Doing the European Dance: Putin and the Next Stage of European Development

08/24/2018

By Robbin Laird

Russia under Putin has been working hard his strategic agenda with regard to the West. At the heart of this strategy has been to reduce the direct threat to Russia posed by NATO and to stop NATO expansion in its tracks.

He has been more successful with the second than the first.

But with the European integration effort in question, with Brexit challenging the foundations of the way ahead for Europe both in terms of its domestic and foreign policy development, Putin has not been sitting idly by and waiting for a outcome favorable to his interests.

He clearly has been playing off President Trump’s approach to public diplomacy in Europe, which has been to challenge the European integration agenda and with his Article V NATO attacks suggesting the President has his own list of allies worthy of being defended which will we only really learn what his internal list is in a crisis.

This kind of ambiguity is exactly what Putin savors as it allows him maneuvering room to suggest that there are alternatives to collective defense, namely the kind of bilateralism President Trump himself favors.

And bilateralism is clearly a key tool for Putin in trying to expand influence and to shape a more favorable environment for the Russian authoritarian state.

We have seen examples of this quite literally in the European dance which he conducted with Austria earlier this month.

In an article published recently in the EU Observer by Stephanie Liechtenstein, the literal dance was described:

Last weekend’s pictures were hard to put into context, even for long-time observers of Austrian politics.

Austrian foreign minister Karin Kneissl got married at a vineyard in the picturesque Styrian hills of southern Austria on Saturday (18 August), but what was originally supposed to be a private affair turned into a highly political event with implications for Austria and Europe at the same time.

Kneissl not only invited Austrian chancellor Sebastian Kurz of the conservative Austrian People’s Party (OVP) and vice-chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache of the far-right Freedom Party (FPO).

There was also a foreign guest who attracted all the attention: Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Putin sat next to the couple as they exchanged vows. Afterwards the Russian president delivered a speech in perfect German, wishing the bridal couple “much, much luck and health for their future together”. 

There was also a Russian Cossack choir dressed in bright red traditional clothes, Putin’s personal wedding gift to the bride and groom.

The Russian leader even briefly danced with the bride, at the end of which the Austrian foreign minister went down on her knees in front of the Russian president in an apparent attempt to thank him for his presence. 

Putin certainly understands his European history and certainly remembers that modern Austria was born in part with the actions of the Soviet Union working with the West.

Russian troops left Austria in 1955 on the condition that it would become a neutral country and not join any military alliance.

And with regard to Germany, the reunification process also involved assurances from the United States and the new German state about how Germany would fit into the EU and NATO going forward.

From  the Soviet side there were clear ideas about how East Germany joining with West Germany would not move the threat directly to Russia further East, as the Soviets understood the nature of the threat posed by NATO.

Of course, the Clinton Administration did precisely that from the Russian point of view.

I followed this process in great detail in both the United States and Europe and wrote number of key pieces on this process as well as running insider working groups in Washington DC at the time.

(Robbin Laird, The Soviets, Germany and the New Europe, Westview Press, 1991.)

This is history which most inside the Beltway politicians simply would not have forgotten; they would not simply know.

But for a Russian like Putin this is not just history.

After the dance in Australia, President Putin went to Germany and worked the German relationship.

In the wake of President Trump’s recent visit to Germany where he highlighted that any German deal with Russia was not a good idea, Putin was given the green light to proceed with what then could elevate and economic deal into a strategic event.

During his visit to Europe in July 2018, President Trump elevated the significance of any gas pipeline deal between Germany and Russia.

U.S. President Donald Trump launched a sharp public attack on Germany on Wednesday for supporting a Baltic Sea gas pipeline deal with Russia, saying Berlin had become “a captive to Russia” and he criticized it for failing to raise defense spending more.

Trump, meeting reporters with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, before a NATO summit in Brussels, said it was “very inappropriate” that the United States was paying for European defense against Russia while Germany, the biggest European economy, was supporting gas deals with Moscow.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-summit-pipeline/trump-lashes-germany-over-gas-pipeline-deal-calls-it-russias-captive-idUSKBN1K10VI

There is a long history to the gas pipeline deal, with many Europeans and Americans concerned about the potential implications, but President Trump now directly correlated the deal with a much higher level strategic issue, namely NATO defense.

It did not take long for German speaking and long time European observer and Soviet policy maker on Germany to jump in and take advantage of this Trump declaration.

In an article published by the EUObserver, entitled “Putin Strikes Blow Against Russia’s Isolation in Europe,” the author focused on the German-Russian meeting to discuss the pipeline deal.

Russian leader Vladimir Putin has joined forces with Germany against the US over a new gas pipeline. 

His weekend trip, which included a visit to Austria, also struck a symbolic blow against EU diplomatic sanctions over his invasion of Ukraine. 

German chancellor Angela Merkel and Putin defended the Nord Stream 2 gas project at their meeting in Meseberg Castle, outside Berlin, on Saturday (18 August) in Putin’s first bilateral visit to Germany since the invasion in 2014.

“In connection with Ukraine, we will also talk about gas transit. In my view, even if Nord Stream 2 exists, Ukraine has a role to play in gas transit to Europe,” Merkel said ahead of their three-and-a-half hour discussions. 

The project will “perfect the European gas transport system and minimise transit risks. It will ensure supply for growing consumption in Europe”, Putin said.

“Nord Stream 2 is an exclusively economic project. It does not close any possibilities for transit of Russian gas through Ukraine,” he added. 

“Germany is one of the largest buyers of Russian energy resources … consumption of Russian gas is growing from year to year. Last year, it increased by 13 percent,” he also said.

The pipeline, which is already being built, will concentrate 80 percent of Russian gas sales to Europe on the German route from 2020. 

Putin has no intention being on the sidelines while Europe sorts through its new stage of development.

And let me be clear; the trajectory of the past two decades of European development is over; the question is what will the next phase become.

And Putin intends to become a key stakeholder in what comes next, which is amazing because not so long ago, the Soviet empire disintegrated.

He will clearly play off of Western developments both at the intra-European and trans-atlantic levels.

 

 

Shaping a Way Ahead for the Royal Australian Navy in a Deterrent Strategy

By Robbin Laird

Sydney, Australia

During my visit to Fleet Base East in Sydney, I had a chance to talk with Captain Leif Maxfield, Deputy Commodore Warfare in the Royal Australian Navy.

At Garden Island, two of the latest additions for the RAN can be seen, namely the new amphibious ships, and HMAS Adelaide was in port the day I was there along with HMAS Hobart, which I reported on during my last article.

Captain Maxfield has a strong background in working in the amphibious warfare area and on the strategic shift worked by Vice Admiral Barrett while working on his staff. Currently, he works as the Deputy Commodore Warfare for the RAN, and among other things, the office is in charge of the Maritime Warfare Center.

The Royal Australian Navy is adding new ships, such as the amphibious ships, the air warfare destroyer, new frigates and new submarines.  But at the heart of the rebuild of the RAN is a very clear focus on two key elements involving concepts of operations and working a manufacturing/sustainment “continuous shipbuilding dynamic.”

With regard to the first, the focus is upon air-sea integration and working multi-domain warfare within an integrated battlespace.  As Captain Maxfield put it: “We area focused on integrated warfare approaches. Our maritime warfare center and the air warfare center have established a joint steering group to guide both centers down this path.”

At the heart of the focus is upon joint task forces and how to work the maritime and air components into effective task force operational capabilities. “We are bringing innovations on the air side and the maritime side into an evolving joint task force approach.”

The focus of the maritime warfare branch is upon force generation.  “We are focused on shaping force training packages to be able to deliver the kind of joint warfighting capabilities we need.”

Another key element of the maritime warfare branch is engagement in multi-lateral training exercises, such as RIMPAC 2018, where they provide standing staffs to provide for the maritime warfare component for the Australian force engaged in the particular exercise.

With a close working relationship with the air warfare center, shaping a maritime joint warfare training approach and participation in key multi-lateral exercises, the focus is upon shaping a solid foundation or building blocks for the journey forward into a more effective joint warfare capability for the RANand the ADF.

According to Captain Maxfield, “we are thereby laying the key stepping stones to how we take us to where want to be in 10, 20 years’ time in shaping a truly joint, integrated force capable of seamlessly interacting and integrating with allies in the combined operational environment.”

The integrated warfare approach being pursued by the RAN is intended to be highly interactive with the shipbuilding approach being crafted to build out the new fleet for the RAN.

The Aussies refer to this as a “continuous shipbuilding approach” which Vice Admiral Barrett then the  Chief of Navy described in an interview I did with him last year.

We spoke last time about the Ship Zero concept.

This is how we are focusing upon shaping a 21st century support structure for the combat fleet.

I want the Systems Program Office, the Group that manages the ship, as well as the contracted services to work together on site.

I want the trainers there, as well, so that when we’re maintaining one part of the system at sea, it’s the same people in the same building maintaining those things that will allow us to make future decisions about obsolescence or training requirements, or to just manage today’s fleet.

I want these people sitting next to each other and learning together.

It’s a mindset.

It puts as much more effort into infrastructure design as it does into combat readiness, which is about numbers today.

You want to shape infrastructure that is all about availability of assets you need for mission success, and not just readiness in a numerical sense.

Getting the right infrastructure to generate fleet innovation on a sustained basis is what is crucial for mission success.

And when I speak of a continuous build process this is what I mean.

We will build new frigates in a new yard but it is not a fire and forget missile.

We need a sustained enterprise that will innovate through the life of those frigates operating in an integrated ADF force.

That is what I am looking for us to shape going forward.

The importance of getting the manufacturing/sustainment approach was highlighted by Captain Maxfield as a key element of the strategic shift to an effective joint warfighting strategy.  If you do not design your ships with flexibility and agility in mind for a long-term effective modernization approach which encompasses joint integration, the RAN will simply not be able to get where it wants to go.

As Captain Maxfield emphasized, “We need to make sure that the integrated design concept and approach is on the ground floor as we build our new ships. We have shaped a navy-government-industry working relationship that we envisage will deliver life-cycle innovation for the joint force, not simply a one off build of a new combat ship. We are building a consolidated industry and service approach to ensure that will give us the best possible chance of delivering integrated output.”

When I visited Portsmouth this Spring, a key focus for the planners working the roll out of the Queen Elizabeth was how to ensure the best ways to ensure that ship availability and aircraft availability would dovetail to deliver best deployed capability.  For the RAN, fast jets and MPA capabilities are provide by the RAAF, which means that one challenge will be to work closely with the RAAF to ensure that aircraft availability dovetails effectively with ship deployments.

This clearly is a work in progress but does highlight how cross-cutting availability of separate service assets need to be coordinated if there is to be a maximum joint capability which can be deployed in a crisis.

Clearly, the coming of the new LHDs in the RAN has been providing a window into that challenge, as an amphibious task force is a very flexible force, which requires coordinated consideration of air and maritime assets appropriate to a specific configuration for an amphibious task force.  And this learning process is a good lead into the evolving task force approach being built by the ADF.

As Captain Maxfield put it: “We are on a journey of discovery with regard to the focus on an integrated task force approach. With the new LHDs and the air warfare destroyer, we have two platforms that are key elements of shaping the approach and forging or way forward.  But it is a journey of discovery for sure.”

Captain Maxfield underscored the importance of what Rear Admiral Mayer, previously Commander of the Australian Fleet, emphasized during his tenure: “It is about the network.”

“To deliver deterrence in the evolving strategic context, we need to deliver an effective integrated force and that relies on secure and capable networks. In the last few years, we have shifted from being a single-ship Navy to becoming a task group-focused organization that is appreciating the imperatives of joint integrated war fighting and what the sustainability and availability of assets delivers to the force.”

Vice Admiral Barrett emphasized in the various interviews I have done with him as well as his book on the Navy and the nation, how critical a comprehensive effort from the workforce as well as the uniformed military was going to be to get the kind of Royal Australian Navy the nation needs to lay a solid foundation for a 21stcentury integrated forces.

As Captain Maxfield concluded: “The ability to deliver new platforms, to maintain those platforms, to sustain those platforms, to repair those platforms and keep ahead with cutting edge technology will rest on our ability to support the effort with our educational system, our industrial system and effective cross cutting learning fromthe fleet back to the yards as we move forward.”

Featured Photo shows ship’s company of HMAS Melbourne standing at attention as she passes HMAS Adelaide during her departure from Fleet Base East in Sydney, for Indo-Pacific Endeavour 2018.

May 28, 2018.

Australian Department of Defece

 

Brexit in Limbo: Summer Time with Boris and Jeremy

By Kenneth Maxwell

It is summer time in the UK.

The politicians are away from Westminster but political intrigue remains at fever pitch.

The fixation continues to be Brexit.

The deadline for the UK exiting the European Community is fast approaching.

But the Conservatives and the Labour Party are deeply split over Brexit and are embroiled in their own internal and never ending leadership battles.

The former British Foreign Secretary and former London mayor, Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, better known as “Boris”  has used his revived column in “The Daily Telegraph” to ignite a venemous bruhaha over the use of the burka by Muslim women.

He ostensibly attacked the Danish decision to ban the burka.

But in doing so he attacked Muslim women who “chose to go around looking like letter boxes” and “bank robbers.”

Boris Johnson has made a career of self-promoting offensive comments.

He is notorious for his overweening ambition to become the leader of the Conservative Party. He resigned from the government three days after prime minister, Theresa May, had corralled her cabinet at her official country retreat of Chequers, into an agreed common proposal for the Brexit negotiations in Brussels.

But Boris, who had been the most high profile leader of the Brexit campaign, jumped ship.

As editor of the conservative opinion weekly “The Spectator,” owed at the time by the Canadian born British media mogel, Conrad Black, also known as Baron Black of Crossharbour (who was later convicted on four counts of fraud in the US District Count in Chicago), Boris published the racist and anti-semitic comments of “Taki” Theodoracopulos.

Black had also employed Boris at the “Daily Telegraph” which he owned at the time, after Boris was fired by the “The Times” for falsifying a quotation.

Black later called Boris “ineffably duplicitous.”

Boris said that the Queen enjoyed her tours of the Commonwealth because of the “cheering crowds of flag-waving piccaninnes.” Tony Blair in the Congo would be met by “watermelon smiles.”

He called Hillary Clinton a “sadistic nurse in a mental hospital.”

It is not surprising that this New York City born British politican, should now be taking pages out of Donald Trump’s “crooked Hillary” political playbook.

Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour Party leader, meanwhile, is embroiled in an ugly controvesy over anti-Semitism.

The British right-wing tabloid press, led by the “Daily Mail,” is attacking him for his attendance at a ceremony in Tunisia in 2014 (before he became Labour Party leader) where he laid a wreath at the memorial for Palestinian victims of an Israeli air strike in 1985.

The problem is that he was standing next to Maher al-Taher, the leader in exile of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine at the ceremony in Tunis, which is considered by both the EU and the US to be a terrorist group.

Benjamin Netanyahu weighed in and said that Corbyn deserved “uneqivocal condemnation” for laying a wreath on the grave of a Palestinian terrorist of “Black September” who had killed 11 hostages from the Israeli Olympic team and a West German policeman at the 1972 Munich Games.

The British Jewish community was already deeply alienated from Corbyn.

Jewish Labour members of parliament, and the Board of Deputies of British Jews, as well as all the leading British Jewish newspapers which claimed that Corbyn is  “an existential threat to Jewish life.”

They were infuriated by the Labour Party’s refusal to align its definition of anti-Semitism with that of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

Len McCluskey, the powerful trade union boss, and a long time Corbyn supporter, said that the Jewish leaders have shown “intransigent hostility” to Mr Corbyn, and that some Labour MP’s were using the row to “provide rocket fuel a split in the party.”

He said the party was descending “into a vortex of McCarthyism” in its row over anti-~Semitism.

The Labour Party has complained to the press regulator over press coverage of the Tunis ceremony.

Perhaps Len McCluskey should have reminded his Labour Party colleagues, that Roy Cohn, who was the chief legal counsel to Senator Joseph McCarthy during his notorious “red-scare” anti-communist hearings, went on to be Donald Trump counsel and mentor (while also representing major Mafia bosses like Tony Salerno, Carmine Galante and John Gotti).

With Boris Johnson anti-muslim rhetoric, and Jeremy Corbyn’s anti-semitic reticience, the undertones of bitterness in British politics is getting very ugly indeed.

Meanwhile, in the real world, the credit agency, Fitch, has lowered its expectations of a smooth Brexit transition deal, warning that “an acrimonious and distruptive no-deal Brexit is a material and growing possibility.”

The featured photo shows Boris Johnson visiting a mosque in west London.

https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/boris-johnsons-facebook-page-mobbed-by-racists-after-burqa-furore-f5jp2k77h

 

Australia Builds Out Its Alliance Relationships With Shipbuilding Deals

By Robbin Laird

Research Fellow, The Williams Foundation

Canberra, Australia

As the Chinese challenge grows, Australia is clearly concerned about expanded Chinese influence within Australia and with regard to Chinese efforts to reshape the external environment to expand the influence and power of the Chinese authoritarian state.

Clearly the United States remains Australia’s core ally in dealing with the Chinese challenge, but as Australia modernizes its forces, it is broadening as well its working relationships with other key allies

The case of dealing with the region’s growing submarine threat provides a good case study of how the Aussies are working their alliance relationships. With the P-8 and F-35, the Aussies are working closely with the US to add new multi-domain warfighting capabilities to the force. The Aussies just stood up their own training facilities for the P-8, have eight P-8s already at RAAF Edinburgh and are moving ahead with this new capability. They are concurrently working to stand up their F-35 squadrons in rapid succession as well.

The Royal Australian Navy has worked hard to rebuild their once-flawed Collins class submarines and to generate higher availability rates as part of their response to the growing submarine threat in the Pacific. With the P-8 working with Collins, and with the F-35s working with P-8s as well, the RAAF and RAN will shape a new template with the United States to work anti-submarine warfare over the next few years, one in which their reach and capabilities are extended.

The next round of naval capability is being worked with the Brits and the French in terms of platforms, though the US is slated to play a continuing role in terms of force integration.

The UK and Australian Shipbuilding

As Britain faces a post-Brexit world, working with the Aussies is seen as a key political objective, in addition to any technological relationship. Australia decided to buy the new UK Global Combat Ship frigate at the end of June 2018, a key touchstone of how London sees its new role. It also is a good indicator of the Aussie point of view on what it needs for a new approach to shipbuilding.

The Australian anti-submarine frigates will be known as the Hunter Class and will be built by ASC Shipbuilding at the Osborne Naval Shipyard in Adelaide, South Australia. The Hunter class should enter service in the late 2020s. They replace eight Anzac frigates, which have been in service since 1996.

The ships will carry the Australian-developed CEA Phased-Array Radar and the US Navy’s Aegis combat management system.

The UK and Australia are shaping a wide ranging set of agreements on working together as well as determining what Aussie assets might go onto the UK version as well.  There is a clear design and build strategy already agreed to and a key focus is upon the manufacturing process and facility to be set up at the Osborne shipyards.

The priority is upon creating a digital build process. According to a top BAE Systemsofficial involved in the process, the benefits will be significant.

“Having a single point of truth in the design phase will mean that each of the nine ships will be replicated, which hasn’t been done in Australia previously, and which will benefit every stage of the program, including the upgrading and maintenance of the ships during service,’’ Glynn Phillips, CEO of BAE Systems Australia, said. “It will also be the first time in Australia where a ship’s systems will have the intelligence to report on its own performance and maintenance needs and have the ability to order both the maintenance and parts required prior to docking.”

With the coming of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers and the new UK frigates, and with extensive collaboration to build the Aussie frigates, a key foundation is being laid for working the UK-Australian strategic relationship in the years ahead.

Australia Reaches Out To The French

The Australians signed an agreement in 2016 to work with the French in building what the Australian government called “a regionally superior submarine.” That agreement has seen the first key enabling contract to establish the ship design process, but not yet the build agreement with a target price for the initial submarine.

What has been signed in addition to the agreement on intent and the security agreements in 2016, is Mobilization Contract for $5B (Aussie) which set up the working facilities to work the design process. in Adelaide and in Cherbourg

With the election of President Macron, the French have been forthcoming in focusing on the Chinese challenge and have highlighted the importance of the strategic relationship with India and Australia as well.  Building a new submarine capability in Australia will allow France not only to enhance their partnership with Australia but could allow French forces as well as industry to play a greater role in the region as well.

But the challenge for France is providing by the need to ensure that the two cultures can find ways to work together effectively in delivering what the Australians seek, which is a work in progress, and no easy task. And now the agreement with the UK with regard to the frigate is shaping a baseline expectation with regard to the build process for the submarine as well.

The Australians are coming to the new build submarine with several key expectations. The submarine is to be a large conventionally powered submarine with an American combat system on board allowing for integration with the US and Japanese fleets.

The Commonwealth has already signed the combat systems side of the agreement with Lockheed Martin and the LM/US Navy working relationship in the Virginia class submarine is the clear benchmark from which the Aussies expect their combat system to evolve as well.

The new submarine is not an off-the-shelf design; it leverages the French Navy’s Barracuda class submarine, but the new design will differ in a number of fundamental ways.  The design contract is in place and the process is underway, with Australian engineers now resident in Cherbourg working with French engineers on the design.

But design is one thing; setting up the new manufacturing facility, transferring technology, shaping a work culture where Aussie and French approaches can shape an effective two-way partnership is a work in progress.  And agreeing a price for the new submarine, and the size of the workforce supporting the effort in France and Australia are clearly challenges yet to be met.

And with the build of new frigates and submarines focused on the Osborne shipyards, workforce will clearly be a challenge.  Shaping a more effective technical and educational infrastructure in the region to support the comprehensive shipbuilding effort is clearly one of the reasons that the yard was picked as a means for further development of South Australia.

The Aussies are coming at the new submarine program with what they consider to be the lessons from the Collins class. This includes limited technology transfer, significant performance problems and a difficult and expensive remake of the program to get it to the point where the submarine has a much more acceptable availability rate.

Clearly, the Aussies are looking to be able to have a fleet management approach to availability and one, which can be correlated with deployability, which is what they are working currently with the Collins class submarine.

This is clearly one of the baseline expectations by the Australians – they simply do not want to build a submarine per se; they want to set up an enterprise which can deliver high availability rates, enhanced maintainability built in, modularity for upgradeability and an ability to better embed the performance metrics into a clear understanding of deployability – where does the Australian Navy need to go and how will it reshape its con-ops going forward and how do upgrades of the submarine fit into all of the above?

In my discussions in Australia, I’ve found a clear focus on building a state-of-the-art facility along these lines with regard to the submarine program as well. This means that the Aussies are not simply looking to see the French transfer current manufacturing technologies to build the new submarine, to co-innovate in shaping new and innovative approaches. By looking at Asian innovations in shipbuilding, the Aussies would like to see some of those innovations built into their manufacturing processes in their new manufacturing facility.

Put simply, the Aussies do not want to repeat the Collins experience. They want modern manufacturing processes, which they anticipate with the new frigate and have seen with regard to P-8, Triton and F-35, all programs in which they are already a key stakeholder.

The question is can the cultural dynamics of France working with Australia, with very clear Australian expectations, deliver the kind of long term, cross-learning partnership which Australia seeks in this program?

There are clearly key challenges of cross-culture learning and trust to be sorted out to be able to make this partnership work. From my discussions in Australia, it is clear that on the Aussie side there is a fundamental desire to shape a long term partnership with France in what the Aussies are calling a “continuous build” process.

Here the question is not of a one off design, and then build with the Aussie work force operating similarly to the Indian workforce in the process of a build as was done by DCNS with India.

The Aussies are not in a rush and as one Aussie put it to me: “We want the right kind of agreement; we are not interested in the wrong type of agreement.”  And when we discussed what the right type of agreement looked like, it was clearly something akin to the UK agreement.

The challenge though is that the Commonwealth has a longstanding working relationship with BAE Systems and the UK. And the UK is part of Five Eyes, which provides a relatively straightforward way to deal with security arrangements.

The Commonwealth has had a more limited working relationship with France and the defense industry within which France is a key player. It has had experience working with programs in which France is a key player like KC-30A, NH-90 and Tiger.  The very good experience has clearly been working with Airbus Defence and Space on the KC-30A, but the NH-90 and Tiger experiences with Airbus Helicopters has not been as positive.

When the Collins Class experience is married to the air systems experience, then the Aussie tolerance for agreeing to anything that is not comprehensive and well thought out is very low.  The challenge for France and Naval Group will be to build a long term partnership which can clearly set in motion a new working relationship which is not framed by these past experiences, but can leverage the very positive KC-30A working relationship.

The KC-30A is obviously different from the submarine because the plane was built abroad and the working relationship very good with Airbus Space and Defence where the Aussies are a cutting edge user pushing the way ahead with the company to shape future capabilities.

That is also the challenge: is Naval Group really a company like Lockheed or Airbus Defence and Space?  Or is the French government involvement so deep that the working processes with Naval Group not be transparent enough and credible enough to shape the kind of partnership the Aussies are looking for?

The migration of Airbus, notably under the leadership of Tom Enders, has clearly underscored the independence of this key European company and Naval Group has more of a challenge demonstrating its independence to deliver not a product nor a build of an existing product on foreign soil, but an open-ended partnership able to shape and evolve a new build product where the digital processes of build and sustain are so significant.

Conclusion

All of this adds up to the Australians building out their force capabilities with the Americans over the next five years, and then start to see UK and French led efforts in shipbuilding then fielding new capabilities, which can be integrated into the evolving Australian force structure.  with these engagements comes in tow the reshaping of their alliance relationships as well.

In effect, the Australians are in the throes of remaking their history.  Their history has been to be part of a broader power defending their interests; first as part of the British Empire, and then during and after World War II as part of the American presence in the Pacific.

What we are seeing now is a more sovereign and independent approach building on that American relationship and broadening their alliance in practical terms as well, And as Japan extends its perimeter defense and industrial investment to do this, almost certainly the relationship with Australia will become a key part of this evolving alliance mosaic for Australia as well.

This article was first published by Breaking Defense on August 22, 2018.

 

 

Visiting RAAF Edinburgh: An Update on the Aussie P-8 Enterprise

By Robbin Laird

Canberra, Australia

During my visit to RAAF Edinburgh on August 10, 2018, I had a chance to talk with Group Captain Darren Goldie, Officer Commanding 92 Wing.

92 Wing is described by the RAAF as follows:

Headquartered at RAAF Base Edinburgh, No 92 Wing (92WG) has long been established as the first Maritime Wing of the Air Force.

The Wing is responsible for conducting long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions in support of Australia’s national interests worldwide. 92WG is also responsible for search and survivor supply missions throughout Australia’s region of responsibility.

92WG commands: 

  • Two operational flying squadrons: Nos 10 and 11 Squadrons;
  • A training squadron: No 292 Squadron;
  • An operational detachment: 92WG Detachment A at Butterworth, Malaysia; and
  • A number of operational support and development elements.

Operating AP-3C Orion and P-8A Poseidon aircraft, 92WG’s combat roles include anti-submarine and anti-surface surveillance and warfare for which the aircraft are equipped with torpedoes and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. 

The AP-3C is being replaced by the P-8A Poseidon and MQ-4C Triton which will perform the vital functions of long-range maritime patrol.

I first visited 92 Wing in March 2017.

Since that time, new buildings have been put up to support the P-8 operations as well as the main operating hangar and control center close to completion.

During that visit I had a chance to meet with Wing Commander Mick Durant, Officer Temporary Commanding 92 Wing, Wing Commander David Titheridge, Commanding Officer 11 Squadron and Wing Commander Gary Lewis, Deputy Director P-8 and Triton Transition.

In that meeting, the process of change was highlighted.

We are P-3 operators but the operating concept of P-8  is very different and we are working the transition from the P-3 to the P-8 which is a networked asset both benefiting from other networks and contributing to them as well as a core operational capability and approach.

The changes that are coming are very exciting.

So we’re moving from an aircraft, which we’ve pretty much maximized, to a new one which is called P-8, for a reason.

This is an A model aircraft. So with an A model aircraft comes to the ability to grow.

And we’re going to a new world with a starting point, which allows us to grow.

The capacity to integrate, innovate, and talk to our allies and our own services is a quantum leap in what we’ve had in the past and it will allow us to be able to do our roles differently.

Shaping that change is one of the key missions that we’ve got.

We are going to innovate and think out of the box compared to P-3 tactics and concepts of operations.

The current visit provided an opportunity to discuss progress and thoughts about the way ahead with the current 92 Wing Officer Commanding.

Group Captain Goldie comes from the C-130 community and he argued that when a new series of aircraft are introduced into a community, in this case a P-8 in what has been a P-3 community, the addition education required (through conversion onto the new aircraft type) is significant whether you have been doing MPA missions or flying very different aircraft. He argued that with a change in the aircraft type, “it’s a great opportunity to move some people around the organization, to get a bit of cross-pollination in the force.”

There are currently seven P-8s at RAAF Edinburgh.

And with the current training cycle, the RAAF will train their P-8 operators in Australia.

“The last pilots to be trained in the U.S. have just arrived. We’re basically using the instructional workforce that has been embedded inside VP-30 for the last few years.

“They’re all posted to 292 Squadron, which is located in the adjacent building to us at the moment using the various training simulators and devices we have purchased and set up for crew training.”

After the interview, we walked around the maintenance training facility, which is very impressive.  The training area includes computer-based virtual training, which is capable of providing very detailed instruction and computer replication on the various aspects of the aircraft.

The virtual maintenance training is complemented by the use of key aircraft components – training devices — to get hands on experience.  This includes a 737 which has been modified to replicate a P-8A and painted in RAAF colors, on which crew can train for loading weapons, reconfiguring the aircraft or loading the search and rescue kit.

The Wing is in the process of crossing over from P-3s to P-8s.

“We’re right in that cross at the moment. We have roughly the same amount of crews flying each of the types, with four crews each on the Orion and Poseidon.

“But numbers five, six, seven, and eight are about to get going on the P-8, which means that we’re at the crossing point. So now it’s a case for every mission between now and the end of the year, we will work with the Air Operations Centre at Joint Operations Command to decide which aircraft type is better suited to the particular mission.”

Looking back at the process, Group Captain Goldie underscored that the planning has worked quite well.

“If you were to open the spreadsheet that someone drew up in 2012 or 2013 in terms of capability realization, we are on those timelines. So it’s a testament to buying an aircraft that another international partner, in this case the United States Navy, deployed a couple years ahead of us.

“But it would be remiss of me not to mention that of course there is challenges; it’s a new aircraft, it’s a spiral upgrade aircraft. That brings with it great opportunity in the future, but it brings challenges, as well.”

The Aussies are standing up their mobile operations center to use with the aircraft. They will receive three mobile tactical operations centers with one located at RAAF Edinburgh, with the other two ready to deploy forward to meet operational requirements.

“The Mobile Tactical Operations Centers will be operated from deployable shelters in the future, although at the moment, we are using tents.”

With both P-8 and now with Triton, Australia is in a co-operative program with the US Navy, which allows them to participate in co-development.

This essentially means Air Force is an equity partner in the aircraft, allowing influence and the sharing of resources for future upgrades.

“Through a co-development program we can participate in R and D for our aircraft through a partnership which leverages the size and technological capabilities of the US.

“For example, with regard to our search and rescue stores drops for the P-8, it was tested by the US Navy’s VX-1 squadron initially, before the conduct of OT&E within Australia.

“Our OT&E results were then fed back to the USN, with the procedures published in our shared document suite.

“Ultimately, the ballistics and checklists will be included in our training system as well.

“We have done the tests for Air to Air refuelling the P-8A with the (RAAF) KC-30A which is crucial for us but gives the US Navy a capability to leverage the global A330MRTT fleet as well.

“You can imagine the United States Navy would not place air-to-air refueling with the Australian KC-30 at the top of their list of priorities, but it’s close to the top of our list.

“Essentially, the US Navy gets a new capability by working with us.”

The P-8A uses jet propulsion jet and we discussed how using a jet versus a P-3 turboprop has changed maritime patrol.

“Firstly, an aircraft that can fly around at Mach 0.8, can get to an area of interest much more quickly.

“Given that it is designed to operate as a family of systems, the Triton will provide persistence, and the P-8 will become the response asset.

“If the Triton sees or senses something that is of value that needs closer investigation then of course the P-8 can respond, but I also see the P-8 as a strategic response asset.

“We are not easily going to be able to move the Triton around in the first few years; it will have a complicated basing structure, heavily reliant on its infrastructure for launch and recovery.

“In contrast, we can operate the P-8 on a variety of bases in the region. The P-8 can base in various locations through our partnership agreements within the region.

“An example of that might be operating with Seventh Fleet in Japan. So an endgame to me would involve taxiing our P-8 in on the ramp in Japan, downloading the aircraft media into the USN disk drives, which is thenprocessed, exploited, disseminated into the intelligence enterprise.”

“The traditional model of a P-3 or similar maritime patrol aircraft, includes transiting to an area, and using its sensors to find something. It then needs to localize the threat of interest. The process relies on that aircraft being a self-contained gatherer and disseminator of all of that. It needs to find it, it needs to collect it, it needs to decide what to do with it.

“It comes back with the information onboard, and it lands at home base. Someone pulls a disk out and sends the information for processing.

“Whereas with the P-8 plugged into a global satellite-enabled network meaning the information is readily available.”

The core point is that the template being shaped by the Triton/P8 dyad is laying a foundation for further innovation, innovation clearly visible in the weapons, sensor and remote platform areas.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Australian Force Integration and Allied Interoperability: Facing and Meeting the Challenge

08/23/2018

By Robbin Laird

Canberra, Australia

I have been coming to Australia for five years and working the seminar reports for the Williams Foundation in support of the Australian Defence Force Modernization.

This modernization process has been very much focused not simply on recapitalization of the force but shaping a new approach to force integration.

And force integration will yield a more capable and effective force able to better defend Australian sovereignty and contribute more effectively to overall deterrence in depth in the Pacific.

Yet there is an inherent challenge which faces the United States as it comes out of a long period of fighting the land wars and relying upon geographically defined command structures.

The geographical commands are organized to shape forces used in a particular geographical area and in the conditions of land warfare against a non-peer adversary many of the tasks are almost fed ex in nature in terms of logistical movement of force and force aggregation, and joint operations understand in terms of supporting ground operations, even if air enabled.

This becomes very different in the face of peer adversaries where the need is to have an effective integrated force postured to dominate rather than simply to collate force up against a relatively slow moving adversary without force on force capabilities that can compete with you.

The challenge of shifting from the geographical commands to an integrated targeted force capability was highlighted in the interview we did with the then head of NORTHCOM Admiral Gortney in 2016.

As Admiral Gortney put the challenge:

We are a different combatant command than the other geographic combatant commands, and the reason is who’s in charge in dealing with the threats to the homeland.

In contrast, NORAD is pretty clear-cut.

It is an air mission command, although the changes over time have been significant facing the command. NORAD was born in the Cold War when the air battle was going to occur above the Great Lakes and over the Seattle area…..

The rise of China and the new Russia are driving a reconsideration of the NORTHCOM mission, for we really do need a commander for the homeland in a more classic sense. But when we were stood up it was not done to deal with more traditional or classic defense threats.

But the challenge for us is to shape what we in the US Navy call the NIFC-CA or Naval Integrated Fire Control—Counter Air battle network solution for North American defense. Put in simple terms, we need to shape a more integrated air and maritime force that can operate to defend the maritime and air approaches to North America as well as North America itself.

It is a question of shaping in this case the US and allied integrated forces able to deal with a peer competitor threat rather than relying on geographical commands to administer military force against a relatively limited capability by adversaries directly against the force.

In my visit to the Australian Air Warfare Centre located at RAAF Edinburgh on August 10, 2018, I had a chance to discuss the challenge of how force integration was shaping the need for new approaches to working with allies.

In my last interview with Air Commodore Joe “Vinny” Iervasi, he addressed the key challenge of how do we learn what we have not done before?”

In this interview, the focus was upon the challenge of both Australia pursuing a force integration strategy and at the same time working out ways to work effectively with allies.

Air Commodore Iervasi put it this way:

We talk about two things, integration and interoperability.

Integration is about the internal mechanisms of putting your force together and operating it across multi-domains.

Interoperability is how your force interfaces with another force.

For the Australian Defence Force, we are driving to deliver military effects as an integrated Joint Task Force, as we believe that is the most effective fighting force, particular for multi-domain warfare. If we are leading a campaign, then we’d inherently design the campaign and associated command and control on the basis of a Joint Task Force.

However, if we are contributing to someone else’s campaign, then our force ‘fit’ will be influenced by the design of that particular campaign. The main point in case is operations with the U.S.

Generally speaking, the U.S. conducts operations within their respective geographic combatant commands under a component framework, utilizing a supported/ supporting command and control arrangement. The consequence of this arrangement is that we have to disaggregate our Joint Task Force to be accommodated within the relevant component.

This inherently poses a dilemma for us; do we retain the integrity of our Joint Task Force and seek accommodation within that campaign to operate as such, or do we fallback to the component model? Either way, there are implications for the way we plan, organize, train and prepare for operations.

Put in other terms, if Australia enhances its warfighting capabilities through force integration and task forces, how does the United States work with such a force? 

One solution would be to task assign or geographical assign a task within a coalition operation but what might be other ways to deal with the opportunities opened up by the Australian approach to force integration?

But Air Commodore Iervasi sees the Aussie challenge as somewhat similar to the US Marine Corps working within the broader US force structure.  The US Marine Corps has shaped an integrated force, which is designed to operate that way for a period of time or within an area of operation, but its integration does challenge the USAF and the US Navy in terms of how best to operate with such an integrated force.

This challenge is reflected in the Aussies approach to working the F-35 within their force integration efforts.

On the one hand, the Aussies are working closely with the US Navy in developing P-8, Triton and F-35 integration.  However, the USAF mission is different to that of the USN, and therefore their mission integration priorities are also different.

Accorinding to Air Commodore Iervasi: “The differences in mission between the U.S. services is reflected within the components of a combatant command. Whilst the U.S. has sufficient mass to be able to segregate missions, a small-medium force like the ADF does not have that luxury. We are required to be interoperable across a broad mission set, and therefore we need to keep abreast of the different integration priorities of the U.S. services.

“There’s a segregation of responsibilities about what they do but we don’t fight that way.

“We’re trying to fight as an integrated force across all the warfighting domains.”

Another aspect of the force integration approach, which we discussed, is the impact which force integration might have on an adversary.

Air Commodore Iervasi: “Does the demonstration or the perception that your force is integrated essentially provide a deterrent effect?

“That is “I can’t just now attack the land force because I know it’s so interconnected with other things, I don’t know where I’m being attacked from.”

“Or “my ability to dominate has now diminished.”

“Does that actually produce a deterrent effect?”

One might conclude that perhaps the challenge which Aussie integration as well as USMC modernization pose for the broader US force structure could provide a critical lead in point for significant innovation in reshaping C2 able to leverage the kind of force integration which new technologies such as the F-35 pose to the US force structure, as currently operated.

The featured photo shows Royal Air Force Air Commodore Alistair Seymour, Commandant Air Warfare Centre, signs the visitors’ book at the Air Warfare Centre (AWC) at RAAF Base Edinburgh with Air Commodore Joe Iervasi, AM, South Australian Senior Australian Defence Force Office and Commander AWC..

The RAAF Air Warfare Centre (AWC) hosted the inaugural Trilateral Commanders’ Initiative on 23-27 April at RAAF Base Edinburgh, incorporating visitors from the United States Air Force and Navy and the Royal Air Force.

The establishment of the AWC, under Plan JERICHO in 2015, was to build collaborative relationships with coalition partner AWC equivalents to promote integrated 5th Generation warfighting.

April 23, 2018.

Credit: Australian Department of Defence

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Upcoming Russian-Chinese Military Exercise: September 2018

08/21/2018

According to the Chinese press:

The Chinese military will take part in the Vostok-2018 (or East-2018) strategic drills in Russia from late August to mid-September, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense announced on Monday.

Military forces from the two countries will hold joint operation exercises at the Tsugol training range in the Trans-Baikal region in Russia from September 11 to 15, said the ministry.

“The drills are aimed at consolidating and developing the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, deepening pragmatic and friendly cooperation between the two armies, and further strengthening their ability to jointly deal with varied security threats, which are conducive to safeguarding regional peace and security,” it said.

“The military exercises are not targeted at a third party,” the ministry said.

China will dispatch about 3,200 troops, along with more than 900 pieces of weaponry and 30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, to conduct fire strike and counter-attack training, among others, it said.

According to an article published on Business Insider, the exercise was described from the Russian side as follows:

Russia’s military forces in the country’s east were put on high alert Monday ahead of massive war games that also involve China and Mongolia, the largest show of power in nearly 40 years, the Russian defense minister said.

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said the five-day “snap inspection” of the troops will pave the way for the massive exercise called Vostok-2018, or East-2018, which will be held in August and September.

Vostok-2018 will be “unprecedented in scale, both in terms of area of operations and numbers of military command structure, troops and forces involved,” Shoigu said, according to The Moscow Times, adding that it will also be “the largest preparatory action for the armed forces since Zapad-81.”

The Zapad exercises in 1981 were the largest war Soviet war games ever held, according to the CIA, with about 100,000 to 150,000 troops participating.

In 2009, Russia re-initiated the Soviet-era quadrennial Zapad war games, which were most recently held last year…..

 Moscow and Beijing have conducted a series of joint military maneuvers, including exercises in the South China Sea and navy drills in the Baltics last summer.

The two countries have forged what they described as a “strategic partnership,” expressing their shared opposition to the “unipolar” world — the term they use to describe perceived U.S. global domination.

And the Moscow Times in an article published on August 20, 2018 highlights the coming exercise as follows:

The Russian military has announced the start of a five-day “snap inspection” testing the combat readiness of troops ahead of massive maneuvers in Siberia and the Far East.

Russia is holding war games dubbed Vostok-2018 (“East-2018”) in the central and eastern military districts in August and September, with some 3,200 Chinese troops scheduled to join the exercises in Siberia’s Zabaikalsky region next month. 

Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu called the upcoming games “the largest preparatory action for the armed forces since Zapad-81,” referring to war games conducted by the Soviet Union in 1981. The minister said that the upcoming games would be “unprecedented in scale, both in terms of area of operations and numbers of military command structure, troops and forces involved.”

Airborne Troops have been activated as part of the Aug. 20-25 snap inspection with long-range and transport aviation in the regions, Interfax quoted Shoigu as saying Monday.

Shoigu said that the mass inspection involving 16 special drills was launched on the orders of President Vladimir Putin.

The featured photo is from The Moscow Times article cited above and is credited to Alexander Demyanchuk / TASS.

 

A Visit to EOS in Australia: A Payload Company Innovates for 21st Century Operations

08/20/2018

By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Australia, I had a chance to visit Electric Optical Systems (EOS) in Canberra and to meet with the founder and his senior team working on space systems.

EOS works closely with global customers, including the United States, and provides cutting edge lasers and sensors to provide for a variety of military solutions.

My colleague Edward Timperlake has written about the central significance of what he calls the payload-utility function for 21stcentury forces, and the reversal between platforms and payload utility capabilities within the kill web, which various platforms in the combat force integrate to provide the desired, combat effect.

To understand Payload/Utility with full honor to John Boyd, it can be noted that Observe/Orient (OO) is essentially target acquisition, and Decide/Act (DA) is target engagement. Thus there is a very simple formula, better and better TA and TE =more effective employment of all payloads available to the battle commander.

And within this focus, the roles of classic platform providers and payload enablers are shifting. Increasingly, the platform is about being able to operate, empower and to operate upgradeable payloads.

Or put another way, payload/utility companies are becoming either the new prime contractors or the key systems houses enabling platforms.

EOS is a payload/utility provider.

They provide a range of systems from enablement of space-based capabilities to a variety of land capabilities as well.

EOS operates in two sectors: Defence Systems and Space Systems.

EOS Defence Systems specialises in technology for weapon systems optimisation and integration, as well as ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) for land warfare. Its key products are next-generation vehicle turrets and remote weapons systems.

EOS Space Systems specialises in applying EOS-developed optical sensors to detect, track, classify and characterise objects in space. This information has both military and commercial applications, including managing space assets to avoid collisions with space debris, missile defence and space control.

http://www.eos-aus.com/sites/default/files/Space%20Update%201%20August%202018.pdf

EOS 2018

During my visit to Canberra, I spent an evening at the Mt Stromlo Space Research Facility where EOS has a laser tracker for space systems.

The entire facility is robotized with only about 30 persons needed to service the operational facility.

The laser tracker at Canberra is connected with remote locations throughout Australia where similar robotized laser trackers create a significant capability to provide for space situational awareness.

Of course, such a laser capability provides a base line for growth in the laser-based engagement area with regard to space as well.

I met with the founder and well-known scientist/entrepreneur Dr. Ben Greene as well as the CEO of EOS Space Systems, Professor Craig Smith and the key software engineer, Dr. James Bennett.  They provided an overview on the capabilities and the growth path for their systems directed to space-based SA and related capabilities.

At the end of the evening, I had a chance to interview Dr. Greene and to get his perspective on the way ahead.

Question: Let us start by talking about your approach to land systems. 

You are a payload company and how do you see the evolution of the platform/payload relationships going forward?

Dr. Greene: In the land warfare sector, we would characterize our payloads as weapon systems.

They are modular and designed to be external to the vehicle.

We are optimized when the platform design approach focuses on modularity, which clearly is the way ahead for vehicles for ground forces.

We have a weapon system family that doesn’t require changes to anything in the platform and we can change the payloads rapidly.

For example, one could have a payload which was the standard 12.7 millimeter machine gun, an M2, or you could have a 30 millimeter cannon firing fused rounds and equipped with a javelin missile.

The two payloads would be interchangeable within 30 minutes on top of that platform, and nothing in the vehicle would change.

The internal software in the vehicle that we supply would sense exactly what the new payload was and adapt to it and adapt the user interface accordingly.

Question: How does this affect the classic relationship between the vehicle prime and the payload provider?

Dr. Greene: There clearly is a change underway.

Our payloads typically cost more than the platforms that they would be fielded on.

And so in some cases we are invited by the customers to be the vehicle integrator or what you would call the prime.

Customers generally are becoming quite savvy about the fact that the payloads are the core value, and the mission is in the payload.

Yet the platform has got to be a viable platform to deliver that payload into combat, but at the same time, the customers are increasingly recognizing that the payload performs the mission.

Question: Another aspect of the payload focus is an expectation that you’re designing the payload with regard to ongoing modernization or put in other terms, you are building a more rapidly upgradable payload.

How should one view this dynamic?

Dr. Greene: Our customers have moved from playing checkers to chess, because they’re thinking six moves ahead.

As we build a capability with a blue team, we have a red team engaged throughout to anticipate obsolescence and needed upgrades.

We’re now expected to deliver the technological architecture, which can deliver continuous upgrades, but ones which can anticipate changes which the reactive enemy might well make.

The opposing combatants are becoming more intelligent in the way that they deploy forces. And in particular, in asymmetric theater operations, you do find that the smaller irregular forces are incredibly innovative,

They’re often supported by major powers, so they have very good intelligence capability. They have what we would call a back room that’s supporting them with great intelligence on how to exploit weaknesses and what’s just been fielded in the last six months against them.

This means that the sophistication of some of the asymmetric combat forces is quite remarkable today.

And so that’s the environment that we are working in as a payload provider. We’re delivering payloads that have had to be pre-mapped to at least to at least two levels of response to what we will field currently.

Question: Let us turn now to the space side of your business. Could you describe the focus of your payload business in this domain?

Dr. Greene: We have built core capabilities to enhance situational awareness in space. We irradiate certain areas of space with lasers, and we then analyze the reflected returns.

We can determine range from that. We can also determine other elements of the spacecraft from a light signal directed at that spacecraft.

We have been in this business area for 40 years.

Question: How would you describe the complementarity of radars with lasers in terms of providing key ISR performance?

Dr. Greene: They’re very complimentary. Radars are exceptionally good at detecting anything that’s moving in a large area of space. Lasers are very good at characterizing that object and that motion very accurately.

For example, we can detect UAVs with radars and kill them with lasers.

The same thing applies on a much larger scale in space.

So space is really consists of two domains. There’s 2,000-kilometer zone around the Earth, which is the lower Earth orbit.

In the space domain above two or three thousand kilometers, only optics applies, and so the lasers can operate to two or three times the range that radars can operate, and beyond that we have passive optical techniques with extreme range, where both laser and radar techniques fail.

And so the entire space domain from 3,000 kilometers to 50,000 kilometers is managed optically with lasers and light.

Question: Your work is rooted in a very strong working relationship between Australia and the United States.

How would you describe that relationship?

Dr. Greene: I think that there’s a very strong two-way relationship.

Australia can offer special aspects of territory in terms of where we sit in the world physically, in terms of our geography. In addition, our technology combined with operating within our specific climate, means that if we deploy optical technologies from Australia, they are of immense value in terms of the information captured from the platforms that we deploy here.

That information can complement and support the intelligence database that US would apply for space information. And we would like to contribute to space information superiority for the alliance in that sense.

We’ve had a very strong program here that has always been a joint program with the US from its inception.

There’s always been significant US participation in our program.

Question: But I would note that talking to you and to your staff and looking at your enterprise, as a whole is like a trip back into time for me in one key sense – you have a very lean operation and you are not afraid to test and fail. 

It is like going back into time in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States.

How does it feel to be both a time capsule and a key driver for 21stcentury innovation?

Dr. Greene: I would tend to agree with the sentiment, The processes that we operate here are a linear extension of the process that we developed jointly and in complete harmony with the US during the ’60s and ’70s and ’80s.

And those processes were very efficient.

We’re talking about a development process for advanced technology that was aggressive. It was well risk mitigated. It had woven into it an integrated operational concept.

The red team analysis was at the table through every design review, so the entire design process was red teamed continuously, not at the end.

The processes are not risk averse.

They are risk mitigated.

We have never been risk averse, but every time we fall over, we have to recover very quickly.

And so I think one thing that we still have, which I see missing in some parts of the world, is that tremendous technological aggression that the US had in the ’70s and ’80s.

And I’m not saying it’s not there now.

It’s just not as evident, and I think it’s muted by a lot more administrative process now than it was previously.

And we haven’t been encumbered by that here.

Appendix

May 30, 2016

Space conference at Mount Stromlo

CLOSE to 100 of the world’s top space environment researchers will this week congregate on Mount Stromlo to discuss ways to clean up the masses of space debris currently orbiting earth; the same debris that recently cracked a window of the International Space Station.

The Space Environment Research Centre’s (SERC) International Research Colloquium, to be held from 31 May – 1 June, is the premier event of the year for the Canberra-based international research organisation.

SERC Chief Executive Officer, Dr Ben Greene, says the Research Colloquium will bring together researchers, industry and space agencies to collaborate, share resources and knowledge to enhance their research outcomes. The purpose of SERC’s collaborative research programs is to develop methods to remove the estimated 170 million pieces of man-made space debris that currently orbit the earth endangering vital space infrastructure.

“More than AUD$1 trillion worth of global space infrastructure is currently at risk from an ever increasing amount of space debris,” Ben said.

“Globally, space infrastructure delivers essential and highly efficient services including communications, navigation, resource management and climate change monitoring. This infrastructure is at risk from space debris ranging in size from spent rocket stages as large as busses, to flakes of paint measuring millimetres. This debris can travel at speeds in excess of 20,000km/h, so even a single flake of paint can badly damage or destroy a vital piece of space infrastructure. The dangers of space debris were highlighted earlier this month when the International Space Station’s Cupola window was badly damaged by a minuscule piece of debris thought to be a paint flake.

“Working at SERC’s multi-million dollar research facility, SERC researchers are tackling the problem by enhancing capability in tracking, characterising and identifying objects in orbit, orbit determination and predicting behaviours of space objects.

“SERC is a joint public, private partnership between the Australian Government and organisations including Canberra based company EOS Space Systems, the ANU, RMIT University, Optus Satellite Systems, Lockheed Martin Space Systems and the Japanese National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT).

“International collaboration is essential for a global problem such as space debris.

“There are estimates of more than 300,000 items of debris orbiting the earth greater than 10cm. There is so much debris that it is colliding with itself, and creating more debris. A catastrophic avalanche of collisions which could quickly destroy all orbiting satellites is now possible.

“Our initial aim is to reduce the rate of debris proliferation caused by new collisions, and then to remove debris using ground-based lasers. There have been strenuous efforts in many countries over the past decade to develop space debris mitigation technology. SERC brings together leading debris mitigation programs from around the world to create a team with the required critical mass of researchers, technology, funding and equipment. The resource commitments for SERC have come from every tier of space activity and are an indication of the international importance of this initiative.”

[Photo: The EOS Space Systems Satellite Laser Ranging Facility at the Space Environment Research Centre (SERC) in action tracking space debris, Mount Stromlo, Canberra. Credit: EOS Space Systems]

Dr. Laird is a Research Fellow at the Williams Foundation.

Recently, the ADF has picked EOS to work a new capability for the Australian Army.

EOS Wins Australian Defence Program

Canberra 24 August 2018

Electro Optic Systems, (ASX: EOS), acting through its subsidiary EOS Defence Systems Pty Limited, is pleased to announce that it has been selected as the remote weapon system provider for Phase 2 (Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle) of the Australian Army’s LAND 400 program. EOS tendered the R400S Mark 2 D-HD remote weapon station for this acquisition. This latest R400 variant is commencing full rate production to meet existing contracts in early 2019. It is expected that approximately 80 remote weapon stations for Land 400 Phase 2 would enter an existing manufacturing process from 2021.

Additionally, the LAND 400 Phase 3 tender released today requires that all tenderers ‘include the integration / use of’ the EOS Remote Weapon Station in their responses for the next Phase of the program. Phase 3 seeks to deliver 450 Infantry Fighting Vehicles and 17 Manoeuvre Support Vehicles from 2024/25 onwards.

These two events represent a significant step forward for EOS Defence Systems as the primary RWS provider to the Australian Army. Combined with the existing in-service 230+ EOS remote weapon stations these additional systems will create a larger EOS RWS fleet across multiple vehicles and deliver significant improvements in operational effectiveness and cost of ownership for Australia’s combat forces.

The R400S Mark 2 Direct Drive-Heavy Duty (D-HD) remote weapon station is the latest high precision product from EOS Defence Systems and can mount different weapons up to and including the M230LF lightweight 30mm cannon and anti-tank guided missiles.

The LAND 400 program comprises four phases which are summarised below:

  • LAND 400 Phase 1 – Project Definition Study (completed);
  • LAND 400 Phase 2 –Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle Capability
  • LAND 400 Phase 3 –Mounted Close Combat Capability; and
  • LAND 400 Phase 4 – Integrated Training System.