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President Putin has just given all in America a wakeup call, butto the Russian Military everlasting regret if combat ever breaks outthe US Navy is always ready-NOW.
Over fifty years ago, 1965, in Bancroft Hall at the United States Naval Academy, Plebes (freshmen) were required when making a very loud announcement to a gathering of fellow Midshipman to begin with the alert-“attention world, attention world.”
It was a time at Annapoliswhen some of those who had fought WWII in the great “Big Blue Blanket” war winning con-ops were still in uniform, several of the Navy Pilots who were featured in the great work “the Bridges of Toko-Ri” were still in uniform, and Vietnam Yankee and Dixie station Carriers were beginning to fight that war.
From Plebe to Four Star Admirals, all in the United States Navy and Marine Corps were constantly engaged and challenged in understanding and mastering the dynamic nature of war at sea and the role of Navy/Marine power projection from across the beach.
In those days sailors still in uniform wearing the Dolphins of the “silent service,” the Navy Submarine Community, would proudly point out that with the loss of 52 subs “still on patrol” that their community sunk over 50% of the tonnage of the Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII.
All Navy commanders have to practice over and over to evolve a much broader scope of understanding and direction in this 21st Century information world.
It is a 21st Century challenge to understand the dynamic learning from a computer-human interface while also recognizing it is the goal of a reactive enemy to attempt to destroy not only individual platforms, sink ships and subs and shoot down aircraft, but wreck the very synapses of all things command and control.
Information assurance with redundancy and reliability is critical but also the ability to act independently as systems are degraded to fight and win cannot be forgotten in all training exercises.
The enemy always gets a vote but so does the United States Navy.
The decade ahead is not a repeat of the past 15 years; it is not about a continuation of the land-centric and counter-insurgency slow motion war.
ASW platforms which can operate in an interconnected manner are the crucial ones to build, deploy and sustain in the period ahead, versus those which are very limited in their capability to provide synergy to joint or coalition forces in the battle space.
This means as well that force packages need to be examined, less in and of themselves terms, than in terms of their synergy and capabilities in shaping dominant combat power in the interconnected battle space.
In a lasting reminder to anyone who threatens America from the sea there is a monument at the sea wall at theUS Naval Academy, of those “Still on Patrol,” the names of lost Submarines from a fading war that are ever within the ethos of the fighting courage of sailors in today’s Silent Service.
Courage does run deep.
Bluntly put, an overemphasis on sensing of hypersonic missiles from space really misses the point — it is not about being alert to what is about to kill you — it is about killing the archer and the arrow.
And we have in our hands the means to do so as we knit together key platforms which are delivering the S cubed revolution.
The future is now and working enhanced integrative capabilities moving forward with the new platforms and the relevant legacy ones is a core priority; not preparing for a new space world in 2035.
This is the tenth and final piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning with regard to threatening the US with sub strikes using high speed hypersonic missiles.
The featured photo shows Russian President Vladimir Putin arrives to deliver his annual state of the nation address in Moscow on February 20, 2019.
My initial 2011 paper “winning Air/Sea Battle” only looked at F-35 as early warning platform 1
Essentially, I focused in that paper on the F-35s as providing a “heads up” to fleet surface ships about “incoming” missiles threats but in the non-stealth mode the F-35 can carry more ordinance than F/A-18 or F-16.
So instead of just a “heads-up” to the NORTHCOM/NORAD Commander or an Admiral commanding aCarrier Strike Group to make ready American shore defenses or a fleet for close in defensive measures, why can’t an F-35 carry anti-HSCM designed ordinance to kill HSCMs in flight?
Design a missile that can link to the fusion cockpit for an immediate fire control solution and launch a missile with an appropriate warhead to take down an incoming HSCM.
In an email exchange with Dr. Lewis, he raised a significant challenge which needs to be addressed in R and D and the shaping of effective con-ops.
“The biggest threat I see is actually a swarm attack of high-speed incoming, that might overwhelm any solution. The Chinese have been rather open about this tactic.”
“It is very fair to say it is truly a wicked problem, but he also adds; “the good news is there are indeed solutions that will stop them.”
“The one point in favor of the HSCM intercept to a kill shot is the need to just get in front of the missile with something that abruptly and directly disrupts its forward motion.
“The key to defeating it is to make it beat itself to death– the old joke about you only have to be close in horseshoes and hand grenades applies.”
Again quoting Dr. Mark Lewis from that email exchange:
“One method of stopping them simple kinetic will be effective, with the challenge that a high-speed maneuvering missile will be rather hard to catch with dumb ordnance.
“And with a rapid closing speed, the window for that kill chain is of course small.
“There are other very promising options as well.
“Stability and control of a hypersonic craft is a key element. The DARPA HTV-2 failed twice due to control losses, something that the Air Force warned DARPA about ahead of time.
“In the case of HTV-2 flight 1, the loss occurred due to yaw-roll coupling; essentially, the vehicle developed a small asymmetry, began to yaw, and corrective control action caused it to roll out of limit.
“That was a case of bad design, but also an example of how easy it is to mess with these craft.
“HTV-2’s second flight was lost because an important protection system failed again making it uncontrollable.
“I can’t help drawing an analogy to the old German V-1’s, that could be disabled by flying alongside in a fighter and hitting their wing tips. The resulting roll made them unstable!
“The third flight of X-51, where a fin broke off the cruise vehicle during solid rocket boost, and when it separated from the solid motor (at Mach 4.8) it almost immediately lost control. So when you are flying at hypersonic (or even supersonic speeds) and take even minor damage, survival is unlikely.
“Coincidentally, and as a funny historical quirk, there is a pretty long list of hypersonic programs that have been lost due to fin failures completely unrelated to the hypersonic portion of the flight: X-43 first flight, the Australian HyShot first flight, and now most recently, AHW’s second flight.
“That last one is especially painful; the booster lost a fin a few inches above the launch pad due to an entangled thermal blanket.
A hypersonic missile must travel between Mach 5 and Mach 10, or 3,840–7,680 miles per hour in order to be considered hypersonic.
One should think a mile a second.
By comparison, a current missile AA missile, the AIM-120 has the characteristics seen in the graphic to the left (credit Wiki).
Thus, there is a speed differential of between 1 and 6 Mach and also the HSCMs are also in flight, the intercept missiles are at a standing start.
The first look at intercepting a HSCM inbound against the fleet is one of the first verbal math problem we all had in Algebra 1-“A train leaves a station going 50 mph… Another train leaves it’s station going 80 mph.. etc etc.”
The logic of that example is that both HSCM and intercept missile are on the “same track” and a parallel track for a perfect “face-shot.”
However, the crossing angle to intercept may be much more significant, say for example an F-35 flying on a heading of 090 and the pilot’s cockpit’s fusion display picks up a HSCM coming at the Fleet heading 180 and the closes point of approach for the physical passing of the F-35 on station and HSCM for intercept is offset by say 30 miles and at a different altitude.
The F-35 sensor shooter for an example could be 90 degrees off the nose for an intercept vector and also off set by some miles and altitude from the physical closes point of approach, this is a very hard shot.
The F-35 at best can try to point and shoot with the missile arming and independently maneuvering but having been initially launched many degrees off the aircraft’s initial route of flight.
The challenge is that at some point in space and time, the kill missile must get in front of the HSCM.
It is not necessary to hit a bullet with a bullet.
With the current significant Mach differential shown above a conventional missile cannot run down a HSCM.
With focused R&D perhaps a future hypersonic-interceptor missile is possible but in this example I am using the current art of the possible and assuming a +6 Mach advantage given to the HSCM and it is already in flight while interceptor missile is on the rail at the start.
Therefore, detection and reaction time for launch and missile light-off the intercept angle for the missile altitude differential make time and distance of flight against HSCM everything.
At around 88 miles per minute incoming, depending on altitude it is a very hard problem.
The first issue is simply just getting a missile off an F-35 in the time of calculation for sensing something approaching at a high rate of speed.
Using the CNO’s formula heat=sensing, an F-35 can see something moving very fast at a distance.
How far away is one key BUT not a showstopper.
Because if the F-35 can sense at a whatever distance it is reacting electronically at the speed of light and there is the possibility of doing something about it.
Slaving an immediate launch fire-control solution from the F-35 fusion cockpit sensed HSCM route of flight vector to an interceptor missile loaded on the aircraft hardpoints is one way.
But just as significant the F-35 sensor can off load the kill shot to another F-35 with a better chance.
To have any chance of success the launching F-35 has to have a certain head on aspect – if the HSCM is beyond the wing-line the engagement is lost at first detection.
The kill-shot game for that one F-35 in launching a counter-missile is already be over.
But now think of a 21st Century “chainsaw” as a solution set and a way ahead.
The USN strike commander is currently using F/A-18s to refuel F/A-18s. Since stealth in not an issue against an HSCM swarming missile attack, a mix of F-35s with F/A-18 tanking assets can put as many F-35s on a combat air patrol station as far away from the surface fleet as possible for early detection. That effort can then feed-back for defense in depth combat engagements.
Against even a Mach 10 threat the F-35 data linked information dominance sensor can off load at the speed of light the incoming track of swarming inbound HSCM threats to other F-35s standing CAP right over the Fleet.
Additionally, all USN combat platforms can also light up; AEGIS ships, Growlers, E-2 Hawkeyes and other close in defensive combat weapon systems.
Additionally, the Ford CVN-78 has been specifically designed with an area on the flight deck to configure the air wing aircraft quickly and efficiently with the appropriate ordinance for the appropriate mission.
In alternating between offensive strikes, using active or passive stealth with weapons in a weapons bay or non-stealth with a significant weapons load, the combat ordinance on an F-35 can be configured quickly.
As the combat situation dictates the defensive requirements of loading anti-HSCM missiles as stated above can also be done quickly. USN ship design teams working on the CVN-78 figured this all out; switching ordinance and/or reloading.
It is no small issue; the Japanese carriers were sunk at the battle of Midway because they were caught in an arming, de-arming, arming cycle. From that moment forward they were going to lose the war.
The challenge for the R&D community is to immediately give a lot of thought and research on what type of ordinance, missiles and warheads are best to defeat a HSCM.
The challenge for strategic planning is to consider a return “back to the future” and establishing an East Coast Air Defense string of bases for the F-35A/B/C.
F-35 wide area sensing targeting and mapping capability against, air -breathing HSCM, enemy aircraft andsurface ships is beyond excellent.
They can fulfill the target acquisition requirementof a Payload Utility function.
“The difference between a good and great officer is about ten seconds”. Admiral Burke.
The US Navy now has many great officers moving in the air at sea and under the ocean surface at light speed sensingacting and if necessary killing.
If F-35s are stationed to stand air defense alert in a21st Century “Cold War basing” con-opsfrom Otis ANG Base to NAS Pax River, (or Quantico air field)Langley field, NAS Oceana, MCAS Beaufortand NAS Key West (Bocha Chica) then appropriately networked to other “kill shot” platforms both at sea and Army ADA we might survive an attempted first strike.
If Putin and the Russian military saw this type of preparedness they might always hesitate.
Even if a Russian cruise missile sub gets off a shot it is dead dead dead because the F-35, P-8 and Triton will know exactly where it is on launch and can deliver an effective payload for its defeat and provide other options as well.
This is the ninth piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning with regard to threatening the US with sub strikes using high speed hypersonic missiles.
The enhanced capability of the US and allied navies is coming not just from platforms but from kill web integration.
There is no greater case in point than how the US Navy and the allies are integrating their Aegis destroyers.
Earlier, this year, the Australian Navy demonstrated its ability to integrate with the US Navy with regard to the CEC system.
According to Andrew McLaughlin in an article published on January 7, 2019:
The tests were conducted in conjunction with the US Navy at the vast Pacific test ranges near Hawaii and off the coast of California, and saw the vessel’s systems and crew challenged in realistic tests and demonstrations. This included testing the vessel’s ability to integrate with US Navy assets via the Co-Operative Engagement Capability (CEC), a US high-end naval networking capability so far made only available to Australia.
“We were presented with some of the world’s toughest and most challenging threats; modern anti-ship missiles, maritime strike aircraft, fighters and high-speed attack craft,” Commanding Officer of HMAS Hobart, CAPT John Stavridis told Navy Today. “On every occasion we successfully defended all threats.”
Part of HMAS Hobart’s systems validation included a series of at sea tests known as Combat System Ship Qualification Trials (CSSQT) which aim to achieve a sustainable level of combat and weapon system readiness.
“This ship represents the future of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface combatants: capable, competent and lethal,” Fleet Commander, RADM Jonathan Mead said upon HMAS Hobart’s return to Sydney. “With her recently commissioned sister ship, HMAS Brisbane, and soon to be delivered NUSHIP Sydney they will be able to defend our Fleet against any threat.”
As part of the increasingly integrated maritime threesome — the US, Australian and Japanese Navies — the Japanese recently added a new platform to the mix.
Japan’s second Asahi-class destroyer, the JS Shiranui, entered Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) service in a ceremony at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Nagasaki Shipyard on February 27.
The lead ship in the class was commissioned a year before, on March 8, 2018.
The 5,100-ton general-purpose escort destroyers were previously designated as 25DD and are designed on the basis of Akizuki-class destroyers but with a focus on anti-submarine instead of anti-air warfare.
JS Shiranui (DD-120) was launched in October 2017 and was commissioned without delays.
Asahi-class destroyers are lauded as fuel-efficient ships featuring COGLAG, a combined gas turbine engine and electric propulsion system. They measure 151 meters in length and reach speeds of 30 knots, according to the Japan defense ministry. Armament includes Mark 41 vertical launch systems for self protection, 62-caliber naval guns, close-in weapon systems and two Mark 32 surface vessel torpedo tubes.
The destroyers will have a complement of around 230 and embark one Mitsubishi-built SH-60J/K are anti-submarine patrol helicopter.
Asahi-class destroyers are the first JMSDF ships to deploy with periscope detection radars in addition to being equipped with new towed array sonars.
Earlier, when the first of the new destroyers was launched from its shipyard last year, the integration piece was highlighted.
Japan launches first 27DDG-class AEGIS destroyer from a shipyard in Yokohama today (July 31). She has named “Maya” after mountain in Japan and WWII heavy cruiser.
The US$1.5 billion vessel is the seventh Aegis destroyer acquired by Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, but the first to be fitted with the advanced Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system. With a displacement of 8,200 tons and a length of 170 meters, it is scheduled to enter service by 2020.
Supplied by the US, the CEC system enables real-time sharing of intelligence on battlefield situations and hostile targets between ships in allied navies, while information and parameters are synced across all platforms linked to a sensory network. Sharing of radar and fire-controlling data will also be possible with the US Navy.
Warships equipped with this system can intercept incoming ballistic missiles in steep, lofted trajectories, and track dozens of targets simultaneously while firing clusters of defensive missiles, according to Japan Times. One such missile is the SM-3 Block IIA.
Japan will have eight Aegis destroyers with a ballistic missile defense capability by 2021. At their core will be a computer-based command-and-decision element capable of mounting simultaneous operations against a range of threats.
Because all three of these navies are part of the F-35 global enterprise as well, integration of F-35s with Aegis is part of the combat capability facing adversaries in the Pacific.
We first wrote about such integration nearly a decade ago.
ESQUIMALT, British Columbia – The namesake of the U.S. Navy’s newest class of guided-missile destroyer USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), arrived in Esquimalt, British Columbia, March 11.
“We are excited for this opportunity to visit Canada and further strengthen the close partnership between our navies and communities,” said Capt. Andrew Carlson, Zumwalt’s commanding officer. “By working together with partners like the Royal Canadian Navy, we help ensure the security, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region.”
The visit marks an opportunity for the crew to experience the hospitality of the Canadian port, as well as showcase the U.S. Navy’s newest class of destroyers.
“USS Zumwalt possesses stealth, size, power and computing capacity that provide the Navy multiple-mission ships capable of meeting today’s maritime missions as well as the ability to incorporate new technologies to counter emerging threats tomorrow,” Carlson said.
During the scheduled port visit, Zumwalt is slated to host Canadian Forces, Marine Forces Pacific Commander, Rear. Adm. Bob Auchterlonie, and U.S. Consul General in Vancouver Katherine S. Dhanani.
The Zumwalt-class destroyer is capable of performing the critical maritime missions of deterrence and power projection and creating battlespace complexity for adversaries with its abilities to operate both near to shore and in the open sea.
Zumwalt is 100 feet longer and 13 feet wider than the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer at 610 feet long, providing the space required to execute a wider array of surface, undersea, and aviation missions.
Zumwalt is under operational control of U.S. 3rd Fleet. Third Fleet leads naval forces in the Pacific and provides the realistic, relevant training necessary for an effective global Navy. Third Fleet coordinates with U.S. 7th Fleet to plan and execute missions based on their complementary strengths to promote ongoing peace, security, and stability throughout the entire Pacific theater of operations.
And in an article published in USNI News by Sam LaGrone on March 8, 2019, the time in San Diego for the new ship was discussed.
Since arriving in San Diego in 2016, the first-in-class Zumwalt has been in an intensive process of installing and activating the destroyer’s combat systems as part of a post-delivery yard period led by contractor Raytheon which is set to be completed later this year.
“We continue to focus hard on delivering this first in class destroyer with advanced capabilities to the fleet, said Capt. Danny Hernandez, a Navy acquisition spokesman said in a Saturday statement to USNI News.
“This underway is another positive step towards testing as we get closer to the ship’s final delivery, later this year.”
In January, the Zumwalt-class program manager briefed reporters that the testing for the combat system activation and post-delivery trials would occur at the same time.
A game changer in weapon effectiveness and a way ahead to deal with a most “wicked problem” facing the US Navy today is how to effectively counter Putin’s threat of using HSCMs, notably aboard submarines.
My preliminaryanalysis on how to engage with evolving HSCM and to develop counter measures originates from a comment made by theprevious CNO Admiral Greenert.
Admiral Greenert graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1975 with a Bachelor of Science degree in ocean engineering and completed studies in nuclear power for service as a submarine officer 2
As a very smart Navy Captain noted in discussing con-ops-“we have no problem using the word attack we are Naval Officers.”
Consequently just like the famous Carrier Pilot mantra “kill the archer not the arrows” in the Navy Air Fight against strike bombers — Sinking the sub at all costs is critical.
But if that isn’t achieved then the Navy then fighting HSCMs in flight is everything.
Thankfully the Navy now has now declared the F-35C carrier version operational. The best way I could hope for in looking atthe problem of destroying aHSCM in flight was to identify the coming global “S-Cubed” revolution of Sensors, Stealth and Speed.
“You know that stealth may be over-rated,” Admiral Greenert, the Chief of Naval Operations, noted during a speech at the Office of Naval Research Naval Future Force Science and Technology Expo, Washington D.C. (2015)
“I don’t want to necessarily say that it’s over but let’s face it, if something moves fast through the air and disrupts molecules in the air and puts out heat – I don’t care how cool the engine can be – it’s going to be detectable.”
The CNO was exactly right.
Admiral Jonathan Greenert, a nuclear trained Navy submarine officer, and General Mike Hostage the recently retired Commander of the USAF Air Combat Command and an F-22 pilot are in agreement on the dynamic nature of “stealth.”
From General Hostage’s last interview before retirement and one which he did with us:
People focus on stealth as the determining factor or delineator of the fifth generation. It isn’t; it’s fusion.
Fusion is what makes that platform so fundamentally different than anything else.
And that’s why if anybody tries to tell you hey, I got a 4.5 airplane, a 4.8 airplane, don’t believe them.
All that they’re talking about is RCS (Radar Cross Section).
Fusion is the fundamental delineator. And you’re not going to put fusion into a fourth gen airplane because their avionic suites are not set up to be a fused platform.
Just like in Admiral Greenert’s initial warfighting community, the U.S. Navy’s submarines “silent service,” airpower commanders have the same type of relative technology dynamic against a reactive enemy but in a different medium.
Both communities have to be ready to fight in a very dangerous three-dimensional maneuvering environment where active and passive sensing and weapons and countermeasures to those weapons mean the difference between life and death.
In our discussions with Dr. Mark Lewis, former Chief Scientist of the USAF and currently head of the Institute for Defense Analysis Science and Technology Policy Institute, we focused on the threat posed by the hypersonic cruise missile.
We interviewed Dr. Lewis, a leading expert on hypersonics,in the context of rolling out an F-35 fleet with the rapidly approaching Hyper-Sonic Cruise Missile (HSCM) as a new weapon of war.4
HSCMs are part of what one might call an S Cubed formula for thinking about military critical technologies for 21st-century targeted R&D.
S-cubed=sensors-stealth-speed of weapons can provide a new paradigm for shaping a combat force necessary for the US Military to fight and win in 21st century engagements.
Stealth or no stealth the F-35 fits perfectly into the S3 revolution in modern war.
No matter which path is taken, the F-35 as a single platform with all three attributes combined or as a non-stealth sensor platform, employing speed of weapons carried organically or trading off with other platforms at the speed of light by giving incoming target vectors to their weapons.
Airframe design characteristics are all blended together in tradeoffs and have been focused on constantly improving, payload (improved by systems/and weapons carried), maneuverability (measured by P Sub s), speed, and range (modified by VSTOL–a basing mobility plus factor).
Stealth was a clean sheet design for F-22 and F-35 and is embedded in the total airframe and it is a very sensitive multiplicative factor; one does not add stealth.
Additionally like all modern fighters stealth aircraft are also designed with inherent other survivability factors, such as system redundancy and hardening.
Stealth is simply a survivability term that impacts the entire airframe and will eventually decline as better sensors are developed.
This is also why passive sensing is also a real revolution. Passive sensing can attenuate the problem of generating active “signals in space” which often can give away a platform’s position either maneuvering or an absolute fixed location for a counter- attack.
Stealth dynamically over time will become more vulnerable as enemies sensors improve.
How long and against what enemy, and where in world will the ant-stealth sensors and successful weapons be employed is unknown, but it will occur.
Modern air combat, just like submarine warfare is essentially an evolving contest of “blind man’s bluff.”
Even if and when stealth survivability deteriorates–ENTER the F-35 fusion cockpit with passive sensing and a significant payload of hard points.
External weapon hard-points on the F-35 are a brilliant design aspect, which is often overlooked in most discussions.
The non-stealth F-35 can sling more ordinance than F/A-18 and F-16.
So even in a non-stealth world, advantage goes to F-35, with its 360 active and passive horizontally linked cockpit decision-making ability.
As the former CNO says “payloads over performance.”
An F-35 as a non-stealth fleet still has a 360-degree sensor platform with “reach not range” as a fundamental fleet enabler.
It is an information dominance fusion platform that can be favorably compared to the equivalent of being a 21st Century version of USN Destroyers standing very dangerous and heroic radar picket duty protecting the amphibious invasion force and Carrier Fleet against kamikazes off Okinawa.
As the former CNO pointed out “something moves fast through the air and disrupts molecules in the air and puts out heat – I don’t care how cool the engine can be – it’s going to be detectable.”
Only this time against the HSCM and also a lesser-included problem of killing slower cruise missiles if F-35 did not exist it would have to be invented.
In other words, an additional benefit of R&D and con-ops efforts to kill HSCMs makes taking down conventional cruise missiles much easier.
Bluntly put, an overemphasis on sensing of hypersonic missiles from space really misses the point — it is not about being alert to what is about to kill you — it is about killing the archer and the arrow.
And we have in our hands the means to do so as we knit together key platforms which are delivering the S cubed revolution.
The future is now and working enhanced integrative capabilities moving forward with the new platforms and the relevant legacy ones is a core priority; not preparing for a new space world in 2035.
This is the eighth piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning with regard to threatening the US with sub strikes using high speed hypersonic missiles.
We have focused for some time on the importance of the modernization efforts of the Nordics in dealing with the return of the direct defense challenge in Europe.
A key state in the effort has clearly been Norway.
Recently, the Norwegian government released their defence plan for the next seven years with regard to projected defense acquisitions.
The long term planning process outlines the continuous development of the Norwegian Defence Sector with respect to organisation, infrastructure (garrisons and bases), personnel (numbers, composition and qualifications) and materiel (existing equipment and new acquisitions).
This process is carried out under the direction of the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Long Term Plan – Materiel forms the basis for all materiel procurements in the short term (4 years), the medium term (8 years) and the long-term perspectives (20 years). Annually, the plan is updated to reflect updates based on changing requirements, available resources and progress in on-going acquisitions.
The Government recognises the vital role the defence industry plays in support of the Armed Forces’ capabilities. This role ranges from the provision and maintenance of military equipment to the delivery of a wide range of support services.
The Government’s national strategy for the defence industry was recently revised, and presented as a new White Paper to Parliament (Meld. St. 9 (2015–2016) Nasjonal forsvarsindustriell strategi) and covers the relationship between the Defence Sector and the defence industry.
The main reasons for presenting an updated White Paper are the developments in the security sphere over the recent years, changes in the defence market both nationally and internationally, changes in terms and conditions, the introduction of the EU’s defence and security procurement directive, in addition to an increased focus on preparedness and security of supply.
The new White Paper focuses on national security interests and security of supply as basis for the new policy and strategy. The policy will continue to maintain and develop an internationally competitive Norwegian defence industry in areas of relevance for the Norwegian Defence Sector.
The Norwegian defence industry contributes substantially to our national economic growth, technological and industrial development, export related income and high-tech related employment.
The aim of the strategy is to secure good cooperation between the defence sector and the defence industry based on our sector’s need for cost-efficient deliveries of defence equipment and services.
The strategy implies that Norway increasingly should cooperate with other nations on defence procurement. The strategy will also contribute to necessary predictability for Norwegian export companies. The Government upholds the governmental support programme for marketing and industrial cooperation.
A central feature in the annual updating of the Long Term Plan – Materiel is the preparation and publication of an unclassified overview of long-term materiel requirements. This publication does not examine each planned project in detail but creates opportunities for in-depth discussions between the Defence Sector and industry. In this way, industry can get an early insight into potential materiel investments.
The aim is to maintain highly skilled companies that individually or in cooperation with others, are able to support the needs of the Defence Sector. Having a proven and highly skilled industry is also fundamental for being able to compete in the international defence market that in many ways remains a closed one.
The materiel investment projects are subject to decisions and approval by the MoD and the Parliament.
The projects listed in this publication are not approved for implementation. It is emphasized that any project not yet formally approved may subsequently be terminated or changed without any further explanation or liability.
Clearly, a key area of focus needs to be on C2 and IT systems, which is underscored in the report:
The Information Infrastructure Programme is by nature a complex programme consisting of different kind of ICT-services, -solutions and –systems.
The Information Infrastructure Programme emphasizes the investment profile on tactical plattforms, data center solutions and to increase the ability of information sharing and interoperability.
In more detail the programme consists of:
Modernization of quantum resistant ecryption solutions.
Providing ICT-infrastructure for new defence base structure.
Augmentation and modernization of mobile and static communication infrastructure.
Modernization of C4ISR and JISRSystems for Information Security and Computer Network Defence.
The evolving con-ops for operating in the extended battlespace is the kill web.
The challenge is that connecting a force package that can operate as a distributed kill web requires new training tools in addition to shaping the force packages themselves.
Earlier this year, the USAF began the construction on a new training center at Nellis AFB to provide for a key contribution to the new training approach.
According to an article by Rebekah Mattes, 99th Air Base Wing Public Affairs and published on February 8, 2019:
Gen. Mike Holmes, Air Combat Command commander and Maj. Gen. Peter Gersten, U.S. Air Force Warfare Center commander, broke ground Feb. 8 on the Virtual Test and Training Center (VTTC), which will enable full-spectrum readiness through next-generation battlespace environments.
The live-virtual-constructive training environments will equip the next generation of lethal, world-class Airmen and warriors.
“The Virtual Test and Training Center will provide a crucial capability for today’s warfighters to experience, train and dominate today’s threats, across multiple domains through a combination of live, virtual and constructive environments,” said Gersten.
Operators from across platforms and domains will have the capability to plan, brief, execute and debrief together in one location, according to Col. Dean Caldwell, VTTC director.
“The center will have a full complement of Air Force fighter aircraft simulators, and a tactical command and control simulator. We’ll also house space and cyber missions to ensure multi-domain integration required for the high-end, near-peer fight outlined in the National Defense Strategy,” said Caldwell.
In addition, the VTTC offers a simulator capability that will augment live fly training, said Caldwell.
“It’s the first step toward a truly blended solution, in which the simulators can participate in the same scenario as aircraft flying over the Nevada Test and Training Range or in a completely separate scenario somewhere globally,” said Caldwell.
Finally, the VTTC training allows warfighters to adapt to the future fight, while strengthening security on the home front.
“Looking to the future, exercises won’t be exclusively live-fly,” said Caldwell. “Our range spaces are finite, and as we bring new capabilities online, we’re outgrowing them. What’s more is that with the combination of live, virtual and constructive training, we’re actually bolstering operational security through innovative uses of live, virtual and constructive technologies.”
The $38 million VTTC ops facility is scheduled to open in the summer of 2021.
The USAFWC is the Air Force’s focal point for development, production and evolution of integrated, multi-domain combat capabilities for major commands and combatant commanders. The mission of the USAFWC is to lead and influence advanced readiness for the high-end fight through air, space and cyberspace combat capabilities.
The challenge of training a fifth generation-enabled force was highlighted by Major General Gersten:
Newer, more capable fifth-generation aircraft platforms and systems are outgrowing even the largest U.S. Air Force training ranges – and the service believes modern simulators and virtual reality may be the answer.
Considering the capabilities of modern advanced threats, even the Nellis Air Force Base’s Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR), the U.S. Air Force’s 12,000-square-nautical mile “crown jewel” range, is 50 percent too small for running realistic sorties, according to U.S. Air Force Warfare Center commander, Major General Peter Gersten.
While fighter aircraft used to be able to take off from Nellis and meet in the middle of NTTR to engage each other, modern fighter capabilities like beyond-line-of-sight targeting mean those aircraft can be targeted and engaged the moment they leave the runway, said Gerten during day one of the Air Force Association’s 2019 Air Warfare Symposium.
Furthermore, through cyber breaches and satellite reconnaissance, adversaries are better equipped to monitor “open air” training.
“We have to start being thoughtful about how we transition a good portion of advanced training into the synthetic space,” said Gersten, suggesting that the best option is to move more training operations into live, virtual training systems.
The featured photo shows Gen. Mike Holmes, commander of Air Combat Command, Maj. Gen. Peter Gersten, U.S. Air Force Warfare Center commander, Brig. Gen. William Burks, the Adjutant General for the state of Nevada, and Col. Christopher Zuhlke, Nevada Test and Training Range commander, break ground on the Virtual Test and Training Center (VTTC) on Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, Jan. 8, 2019.
(U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Bailee A. Darbasie)
It is now time to accept that a war-changing weapon, HSCM is in the late stages of R&D and it must be accounted for in any battle plan.
Unlike distant “hyper-sonic” R&D efforts such a Global Strategic Strike aircraft, a hypersonic cruise missile is a rapidly evolving technology, which sooner than later will be demonstrating the art of the possible up close and personal.
Such a revolutionary CM in the US arsenal is a very good thing. In the hands of Russian forces it is a very real “wolf at the door.”
Consequently when, not if, a hypersonic-Cruise Missile is battle ready the Air/Sea Battle staff will have to figure out both offensive and defensive con-ops.
In sufficient numbers a hypersonic cruise missile can be a war-tipping asset.
Employed by US and Allied forces the capability will greatly enable a deadly combat punch.
If it is in the hands of an enemy a hypersonic cruise missile is a ship killer and now a direct strategic threat to the US.
The Cold War USN Carrier Battle Group protection mantra against Russian Bombers with anti-ship cruise missiles was to try and first kill the archer not the arrows.
Top Gun in the late eighties briefed “Chainsaw” tactics, and the F-14 was very well designed for long-range interception of threats against the Fleet.
“Chainsaw” was a focus on reaching out as far a possible against any threats.5
Now if Russian and/or PLAAF successfully air launch HSCMs or their missiles are launched from ground batteries or surface ships or subs (USN fast attack subs are of utmost importance in that battle) they will be engaging in their version of the S-3 formula.
Just like the USN and USAF they first need sensors to make it all work.
The order of the “S” words in the priority of formula is very important.
If they develop a HSCM to empower their fighting force the F-35 does not have to fight in the stealth mode against HSCMs.
Even if HSCMs move at Mach 10 an F-35 sensor platform moves “trons” at the speed of light and this can make all the difference.
It is very evident that all fighting forces need both reach and range.
The F-35 today can play both stealth and non-stealth and is a generation better than any other aircraft in the world.
One just has to look at Russian and PLAAF attempts to develop a real F-35 capability and their stealth airframe is lacking the sensor systems comparable to F-35.
It is a pure marketing assertion that they have fusion parity and DAS.
The F-35 “360 Degree Fusion Cockpit” is good for a decade or more as the never ending action/reaction cycle of our enemies attempt to make their technology and training moves to catch up to the United States.
The US and its Allies are the only airpower thinkers and practitioners that can learn TTPs when F-35, F-22 and legacy aircraft mix it all up at a Red Flag. Russian and PLAAF cannot do that training within a decade.
They might claim that they are building fusion cockpits in stealth jets-but currently just by looking at their airframes with no nose sensors or wing sensors, they are simply fusing linear improvements to radar systems. They do not have the complete 360-active/passive reach that the F-35 brings to AA, AG and EW fight.
There is one other significant factor of HSCMs.
A ship has an advantage in that it can maneuver at sea; it also has a distinct disadvantage if a mortal blow is landed it sinks.
In contrast, an airfield or strategic target like the White House or Camp David has a disadvantage in that it they are a very well-known fixed point on land.
Training for the Kill Web
Both the US Navy and US Air Force have the vision and resources to develop the most modern training ranges in the world and a dedicated unified approach to collecting operational intelligence against HSCM airborne “signatures.”
During a visit to Nellis AFB Major General Jay Silveria, then the Commander of the USAF Warfare Center, pointed out that one of the missions of his command is to create a mission file for the F-35 fleet.
“The mission file includes all of the data about every threat, aircraft, surface-to-air missile, blue aircraft, and airliner, whatever that airplane may see during its flights.
“That intel mission data will fill the mission data file that will build is what the airplane then goes in and looks to see when it fuses that target.
The mission data file that we’re building right now in the 513th at the 53rd wing which are part of the Warfare Center were initially building are for the Marines.”6
The value is that USAF, USMC, USN and Allis have the possibility of working off that same mission data library.
The very practical application and perhaps battle tipping aspect of a fleet wide mission data file is that if just one F-35 anywhere anytime gets hit on a HSCM, the entire fleet can have the data.
This is unique capability to be able to prevail in modern war.
Concurrently, the Navy at Fallon is also building a significant training complex for practicing current con-ops and looking forward to studying how to defeat future threats.
Rear Admiral Scott Conn was Commander of Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center during our visit in 2014. He is now head of Naval Aviation at N-98.
According to Admiral Conn, “We are working at Fallon at expanding the capability for Naval aviation to operate in an expanded battlespace.”7
And the Admiral made it clear that this was being done with adding capabilities like the F-35, and leveraging joint and coalition capabilities into what we are calling an attack and defense enterprise.
He and his team are spearheading a broad based effort to expand the envelope of training to combine live and virtual training by building a Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) training range as well, an approach well under progress at Fallon.
Rear Admiral Michael Manazir, when he was Director of Naval Air Warfare identified the Navy way ahead that will allow tactical innovation and practices for the best way to attack and destroy incoming HSCMs.
The threat baseline that we’re looking to fight in the mid-2020s and beyond is so much more advanced that we cannot replicate it using live assets. And those advances are in the aircraft capability, the weapon capability, and in the electronic warfare capability of the threat systems.
That drives us to thinking about a different way to train.
Live, virtual, constructive (LVC) training is a way to put together a representation of the threat baseline where you can train to the very high end using your fifth generation capability.
Some of it is live with a kid in the cockpit, some of it is virtual in a simulator, and so “virtual” is actually the simulator environment.
And then constructive is a way to use computers to generate a scenario displayed on either or both of the live or simulated cockpit.
You can also combine them to be live-constructive, or virtual-constructive, and by that I mean there are systems out there right now that you can install in the airplane that will give you a constructive radar picture air-to-air and surface-to-air along with the electronics effects right onto your scope.
You’re literally flying your airplane, and through a data link, you can share that information between airplanes, you can share it between dissimilar airplanes.8
Thus a key way ahead for R&D and con-ops to deal with the coming HSCM threat is clear.
The F-35 does not have to be in a stealth mode to sense and engage against HSCM racing at a CSG–it can go out and loiter as a 360-sensor picket platform and can empower the kill web with its detection capabilities.
This is the seventh piece in our series on the response to Putin’s escalatory rhetoric and force structure planning with regard to threatening the US with sub strikes using high speed hypersonic missiles.
The featured photo shows an F-35C Lightning II assigned to the Rough Raiders of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 125 launching from the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72).
ATLANTIC OCEAN (Aug. 26, 2018)
(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jeff Sherman/Released)
The 5,100-ton general-purpose escort destroyers were previously designated as 25DD and are designed on the basis of Akizuki-class destroyers but with a focus on anti-submarine instead of anti-air warfare.
