Warlords Fly at MCAS Beaufort Air Show

04/29/2019

We had a chance to attend the 2019 Beaufort MCAS Airshow on Friday, April 26, 2019.

A visit the day before with the CO of the Warlords provided the framework for viewing the airshow and its star, the F-35 with its 3F software capabilities.

The upgrade from the earlier version for the Marines, the 2B, requires a hardware and software upgrade, which included an expanded flight envelope which is very clear to the naked eye when you witness a flight demo of this new variant of the aircraft.

Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 (VMFAT-501), known as the “Warlords,” stood up in 2010 at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and trained the initial group of Marine Corps F-35B pilots there.

In late 2014, the Pilot Training Center and Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 began the first F-35 pilot training course.

Editor’s Note: From the outset of the F-35 program, the approach was to develop six key software releases known as blocks:

Block 1A/1B – Block 1 comprises 78 percent of the more than 8.3 million source lines of code required for the F-35’s full warfighting capability. Block 1A was the ready for training configuration while Block 1B provided initial multi-level security.

Block 2A – Block 2A is currently released to the F-35 fleet. It provides enhanced training including functionality for off-board fusion, initial data links, electronic attack and mission debrief. With Block 2A, nearly 86 percent of the required code for full warfighting capability is flying.

Block 2B – Block 2B provides initial warfighting capabilities, including but not limited to expanded data links, multi-ship fusion and initial live weapons. The U.S. Marines declared IOC in July 2015 with Block 2B. With Block 2B, more than 87 percent of the required code for full warfighting capability is flying.

Block 3i – Block 3i provides the same tactical capabilities as Block 2B. The principal difference between 2B and 3i is the implementation of new hardware, specifically the updated Integrated Core Processor. The Air Force declared IOC with Block 3i in August 2016. With Block 3i, 89 percent of code required for full warfighting capability is flying.

Block 3F – Block 3F provides 100 percent of the software required for full warfighting capability, including but not limited to data link imagery, full weapons and embedded training

Some of the flight characteristics demonstrated by a Block 3F F-35 can be seen in the following video

And for those who wonder why on earth the USAF is having F-15s pushed down its throats – and without a requirements assessment process to boot – it runs out that Shannon Erickson in an article published by the Beaufort Gazette and the Island Packet is asking the same question.

You can imagine my surprise when I read that the Pentagon brass is trying to push the Air Force to buy F-15s instead of F-35s. The F-15 has been in production since 1976, and production of this fourth-generation airplane is due to end in 2022.

The F-35 capabilities can never be added to an old F-15 aircraft, because what makes the F-35 a fifth-generation fighter is built into its stealthy structure, advanced avionics, and helmet with a 365-degree view.

The first time I saw an F-35B fly, I was amazed at its power, but when I had the chance to fly the cockpit demonstrator, the power and advanced capabilities became real to me. Our men and women in uniform need these capabilities to stay safe in our uncertain world.

Would you want your son or daughter to go to war with less protection than was available because someone in the Pentagon thought that 45-year-old airplane was good enough? Those of us living in the area — and truly across the Palmetto State — are proud, as the F-35 sound of freedom protects our country and makes our world safer.

Our Beaufort Marines know that their F-35 planes are on the front lines of fighting tyranny. From North Korea to Syria, both American and international F-35 pilots are showing the vital difference made by the only fifth-generation fighter jet so far operating in the world.

As you watch the amazing capabilities of the F-35 at the Beaufort air show this weekend, realize that you are watching a fighter that the world envies and that is contributing to the economy of our state, safety of our men and women in uniform, and protecting America.

https://www.islandpacket.com/opinion/op-ed/article229573179.html

The video shows a pilot with Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 (VMFAT-501) flying the F-35B Lightning II during the 2019 Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort Air Show, April 27, 2019.

BEAUFORT, SC, UNITED STATES
04.27.2019
Video by Cpl. Kathryn Adams
Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort

Some of the flight characteristics demonstrated by a Block 3F F-35 can be seen in the following video shot in 2018 of that version of the F-35.

Or if you prefer, you can watch an Aussie pilot fly his Block 3F F-35 at the Avalon Air Show earlier this year.

In this video by Spencer Hughes which he published on February 22, 2019, the air demo by the RAAF F-35 at the Melbourne Air Show is highlighted.

According to the Australian Department of Defence:

The F-35A Joint Strike Fighter is the Australian Defence Force’s first fifth-generation air combat capability. It is a highly advanced multi-role, supersonic, stealth fighter which will meet Australia’s requirements to defeat current and emerging threats.

The F-35A is at the forefront of air combat technology.  Its advanced sensors and data fusion allows it to gather more information and share it with other Air Force aircraft, Navy ships and Army units quicker than ever before. This will greatly enhance the Australian Defence Force’s situational awareness and combat effectiveness. In addition, to greatly enhanced situational awareness, the F-35A provides its pilots with significantly higher levels of lethality and survivability in combat.

Australia has committed to 72 F-35A aircraft for three operational squadrons at RAAF Base Williamtown and RAAF Base Tindal, and a training squadron at RAAF Base Williamtown.

The first F-35A aircraft was accepted into Australian service in 2018 and the first squadron, Number 3 Squadron, will be operational in 2021. All 72 aircraft are expected to be fully operational by 2023.

In the future, a fourth operational squadron will be considered for RAAF Base Amberley, for a total of 100 F-35A aircraft.

The F-35A is being purchased by the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group under project AIR 6000.

Mentioning allies makes sense for Beaufort MCAS, because the British have trained with the Marines there and when they leave this summer, the Italians are coming in next to work their F-35B training.

The 2019 Beaufort MCAS Airshow: The Warlords and the Latest F-35 on Display

04/28/2019

We had a chance to attend the 2019 Beaufort MCAS Airshow on Friday, April 26, 2019.

The airshow goes through today, April 28, 2019.

A visit the day before with the CO of the Warlords provided the framework for viewing the airshow and its star, the F-35 with its 3F software capabilities. The upgrade from the earlier version for the Marines, the 2B, requires a hardware and software upgrade, which included an expanded flight envelope which is very clear to the naked eye when you witness a flight demo of this new variant of the aircraft.

Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 (VMFAT-501), known as the “Warlords,” stood up in 2010 at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and trained the initial group of Marine Corps F-35B pilots there.

In late 2014, the Pilot Training Center and Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501 began the first F-35 pilot training course.

We will publish an interview with the CO soon.

The Marines have published a video which provides highlights of the airshow and is credited too Sg. Rene Lucerobonilla.

Beaufort Air Show 2019 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

Editor’s Note: From the outset of the F-35 program, the approach was to develop six key software releases known as blocks:

Block 1A/1B – Block 1 comprises 78 percent of the more than 8.3 million source lines of code required for the F-35’s full warfighting capability. Block 1A was the ready for training configuration while Block 1B provided initial multi-level security.

Block 2A – Block 2A is currently released to the F-35 fleet. It provides enhanced training including functionality for off-board fusion, initial data links, electronic attack and mission debrief. With Block 2A, nearly 86 percent of the required code for full warfighting capability is flying.

Block 2B – Block 2B provides initial warfighting capabilities, including but not limited to expanded data links, multi-ship fusion and initial live weapons. The U.S. Marines declared IOC in July 2015 with Block 2B. With Block 2B, more than 87 percent of the required code for full warfighting capability is flying.

Block 3i – Block 3i provides the same tactical capabilities as Block 2B. The principal difference between 2B and 3i is the implementation of new hardware, specifically the updated Integrated Core Processor. The Air Force declared IOC with Block 3i in August 2016. With Block 3i, 89 percent of code required for full warfighting capability is flying.

Block 3F – Block 3F provides 100 percent of the software required for full warfighting capability, including but not limited to data link imagery, full weapons and embedded training

Some of the flight characteristics demonstrated by a Block 3F F-35 can be seen in the following video shot in 2018 of that version of the F-35.

There will undoubtedly be videos released of the Warlords pilot’s flight at the airshow and we will of course publish those videos when available.

Or if you prefer, you can watch an Aussie pilot fly his Block 3F F-35 at the Avalon Air Show earlier this year.

In this video by Spencer Hughes which he published on February 22, 2019, the air demo by the RAAF F-35 at the Melbourne Air Show is highlighted.

According to the Australian Department of Defence:

The F-35A Joint Strike Fighter is the Australian Defence Force’s first fifth-generation air combat capability. It is a highly advanced multi-role, supersonic, stealth fighter which will meet Australia’s requirements to defeat current and emerging threats.

The F-35A is at the forefront of air combat technology.  Its advanced sensors and data fusion allows it to gather more information and share it with other Air Force aircraft, Navy ships and Army units quicker than ever before. This will greatly enhance the Australian Defence Force’s situational awareness and combat effectiveness. In addition, to greatly enhanced situational awareness, the F-35A provides its pilots with significantly higher levels of lethality and survivability in combat.

Australia has committed to 72 F-35A aircraft for three operational squadrons at RAAF Base Williamtown and RAAF Base Tindal, and a training squadron at RAAF Base Williamtown.

The first F-35A aircraft was accepted into Australian service in 2018 and the first squadron, Number 3 Squadron, will be operational in 2021. All 72 aircraft are expected to be fully operational by 2023.

In the future, a fourth operational squadron will be considered for RAAF Base Amberley, for a total of 100 F-35A aircraft.

The F-35A is being purchased by the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group under project AIR 6000.

Mentioning allies makes sense for Beaufort MCAS, because the British have trained with the Marines there and when they leave this summer, the Italians are coming in next to work their F-35B training.

The photos are credited to Second Line of Defense.

And for those who wonder why on earth the USAF is having F-15s pushed down its throats – and without a requirements assessment process to boot – it runs out that Shannon Erickson in an article published by the Beaufort Gazette and the Island Packet is asking the same question.

You can imagine my surprise when I read that the Pentagon brass is trying to push the Air Force to buy F-15s instead of F-35s. The F-15 has been in production since 1976, and production of this fourth-generation airplane is due to end in 2022.

The F-35 capabilities can never be added to an old F-15 aircraft, because what makes the F-35 a fifth-generation fighter is built into its stealthy structure, advanced avionics, and helmet with a 365-degree view.

The first time I saw an F-35B fly, I was amazed at its power, but when I had the chance to fly the cockpit demonstrator, the power and advanced capabilities became real to me. Our men and women in uniform need these capabilities to stay safe in our uncertain world.

Would you want your son or daughter to go to war with less protection than was available because someone in the Pentagon thought that 45-year-old airplane was good enough? Those of us living in the area — and truly across the Palmetto State — are proud, as the F-35 sound of freedom protects our country and makes our world safer.

Our Beaufort Marines know that their F-35 planes are on the front lines of fighting tyranny. From North Korea to Syria, both American and international F-35 pilots are showing the vital difference made by the only fifth-generation fighter jet so far operating in the world.

As you watch the amazing capabilities of the F-35 at the Beaufort air show this weekend, realize that you are watching a fighter that the world envies and that is contributing to the economy of our state, safety of our men and women in uniform, and protecting America.

https://www.islandpacket.com/opinion/op-ed/article229573179.html

Hi-Intensity Operations and Sustaining Self-Reliance

04/26/2019

The latest Williams Seminar held in Canberra on April 11, 2019 focused on the strategic shift for Australia within the context of the evolving global situation.

Facing the rising challenges posed by the 21stcentury authoritarian states, and by the changing nature of alliances in the Pacific and in Europe, Australia needs to enhance its sovereign capabilities to operate within a regional or global crisis.

And this requires, Australia to have more capability to sustain its evolving integrated force and to do so in the service of the direct defense of Australia.

The Williams seminars over the past five years have focused in detail on the reshaping of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a more integrated force, one which can operate as discrete Australian force packages able to operate with allies or on their own.

The acquisition of the F-35 is seen as a trigger for accelerating the kind of force integration which Australia is seeking, namely a very capable force package within which fifth generation enablement enhances the lethality and survivability of modular force packages.

But the goal is to have such capability both for the direct defense of Australia and to work with allies during sustained periods of crisis.

It was clear from the latest Williams Seminar that this is not just a technical force packaging effort. It is part of a broader reset within Australian thinking about how to move ahead as the global competition changes.

As Williams Research Fellow, Dr. Alan Stephens put it, Australia needs to focus on Plan B:

“A military posture based on the premise that Australians will assume the burden of combat of defending their own country.”

“For most of our history, Australia has been unwilling to confront the imperatives of a defence posture which would require us to assume the burden of responsibility. Consequently, when faced with our only existential threat, in World War II, we were left dangerously exposed; while on other occasions, the apparent need to pay regular premiums on Plan A has drawn us into morally dubious wars of choice.

“In short, Plan A has distorted our strategic thinking and compromised our independence.

“If Australian defence is to be credibly self-reliant – if we are to have a Plan B – we can start by looking to the examples of those individuals and local industries that have challenged traditionalists and science-deniers, and have instead embraced innovation and transformation.”

Dr. Andrew Carr then followed highlighting what this means in terms of the strategic reset for Australia in dealing with the direct challenges from China and the changing dynamics of the American Alliance. Carr argued that Australia needed to focus on its regional interests rather than following American proclivities over the past three Administrations to pursue conflicts significantly removed from direct defense challenges to Australia itself.

“This is not to suggest an isolationist or inward-looking turn. Far from it. Nor is it about returning to the 1980s Defence of Australia concepts.

“Rather, it is a position which takes seriously the idea that we may be early into a half-century or more of strategic competition. This means knowing what we will fight to protect and how we can do so. And then being able to go forward from a secure continent. That is what a return to fundamentals means.

“To do otherwise, to keep focusing on what we can do at the furthest limits from our core interests, attempting merely to hold firm to the status quo is to risk our own version of a grey zone style crisis.

“A world where we are making commitments to our allies abroad that we can’t be sure future government’s and the Australian public will want to keep.

“Nor does this extended approach make sense in the face of our specific adversary on the field today. A strategy of simply trying to give ‘110%’, year in and year out, by tired and debt-ridden Western nations, finding ourselves always on the defence against a better resourced and fresher People’s Republic of China is not a winning approach.”

He posed a key question: What are the fundamentals of continental security for Australia?

Carr underscored that Australia needed to deal with the new strategic challenge and to do so by rethinking its defense and security strategies.

“Unfortunately, this is a question we will need to think through afresh, rather than hoping that past generations have done the work for us. The Defence of Australia policy, which was in place from roughly 1972 to 1997 took shape in a very different world, politically and technologically. This was an era where our continent was secure – something that is not obviously true today.”

The well-known Australian strategist Brendan Sargeant then contributed his thoughts on the way ahead in this new historical era.  Sargeant has had many policy positions in the Australian government and spoke from that experience to discuss the challenges facing Australia in this new period of history.

His focus was upon how best to take the capabilities Australia has built and is building and how to leverage them effectively in Australian interests

“The development of capability is important, perhaps the most important element of defence policy, but also important is understanding how these capabilities might need to be used in the future.

“How should we shape the force to respond to future crises?

“How we think about that question will in part determine how we want to evolve capabilities, and how powerful and sustainable we will want the force to be.

“Have we thought sufficiently about how we might need to use defence capability in the future, and are we building for that day or days?”

The remainder of the seminar focused on what one might call the eco system for a more sustainable ADF.  A key element of shaping a way ahead clearly is to shape a more sustainable force which can endure through a crisis. This meant taking off the table the capability of the Chinese to disrupt the supply chains into Australia and choking off the sustainability of the ADF. This clearly needs to be dealt with by crafting “buffer” capabilities to sustain the force.

Another key aspect being worked is enhanced local industrial support to ADF forces, as well as new approach to stockpiling parts and skill sets to sustain the force.

There are clear security issues as well. There needs to be enhanced security of Australian civil as well as military infrastructure, in terms of IT, C2 and energy security.

Put in blunt terms, with a focus on direct defense of Australia comes a broader social recognition of the long-term challenges posed by its powerful neighbor in the region as well as finding ways to rethink crisis management tools. An integrated ADF which able to operate in flexible force packages as a key enabler for sovereign options in a crisis is a different trajectory than envisaged in the last White Paper.

But to enable, you need to survive and be sustained. This is why active defense measures are being stood up and rethinking about logistics and industrial support under way.

It is clearly a work in progress.

But the new Aussie approach will have significant implications for Australia’s allies and industrial partners as well.  A focus on sustainable direct defense will clearly mean a shift in focus and reorientation of how Australia will work with global partners and industry.  And this has direct consequences for programs such as the British frigate, the French submarine and US produced 21st century air combat assets, such as P-8, Triton, Growler and F-35.

Dr. Carr highlighted how different the way ahead is from the recent past.

“We should find a new language instead of the term self-reliance.

“This term has always been used by Australians to mean an exception to usual practice. Self-Reliance was we did in the worst-case scenario, or did on the margins while normal allied cooperation was the mainstay.

“Instead we should think of this issue as most other countries do. Defending ourselves is our task and our primary responsibility. We will build alliance cooperation on top of this, we will seek to use our geography to support and sustain a regional order that has been very valuable to us. But what we do alone is not the exception, but a fundamental part of a re-invigorated, and resilient approach.

“So let us take this moment to rethink and regroup. The siren calling us back onto the pitch is sure to blast very soon, and the next half is going to be even tougher. But with a better plan, based on the fundamentals, I am confident the game’s momentum will soon run our way.”

The report can be found here:

The Strategic Shift and the Reset for Australian Defence and Security

The Strategic Shift and the Reset for Australian Defence and Security

The latest Williams Seminar held in Canberra on April 11, 2019 focused on the strategic shift for Australia within the context of the evolving global situation.

Facing the rising challenges posed by the 21stcentury authoritarian states, and by the changing nature of alliances in the Pacific and in Europe, Australia needs to enhance its sovereign capabilities to operate within a regional or global crisis.

And this requires, Australia to have more capability to sustain its evolving integrated force and to do so in the service of the direct defense of Australia.

The Williams seminars over the past five years have focused in detail on the reshaping of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) as a more integrated force, one which can operate as discrete Australian force packages able to operate with allies or on their own.

The acquisition of the F-35 is seen as a trigger for accelerating the kind of force integration which Australia is seeking, namely a very capable force package within which fifth generation enablement enhances the lethality and survivability of modular force packages.

But the goal is to have such capability both for the direct defense of Australia and to work with allies during sustained periods of crisis.

It was clear from the latest Williams Seminar that this is not just a technical force packaging effort. It is part of a broader reset within Australian thinking about how to move ahead as the global competition changes.

As Williams Research Fellow, Dr. Alan Stephens put it, Australia needs to focus on Plan B:

“A military posture based on the premise that Australians will assume the burden of combat of defending their own country.”

“For most of our history, Australia has been unwilling to confront the imperatives of a defence posture which would require us to assume the burden of responsibility. Consequently, when faced with our only existential threat, in World War II, we were left dangerously exposed; while on other occasions, the apparent need to pay regular premiums on Plan A has drawn us into morally dubious wars of choice.

“In short, Plan A has distorted our strategic thinking and compromised our independence.

“If Australian defence is to be credibly self-reliant – if we are to have a Plan B – we can start by looking to the examples of those individuals and local industries that have challenged traditionalists and science-deniers, and have instead embraced innovation and transformation.”

Dr. Andrew Carr then followed highlighting what this means in terms of the strategic reset for Australia in dealing with the direct challenges from China and the changing dynamics of the American Alliance. Carr argued that Australia needed to focus on its regional interests rather than following American proclivities over the past three Administrations to pursue conflicts significantly removed from direct defense challenges to Australia itself.

“This is not to suggest an isolationist or inward-looking turn. Far from it. Nor is it about returning to the 1980s Defence of Australia concepts.

“Rather, it is a position which takes seriously the idea that we may be early into a half-century or more of strategic competition. This means knowing what we will fight to protect and how we can do so. And then being able to go forward from a secure continent. That is what a return to fundamentals means.

“To do otherwise, to keep focusing on what we can do at the furthest limits from our core interests, attempting merely to hold firm to the status quo is to risk our own version of a grey zone style crisis.

“A world where we are making commitments to our allies abroad that we can’t be sure future government’s and the Australian public will want to keep.

“Nor does this extended approach make sense in the face of our specific adversary on the field today. A strategy of simply trying to give ‘110%’, year in and year out, by tired and debt-ridden Western nations, finding ourselves always on the defence against a better resourced and fresher People’s Republic of China is not a winning approach.”

He posed a key question: What are the fundamentals of continental security for Australia?

Carr underscored that Australia needed to deal with the new strategic challenge and to do so by rethinking its defense and security strategies.

“Unfortunately, this is a question we will need to think through afresh, rather than hoping that past generations have done the work for us. The Defence of Australia policy, which was in place from roughly 1972 to 1997 took shape in a very different world, politically and technologically. This was an era where our continent was secure – something that is not obviously true today.”

The well-known Australian strategist Brendan Sargeant then contributed his thoughts on the way ahead in this new historical era.  Sargeant has had many policy positions in the Australian government and spoke from that experience to discuss the challenges facing Australia in this new period of history.

His focus was upon how best to take the capabilities Australia has built and is building and how to leverage them effectively in Australian interests

“The development of capability is important, perhaps the most important element of defence policy, but also important is understanding how these capabilities might need to be used in the future.

“How should we shape the force to respond to future crises?

“How we think about that question will in part determine how we want to evolve capabilities, and how powerful and sustainable we will want the force to be.

“Have we thought sufficiently about how we might need to use defence capability in the future, and are we building for that day or days?”

The remainder of the seminar focused on what one might call the eco system for a more sustainable ADF.  A key element of shaping a way ahead clearly is to shape a more sustainable force which can endure through a crisis. This meant taking off the table the capability of the Chinese to disrupt the supply chains into Australia and choking off the sustainability of the ADF. This clearly needs to be dealt with by crafting “buffer” capabilities to sustain the force.

Another key aspect being worked is enhanced local industrial support to ADF forces, as well as new approach to stockpiling parts and skill sets to sustain the force.

There are clear security issues as well. There needs to be enhanced security of Australian civil as well as military infrastructure, in terms of IT, C2 and energy security.

Put in blunt terms, with a focus on direct defense of Australia comes a broader social recognition of the long-term challenges posed by its powerful neighbor in the region as well as finding ways to rethink crisis management tools. An integrated ADF which able to operate in flexible force packages as a key enabler for sovereign options in a crisis is a different trajectory than envisaged in the last White Paper.

But to enable, you need to survive and be sustained. This is why active defense measures are being stood up and rethinking about logistics and industrial support under way.

It is clearly a work in progress.

But the new Aussie approach will have significant implications for Australia’s allies and industrial partners as well.  A focus on sustainable direct defense will clearly mean a shift in focus and reorientation of how Australia will work with global partners and industry.  And this has direct consequences for programs such as the British frigate, the French submarine and US produced 21st century air combat assets, such as P-8, Triton, Growler and F-35.

Dr. Carr highlighted how different the way ahead is from the recent past.

“We should find a new language instead of the term self-reliance.

“This term has always been used by Australians to mean an exception to usual practice. Self-Reliance was we did in the worst-case scenario, or did on the margins while normal allied cooperation was the mainstay.

“Instead we should think of this issue as most other countries do. Defending ourselves is our task and our primary responsibility. We will build alliance cooperation on top of this, we will seek to use our geography to support and sustain a regional order that has been very valuable to us. But what we do alone is not the exception, but a fundamental part of a re-invigorated, and resilient approach.

“So let us take this moment to rethink and regroup. The siren calling us back onto the pitch is sure to blast very soon, and the next half is going to be even tougher. But with a better plan, based on the fundamentals, I am confident the game’s momentum will soon run our way.”

The Ruler of the East: Kim and Vladimir Meet and Maneuver

04/25/2019

By Lucas Bertolo

Kim Jong-un arrived this Wednesday in Vladivostok on his armored train. It is his first time in his northern neighbor since he took power eight years ago.

It is going to be also his first meeting with Vladimir Putin.

The summit will take place at the Far Eastern Federal University, at its new campus on Russky Island, where the new, open, and international Vladivostok, is being built since the preparations for the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in 2012.

The North-Korea’s “dear leader” (or dictator) had also arrived on his armoured train in Hanoi, Vietnam, for his meeting with Donald Trump in late February this year, travelling over 2,800 miles.

This month’s trip from Pyongyang to Vladivostok was not that long: the distance between the two cities is less than 450 miles. Most of the Korean railways were built during the Japanese occupation, which ended in 1945. The Russian Empire finished the Trans-Siberian Express before the Bolshevik Revolution broke out in the West of Russia.

Vladivostok, which stands for “The Ruler of The East” in Russian, was no more open during Soviet times than North-Korea is nowadays. Conquered from the Chinese in the late XIX century, the hilly city by the Sea of Japan still is Russia’s most important Eastern military port. Under Soviet rule the city was even closed for USSR citizens: the home of the Soviet Pacific Fleet only welcomed officials and their families.

Today, the city has more than 550,000 inhabitants, and welcomes people from all over the world (with a large majority of South-Korean and Chinese tourists). A statue of Lenin still stands near the seashore in Vladivostok, surrounded by shopping centers with shiny billboards written both in Russian, in Korean and in Chinese.

The city’s strategical position is today even more relevant, and Putin knows it better than anyone. Although more than 5,500 miles (and seven time zones) between Moscow and Vladivostok still presents the Russians with the problem maintaining their influence in the region.

The city of Vladivostok was erected in the very fissure between West and East.

The Soviet epoch buildings contrast with new business towers and high-end residential buildings, and the enclosed city of the last century now thrives on business with its Asian neighbors. The Russky Bridge, the longest of its kind in the world, and all the new facilities built in the Russky Island for the APEC, underscore the attention and care of Moscow to the region.

In Vladivostok, some cars drive on the left side of the road, like the Japanese, others drive on the right, like the Korean, European and Russians. Students often choose Chinese or Korean as their second language.

The majority of the locals might have been to Beijing or Seoul, but have never crossed the Urals West. The only neighbor they obviously don’t interact much with is the North-Korean people. Besides that, most of them share Russian traditions, and are proud of being Far Eastern Russians.

The tensions involving North-Korea missile tests predate Kim Jong-un’s regime: both Kim Il-Sung, his grandfather, and Kim Jong-il, his father, tested together 31 missiles since 1984. In the last eight years, however, Kim Jong-un tested 80 missiles, and fired some of them onto the Sea of Japan.

North Korea’s army is disproportionally large for such a poor and small country (yet, it does not compare to the American and Russian armies). Pyongyang’s regime stoked these tensions with their neighbors South Korea and Japan, and by threatening the West (most notably the United States).

In Hanoi, two months ago, Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump seemed to have ended their honeymoon.

No relevant agreements were made, and it seems Kim is back at playing with his rockets.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian influence over North-Korea decreased significantly.

Putin is now entering into this dispute with both feet.

North-Korea depends hugely on their giant neighbor China, both politically and economically.

This ever-growing Chinese influence must worry both Putin and Trump.

This Thursday another chapter of this “nuclear tension” will unfold, and while the West worries about Kim’s weapons, he is meeting in two months the two largest nuclear powers in the world, and if Kim Jong-un is unpredictable, so too are Trump and Putin.

Lucas Bertolo is the Brazilian assistant to Professor Kenneth Maxwell.

These photos were shot by him during his visit to Vladivostok last May.

The Strategic Shift and Reshaping Australian Defense Policy

04/24/2019

By Robbin Laird

After the recent Williams Foundation Seminar which focused on the evolution of Australian defense capabilities and policies, I had a chance to discuss the changing context for Australian policy and the challenge of reshaping the Australian policy approach with Brendan Sargeant.

Sargeant is currently Honorary Professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, at the Australian National University and has had a long period of service to the Australian Department of Defence, most recently serving as Associate Secretary in the Department.

The key challenge to shape and execute a nation’s defense policy is to understand the priorities, to shape capabilities which can meet those priorities, as well as understanding the limits facing a nation in terms of its resources and its capabilities. It is is also crucial to shape effective approaches to managing that policy in times of crisis, which is a combination of capabilities as well as having skillful leadership.

For Australia, this means refocusing its policies upon the challenges in its region, which is one with global reach.

We started by discussing the changing strategic context.  With the rise of the 21stCentury authoritarian powers, and the various dynamics of change in Europe, and in the United States, obviously Australia’s policy approach over the past two decades was no longer valid.

Australia has focused its efforts to contributing the United States leadership in providing for enforcement of a rules-based order, and doing so with enhanced capabilities, but within the context of enforcing an order, not shaping it.

Indeed, the 2016 Defence White Paper underscores throughout the need to enforce the rules-based order. But the 21stcentury authoritarians have no intention of operating within those constraints and are seeking to reshape global order to their advantage.

As Sargeant put it: “The world we have assumed is not necessarily going to be the world of the future.  So how is Australia going to live in that world and play its role?”

He noted that the Chinese were seeking to reshape the global order. “The Chinese strategy is clear – guarantee access to resources, create buffers, break alliances and not be constrained by any rules-based order that they do not consider congruent with their perception of their interests.”

He argued that we are facing a fluid period of global change.

“We will see lots of experiments, and see lots of ideas and you’ll see states trying out different political and architectural formations to meet their interests.

“We’re in a world with we don’t know what the future strategic order is going to look like, or how it’s going to be managed. The global order is clearly in play.”

There are cross cutting forces at play.

“Globalization has unleased one set of forces; the rise of nationalism another set of forces; and the rise of the illiberal powers yet a different set of force.  Nations are trying to work out how best to protect their interests and with whom to work to do so.”

This has a significant impact on the inherited alliances.  There is the habitual cooperation which has underlaid the Western Alliances and that cooperation is continuing but in the context of significant redefinition of what alliances are going to look like going forward,

“Great powers like the United States are more interested in totalizing alliance arrangements than their alliance partners are likely to accept.  Australians like other regional allies of the United States will seek working arrangements with a variety of regional partners to provide for our interests and work through different sorts of working arrangements to deal with our strategic challenges.”

The shift is clearly from followership to engagement in working relationships where leadership is shouldered or shared differently from the great power followership role which Australia has followed first with Britain and then with the United States.

Working relationships with regional or global partners around specific issues and challenges are becoming “the real alliances.  They are being built in response to specific crisis or specific problems.”

For Australia, the challenge will be how to deal with global and regional crisis management.  For defense, this means shaping capability which can be leveraged in a crisis and effectively used by political leadership effectively to meet the national interest.

This means taking a hard look at the kind of defense force which Australia has and is developing and determining which tools are available to decision makers.

It also means building a more durable and sustainable force through a crisis period.

“The ability to deploy force creates more decision space in a crisis.  But you need to do that over time.  That requires a robust logistical and industrial base that can give you more confidence that you can scale up during a crisis.”

“From a policy perspective, you want to give yourself more strategic options by giving yourself more time. Which means that you will need to have a more sustainable force during a crisis.”

And the crisis management challenge requires thinking through partnerships and working relationships with allies.

“When do you exercise leadership? When do you exercise followership?”

An example of how force packaging might be reworked in terms of partnerships in the region could be the working relationship between Australia and Indonesia.

“We ought to be able to put together an integrated task force with Indonesia to manage a regional crisis from the low end to the high end. And a task force where either Australia or Indonesia could take the lead.”

In short, for Sargeant, “We need to think differently about our position in this part of the world and how that may drive our thinking about the capability which we need to have and to develop going forward.”

The featured graphic shows the Chinese island building strategy in the South China Sea.

Credit: The New York Times.

http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/news-events/news/6443/radical-new-defence-policy-brendan-sargeant

Australian Defence Policy in Flux: The Perspective of Brendan Sargeant

 

Ending US Dependence on Russian Rocket Engines: The Danger of Further Delays

04/23/2019

By Richard Weitz

The U.S. Congress has a welcome opportunity to end U.S. dependence on Russian rocket engines for its national security satellites. However, Congress needs to proceed with the existing agreed timetable to avoid unnecessary deals that risk U.S. national security.

Members recognize that the United States can leverage the strengths of the U.S. private sector to promote the commercial development of space launch systems for national security as well as civilian missions.

Congressional legislation mandates ending launching of U.S. national security satellites on rockets employing Russia’s RD-180 enginefor propulsion in less than three years from now.

To maintain a broad competitive industrial base for space launch vehicles, the Air Force has provided targeted funding to several firms developing launch system prototypes. These Launch Service Agreements (LSA),represent Other Transaction Authority (cost-sharing) grants the Air Force makes to various firms.

They help defray their financial expense in making the changes necessary to certify that their commercial rockets can fulfill the unique requirements for launching national security payloads, such as military satellites.

This process supports an accelerated timeline, while maintaining fair and open competition, to end U.S. dependence on RD-180 engines by the congressionally mandated date of December 31, 2022.

The planned launches of the existing ULA Atlas 5 rocket will soon exhaust thedwindling number of these enginesunder U.S. possession in any case.

In 2016, the Defense Department awarded initial contractsto SpaceX, Aerojet Rocketdyne (AJRD), Orbital ATK, and United Launch Alliance (ULA), a joint venture of the Boeing and Lockheed Martin Corporations that previously provided Titan and Atlas rockets, to develop U.S.-made rocket engines.

In October 2018, the Pentagon selected three companies–Blue Origin, Northrop Grumman Innovation Systems ((formerly Orbital ATK), and ULA—to receive additional funding to research and design space launch vehicles using these U.S.-manufactured propulsion systems.

The Air Force will review the performance of these three LSA Phase 1 systems:

  • Northrop Grumman’s OmegA (employing the company’s Castor engines for its first two stages and Aerojet’s RL10 engine for its third stage)
  • Blue Origin’s New Glenn (with seven reusable BE-4 engines for its first stage, a BE-4U re-ignitable engine for stage two, and BE-3U engines for its third stage); and
  • ULA’s Vulcan Centaur rockets(with Blue Origin’s BE-4engine for its lower stage and Aerojet’s Rocketdyne engine for the Vulcan’s upper stage).

In Fiscal Year 2020, the military will designate two of them to receive a block of contracts during the five-year LSA Phase 2 period, scheduled to begin in 2022. Formally termed the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Phase 2 Launch Service Procurement(EELV), the two companies will launch up to sixdefense payloads annually, following full-scale flight tests of new space launch vehicles.

The third, non-selected firm, as well as other pioneering private sector space companies like SpaceX, can still submit bids for future U.S. national security payload contracts.

SpaceX is already a certified EELV launch provider and has received several defense contracts for its Falcon 9 and Falcon Heavy rockets, equippedwith the company’s U.S.-manufactured Merlin engines.

The Air Force contract given to SpaceX in 2016 also subsidized the creation of its Raptor engine, which will power its future Big Falcon spacecraft and perhaps the Falcon 9.

During a March 27 hearingof the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommitteeon “Military Space Operations, Policy and Programs,” Lieutenant General David D. Thompson, USAF Vice Commander, Air Force Space Command, recommitted the Air Force to work closely with firms not selected for Phase 2 to allow them to compete effectively for future national security launch opportunities.

To sustain America’s assured access to space, the Air Force has committedto “facilitate the development of three domestic launch system prototypes and enable the future competitive selection of two national security space launch service providers for future procurements.”

The Secretary of the Air Force, Heather Wilson, has calledthe present Launch Service Procurement (LSP) an outstanding example of how we are “fielding tomorrow’s Air Force faster and smarter.”

The LSP goal of reducing dependence on Russian rocket propulsion enjoys widespread support in the U.S. national security community. Yet, Adam Smith, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, wrote to Wilson at the end of March to propose a postponementin the LSA processand to review the program’s selection process. This intervention represents a counterproductive, potentially damaging policy proscription.

Any further delay in issuing LSP Request for Proposals would result in a critical misstep given the urgent need to revitalize the U.S. national security space launch fleet by developing several capable rocket manufacturers.

The Pentagon and Congress should proceed as scheduled to issue the RFPs for these next-generation systems in accordance with the meticulously agreed procedure, while also reaffirming and clarifying how non-Phase 2 selectees will continue to enjoy opportunities to contribute to critical U.S. national security space missions.

The featured photo shows the aft of a ULA Atlas V rocket and the dual-nozzle RD-180 engine. Photo Credit: United Launch Alliance

European Update, April 22, 2019

04/22/2019

We published a composite of our recent articles on European issues.

Murielle Delaporte provide an exclusive interview with the SACT Commander, and an overview on how the European Union is beginning to address the challenge of dealing with direct Chinese investments in Europe.

Pierre Tran dealt with the impact of the German embargo on European Arms Collaboration as well as the reach out by the French to operate in the Australian context, one where the challenge is co-development, not simply managing the rebuild of an existing French asset. He also continued his look at the French approach to FCAS.

Laird looked at the issues of nuclear deterrence and the challenges of dealing with the security challenges posed by 21st century authoritarian powers. He also review two recent books on the dynamics of change in Europe as well.

The articles by Murielle Delaporte, Pierre Tran and Robbin Laird cover the following issues:

European Update April 22 2019

For an ebook version of the report, see the following: