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The slideshow contained in this article shows the formal celebration of Australian National Day held on the 26thof January.
The day marks the arrival of the first fleet to Australia.
The day honors the arrival of the British first fleet in Botany Bay on January 24, 1788.
The trip was an amazing one for the times, and the voyagers traversed the world’s oceans in a trip of the sort 21stcentury man cannot really fathom.
The seamanship and the courage of the captain, the crew and the voyagers was unprecedented for the age.
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In his magisterial look at the first fleet, the noted Australian maritime historian Rob Mundle has provided a sense of the epic adventure, its risks and its accomplishments.
And in today’s atmosphere of the denigration of historical achievements or the effort to create politically correct history, the tale of the First Fleet can be clearly minimized or degraded as an “invasion” force.
“Eleven vessels carrying some 1400 people had crossed more than 17,000 nautical miles of ocean, much of that distance through hostile and little-known waters.
“The duration of the passage was 252 days, and while there had been loss of life, the death toll (which was never recorded with great accuracy) could be considered extraordinarily low for the era – around 3 per cent of the total number.”
Mundle later added about the landing at Botany Bay:
“By midday, the felling of trees and the clearing of undergrowth were sufficiently advanced for Arthur Phillip to undertake his first formal event as governor on this foreign shore. The Union Jack had been flying since early morning, probably from the branch of a tree; now, for what would have to pass as the inauguration of New South Wales as an occupied territory of Great Britain, the marines assembled around the flag, while the governor and his officers stood to one side of it and the convicts on the other.
“King wrote of an event that was conducted with all possible pomp and ceremony: ‘His Majesty whose health, with the Queens, Prince of Wales & Success to the Colony was drank, a feu de joie [rifle salute] was fired by the party of Marines & ye whole gave 3 Cheers which was returned by the Supply …’
“The true historical significance of this ceremony could never have been appreciated by those present. It was the founding moment for Australia.
“No nation before then or since has been so informally born from a settlement that had been established to hold convicts in exile.”
I attended an exhibit at the British Library last year which highlighted the Captain Cook voyages and contained a wealth of material highlighting the voyages, the challenges, the achievement and the exploration of unknown worlds to Europeans and to many of the inhabitants of the Pacific region as well.
But as one went through the exhibit, there were a number of videos ensuring that the visitor understood that the Cook team should really not have showed up because of the “invasion” they were undertaking in the world of the native peoples.
And on Australia’s National Day there were protestors to be found who certainly resonated with this belief that Cook and the British should simply have not shown up.
Protestor puts up her sign in protest. Credit Photo: ABC News. Gemma Hall
Of course, this misses the whole point of human history, which is travel, invention, conflict, destruction, and domination and deliverance.
There are stubborn historical realities and facts, which nations and peoples need to address, the good, the bad and the ugly.
When celebrating historical events, there are no moments of pure progress.
And rejecting one’s history is even more damaging that accepting it and moving forward always remembering that human history is not a continuous march towards progress but always a struggle.
An American writer recently focused on what he sees as the impact of the destruction of history in the United States to serve contemporary advocates of whatever position they might hold.
“It is no coincidence that those most driven to disparage their country’s history are also those most hostile to liberty.
“Progressive thinking is reflexively autocratic, seeking to broaden and deepen government and bureaucratic control over daily life. That is why it is hostile to history, which undermines its.
“Every authoritarian system has to rewrite the past.”
And in remembrance on Australia day of the unique and valued relationship between Aussies and Americans, see the following Australian TV clip shot during the Iraq War.
This weekly update includes articles published over the last 90 days on Second Line of Defense and Defense Information with regard to Russia and China.
A detachment of CLAEX, with 2 planes alongside support from the 11th Wing maintenance personnel, has been relocated to Istres Air Base in France, where they partook in a flight test campaign with the UAV nEURON.
The development of nEURON is the result of a European partnership led by the French company Dassault Aviation, with the technological contribution from industrial members of the countries involved (i.e. Spain, previously known as EADS-CASA).
Spain (and more specifically her fighter planes) was invited to participate in this campaign after formal invitation from the French DGA (Direction Générale de l’Armement).
The main objective of the test was to evaluate the level of detectability of the UAV when confronted with the array of sensors available in the Eurofighter: air to air radar, IRST (Infrared Search and Track) as well as IRIS-T missiles.
One has to take into account that the UAV nEURON was designed as stealth aircraft with very low level radar signatures and infrared- which is why there was great interest to test this system with radars and other aerial sensors.
The Trump Administration has clearly indicated that it is working a strategic shift away from the land wars to crisis management with peer competitors.
The focus has been upon a return of great power competition.
But it this will be difficult to do in terms of resources and recrafting the US military if we continue to be mired down in Afghanistan, the endless war.
When one reads Sherlock Holmes, we learn that Dr. Watson has returned from Afghanistan.
The makers of the series Sherlock which is set in our time, had no difficulty in bringing Dr. Watson back once again from Afghanistan, but this a century apart from the original Sherlock Holmes.
It is time to move on.
In stepping up to change the engagement dynamics of how to bring peace to Afghanistan and end the current “Forever War,” Erik Prince released a very insightful video in English and also in Dari for the Afghans to see themselves.
His vision captures a bold plan that says: enough with the current 17 + years of unimaginative linear strategic planning.
He has made a very public call for dramatic change in how to engage on the ground to bring a peaceful solution to that country.
It is always true in every American war, often in partnership with our Allied fighting forces, that the troops always give their all with unselfish valor and courage.
It is up to the selection process of picking Commanding Generals and a Secretary of Defense to give the fighters engaged commanders who know how to fight, win and leave as soon as possible.
It is not about restocking the endless war with new participants.
That is not a strategy — it is a revolving door to nowhere.
The Afghanistan war has had a never-ending series of public statements and briefing charts depicting a “stay the course” with more of the same mentality.
That process of no change in strategic vision after seventeen years is especially tragic because there was a brilliant opening battlefield victory.
Last Fall, I asked if President Trump was at essentially a pre-Grant moment with Jim Mattis.
Is this a pre-General Grant moment?
General Mattis USMC (ret) and now Defense Secretary Mattis has been at the highest levels of leadership fighting the Afghan war for almost 25% of the time the war has gone on.
It turns out he was.
Now with the relieving of his Secretary of Defense, over his lack of a strategic vision for Afghanistan, the President has the opportunity in his search process to ask what his new candidates for the Secretary of Defense position what they think of Erik Prince’s innovative plan.
It is a simple test; let them watch the video and then ask “what do you think?”
In that vein, I asked two highly experienced combat fighter pilots who had extensive experience in Afghanistan the same question and to comment after watching the video. .
Col. Bob “Juice” Newton is a retired AF Fighter/ and Test Pilot who was in Afghanistan on General McChrystal’s staff.
According to “Juice’ Newton:
“Afghanistan is a place where you wonder about the humanity of man.
“Do people want to live in harmony or forever molest, maim, and murder one another?
“For generations now, pure evil has flourished there, and change is long overdue.
“Erik Prince provides a practical solution that puts the onus on the Afghans and not on the US Military.
“Yes, humanity can win in Afghanistan.”
Retired Marine Col Bill Buckey is an accomplished fighter pilot and a commander who lead the surge to turn Kandahar Airfield into the busiest single runway airfield in the world.
He observed: “The throughput of personnel and material beginning in January 2009 was incredible.
“24/7 air operations and a similar round-the-clock ground effort from the port of Karachi to KAF I called the “Green Ball Express.”
“Did we achieve near-term gains? Absolutely.
“Were they enduring? Clearly not.”
Erik Prince has just presented to his fellow American citizens and our allies a strategic plan that can change the course from us losing a war to begin a process that can bring peace to a war-torn country.
The featured photo shows a bomb dropped by an A-29 Super Tucano strikes its target during a Tactical Air Coordinators exercise near Kabul, Afghanistan. The training of Afghan Tactical Air Coordinators (ATACs) by coalition forces, including Australians, is having a significant impact on Afghanistans battles with insurgents.
In early December, the Afghan Air Force conducted its first night-time air strike inflicting heavy casualties on insurgents and destroying enemy munitions stores. Operation Highroad is the Australian contribution to the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Australia contributes about 300 Defence personnel to the train, advise and assist mission.
Credit Photo: Australian Department of Defence, January 2019.
For earlier articles on how to move away from the Endless War, see the following:
The Russian takeover of Crimea signaled an end to the optimistic post-Cold War era.
As Putin continued to ramp up challenges, the West gradually began to focus on the return of direct defence. Protecting critical infrastructure from cyber attack is, in many ways, surpassing other forms of military protection mandates.
Although counter-insurgency remains a key skill set, once again Western militaries face the threat of force-on-force confrontations and the challenge of returning to core tasks, such as anti-submarine warfare and air superiority, which had atrophied.
The Cold War has returned – in a new form.
Sure, it has Cold War elements, but in a very changed strategic situation.
This is becoming increasingly clear in Northern Europe where I have conducted several visits over the past few years interviewing political, strategic and military leaders about how to shape a way ahead to deal with the new Russia and the evolving Western policies, leaders and threats.
It is clearly not your daddy’s Cold War but, for the younger generation, not having lived through it, it can be a bit of a shock facing a nuclear power that has threatened Northern Europe (several times) with destruction if they don’t comply with how the Russians want to see security and defense develop in Europe.
But there is no Warsaw Pact.
The Russians cannot lead an envelopment campaign in the event of war against Northern Europe.
In the Kola Peninsula, Russia maintains the greatest concentration of military power on earth, and this makes Northern Europe a key flashpoint as Russia pushes its military power to areas of interest, including the Middle East.
The opening of the Arctic is clearly changing the strategic geography as Putin stands up new military bases, including air bases, to provide greater reach and range and affecting his ability to project force out into the North Atlantic.
The Nordic countries recognize that the extended reach of Russian strike capability (longer-range missiles) changes the threat calculus.
A very clear statement of the strategic shift was provided during my visit last year to Denmark. Admiral Nils Wang, former head of the Danish Navy and then head of the Royal Danish Military Academy, clearly differentiates between the Cold War threat of the Soviet Union and the Russian threat the Nordics now face.
Wang argues the Russian challenge has little to do with the old Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat, which had been one of invasion and occupation and using Nordic territory to fight American and allied forces in the North Atlantic. The Danes and their allies were focused on sea denial through the use of mines, with fast patrol boats providing protection for the minelayers. Aircraft and submarines were part of a defence strategy to deny the ability of the Soviets to occupy the region in time of a general war.
Admiral Wang contrasts this with the current situation, in which Russia is less focused on a general war, and more on building capabilities for a more limited objective – controlling the Baltic States.
He points to Russia’s arms modernization (focused on land- and sea-based attack missiles, missile defence, and airpower) as the means to shape a defence-in-depth strategy that creates significant freedom of manœuvre to achieve their objectives.
A core Russian asset is the Kalibr cruise missile, which can operate off of a variety of platforms and provide a cover for their manœuvre forces. Land-based mobile missiles are being used as their key strike and defense asset. “[It] is all about telling NATO, ‘we can go into the Baltic countries if we decided to do so. And you will not be able to get in and get us out.’ That is basically the whole idea,” says Wang.
Wang suggests a reverse engineering approach to the Russian threat, combining several key capabilities: anti-submarine (ASW), F-35, frigate- and land-based strike. This position is based in part on the arrival of the F-35 as a core coalition aircraft designed to work closely with either land-based or sea-based strike capabilities.
“This is where the ice-free part of the Arctic and the Baltic gets connected. We will have missions as well in the Arctic at the northern part of Norway because the Norwegians would be in a similar situation if there is a Baltic invasion.”
Infrastructure Protection
During a conference held in Copenhagen on October 11, 2018, the Danish Minister of Defence provided an overview on how the government views defence and security, particularly challenges in direct defence of Denmark and Europe – cyberwar posed by Russia and the need to enhance infrastructure defence are of key concern.
The lines between domestic security and national defence are clearly blurred in an era where Russians have expanded their tools sets to target Western infrastructure. Such hidden attacks also blur the lines between peace and war.
Within an alliance context, the Danes and other Nordic nations, are having to focus on direct defence as their core national mission. This will mean a shift from a focus on out of area operations back to the core challenge of defending the homeland.
Russian actions, starting in Georgia in 2008 and then in the Crimea in 2014, have created a significant environment of uncertainty for European nations, one in which a refocus on direct defence is required.
Denmark is earmarking new funds for defence and buying new capabilities as well, such as the F-35. By reworking their national command systems, as well as working with Nordic allies and other NATO partners, they will find more effective solutions to augment defensive force capabilities in a crisis.
It was very clear from discussions during my visits to Finland, Norway and Denmark earlier this year, that the return to direct defence has changed as the tools have changed, notably with an ability to leverage cyber tools to attack Western digital society to achieve political objectives with means other than use of lethal force.
This is why the West needs to shape new approaches and evolve thinking about crisis management in the digital age. It means that NATO countries need to work as hard at infrastructure defence in the digital age as they have been working on terrorism since September 11th.
New paradigms, new tools, new training and new thinking is required to shape various ways ahead for a more robust infrastructure in a digital age.
Article III of the NATO treaty underscores the importance of each state focusing resources on the defence of its nation. In the world we are facing now, this will mean much more attention to security of supply chains, robust security of infrastructure, and taking a hard look at any vulnerabilities.
Robustness in infrastructure can provide a key defence element in dealing with 21st century adversaries, and setting standards may prove more important than the build up of classic lethal capabilities.
A return to direct defence, with the challenge of shaping more robust national and coalition infrastructure, also means that the classic distinction between counter-value and counter-force targeting is changing. Eroding infrastructure with non-lethal means is as much counter-force as it is counter-value.
We need to find new vocabulary to describe the various routes to enhanced direct defence for core NATO nations.
A new strategic geography is emerging, in which North America, the Arctic and Northern Europe are contiguous operational territory that is being targeted by Russia, and NATO members need to focus on ways to enhance their capabilities to operate seamlessly in a timely manner across this entire chessboard.
In an effort to shape more interactive capability across a common but changing strategic geography, the Nordic nations have enhanced their cooperation with Poland and the Baltic states. They must be flexible enough to evolve as the reach and lethality of Russia’s air and maritime strike capabilities increases.
Clearly, tasks have changed, expanded and mutated.
An example of a very different dynamic associated with direct defence this time around, is how to shape a flexible basing structure.
What does basing in this environment mean? Can allies leverage national basing with the very flexible force packages needed to resolve a crisis?
One of the sponsors of the Danish Conference was Risk Intelligence, a key strategic partner to Second Line of Defense and Defense Information.
Their CEO, Hans Tino Hansen, a well-known Danish security and defense analyst explains the new context and challenges facing the Nordic countries:
“We need to look at the Arctic Northern European area, Baltic area, as one. We need to connect the dots from Greenland to Poland or Lithuania and everything in between. We need to look at the area as an integrated geography, which we didn’t do during the Cold War.
“In the Cold War, we were also used to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact being able to actually attack on all fronts at the same time, which the Russians wouldn’t today because they are not the power that they used to be.
“And clearly we need to look beyond the defence of the Baltic region to get the bigger connectivity picture.”
He went on to assert the need to rethink and rebuild infrastructure and forces to deal with the strategic geography that now defines the Russian challenge and the capabilities they have […] to threaten our interests and our forces.”
Evaluating threats across a spectrum of conflict is the new reality. “We face a range of threats in the so-called gray area which define key aspects of the spectrum of conflict which need to be dealt with or deterred.”
A system of crisis identification with robust procedures for crisis management will go a long way towards effective strengthening of infrastructure in the face of the wider spectrum of Russian tools.
“A crisis can be different levels. It can be local, it can be regional, it can be global and it might even be in the cyber domain and independent of geography. We need to make sure that the politicians are not only able to deal with the global ones but can also react to something lesser,” Hansen says.
“The question becomes how to define a crisis.
“Is it when x-amount of infrastructure or public utilities have been disrupted or compromised?
“And for how long does the situation have to extend before it qualifies as a crisis?
“This certainly calls for systems and sensors/analysis to identify when an incident, or a series of incidents, amount to a crisis. Ultimately, that means politicians need to be trained in the procedures necessary in a crisis similar to what we did in the WINTEX exercises during the old days during the Cold War, where they learned to operate and identify and make decisions in such a challenging environment”.
In short, the Russian challenge has returned – but in a 21st century context. that incorporates incredibly invasive infrastructure threats. Direct defence strategies must quickly include these threats as part of any comprehensive national security concept.
In visits to the Nordics over the past few years, we have been looking at the return of direct defense and the challenges facing Northern Europe with the shaping of a new Russian challenge. This challenge is hybrid, nuclear and direct.
We have looked as well at Trident Juncture 2018, both from the Norwegian side as well as from the allied side, notably with regard to the USMC and recent interviews conducted at 2nd Marine Air Wing with participants in the exercise discuss their role in direct defense in Northern Europe.
But with the inclusion of Poland and the Baltics within NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new geographical situation was created within which the defense of Poland and the Baltics became part of the new direct defense challenge. And while the geography changed for direct defense, so did the threat. The Russians have built out new capabilities, notably with regard to strike systems which can bring Northern Europe, the Baltics and Poland under direct and immediate threat in a crisis.
It is not the Soviet days of large rolling ground forces supplemented by air and naval strike forces starring down at NATO and West Germany, it is now a question of isolating and picking off parts of NATO and threatening a wider attack if challenged threat which Putin’s Russia poses.
The Baltics pose a particular problem given that they could get stalled up by an air-ground attack relatively easily by Russian forces.
What then constitutes a credible military approach to Baltic defense that is part of a broader deterrent strategy?
The response until now has largely been about demonstrating commitment through small scale air patrols by NATO nations, rotating ground forces through for training purposes, all of which demonstrate commitment, but fall short of a fully credible defense appraoch.
The response of the Nordics has clearly played a role as well in terms of demonstrating commitment and to revitalizing their approach to direct defense, which certainly plays a role in Russian calculations. Indeed, without a strong Nordic response perhaps the Russians might have already played a much more agressive Baltic intimidation game.
Finland has always played a key role in Russian calculations towards the Baltics, and the Finns have been very clear about their response to Russian games — they have consolidated their relationships within the Nordic region, deepened their relationships with the US, the UK and other NATO partners, and are undergoing defense modernization, including the acquisition of a new combat aircraft.
A recent French report published by the French Ministry of Defense highlighted their engagement in Baltic defense and why they take it seriously.
This is how the French MoD describes the challenge:
A partly closed sea, joining the North Sea and the Atlantic Ocean after a series of straits, the Baltic Sea accounts for one-third of the European Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and is home to nearly 200,000 French nationals.
Marked by major security challenges, it has seen, over the last decade or so, the revival of tensions forgotten since the end of the Cold War that led to a deterioration of the regional stability.
Brought about by Moscow’s posture, the remilitarisation of the region has spread to all the countries bordering the Baltic Sea. Russia has developed a policy of power assertion and strategic intimidation made of military deployments, threats to use force and use of force on different theatres (Georgia, Ukraine, Syria), as well as international law violations, especially with the annexation of Crimea.
Since 2011, it has modernised its armed forces in the Kaliningrad and Leningrad oblasts and adopted a posture of ‘aggressive sanctuarisation’ by deploying a large number of anti-access / area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
Along its Western border, Russia has set up a ‘strategic belt’ from the Arctic to the Middle East. In an unprecedented manner since the Cold War, Russia conducts exercises and operations on different theatres at the same time (Baltic Sea, Caspian Sea, Black Sea, Levant). Its maritime presence and airstrike campaign in Syria are both symbols of it.
In reaction, the Allies, including France, have reinforced their protection measures in the East on behalf of their Eastern Allies.
This effort is part of the reassurance mission demonstrating a will and capability to defend the region.
But are such efforts enough to build a credible defense posture?
And let me be clear, this is no criticism of the French but a general challenge facing both the Baltics themselves and their allies.
In a 2015 article, I highlighted what I believe to be the foundation from which credible defense, rather than demonstration of commitment might look like.
With the Russian approach to Ukraine as defining a threat envelope, the question of Baltic defense has become a central one for NATO. And deterrence rests not simply on having exercises and declarations but a credible strategy to defeat the Russians if they decided to probe, push and dismember the Baltic republics.
How can NATO best shape a credible defense strategy which meets the realistic performance of the key stakeholders in defense and security in Northern Europe?
It is no good talking in general deterrence terms; or simply having periodic exercises. The exercises need to be part of shaping a realistic engagement and defense strategy.
As one Russian source has put it with regard to characterizing with disdain NATO exercises:
The West keeps accusing Russia of aggression towards neighboring countries and this is largely bluff in order to make it appear strong, Alexander Mercouris, international affairs expert, told RT.
He suggests it’s a dangerous game because it does bring NATO troops very close to Russian borders.
RT: We’re seeing this massive build-up in the Baltic states, while another NATO member, Norway, is also holding massive military exercises on Russia’s borders.Is the US-led bloc preparing for war?
Alexander Mercouris: No I doubt they are preparing for war, I doubt anybody seriously contemplates war with Russia which is a nuclear power, and it will be a suicidal idea. What I think we are seeing is a show force basically to conceal the fact that Western policy over Ukraine is falling apart, and all sorts of Western politicians and political leaders who made a very strong pitch on Ukraine now find that they have to do something to show that they are still a force to be counted on.
RT: How justified are these claims by some Western officials that Russia could be preparing to test NATO’s resolve by invading a member country?
AM: There is no justification for that whatsoever. Russia has never attacked a NATO-state. It didn’t do so when it was a part of the Soviet Union. There is no threat from Russia to do so, and this whole thing is completely illusory. I’m absolutely sure that everybody in the government, in the West, in NATO knows that very well.
And providing token forces as symbols of intent are not enough as well.
When the secret cables about NATO planning for Baltic and Polish defense were released in the WikiLeaks scandal, a Polish source characterized what he thought of symbolic measures:
Earlier this year the US started rotating US army Patriot missiles into Poland in a move that Warsaw celebrates publicly as boosting Polish air defenses and demonstrating American commitment to Poland’s security.
But the secret cables expose the Patriots’ value as purely symbolic. The Patriot battery, deployed on a rotating basis at Morag in north-eastern Poland, 40 miles from the border with Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, is purely for training purposes, and is neither operational nor armed with missiles.
The Russians with the advantage of having significant Russian minorities in the Baltics can play a probing game similar to Ukraine if they deem this necessary or useful.
The probing certainly is going on.
Deterrence is not just about arming and occupying the Baltic states in ADVANCE of the Russians doing something and given the geography such actions seem unlikely at best.
As a landpower with significant Baltic sea assets, it is difficult to imagine the Russians providing a long period of warning for the USAF to deliver significant US Army forces to the Baltic states to deter Russian attack. This is not a US Army led operation in any real sense.
And building up outside forces on the ground in the Baltics takes time and could set off Russian actions which one might well wish not to see happen.
This latter point is crucial to Balts as well who would not like to be viewed by the Russians as an armed camp on their borders in times of crisis, and not only the Russians living in Russia, but those in the Baltic republics themselves.
Credible defense starts with what NATO can ask of the Baltic states themselves.
In the 1980s, there was a movement in Western Europe which called for “defensive defense,” which clearly applies to the Balts.
Greater cooperation among the three states, and shaping convergence of systems so that resupply can be facilitated is a good baseline.
Add to that deployments of defensive missile systems designed for short to mid-range operations, and the ground work would be created for a stronger DEFENSIVE capability which would slow any Russian advance down and facilitate the kind of air and naval intervention by NATO which would mesh very nicely with the defensive capabilities of the Baltic states.
In a piece by Thomas Theiner called “Peace is Over for the Baltic States,” he looks at what kinds of actions by the Baltic states make sense in terms of collaborative defense within the bounds of realistic expectations.
The key is not simply to wait for NATO’s so-called “rapid reaction force” to show up in time to view the Russian forces occupying the Baltic states.
Most importantly, the three Baltic nations need a modern medium range air-defense system and tanks.
The air-defense systems currently in service, namely RBS-70, Mistral, Stinger and Grom man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) , do not reach higher than 4-5km and have a range of just 6-8 km.
The three Baltic nations do not need a high-end long-range system like the SAMP/T or the MIM-104 Patriot.
What the core Nordic states (Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland) can do is create a more integrated air and naval defense.
If the Russians believed that the Nordics most affected by a Baltic action could trigger what other NATO nations can do, there is little incentive for them to do so.
This means leveraging the Baltic Air Patrol to shape a Northern region wide integrated air operations capability that the US, France, Germany and the UK can work with and plug into rapidly.
It is about modular, scalable force with significant reachback that would kill a Russian force in its tracks, and be so viewed from the outset by the Russians.
And because it is not based in the Baltics, but the air controllers could well be, it is part of the overall defensive defense approach.
Naval forces are crucial as well, not only to deal with Russian naval forces, but to support the Baltic operation as well. Modern amphibious forces are among the most useful assets to provide engagement capabilities, ranging from resupply, to air operations, to insertion forces at key choke points.
By not being based on Baltic territory, these forces are part of the overall defensive defense approach, and not credibly part of a forward deployed dagger at the heart of Russia argument that the Russian leadership will try to use if significant NATO forces were to be forward deployed upon Baltic territory itself.
Shaping an effective defensive template, leveraging collaborative Baltic efforts, with enhanced integrated air and naval forces will only get better as Western naval and air transformation occurs in the period ahead.
There are a number of key developments underway which can reinforce such a template.The first is the Dane’s acquiring the missiles to go with the sensors aboard their frigates and to position their frigates to provide area wide defensive capabilities which can be leveraged in the crisis.
The second is the acquisition of the F-35 by key states in the region whose integrated fleet can lay down a sensor grid with kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, which can operate rapidly over the Baltic states by simply extending the airpower integration already envisaged in the defense of the region.
The Norwegians, the Dutch, and possibly the Danes and the Finns will all have F-35s and a completely integrated force which can rapidly be inserted without waiting for slower paced forces has to be taken seriously by Russia. There is no time gap within which the Russians can wedge their forces, for Norway and Denmark are not likely to stand by and watch the Russians do what they want in the Baltics. With the integrated F-35 fleet, they would need to wait on slower paced NATO deliberations to deploy significant force useable immediately in Baltic defenses.
The third is the coming UK carrier, which can provide a local core intervention capability to plug into the F-35 forces in the region and to add amphibious assault capability.
The fourth is that the USN-USMC team coming with F-35B and Osprey enabled assault forces can plug in rapidly as well.
The fifth is the evolving integration of air and naval systems. The long reach of Aegis enabled by F-35/Aegis integration can add a significant offensive/defensive capability to any reinforcement force, and the Norwegians are a local force that will have such a capability.
By leveraging current capabilities and reshaping the template for Baltic defense, the coming modernization efforts will only enhance the viability of the template and significantly enhance credible deterrence, rather than doing what RT referred to scornfully as “US troops drills in Baltic states is more a political than military show.”
A key advantage of the approach is that it is led by the Nordics and gets away from the Russian game of making this always about the US and the “US-led” Alliance.
Putin and his ilk can play this game, but European led capabilities are crucial to reshaping Russian expectations about how non-Americans view their aggression as well.
That was what I wrote in 2015.
And in 2016, the Estonians published a very insightful report on Baltic defense co-authored by three experienced NATO hands: Wesley Clark, Juri Luik, Egon Ramms and Richard Shirreff.
The report focuses upon the importance a credible direct defense capability able to credibly deflect, defeat and deter Russian military forces against the region.
Because the region geographically is virtually indefensible, a credible speed bump needs to be put in front of the Russians providing the time whereby NATO allies can bring significant force to the fight to degrade Russian forces significantly.
The report provides a very good overview of the challenges, the threats and key elements for shaping a credible defense posture in the region.
They argue that the military aspects of deterrence clearly need to be strengthened for a credible appraoch to Baltic defense.
The Alliance must act with a sense of urgency when it comes to reinforcing its deterrence posture in the Baltic states, where NATO is most vulnerable. NATO has too often acted like a homeowner who sets the alarm once the burglars have left. A general change in mindset is needed—a culture of seizing the initiative and actively shaping the strategic environment should become the Alliance’s modus operandi. The Alliance’s decision-makers and general public must realise that the costs of credible deterrence by denial pale in comparison to the costs of deterrence failure.
The authors then address in the report the question of how to strengthen the military aspects of deterrence.
The transition at the Warsaw Summit from assurance to deterrence must be made credible with a more substantial forward presence in the most exposed NATO Allies and an effective coun- ter-A2/AD strategy. While the Baltics are sometimes compared to the West Germany of the Cold War, deterrence by denial is more important today than it was then. It is also feasible because deterrence by denial can be achieved without establishing parity with the opposing forces in the region. We do not need to match Russia tank-for-tank in order to have a deterrent effect.
While we agree with both the former and current SACEURs, Generals Breedlove and Scaparrot- ti, who would prefer permanent forces in Europe, the debate about permanence should not be at the forefront if the continuous presence of combat-capable forces can be ensured through rotation.
The Alliance must deploy, as a minimum, a multinational “battalion-plus” battle group with a range of enablers and force multipliers in each of the Baltic states, with one nation or an estab- lished multinational formation providing its core. Together with the additional US Army pres- ence, which should also be built up to a battalion size in each Baltic country, such a NATO force would be able create a “speedbump” for Russia, and not act only as a “tripwire”.
The Warsaw Summit is not a final destination. NATO must continue efforts to ensure that this posture expands the range of its deterrence and defence options and limits Russia’s freedom of action. The Alliance should continue building its forward presence towards a multinational brigade in each of the Baltic states.
While land presence has gained much attention in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit, the mari- time and air dimensions of NATO’s deterrent posture, as well as the availability of key enablers, have been less touched upon. After the Warsaw Summit, these issues need to be addressed.
Quick reinforcement of the Baltic states by the Allies should be made more credible by pre-po- sitioning equipment much closer to the frontline than 1,600 km away from it as currently planned. During the Cold War, this distance was only 300 km. We recommend that at least a battalion-worth of heavy equipment be pre-positioned in each Baltic state in order to be able to surge the presence of Allied troops rapidly when necessary. The former REFORGER exercises should be revived under the name REFOREUR (Return of Forces to Europe).
NATO’s nuclear deterrent should be strengthened by signalling to Russia that Moscow’s strategy of using sub-strategic nuclear weapons to de-escalate conflict would be a major escalation and would warrant the Alliance’s nuclear response.
An approach should be adopted to cyber weapons similar to the existing one on nuclear weap- ons, stating that the Allies’ offensive cyber capabilities have a deterrent role even if NATO as an organisation does not pursue an offensive cyber strategy. Removing cyber offensive option is tantamount to someone taking away kinetic options from an artillery commander on a battle- field.
NATO must signal to Russia that, in case of aggression against any NATO Ally, there is no such thing as a limited conflict for the Alliance, and that it will contest Russia in all domains and with- out geographical limitations.
North American and European Allies should state that they will act individually in anticipation of NATO, should the Alliance’s collective military response be delayed. The Allies should underline that an individual response is, in fact, a legal obligation that they take seriously, and have plans and units allocated for this purpose.
NATO’s plans should take into account the possible contribution of Sweden and Finland. The Al- liance should also conduct prudent planning for assisting these countries, as a way of reassuring them that their support for NATO would not leave them exposed to Russia’s punitive military action.
In short, as the Russians re-calibrate the use of their military force for both political purpose and combat success, the US and its allies need to do no less.
The featured photo shows thirty maritime units ships from 12 nations maneuvered in close formation for a photo exercise, June 9, 2018, during Exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2018 in the Baltic Sea.
BALTOPS is the premier annual maritime-focused exercise in the Baltic region and one of the largest exercises in Northern Europe enhancing flexibility and interoperability among allied and partner nations.
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Justin Stumberg/Released)
(June 9, 2018)
For the French report on the Baltics, see the following:
The Ministry of Defence of Singapore has started its process of formally replacing their legacy fleet with the F-35.
An article by Andrew McLaughlin published in the Australian Defence Business Review on January 19, 2019 focused on the decision by Singapore’s Ministry of Defence.
The Republic of Singapore Air force (RSAF) and Singapore Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) have selected the Lockheed Martin F-35 to replace the RSAF’s fleet of F-16 fighters.
The intensive study and technical evaluation process commenced in 2013 but was paused for two years due to ongoing delays to the JSF program and a decision to upgrade the RSAF’s F-16s, but resumed in 2017. Along with Israel, Singapore has been a JSF Program Security Cooperation Participant (SCP) since 2004, which has given it an insight into the program’s development and status throughout its often-troubled development.
“Happy to report that DSTA Defence Science and Technology Agency and RSAF have completed their technical evaluation for the replacement,” a social media post by Singapore’s Defence Minister, Ng Eng Hen reads.
“It took longer than expected – more than five years – as they had to go through in detail specifications and needs, which they could only do after developmental flight testing of the F-35s was completed in early 2018. They have decided that the F-35 would be the most suitable replacement fighter.”
The RSAF currently operates about 60 F-16C/D Block 52s and Block 52 D+ Advanced models, the oldest of which entered service in 1998. All of the F-16s are currently being upgraded to the latest F-16V standard with AESA radars and other improvements, and the RSAF maintains a training detachment of the jets at Luke AFB in Arizona.
The evaluation recommended the acquisition initially of a small number of F-35s for a full evaluation and assessment before the RSAF commits to a full fleet of between 40 and 60 aircraft to equip three squadrons. It is unclear whether the RSAF favours the conventional takeoff and landing F-35A model, or the short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B, or a mix of both.
“Our agencies will now have to speak to their US counterparts to move the process forward, which may take 9 – 12 months before a decision is made,” Mr Ng said.
“Even then, we want to procure a few planes first, to fully evaluate the capabilities of the F-35 before deciding on the acquisition of a full fleet. We must prepare well and cater enough time to replace our F-16s.”
The island nation has very limited airspace in which to operate and land upon which to build runways and base facilities, so despite its reduced combat capabilities over the A model, the F-35B has always been seen as a practical option. The F-35B also has the advantage of being able to deploy aboard Singapore Navy and allied amphibious carriers if required.
The RSAF also operates 36-40 Boeing F-15SG fighters, and a small number of Northrop F-5E/Fs in the air combat roles.
Joseph Trevitchik noted in an article published on January 18, 2019 that Singapore with this decision has moved closer to joining what China calls the US F-35 friends circle.
China is only expanding its anti-access and area-denial capabilities in the South China Sea, especially when it comes to its made-made islets. Many of these have, or could readily accommodate, long-range surface-to-air missiles and shore-based anti-ship defenses that would present a significant challenge to any potential opponent in a crisis.
A stealthy fighter may simply soon become a requisite for any country in the region who is looking to present a credible challenge to those developments.
The obvious threat the F-35 specifically poses has led Chinese media to downplay it and derisively dub Joint Strike Fighter operators in the Pacific region, which includes Australia, South Korea, and Japan, so far, as the “U.S. F-35 friends circle.”
As such, evaluating the jet is a logical course of action for Singapore given its relationship with the United States and the simple fact that the aircraft is in production now. At the same time, the country’s “fly-before-you-buy” approach shows that they’re willing to take the time to fully explore their options.
The country is now in the process of upgrading those jets to the even more advanced F-16V configuration, which could help keep them relevant beyond 2030 if necessary.
The decision is hardly a surprise given that Singapore trains on both Australian and US territory and understands the advantage of being able to operate with the Pacific fleet of F-35s being stood up in South Korea, Japan, Australia, the US and European allies who come to the region, such as the UK onboard their new class of carriers.
If one looks at the strategic context, the strategic quadrangle which encompasses the allies who face the Chinese military extended reach provides a base line from understanding why the F-35 makes sense. We wrote a book several years ago which highlighted the synergy between technology and geography in the region, and also highlighted the capabilities of the aircraft to integrate with active defense systems, a key capability which the US and allies clearly need as well.
The challenge of reshaping Pacific defense to deal with the various strategic challenges of the 21st century – the Arctic opening, SLOC and maritime trade conveyer belt security, North Korea and the dynamics of the second nuclear age, and the reaching out into the Pacific by the PRC – is about augmenting Pacific defense and an ability of the U.S. and its allies to operate collaboratively over the geographic expanse of the Pacific.
What we have called the strategic quadrangle in the Pacific is a central area where the U.S. and several core allies are reaching out to shape collaborative defense capabilities to ensure defense in depth.
This area is central to the operation of forces from Japan, South Korea, Australia, India, Singapore and the United States, to mention the most important allies.
Freedom to operate in the quadrangle is a baseline requirement for allies to shape collaborative capabilities and policies. Effectiveness can only emerge from exercising evolving forces and shaping convergent concepts of operations.
In effect, U.S. forces operate in two different quadrants—one can be conceptualized as a strategic triangle and the other as a strategic quadrangle.
The first quadrant—the strategic triangle—involves the operation of American forces from Hawaii and the crucial island of Guam with the defense of Japan. U.S. forces based in Japan are part of a triangle of bases, which provide for forward presence and ability to project power deeper into the Pacific.
The second quadrant—the strategic quadrangle—is a key area into which such power needs to be projected. The Korean peninsula is a key part of this quadrangle, and the festering threat from North Korea reaches out significantly farther than the peninsula itself.
The continent of Australia anchors the western Pacific and provides a key ally for the United States in shaping ways to deal with various threats in the Pacific, including the PRC reach deeper into the Pacific with PRC forces. Singapore is a key element of the quadrangle and provides a key ally for the United States and others in the region.
A central pressure in the region is that each of the key allies in the region works more effectively with the United States than they do with each other.
This is why the United States is a key lynchpin in providing cross linkages and cross capabilities within the region. But it is clear that over time a thickening of these regional linkages will be essential to an effective 21st-century Pacific strategy.
The distances in these regions are immense.
For the strategic triangle, the distance from Hawaii to Japan are nearly 4,100 miles. The distance from Hawaii to Guam—the key U.S. base in the Western Pacific—is nearly 4,000 miles. And the ability of Guam to work with Japan is limited by the nearly 2,000-mile distance between them as well.
For the strategic quadrangle, the distances are equally daunting. It is nearly 4,000 miles from Japan to Australia. It is nearly 2,500 miles from Singapore to Australia and nearly 3,000 miles from Singapore to South Korea.
Clearly, air and naval forces face significant challenges in providing presence and operational effectiveness over such distances.
This is why a key element of shaping an effective U.S. strategy in the Pacific will rest on much greater ability for the allies to work together and much greater capability for U.S. forces to work effectively with those allied forces.
The allies are looking to the operational quadrangle as a key area within which to project force outwards and to find ways to expand both the effectiveness and survivability of a flexible force.
Air platforms have the distinct advantage of flexibility in operations, and with an ability to operate from various land and sea bases can operate from different trajectories of operation as well.
The common infrastructure being built to facilitate an F-35 global enterprise clearly is important to Singapore and its capabilities to operate in the region in a crisis and to shape its engagement with an effective allied coalition.
In addition, the technology being shaped, notably with the F-35B, is crucial as well to the geography of Singapore itself.
As Ed Timperlake put it in an article published in 2012 entitled “strategic deterrence with tactical flexibility:”
Every fighter pilot has had or will have a moment in the air when the biggest indicator in the cockpit is showing how much fuel is left: the fuel indicator immediately can dominate the pilots attention and really focus thinking on where to immediately land.
Fuel is measured in pounds usually with an engineering caveat stating a degree of uncertainty over how low the number may go before all the noise will stop. Pounds of fuel remaining eventually become everything.
It is actually a very simple and terrifying equation, no fuel means simply no noise because the jet engine has stopped working.
Contemplating this very time sensitive dilemma, when the “noise gage” goes to zero, all pilots know that their once trusted and beautiful sleek multi-million fighters that they are strapped into will rapidly take on the flying characteristic of a brick.
Running low on fuel, calling “bingo,” on the radio which is announcing min fuel left for a successful recovery and then realizing you are actually going below “bingo” could occur for a variety of reasons.
In peacetime it is mostly a delay in landing because of weather related issues.
In combat, in addition to horrific weather at times, throw in battle damage to the fuel tanks and it becomes a real life or death problem.
In peacetime you can eject, probably lose your wings and that will be that.
However, in combat, in addition to shooting at you the enemy always gets a vote on other methods to kill you and destroy your aircraft. They will use any means possible.
Consequently if aircraft in their combat strike package get lucky and a few survive to bomb “homeplate” taxiways and all divert fields it can become a significant problem.
Even more realistically in this 21st Century world, missile proliferation, both in terms of quality and quantity, is a key challenge. All nations can be peer competitors because of weapons proliferation.
An enemy may have successfully improved the quantity and quality of their missile such that an Air Battle commander’s entire airborne air force can be eliminated by the enemy destroying all runways, taxiways and divert bases.
In a war at sea, hitting the carrier’s flight deck can cripple the Carrier Battle Group (CBG) and thus get a mission kill on the both the Carrier and perhaps even the entire airborne air wing if they can not successfully divert to a land base.
With no place to land, on the sea or land and with tanker fuel running low, assuming tankers can get airborne, the practical result will be the loss of extremely valuable air assets.
In such circumstances, The TacAir aircraft mortality rate would be the same as if it was during a combat engagement with either air-to-air or a ground –to-air weapons taking out the aircraft.
The only variable left, between simply flaming out in peacetime, vice the enemy getting a kinetic hit would be potential pilot survivability to fly and fight another day.
However, with declining inventories and limited industrial base left in U.S. to surge aircraft production a runway kill could mean the loss of air superiority and thus be a battle-tipping event, on land or sea.
Now something entirely new and revolutionary can be added to an Air Force, the VSTOL F-35B.
Traditionally the VSTOL concept, as personified by the remarkable AV-8, Harrier was only for ground attack. To be fair the RAF needed to use the AV-8 in their successful Falklands campaign as an air defense fighter because it was all they had.
The Harrier is not up to a fight against any advanced 4th gen. aircraft—let alone F-22 5th Gen. Fighters that have been designed for winning the air combat maneuvering fight (ACM) with advanced radar’s and missiles.
Now though, for the first time in history the same aircraft the F-35 can be successful in a multi-role.
The F-35, A, B &C type, model, series, all have the same revolutionary cockpit-the C4ISD-D “Fusion combat system” which also includes fleet wide “tron” warfare capabilities.
There has been a lot written about the F-35B not being as capable as the other non-VSTOL versions such as the land based F-35A and the Large carrier Battle Group (CBG) F-35, the USN F-35C.
The principle criticism is about the more limited range of the F-35B. In fact, the combat history of the VSTOL AV-8 shows that if properly deployed on land or sea the VSTOL capability is actually a significant range bonus. The Falklands war, and recent USN/USMC rescue of a Air Force pilot in the Libyan campaign proved that.
The other key point is limited payload in the vertical mode. Here again is where the F-35 T/M/S series have parity if the F-35B can make a long field take off or a rolling take off from a smaller aircraft carrier-with no traps nor cats needed it can carry it’s full weapons load-out.
The Royal Navy just validated this point by reversing back to the F-35B.
Give all aircraft commanders the same set of strategic warning indicators of an attack because it would be a very weak air staff that would let their aircraft be killed on the ground or flight deck by a strategic surprise.
Consequently, the longer take off of the F-35 A, B or C with a full weapons complement makes no difference. Although history does show that tragically being surprised on the ground has happened.
Pearl Harbor being the very nasty example. Of course, USN Carrier pilots during the “miracle at Midway” caught the Japanese Naval aircraft being serviced on their flight deck and returned the favor to turn the tide of the war in the pacific.
In addition to relying intelligence, and other early warning systems to alert an air force that an attack is coming so “do not get caught on the ground!” dispersal, revetments and bunkers can be designed to mitigate against a surprise attack.
Aircraft survivability on the ground is critical and a lot of effort has also gone into rapid runway repair skills and equipment to recover a strike package. All F-35 TMS have the same advantages with these types of precautions.
The strategic deterrence, with tactical flexibility, of the F-35B is in the recovery part of an air campaign when they return from a combat mission, especially if the enemy successfully attacks airfields.
Or is successful in hitting the carrier deck-they do not have to sink the Carrier to remove it from the fight just disable the deck. War is always a confused messy action reaction cycle, but the side with more options and the ability to remain combat enabled and dynamically flexible will have a significant advantage.
With ordinance expended, or not, the F-35B does not need a long runway to recover and this makes it a much more survivable platform — especially at sea where their might be no other place to go.
A call by the air battle commander-all runways are destroyed so find a long straight road and “good luck!” is a radio call no one should ever have to make.
But something revolutionary now exists.
In landing in the vertical mode the Marine test pilot in an F-35B, coming aboard the USS Wasp during sea trials put the nose gear in a one square box. So the unique vertical landing/recovery feature of landing anywhere will save the aircraft to fight another day.
It is much easier to get a fuel truck to an F-35B than build another A or C model, or land one of the numerous “decks” on other ships, even a T-AKE ship then ditch an F-35C at sea.
This unique capability can be a war winning issue for countries like Israel, Taiwan and the U.S. Navy at sea.
In an article by Mike Yeo published on July 10, 2018, the reporter addressed how the F-35 would enhance Singapore’s regional operational capabilities.
There are several regional air forces already buying F-35s with Australia, an F-35 development partner country who has a close security relationship with Singapore, ordering 72 F-35As.
Australia is also building facilities and infrastructure to support its own F-35s, which includes threat emitter systems to simulate hostile radar and air defences in the same training areas RSAF fighters have used in the past as part of the training agreements Singapore has signed with Australia. These could potentially be used by the RSAF to train with in the future.
In northeast Asia, both Japan and South Korea have ordered F-35As for their own air forces and have reportedly looked into the possibility of operating F-35Bs from ships of their respective navies.
The United States military also plans to deploy F-35s to its forward-deployed forces based in the region, with one squadron of US Marine Corps F-35Bs already based in Japan while more US Air Force and Navy fighter squadrons based in Japan are expected to convert to the F-35 over the next decade.
This will create a significant pool of F-35 users in the region, which will potentially enhance interoperability among these nations during any multinational coalition operations.
Australian companies have also successfully secured the rights to conduct heavy maintenance and warehousing of spare parts for regional F-35 operators, and this would streamline sustainment and supply chain matters should Singapore opt for it as the next fighter jet.
And certainly the F-35’s integrated sensor and C2 capabilities will fit nicely into the core IKC2 design of their force as well. We will close with the article we first published in 2012 which explained the core Singapore defense transformation approach which clearly anticipate the coming of the F-35 as well.
Singapore is a non-aligned power with close ties to the United States politically and militarily and close ties with China economically and politically. They depend on the security of maritime trade and the safety and security of the global commons.
They have built a modern naval and air force and are investing in its further modernization. And their efforts are founded on working with Western countries and firms in shaping an effective modernization strategy. And they are seeking to ensure that the force is well integrated and networked. Their concept for doing so is called an Integrated Knowledge Command and Control Concept, which is their version of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).
On the ground and in the jungles, the SAF will transform into a lean, networked and lethal fighting force while staying focused on the new security challenges. It will employ new technologies, such as precision fire, advanced communications and information technology, as well as unmanned vehicles, to defeat potential adversaries. At the same time, innovative warfighting concepts in combined arms operations, urban fighting and infantry fieldcraft will be introduced in tandem to provide the SAF with the operational edge.
Out at sea, the SAF will achieve potent three-dimensional fighting capabilities in the air, on the surface, and under the sea. Its ships will also have the command and control capability to conduct seamless operations as an integrated force with aircraft and land forces, through effective use of advanced communications and information technology, while leveraging on platform strengths. The SAF should thus be ready to meet the full spectrum of maritime threats, including small, fast-moving boats in the littorals that can otherwise pose a tremendous challenge to traditional naval forces.
In the air, the SAF will achieve Air Dominance through the coordinated employment of fighters, unmanned air vehicles and airborne surveillance aircraft, which are integrated through real-time knowledge-based systems and networks. The networked force will have comprehensive situational awareness that gives the critical edge in air operations. The SAF will also marry advanced surveillance and strike capabilities over surface threats, including elusive targets that may be concealed under foliage or ships out on open sea.
Finally, tying all these air, land and sea capabilities together into a synergistic whole is the concept of Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2). The concept gives commanders and soldiers the ability to see first, see more; understand better; decide faster; so that they can act decisively to achieve victory. This is achieved by leveraging on networks of sensors, shooters and communications to provide comprehensive awareness and self-synchronization on the battlefield. The networks also provide wells of information, which will also be translated into relevant knowledge for superior decision-making to achieve precise effects, and effectively shape the battlefield.
To understand the Singapore approach and its place in the world, Second Line of Defense discussed Singapore and the defense situation in Asia with Richard Bitzinger. Bitzinger is a leading expert on defense issues in the Pacific, and has focused much of his recent work on the evolving PRC policies. He teaches and works in Singapore and provides support for Singapore’s thinking about the RMA.
He is a Senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
SLD: How would you describe Singapore’s defense orientation?
Bitzinger: Singapore is non-aligned.
But it operates closely with the United States and allies in the region. They buy Western equipment, provide a leasing arrangement for the US navy to operate in Singapore and train in several allied facilities in the region.
They train for tank warfare in Australia, they train for jungle warfare in Brunei, they do infantry training in Taiwan, fighter training in the U.S. and have a working relationship for training in France.
At the same time, they have close economic and political ties with China. A balancing act is central to Singapore’s security policies in the region.
There has been a clear shift in the past few years.
Prior to this period, the main focus of military modernization for Singapore has been upon dynamics in Southeast Asia, and preparing for threats from countries like Malaysia and Indonesia. Now this concern is being superseded by the perceived need to deal with the military rise of China.
SLD: With regard to the modernization and development of their forces, and given their geography, it seems Singapore is shaping an extended defense and security bubble to surround themselves with an integrated naval and air force.
Is this the case?
Singapore is at the vortex of what we are calling the Strategic Quadrangle in the Pacific. They have built a modern naval and air force and are investing in its further modernization. And they are seeking to ensure that the force is well integrated and networked. Credit Image: Bigstock
Bitzinger: The defense bubble concept does make sense in describing Singapore’s approach to modernization.
The Singaporeans see technology as their force multiplier. They have a conscript Army, and a relatively large mobilization force. But the ability to leverage technology to bring air, sea and ground into a more effective force is crucial to their approach.
They are creating what they call a 3G Singapore Armed Forces or 3GSAF. They are looking to shape an effective networked and integrated force with the Navy and the Air Force in the lead, with the goal of providing an intelligently informed ground force element.
SLD: It would seem then that the F-35 as a C5ISR aircraft would fit nicely into their approach?
Bitzinger: It would.
They are not in a rush because they have modern F-16s and F-15s but they are already participating in the F-35 program.
SLD: And the F-35B would seem to fit their basing needs well.
Bitzinger: It would. The F35-B certainly gives you more flexibility when it comes to basing.
They only have two air force bases here and additionally have roadway-focused bases. Those are extremely difficult to use because it takes several days to get ready to use. It would help with the dispersed basing approach favored by Singapore.
SLD: How does the Chinese military modernization effort and Chinese policy in the region shape Singapore’s and others modernization efforts?
Bitzinger: The Chinese are becoming significantly more assertive and more capable at the same time. They are following a path of what I would call “creeping aggressiveness.”
They have become very assertive about their territorial claims in the South China Sea, and their policies have gotten the attention of others in the neighborhood.
Historically, most of the modernization of the military in Southeast Asia has been about power balances in the region. Now it is increasingly about China.
Singapore would like to see multilateral agreements in the region to reduce tensions; but the PRC has evidenced little interest in such an approach.
SLD: How important is an effective US “pivot to the Pacific?”
Bitzinger: Very. But to date, allies in the region are disappointed about what they see as the realities of more rhetoric than reality in US policy.
But make no mistake.
The allies in the region cannot counter China by themselves, and are looking to the United States to play a key role in this effort.
A key element to understand the challenge is that the allies in the region tend to be ground-centric and have limited modernization programs in place for air and naval systems. The real force projection parts of their military, their navies and their air forces are still rather small.
And the idea of a regionally integrated system is years away.
This means that the Chinese are in a good position to pressure, if the United States is not part of the equation.
In the last two years, the United States has been looked upon by a lot of countries in Southeast Asia as we need to have you involved; we need to have you more active in Southeast Asia than ever as a hedge against the Chinese.
SLD: You have been involved for a long time in analyses of the Revolution in Military Affairs. It makes sense that you are in Singapore, because I think they take this effort very seriously.
Bitzinger: They do. For Singapore, the core concept is that of Integrated Knowledge Command and Control.
They see C5ISR as a core force multiplier and an ability to reach out further with their forces, rather than having stovepiped service approaches.
It is a central tenet of their approach, and they clearly at the cutting edge of thinking on this.
And they certainly appreciate the role of the USMC in the region because the USMC is the most integrated of the American forces.
The featured photo shows Singapore Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen inspecting a USAF F-35A during a visit to Luke AFB. Credit Photo: Ministry of Defence, Singapore.
A combination of strained alliances and ever-expanding political demands explains the MOD’s determination to secure funds to rebuild UK military capability.
After 20 years of preoccupation with counter-terrorism and humanitarian intervention, the current Defence Equipment Programme is now more focused on the heavier “state-on-state” capabilities required to deter a hostile major power in the North Atlantic region (warships, combat aircraft, mechanised ground forces, and so forth).
And all of this must take place while still having enough left over to do a bit of all the other things that are asked of the armed forces.
The report can be downloaded later in this article if so desired.
Here is one excerpt of the report which highlights the focus of UK defense modernization.
The character of warfare is fundamentally changing. Advances in information and communications technology have drastically increased the speed at which attacks can unfold. The newer domains of warfare – cyberspace and space – continue to grow in significance and provide our competitors greater scope for hostile action.
Areas such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, directed energy weapons (such as lasers) and warheads that can manoeuvre at hypersonic speeds provide new challenges and opportunities.
We expect this troubled period to endure. States will continue to engage in aggressive competition unless deterred from doing so. Technologies – established and novel – will continue to evolve at great speed. We must act to maintain our competitive advantage in the immediate term and for the decades to come…..
More generally, we will focus on gaining ‘Information Advantage’ as the character of warfare changes. The effective collection, analysis and dissemination of vast quantities of data will enable us to understand how our adversaries are thinking, how they may choose to act against us, and how we can act quickly to deter or defeat them.
We are pursuing modernisation in areas like artificial intelligence, machine-learning, man-machine teaming and automation to deliver the disruptive effects we need in this regard.
In addition, the technology being shaped, notably with the F-35B, is crucial as well to the geography of Singapore itself.
