From the Osprey to the CH-53K: Progress in Building a Maintainable Aircraft

02/21/2019

By Robbin Laird

Recently, I visited New River to talk with the team doing the Log Demo in support of the CH-53K.

A decade ago I visited the Osprey maintainers standing up the Osprey at New River as well.

I have republished a number of those interviews from a decade ago with the maintainers to provide a baseline against which to measure the progress for the USMC as they standup their next major ground support air system.

I reached back to one of my hosts during the Log Demo visit, Jim Lambert, the head field representative for Sikorsky working on the Log Demo, to discuss the differences between the two generations of aircraft from a maintenance perspective as well as to discuss some aspects of the generational change in heavy lift from the CH-53E to the CH-53K.

Question: How would contrast the standup of the K with that of the Osprey from a maintenance perspective?

Lambert: We are directly focused on the training of the Marine maintainers in a crawl, walk and run approach.

“We are building the confidence of the Marine maintainers as well as building the domain technical knowledge.

“We are taking the time to teach them not just how to maintain the aircraft but confidence on the aircraft.

“They are getting a rare opportunity to get incredibly valuable touch time in a slow paced learning environment, which allows them to get comfortable with the airplane.

“Clearly, when we get to flight, operations we are going to ask them to run, but only after a smooth learning curve leading up to them confidently maintaining the aircraft.

“We’ve put the tools designed to maintain the aircraft into their hands to test in the environment they were designed for ahead of the time that we’re going actually have them use them for the first time.

“And with their feedback, we can ensure they meet all the needs of the fleet to support aircraft operations. We collect the data and have the ability to adjust the tools designs as needed.

“Much like the aircraft itself that was designed in an office and is being tested in its intended designed environment, we are doing the same with all the aspect of fleet supportability and logistics.

“The maintenance procedures, tooling, ground support equipment, spares, data collection and maintenance tracking systems are being tested now in their intended environment by the target users.

“Testing the entire scope during log demo has added opportunity to train and familiarize the Marines through the full spectrum of what fleet support will be.”

Question: And to be clear, with the Osprey, the Marines started by walking their way through the first manuals to support operations. 

Aren’t you with the logs demo shaping domain knowledge rather than manuals to launch the K fleet experience?

Lambert: That is correct.

“We are focused on having the Marines working with the airplane get familiar and comfortable with the maintenance approach and indeed, to shape that approach.

“In Osprey interviews which you published from a decade ago, one of the challenges highlighted was the lack of knowledge, the lack of being comfortable with the airplane which led to a high amount of premature removal of parts for unknown failures.

“We are focused on training the Marines to make good sound judgment calls when troubleshooting and performing maintenance.”

Question: How does having a Sikorsky field rep involved in the team affect the learning continuity process?

 Lambert: Continuity of experience and the learning curve to be built by such experience is a key part of the program.

“As the aircraft proliferates across the globe to USMC operating bases, we will have service reps deployed with the aircraft.

“We are going to be there to shape the domain knowledge and confidence factor crucial to maintenance, especially with regard to a digital aircraft.

“We will provide a backstop for the Marines who can be confident that we are providing representation, boots on the ground, wherever the aircraft’s going to be operating.”

Question: My final question is to turn to one aspect of the difference between the legacy CH-53 and the new one.

When I was at New River recently, you have an E next to a K and you were doing rotor head maintenance on the K and had just removed the rotor blades.  How do you do that differently on the two aircraft and to do so in a way that gives the K much greater capability to support a higher ops tempo?

Lambert: The 53K is a completely different airplane than the 53E, so there is virtually no place on the K that I can’t walk around and show you that there’s been a head and shoulders improvement over the legacy 53E.

“There’s so much thought that went into the maintainability of this aircraft.

“We’ve removed a significant amount of parts on the airplane compared to the legacy CH-53.

“This was possible by moving from a mechanical aircraft to a digital 21stcentury aircraft.”

“We removed whole gear boxes from the airplane, dozens of mechanical flight control components with multiple bit piece parts, engine cables and a significant amount of analog avionics and hydraulic components.

“All these required spare part support, repair capability, recurring maintenance inspection as well as significant amounts of time to manually rig/ adjust these systems.

“We’ve simplified it mechanically, like no other aircraft that I’ve ever worked on or have had experience with.

“A prime example of maintainability influenced aircraft design is the rotor system”

“You asked about the rotors and blades which provide a good example of simplification and greater robustness.

“We’re using an elastomeric rotor head system.

“We didn’t use an elastomeric rotor on our 53E; we used what’s called a Wet Head which is a rotor head which uses oil bath bearings and spherical bearings for all control points as opposed to elastomeric bearings, which are rubber composite bearings.

“We don’t use any spherical bearings on the rotor head itself on the K.

“Spherical bearings have a lot higher wear rate, and they have a lot higher inspection intervals. The spherical bearings wear out at a significant rate compared to an elastomeric bearing.

“We’ve proven elastomeric bearings, out through many years of use, on the 60 fleet to 92s. They’re very good, reliable bearings. We have at least a few hundred flight hours on most of the 53K aircraft in test by now with almost all still flying with all their original bearings installed.

“In comparison, the 53E, the spherical bearings are inspected and they’re changed on a pretty routine basis every 25 to 50 hours.

“This means that using the elastomeric bearings significantly reduces the maintenance burden as far as inspection and actual time on maintenance is concerned.”

“With regard to the blades, maintenance has simplified and sped up as well.

“The blades are held, on a 53E rotor head, with a bolts and all require safety cable. This process includes applications of primer, bolts to be installed, torque sequences to perform and safety cable application ending with sealant.

“There’s a rotor blade servicing procedure that we have to do as part of the old in flight blade inspection system.

“In contrast, for the 53K, the plane has a fully composite rotor blade with no service needed. Two quick release pins hold it on and even the grounding wire is a quick release.

“We can put these blades on and off in a very short amount of time. It’s very much of an improved interface as far as maintenance is concerned.

“These are some of the key maintenance improvements along with blade removal and reinstallation, servicing the rotor head, the dampers on the rotor head can all be individually serviced as need.  They are not all serviced together as is required by the 53E. The result is a better more maintainable rotor head.”

“Clearly, the less time we’re performing excessive inspections or maintenance due to the before mentioned significant reductions in parts, modularized design with an aircraft built for unparalleled maintainability; the more time we’re able to fly and complete the mission.”

“Bringing people home everywhere every time! “

Editor’s Note:

What one saw through the early years of the Osprey was a clear problem with lack of understanding of parts failures and lack of confidence or familiarity of Marine maintainers with the certain key parts performance which led to a more hit and miss approach to manage the parts flow.

This point was driven home to me in an interview with Col. Seymour prior to his retirement from the USMC, a senior Marine who knew the Osprey better than anyone.

In the exit interview I did with Colonel Christopher ‘Mongo’ Seymour in the summer of 2013 during the week prior to his retirement, the hard hitting and well-respected Marine Corps leader provided a look back and a way ahead with regard to sustainment of the Osprey.

QUESTION: A major challenge in fielding a new system is getting the supply chain up and working and getting the inevitably maintenance problems sorted out.

How have you worked through these problems?

Col. Seymour: There are three separate streams of activity which need to align to really get the new system up and running and integrated into operations.

The first is getting the Marines committed to owning the system and learning how to fix “new” problems, which come up with a new system.

The problems are different and have to be worked differently.

You need to get the maintainers to change their culture.

Sorting out problems with the gearbox is a good example of what needed to be done.

The gearbox on this airplane is very complex and central to its unique operational capabilities.

The gearbox inside the nacelle turns a rotor, and they were chipping.

This is high-end engineering.

But it was chipping and when it did so maintainers put it aside and waited for a new part.

This meant the fleet was going to be degraded.

The flight line needed to take ownership of the problem because a lot of it was self-inflicted gunshot wounds.

Maintainers would look to blame someone else when they had a Prop Rotor gearbox go bad.

As it turns out, the technology required was to use isotropic oil that actually absorbs moisture out of the air, so if you have a gearbox that’s not turning and boiling the oil out on a regular basis, it goes long term down.

It’s sucking in the moisture of the North Carolina Coast into the oil.

And the maintainers would leave it out on the flight line all opened up just breathing the air, and then when they finally got a part or piece, they try to fire it up and another gearbox would chip or another problem would manifest itself someplace else. It was an endless loop.

We took some ownership here on flight line, and shaped better maintenance practices, and to help industry.

Once we got that Prop Rotor gearbox moving back out of the red into the black, the internal culture of the community changed to become significantly more optimistic, you know.

The maintenance man-hours required to change a proper gearbox initially was estimated at 1800 maintenance man-hours.

We’re doing it now in about 380.

That’s how good we got at it.

Exercice “Marathon Monfreid” in Djibouti

02/20/2019

By Lieutenant Lise Moricet (French Air Force)

TUESDAY 8 JANUARY 2019- DJIBOUTI

Three Rafale from the Saint-Dizier based fighter squadron 1/4  “Gascogne,” as well as one C-135 from Istres Air Base 125 participated in a long range projection exercise, called “Marathon-Monfreid.”

Eight hours of in-flight time and four air-to-air refuelings were necessary for the Rafales to join in flight the Mirages 2000-5 from the fighter squadron 3/11 “Corse,” permanently stationed on the  Djibouti Air Base 188.

Deploying French strategic air capabilities (FAS for « Forces aériennes stratégiques » ) at more than 5500 kilometers from France had two objectives :

  • Ensure that fighter crews get proper training for long range air raids while simulating a raid by the nuclear air component (Marathon);
  • Train them for first-entry in a high intensity warfare theater in a realistic tactical environment.

Ideally situated in the horn of Africa and at the gates of the Middle East, Djibouti is a unique interallied joint training area.

Of the 1700 military personnel deployed, 300 aviators operate daily from Air Base 188, the first French forward-based operational airbase for French forces prepositioned in Africa.

The Rafale fighter jets then continued on their mission to the island of la Réunion, where FAF  Air Detachment 181 is stationed at Saint-Denis, to be followed by the A330 Phénix which has recently been deployed in the force.

Original link– https://www.defense.gouv.fr/air/actus-air/exercice-marathon-monfreid-en-terre-djiboutienne

Translation from the original French by Chloe Laird.

A Tale of Three Contracts: France Shapes its Global Defense Industrial Posture

By Robbin Laird

One can be forgiven if in looking at Macron’s France you focus on his emphasis on Europe and the prioritization of the next phase of European integration.

Yet at the same time, one is witnessing within France the very forces, which are undermining the capability to do so.

Yellow jackets are hardly the storm troopers for more European integration.

Nonetheless, one should not miss what the Macron Administration is doing to shape a global presence beyond Europe itself.

If France has a relatively modest force structure, why not do so with a global focus on defense industry?

What is also notable is that the sweep of three contracts in less than a month have not really been linked together in terms of France shaping a global posture, a somewhat post-Brexit but also post European integration effort as well.

All three contracts position France nicely but also challenge it significantly.

France will need to have the engineering talent to execute the contracts.

France will need to have the global management skills to manage the contracts as well as the conflicting interests implied by those three contracts.

France will need to balance the very different interests of partners in these three contracts.

France will need to shape a wide range of partnering approaches, techniques and means to succeed as well.

It is not just about exporting made-in France and partnering done along those lines to promote the national interest.

Finally, France will need to ensure that economic regression and social warfare don’t undercut the French industrial infrastructure necessary to succeed.

Or put another way, the three contracts also put France in the spotlight with any perceived successes or failures to be magnified on the world stage as well.

The Aussie Submarine

The first contract is with the Aussies to build a new submarine.

The submarine to be built has never been built; it will leverage the work of Naval Group, formerly DCNS, won both nuclear and conventional submarines.

For this contract to succeed, Naval Group and the Aussies will have to build capacity in Australia which is not there to design, build, and maintain a new class of submarines with the first arriving a decade or more away.

If successful, a French company would have a solid base in Australia from which to operate in the region and beyond.

Strategic Partnering Agreement for the Future Submarine Program   from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

FCAS

The second contract is with Germany to build a new air combat system in the 2040s.

For the French, this is about taking Dassault and several key French companies forward into the evolving world of air combat, notably Thales and Safran.

A French Dassault Rafale lands at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, in support of exercise POINTBLANK Nov. 25, 2018. The objective of the exercise is to prepare coalition warfighters for a highly contested fight against near-peer adversaries by providing a multi-dimensional battle-space to conduct advanced training in support of U.S. and U.K. national interests. (U.S. Air Force photo/ Tech. Sgt. Matthew Plew)

Airbus is the swing company straddling Germany and France with its role being sorted out.

Here the French are shaping a larger pool of money to work with and to build out from a pragmatic way ahead with regard to Rafale modernization.

The success of this venture will rest on France and Germany finding common solutions to airpower, something which has proven elusive in the past.

But building a common air system does pose a tough question for the two governments: Can they agree on a common and flexible arms export policy?

SAMI and Naval Group

The challenge of doing so is certainly brought to the fore by the third agreement.

The third agreement is with Saudi Arabia and the Naval Group and is about building an entirely updated or new infrastructure to build 21stcentury combat vessels.

The agreement is signed with Saudi Arabian Military Industries (SAMI) the new entity created by the Saudi ruler to craft a new defense industrial approach, akin to what the UAE has done, in order to build from Saudi Arabia rather than simply to import into Saudi Arabia.

This is the same ruler whom the German government is doing its best to sanction.

But clearly from the French point of view, building out capabilities in an allied Arab nation is worth the risk and any German blowback.

Let us be clear here – this is being done to support French national interests no matter how much the discourse about European sovereignty is launched from the Macron government’s spin machine.

The good news is that France is diversifying its global presence.

The bad news is that France is diversifying its global presence in the face of significant economic and social difficulties and conflicts.

But what Macron has done is to expand the landscape within which he and his successors can operate to perhaps get better maneuver room to deal with European allies like Germany or France’s own social challenges.

If you can build from Australia or Saudi Arabia, then what you need to build from France becomes a contextual issue, not a survival issue, thereby gaining some strategic maneuvering room for the French government.

 

 

A Look at the F-4 Rafale Upgrade Program

02/19/2019

By Pierre Tran

Paris

French Armed Forces minister Florence Parly announced Jan. 14 the award of a €1.9 billion ($2.2 billion) development contract to upgrade the Rafale fighter jet to an F4 standard, while evoking national sovereignty, operational capability and exports as key factors.

That budget was agreed after close negotiations between government and industry, a source close to the talks said.

“This is a guarantee of our sovereignty,” Parly said on a visit to the Dassault Aviation factory at Mérignac, next to Bordeaux, southwest France.

“This is a chance for our capabilities,” she added.

“It is also a necessary investment to ensure the Rafale’s competitiveness for exports in the coming decades and to safeguard the industrial sector for the fighter jet.”

Parly said she was proud to be the lead advocate for the Rafale in any prospective foreign deal, adding that the upgrade offered further argument in favor of the French fighter.

Dassault, MBDA, Safran and Thales are the four big companies working on the Rafale.

The main modernization features include a connectivity of data links with French and allied forces, greater detection and identification of threats, and fitting upgraded missiles.

A modernization to F4 was in response to the French Air Force’s “evolution of probable threat,” said Etienne Daum, manager for aeronautics, defense and security at think-tank CEIS, based here.

The F4 is important as a a step toward to the Future Combat Air System.

The F-4 upgrade is the first technology package which allows the French fighter to fly in a data network until the planned Next-Generation Fighter flies some time after 2035.

That fighter will be a key element in the FCAS, a European project for a system of systems, which will include a mix of piloted jets, unmanned armed drones and smart weapons.

A Rafale upgrade could be seen as a victory of pragmatism over a cultural stereotype of the French character which is said to favor philosophy.

The upgrades are due to be installed in two phases, with a first batch in 2023, followed by a second in 2025, the Armed Forces ministry said in a statement.

That incremental approach is intended to fit the features as soon as they are available, part of a new defense policy.

“The F4 standard is part of the ongoing process to continuously improve the Rafale in line with technological progress and operating experience feedback,” Dassault said in a statement.

The work will also allow more weapons to be fitted to aircraft, including Mica New Generation air-to-air missile and 1,000-kg AASM powered smart bomb.

Planned upgrades of the ASMP-A airborne nuclear-tipped missile and Scalp cruise weapon will also arm the F4.

France will order a further 30 Rafale in 2023, with delivery of 28 due by 2024, Parly said.

Dassault will be industrial architect, the company said.

“We will be responsible for implementing innovative connectivity solutions to optimize the effectiveness of our aircraft in networked combat (new satellite and intra-patrol links, communication server, software defined radio).”

There will be also be upgrades to the active electronically scanned array radar, front sector opto-electronic targeting system, and helmet-mounted display, the company said.

There will a new service contract and a prognosis and diagnostic aid system intended to deliver a predictive capability.

Maintenance will draw on the use of Big Data and artificial intelligence.

A new control unit for the M88 engine will be fitted.

The Spectra electronic warfare system and Talios targeting pod will be boosted, the ministry said.

The Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA), Joint Chiefs of staff and the service wing — Direction de la maintenance aéronautique (DMAé) – worked together to draw up the F4 requirement, seen as essential to maintain French capability with the introduction in Europe of the F-35 joint strike fighter.

France signed a development contract  with MBDA for the Mica NG, the company said Nov. 11, 2018.

The weapons is intended to have greater range and sensitivity in sensors,with lower service cost.

First delivery is due in 2026.

How the Munich Security Conference Embodied the New Communications Approaches

Social media, tweeting, and various other coms tools are largely being used either to shape and reinforce self-defined communities or to provide the means to attack “them” while we define “us.”

John Stuart Mill would not thrive in this environment.

He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that.

His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them.

But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.

So we won’t see JSM tweeting or gathering his like minded community in the current version of the us versus them club and celebrating the only version of truth – theirs.

And this thought clearly runs against the grain of today’s “thinking.”

But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the present generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.

If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth, if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

President Trump certainly has used tweeting and his rhetorical style to disrupt opponents and mobilize supporters.

But he did not create an age in which this is becoming more of the norm of discourse than its exception.

A clear example of this were several of the presentations at the Munich Security Conference whose entire goal was to reinforce and rally the troops against the evils of the world we live in.

Judy Dempsey, a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe, provided a look back at the MSC.

She argued that the Munich Security Conference was more like the meeting of a nostalgia group meeting to remember the Old West rather than to debate and to disagree and to shape a way ahead for the world were are in.

Diplomacy didn’t have much of a field day in Munich.

 Nor did the West for that matter.

The absence of diplomatic tools and a sense of inquiry combined with sharp exchanges between the Europeans and some of the American delegation confirmed, more than ever, the weakness and disunity of the West.

This obsession with the “old” West during this year’s Munich Security Conference will delay any strategic realignment of its priorities as Russia and China, but also Japan and India, move on to define their interests. The West reacts as the rest of the world changes.

Blaming the Trump administration, lambasting Vice President Mike Pence’s anti-European speech, and waxing lyrical over former U.S. vice-president Joe Biden’s elegant and passionate pro-transatlantic speech will not equip the West with the essential tools to defend its values and interests.

If anything, in Munich there was a nostalgia for the old West of the post-1945 era. Back then, there was a certain predictability about the conduct of diplomacy, about spheres of influence, and about ideological certainties.

The wars in the former Yugoslavia, Russia’s invasion in Georgia and later in Ukraine, and the continuing violence and misery of the wars in Syria and Yemen should have surely convinced the West that the old parameters and narrative are long over.

Listening to Henrietta Fore, executive director of the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), speak in the main hall on Sunday about what was happening to women and children in Syria and other countries in the region was a world away from another discussion going on down the corridor.

The former debate confirmed the absence of strong, diplomatic tools to end the suffering. The latter was an elegant and worthy town hall meeting focused on a new publication: Defending Democracy and a Rules-Based Order. The gap in the language between both meetings was stark.

And that is what the MSC amounted to in the main hall: little listening. Too many polemics.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov railed against the United States but spared Europe. No wonder. The Kremlin must be savoring the weak dialogue in the transatlantic relationship. Pence didn’t hold back any punches about the hapless Europeans, and their continuing defense of the Iran deal. Russia was slapped hard, too.

And you should have heard Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif—his speech was one long tirade against the United States.

At least the BBC’s ace journalist Lyse Doucet did her utmost not to let him drift, compared to last year when he got away scot-free without any trenchant questioning. But similar to last year, Zarif was a stand-alone. There was no engagement with other regional players.

Zarif’s speech exposed the deep divisions between the United States and the Europeans over the Iran nuclear deal. Despite Chancellor Angela Merkel’s attempts on Saturday to explain why it was necessary to preserve the deal, while at the same time acknowledging Iran’s disruptive role in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Gaza, there was no meeting of minds between both sides of the Atlantic.

And since that is the case, how on earth are the Americans and Europeans going to work together—and with Russia—to save the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty?

How are Western leaders going to take stock that the idea of the old West, one of Atlanticism, needs to break out of this geographical setting and mindset?  

This would mean creating a wider security, political, and economic architecture that could include Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, and African and Latin American countries.

It would be about widening and deepening democracy and its values. None of these issues were brought up in the main sessions.

And as for the West defending its values, it was really shameful how Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who was given the podium on Saturday, was not at all confronted by either the chairman of the MSC nor the audience about the widespread abuse of human rights, the disappearances, the torture, and the crackdown on civil activists.

Not forgetting the fact that the rubber-stamped Egyptian parliament approved measures that would allow him to extend his rule until…2034.

And yet, three interesting, optimistic trends that affect the traditional way of doing business by the West may have traction.

The first is the way in which Greek and Macedonian leaders managed to end years of dispute over the future name of Macedonia.

Besides paving the way for Macedonia to join the EU and NATO, the accord was about political will and immense leadership and courage shown by Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and his Macedonian counterpart, Zoran Zaev. They were backed by skilled and patient diplomats from both sides who made the deal possible.

The second, again outside the confines of this almost anachronistic MSC, is the way other countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway, are quietly mediating in conflicts in the Middle East.

And the third is how a group of retired diplomats, but also those in office, realize that the West is no longer the old West. It’s about reaching out to democracies across the globe.

I’ve seen the likes of these “Declarations of Principles” before.

But they were confined to the Euro-Atlantic organizations of the EU and NATO. (And now look what’s happening in Hungary and Poland).

This time it’s about the bigger horizon that should define the contours of the West.

About using globalization and digitization to support values and democracy and humanitarian support for refugees.

Just another initiative, cynics would respond.

As it is, there’s already too much cynicism and too little dialogue. Maybe it’s time to really change the contours of the MSC itself.

For other pieces on the MSC 2019, see the following:

The Munich Security Conference Report 2019: An Evaluation

 

https://defense.info/featured-story/2019/02/the-munich-security-conference-the-european-blame-game/

 

 

The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: The Challenges for Germany

02/17/2019

We have been looking at the strategic shift for the liberal democracies from a primary focus on the land wars in the Middle East to the challenge of dealing with crisis management involving peer competitors who can engage in force-on-force conflict.

We have done so both with regard to the Pacific and with regard to Europe.

We have focused on the UK, the Nordics and in this report shift our attention to Germany.

Based in part on recent interviews and meetings with German defense experts and former senior Bundeswehr officers, the report looks at the challenges facing Germany as it too addresses the direct defense challenge.

This is the third version of the report which was released on March 5, 2019.

 

 

The Australian F-35 Decision and the German Tornado Replacement Decision

By Robbin Laird

Having just returned from my latest trip to Germany to discuss the significant challenge facing Germany in shaping a credible force to provide for its direct defense and to contribute effectively to NATO’s overall collective defense, it is clear that for the near to mid term the Tornado replacement decision is a significant indicator of the way ahead.

The German government has committed itself to work with France to launch a long-term project to build a new air combat systems approach which will include a new fighter for the 2040s.

That is a long way off and will not contribute in the short to medium term to the deterrent challenges being faced now.

And that is not providing for a Tornado replacement.

For the Luftwaffe, there are two elements in play, which can provide for near to mid term ways to reshape its capabilities to provide for a credible effort.

On the one hand, the government is proposing to build a new Eurofighter which they have dubbed Tranche IV to replace the Tranche I Eurofighters.

If they wish to do this, the shortest path to do so is to build on the Luftwaffe’s relationship with the RAF and with British industry and its engagement in Eurofighter to adopt the British innovations which are shaping a new Typhoon for the force, one clearly being redesigned to fly with the F-35.

If the gap between the UK and Germany created by Brexit and selected EU conflicts with Britain can not be attenuated to allow for Germany to work with the UK, there will be no short path to providing for the German Eurofighters transformation into an advanced Typhoon.

On the other hand, the Tornado replacement is pressing and carries with it many key tasks essential to direct defense.

One such task is the nuclear mission to shaping effective air ground integration.

Another key task is to be able to integrate with Patriot and MEADS to deliver movable joint fires solutions for the protection of Germany and its to be rebuilt logistics sites.

The importance of this latter task is critical.

Germany has committed itself to be the logistical hub of NATO for the movement of force through Germany to the nations East and North of it for collective defense.

And doing so is a near to mid-term task, not a long range one.

Options which have been or are being considered are the F-35, the German Eurofighter (which does not yet have an AESA radar) and the Super Hornet.

In 2014, the RAAF faced a key replacement aircraft decision when it was looking to move beyond the Super Hornet to a fifth generation solution.

The thinking which shaped that decision is very relevant to Germany or even more relevant to Germany because it is the center of any Russian action against Europe in a way that is not what the Aussies face from China or North Korea.

I wrote the report for the Williams Foundation in 2015 when the RAAF discussed in a public forum the nature of the turning point and why they believed that a transition to the F-35 was essential, not just for the RAAF but for the entire transformation of the Australian Defence Force.

A key strategic thinker who retired as an Air Vice Marshal of the RAAF and has remained a key player in the transformation effort is John Blackburn.

I decided to interview Blackburn about that turning point and his thoughts about why the transition was critical for the RAAF.

In that interview, he identified three key reasons he thought the transition was critical.

First, he took me back to the presentation of the RAAF F-22 pilot who spoke at the 2014 seminar and he compared his experiences with Super Hornet to the F-22.

The core point which the pilot made was that the fifth generation air system allowed for proactive planning and operations, compared to the largely reactive situation he was in with regard to Super Hornet.

In that briefing, the experienced combat pilot underscored that from the pilot’s perspective the data fusion in the aircraft left the pilot free to manage the flow of information and to focus on mission tactics.

From the perspective of the mission commander, he now had the ability to forward plan and allocate resources pre-emptively and had a much greater ability to think and plan ahead of the current engagement.

Second, the force commander without a fifth generation aircraft would be limited against a significant peer competitor and the need to operate in contested airspace to operating in lower or mid threat levels.

This meant that a nation without direct access to fifth generation capability would need to rely on others to provide for the capability to degrade the forces of the adversary in a high threat area.

Clearly, if a nation was directly facing a peer competitor which was shaping area denial capabilities this meant that they would have to ensure that an ally with such capabilities would show up and lead the air operations.

“The challenge of working with coalition partners who really are not making the transition is that they risk becoming speed bumps in the way of fifth-generation airpower coalition engaging a peer competitor.”

Third, he argued that even though the first two points were significant, the most compelling one was that “if you are focused on platform replacement in these conditions, you are asking the wrong question.

“The right question is how your fifth generation asset would drive transformation of the entire force whilst also integrating legacy capabilities.”

Put in other words, the introduction of the F-35 into the ADF is driving overall force transformation, without which one would be looking for single force modernization rather than multi-domain transformation.

From this point of view, the F-35 is a multi-domain not a multi-mission aircraft.

“Without the F-35, we would not be doing our Plan Jericho for the air force, or the kind of significant force integration efforts which we are currently undergoing in Australia.”

However, an important point to emphasise here is that the transformation is about much more than just the 5th Gen platforms.

As Blackburn wrote in a recent article in the Australian Defence Magazine: the issue faced by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) today is that existing communications and information networks were not “designed” as an integrated system and do not appear to be a good foundation upon which to build the 5th Generation Force the ADF is acquiring. 

Indeed, Blackburn came to Denmark in 2015 to co-host a conference on behalf of the Williams Foundation with the Copenhagen-based Centre for Military Studies.

And at that conference several European airpower leaders spoke and discussed how they viewed the airpower transition in Europe.

In his presentation to the conference, Blackburn focused on the transformation process, which had been launched driven in large part by the acquisition of the F-35.

And at that conference, Col. Anders Rex who is now chief of the Danish Air Force, highlighted the importance of coalition air operations for the Danish Air Force and for European collective defense.

Later as Chief of the Danish Air Force, with the F-35 decision behind them and with preparation for the coming of the F-35 to Denmark, he has made it clear why this is important for Denmark.

His comments in that interview highlighted a way ahead for European airpower transition.

The goal for our coalition and our alliance is to get the best out of what we have as a coalition force.  During Red Flag, the experiences we have been briefed on, fifth-generation aircraft make fourth-generation more lethal and survivable, and more effective.

“We could focus on the significant kill ratios which a fifth-generation aircraft can deliver. But that is not the sole focus. It is about how fifth generation aircraft lift the whole force so that the kill ratio for the entire force goes up exponentially.”

He emphasized the importance of combat learning associated with the new aircraft.

“When we were running our competition for a new fighter aircraft, I witnessed the operation of a Super Hornet F-squadron on the USS Nimitz carrier off the coast of San Diego.

“This was the latest variant of the Super Hornet which had just received a new AESA radar on it.

“And when we talked to the pilots, they made the point that there was no way they could have thought up or analyzed what they can use this radar for. Every single day they learned new things.

“That is how I see the kind of learning we are going to have operating the F-35 and more broadly the kind of co-learning which other platforms in the air, ground and naval forces will need to have as well to leverage what a fifth generation enabled force can bring to the fight.”

In effect, what Major General Rex was discussing was the opening of a significant aperture of co-learning, for example, in Danish terms, how the frigates can use their future SM-2s and SM-6s in conjunction with the SA and targeting capabilities which the F-35 would bring to the Danish force.

“Co-learning across the forces and the F-35 to the legacy platforms is a major challenge but a task which we need to master to get where we need to go as a Danish force, but even more significantly at the coalition level.”

And working with coalition partners who are not going to buy the F-35, Major General Rex underscored that the challenge was then “how do we elevate the effectiveness of those coalition partners?

“We need to focus on the broad co-learning challenge and how to elevate the combat force as a whole as the F-35 becomes a key force for change.”

In short, it is not simply a shift from one platform to another, and in the Danish case the shift is from the F-16 to an F-35; it is about what Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) Blackburn highlighted about overall force transformation and a significant step change in overall capabilities for the force.

The featured photo is credited here:

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/pictures-typhoons-escort-f-35-british-airspace/

RAAF Wedgetail Returns Home from the Middle East

02/16/2019

After drawing down the bulk of its engagement in their forces operating in the Middle East, the RAAF has rotated their advanced air battle management aircraft or their advanced tanker to the Middle East.

When we say advanced, were are referring with reference to the US or other allied air forces.

The RAAF E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft has completed its final rotation as of early February 2019 in support of Operation Okra.

The air battlespace management aircraft has been conducting airborne surveillance operations in the airspace over Syria and Iraq as part of the coalition to defeat Daesh.

As part of Australia’s Air Task Group in the Middle East, the E-7A has provided control of the tactical movement of aircraft in a busy airspace with partners from the American, British, French and Italian air forces.

The Australian Defence Force will work alongside Coalition and NATO partners with future deployments of the KC-30 Multi-Role Tanker Transport Aircraft on a non-continuous basis.

The KC-30 Tanker will recommence air-to-air refuelling operations in the skies over Iraq and Syria later in 2019.