Social media, tweeting, and various other coms tools are largely being used either to shape and reinforce self-defined communities or to provide the means to attack “them” while we define “us.”

John Stuart Mill would not thrive in this environment.

He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that.

His reasons may be good, and no one may have been able to refute them.

But if he is equally unable to refute the reasons on the opposite side; if he does not so much as know what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion.

So we won’t see JSM tweeting or gathering his like minded community in the current version of the us versus them club and celebrating the only version of truth – theirs.

And this thought clearly runs against the grain of today’s “thinking.”

But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the present generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.

If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth, if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.

President Trump certainly has used tweeting and his rhetorical style to disrupt opponents and mobilize supporters.

But he did not create an age in which this is becoming more of the norm of discourse than its exception.

A clear example of this were several of the presentations at the Munich Security Conference whose entire goal was to reinforce and rally the troops against the evils of the world we live in.

Judy Dempsey, a nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe, provided a look back at the MSC.

She argued that the Munich Security Conference was more like the meeting of a nostalgia group meeting to remember the Old West rather than to debate and to disagree and to shape a way ahead for the world were are in.

Diplomacy didn’t have much of a field day in Munich.

 Nor did the West for that matter.

The absence of diplomatic tools and a sense of inquiry combined with sharp exchanges between the Europeans and some of the American delegation confirmed, more than ever, the weakness and disunity of the West.

This obsession with the “old” West during this year’s Munich Security Conference will delay any strategic realignment of its priorities as Russia and China, but also Japan and India, move on to define their interests. The West reacts as the rest of the world changes.

Blaming the Trump administration, lambasting Vice President Mike Pence’s anti-European speech, and waxing lyrical over former U.S. vice-president Joe Biden’s elegant and passionate pro-transatlantic speech will not equip the West with the essential tools to defend its values and interests.

If anything, in Munich there was a nostalgia for the old West of the post-1945 era. Back then, there was a certain predictability about the conduct of diplomacy, about spheres of influence, and about ideological certainties.

The wars in the former Yugoslavia, Russia’s invasion in Georgia and later in Ukraine, and the continuing violence and misery of the wars in Syria and Yemen should have surely convinced the West that the old parameters and narrative are long over.

Listening to Henrietta Fore, executive director of the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), speak in the main hall on Sunday about what was happening to women and children in Syria and other countries in the region was a world away from another discussion going on down the corridor.

The former debate confirmed the absence of strong, diplomatic tools to end the suffering. The latter was an elegant and worthy town hall meeting focused on a new publication: Defending Democracy and a Rules-Based Order. The gap in the language between both meetings was stark.

And that is what the MSC amounted to in the main hall: little listening. Too many polemics.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov railed against the United States but spared Europe. No wonder. The Kremlin must be savoring the weak dialogue in the transatlantic relationship. Pence didn’t hold back any punches about the hapless Europeans, and their continuing defense of the Iran deal. Russia was slapped hard, too.

And you should have heard Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif—his speech was one long tirade against the United States.

At least the BBC’s ace journalist Lyse Doucet did her utmost not to let him drift, compared to last year when he got away scot-free without any trenchant questioning. But similar to last year, Zarif was a stand-alone. There was no engagement with other regional players.

Zarif’s speech exposed the deep divisions between the United States and the Europeans over the Iran nuclear deal. Despite Chancellor Angela Merkel’s attempts on Saturday to explain why it was necessary to preserve the deal, while at the same time acknowledging Iran’s disruptive role in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Gaza, there was no meeting of minds between both sides of the Atlantic.

And since that is the case, how on earth are the Americans and Europeans going to work together—and with Russia—to save the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty?

How are Western leaders going to take stock that the idea of the old West, one of Atlanticism, needs to break out of this geographical setting and mindset?  

This would mean creating a wider security, political, and economic architecture that could include Japan and South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, and African and Latin American countries.

It would be about widening and deepening democracy and its values. None of these issues were brought up in the main sessions.

And as for the West defending its values, it was really shameful how Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who was given the podium on Saturday, was not at all confronted by either the chairman of the MSC nor the audience about the widespread abuse of human rights, the disappearances, the torture, and the crackdown on civil activists.

Not forgetting the fact that the rubber-stamped Egyptian parliament approved measures that would allow him to extend his rule until…2034.

And yet, three interesting, optimistic trends that affect the traditional way of doing business by the West may have traction.

The first is the way in which Greek and Macedonian leaders managed to end years of dispute over the future name of Macedonia.

Besides paving the way for Macedonia to join the EU and NATO, the accord was about political will and immense leadership and courage shown by Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and his Macedonian counterpart, Zoran Zaev. They were backed by skilled and patient diplomats from both sides who made the deal possible.

The second, again outside the confines of this almost anachronistic MSC, is the way other countries, such as the Netherlands and Norway, are quietly mediating in conflicts in the Middle East.

And the third is how a group of retired diplomats, but also those in office, realize that the West is no longer the old West. It’s about reaching out to democracies across the globe.

I’ve seen the likes of these “Declarations of Principles” before.

But they were confined to the Euro-Atlantic organizations of the EU and NATO. (And now look what’s happening in Hungary and Poland).

This time it’s about the bigger horizon that should define the contours of the West.

About using globalization and digitization to support values and democracy and humanitarian support for refugees.

Just another initiative, cynics would respond.

As it is, there’s already too much cynicism and too little dialogue. Maybe it’s time to really change the contours of the MSC itself.

For other pieces on the MSC 2019, see the following:

The Munich Security Conference Report 2019: An Evaluation

https://defense.info/featured-story/2019/02/the-munich-security-conference-the-european-blame-game/

By Robbin Laird

Having just returned from my latest trip to Germany to discuss the significant challenge facing Germany in shaping a credible force to provide for its direct defense and to contribute effectively to NATO’s overall collective defense, it is clear that for the near to mid term the Tornado replacement decision is a significant indicator of the way ahead.

The German government has committed itself to work with France to launch a long-term project to build a new air combat systems approach which will include a new fighter for the 2040s.

That is a long way off and will not contribute in the short to medium term to the deterrent challenges being faced now.

And that is not providing for a Tornado replacement.

For the Luftwaffe, there are two elements in play, which can provide for near to mid term ways to reshape its capabilities to provide for a credible effort.

On the one hand, the government is proposing to build a new Eurofighter which they have dubbed Tranche IV to replace the Tranche I Eurofighters.

If they wish to do this, the shortest path to do so is to build on the Luftwaffe’s relationship with the RAF and with British industry and its engagement in Eurofighter to adopt the British innovations which are shaping a new Typhoon for the force, one clearly being redesigned to fly with the F-35.

If the gap between the UK and Germany created by Brexit and selected EU conflicts with Britain can not be attenuated to allow for Germany to work with the UK, there will be no short path to providing for the German Eurofighters transformation into an advanced Typhoon.

On the other hand, the Tornado replacement is pressing and carries with it many key tasks essential to direct defense.

One such task is the nuclear mission to shaping effective air ground integration.

Another key task is to be able to integrate with Patriot and MEADS to deliver movable joint fires solutions for the protection of Germany and its to be rebuilt logistics sites.

The importance of this latter task is critical.

Germany has committed itself to be the logistical hub of NATO for the movement of force through Germany to the nations East and North of it for collective defense.

And doing so is a near to mid-term task, not a long range one.

Options which have been or are being considered are the F-35, the German Eurofighter (which does not yet have an AESA radar) and the Super Hornet.

In 2014, the RAAF faced a key replacement aircraft decision when it was looking to move beyond the Super Hornet to a fifth generation solution.

The thinking which shaped that decision is very relevant to Germany or even more relevant to Germany because it is the center of any Russian action against Europe in a way that is not what the Aussies face from China or North Korea.

I wrote the report for the Williams Foundation in 2015 when the RAAF discussed in a public forum the nature of the turning point and why they believed that a transition to the F-35 was essential, not just for the RAAF but for the entire transformation of the Australian Defence Force.

A key strategic thinker who retired as an Air Vice Marshal of the RAAF and has remained a key player in the transformation effort is John Blackburn.

I decided to interview Blackburn about that turning point and his thoughts about why the transition was critical for the RAAF.

In that interview, he identified three key reasons he thought the transition was critical.

First, he took me back to the presentation of the RAAF F-22 pilot who spoke at the 2014 seminar and he compared his experiences with Super Hornet to the F-22.

The core point which the pilot made was that the fifth generation air system allowed for proactive planning and operations, compared to the largely reactive situation he was in with regard to Super Hornet.

In that briefing, the experienced combat pilot underscored that from the pilot’s perspective the data fusion in the aircraft left the pilot free to manage the flow of information and to focus on mission tactics.

From the perspective of the mission commander, he now had the ability to forward plan and allocate resources pre-emptively and had a much greater ability to think and plan ahead of the current engagement.

Second, the force commander without a fifth generation aircraft would be limited against a significant peer competitor and the need to operate in contested airspace to operating in lower or mid threat levels.

This meant that a nation without direct access to fifth generation capability would need to rely on others to provide for the capability to degrade the forces of the adversary in a high threat area.

Clearly, if a nation was directly facing a peer competitor which was shaping area denial capabilities this meant that they would have to ensure that an ally with such capabilities would show up and lead the air operations.

“The challenge of working with coalition partners who really are not making the transition is that they risk becoming speed bumps in the way of fifth-generation airpower coalition engaging a peer competitor.”

Third, he argued that even though the first two points were significant, the most compelling one was that “if you are focused on platform replacement in these conditions, you are asking the wrong question.

“The right question is how your fifth generation asset would drive transformation of the entire force whilst also integrating legacy capabilities.”

Put in other words, the introduction of the F-35 into the ADF is driving overall force transformation, without which one would be looking for single force modernization rather than multi-domain transformation.

From this point of view, the F-35 is a multi-domain not a multi-mission aircraft.

“Without the F-35, we would not be doing our Plan Jericho for the air force, or the kind of significant force integration efforts which we are currently undergoing in Australia.”

However, an important point to emphasise here is that the transformation is about much more than just the 5th Gen platforms.

As Blackburn wrote in a recent article in the Australian Defence Magazine: the issue faced by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) today is that existing communications and information networks were not “designed” as an integrated system and do not appear to be a good foundation upon which to build the 5th Generation Force the ADF is acquiring. 

Indeed, Blackburn came to Denmark in 2015 to co-host a conference on behalf of the Williams Foundation with the Copenhagen-based Centre for Military Studies.

And at that conference several European airpower leaders spoke and discussed how they viewed the airpower transition in Europe.

In his presentation to the conference, Blackburn focused on the transformation process, which had been launched driven in large part by the acquisition of the F-35.

By Robbin Laird

I first had the opportunity to meet Lt. General (Retired) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz, a former German Air Chief, last Fall in Berlin at the International Fighter Conference.

During my visit to Germany in February 2019, where I was continuing my look at the challenge of building a 21st century approach to the direct defense of Europe, I had a chance to meet with him again, this time in Bonn, to discuss the challenges facing a German reset on direct defense.

According to Stieglitz: “The strategic environment has changed and requires Germany, a nation in the heart of Europe with more than 80 million people, to pay it’s fair share for the collective defense and to shape and focus on a force appropriate to the new situation.

“Obviously, the new defense effort requires more money.

“This is starting to happen.

“But we are facing a significant rebuild given the state of readiness of the force today and the need to repair that force.

“Just undertaking the repair of todays state of readiness will make the Bundeswehr a construction site for the next years.”

“We are almost back to 1955 when we had to build a new Bundeswehr.

“Our rebuild for the new strategic environment today is as significant as during these early years of the Bundeswehr.

“And all that happens after decades enjoying a peace dividend, where savings certainly have not been spent within the Bundeswehr.”

“But money alone is not enough.

“We are talking about changing the focus and building a 21st century defense force which can play its role at the heart of Europe.

“We are no longer talking about defense at the inner-German border or supporting out of area operations; we are talking about providing an umbrella for new allies who wish to see that NATO has a credible defense strategy and deterrence capability.

” Germany needs to focus on this challenge and build the appropriate force.”

He highlighted further that rebuilding the territorial defense is a key priority so that Germany could operate as a key operational reserve for NATO forces and to ensure that an adequate financial support could correct the current situation where i.e. pilots are waiting two years to get their first fighter cockpit after they finished their basic training.

“We Germans asked our allies for decades during the Cold War period to show their solidarity and to join in on the defense of Germany.

“They did this.

“Now we need to pay that back.”

The General also highlighted a key point which cannot be overlooked by the critics of NATO – the NATO military has worked effectively together and shaped common procedures and standards.

This commonality and the habit of cooperation needs to be reinforced and built upon.

“NATO is one of the international organizations which is still really functioning well.”

And he underscored that core bilateral relationships are of importance as well.

“I fully support the decisions of my successors to work on and to reinforce the relationship between the Luftwaffe and the RAF in terms of training and operations.

“We need to get to the point where we – while doing things like our Baltic Air Policing mission together – use the interoperability of our Eurofighter forces and employ these aircraft more efficiently.”

Lieutenant General (ret) Klaus-Peter Stieglitz was Chief of Staff, German Air Force from 2004 to 2009.

Lieutenant General Stieglitz joined the Luftwaffe in October 1968 and commenced officer training, followed by pilot training in the USA to become a fighter pilot. During his flying career he has accumulated more than 3.600 flight hours, mostly on combat aircraft, i.e. the F-104 Starfighter, F-4F Phantom, Mig-29 and Eurofighter/Typhoon. In 1981 – 83 he attended the German Armed Forces Staff College.

During his career he held numerous national and international staff and command positions, i.e. squadron commander, group commander, commander of a fighter wing, staff officer within the German MOD, staff officer at NATO Headquarters SHAPE, Belgium, commander of the NATO AWACS Component, Director Flight Safety of the German Armed Forces, commander of a German Air Division in Berlin and Deputy Commander NATO Air Forces Northern Europe, Ramstein.

In his last assignment he was Chief of Staff of the German Air Force from January 2004 to October 2009. Today he is engaged as senior advisor and consultant.

The featured photo shows the day when the Tornado bombers of the German Air Force are sent to their mission to Afghanistan.

Franz Josef JUNG l CDU federal minister of defence is together with general Klaus Peter STIEGLITZ/

April 2, 2007.

Credit: Alamay.