By Robbin Laird

On July 9, 2024, I had the opportunity to visit MWCS-28 which in English is Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28. The squadron provides expeditionary communications for the aviation combat element of the II Marine Expeditionary Force. They are based at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point and fall under the command of Marine Air Control Group 28 and the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing.

I was privileged to have a robust representation of the squadron and an opportunity to have a wide-ranging discussion of their approach and their recent engagement in the Nordic region in support of the Wing’s most recent Arctic exercise.

Present at the discussion were Maj. Mikel Santiago, operations officer, Lt. Col. Craig Schnappinger, commanding officer, MWCS-28, MGySgt Marcus Jackson, communications chief, MWCS-28, Maj. Richard Wise, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, 2nd MAW G-6, 1st Lt. Kara Paradowski, communications officer, MWCS-28, and 1st Lt. Bennett Lax, communications officer, MWCS-28.

It was an interesting group to discuss the way ahead with as two of the Marines were in the first tour of duty along with Marines which much combat experience.

The nature of the challenge set for the command was outlined during my interview in June with the then CG of 2nd MAW, Maj. Gen. Benedict. In that interview, he described 2nd MAW’s time in Nordic Response 2024 when a key focus was upon distributed aviation operations.

As he described the challenge: While a FARP remains the most visible manifestation of DO, it is the final action and does not by itself reflect significant choices and work necessary to create that capability to re-arm air assets at remote and ever-changing locations – allowing the force to disaggregate for protection and then aggregate to mass combat capability, all in a rapid manner to maintain tempo.

As MajGen Benedict put it: “The difference is the backside. Where is the location? Why that location? How do we get the fuel there? How do we get ordinance there? How do we provide force protection? How do we maintain the aircraft and for how long? How long are we going to be there? When do we need to move? All of these things are what I call the backside of distributed operations.”

 MWCS-28 was working the C2 support to 2nd MAW in support of distributed aviation operations.  And we discussed this along with correlated issues.

The conversation focused on the need for a fresh approach to command and control, logistics, and force distribution in the Nordic Region. Speakers emphasized the importance of understanding new technologies and integrating them into existing command structures. They also discussed the challenges of modernizing military infrastructure and investing in mobile capabilities.

Additionally, they highlighted the significance of interoperability, communication, and redesigning Command and Control systems to accommodate small form factors and user-friendly interfaces.

And a key point was that the Marines used various COTS equipment, but as they desire to use such equipment goes up notably in the C2 area, it is imperative to ensure proper training and maintenance procedures are in place for the deployed personnel to have the ability to make full use of the equipment in the most effective manner possible.

The clear purpose of working distributed forces is to enhance survivability but this has to be done within the logic of what is feasible. So this means discrete numbers of movement with the ability of C2 to support such movement.

This was exercised during Nordic Response 24, and as one Marine put it: “We utilized existing Marine Corps assets and commercial off the shelf assets in order to make ourselves more survivable and less prone to being identified hiding within the noise, so to speak. We were operating within existing infrastructure and bases that are already owned and operated by the Norwegians and working closely with them as well.”

In other words, the Marines were working distributed aviation operations but within a Nordic/NATO operating space.

But the integration piece within the Nordic operating space is a work in progress and part of the evolution of C2 capability in general which is required going forward. DAO in the Nordic case to be most effective is not a pickup piece but a planned and thought through concept of operations piece, and in my view, something 2nd MAW can excel at as the Nordics work their defense integration efforts.

There is no part of the world with more experience at operating a protected and distributed force than the Nordics and coming from North Carolina, the 2nd MAW Marines can contribute and learn how to seamless integrate into regional distribution of forces.

The challenge is significant as well as the opportunities for innovation.

By Robbin Laird

You have heard of the USMC Force Design 2030 as an adaptation to the threat environment. But with an emergent multi-polar authoritarian world, an even larger strategic redesign of U.S. forces is warranted.

The Osprey is important for the first; but is crucial for the second.

The United States and its allies are shaping a significant strategic redesign in the defense of Northern Europe coupled with the force projected from Norfolk and North Carolina.

In a way, what is being built with the Nordic region in terms of defense cooperation and integration (from Finland to Iceland) is being reinforced by the ability of the Norfolk-based fleet and the North Carolina-based Marines to work together in shaping a new strategic capability.

The three N’s (Nordics. Norfolk and North Carolina) are reshaping Northern European and North Atlantic defense, where the region is working its own defense and the United States (and Canada and Britain) provide reinforced capabilities to the overall strategic deterrence of Russia.

This is has come about with the interaction among three key dynamics:

• The Nordics post-2014 ramping up their defense capabilities and integration with the entrance of Finland and Sweden as an expression of this;
• the standup of Second Fleet and the establishment of the only NATO command on U.S. territory under President Trump (there are three commands under the 2^nd Fleet Commander which are 2^nd Fleet, Allied Joint Forces Command and the Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of Excellence (CJOS COE));
• And the enhanced focus of attention of the North Carolina-based Marines on the Northern European region.

All three developments I have documented in detail in recent book length publications, so those books can be examined for detailed looks.[1]

But for the purposes of this article, the key point is that these three developments are creating the opportunity for a significant strategic redesign of U.S. and allied forces whereby the United States is reinforcing key allies and not replacing capabilities they should but don’t have developed themselves.

It is open ended in the sense that as the Nordic allies work through how to use their territory as a common defense capability, the U.S. Navy and USMC can work on how to operate in concert with these allies whereby the fleet can operate in the High North as well as in support of air and missile defense of the Nordic region. Additionally, the Marines can work on how to embed themselves in the Nordic region whereby the Nordics are the “inside force” to use the language of the USMC force design effort.

I have frequently visited 2^nd Marine Air Wing, and in one of the more recent visits (May 2024), the departing CO of 2^nd MAW, MajGen Benedict highlighted how he saw the opportunity.

“I went to a senior commander course in Naples where we focused on maritime combined arms operations. It struck me that both the Navy and Marines almost solely focus on Marine capabilities being employed from the sea, but not so much on how we can come from the land to support the naval campaign.”

“The opportunity to work with the Nordics as they continue to enhance defense integration clearly allows us to demonstrate and take advantage of that opportunity and to shape innovative ways to do so. And we did that in the Nordic Response 2024 exercise as well. There is a lot we can achieve in littoral operations without solely operating from an amphibious ship.”

The Marines have moved from their classic Cold War role of arriving in Norway and pulling out equipment from storage facilities as part of the reinforcement of Norway to become increasingly part of an integrated Marine Corps-Navy team reinforcing the Nordics, who are enhancing their capability to defend themselves.

But what role can the Osprey play in this strategic redesign?

In what I am calling the “3N” strategic redesign, the Nordics are working collectively together to enhance their ability to operate in strategic depth across their region, in addition to enhancing local or national defense capabilities. 2nd Fleet and the NATO command are working to shape more effective maritime reach and cover over the region reaching back to North America.

The Marines can project into the region, and through their innovations in distributed operations, in concert with the Nordic nations, can work through various combat nodes across the region. Supplies can be pre-positioned across the region and flown by Ospreys from the land to the fleet.

And with the CMV-22Bs coming from Norfolk, and working from the fleet and within the fleet, they can work together with USMC MV-22Bs to shape a cross-linking logistical capability for the fleet operating in support of Nordic and Marine Corps operations in the Nordic region, including the High North.

The Osprey, whether operating from the ship or the land, becomes a key logistical connector in the operations that can link up Nordic land and air defense with maritime reach.

Because the Osprey can land virtually anywhere, and has speed and range, the logistical reach from sea to land or land to sea becomes a key enabler for the evolving strategic redesign of the defense of the Nordics and the reach into North Atlantic defense.

There is no other logistic link which can work the distribution of supplies embedded in the Nordic region with the range and speed of the Osprey in order to connect the various nodes of the warfighting force across an integrated land and maritime extended battlespace.

[1] Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21^st Century Authoritarian Challenge (2020); Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21^st Century (2022); Robbin Laird, The U.S. Marine Corps Transformation Path: Preparing for the High-End Fight (2022).

Featured Photo: Aug. 17, 2023) A CMV-22B Osprey, assigned to the “Titans” of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30, returns to Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Vinson, Carrier Strike Group 1’s flagship, is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Isaiah B. Goessl)

By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, I visited Marine Corps Air Station New River and had a chance to meet with two members involved from the outset in HMH-461 standing up the CH-53K.

I first visited New River in 2010, where the focus was on the coming of the Osprey and its initial engagement in Iraq and later that year in Afghanistan. The Osprey is obviously a very different aircraft than the CH-46 it replaced, as is the CH-53K with regard to the CH-53E. It just doesn’t look that way in terms of a quick glance.

That is why I wrote a piece in 2020 where I suggested it should have been called something different, such as the CH-55. This is what I wrote:

To the casual observer, the Super Stallion and the King Stallion look like the same aircraft.

One of the challenges in understanding how different the CH-53K is from the CH-53E is the numbering part.

If it were called CH-55 perhaps one would get the point that these are very different air platforms, with very different capabilities.

What they have in common, by deliberate design, is a similar logistical footprint, so that they could operate similarly off of amphibious ships or other ships in the fleet for that matter.

But the CH-53E is a mechanical aircraft, which most assuredly the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is not.

In blunt terms, the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is faster, carries more kit, can distribute its load to multiple locations without landing, is built as a digital aircraft from the ground up and can leverage its digitality for significant advancements in how it is maintained, how it operates in a task force, how it can be updated, and how it could work with unmanned systems or remotes.

These capabilities taken together create a very different lift platform than is the legacy CH-53E. In a strategic environment where force mobility is informing capabilities across the combat spectrum, it is hard to understate the value of a lift platform, notably one which can talk and operate digitally, in carving out new tactical capabilities with strategic impacts.

During my July 2024 visit, I met with Capt. Jeffrey Stanton, assistant operations officer, and with Capt. Philip Wood, CH-53K pilot and pilot training officer.

In fact, at the beginning of the discussion, the officers noted my chapter in my CH-53K book which made the CH-55 point, and they fully underscored the core argument about the differences of the King Stallion from its predecessor.

Both officers were legacy heavy lift operators and came to the squadron at the same time and have been on the ground floor with the squadron as it has begun its CH-53K operations.

As Capt. Wood put it: “The CH-53K is a completely different aircraft from the CH-53E. The way you physically fly it, the way you plan for operations, and the way you maintain it are completely different.”

He went on to note that when he came to the CH-53K he was told not to treat it as an Echo but to change his mindset. And he noted that helped him to shape a different muscle memory capability to fly and operate the aircraft, again, completely different from the Echo.

Capt. Wood described the shift as follows: “It is more of mental than physical game in operating the aircraft.

“You are focused on manipulating everything the aircraft can do. You are focused outside of the aircraft on what the pilots can do to support operations. The pilots have much more situational awareness and can operate the aircraft to support the changing operations environments more rapidly.”

We then discussed an interesting case of the difference which I learned about when I visited MAWTS-1. This was the case of a downed Navy helo which had to be lifted out of a very difficult location, namely at the bottom of a ravine.

This is how 2nd MAW described the operation:

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 and 2nd Distribution Support Battalion (DSB), U.S. Navy Sailors with Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Four, and animal packers with the U.S. National Forest Service hike to the site of a downed U.S. Navy MH-60S Seahawk to prepare it for recovery at Inyo National Forest, California, Oct. 19, 2023.

The combined efforts of U.S. Marines, Sailors, and Forest Service personnel allowed HMH-461 to successfully recover the MH-60S Seahawk with a CH-53K King Stallion.

HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, and 2nd DSB is a subordinate unit of the 2nd Marine Logistics Group, the aviation and logistics combat elements of the II Marine Expeditionary Force.

What I learned at MAWTS-1 was that the hover capability of the King Stallion was critical to being able to lift the downed Seahawk out of the ravine. During a visit to VMX-1 in 2020 with Lt. Col. Frank, he underscored the importance of precision hover as follows:

“We’re not used to anything like this. It’s very intuitive. It can be as hands off as you know, a brand-new Tesla, you can close your eyes, set the autopilot and fly across country. Obviously, you wouldn’t do that in a tactical environment, but it does reduce your workload, reduces your stress.

“And in precision hover areas, whether it’s night under low light conditions, under NVGs, in the confines of a tight landing zone, we have the ability to hit position hold in the 53K and have the aircraft maintain pretty much within one foot of its intended hover point, one foot forward, lateral and AFT, and then one foot of vertical elevation change. It will maintain that hover until the end of the time if required. That’s very, very stress relieving for us when landing in degraded visual environments.”

Capt. Stanton was part of the ground crew during the Seahawk recovery operation and underscored how the King Stallion facilitated the lift operation. He noted: “I was on the advance party we sent out to plan the operation. It was clear that using the CH-53K would reduce significantly the risk factors involved in such an operation. It was around a 2 minute precision hover to come in and allow the helicopter support team to rig the Seahawk and to have the CH-53K to lift the Seahawk. And we did some non-traditional hooking of the aircraft to the CH-53K as well.”

The two officers noted that the aircraft is going through its developmental progression so that new capabilities are being released as the aircraft tests out each of these capabilities. That means that the King Stallion has been largely limited operationally to what the Marines do with the CH-53E but as capabilities are certified and then available, they fully expect the squadron to drive significant new innovations with a fully operational CH-53K squadron.

And while doing the path to transition, they are doing even CH-53E tasks more efficiently and in a more effective manner. Notably when moving equipment off an amphibious ship, the CH-53K can carry what a CH-53E either cannot or not do as easily or efficiently. A case in point is the ability of a CH-53K to carry a JLTV ashore in one sweep.

Col. Fleeger in my recent interview with her underscored how she saw the innovation process associated with the aircraft as follows:

“The operating crews will drive the out of the box thinking about how we can use our heavy lift assets to do new things and work new thinking about what payloads we can and should carry. In the Marine Corps, there is not simply out of the box thinking, it is really about operational innovations, and such innovations will drive new ways to use the CH-53K forward and suggest innovations we can work with the remaining legacy heavy lift aircraft.”

Both officers underscored their agreement with this perspective.

As Capt. Wood put it: “There are a lot of things we could do now with the CH-53K that have yet to explore.

“And there are certainly things the aircraft can do that we have not even thought of.

“The fleet pilots will come up with new ways of doing things and employing its new capabilities.

“And it has capabilities were are not even realizing now.”

Featured Image: A U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion helicopter, assigned to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, conducts an external lift at Auxiliary Airfield II near Yuma, Arizona, March 28, 2023. The CH-53K King Stallion performed the heaviest lift by a U.S. military helicopter outside of developmental testing with a total load weight of 36,000 pounds. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps still image extracted from video by Cpl. Jaye Townsend)

The Strategic Shift and the Role of the Heavy Lift Helicopter in the USMC