as well global jihadism, in this case the war against the Chechens. To this day, we do not know whether the Russians themselves or terrorists set up the deadly explosions in Moscow, which brought Putin to power.
“Putin may not have ordered or even been aware of the plan to bomb Moscow. But it was a gift – whoever wrapped it – to the new hard man of Russian politics.”54
And in his life after MI-6, the author has worked with various clients to deal with global jihadism.
One of those clients has been the Chinese security services.
“The aftermath of 9/11 has touched every corner of the world; even China was not immune. The Taliban might have been ejected from Kabul, but their continuing resistance had p[provide the Uighurs with an escape route. How ironic that the government of Pakistan had gone with its begging bowl to Beijing seeking investment and trade even as its security services continued helping the Taliban on the quiet,”55
The book is clearly essential reading to understand the dynamics of change in our world, notably with jihadism as a significant global driver of change. This is an aspect of globalization usually left off the lists of the business-consulting firms when they are promoting the benefits of globalization.
The challenge to the West and liberal democracy is its commitment to secularism.
How does a secular society defend itself against an enemy within while dealing with an explosive force within the Middle East as well?
How can a secular society work its ability to defend itself against the rising authoritarian powers who are also at odds with one another.
Clearly, China and Russia are very concerned with global jihadism, but their actions even when cooperating with the West pursue their own trajectory.
U.S. Marines with Company C, 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment conduct a platoon-sized attack on range 410A during the Integrated Training Exercise (ITX) 5-19 aboard Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Calif., July. 29, 2019.
The purpose of ITX 5-19 is to create a challenging, realistic training environment that produces combat-ready forces capable of operating as an integrated MAGTF.
TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA, UNITED STATES
07.29.2019
Video by Lance Cpl. Skylar Harris
2nd Marine Division
Last year’s International Fighter Conference provided a chance for the participants and the attendees to focus on the role of fighters in what we have been calling the strategic shift, namely, the shift from the land wars to operating in higher intensity operations against peer competitors.
It is clear that combat capabilities and operations are being re-crafted across the board with fighters at the center of that shift, and their evolution, of course, being affected as well as roles and operational contexts change.
The baseline assumption for the conference can be simply put: air superiority can no longer be assumed in operations but needs to be created in contested environments.
It is clear that competitors like China and Russia have put and are putting significant effort into shaping concepts of operations and force structure modernization which will allow them to contest the ability of the liberal democracies to establish air superiority and to dominate future crises.
There was a clear consensus on this point, but, of course, working the specifics of how one would defeat such an adversary in an air campaign gets at broader and more specific force design and concepts of operations.
The conference worked from the common assumption rather than focusing on specific options.
But the way ahead was as contested in the presentations and discussions as any considerations for operations in contested airspace.
We argue that what the liberal democracies are working to shape in response to the new strategic environment is something we call building an “integrated distributed force.”
For example, the new Sec Def, Mark Esper, has prioritized defense efforts in the Pacific as a key anchor to the Great Power strategy. In particular, given the withdrawal from the INF treaty, a key focus is upon the building of new conventional longer-range missiles deployed throughout the US and allied Pacific defense perimeter.
This entails interactive technological, force structure and geographical deployment dynamics. We have argued that a new basing structure combined with a capability to deploy and operate an integrated distributed force is at the heart of the strategic shift, and not only in the Pacific.1
This is a key part of the effort to shape a full spectrum crisis management capability whose con-ops is shaped to deal with adversary operations within what some call the “gray zone” or within the “hybrid warfare” area.2
The nature of the threat facing the liberal democracies was well put by a senior Finnish official: “The timeline for early warning is shorter; the threshold for the use of force is lower.”
What is unfolding is that capabilities traditionally associated with high end warfare are being drawn upon for lower threshold conflicts, designed to achieve political effect without firing a shot.
This means that not only do the liberal democracies need to shape more effective higher end capabilities but they need to learn how to use force packages which are making up a higher end, higher tempo or higher intensity capability as part of a range of both military operations but proactive engagement to shape peer adversary behavior.
In today’s world, this is what full spectrum crisis management is all about.
It is not simply about escalation ladders; it is about the capability to operate tailored task forces within a crisis setting to dominate and prevail within that crisis. If that stops the level of escalation that is one way of looking at it. But in today’s world, it is not just about that but it is about the ability to operate and prevail within a diversity of crises which might not be located on what one might consider an escalation ladder.
The presence force however small needs to be well integrated but not just in terms of itself but its ability to operate via C2 or ISR connectors to an enhanced capability. But that enhanced capability needs to be deployed in order to be tailorable to the presence force and to provide enhanced lethality and effectiveness appropriate to the political action needed to be taken.
This rests really on a significant rework of C2 in order for a distributed force to have the flexibility to operate not just within a limited geographical area but to expand its ability to operate by reaching beyond the geographical boundaries of what the organic presence force is capable of doing by itself.
This requires multi-domain SA – this is not about the intelligence community running its precious space- based assets and hoarding material. This is about looking for the coming confrontation which could trigger a crisis and the SA capabilities airborne, at sea and on the ground would provide the most usable SA monitoring. This is not “actionable intelligence.” This is about shaping force domain knowledge about anticipation of events.
This requires tailored force packaging and take advantage of what the new military technologies and platforms can provide in terms of multi-domain delivery by a small force rather than a large air-sea enterprise which can only fully function if unleashed in sequential waves.
This is not classic deterrence – it is about pre-crisis and crisis engagement.
The force we are building will have five key interactives capabilities:
The new approach is one which can be expressed in terms of a kill web, that is a US and allied force so scalable that if an ally goes on a presence mission and is threatened by a ramp up of force from a Russia or China, that that presence force can reach back to relevant allies as well as their own force structure.
This year’s international fighter conference focuses on a core aspect necessary to be able to be in position to shape an integrated distributed force, namely, namely, what the organizers are calling networked lethality.
The conference will be held from 12-14 November 2019 in Berlin and the program and opportunity to register for the event can be found here:
https://www.defenceiq.com/events-internationalfighter
For a look at some of the arguments and presentations at last year’s conference, see the report below.
International-Fighter-Conference-2018 (wecompress.com)