U.S. Marine Corps Valkyrie Completes First Flight

10/25/2023

The Marine Corps XQ-58A Valkyrie, a highly autonomous, low-cost tactical unmanned air vehicle successfully completed its first test flight October 3, 2023, at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The Marine Corps partnered with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)), the Naval Air Systems Command and Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) to facilitate the ongoing research, development, test and evaluation of the Marine Corps XQ-58A Valkyrie.

This joint collaboration was supported by the 40th Flight Test Squadron, 96th Test Wing and the NAWCAD. This flight marks a key milestone in the Marine Corps’ Penetrating Affordable Autonomous Collaborative Killer – Portfolio (PAACK-P) program. Future test flights inform Marine Corps XQ-58A Valkyrie requirements for the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Unmanned Aerial System Expeditionary (MUX) Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR).

“This XQ-58A test flight and the data collected today not only help to inform future requirements for the Marine Corps,” said Scott Bey, a prototyping and experimentation portfolio manager at OUSD(R&E).

“It fuels continued joint innovation and experimentation opportunities and demonstrates the agility that can be achieved through partnership.”

The aircraft performed as expected.

The XQ-58A has a total of six planned test flights with objectives that include evaluating the platform’s ability to support a variety of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions; the effectiveness of autonomous electronic support to crewed platforms; the potential for AI-enabled platforms to augment combat air patrols; and continuing to mature other manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) capability objectives.

The Marine Corps received the first of two XQ-58A unmanned aerial systems (UAS) on March 14, 2023, to support platform prototyping and integration efforts for the PAACK-P program.

“The Marine Corps constantly seeks to modernize and enhance its capabilities in a rapidly evolving security environment,” said Lt. Col. Donald Kelly, Headquarters Marine Corps Aviation Cunningham Group and Advanced Development Team. “Testing the XQ-58 Valkyrie determines requirements for a highly autonomous, low-cost tactical UAS that compliments the need for agile, expeditionary and lethal capabilities in support of both the Marine Corps’ stand-in force operations in austere environments and the Joint Force.”

EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FL.

10.03.2023

Video by Master Sgt. Tristan McIntire

The Australian Government’s Asian Balancing Act: How does it Deal with the Chinese Challenge?

10/23/2023

By Robbin Laird

If one simply read this year’s Defence Strategic Review, the position of the current Australian government towards China would seem very clear:

“A large-scale conventional and non-conventional military build-up without strategic reassurance is contributing to the most challenging circumstances in our region for decades.

“Combined with rising tensions and reduced warning time for conflict, the risks of military escalation or miscalculation are rising.”

Lest you be confused, that is China they are talking about.

One would have expected a DSR with such language to recraft the ADF and to fund it appropriately. Well half of that is an accurate statement.

A key part of the effort associated with the DSR is expanded engagement with core allies, whether it by means of the AUKUS agreement or new ways of working with Japan or South Korea.

The expanded role of Australian bases and the involvement of both the United States and Japan are clearly being worked.

And the Defence Minister’s visit to Japan is clearly designed to do this as well.

For example, a Defence Connect, October 20, 2023 article underscored:

As part of the visit, the Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister reinforced Japan’s central role as an “indispensable partner” to Australia during his conversations with his Japanese counterpart, Japanese Minister of Defense Kihara Minoru.

The two ministers officially welcomed the entry into force of the landmark Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement, transforming the bilateral defence cooperation and enhancing the interoperability of forces. The pair also discussed a number of recent milestones in the strategic partnership, including:

First applications of the Reciprocal Access Agreement last month in the mutual deployment exercises of F-35As, including for Exercise Bushido Guardian.

Live firing of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s surface-to-air and surface-to-ship missiles during Exercise Talisman Sabre using Australia’s training ranges.

Australian Defence Force (ADF) participation in Japan-United States exercises, Yama Sakura in November 2023 and Keen Edge in February 2024.

Progress under the JDSC to enhance the scope, objectives, and forms of enhanced operational cooperation.

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, the Honourable Richard Marles, said, “Our growing strategic alignment contributes to shared security challenges in our region and is key to promoting an open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. This is my third visit to Japan as Deputy Prime Minister, demonstrating the importance I ascribe to the bilateral defence relationship.”

Additionally, the ministers celebrated the first-of-its-kind collaboration between the Australian Department of Defence, Mitsubishi Electric Australia, and Mitsubishi Electric Corporation on cutting-edge laser technology to enhance the ADF’s surveillance capability and survivability of defence platforms.

“Japan is an indispensable partner and we have achieved much in 2023, including entry into force of the Reciprocal Access Agreement and lifting the complexity and sophistication of our operational cooperation. I look forward to progressing our shared ambition with my new counterpart Minister Kihara Minoru,” the Deputy Prime Minister added.

And new agreements are being worked between Australia and Japan.

For example, a 20 October 2020, Australian Department of Defence article underscores such an agreement:

Defence and Mitsubishi Electric Australia (MEA) have signed an agreement to develop and transition a cutting-edge laser capability for the Australian Defence Force to enhance surveillance and survivability of defence platforms.

The new capability – being developed by Defence’s Science and Technology Group – is being industrialised in partnership with MEA and Japanese industry Mitsubishi Electric Corporation (MELCO). 

This collaboration combines over a decade of Defence Science and Technology Group’s laser technology development with MELCO’s proven ability to commercialise and deliver electro-optic systems for defence applications. 

The agreement will enable Defence and MEA to collaborate and develop capabilities and prototypes using this technology. It will also create opportunities for MEA to access MELCO defence technologies of interest to the Australian Defence Force.

During this week’s Japan-Australia Defence Ministers’ Meeting in Tokyo, Deputy Prime Minister, Richard Marles and Japanese Minister of Defense, Kihara Minoru celebrated the first of its kind collaboration.

Quotes attributable to the Chief Defence Scientist, Professor Tanya Monro:

“This collaboration with Mitsubishi Electric Australia will enable cutting-edge laser technology developed by Australian defence scientists to be transformed into new technologies that protect our Australian Defence Force personnel.

“This will not only lift Australia’s capability, but deepen our science and technology collaboration with Japan.

“Maintaining a technological edge relies on Australia committing to working with partners on defence science and technology.

“We look forward to collaborating with Mitsubishi Electric Australia to deliver new capability, using technology developed by Defence, which enhances surveillance and survivability of defence platforms.”

One would then expect given this policy thrust which rests in part upon significant strategic redesign on Australian territory of how to leverage Western and Northern Australia to have seen the termination of the Chinese lease to manage the port of Darwin.

But as Peter Jennings has informed us, not so fast bucky.

Yet another review has defended the absurd 2015 Northern Territory decision to lease the Port of Darwin to a Chinese company for 99 years. The lease continues to dog successive federal governments and is undermining defence planning….

The review released by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet last Friday points to a “robust regulatory system in place to manage risks to critical infrastructure”. Such is the alertness of our national security guardians that “Australians can have confidence that their safety will not be compromised”. The statement acknowledges “the importance of the Port of Darwin as a key piece of critical infrastructure” but the focus on risks to the “safety” of Australians moves the attention away from national security.

The bigger picture is clear: China is becoming militarily aggressive in our region. Since the lease of the Port of Darwin, Beijing illegally took over disputed territory in the South China Sea, building new military air bases and sea ports. Chinese military power projects much further south to the Indonesian archipelago. Routine Chinese air and naval patrols and intelligence-gathering ships now operate in Australian waters.

These developments make northern Australia much more strategically important. This is why the US Marine Corps and US Air Force presence in the north is growing, and why they are building up fuel and other stores. It is also why US Virginia -class submarines will operate out of our western navy base from 2027. And it is why Australia is developing plans for nuclear-powered submarines.

The Albanese government should have overturned the lease because we, and our key ally, the US, need that facility to expand and secure a larger military presence in the north.

Jennings has been one of the key Australian voices focused on the need to address China as an urgent threat, not as a distant problem.

And he has pointed out repeatedly, to do so needs commitment of resources, and creative policy energy to the problem.

Which raises the key problem of how the Australian Prime Minister will handle his upcoming visit to President Xi.

Jennings warns:

“The risk for Albanese is that the visit will make him look weaker on China in Australia by celebrating small concessions in trade and ignoring the big strategic changes sweeping the world.”

But at a minimum, the challenge is bring the different pieces together for a coherent reset of Australian policy towards China and to have the kind of “strategic imagination” which my friend the late Brendan Sargeant argued was necessary in this new phase of history.

And obviously, this Is not a challenge just facing Australia.

Featured graphic: Shutterstock

Stock Photo ID: 1586568916

Exercise Steadfast Noon

Thirteen Allies are participating in NATO’s annual nuclear deterrence exercise Steadfast Noon, a long-planned, routine training activity that is hosted by a different NATO Ally each year. This year, training flights are taking place over Italy, Croatia and the Mediterranean Sea.

Sixty aircraft of various types including advanced fighter jets and US B-52 bombers, as well as conventional jets, surveillance aircraft and refuelling aircraft from Allied air forces are taking part in the exercise to test NATO’s nuclear deterrent.

The manoeuvres involve aircraft capable of carrying nuclear warheads but do not involve any live bombs.

The exercise runs from 16 to 26 October 2023.

10.18.2023

Natochannel

CH-53K King Stallions at WTI-1-24

10/21/2023

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 perform preflight checks as part of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-24 at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, Oct. 12, 2023.

The WTI course is an advanced, graduate-level, seven-week course hosted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS) 1, which provides standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications, to support Marine aviation training and readiness and to assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force.

10.12.2023

Video by Cpl. Rowdy Vanskike

2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

In an April 26, 2023 interview with the CO of MAWTS-1 we discussed the King Stallion coming to the WTI courses at MAWTS-1.

Ever since 2018, MAWTS-1 has focused on the high-end fight component of the full spectrum of warfare. Force distribution is a key part of the survivability against a competitor who has significant firepower and can concentrate fires on relatively fixed positions.

The Marines have worked mobile basing for a long time, such as working forward refueling points and buying the Osprey and the F-35B which can operate off a wide variety of launch and landing points.

But in the past few years, the emphasis has been with regard to how to move more quickly from mobile operating bases and to do so in support of the joint force. This is a capability not only of interest to the Marines and the U.S. forces but core allies as well.

While during my latest visit to Australia where there is enhanced interest, for example, in the RAAF with agile air operations, I spoke with the CO of MAWTS-1, Colonel Eric Purcell about how MAWTS-1 was progressing with regard to training with regard to mobile basing.

He started by noting that given the close working relationship which the Marines had with the Australians, they were focused on training for such operations. Col Purcell mentioned that last November his team met in London with U.S, and partner commands similar to MAWTS-1 in the UK. The USAF and the U.S. Navy along with Canada, and Australia discussed joint learning and training perspectives.

According to Purcell: “At the meeting last November, we looked at a number of different ways in which we can work jointly on problems such as agile combat employment, distributed maritime operations, EABOs (Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations) and F-35 integration. Canada has just recently formally joined the F-35 program, so they were not part of that discussion.”

As the Marines operate Ospreys. F-35s and now CH-53Ks, the Marines are bringing significantly capability to the evolving mobile basing function. In my book published last year on USMC transformation, I underscored the central role which mobile basing is playing in the current phase of USMC transformation. Col Purcell put it succinctly: “We are taking capability which we have had for some time, but focused on how we can move more rapidly from mobile base to mobile base. We have to find ways to make mobile bases, smaller, more distributed and persist for shorter periods of time.”

Another key aspect is that what has been a core competence of the USMC now is becoming a key capability for the wider joint and coalition force. Col Purcell put it this way: “I think the challenge for all of the forces, whether it’s the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the coalition forces is that the sustainment of distributed forces is challenging. How do we adapt our maintenance, logistical and sustainment systems that have been used to operating from austere bases, but now enhance the mobility of those austere bases?”

During my last two visits to MAWTS-1, I discussed with the ground artillery Marines the challenge of integrating their fires into a joint fires solution when emphasizing force distribution and mobility. I asked Col Purcell about progress in this area. He argued that the joint fires piece is a central challenge being worked. He noted that at the recent WTI 2-23 they were working this hard. One example was incorporating the simulated integration of the future USMC Nemesis ground launch system into joint naval fires.

Part of the enhanced capability for the Marines to support force mobility was the involvement of four CH-53Ks into WTI 2-23. Col Purcell indicated that “during the course we lifted 36K loads with the CH-53K which points to future capabilities. With regard to future capabilities, we can leverage the aircraft’s ability to hold 9 to 10,000 pounds of fuel off on each of the three hooks of the CH-53K. The ability of each of the hooks to carry a fuel bladder is a key advantage for force mobility. One could add that the changes in the cockpit allow for the management of such a load as well. This is a real game changer for us at a time when we and the joint force are emphasizing distributed force logistical support and sustainability.”

In short, MAWTS-1 continues its core mission of supporting the change which the Marines and the joint and coalition force need to pursue. In our 2013 book entitled, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific, we underscored what we saw as the integration being generated at MAWTS-1 a key driver of the kind of military change required to deal with Pacific threats. We still do.

Flight Line Maintenance at MAWTS-1: WTI-1-24

Currently, MAWTS-1 is conducting its latest WTI course.

These photos show flight line maintenance during the course.

The current course includes the new King Stallion it is training regime.

The King Stallion is the third major new air systesm introduced into the USMC since 2007, the first being the Osprey and the second the F-35B.

Featured Photo: A U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion helicopter, assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, executes an external lift of a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-24 at Auxiliary Airfield II, near Yuma, Arizona, Oct. 3, 2023. WTI is an advanced, graduate-level course for selected pilots and enlisted aircrew providing standardized advanced tactical training and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elizabeth Gallagher)

Poland After the Elections: What Happens Next?

By Robert Czulda

Last Sunday, millions of Poles voted for a new parliament for a four-year term.

These elections had record-breaking turnout (74.38%) and attracted the attention of global media like no other recent election.

Although Western liberal media immediately declared a great victory for the opposition in Poland, the new political landscape is more complicated than such judgements would suggest.

A new distribution of seats in the Polish bicameral parliament creates an almost deadlock situation, which will practically make governance more difficult. It’s not even known who will become the prime minister.

PiS (Law and Justice), which has been the ruling party since 2015, and is ideologically right-wing but economically left-leaning, won the election. In total, PiS received 35.38% of the votes (in 2019, they got 43.59%), which gives them 42.17% of all Sejm mandates (194). The second is KO (Citizens’ Coalition) with 157 mandates, while the third, Trzecia Droga (Third Road), obtained 65 mandates.

PiS has the most votes, but it no longer has a parliamentary majority, and its ability to form a coalition with other parties is very limited.

However, PiS does not want to lose power and is offering the PSL (Polish People’s Party), which is an agrarian party, a coalition.

However, the PSL, at least for now, remains on the opposition side. If the PSL changes its stance and accepts the offer, the current government will retain power.

It is also legally possible to form a minority government, but its effectiveness would be minimal.

Currently, this is the most likely scenario.

An alternative option is the formation of a coalition government of opposition parties that have already begun negotiating a potential division of power.

However, such a government would be constrained by a power of the President.

Until August 2025, the right-wing President Andrzej Duda will remain in office, but he cannot run for re-election.

Duda has closely collaborated with the PiS government. Thus it is expected that he would be willing to veto any laws that deviate from the previous government’s program.

This also applies to military matters, as Duda has emphasized a crucial role of military modernization since the beginning of his term. Overriding a presidential veto in Poland requires a 3/5 majority vote.

This means that Poland is expected to face months of political chaos and severe struggle for power.

More elections  – in early 2024 – cannot be ruled out.

The final distribution of mandates has created an impasse in that no one party has a stable majority that would enable effective governance.

However, what if re-elections do not ultimately take place, and the opposition assumes power?

Fundamental problems remain in obtaining a clear majority which means there will be an ongoing need to consider opinions and interests of coalition partners and face the risk of the President’s veto.

The President will no longer be required to be loyal to PiS and can act more independently to pursue his individual goals.

For now, the opposition pledged not to abandon arms procurements made by the PiS government.

Currently, Poland is undertaking significant investments in its armed forces.

From 2021 to 2035, the state budget is expected to include USD 154 billion on defense, with additional off-budget expenditures expected to reach up to USD 75 billion between 2021 and 2027.

This entails increasing expenditures (3% of GDP) and a planned rise in debt up to USD 19 billion annually between 2025 and 2027.

However, many of these planned purchases have not yet been financed, and there are no executive agreements, which raises questions about their future.

The opposition, particularly left-wing coalition partners, may be tempted to reduce defense spending.

It is speculated that the new (opposition) government could try to cancel some agreements with South Korea, including civil ones (a future of the Polish nuclear energy program, which also involves the U.S. companies, is in serious doubt).

The most controversial modernization projects include an agreed purchase of 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft and up to 672 K9 155 mm self-propelled howitzers.

Poland is almost certain to abandon a plan to establish armed forces with a size of 300,000 personnel. This was one of the flagship programs of the PiS government.

The new government (if formed by the current opposition) will seek to improve relations with the European Union, primarily with Germany.

Therefore, one can expect a return to arms deals with European suppliers and certain reductions in orders from the United States, although Polish commentators generally agree that the new government in Warsaw will not want to spoil its relationship with the Americans.

One should anticipate reduced procurements of the AH-64E assault helicopters and a cancellation of a plan to buy the S-70i helicopters.

Even without such radical moves, the United States will no longer have such a loyal and a steadfast ally.

“New” Poland under the opposition’s rule will speak more often with a European (German) voice than an American one.

There is a widespread awareness in Poland that the armed forces have to be further strengthened.

This impression is a result of two fundamental factors.

Firstly, Russia has not been defeated in Ukraine and continues to present aggressive intentions. Particularly concerning are recent announcements of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian parliament, who stated that in 2024, military expenditures are supposed to increase by 68% to roughly USD 110 billion (6% of Russian GDP).

Secondly, the situation in the Middle East is becoming increasingly unstable. At some point, this may necessitate direct involvement by the United States. In the event of a deteriorating situation in the Indo-Pacific region (where China might attempt to exploit the issue), Poland may be compelled to defend itself independently.

Although there are many open questions in post-election Poland, two things are certain.

Firstly, even with a change of government, Poland will not undergo any abrupt changes in its foreign and security policy. The friendly stance towards NATO and the West will be maintained.

Secondly, Poland continues to be a strong and healthy democracy.

Despite the opposition’s hysterical claims in recent years that PiS is an authoritarian regime that will not relinquish power and might attempt a military coup in case of an electoral defeat (sic!), none of such scenarios have materialized.

Photo Credit: Poland’s President Andrzej Duda during a press statement after meetings with European Council and Commissions presidents in Brussels, Belgium, 07 February 2022.

Shutterstock: Stock Photo ID: 2120178674

Pacific Defender Exercise

10/20/2023

Multinational Humanitarian Disaster Relief Exercise in San Jose Ca, Aug 2023. 20 plus countries in the Indo-Pacific Region come together to train on communications efforts during and after a Humanitarian event.

Hosted by USINDOPACOM from Hawaii, this annual event serves as a catalyst for joint training and networking amongst the participants.

09.01.2023

Video by Justin Fairley

2D Audiovisual Squadron

REPMUS 23

10/19/2023

Exercises REPMUS 23 and Dynamic Messenger 23 took place in Tróia and Sesimbra, Portugal in September 2023. They focused on integrating new maritime unmanned systems into NATO operations, and featured the ability of autonomous underwater vehicles to operate effectively together.

REPMUS (Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping augmented by Maritime Unmanned Systems) is an annual sea trial that focuses on technology development and interoperability. REPMUS is led by host country Portugal.

Fifteen NATO Allies, along with partner Ireland and NATO invitee Sweden, were involved in the exercise.

Exercise Dynamic Messenger 23 focused on integrating maritime unmanned systems into NATO’s military operations.

This exercise gathered more than 2,000 civilian and military personnel, giving all involved a chance to familiarise themselves with the cutting edge of unmanned systems in the maritime domain. Fourteen NATO Allies took part, as well as NATO invitee Sweden.

September 18, 2023

NATOCHANNEL

We are publishing a new book next year entitled The Coming of Maritime Autonomous Systems.