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The last Operation Shader RAF Tornado has left the Middle East for the UK.
According to an article published on February 5, 2019 on the UK Ministry of Defence website, after almost 40 years serving the UK on military operations across the world, RAF Tornados have returned home for the last time.
First entering service in 1979, the fast jets have been used in operations across the world, most recently bombarding Daesh to push the terrorist group back through Syria and Iraq.
Families and friends of the present-day squadron members were on hand to welcome them back to RAF Marham, Norfolk, on Tuesday afternoon.
The weapons capabilities of the soon-to-retire Tornados are now being delivered by RAF Typhoon jets, which will continue to take a leading role in the Coalition’s mission against Daesh.
Under ‘Project Centurion’, worth £425million over the past three years, the Typhoon can now also launch the world-leading Meteor air-to-air missile, the Stormshadow deep strike cruise missile and the precision attack missile Brimstone.
These improved RAF Typhoon jets will form the backbone of the UK’s combat air fleet, alongside the recently introduced new fleet of F-35 Lighting jets over the coming years.
The Tornado will be officially retired from service at the end of March and will only be used for training purposes over the UK in the intervening period.
Originally named the Tornado GR1 the aircraft’s first use in live operations was during the Gulf War in 1991, when 60 Tornado GR1s were deployed from bases in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Later they were upgraded to the GR4 model, which has been used ever since over the skies of Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria.
On January 31st of January 2019, the RAF operated the final operational sortie of the Tornado GR4. The aircraft (ZA601/066 and ZA542/035) took off from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus. Pictured here is the last aircraft to take off, bringing an end to four and a half years of the types involvement on Op SHADER.
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said:“It is with a heavy heart, but enormous pride, that we bid farewell to the Tornado from operations. This truly is the end of an era, having played a vital role in keeping Britain and its allies safe for four decades.
“But, after so long in service, it is only right that we now look to the future. The combination of our state-of-the art F35s and the Typhoon’s new weapon systems will keep us as a world leader in air combat for a generation.”
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Hillier said:
“My sincerest congratulations to the Tornado Force, returning home after more than 4 years of continuous commitment to defeating Daesh in Iraq and Syria – an exceptional effort from everyone, well done and thank you.
“As a Tornado GR4 pilot myself, I have seen the aircraft develop over its nearly 40 years of service into an outstanding combat aircraft, flown, maintained and supported by similarly outstanding air and groundcrew. The Tornado Force has been continuously deployed on operations since 1990, serving with immense distinction in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya and the Balkans.
“I will personally be very sad to see the Tornado retire, but it is time now to pass the baton to our next generation combat aircraft. The F-35B Lightning is now operational and the Typhoon is now fully multi-role capable and able to take on the Tornado’s missions.”
“We can all take immense pride in what the Tornado has achieved in defence of the nation over nearly four decades, and reflect back on the courage, commitment and achievements of everyone who has contributed to the success of this extraordinary aircraft.”
Future Capabilities
The RAF has already trialled its Typhoon and F-35 Forces’ abilities to work together.
In a series of operational trials, the evidence gathered has confirmed the potency of the combination and demonstrated the effectiveness of both platforms when operating alongside on another.
With its larger payload and increased agility and range, the Typhoon will operate in concert with the stealthy F-35 and its next-generation sensors, making the RAF one of the few air forces with the ability to exploit the synergy of 4th and 5th generation combat aircraft and delivering the UK a potent force equipped to counter evolving threats in the global environment.
The UK is a world-leader in the combat air sector, which supports over 18,000 highly skilled jobs with a mix of skills and technologies unique in Europe. The sector delivers a turnover in excess of £6billion a year and has made up over 80% of defence exports from the UK over the last ten years.
Additional text for the caption to the last RAF Tornado photo:
After almost 40 years serving the UK on military operations across the world, iconic RAF Tornado jets has returned home for the last time.
First entering service in 1979, the fast jets has been used in operations across the world, most recently bombarding Daesh to push the terrorist group back through Syria and Iraq.
The weapons capabilities of the soon-to-retire Tornados are now being delivered by RAF Typhoon jets, which will continue to take a leading role in the Coalitions mission against Daesh. Under Project Centurion, worth £425million over the past three years, the Typhoon can now also launch the world-leading Meteor air-to-air missile, the Stormshadow deep strike cruise missile and the precision attack missile Brimstone.
These improved RAF Typhoon jets will form the backbone of the UKs combat air fleet, alongside the recently introduced new fleet of F-35 Lighting jets over the coming years.
The Tornado will be officially retired from service at the end of March and will only be used for training purposes over the UK in the intervening period.
And the featured photo shows XV(R) Sqn tornado aircraft flying in formation for the last time, flying over RAF Lossiemouth and surrounding areas, Wg Cdr Froome OC of the squadron was flying the lead aircraft.
For an interview with Wg Cdr Froome, see the following:
Last year during my visit to Norway, I had a chance to visit several airbases and talk with a wide variety of Norwegian officers and defense officials.
With the return of direct defense challenges to the Nordics, there has been a major shift to recapitalizing the force, introducing mobilization measures and reworking the concepts of operations to deal with the Russian threat.
But it has been nearly two decades since the Nordics have faced a direct defense threat and at that time, they were facing the Soviet Bloc, and not simply Russia. This meant that the core threat they faced in times of war would be an amphibious assault from the Soviets similar to what the Germans did against them in World War II.
But now the threat is different and the concepts of operations not the same as well.
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For the Nordics, the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise was a building block for shaping approaches to dealing with the new strategic situation.
The exercise will test the whole military chain – from troop training at the tactical level, to command over large forces. It will train the troops of the NATO Response Force and forces from other allies and partners, ensuring they can work seamlessly together.
WHY NORWAY?
This exercise has air, sea and land elements, and Norway offers the possibility to train realistically in all of these domains. The cold and wet weather will pose additional challenges for NATO troops, and will train them to operate in extreme conditions.
Norway offered to host Trident Juncture 18, and NATO accepted the offer more than four years ago. Norway has a long tradition of hosting major allied and multinational military exercises. Among them are Cold Response, Dynamic Mongoose and Arctic Challenge.
WHY DO WE EXERCISE?
Since 2014, collective defence has become a more prominent feature of NATO, due to the changes in the global security situation. In order to train and test NATO’s ability to plan and conduct a major collective defence operation, the Alliance has held several large-scale exercises. This autumn, the turn has come to Norway.
Trident Juncture is also a great platform to cooperate with close partners like Finland and Sweden – exchanging best practices and working together to address crises.
(For a comparison of Trident Juncture 2015 and 2018, and what has already happened in three short years, see the following:
During my visit to 2ndMarine Air Wing earlier this month, I had a chance to talk with Marines involved in the exercise to get their sense of the return of direct defense in Northern Europe and the challenges facing the Marines to provide the kind of force engagement which ultimately the Nordics, the US and NATO would like to see in terms of coalition interoperability necessary to operate in a crisis situation.
In my first article based on my visit, I focused on MAG-31 and the role of fast jets; in this article, I am going to focus upon MAG-26 and the participation of VMM-365 in the exercise. VMM-365 is an Osprey squadron.
I had a chance to talk with the CO of MAG-26, Col. Boniface, whom I have met with several times before he took this command, and Lt. Col. Fowler, the CO of VMM-365.
According to Col. Boniface: “It is important to note that during the exercise, which encompassed actions in Iceland and Norway, the V-22 operated above the Arctic Circle.
“We were able to deploy, engage and provide presence in the exercise. We had to deal with the weather and operating conditions in the region, which are quite different from where our Marines have spent most of their time in the past decade.
“And we need to continue to learn how to operate in those conditions, and to have the domain knowledge of how to exercise patience and timing appropriate to operations in the Nordic region.
“The weather comes in, each fjord has its own weather so to speak and we have to learn patience and how to deal with the second and third order affects which operating in cold weather generates.”
Most of the conversation about the Trident Juncture 2018 engagement involving MAG-26 focused on the experiences of VMM-365 and Lt. Col. Fowler provided an overview and various insights into the USMC experience.
According to Lt. Col. Fowler, the impact of Hurricane Florence on North Carolina meant that they had reduced participation in the exercise. The initial plan was to send six aircraft, but they did send 114 Marines and 4 Ospreys to the exercise.
Lt. Col. Fowler highlighted that they operated from the Iwo Jima amphibious ship and in Iceland did a raid against an “enemy” airfield. That raid was launched from the ship and the force returned to the ship after the raid.
The raid did not highlight the long-range capability of the Osprey but rather operated as integral part of the insertion force which also included CH-53Es and related assets.
A major piece of the operations in both Iceland and Norway was working with the Osprey in cold weather conditions. Notably, they were operating the Osprey’s de-icing capabilities and getting a comfort level with the aircraft in cold weather conditions.
Lt. Col. Fowler underscored the point made by Col. Boniface with regard to the importance of weather conditioning and learning in Norway during the exercise.
“The Norwegians are great partners. They supported us as we worked our learning curve in the cold weather environment. But clearly we need to improve the communication systems used during the exercise, to get the full combat capability out of our force and to better integrate with the Norwegian force as well.”
And as all pilots note when flying in Norway, it is not just the weather, which is challenging but the terrain and the infrastructure built into the terrain as well.
“With the towers and power lines running throughout the fjords, it is dangerous for aircraft operations. And we operate both as a helicopter and as an airplane so we faced challenges which are both the same but different for both type of craft all rolled up into one type of aircraft!”
“There was extensive use of UASs as well during the exercise, which creates a challenge to sort out the operations of the manned with the unmanned aircraft operating in the same airspace as well. Clearly, this is a work in progress.”
One change which is critical to reshaping operations is the nature of the local community, meaning that when operating in Norway it was clear that they are a committed ally and the population was highly committed to supporting Marine Corps operations, including providing real time intelligence with regard to the “enemy” force. This was noted as a significant difference from USMC operations in the Middle East.
In short, the picture provided of MAG-26 involvement in Trident Juncture 2018 reinforced the picture provided by MAG-31. The exercise was a success in terms of being able to project force, but to get the full combat value from a Marine Corps force in a real crisis, significant effort needs to be directed towards enhanced capabilities to integrate the insertion force with the host nation and its force.
My discussions in Norway as well as Denmark have underscored how important shaping an effective C2 system for the defense of Northern Europe. In an interview with Brigadier General Rygg conducted last year at Bodø Airbase, the Chief of the Norwegian Air Operations Centre highlighted the importance of getting C2 right in the new strategic situation.
Brigadier General Rygg: “We are building out new C2 capabilities within the National Joint Headquarters. It is about technology and reworking the workflow.
“We are bringing the key players into a close working relationship within the mountain to provide for better crisis management support as well.”
As infrastructure changes, the focus will as well to provide for crisis management support.
Brigadier General Rygg: “We are shifting from a classic joint targeting approach to a joint effects approach. Every time that you do something with the military, you are creating an effect.
“We are fielding new systems, which provide capabilities we have not had in the past.
“How do we use these systems to create the appropriate joint effect?”
The kind of C2 system needed is clearly an agile, scalable and flexible one.
Brigadier General Rygg: “We may need to provide for mission control where the autonomy of key systems will be maximized.
“We may need to have a tight hierarchical C2 system.
“It depends on the threat; it depends on the mission and on the crisis management situation.
“But we need to build in redundancy and flexibility from the ground up.”
Clearly, the Marines agree and would underscore the core importance of enhanced interoperability in a crisis situation to get full benefit from working together.
Colonel Chris Boniface
MAG-26 Commanding Officer
Colonel Boniface is a 1994 graduate of the University of South Alabama and entered the Marine Corps through the Platoon Leader’s Class Program.
After completing flight training in December 1997, First Lieutenant Boniface was assigned to Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 365, where he served as the Assistant Logistics Officer, Current Operations Officer, and Squadron Weapons and Tactics Instructor. During this tour he completed two deployments with the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) supporting Operations JOINT GUARDIAN and ALLIED FORCE during the 1999 Kosovo War, Turkish earthquake relief operations for Operation AVID RESPONSE, and a 2001-2002 deployment to Afghanistan for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
In 2003, Captain Boniface reported to the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Anti-Terrorism) for duty as the Air Officer. In October of that year, he transferred to the 8th Marine Regiment to serve as the Regimental Air Officer and deployed to Port-au-Prince, Haiti as part of SPMAGTF-8, CJTF Haiti for Operation SECURE TOMORROW.
Major Boniface reported to HMM-264 in September 2004. During this tour he served as the Logistics Officer and deployed to Iraq for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Between deployments, Major Boniface assumed the duties of the Squadron’s Aviation Maintenance Officer, and in January 2007, deployed with the 26th MEU to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility.
Upon completing his second deployment with HMM-264, Major Boniface reported to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron (VMM) 204 for training on the MV-22 Osprey. After his initial training, he remained onboard as an instructor pilot and Fleet Projects Officer before assisting in the stand-up of VMM-264 as the Operations Officer.
Following his selection to command, Lieutenant Colonel Boniface was directed to report to VMM-266 to serve as the Executive Officer and subsequently deployed with the 26th MEU. During this deployment he participated in Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR off the coast of Libya.
From May 2011 until December 2013, Lieutenant Colonel Boniface commanded VMM-266. During his command tour, VMM-266 (REINFORCED) deployed as the Aviation Combat Element, 26th MEU to the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. European Command areas of responsibility.
Before taking command of MAG 26, Colonel Boniface served as the Branch Chief of the Iran Division on the Joint Staff, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), Middle East Directorate.
Colonel Boniface is a 2003 graduate of the Expeditionary Warfare School, a 2008 graduate of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and a 2015 graduate of the National War College.
Lt. Col. Mark C. Fowler
VMM-365 Commanding Officer
Lieutenant Colonel Mark C. Fowler is a graduate of North Carolina State University and commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in April 2000. Following commissioning, he reported to the Basic School in Quantico, VA for initial officer training and upon completion, reported to Pensacola, FL for initial flight training. He was designated a Naval Aviator in December 2002. Following initial flight training, he reported to Marine Medium Helicopter Training Squadron (HMMT) 164 for training in the CH-46E and was designated a helicopter second pilot in May 2003.
After completing initial CH-46E flight training, he reported to Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 26, Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) New River, where he joined the Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 261 “Raging Bulls” from June 2003 to January 2007. During this time, he completed two deployments with the squadron. The first deployment was in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF II and OIF 2-1) to Al Asad Air Base, Iraq from Jan 2004 until Sept 2004. He worked in the operations department as a scheduler writer and Assistant Training Officer. He became a Helicopter Aircraft Commander (HAC) during the deployment. His second deployment was the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit’s (22d MEU) deployment to Iraq in support of OIF 4-6. During the deployment, he held the billet of Administration Officer.
Upon returning from the 22d MEU deployment, he was assigned as the Pilot Training Officer (PTO) for the squadron. He managed the daily, weekly, and monthly scheduling for all squadron pilots and aircrew, maintaining T&R currency, proficiency, and combat readiness.
In November 2006, he attended the Tactical Air Control Party school at Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic (EWTGLANT) in Dam Neck, VA and was designated a Forward Air Controller (FAC). In January 2007, he reported to Third Battalion, Eighth Marines (3/8), Camp Lejeune, NC to serve as a FAC. He deployed with Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/8 and the 22d MEU in support of OIF and Humanitarian Assistance to Bangladesh. Following his tour with 3/8, he reported to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Training Squadron (VMMT) 204 at MCAS New River for MV-22 transition.
In February of 2009, he was designated a MV-22B (Osprey) pilot and executed orders to VMM-365. While at VMM-365, he served as the Training Officer during the squadron aircraft transition from CH-46 to the MV-22B, thereby becoming a plank owner. In June of 2010, VMM-365 deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to Bastion Air Base, Afghanistan.
In the February of 2011, he reported to VMMT-204 for assignment as an Instructor Pilot. While at VMMT-204, he served as the Administration Officer, Aircraft Maintenance Officer, Assistant NATOPS instructor and MAG-26 Functional Check Flight standardization officer.
In September of 2013, he rejoined VMM-365 and served as the Aircraft Maintenance Officer (AMO), Executive Officer (XO), assistant NATOPS instructor (ANI), and Night Systems Instructor (NSI). During this time, VMM-365 deployed as the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) for the 24th MEU, in support of Operation Inherent Resolve from December 2014 to July 2015.
In August of 2015, Major Fowler reported to MAG-26 headquarters to serve as the MAG Maintenance Readiness Officer. This position was created by the MAG-26 Commanding Officer in order to increase readiness and improve the Ice Protection System (IPS) on the MV-22.
In August of 2016, he executed orders to II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Camp Lejeune to serve as the MEF Air Officer. During this time, he worked to ensure the safe and efficient use of limited aviation assets and resources whether deployed or CONUS.
His personal decorations include the Air Medal with numeral “6”, and the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with a gold star.
Last year during my visit to Norway, I had a chance to visit several airbases and talk with a wide variety of Norwegian officers and defense officials.
With the return of direct defense challenges to the Nordics, there has been a major shift to recapitalizing the force, introducing mobilization measures and reworking the concepts of operations to deal with the Russian threat.
But it has been nearly two decades since the Nordics have faced a direct defense threat and at that time, they were facing the Soviet Bloc, and not simply Russia.
This meant that the core threat they faced in times of war would be an amphibious assault from the Soviets similar to what the Germans did against them in World War II.
But now the threat is different and the concepts of operations not the same as well.
As I wrote in a recent article in the Canadian publication Front Line Defence:
It is clearly not your daddy’s Cold War but, for the younger generation, not having lived through it, it can be a bit of a shock facing a nuclear power that has threatened Northern Europe (several times) with destruction if they don’t comply with how the Russians want to see security and defense develop in Europe.
But there is no Warsaw Pact. The Russians cannot lead an envelopment campaign in the event of war against Northern Europe. In the Kola Peninsula, Russia maintains the greatest concentration of military power on earth, and this makes Northern Europe a key flashpoint as Russia pushes its military power to areas of interest, including the Middle East.
The opening of the Arctic is clearly changing the strategic geography as Putin stands up new military bases, including air bases, to provide greater reach and range and affecting his ability to project force out into the North Atlantic. The Nordic countries recognize that the extended reach of Russian strike capability (longer-range missiles) changes the threat calculus.
For the Nordics, the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise was a building block for shaping approaches to dealing with the new strategic situation.
During my visit to Norway this past Spring, I had a chance to talk with one of the key Norwegian officers involved in the preparation for the exercise.
“A key focus of the exercise from the NATO side is exercising our ability to conduct high intensity operations in a multi-national environment.
“What we’re looking at here is confronting an opponent who has the whole arsenal available.
“We need to be able to function not only as individuals and individual nations, but actually function together.
“This is a key focus of the exercise.”
Trident Juncture 2018 is also a command post exercise as well and given that Norway is reworking its C2 capabilities as part of defense modernization, the exercise provides an opportunity to input multinational operational training as well into the transformation process.
Col Lars Lervik highlighted that “It is very important to ensure that we have the procedures in place necessary to operate an integrated force on Norwegian territory in a higher intensity operational environment.
“We are starting really to be serious about C2 again.”
During my visit to 2ndMarine Air Wing earlier this month, I had a chance to talk with Marines involved in the exercise to get their sense of the return of direct defense in Northern Europe and the challenges facing the Marines to provide the kind of force engagement which ultimately the Nordics, the US and NATO would like to see in terms of coalition interoperability necessary to operate in a crisis situation.
During my visit I had a chance to talk with Col. Pares, Commanding Officer of MAG-31, and with the Commander of VMFA Squadron 224, Lt. Col. Joshua Pieczonka.
According to both officers, from the standpoint of mobilization the exercise was a success, but the years of working in the Middle East had clearly have not allowed them to focus on their ability to fight in the cold.
But the exercise really did not achieve a core goal – training for the high-end fight.
The Marines showed up, flew, but not really do a good job of integrating with the Marine Corps force deployed to Norway nor with the Norwegian and allied forces as well.
I pointed out that the Nordics are now shifting to the direct defense challenge but doing so is a work in progress.
It would be important to influence what they are investing in so that the Marines could plug and play more effectively in the future.
Pares: “We’ve been sending squadrons for years now to the sandbox in the Middle East, and it’s been a long time since we sent anybody back to the North.
“So, thanks to the Commandant’s direction, we’re attempting to get back into cold weather operating environments.
Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Robert B. Neller speaks with a Marine during an exercise in Bridgeport, Calif., Feb. 11, 2019. Gen. Neller observed mountain warfare cold weather training and discussed ways to optimize training. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Olivia G. Ortiz)
“And so really for us, we haven’t really looked at this really strategically. It’s direct asking from the Commandant and to get back familiar with working in those types of environments, so we’re looking for cold weather training opportunities.
“We want to make sure our equipment is still able to operate there, and that we know how to operate there. And so we’re looking for more of these opportunities.”
He noted that they were going to Finland as part of the Arctic Challenge exercise in May 2019 as well.
Lt. Col. Joshua Pieczonka noted that his previous experience has all been in hot weather type climate environments.
“I think we can essentially declare it as a success from the lower level operational tactical level, but we need to augment our ability to do higher end training in this exercise environment.
“We did take eight F18s, packed them up and moved them across the Atlantic Ocean. It’s always challenging to cross the ocean. It’s more so challenging when you get in the winter months, of course, where this airplane has a finite amount of places that we can put it once we get going.
“We were able to move essentially the majority of the VMFA, and put it in place over a couple of days. And there was already a Marine wing support squadron footprint there for us, so we had a life support. Basic life support required to operate already existed.
“We had a threshold requirement that was in place to receive us.
“So from a strategic perspective, of getting something somewhere into a base and just figuring out operations and then having a very warm reception by our Norwegian counterparts, were ready to receive us and help us move forward, is very well done.”
But the exercise demonstrated that this was a beginning not an end point.
There is a clear need to work through how Marines coming to Norway in a crisis can bring their full combat capabilities to the fight and to integrate those capabilities with the Norwegians.
This clearly will be a work in progress and with the Nordic commitment to the F-35 as well, there will be an important opportunity to leverage the stand up of the combat capability in the Nordic region to shape better competencies and capabilities in the C2 area to ensure that the force can be optimized for the high-end fight.
Col. Phares emphasized that there was a clear emphasis on seeking out cold weather training opportunities for the Marines, and that the Commandant has put significant emphasis on so doing.
He underscored that with the challenge of ramping up readiness for the Marine Corps and the shift from the desert, training opportunities at the higher end were clearly necessary.
And the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise only partly met this requirement as improvement will be needed on all sides to ensure that the insertion force into Norway can bring its full combat capability to the fight.
An example of a work in progress has been the introduction of the G/ATOR radar.
When I visited MAWTS-1 last year, they had introduced the new G/ATOR radar into the WTI course. During the WTI course, they were focused on unlocking the capabilities the new radar could bring to the USMC and the joint force.
One example of this being tested at MAWTS-1 is the continued integration of Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) TACDEMOs.
G/ATOR provides targeting information and fires support ashore.
One challenge will be to shape a MAGTF, joint and allied understanding of how to efficiently operate in concert.
This is magnified with the introduction of the F-35 which provides significant MAGTF organic support but also possesses capabilities to enable joint and allied fourth generation aircraft as well.
A key focus was how to manage and conduct Integrated Fire Control between G/ATOR and F-35.
“We focused on how to maximize three core systems – G/ATOR, the Composite Tracking Network (CTN) and CAC2S (the latest software iteration of the Common Aviation Command and Control System) as they are fielded to the force for the first time as a systemic whole.”
“We are going to be able to provide significantly greater information to all of the shooters, whether airborne, shipborne or ground based missile defense systems.”
The Marines brought the new radar to the Trident Juncture 2018 exercise but really were able to demonstrate its transportability more than what it could contribute to the fight.
Clearly, the goal must be to not only bring the new radar into the Nordic environment but work the connectivity and force integration which would allow that radar to contribute to Marine Corps and allied operations in a crisis situation.
This is an example of the work in progress.
2ndMAW engagement Trident Juncture 2018 is an important turning point in the strategic shift.
They demonstrated they can show up effectively to support crisis management, but it remains necessary to shape the force integration in Norway to be able to gain the level of warfighting capabilities needed in a crisis.
Col. Matthew H. Phares, MAG-31 Commanding Officer
Colonel Matthew H Phares graduated from West Virginia University with a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering. He was commissioned in 1993 as a naval aviator. Following designation as an F/A-18 pilot he was assigned to VMFA-251 where he completed two carrier deployments, flying combat missions in support of Operation Southern Watch in Iraq and in Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. He also completed the Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor course. Following his tour with VMFA-251, he was assigned to 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion during the Iraq invasion as a Forward Air Controller in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
As a field grade officer, he returned to MCAS Beaufort and was assigned to VMFA(AW)-533 where he filled multiple billets as the pilot training officer, Operations officer and Aviation Maintenance officer. He also completed the MAWTS-1 Weapons and Tactics Instructor course. While assigned to the Hawks, he completed a deployment to the western Pacific as part of the Unit Deployment Program and another deployment to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Following his tour at VMFA(AW)-533, he attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College before being assigned as the section head for MMOA-4.
Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, he returned to MCAS Beaufort in June 2010, and assumed command of Headquarters Squadron 31. In June 2011, he assumed Command of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 and completed a deployment to the western Pacific as part of the Unit Deployment Program. Relinquishing command in February 2013, Lieutenant Colonel Phares was selected to attend Top Level School at the National War College. In June 2014, Lieutenant Colonel Phares was assigned to the Joint Staff where he served as the Kinetic Weapons Branch Chief in the J-8 Force Application Division. In May 2016, Colonel Phares was selected to serve as the Military Aide to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy for Policy. In August 2017, he assumed his current duties assigned to the staff of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing.
Colonel Phares’ personal decorations include the Legion of Merit, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (2nd award), 12 Air Medal’s (one single action with combat V and eleven strike flight awards), Navy Commendation Medal with combat V, Navy Achievement Medal and the Combat Action Ribbon.
Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka graduated from The State University of New York at Buffalo in May 1997 with a bachelor’s of science degree in Exercise Science, was commissioned in April 1998 a second lieutenant, and ordered to The Basic School (TBS).
In April 1999, Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka reported for Naval Flight Officer (NFO) training at NAS Pensacola, FL. He was designated an NFO in October 2000 and ordered to Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 101 (VMFAT-101), MCAS Miramar CA for training as a Weapons Systems Officer (WSO) in the F/A-18D. Upon completion of training with VMFAT-101 in January 2002, Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka was directed to report to Marine All-Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 (VMFA(AW)-533) at MCAS Beaufort, SC.
During his tour with VMFA(AW)-533, Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka served as a Schedules and Flight Officer, Ground Safety Officer, and Assistant WSO Training Officer. Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka executed deployments in support of Operation Southern Watch, Operation Iraqi Freedom and a Western Pacific deployment as part of the Marine Corps’ Unit Deployment Program (UDP).
Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka detached from VMFA(AW)-533 in May 2005 and reported for duty as a Forward Air Controller with the 2d Reconnaissance Battalion at Camp Lejeune, NC where he served as the Battalion Air Officer. While attached to the 2d Marine Division, he was again order to the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) as a combat replacement individual augment to Operation Iraqi Freedom. He executed operations as the assistant Regimental Air Officer for Regimental Combat Team Two (RCT-2) aboard Camp Ripper at Al Asad Airbase, Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka returned to serve the remainder of his FAC tour as the Air Officer for 2d Tank Battalion.
In November 2006, Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka reported to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One where he served as an Air Officer Department Instructor. While on staff at MAWTS-1, he completed the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course in the spring of 2008 and served an additional role as an F/A-18 instructor for the remainder of his tour. Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka was the subject matter expert for Close Air Support execution and doctrine, terminal attack control standardization, Digital Precision Strike Suite (DPSS) and portable targeting devices, precision guided weapons targeting and mensuration, and fixed-wing tactics.
Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka was selected to attend the United States Air Force, Air Command and Staff College, Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, AL in the summer of 2009. He earned a Master’s Degree in Operational Art and Military Science with a concentration on Small Wars and Counter Insurgency Operations.
In August 2010, Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka reported for duty to the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Aircraft Group-11, and was assigned to VMFA(AW)-225.
During his tour of duty, he executed the Operations Officer, Assistant Aircraft Maintenance Officer, and Director of Safety and Standardization Officer billets. Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka executed two western Pacific UDPs during his 29 months with the Vikings. He completed the remainder of his MAG-11 tour as the Tactics Training Facility (TTF) Officer in Charge and the MAG-11 WTI.
Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka reported to Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Department of Aviation in June 2013 to serve in the Aviation Weapons Requirements Branch (APW) as the Aviation Training System Requirements Officer. In the summer of 2014, he was reassigned to the Aviation Plans, Programs, Joint/Congressional Matters, Doctrine and Budgeting Branch (APP) as the Tactical Air Control Party, Joint Fire Support, and Joint Close Air Support Executive Steering Committee Action Officer. He also served as the Contract Air Services/Adversary Requirements Officer.
During his tour in the Pentagon, Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka deployed forward in 2015 to augment the Combined Joint Force Land Component Command, Combined Joint Task Force-Iraq as the Strike Director at the operations center in Baghdad, Iraq in support of Operation Inherent Resolve.
In August 2016, Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka reported to Marine Aircraft Group 31 at MCAS Beaufort, SC. He executed the F/A-18 WSO refresh period of instruction at VMFAT-101, and served as the Marine Aviation Training System Site Beaufort Operations Officer and acting Officer in Charge until 26 March 2017. Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka was reassigned and directed to report to VMFA(AW)-224 to assume the Executive Officer billet and accompany the Bengals on the deployment in support of Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force – Crisis Response, CENTCOM (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) 17.2. On 23 February 2018, Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka assumed command of VMFA(AW)-224 and is currently executing that assignment.
Lieutenant Colonel Pieczonka’s personal awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal (with Strike Flight Numeral 8), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (with 2 Gold Stars in lieu of 2nd and 3rd Awards), and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device.
We have written a number of pieces looking at the impact of Brexit on European defense and will continue to do so.
We believe the impact is significant in many way from a negative perspective, but provides significant openings as well if military and political leaders in Europe focus on a realistic way ahead, and do not use Brexit as a whipping post by European leaders.
There is also the significant danger of pursuing narrow defense industrial deals on the continent and ignoring the significant impact which cooperation with regard to the UK, its forces and its industry can provide.
A notable case is that for the Luftwaffe to get advanced Eurofighters, the shortest path to do so will to work with the RAF and British industry.
The agreement reached in 2018 between the RAF and the Luftwaffe could be a good starting point for this effort.
But the temptation will be recreate what has already been done in Britain with regard to Typhoon, which is in significant part driven by joint operations with the F-35 fleet.
Certainly, the perspective laid down by the UK Minister of Defence in a speech delivered at RUSI on February 11, 2019 indicates the openness of the UK leadership to such relationships going forward.
It’s important to start off by asking the question why do we fight? It is fundamentally, to protect our people, protect our interests, and, of course, to defend Britain.
As a nation, we’ve never shied away from acting even if that has meant standing alone as we did in the darkest hours of the Second World War. Even after the Berlin Wall fell 30 years ago, when there was no overwhelmingly obvious threat to our security, we recognised the UK had a role and responsibility to stand up for our values across the globe. Defending our values took us to Kuwait, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo and it made a difference to millions of peoples’ lives.
But, after September 11th, the importance of defence increased as a deadly new threat arose. A threat not just to any nation but to all who cherished the values of the Western way of life. A global ideology seeking the destruction of everything that we hold dear. We have learned much from fighting Al Qaeda and Daesh.
But, while we tackled this extremism, state-on-state competition has reviving. Today, Russia is resurgent – rebuilding its military arsenal and seeking to bring the independent countries of the former Soviet Union, like Georgia and Ukraine, back into its orbit.
All the while, China is developing its modern military capability and its commercial power.
Today, we see a world of spheres of influence and competing great powers. Not only are we confronting a state like Russia. An ideological enemy without a state like Al Qaeda and Daesh. But the very character of warfare itself is changing. The boundaries between peace and war are becoming blurred.
Our adversaries are increasingly using cyber-attacks, subversion and information operations to challenge us and the rules-based international order. Operating in the ‘grey zone’. Operating below the threshold of conventional conflict. Our Joint Forces Command is already dealing with this.
But, we need to go further. We need to bring together our strategic capabilities. We need to integrate them more effectively and a greater agility to meet the demands of this increasingly contested environment.
We and our allies must deter and be ready to defend ourselves. Ready to show the high price of aggressive behaviour. Ready to strengthen our resilience. And ready, where necessary, to use hard power to support our global interests.
But there is a great opportunity here too.
As we look at our position in the world, we should remind ourselves that we are a nation with a great inheritance. A nation that makes a difference. A nation that stands tall. Inevitably, there are those who say that we are in retreat. Those who believe that, as we leave the European Union, we turn our back on the world. But, this could not be further from the truth.
Whether people voted to leave or remain, they believe Britain must continue to play an important and major role on the international stage.
It is my belief that Britain has its greatest opportunity in 50 years to redefine our role.
As we leave the European Union.
And, the world changing so rapidly it is up to us to seize the opportunities that Brexit brings. We will build new alliances, rekindle old ones and most importantly make it clear that we are the country that will act when required.
We should be the nation that people turn to when the world needs leadership.
And Defence will be pivotal in reinforcing Britain’s role as an outward looking nation. We are making sure it does so in a number of key ways:
A GLOBAL PRESENCE
First, by increasing our global presence and building on our alliances.
NATO. 70 years on from its founding, remains the bedrock of our nation’s Defence.
In the past five years, the Alliance has come a long way. It is far more focused and ready to deter and defend against Russian hostile acts. But, more European nations need to be ready and capable of responding too.
Stepping up to the 2% NATO target and not being distracted by the notion of an EU Army.
Secretary of State for Defence Gavin Williamson CBE (Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire) sits in the cockpit of an F-35 Lightning II during a visit to the Royal Air Force’s 17 Squadron Dec. 2. The squadron is part of the F-35 Joint Operational Test Team at Edwards Air Force Base. (U.S. Air Force photo by Kyle Larson)
Britain must be willing and able to lead the Alliance, to bring stability in a changing-world. We are a leader in NATO, this year hosting the Leaders Meeting here in London. Alongside this we have sent a Battle Group to Estonia to support NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. We lead multi-national maritime task groups in the Mediterranean and defend the skies over the Black Sea and the Baltics.
And, we strongly support NATO’s Readiness Initiative to make sure forces are available and ready to do their job.
And in NATO, we must stand firm against Russia’s non-compliance with the INF Treaty. If necessary being ready to deal with the threat that new Russian missile systems may pose. The Alliance must develop its ability to handle the kind of provocations that Russia is throwing at us. Such action from Russia must come at a cost.
Nor, can we forget those countries outside NATO who face a day-to-day struggle with Russian attempts to undermine their very sovereignty.
We stand ready to support our friends in Ukraine and the Balkans. These countries have the right to choose their own destiny and be free from Russian interference. At the same time, in such an uncertain age, like-minded nations must come together to increase their own security.
That is why the United Kingdom is leading the nine-nation Joint Expeditionary Force which in a few months’ time will take part in its first deployment to the Baltics.
But we must not see this as our limit. We must be willing to go further. History has taught us that crisis comes when we least expect it. As uncertainty grows we must be ready to act, bringing others with us. Readiness has to be our new watchword.
In an era of ‘Great Power’ competition we cannot be satisfied simply protecting our own backyard. The UK is a global power with truly global interests. A nation with the fifth biggest economy on the planet. A nation with the world’s fifth biggest Defence budget and the second largest Defence exporter.
And since the new Global Great Game will be played on a global playing field, we must be prepared to compete for our interests and our values far, far from home.
That is why Global Britain needs to be much more than a pithy phrase. It has to be about action. And our armed forces represent the best of Global Britain in action. Taking action alongside our friends and allies. Action to strengthen the hand of fragile nations and to support those who face natural disasters.
Action to oppose those who flout international law. Action to shore up the global system of rules and standards on which our security and our prosperity depends.
And action, on occasion, that may lead us to have to intervene alone.
Now, I know there are some that question the cost of intervention. But it is often forgotten the cost of non-intervention. The fact that this has been unacceptably high. It will not always be the role of the traditional Western powers to act as a global policeman but nor can we walk-on-by when others are in need. To talk…but fail to act…risks our nation being seen as nothing more than a paper tiger.
I do not underestimate the challenges that this approach brings. But we do start from a position of strength. Our people are already acting around the world from the North Sea to the South Pacific to protect our interests and we already benefit from strong international partnerships. But we cannot take such relationships for granted.
Our global presence must be persistent…not fitful. Patient…not fickle.
Permanent…not fly-by-night.
So, as well as our relationships with Europe, we need to build on our established relationship with the United States, Australia, New Zealand and Canada as part of the Five Eyes. With Singapore and Malaysia in the Five Powers Defence Arrangement. With other ASEAN nations, with Japan, the Republic of Korea and India. With our partners in the Middle East, and with our many friends in Africa – from Nigeria in the West to Kenya in the East.
And we are seeking to use our global capabilities to strengthen our global presence.
From this spring, HMS Montrose, along with five other naval vessels, will be permanently based in the Gulf using innovative crewing and support methods to keep the ship available for more of the time.
Today, we also go further. And I can announce the first operational mission of the HMS Queen Elizabeth will include the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Pacific region.
Making Global Britain a reality.
Significantly, British and American F35s will be embedded in the carrier’s air wing.
Enhancing the reach and lethality of our forces and reinforcing the fact that the United States remains our very closest of partners. We share the same vision of the world.
A world shaped by individual liberty, the rule of law and, of course, the tolerance of others.
We have the unique ability to integrate with US forces across a broad spectrum of areas. And, we are more determined than ever to keep working together.
We will also be using our string of global support facilities and military bases more strategically…to consistently project power both hard and soft. The Duqm port facilities in Oman are large enough to be able to support our aircraft carriers. The Al Minhad and Al Udeid Air Bases, in the Emirates and Qatar respectively, provide strategically important capabilities.
In Bahrain, our Naval Base and our long-standing Maritime Command make a major contribution to our activities in the region but also beyond.
Further afield we already benefit from facilities in Belize, in Brunei, in Singapore as well as our bases in Cyprus, Gibraltar and Ascension Island.
And, I believe that we need to go further. Considering what permanent presence we might need in areas including the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific to extend our global influence. Our proactive approach shows we are not getting by on half measures.
For us global engagement is not a reflex reaction to leaving the European Union.
It is about a permanent presence.
ARMED FORCES WITH MORE MASS
But having that presence goes hand-in-hand with our multi-million-pound Transformation Fund, making sure our armed forces have the right capabilities as quickly as possible. And today, I can announce some of the first investments from that Fund.
Take the Royal Navy. They are exerting British influence through greater forward presence. I want to capitalise on that. Investing now to develop a new Littoral Strike Ship concept. And, if successful, we will look to dramatically accelerate their delivery. These globally deployable, multi-role vessels would be able to conduct a wide range of operations, from crisis support to war-fighting.
They would support our Future Commando Force. Our world-renowned Royal Marines – they’ll be forward deployed, at exceptionally high readiness, and able to respond at a moment’s notice bringing the fight from sea to land.
Our vision is for these ships to form part of 2 Littoral Strike Groups complete with escorts, support vessels and helicopters. One would be based East of Suez in the Indo-Pacific and one based West of Suez in the Mediterranean, Atlantic and Baltic.
And, if we ever need them to, our two Littoral Strike Ships, our two aircraft carriers, our two amphibious assault ships Albion and Bulwark, and our three Bay Class landing ships can come together in one amphibious task force. This will give us sovereign, lethal, amphibious force. This will be one of the largest and best such forces anywhere in the world.
In 1940, Winston Churchill said: “Enterprises must be prepared with specially-trained troops of the ‘Hunter Class’, who can develop a reign of terror down enemy coasts.” Our actions mean that we will deliver on Churchill’s vision for our Royal Navy and for our Royal Marine Commandos.
Turning to our Royal Air Force, fresh from celebrating its centenary last year, it is now firmly focused on the next 100 years. They already have 17 new RAF and Royal Navy F35 Lightning jets, capable of land-based operations anywhere on the globe and due to embark on our aircraft carrier for the first time later this year.
We’ll soon have nine new Poseidon P-8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft enabling us to patrol thousands of miles of ocean and greatly enhancing our anti-submarine and maritime capability.
We’re upgrading our AWACS aircraft with modern and better capability that will improve our battle winning airborne command and control.
We are growing our operational Typhoon squadrons from five to seven – equipping them with world leading radar and now carrying deep strike Storm Shadow cruise missiles.
And, to complement leading edge technology from F35, I have decided to use the Transformation Fund to develop swarm squadrons of network enabled drones capable of confusing and overwhelming enemy air defences.
We expect to see these ready to be deployed by the end of this year.
And the Army is continuing to modernise its forces. We will have a Warfighting Division with troops able to deploy from our bases at home and in Germany.
We’ll increase the firepower and protection of the battle-proven Warrior and introduce the ultra-modern AJAX. And, at the tip of the spear, will be our elite Parachute Regiment within 16 Air Assault Brigade, able to deploy into any environment at a moment’s notice.
So, we are making sure our armed forces have the sufficient mass to be in the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment to deal with the coming dangers.
TRANSFORMING DEFENCE THROUGH INCREASED LETHALITY
Finally, if we are to live up to our global role then our armed forces must continue to be a lethal fighting force fully adapted to the demands of 21st century warfare.
When I came into the Department the talk was about cutting capability. But instead, this Government has delivered an extra £1.8 billion of Defence funding, keeping us on track and prioritising the right UK Defence for the decade to come. That includes £600 million to protect the future of our nuclear deterrence. This ensures we will deliver the new submarines on time and means that we are spending £4 billion every year to ensure the ultimate guarantee of our safety for another 50 years.
That means £60 million to invest in Typhoon’s next generation radar. And, as the cyber threat grows, we are making a very significant additional investment on the £1.9 billion we spend on cyber capabilities. That’s funding to improve offensive cyber, putting the command and control structures in place across-Government. And, it will give us extra money to protect our network resilience from online attacks.
With the threat from the Kremlin increasing in the North Atlantic, we’re spending an additional £33 million to improve our anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
And, we will also spend £100 million on a variety of initiatives to modernise how we do business in defence. If this isn’t enough there will also be a further £24 million available through innovative Spearhead projects.
Meanwhile, we are using our Transformation Fund to further increase our armed forces’ lethality. For example, we’re going to make sure that our ground troops – whether in the Army, the Royal Marines or the RAF Regiment – are going to get the same night vision equipment that their colleagues in Special Forces have. We’re also going to buy pioneering robotic fighting and logistic vehicles. Reducing the risk to our personnel and increasing the firepower and agility of our infantry.
In addition, as a result of the Transformation Fund the Royal Air Force will double our armed ISR capability so we can identify and neutralise targets far faster. The Venom kinetic strike capability will mean those who wish to do us harm have more to fear.
And to our armed forces quite simply the sky is not the limit. In space, they look forward to the investment we are making to enhance our space operations centre bringing together the best civilian and military minds.
And our ambitions are greater still.
I want to see our armed forces embracing transformation at an ever-faster rate, keeping pace with technological change, enhancing our mass and increasing our lethality. We shouldn’t be shy about the ambition that we have for our forces.
The future of conflict will require us to be adaptable, agile and capable of using new technologies quickly and cost-effectively. I am determined to focus the Transformation Fund on investments that will create the armed forces of the future.
That future, of course, is uncertain.
But I expect to see, the Army using both manned and unmanned teams, Artificial Intelligence and the unmatched quality of our personnel to win, not just conventional wars but also dominate the conflict in the grey zone.
I expect the Royal Navy to deploy flexibly, to be capable of being in many places at once and to ensure we have an efficient fleet of warfighting ships, looking at how they can grow both their mass and their lethality.
And, I expect the Royal Air Force to operate the next generation with modern Air Command and Control, more combat air squadrons and energy weapons to keep our skies safe.
CONCLUSION
Wherever I go in the world I find that Britain stands tall. It’s not just because are the world’s fifth biggest economy. Not just because we have the world’s finest scientists, mathematicians and engineers. It’s because we have the world’s finest and best Armed Forces. Brave men and women who stand up for the values that we hold dear. Men and women that we are so truly proud of.
They are contributing and they are the key capabilities that guard UK airspace and waters. They are supporting the civil authorities right across the United Kingdom. They are ensuring that we remain a leading member of NATO. They are protecting our interests and enhancing our prosperity.
And they are showing, they are showing that Britain still matters on the global stage. Some still wish to cut Britain down to size and send her back to her shores.
But to those I say that has never been our way. It is not in our nature. Britain has always sought to take risks. Britain has always stood up for its deeply held values. Britain has always been an outward looking nation. And against adversaries upping their spending…investing in new technologies… we have to respond. If we do not, we will find ourselves with fewer options when we face the challenges and the threats in the future.
And Brexit. Brexit has brought us to a moment. A great moment in our history. A moment when we must strengthen our global presence, enhance our lethality, and increase our mass.
So today I set out my vision for UK Defence in a more global age. But as we look to life beyond Brexit, I believe it is incumbent on us all to consider the role of Defence in our national life. Defence has always been the most vital and first duty of Government.
But now we have an unparalleled opportunity to consider how we can project and maximise our influence around the world in the months and years ahead. It is up to all of us…from here on in…to make sure that our great nation seizes and grasps the opportunity that present themselves with both hands.
The featured photo shows Secretary of State for Defence Gavin Williamson CBE (Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire) meeting with members of the Royal Air Force’s 17 Squadron, which is the organization on Edwards Air Force Base responsible for the operational test and evaluation of the U.K.’s F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Dec. 2. (U.S. Air Force photo by Kyle Larson).
During my visit to Germany in February 2019, I had a chance to talk with a number of retired senior Bundeswehr officers and procurement officials.
My focus is upon the challenge facing the US and its NATO allies to rebuild their forces to be able to have a credible defense and deterrence strategy in terms of providing direct defense of Europe and North America against the Russian challenge.
These discussions were wide ranging and highly interactive and many of them are either off the record or partially on the record.
I will be building out a narrative of my assessment of the German contribution as well as challenges facing the rebuild of the Bundeswehr in the weeks ahead.
The broad point is that the German forces remained focused on direct defense through the mid-1990s and had a force structure appropriate to this challenge.
With the Bosnian War and with a strong US push, Germany committed itself to restructure its forces from direct defense to more mobile, and lighter forces to participate in what were referred to as crisis management operations.
The Bundeswehr for the past twenty years then participated in such operations and COIN operations.
The only problem is that these forces really are have not been oriented to or prioritized for collective or direct defense.
Since 2014, NATO has focused on the rebuild of direct defense forces, a significant challenge for the US and its European allies.
During the visit, I had the privilege to meet with the former Commander of Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command, Lt. General (ret) Rainer Glatz and to discuss these issues.
We discussed a wide range of issues, but for the purposes of this article, I want to focus on the core thematic which the Lt. General (ret.) drove home.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel (R) and Lieutenant General Rainer Glatz, Commandant of the Bundeswehr Operations Command speak at the Bundeswehr Operations Command in Geltow, eastern Germany on April 10, 2010. One day after the funeral service of three German soldiers, killed in a Taliban ambush in Afghanistan on April 2, Merkel informed herself at the command center of the German Bundeswehr about the current situation in Afghanistan. AFP PHOTO DDP/ MICHAEL KAPPELER GERMANY OUT (Photo credit should read MICHAEL KAPPELER/AFP/Getty Images)
According to Lt. General (ret.) Glatz, Senior Distinguished Fellow, International Security Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs:
“In relation to the Cold War and the developments afterwards, we not only dismantled our structures, which to a certain extent have become much hollower, but we nearly dismantled our logistic structures, our support structures, and our transport structures as well.”
“People have to be clear about the fact, that in future the defense of Germany probably won’t take place at the German border, but at the borders of NATO in the east. “
“As part of credible deterrence, we have to question whether it was really wise that what we have left in place are only in soft or non-hardened support facilities.”
“It is clear that the proper logistics support and transport structures are even more important than they have been in the past.”
“I also am concerned that we, along with our allies, have lost a lot of personal expertise if we focus on the challenges of deterrence in all of its aspects.”
“Has it to be the same as it has been in the past or have we to look at a totally new approach?”
“And this should be thoroughly thought through from my perspective.”
“But the cornerstone of that is that you have to talk with our populations about what deterrence is all about.”
“Clearly as part of the effort, we have to go back to military ownership of the most important parts of the logistic structures.”
“Also, we have to think about the stocks of supplies because in conflict we are not only surrounded by friends but by adversaries which in case of conflict clearly will target not only our C2 structures those stocks of supplies as another priority mission.”
Lieutenant General (ret.) Rainer Glatz
2006–2013 Acting Commander, Deputy Commander and from 2009 onwards Commander Bundeswehr Joint Forces Operations Command, Potsdam
2002–2006 Commander, Special Operations Division, Regensburg
2001–2002 Deputy Chief of Staff (Doctrine and Operations, Structure, Finance), FMOD Army Staff FüH III, Bonn
1998–2001 Commander, Light Infantry (Reaction Force) Brigade 37 (AMF-L), »Freistaat Sachsen«, Frankenberg, Saxony, including the deployment as Commander, Multinational Brigade Centre (DFGFA), SFOR, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (11/98 – 04/99)
1987–1989 Personal Assistant to Horst Teltschik, the Head of the Directorate for Foreign, Security and Development Policy, Federal Chancellery, Bonn
The featured photo shows German Army Lt. Gen Rainer Glatz, commander of German Operations Command, congratulating U.S. Army Col. Daniel Williams, commander of the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, International Security Assistance Force, Feb. 26, 2011 after awarding him the Silver Bundeswehr (German military) Cross of Honor for his outstanding meritorious service, as U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Sean Mulholland, deputy commander of Regional Command (North), also a recipient, looks on.
When visiting Berlin over the years, the dramatic change in Germany and in Europe is physically notable,
The Potsdamer Platz in Berlin went from being part of the demarcation point between East and West Berlin, and then the breaching point between the two parts of the divided city inn 1989. It then to became the largest building site in Europe in the newly reunified Germany to what it is today — a modern city square.
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That evolution marks the removal of the Soviet Union from Germany and the opening of two decades of peace.
The challenge for Germany now is that the Russian challenge is no longer in the center of Berlin or on the inner-German border, and further away.
The direct defense of Europe has returned but now it is not an intra-German affair but a question of Germany’s role as Europe’s largest country and economy in playing an anchor role in the forward defense of Europe.
At best, this is a work in progress.
A short history of the square is provided in Wikipedia and the slideshow above and text below are credited to Wikipedia.
It is named after the city of Potsdam, some 25 km (16 mi) to the south west, and marks the point where the old road from Potsdam passed through the city wall of Berlin at the Potsdam Gate.
After developing within the space of little over a century from an intersection of rural thoroughfares into the most bustling traffic intersection in Europe, it was totally laid to waste during World War II and then left desolate during the Cold War era when the Berlin Wall bisected its former location.
Since German reunification, Potsdamer Platz has been the site of major redevelopment projects…..
After the initial opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, Potsdamer Platz became one of the earliest locations where the Wall was “breached” to create a new border crossingbetween East and West Berlin.
The crossing began operating on 11 November 1989, earlier than the iconic Brandenburg Gate crossing which opened more than a month later.
The crossing required the dismantling of both the inner and outer walls and the clearance of the death zone or no man’s land between the two. A temporary road, lined with barriers, was created across this zone and checkpoints were set up just inside East German territory.
Proper dismantling of the entire wall began on 15 May 1990 and all border checks were abolished on 1 July 1990 as East Germany joined West Germany in a currency union.
After 1990, the square became the focus of attention again, as a large (some 60 hectares), attractive location which had suddenly become available in the centre of a major European city.
It was widely seen as one of the hottest, most exciting building sites in Europe, and the subject of much debate amongst architects and planners.
If Berlin needed to re-establish itself on the world stage, then Potsdamer Platz was one of the key areas where the city had an opportunity to express itself.
More than just a building site, Potsdamer Platz was a statement of intent.
In particular, due to its location straddling the erstwhile border between east and west, it was widely perceived as a “linking element,” reconnecting the two halves of the city in a way that was symbolic as well as physical, helping to heal the historical wounds by providing an exciting new mecca attracting Berliners from both sides of the former divide. Whether fairly or unfairly, a great deal was riding on the project, and expectations were high.
The Berlin Senate (city government) organised a design competition for the redevelopment of Potsdamer Platz and much of the surrounding area.
Eventually attracting 17 entrants, a winning design was announced in October 1991, that from the Munich-based architectural firm of Hilmer & Sattler. They had to fight off some stiff competition though, including a last-minute entry by British architect Richard Rogers.
The Berlin Senate then chose to divide the area into four parts, each to be sold to a commercial investor, who then planned new construction according to Hilmer & Sattler’s masterplan.
During the building phase Potsdamer Platz was the largest building site in Europe.
While the resulting development is impressive in its scale and confidence, the quality of its architecture has been praised and criticised in almost equal measure.
The first photo in the slideshow shows Potsdamer Platz seen through barbed wire in 1963.
The second photo shows an empty Potsdamer Platz in 1977.
The third photo shows the line on the ground marking where the Wall used to stand, on the edge of Potzdamer Platz (2015).
The fourth photo shows the Potsdamer Platz crossing, seen here from the west into East Berlin, opened days after the first breach of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.
The fifth photo shows buildings at Potsdam square (Potsdamer Platz) in Berlin, spring 2018.
And views from the Panoramapunkt provide striking perspectives of the Potsdamer Platz as well.
It is a dramatic shift from the wasteland created by the Berlin Wall to the new Berlin.
With the fastest elevator in Europe, you’ll be up on the viewing platform on the 25th floor before you know it. In just 20 seconds, you’re 100 metres above Potsdamer Platz. The Panoramapunkt is at the top of the Kollhoff Tower. The TV Tower at Alexanderplatz, the Berlin Cathedral on Museum Islandor the Bundeskanzleramt and the Gedächtniskirche – there is (almost) nothing you can’t see from up here.
The building with the brick façade was completed in 1999 and is part of the Quartier Potsdamer Platz. Its famous neighbours include the DB Tower and the Sony Center – both of which can be seen from the viewing platform. On the 24th and 25th floors of the Kollhoff Towers you will find the viewing platform, a panorama café with an open-air terrace sunroof and an exhibition.
Here is one view, of what the new Berlin looks like from this vantage point.
The featured photo shows the Sony building seen from this vantage point as well.
Recently, Andrew Rettman of EuObserver provided an overview on the continuing Russian campaign in and against Ukraine.
It is risky to stop near the old grain silo on the road from Mariupol to Marinka, two towns in eastern Ukraine.
Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) snipers had targeted the site from the nearby “fire line” because it housed Ukrainian soldiers, the soldiers told EUobserver on 23 January on a visit to the region.
Further north the same day, near the town of Avdiivka, Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) forces fired 120-mm mortar rounds at Ukraine’s 93rd Mechanised Brigade, Ukrainian authorities said.
An LPR anti-tank grenade had recently hit the engine of a civilian car, hospitalising the driver, they added.
Small arms fire had also injured a civilian in Marinka on 22 January, international monitors from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) confirmed.
Mortars above 100mm are prohibited by the Minsk accords, an international pact.
But if the LPR fires them, then the 93rd brigade brings forward high-calibre ones to fire back.
That is daily life in what people call the “grey zone” – a patchwork of towns, villages, and farms along the contact line – four and a half years after the conflict began….
The war in east Ukraine has already killed 13,000 people and injured 30,000 in total on both sides, the UN said on 21 January.
It has lasted as long as World War One and shows little sign of going away.
For the last three years, I have traveled extensively in Northern Europe to discuss the Russian challenge and the return of direct defense.
During a visit to Germany in February 2019, I am visiting Germany to discuss with German experts and retired senior German military, their assessments of the challenge to Germany and the way ahead to deal with direct defense of Germany and its contribution to deterrence.
I had the opportunity to talk with one of the most respected retired senior German officers during my visit to Bonn and to get his perspective on the challenges and the way ahead. General Egon Ramms has had an impressive career, which is detailed in his resume seen at the conclusion of this article.
For the purposes of my research, his time in Poland and working with the Baltics on their defense are especially relevant to thinking through the direct defense challenge and Germany’s potential contribution.
Quite clearly, the German, Baltic and Polish defense spaces are closely interconnected, and Germany’s potential role in reinforcing deterrence crucial to a credible NATO effort to constrain Putin and the authoritarian Russian state.
For General Ramms, the Russian actions in Crimea in 2014 functioned as the 9/11 attacks on the United States did for Europe.
It was clear that Russia was not going to play by the rules based or with regard to respected international law anymore and was taking seriously its claim that Russians in the former Soviet territory needed to be included in the new Russia.
This was already evident in 2008 with Russian actions against Georgia; but those warnings were largely ignored; but the Crimean (invasion) occupationcould not be ignored. It was an in your face intervention which violated accepted international norms.
Question: Based on your experience, how do you view the challenge of common defense for the Balts, Poland and Germany?
General Ramms: I have had the advantage that I was garrisoned in Poland, and responsible as the Commander of Multinational Corps in Stettin in Poland between 2004 and the end of 2006.
“Something I realized when I came to Poland was that the Polish people and officials had a completely different feeling, and a different behavior towards Russia than we Western Europeans have had.
“There is real concern about Russian incursions against Poland.
“I then had the chance, a few years later in 2008, directly after the Georgian War to have a duty visit as the commander of Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (NLD) to go to the Baltic States. That was six weeks after the Georgian War, and what the Baltic states expressed was their real concern about their safety, security and defense with what they saw as clearly a Russian aggressive role.
“They clearly feared that what has happened to Georgia could happen to them. The question then become how do we establish a defense plan for the Baltics?”
Question: With the return of direct defense clearly seen in the Baltic and Polish cases, what needs to be the German response?
General Ramms: The initial step has been to develop consensus with regard to the new situation. The Defense White Paper issued in 2016 is a whole of government document as opposed to the previous ones which were simply MOD White Papers on defense.
“Based on this commitment, we have begun to revise policy and for example, Germany deployed additional aircraft to the Baltic Air Policing mission and began to shape a battalion for deployment to the Baltics.
“Obviously, this is not enough and one can look at the paper which I coauthored with regard to Baltic defense to get a sense of what I think is required for credible defense of the Baltics.
“But it is a start.”
Question: That raises the question of what capabilities in your view does Germany need to provide a credible defense capability after the years of hollowing out the Bundeswehr?
General Ramms: What do we need?
“We have to have forces which are able to conduct enduring defense operations. From 2011, the German government focused completely on global deployments, stabilization operations and providing a contribution along those lines.
“That meant giving up the kind of capability we had in the 1970s and 1980s for common defense, home defense, enduring defense operations and Host Nation Support.
“It is clear that such an approach has led to a military much less capable of providing for the kind of direct defense requirements we now face. As a follow up to the 2016 White Paper, conceptual papers have been written by the Bundeswehr with regard to the capability profile which is necessary for a build out of forces and which can provide for enduring defense.
“By that I mean a force that can defend, attack and conduct delaying operations and – most important – is available in a timely manner.
“The force capabilities necessary have been identified; but they need not only be funded but fielded much more rapidly than a slow rollout process would allow.
“When we talk about direct defense, we are not simply talking about power projection; we are talking about defense in depth, territorial and home defense as well as about Combat Service Support and Host Nation Support.
“Because Germany would function as the rear in terms of force generation,C2, deployment and logisticsfor any defense operation for the Baltics or Poland, we need to be able to provide a credible and stable territorial defense of Germany as well.
“We need credible logistics and supply systems which can provide both timely and enduring support to German and allied forces.
“We need to do what you referred to as mean logistics not just lean logistics.
“The capability profile to be achieved until 2031 which I mentioned foresees the creation of three mechanized divisions which will be deployable in a much shorter time that we can do with today’s Bundeswehr.
“We are talking about 10 to 30 days at the maximum.
“But we have to introduce in some areas even more equipment than the plan projects for we will need to increase the number of artillery battalions, the number of engineering battalions, Army air defense units and acquire all those tools, equipment and supplies which provide for a sustainable force which can credibly defend Germany and support operations in the Baltics and Poland.
“And with regard to education, training and equipment, we have to regain the capacity to conduct combined arms operations and today under Hybrid Threat conditions.”
For a look at the study co-authored by General Ramms concerning Baltic defense, see the following:
General Ramms was born in Datteln, Westphalia on 21st September 1948. He joined the Bundeswehr on 1st October 1968 as an officer candidate and temporary career volunteer for three years, serving in the Unna-based Maintenance Battalion 470. From 1968 to 1971, General Ramms undertook his initial officer education and training at Aachen and Hannover. In 1971, he began academic studies in Darmstadt, from where he graduated as a Master of Mechanical Engineering (Diplomingenieur) in 1975.
From 1975 to 1978, General Ramms was appointed Commander of Maintenance Company 70 in Stade. From there he continued his military service as the G4 maintenance officer, Headquarters 3rd Armored Division in Buxtehude until 1980. Returning to the academic environment General Ramms attended the General Staff Course at the German Command and Staff Academy in Hamburg for the following two years.
From 1982 to 1984, General Ramms served in G3 Operations, 6th Armored Infantry Division in Neumünster. This was immediately followed by two years as Chief of Staff and G3 in Germany’s Home Defense Brigade 51 in Eutin. From 1986 to 1988, he was Assistant Branch Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Branch in the Federal Ministry of Defense, Armed Forces Staff III 5. General Ramms’ next appointment, again for a period of two years, was Commanding Officer of Maintenance Battalion 120 in Rheine.
In 1990, General Ramms returned to the German Ministry of Defense as the Assistant Chief of Branch in Army Staff I 7. Subsequently he was appointed as Assistant Chief of Branch in the office of the State Secretary for Procurement. In this position, he was responsible for both Army and Air Force Armament and Logistics. For the years 1992 to 1994 General Ramms continued to work in the office of the State Secretary for Procurement (State Secretary Jörg Schönbohm), as Section Chief of the Armament Section. In 1994, he was appointed as Head of the Central Branch of the Army Staff, German Ministry of Defense.
From there, in 1996, General Ramms took command of Logistics Brigade 1 in Lingen/Ems, for a period of two and a half years. 1998 saw General Ramms assume the position Division Head Armed Forces Staff V, Logistics, Infrastructure and Environmental Protection in the German Armed Forces. This was followed by his appointment as Director of Armed Forces Staff, Ministry of Defense, commencing September 2000 from where he was assigned as Commander to the Multinational Corps Northeast Stettin in Poland in February 2004.
In his time as Commanding General, the Multinational Corps Northeast was certified as Combat ready HQ of lower readiness, got the Baltic States, Tchech Republic and Slovakia as new members into the Headquarters. General Ramms took up his post as Commander Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum on 26th January 2007. His main effort was the ISAF – Mission as its operational Commander. Dan McNeill, David McKiernan, Stan McChrystal and David Petraeus served as COMISAFs under his command. NAC authorized Prudent Military Planning for the Defense of Poland and the Baltic States was another – from today’s perspective – very important part of his mission within his regional responsibility. He finished his duty in the Federal Armed Forces on 30th September 2010.
The featured photo shows ISAF Joint Command commander, Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, greeting German Gen. Egon Ramms during a visit to ISAF Joint Command at Kabul Afghanistan International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2009.
