USAF Bombers Deploy to Europe: Baltic Sea Exercise

03/24/2019

U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortresses are conducting training flights in the vicinity of the Baltic Sea as a clear and visible demonstration of U.S. commitment to regional security.
These missions have been closely coordinated with the governments of neighboring countries.

The strategic bombers, part of the Bomber Task Force currently deployed to the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, are from the 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana.

The aircraft arrived in theater on March 14-15 and are temporarily operating out of RAF Fairford.

The deployment of strategic bombers to the U.K. helps exercise RAF Fairford as the U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s forward training location for bombers.

Published March 22, 2019

https://www.usafe.af.mil/News/Press-Releases/Article/1792342/us-air-force-b-52s-conduct-training-missions-over-baltic-sea/

The Next Phase in Shaping an Integrated 21st Air Combat Force: The RAF Adds Wedgetail

By Robbin Laird

My visits to the UK and Australia over the past five years indicate growing working relationships between the two air forces but also that the significant rethink in Australia about shaping a fifth-generation combat force has clearly had its impact and resonance in the United Kingdom as well.

During a visit to RAF Waddington, I had a long conversation with Air Commodore Dean Andrew, we focused on a key aspect of change for the smaller Air Forces.  The opportunity offered by new software upgradeable aircraft to provide for a more integrated force which enhanced the overall combat force was a clear strategic opportunity and objective.

In our 2016 discussion at the base, we discussed shaping a way ahead for a more effective RAF.

He saw the F35 as an example of the paradigm shift in capability that the RAF will experience as the aircraft comes into service — particularly in terms of its ISR role, which complements its strike capabilities and can be leveraged for the ISTAR Force.

He adds that “the F35 will not be our platform, but it will have core ISTAR contributing capabilities that stretch the boundaries of integration even further for the transformed Force.

The overlapping Venn diagrams that we start to see across the RAF and Defence if we use an ISTAR ‘contributing capability’ lens get bigger and more complex as new and legacy platforms and services become integrated….”

“Treating each of the platform types as interconnected segments of an ISTAR capability Venn diagram will allow us to create the breadth of intelligence and understanding in the common operating picture that the Joint Force needs.

“Getting out of the platform stovepipe mentality will not be easy; it will be necessary to shape an overall operational approach to where the key operators of the platforms become plug and play elements in the overall ISTAR Force.”

We discussed as well how shaping an integrated fleet driven by software upgradeability could transform the modernization process as well.

“As the core platforms are replaced by an all software upgradeable fleet, the possibility could exist to put the platforms in competition with one another for modernization upgrades.

“Which upgrade gets the priority for which platform to make the greatest contribution to the integrated ISTAR capability are the sort of decisions that should lie with the ISTAR Force in the future – it is at Force level, not within individual programmes and projects that the overall capability benefit can be seen and prioritized.”

Since the time of our interview, the RAF has added the F-35, the P-8 and now is adding the Wedgetail, which provides a significant opportunity for platform integration and enhanced combat effectiveness.

The recent announcement of the addition of the Wedgetail opens up not only greater collaboration between the RAAF and the RAF, but opens the aperture as well for cross-platform integrated transformation.

I have visited the RAAF Wedgetail squadron many times and have watched as the system has migrated its capabilities through a software upgrade process and as the “radar” technology evolves into a tron warfare capability.  When combined with the F-35, this create a unique combat capability in a smaller force package for sure.

The upgrade process was highlighted during a visit to Williamtown and then with a follow up discussion in Baltimore with Northrop Grumman.

In an August 2016 interview, the process was discussed.

The difference between older and such a new system was outlined by one participant during the visit as follows:

“We have in the same time frame bought a CRC system full up which will look pretty much like it is in 20 years; with Wedgetail it will look nothing like it does now in 20 years.”

This process of upgrading means that the software engineers work closely with the operators in shaping the evolution of the aircraft.

This is a very different approach from legacy systems.

As Paul Kalafos, Vice President of Surveillance Systems at Northrop Grumman has put it:

“We are getting significant feedback from the RAAF on deployment and requests to automate tasks where possible to enhanced the capability of the machine part of the man-machine relationship to shape a way ahead.

“A lot of the input is through the ARCS working group, which is a collaborative study environment involving Boeing, Northrop Grumman, MIT/Lincoln Labs, Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC), CEA Technologies, Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), and the Common Wealth of Australia (CoA).

“Operational requirements come out of that process and shape the next increment of software development.

“The ARCS is focused on problems and their resolutions.

“These are software updates.

“We get a software refresh out about once a year.

“Six months are spent doing the study to shape the plausible change; and the next six months are spent doing the integration and then getting it out the door.

“We shed the specs in favor of resolving problems, which the operational community identified.

“They can even write recommended change requests as well which provides part of the demand side process.”

Now the RAF has acted on what it has learned from the RAAF and the progress the RAAF has made with force integration and has committed to buying five Wedgetails for its combat fleet.

In an article by Andrew McLaughlin published in Australian Defence Business Review on March 23, 2019, the UK decision was discussed.

The UK Government has announced it will acquire five Boeing 737-700-based E-7A Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft.

The announcement was made on March 22 by Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson, and will see the RAF’s five E-3D Sentry AWACS systems replaced by the E-7A in the “early 2020s” under a US$1.98bn (A$2,8bn) deal. The E-7A is known as the Wedgetail in RAAF service, and is also operated by South Korea and Turkey.

“The E-7 provides a technological edge in an increasingly complex battlespace, allowing our pilots to track and target adversaries more effectively than ever. This deal also strengthens our vital military partnership with Australia,” Secretary Williamson said. “We will operate the same state-of-the-art F-35 jets and world-class Type-26 warships, and this announcement will help us work even more closely together to tackle the global threats we face.”

Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Hillier, added, “Today’s announcement about the procurement of five E-7 ‘Wedgetail’ Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft is excellent news for both the RAF and wider Defence. This world-class capability, already proven with our Royal Australian Air Force partners, will significantly enhance our ability to deliver decisive airborne command and control and builds on the reputation of our E-3D Sentry Force.

“Along with Defence’s investment in other cutting-edge aircraft, E-7 will form a core element of the Next Generation Air Force, able to overcome both current and future complex threats.”

In order to free resources for a smooth transition to the E-7A, the RAF will retire one of its five operational E-3Ds immediately and consolidate its AEW&C operations. A sixth aircraft was retired several years ago and has been used as a spares hulk. An RAF rendering shows the E-7 flying over the Lincoln cathedral, which suggests the new aircraft will be based at nearby RAF Waddington, the RAF’s hub of Intelligence, Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) operations.

The Wedgetail agreement has been mooted since July 2018, and gathered pace after Australia’s announcement to acquire the BAE Systems Type 26-based Hunter class frigate prompted talks of closer defence ties and the possibility of a free trade agreement with the UK, especially with the UK’s exit from Europe looming.

RAF personnel reportedly visited the RAAF E-7A’s home base of Williamtown last August for a full brief on the aircraft and the results of its many missions in recent years over Iraq and Syria in support of operations against ISIS.

But just what role Australia will have in the UK’s program is yet to be announced. Four of the RAAF’s five Wedgetails were converted from ‘green’ 737s to E-7s at Boeing’s RAAF Amberley facility, and a large proportion of the company’s corporate knowledge of the system is now centred there and at Williamtown. The E-7’s primary sensor, the multi-mode electronically scanned array (MESA) radar is supplied by Northrop Grumman.

But like Australia, the UK is likely to want to perform the conversions in-country using local industry, a fact Mr Williamson articulated last November, and the work will most likely be conducted by Marshall Aerospace & Defence Group in Cambridge. But there may be export opportunities for Australian companies which have provided components, sustainment and training on the Wedgetail program.

Rather than switching to a newer 737MAX or a P-8-common 737-800/900 hybrid airframe, like the RAAF aircraft, the RAF’s E-7As will be based on the 737-700IGW which features heavier gauge landing gear from the -800, and three auxiliary fuel tanks. This will ensure commonality with the RAAF’s aircraft, and will remove the risk of having to conduct an expensive and time-consuming flight test campaign of a new AEW&C configuration.

The RAF will also need to decide how best to refuel its Wedgetails in the air to extend its mission endurance beyond eight hours. The RAF’s 14 A330 MRTT Voyager tankers use only hose and drogue systems, whereas the E-7A has been configured for boom refuelling through its Universal Aerial Refuelling Receptacle Slipway Installation (UARRSI) receptacle above and behind the cockpit.

The featured photo from 2017 shows the Commander of the Strike and Reconnaissance Group, Air Commodore Craig Heap, CSC, stands with the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry of Defence) Harriett Baldwin MP, in front of a No. 11 Squadron P-8A Poseidon during a visit to RAAF Base Edinburgh.

The Parliamentary Under Secretary of State and Minister for Defence Procurement, Harriet Baldwin MP, toured RAAF Base Edinburgh on November 10th to deepen her understanding of Australian capability on a recent visit to Australia.

As part of the demonstration, Minister Baldwin rode in a Thales Bushmaster and flew in an E-7 Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft.

The tour came after meeting with Minister for Defence Industry, the Hon Christopher Pyne, MP in Adelaide to discuss the defence industry relationship between Australia and the United Kingdom.

 

 

 

Japan and the Coming of the Osprey

The Japanese along with the USAF and the USN are trained to operate the Osprey at the USMC’s New River Air Station.

The increased number of aircraft and partners is providing a welcome challenge to the Marines at New River.

In a recent visit to 2nd MAW, the training role was highlighted for the new partners.

During visits several years ago at New River, the Osprey training squadron was focused upon the Marines and the Air Force.

Now with the US Navy buying Ospreys as well as the Japanese, there are new stakeholders in the training process, and that training squadron has become a priority effort within MAG-26 for sure.

Given the concerns the Japanese have about public opinion, and the flawed public record with regard to Osprey safety, there is a challenge facing the Japanese forces to deploy and use the new aircraft in Japan.

An original way to address the challenge has been provided by working the CV-22 aspect of the Osprey within the Japanese force structure.

According to a story published on March 24, 2019 by The Japan Times, the Japanese government has decided to deploy CV-22s along with a revamped UH-60 as part of a rescue ops package.

The government plans to introduce a special operations variant of the U.S. Marine Corps MV-22 tilt-rotor Osprey aircraft for Self-Defense Forces to conduct dangerous and covert missions abroad, such as the rescuing of Japanese citizens, according to sources.

The Ground Self-Defense Force has a special anti-terror unit to carry out such operations. But the unit is still not fully capable and lacks specialized aircraft.

Under the government plan, the CV-22 Osprey, the special operations variant of the MV-22, will be deployed along with refurbished models of the GSDF’s UH-60 helicopter, the government sources said Saturday.

The CV-22 is widely seen as more capable of nighttime flying and its terrain-following radar enables it to fly at low altitudes, they said. The remodeled UH-60 is regarded as better armored and can be carried by the Air Self-Defense Force’s C-2 transport airplanes.

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/03/24/national/japan-use-osprey-aircraft-overseas-rescue-operations-sources/?utm_source=Daily+News+Updates&utm_campaign=d46f281edb-Monday_email_updates25_03_2019&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c5a6080d40-d46f281edb-332756961#.XJeyjC2B1sY

In an article we published in 2014, we focused on the coming of the Osprey as part of the defense modernization effort by the Japanese.

That article follows:

When we wrote our book on Pacific strategy, a key element in considering how the key challenges facing the United States and its allies was how Japanese relationships with the US and the Pacific allies might evolve.

The entire second section of our book deals with Japan, and after a history of the relationship, which was largely, the work of Dr. Richard Weitz, we focused on where Japanese defense policy might evolve in the coming years. We argued that with the emergence of the “dynamic defense” approach Japan would reach out to shape new capabilities to provide for perimeter defense and to plus up its working relationships with allies in the region.

We argued that:

The Chinese seem bent on driving the two greatest maritime powers of the 20th century together into a closer alliance.

And at the heart of this alliance are key joint investments and procurement working relationships.

Japan is a key technological partner for the United States throughout. They are a founding member of the Aegis global enterprise.

They are an investor and operational partner in the SM-3 missile capability to enhance missile defense.

They are a major player in the F-35 program, which will allow the shaping of an attack-and-defense enterprise.

They are building a final assembly facility for the F-35, which will become a key element in the F-35 global procurement system, subject to Japanese
government policy decisions.

And they are keenly interested in seeing how the Osprey can shape greater reach and range for the “dynamic defense” of Japan.

Laird, Robbin F.; Timperlake, Edward (2013-10-28). Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy: A 21st-Century Strategy (The Changing Face of War) (Kindle Locations 3968-3969). ABC-CLIO. Kindle Edition.

Hardly had the book been printed than the Japanese government moved forward on its “dynamic defense” policy.

Notably, the current Prime Minister has worked to reshape Japanese policy to allow it to become a more significant contributor for its neighbors and to provide a more significant contribution to the US and allied deterrence in depth strategy, which is emerging in this decade of the 21st century.

With the decisions made to re-set Japanese defense policy, the Japanese government will clearly play a greater role in Pacific defense. 

And a recent piece in The Japan Times provides the following look at how the “new look” in defense policy might alter Japanese policies.

The Abe administration’s reinterpretation of the war-renouncing Constitution to allow greater use of military force in defending other countries is one of the biggest changes ever to Japan’s postwar security policy.

The administration has given a range of examples as to how the Self-Defense Forces might used when related laws are updated later this year. They include scenarios in which troops might:

Defend U.S. warships.

Troops could protect U.S. warships under attack from a third country near Japanese waters, before an imminent, direct attack on Japan, because cooperation with the U.S. military is considered essential to secure Japan’s own survival.

Intercept ships for inspection.

Troops might forcibly stop vessels for inspection when they are believed to be carrying weapons to a third country that is attacking U.S. warships in the region, when the battle seems likely to spill over to Japan — a step currently considered unconstitutional and prohibited as use of force.

Shoot down a missile fired at the U.S.

The SDF could intercept a ballistic missile that is flying over the Japanese archipelago heading toward Hawaii, the U.S. territory of Guam or the U.S. mainland, and when requested by America to do so.

Protect peacekeepers abroad.

SDF personnel could rescue civilians engaged in U.N.-backed peacekeeping operations that come under attack, using weapons if necessary to defend those civilians.

Minesweeping in the Middle East.

A plan still being contemplated would allow Japanese forces to participate in U.N.-led multinational minesweeping efforts to secure sea lanes in the Middle East, such as in the Strait of Hormuz, arguably crucial lifelines for resource-poor Japan.

For a look at the Japanese rethink on defense see the video below which was released by the Japanese MOD earlier this year, March 14, 2014:

 

China’s Regional Bomber and its Potential Impact

03/23/2019

By James Bosbotinis

The US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) published an unclassified assessment of Chinese military developments on 15 January 2019. The report, China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, disclosed that China is developing ‘new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets’, thus confirming long-standing rumoursregarding a potential regional bomber.

The development of a new strategic bomber, the H-20,  had been confirmed by the commander of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) in 2016. The medium-range bomber is also described as a tactical bomber and a fighter-bomber in the DIA report: significantly, the new aircraft will reportedly possess a long-range air-to-air missile capability.

The medium-range stealth bomber programme is indicative of China’s efforts to expand and enhance its air power capabilities, in particular through the pursuit of multiple fifth-generation aircraft (such as the J-20, J-31 and H-20), unmanned air systems, and an aircraft carrier force. It will also constitute a potent addition to China’s growing long-range strike capability.

Although the DIA report does not provide detailed information concerning either of China’s stealth bomber programmes, it does offer useful insight, which together with other open-source analyses, enable some discussion of the regional bomber, its potential roles, and the implications both for the PLAAF and more broadly.

The Regional Bomber

China Military Power states that stealth technology is central to the development of the regional bomber and that it will employ ‘many fifth-generation fighter technologies’ (as will the H-20); the aircraft will include an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and be capable of delivering precision-guided munitions.

The new bomber is not likely to enter service before 2025, nor has it been disclosed whether the aircraft will be subsonic or possess a supersonic capability. In this regard, if the regional bomber is indeed the JH-XX, a designation noted by observers in connection to a regional strike aircraft programme for a number of years, it will likely be supersonic.

The JH-XX is believed to be a relatively large, twin-engine aircraft, possibly around 100 feet long with a maximum take-off weight of 60 to 100 tons, with a combat radius potentially around 1,500 miles (estimates vary between 1,000 and 2,000 miles).

A combat radius of 1,500 miles would, for example, be sufficient to cover Japan, the Korean peninsula, (if operating from Hainan) the South China Sea and northern halves of Sumatra and Borneo plus the entirety of the Philippines, and from western or southern China, much of India and the Bay of Bengal.

If forward deployed to the airfield on Panganiban Reef in the South China Sea, the regional bomber could threaten, with stand-off weaponry, targets in northern Australia. The JH-XX has been compared in concept to the FB-22 regional bomber project.

The approximate coverage of the JH-XX’s 1500 nm combat radius operating from China.

The armament of the regional bomber is likely to include a variety of precision-guided munitions, stand-off weapons (potentially including air-launched cruise missiles such as the CJ-10), and anti-ship missiles.

In terms of the aforementioned long-range air-to-air missile capability, this could include the ramjet-powered PL-XX, a 400 km-range weapon featuring mid-course off-board targeting support and active radar and infra-red terminal guidance, and intended to target large platforms such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft.

The integration of a significant electronic warfare capability may be likely, given that the H-20 strategic bomber is described as ‘able to disturb and destroy incoming missiles and other air and ground targets through a range of equipment including radar, electronic confrontation platform, high power microwave, laser and infrared equipment’. Likewise, as with the H-20, the regional bomber may be ‘capable of large-capacity data fusion and transmission.

It can serve as a C4ISR node and interact with large sensor platforms like UAV, early warning aircraft and strategic reconnaissance aircraft to share information and target data’. In this respect, the long-range air-to-air capability of the regional bomber may be particularly significant.

That is, the aircraft could be employed as an extended-range interceptor utilising targeting support from unmanned air vehicles such as the Divine Eagle counter-stealth airborne early warning system. This would, assuming a 1,500-mile combat radius for the regional bomber, together with the 250-mile range of the PL-XX, enable the PLAAF to target high-value assets such as ISR aircraft and strategic bombers deep within ostensibly friendly airspace.

Implications

The development of the regional bomber, alongside the H-20 strategic bomber, reflects China’s ambition to develop world-class armed forces. The pursuit of two stealth bomber programmes alongside two known fifth-generation fighter projects – the J-20 and follow-on variants and the J-31, unmanned air systems, and hypersonic technologies provide a clear statement of intent concerning the level of air power Beijing is seeking. In this context, the regional bomber project is noteworthy.

Although the US and Russia are working on strategic stealth bombers, the B-21 Raider and PAK DA (‘Prospective Aviation Complex for Long Range Aviation’) respectively, neither are known to be developing a manned sub-strategic bomber (Russia had previously sought to develop a stealthy medium-range bomber, the Sukhoi T-60S, to replace the Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire).

The regional bomber, given its combination of stealth, precision-guided munitions and long-range air-to-air missiles, AESA radar, and other advanced systems, will provide the PLAAF with a potent ‘day one’ (the ability to conduct operations at the start of a conflict, against an adversary’s strategic targets defended by a still-intact integrated air defence system) capability.

The new aircraft will constitute a significant defensive challenge, in particular with regard to the find, fix, track, target, engage and assess (F2T2EA) process. Moreover, the potential for the regional bomber to be employed in a deep, offensive counter-air role would likely necessitate the diversion of allied fifth-generation aircraft from offensive operations to defend high-value assets.

Also, is the development of the regional bomber intended to enable the PLAAF to focus its eventual H-20 force on strategic air operations, in particular, vis-à-vis US forces in the Pacific and potentially the continental US? Similarly, the H-20 is believed to be intended to have a nuclear role; will the regional bomber also be dual-capable?

It also warrants asking whether an intermediate-range stealth aircraft offering precision-strike and long-range air-to-air capabilities should be considered by, for example, the US, UK, Australia and Japan?

Would such an aircraft offer a sufficient level of capability, in particular against high-end anti-access/area denial and advanced air threats, to justify what would likely require considerable investment?

The trajectory of Chinese air power development in the coming decades, the options it confers on policy-makers in Beijing, and the implications are likely to prompt too many more questions regarding the direction of Western air power.

Dr James Bosbotinis is a UK-based specialist in defence and international affairs, and Co-CEO of JB Associates, a geopolitical risk advisory. Dr Bosbotinis has written widely on   British defence issues, Russian strategy and military modernisation, China’s evolving strategy, and regional security in Europe, the Former Soviet Union and Asia-Pacific.

This article was first published by The Williams Foundation’s Central Blue on March 17, 2019.

See our Williams Foundation corner on defense.info:

https://defense.info/category/williams-foundation/

 

Meeting the Challenge of Managing the Second Nuclear Age

by Paul Bracken

The failed “denuclearization” summit held in Hanoi between the United States and North Korea took place just as a border flare up played out between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India. So it’s easy to warn in vivid — and realistic — ways about the danger of nuclear war.

It’s easier still to call for an end to the madness of nuclear weapons. This point of view has its merits. It shows that one’s heart is in the right place. But let’s not overlook how recent efforts to abolish the bomb have hit a complete dead end, as North Korea, Pakistan and India demonstrate.

Doubling down on calls to get rid of the bomb is just as likely to go nowhere as it has with these and other countries. It makes us feel good, but it distracts us from more serious efforts to get through this second nuclear age in one piece.

After the Cold War, the overwhelming policy emphasis in the United States and Europe was on arms control and nuclear nonproliferation. Nonproliferation especially had wide backing. It had more support than any other policy, whether economic, educational or environmental.

In those fields, there were disagreements over goals and the ways to reach them. But there was no such squabbling when it came to nonproliferation and reducing the role of nuclear weapons in American defense.  Hawk, dove, Republican, Democrat, liberal, conservative — it didn’t matter. All were on board to oppose nuclear arms.

U.S. nuclear weapons were cut by two-thirds after the Cold War. In the late 2000s, the abolition of all nuclear weapons seemed to be coming. President Barack Obama advanced such a plan in a 2009 speech in Prague.

The foreign policy establishment backed it: Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, Sam Nunn and William Perry all supported “global zero” — the elimination or very sharp reduction of nuclear weapons for all countries, including the United States.

Academics, think tanks and intellectuals quickly jumped onto the bandwagon. For a time, it really looked like there was going to be an antinuclear turn in U.S. strategy.

I disagree with those who argue that the effort to get rid of the bomb was never serious. There’s a long history of such disarmament proposals, true enough.

At the dawn of the nuclear age, the 1948 Baruch Plan to put all nuclear weapons under U.N. control was never considered anything but a propaganda stunt by Washington. It was a way to make the Soviet Union look bad because we knew they would reject it.

Likewise, Ronald Reagan’s awakening to the horrors of nuclear war wasn’t really a practical plan. It was quickly derailed by the Pentagon.

The abolition movement of the 2000s was different. Largely because banning nuclear weapons, or sharply reducing their role, locked in U.S. conventional advantages. In the 2000s, the U.S. technological edge still looked certain.

So nuclear abolition — seen from Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang — looked like a way to make the world safe for U.S. conventional strong-arm tactics. No one else had the global, lethal military reach of the United States. So getting rid of the bomb made sense, at least to many Americans.

So why did the effort to get rid of the bomb, or sharply cut back its significance hit a dead end? Because the world changed, and the United States didn’t have enough power to stop the changes. Trying to get North Korea, Pakistan, India or Israel to “denuclearize” wasn’t in the cards.

No arms control treaty was going to restore the world of 1975, when two big superpowers could run the planet on nuclear matters. It wasn’t lack of will, partisan politics or a military industrial complex that derailed nuclear abolition.

It was the international order changing in natural ways, as sovereign states could pretty much do what they wished inside their own borders.

This is the nub of the problem. It’s the real reason that a movement with wide public support, bipartisan agreement and grudging Pentagon backing, nonetheless, hit a dead end.

The 2000s, seen from Russia, China and North Korea perspective, posed a mortal danger: a technologically dominant United States that would be unrestrained by the risk of an “explosion” to massive destruction from nuclear weapons.

Others — Israel, India and Pakistan — didn’t like the anti-nuclear shift either, as they might be victims of conventional attack.

Today, the major powers — the United States, Russia and China — have strategic nuclear modernizations programs underway. U.S. policy is responding to this change. There’s a return to a nuclear emphasis, whether anyone cares to say so or not.

Nine countries now have the bomb, and a prudent bettor would likely put his or her money on this number going up, not down.

But I would bet on something else as well: Arms control will come back. Right now,the price of “arms control stock” is in the basement, true. But let’s not forget that it’s been there before. In the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and in the Reagan nuclear build-up of the 1980s, its price was even lower.

Yet arms control came back both times. And it will again. Why? Because it has to. In these earlier episodes, the dangers of the arms race itself were seen as greater than those of falling behind the enemy.

With nine nuclear weapons states today and big nuclear modernizations underway, at some point the dangers will force the big powers to understand the same thing. No one can say whether there will be a happy ending to the arms race. I can imagine a wide range of possibilities here, except one: disarmament.

Paul Bracken is a professor of management and political science at Yale University.

This article first appeared in The Hill on March 19, 2019 and is republished with permission of the author.

The featured photo shows one of the video graphics appeared to show missiles dropping on the US state of Florida during a Putin presentation on the nuclear capabilities of Russia against the United States.

The last time we had a KGB leaders in charge of Russia we faced a significant nuclear crisis management challenge.

The Spy and the Traitor: The Gordievsky Affair

 

 

Japan Enhances Perimeter Defense

03/22/2019

With the continuing threat from North Korea and the Chinese pushing out their perimeter of operations, Japan has had little choice than to enhance the capabilities of their forces and push their operational reach out to the Japanese perimeter.

According to a recent story in Japan Times published on March 16, 2919, the Japanese government is focusing on enhanced presence in its outer islands as one means of doing so,

The government is pushing ahead with plans to build new Ground Self-Defense Force bases on remote islands in the southwest in response to military threats from China.

On March 26, GSDF bases are due to be opened in the city of Amami and the town of Setouchi, both on Amami Oshima island in Kagoshima Prefecture. About 560 troops will be stationed at the bases.

Surface-to-air missile systems will be deployed at the Amami base, while land-to-sea missiles and an ammunition depot will be placed at the Setouchi base.

Another GSDF base will be opened on the same day on Miyako Island in Okinawa Prefecture. That base will initially host 380 soldiers, but will eventually expand to host some 700 to 800 troops once surface-to-air and land-to-sea missiles are deployed in fiscal 2019.

In the meantime, work to lay the groundwork for yet another GSDF base has started on Ishigaki Island in Okinawa. The city of Ishigaki includes the Senkaku Islands, which are administered by Japan but also claimed by China, which calls them Diaoyu, and Taiwan, which calls them Tiaoyutai.

The government plans to situate the base in the Hiraeomata area, around the center of Ishigaki Island, and man it with 500 to 600 troops plus a missile unit.

For the complete story, please go to the following:

https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/03/16/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-expanding-gsdfs-presence-southwestern-islands-new-bases-missile-batteries/?utm_source=Daily+News+Updates&utm_campaign=1201379944-Sunday_email_updates17_03_2019&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c5a6080d40-1201379944-332756961#.XJIDZi2ZPUI

Also, see the following story:

Japanese Defense Modernization: Shaping a Way Ahead

Lessons from the 1980s: Dealing with the Russian Challenge in the 21st Century

03/21/2019

By Robbin Laird

I am writing a three-part series to deal with some lessons learned from the 1980s which provided some insights with the current challenge of dealing with Russia.

The Cold War is over; but the Russians are back.

This is NOT the Cold War; and we do not need the same force structure or approach to deal with today’s Russians. But there are some key similarities which require looking back enough to understand where Putin is coming from.

For he unlike Presidents Macron or Trump or Prime Minister Mey was steeled in this period of conflict between the Soviet Union and the West and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.

Secretary Kerry referred to Russian actions in Crimea as from the 19th Century. Actually, its roots are much closer and much less comfortable than such a comment of disdain would imply.

Recently I read the 2018 book written by Ben Macintyre about the Gordievsky Affair or as the title calls it, “the greatest espionage story of the Cold War”.

I then re-read the book dealing with the other greatest espionage story of the Cold War, namely the Farewell Affair.

This gave me an opportunity to think about the concurrent impact of the two operations on how cooperation in the West had its impact on the Soviet Union and its leadership.

One operation was run by the British; the second was run by the French.

Clearly, the United States was a major beneficiary of both operations, and without the ability of the heads of state to work together and to establish a working relationship among competent aides this would not have happened.

In this piece, I will review the Macintyre book; in the second, the book on the Farewell Affair.

And then in a third piece I will discuss both operations and their collaborative impact as well as the importance of how Western governments worked with one another to create a significant impact on the Soviet leadership.

There are clear lessons to be learned here for the current set of Western leaders more set on conflict than cooperation, which frankly only benefits President Putin.  And that is no accident, for Vladimir Putin was a key student of geopolitics during the 1980s when the two spy stories played out.

Clearly, President Reagan came to power with a  focus on challenging the Soviet leadership and end the kind of détente which had preceded him.

But without British and French cooperation and contributions through standing tall in the Euromissiles crisis, which was very visible, and through the inflow of information from inside the Soviet Union from the two separate espionage operations this would not have happened, certainly the way they did.

The book starts by reminding us that although this about the history of the 1980s, in some ways it is not simply that.

“There is no such thing as a former KGB man,” the former KGB officer Vladimir Putin once said. 1

Gordievsky came from a KGB family with his father having served faithfully through the hard days of the 1930s, and his older brother as well.  He started by being a paper pusher in the agency but was finally able to serve in the West in terms of running agents in the West.

While in Denmark, Gordievsky observed the rise and fall of the Czech reform movement, viewing the movement favorably but very disappointed in the Russian crushing of the rebellion.

What he did not know from his post in Copenhagen was that his brother was playing a role in crushing the Czech “Spring.”

“The older Gordievsky brother was at the forefront of KGB efforts to defame and destroy the Prague Spring; like his father, he never questioned the rectitude of what he was doing.”2

The crushing of the Czech reform movement and the end of the Czech spring was a turning point for the younger brother.

“Oleg Gordievsky was appalled and disgusted. As angry Danish protestors gathered outside the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen to denounce the invasion, he felt a deep shame. Witnessing the building of the Berlin Wall had been shocking enough, but the invasion of Czechoslovakia offered even more blatant proof of the true nature of the regime he served. Alienation from the Communist system turned, very swiftly, to loathing: “This brutal attack on innocent people made me hate it with a burning, passionate hatred.”3

Gordievsky then returned to the Soviet Union only to return to Copenhagen in 1972.  In the meantime, British intelligence had learned from the Danes that in their view Gordievsky could be turned.

“In his new role as a political-intelligence officer, Gordievsky would no longer be running illegals, but actively gathering secret intelligence and trying to subvert Western institutions. In practice this meant seeking out, cultivating, recruiting, and then controlling spies, contacts, and informants.

“These might be Danish government officials, elected politicians, trades unionists, diplomats, businessmen, journalists, or anyone else with privileged access to information of interest to the Soviet Union. They might even, ideally, work in Danish intelligence.” 4

This meant as well that his new job would allow him an opportunity to switch sides if he was so inclined and that what was to happen.

A key role for the KGB in the West was as well was the generation of their own version of the news and seeking out friendlies in the West who would spread their version of the news.  The means today are a bit different but the strategic goal is the same.

“The KGB had long excelled in the dark art of manufacturing “fake news.” Under KGB taxonomy, foreign contacts were classified in order of importance: at the top was an “agent,”5

After a several months courtship, MI6 had recruited Gordievsky and agent “sunbeam” was now operational.

By 1973, the moment had come for MI6 to pull a Kim Philby in reverse strategy on the KGB with Gordievsky. He would provide information which would expose spies in both Norway and Sweden working for the Soviet Union.

During this time in Denmark his marriage was coming apart and new love relationship developing. Divorce in the KGB was usually a career killer so his personal life was threatening his promotion paths within the KGB.

As he was producing significant high-grade information delivered by a camera system, MI6 was starting to focus on how they would get their spy out when discovered.  If operating in the West this would not be difficult; but if he were to return to the Soviet Union this would be virtually impossible.  This indeed what they would do a decade later which also is a remarkable aspect of his case.

An exfiltration plan was worked out in case Gordievsky returned to Moscow.

“The plan envisaged that at 7:30 p.m. every Tuesday when Gordievsky was in Moscow, a member of the MI6 station would “police” the signal site. The spot was actually visible from parts of the housing complex; an MI6 officer would head out with the excuse of buying bread or time his return from work to be passing the site at exactly the right moment.

“The exfiltration plan could be activated in only one way: Gordievsky must be standing by the bread shop at 7:30, holding a plastic bag from a Safeway supermarket. Safeway bags bore a large red S, an immediately recognizable logo that would stand out in the drab Moscow surroundings. Gordievsky had lived and worked in the West, and there would be nothing particularly remarkable about his holding such an object. Plastic bags were prized, especially foreign ones.

“As an additional recognition signal, Gordievsky should wear a gray leather cap he had recently purchased, and a pair of gray trousers. When the MI6 officer spotted Gordievsky waiting by the bread shop with the all-important Safeway bag, he or she would acknowledge the escape signal by walking past him carrying a green bag from Harrods and eating a chocolate bar, either a KitKat or a Mars bar—“a literally hand-to-mouth expedient,” as one officer remarked.

“The chocolate eater would also be wearing something gray—trousers, skirt, or a scarf—and would make brief eye contact but not stop walking. “Gray was an unobtrusive color, and therefore helpful in averting pattern accumulation by watchers. The downside being that it was all but invisible in the murk of a long Moscow winter.” 6

Sounds a bit mission impossible like and when it came to execute it there were several bumps in the road to be sure.

Then in the early 1980s, a crucial period in Soviet history, for combating Western politics and the arms buildup, the KGB needed to rebuild their capability in London.  They turned to Gordievsky to become a key part of their rebuild in the UK.  This would become a crucial moment in terms of the impact of the MI6 spy in the KGB on UK insights into the Russian leadership and would be eventually provided for the PM, Mrs. Thatcher, with a direct view inside Kremlin thinking.

This would provide especially crucial as a NATO planned nuclear exercise was to be misinterpreted as providing for an operation to execute a first strike on the Soviet Union.

It is no small statement that Gordievsky changed history by providing Thatcher and her Western allies with direct intelligence on how Andropov former head of the KGB and now the head of the Soviet Union was preparing a response to what was perceived as a coming US led first nuclear strike on the Soviet Union.

Prior to his taking up his position in the UK, Gordievsky went through the files in Moscow about the UK and discovered a great deal about the “friendlies” who were supportive of the Soviet Union.  One file particularly stood out.

“But there was one dossier that stood out from all the others. The cardboard box contained two folders, one three hundred pages thick, the other perhaps half that size, bound with old string and sealed with plasticine. The file was labeled BOOT. On the cover the word “agent” had been crossed out, and “confidential contact” inserted.

“In December 1981, Gordievsky broke the seal and opened the file for the first time. On the first page appeared a formal introductory note: “I, senior operational officer Major Petrov, Ivan Alexeyevich, herewith open a file on the agent Michael Foot, citizen of the UK, giving him the pseudonym Boot.” Agent BOOT was the Right Honorable Michael Foot, distinguished writer and orator, veteran left-wing MP, leader of the Labour Party, and the politician who, if Labour won the next election, would become prime minister of Britain. The Leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition had been a paid KGB agent.”7

The Foot relationship was described by Gordievsky as follows:

“Gordievsky recalled: “Foot freely disclosed information about the Labour movement to them. He told them which politicians and trade union leaders were pro-Soviet, even suggesting which union bosses should be given the present of Soviet-funded holidays on the Black Sea. A leading supporter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Foot also passed on what he knew about debates over nuclear weapons.

“In return, the KGB gave him drafts of articles encouraging British disarmament, which he could then edit and publish, unattributed to their real source, in Tribune. There was no protest by Foot to the KGB over the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, and he quite often visited the Soviet Union to a top-level welcome.”8

The author provided a rather full analysis of the Foot case and highlighted it with this comment:

“Lenin is often credited with coining the term “useful idiot,” poleznyi durak in Russian, meaning one who can be used to spread propaganda without being aware of it or subscribing to the goals intended by the manipulator. Michael Foot had been useful to the KGB, and completely idiotic.”9

On June 28, 1982, Gordievsky landed in London from Moscow beginning a new phase of his career. He arrived with his new wife and his daughters to a new phase of his life, one in which his daughters would become Anglicized and where they still live to this day.

While the UK was working a key MI6 agent within the KGB, the US was undercutting the effort inadvertently by the actions of Aldrich Ames who eventually would provide the KGB with the names of many Western agents working inside the Soviet system.  He received money in effect for executing the West’s top agents in the Soviet Union. He would eventually finger Gordievsky so what the book describes is the ticking time bomb of Ames up against what Gordievsky was doing for the UK and the West.

It should be noted that MI6 decided not to disclose the Foot relationship with the KGB to Mrs. Thatcher as she would end up running against him in the general election.  They did however set up a working relationship between what they were learning and presenting that in packages presented directly to her.

The most important package of information involved the launching of Operation Ryan by the Soviets.

By the end of the 1970s the West had begun to pull ahead in the nuclear arms race, and tense détente was giving way to a different sort of psychological confrontation, in which the Kremlin feared it could be destroyed and defeated by a preemptive nuclear attack. Early in 1981, the KGB carried out an analysis of the geopolitical situation, using a newly developed computer program, and concluded that “the correlation of world forces” was moving in favor of the West.

“Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was proving costly, Cuba was draining Soviet funds, the CIA was launching aggressive covert action against the USSR, and the US was undergoing a major military buildup: the Soviet Union seemed to be losing the Cold War, and, like a boxer exhausted by long years of sparring, the Kremlin feared that a single, brutal sucker punch could end the contest.10

Andropov believed the US was preparing to do just that and launched an operation to prove his “conviction.”

“Like every genuine paranoiac, Andropov set out to find the evidence to confirm his fears. Operation RYAN (an acronym for raketno-yadernoye napadeniye, Russian for “nuclear missile attack”) was the biggest peacetime Soviet intelligence operation ever launched. To his stunned KGB audience, with the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev, alongside him, Andropov announced that the US and NATO were “actively preparing for nuclear war.” The task of the KGB was to find signs that this attack might be imminent and provide early warning, so that the Soviet Union was not taken by surprise.

“By implication, if proof of an impending attack could be found, then the Soviet Union could itself launch a preemptive strike. Andropov’s experience in suppressing liberty in Soviet satellite states had convinced him that the best method of defense was attack. Fear of a first strike threatened to provoke a first strike.

“Operation RYAN was born in Andropov’s fevered imagination. It grew steadily, metastasizing into an intelligence obsession within the KGB and GRU (military intelligence), consuming thousands of man-hours and helping to ratchet up tension between the superpowers to terrifying levels.”11

This particular affair underscores the key significance of senior leadership looking for information simply confirming what they already believe to be true rather than allowing for an honest intelligence effort to sort out what is really happening with regard to one’s adversary.

I wish this was an historical comment but it is much more an ongoing challenge in the intelligence and policy worlds. Self-licking ice cream cones for the intelligence to policy worlds can be fatal to both worlds.

“In launching Operation RYAN, Andropov broke the first rule of intelligence: never ask for confirmation of something you already believe. Hitler had been certain that the D-day invasion force would land at Calais, so that is what his spies (with help from Allied double agents) told him, ensuring the success of the Normandy landings” 12

The author added this priceless comment with regard to the self-licking ice cream cone dynamic.

“In a craven and hierarchical organization, the only thing more dangerous than revealing your own ignorance is to draw attention to the stupidity of the boss.” 13

This crisis would lead the UK to decide to include the US intelligence community in its findings which would prove nearly fatal to Gordievsky because of Ames but crucial in informing the Reagan Administration of what was going on inside the mind of Andropov.

“The decision to widen the circle of distribution to include the US intelligence community marked a critical juncture in the case. MI6 did not say which part of the world the material came from, or who had supplied it. The source was carefully camouflaged and underplayed, the intelligence packaged in such a way that its origin was obscured.

“The decision was taken to pass filleted, edited material as normal CX [an intelligence report]. We had to disguise the provenance. We said it came from a middle-ranking official, not in London. We had to make it look as bland as possible.”

“But the Americans were in no doubt about the authenticity and reliability of what they were hearing: this was information of the highest grade, trustworthy and valuable. MI6 did not tell the CIA that the intelligence came from within the KGB.

“But it probably did not need to. So began one of the most important intelligence-sharing operations of the twentieth century.14

As the process gained steam, the flow of information to the President began to take shape.

“Eventually, as Gordievsky’s espionage haul grew in volume and detail, the intelligence would find its way to the highest levels of the American government, influencing policy within the Oval Office itself. But only a tiny handful of American intelligence officers ever knew that the Brits had a highly placed Soviet mole: one of these was Aldrich Ames.”15

Mrs. Thatcher was now reading material from the MI6 spy on a regular basis and she referred to him as Mr. Collins.  Meanwhile, the Soviets were on full time attack against Western governments, notably around the Euro-missile conflict.

“The KGB was working hard to try to ensure that Thatcher lost the 1983 general election. In the eyes of the Kremlin, Thatcher was “the Iron Lady”—a nickname intended as an insult by the Soviet army newspaper that coined it, but one in which she reveled—and the KGB had been organizing “active measures” to undermine her ever since she came to power in 1979, including the placing of negative articles with sympathetic left-wing journalists.

“The KGB still had contacts on the left, and Moscow clung to the illusion that it might be able to influence the election in favor of the Labour Party, whose leader, after all, was still listed in KGB files as a “confidential contact.”

In an intriguing harbinger of modern times, Moscow was prepared to use dirty tricks and hidden interference to swing a democratic election in favor of its chosen candidate.16

And into this environment, entered Able Archer which was to follow the downing of the Korean airliner by the Russians.

“Into this stew of ferocious mistrust, misunderstanding, and aggression came an event that took the Cold War to the brink of actual war. “ABLE ARCHER 83” was the code name for a NATO war game, held from November 2 to 11, 1983, intended to simulate an escalating conflict, culminating in a nuclear attack.”17

Gordievsky provided important insights into Soviet thinking about the exercise and that information was used to modify the exercise to reduce the danger of escalation.

“Margaret Thatcher was deeply worried. The combination of Soviet fears and Reaganite rhetoric might have ended in nuclear war, but America was not fully aware of a situation it had partly created. Something must be done, she ordered, “to remove the danger that, by miscalculating Western intentions, the Soviet Union would over-react.” The Foreign Office must “urgently consider how to approach the Americans on the question of possible Soviet misapprehensions about a surprise NATO attack.” MI6 agreed to “share Gordievsky’s revelations with the Americans.”

“The distribution of NOCTON material moved up another gear: MI6 specifically told the CIA that the KGB thought a war game had been a deliberate prelude to the outbreak of war. “I don’t see how they could believe that,” said Ronald Reagan, when told that the Kremlin had genuinely feared a nuclear attack during ABLE ARCHER, “but it’s something to think about.” 18

This would provide an input in Reagan’s thinking about Star Wars as well and as what we learned from the Farewell Affair. There was another reason for launching Star Wars, namely, the Russian capability to steal Western technology was being decisively reduced and the ability to compete reduced concurrently as well.

“ABLE ARCHER marked a turning point, a moment of terrifying Cold War confrontation, undetected by the Western media and public, that triggered a slow but perceptible thaw. The Reagan administration began to moderate its anti-Soviet rhetoric. Thatcher resolved to reach out to Moscow.

“She felt the time had come to move beyond the rhetoric of the ‘evil empire’ and think how the West could bring the Cold War to an end,” according to a senior adviser. Kremlin paranoia started to abate, particularly after the death of Andropov in February 1984, and though KGB officers were told to remain alert for signs of nuclear preparation, the momentum of Operation RYAN began to wane.”19

In short, the book provides key insights into a crucial historical period.  It provides as well insights into how important good working relationships between Western governments are in dealing with the Russian challenge.

It also highlights how important it is to have competent and well-structured working relationships at the policy level.

It was not just about the special relationship between Thatcher and Reagan; it was about the ability as well to have effective working relationship.

And the impact of a mole like Ames on blowing apart the networks is a useful reminder as well of the difficulties of managing a large intelligence structure such as the United States has built.

The deep state has its own problems for sure.

But I can not close before including an interesting comment made with regard to the exfiltration of Gordievsky from Moscow through Finland to Norway to the UK.

When it came to recriminations inside the Soviet system with regard to how the MI6 spy could escape the Soviet Union, a name to become famous in our period pops up.

“Everyone blamed the surveillance team, which, since it occupied the lowest rung of the pecking order, had no one else to blame. The Leningrad KGB, responsible for surveillance of the British diplomats, was held directly accountable, and many senior officers were either sacked or demoted.

“Among those affected was Vladimir Putin, a product of the Leningrad KGB who saw most of his friends, colleagues, and patrons purged as a direct consequence of Gordievsky’s escape.”20

This is yet another reminder of Putin’s roots in the 1980s conflicts between the West and the Soviet Union and the learning curve which he has gone through, something which leaders like Mey, Trump, and Macron have not.

Currently, there are only two key leaders with this experience and which each speak the other’s language: Chancellor Merkel and President Putin.

It really never is only history.

The featured photo shows Oleg Gordievsky (right) with U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

 

Aussies Work Supply Chain Digitalization on the F-35

03/19/2019

According to a press release from BAE Systems Australia, the company is working with the Commonwealth of Australia to work supply chain innovations with regard to the F-35.

Given Australia’s role in regional support for the aircraft, this is an especially important effort.

BAE Systems Australia and the Advanced Manufacturing Growth Centre (AMGC) will bring Industry 4.0 to reality through participation in the world’s biggest defence program, the Joint Strike Fighter.

The $750,000 project will develop a new approach to supply chain digitisation that avoids having to use expensive, proprietary software which is currently one of the major barriers to Australian SME manufacturers participating in global supply chains.

Digitisation allows for project partners to see plans in real time, identify and resolve issues faster, improve risk management and optimise production.

Australia received its first two F-35 aircraft in December last year in what is the largest air force acquisition in Australia’s history.

BAE Systems supplies 300 titanium components per month from its advanced manufacturing facility at Edinburgh Parks in South Australia for each F-35 vertical tail. The Company will work with its existing Joint Strike Fighter supply chain partners Axiom Precision Manufacturing and RUAG on this project, together with Advanced Focus and Flinders University.

The Defence aerospace industry was selected because of the stringent security and traceability requirements both in Australia and allied nations.

BAE Systems Australia’s Aerospace and Integrated Systems Director Steve Drury said: “This is so much more than replacing paper processes with digital technology.

“If we get this right and develop a freely available, open standard to digitise supply chains, the long-term benefits of this project to the broader Australian industry could be significant.”

This project is part of a series of BAE Systems Industry 4.0 activities that the company is running on its own or in collaboration with industry and universities. Success could also see the adoption of digitisation on other major defence projects including the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) and the Hunter Class Frigate Program.

AMGC, which is part of a Commonwealth backed initiative, expects its co-funding of this project to allow other SMEs interested in participating in future defence projects to have access to the trial results and business tools developed as a result of the work.

AMGC Managing Director Dr Jens Goennemann, said: “The development of best practice between a leading defence industry prime and Australian SMEs is another example of how everyone can win from collaboration. This will be essential if Australia’s manufacturing sector and economy is to successfully transform as the global market accelerates toward the adoption of Industry 4.0.”

The featured photo shows a pair of Royal Australian Air Force F-35A Joint Strike Fighters over Nelson Bay, NSW.

January 21, 2018.

Australian Department of Defence.