EFES 24 features the highest participation in its history, involving 49 allied countries and nearly 11,000 military personnel at a military training site south of Izmir, Türkiye, May 30, 2024.
EFES is a multinational military exercise conducted biennial by Türkiye and is one of the largest and most comprehensive joint military exercises in the region.
IZMIR, TURKEY
05.30.2024
Video by Spc. Ashley Xie
22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment
U.S. Marines with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 312 and Marine Attack Squadron (VMA) 231 conduct flight operations at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, June 3, 2024.
VMFA-312 and VMA-231 supported Distributed Aviation Operations Exercise 24, which is designed to distribute command and control of aviation forces across echelons of command, pushing authorities to the lowest levels, while keeping forces moving between airfields and air sites.
06.03.2024
Video by Lance Cpl. Orlanys Diaz Figueroa
2nd Marine Aircraft Wing
By Robbin Laird
On July 9, 2024, I had the opportunity to visit MWCS-28 which in English is Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28. The squadron provides expeditionary communications for the aviation combat element of the II Marine Expeditionary Force. They are based at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point and fall under the command of Marine Air Control Group 28 and the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing.
I was privileged to have a robust representation of the squadron and an opportunity to have a wide-ranging discussion of their approach and their recent engagement in the Nordic region in support of the Wing’s most recent Arctic exercise.
Present at the discussion were Maj. Mikel Santiago, operations officer, Lt. Col. Craig Schnappinger, commanding officer, MWCS-28, MGySgt Marcus Jackson, communications chief, MWCS-28, Maj. Richard Wise, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, 2nd MAW G-6, 1st Lt. Kara Paradowski, communications officer, MWCS-28, and 1st Lt. Bennett Lax, communications officer, MWCS-28.
It was an interesting group to discuss the way ahead with as two of the Marines were in the first tour of duty along with Marines which much combat experience.
The nature of the challenge set for the command was outlined during my interview in June with the then CG of 2nd MAW, Maj. Gen. Benedict. In that interview, he described 2nd MAW’s time in Nordic Response 2024 when a key focus was upon distributed aviation operations.
As he described the challenge: While a FARP remains the most visible manifestation of DO, it is the final action and does not by itself reflect significant choices and work necessary to create that capability to re-arm air assets at remote and ever-changing locations – allowing the force to disaggregate for protection and then aggregate to mass combat capability, all in a rapid manner to maintain tempo.
As MajGen Benedict put it: “The difference is the backside. Where is the location? Why that location? How do we get the fuel there? How do we get ordinance there? How do we provide force protection? How do we maintain the aircraft and for how long? How long are we going to be there? When do we need to move? All of these things are what I call the backside of distributed operations.”
MWCS-28 was working the C2 support to 2nd MAW in support of distributed aviation operations. And we discussed this along with correlated issues.
The conversation focused on the need for a fresh approach to command and control, logistics, and force distribution in the Nordic Region. Speakers emphasized the importance of understanding new technologies and integrating them into existing command structures. They also discussed the challenges of modernizing military infrastructure and investing in mobile capabilities.
Additionally, they highlighted the significance of interoperability, communication, and redesigning Command and Control systems to accommodate small form factors and user-friendly interfaces.
And a key point was that the Marines used various COTS equipment, but as they desire to use such equipment goes up notably in the C2 area, it is imperative to ensure proper training and maintenance procedures are in place for the deployed personnel to have the ability to make full use of the equipment in the most effective manner possible.
The clear purpose of working distributed forces is to enhance survivability but this has to be done within the logic of what is feasible. So this means discrete numbers of movement with the ability of C2 to support such movement.
This was exercised during Nordic Response 24, and as one Marine put it: “We utilized existing Marine Corps assets and commercial off the shelf assets in order to make ourselves more survivable and less prone to being identified hiding within the noise, so to speak. We were operating within existing infrastructure and bases that are already owned and operated by the Norwegians and working closely with them as well.”
In other words, the Marines were working distributed aviation operations but within a Nordic/NATO operating space.
But the integration piece within the Nordic operating space is a work in progress and part of the evolution of C2 capability in general which is required going forward. DAO in the Nordic case to be most effective is not a pickup piece but a planned and thought through concept of operations piece, and in my view, something 2nd MAW can excel at as the Nordics work their defense integration efforts.
There is no part of the world with more experience at operating a protected and distributed force than the Nordics and coming from North Carolina, the 2nd MAW Marines can contribute and learn how to seamless integrate into regional distribution of forces.
The challenge is significant as well as the opportunities for innovation.
Active Duty fuels Airmen work together with the Army Reserves and Air National Guard preparing for a joint logistics exercise at the Lincoln Airport and Nebraska National Guard Airfield, June 5, 2024, in Lincoln, Nebraska.
This joint exercise provides a unique training opportunity for the Total Force to enhance readiness, joint operations, equipment interoperoperability, and communications.
06.05.2024
Video by Master Sgt. R Denise Mommens
155th Air Refueling Wing, Nebraska Air National Guard
By Chloe Ladd
In the European parliamentary elections this June, far-right parties surged. In France, the right-wing Rassemblement National (RN) demolished President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissanceparty. Macron the loss to heart and consequently announced the dissolution of the French National Assembly. Never before had a French president made such a drastic decision in the aftermath of the European elections. After three short weeks of campaigning and two volatile rounds of elections, the final results are in, but still no one seems to understand why Macron made the decision. His broader strategy is a puzzle to many who are close to him. Only time will tell whether Macron’s decision made any sense for the future of France.
Voters returned no absolute majority for any party in the National Assembly. This lower house of parliament has 577 seats, setting the magic number to form a governing coalition at 289. The newly-formed coalition of the Left, the New Popular Front (NPF), holds the most seats, but it falls far short of a majority at 182. So, in order to pass any legislation, the parties will have to find a way to build a coalition of political convenience.
The second most powerful group is Macron’s coalition, Ensemble, which holds 168 seats. RN comes in third with 143 seats – counting some allied members of the more traditional right-wing party Les Républicains.
While voting concluded just over a month ago, France is still waiting on a governmen. No prime minister or cabinet have yet been announced, and there is no set deadline in place (and none enforceable per the French Constitution). As France continues to wait, a number of trends will bear paying attention to.
Historically, in France’s Fifth Republic, the president should appoint a prime minister that reflects an absolute majority in the National Assembly. With no absolute majority in place, Macron has more freedom to pick, but if the National Assembly does not approve of the final selection, it does have the power to hold a vote of no confidence to have the prime minister and cabinet resign.
Theoretically, the pick should now come from the largest governing power in the National Assembly, the NPF. The bloc had been unable to agree on who they would nominate as prime minister, with multiple options having been shot down, but finally, in late July, they announced that Lucie Castets would be the candidate.
However, within hours of the announcement, Macron stated on national television that it “was not a matter of a name, but of what majority can be built.” This was widely seen on the Left as disregard for the election results. Yet Castets does not seem to be a popular choice in France. In the latest polling, 58% of French citizens do not approve of Castets as their prime minister.
No matter the candidate, the prospective prime minister will have to appease a split government. Given the slim margins between parties, this may mean a difficult path ahead.
Initial polling largely predicted that the far right would sweep the vote in France. In the first round, RN led with 33.1% of the votes. Thirty-nine deputies RN were immediately elected without passing on to a runoff. This was a historic first for a party that previously had never cemented a first round win.
The second round led to very different results because leftist and centrist candidates struck electoral agreements to block the far right by any means possible. Those in Macron’s camp and the NPF calledon citizens to vote for anything but the far right, and they stepped down in each other’s favor when their counterpart had more support. It worked, and the electoral surge RN had been expecting did not materialize.
Still, the far right has never held as much power in France as it does now. This is uncharted territory for a country that has upheld a strict cordon sanitaire, bringing together disparate parties to exclude extremists from power.
As the far right continues to build up, the traditional right (Les Républicains) continues to fragment, splitting into factions over the question of allying with RN. The split raises questions about the party’s ability to survive in French politics. The infighting has alienated voters, and if the traditional right is unable to build itself back up, this turmoil will push some voters to the extremes.
Macron ran on the premise of enacting policies from both the left and right sides of the spectrum “en même temps” (at the same time). By pushing policies intended to satisfy everyone, he ended up satisfying no one. His approval rating is near an all time low. Further, this style of governance has led to the massive disruption in French politics with the jumbling of both the traditional left and right.
Macron will also have an incredibly difficult time recovering from his decision to call these unexpected, destabilizing elections. In the eyes of his own citizens, his credibility is severely undermined. According to the latest polling, one in every three French citizens is worried for their political future. In the eyes of his own party, recovering from the breach of trust caused by his decision to dissolve the National Assembly with absolutely no warning, will be close to, if not outright, impossible.
Macron’s Prime Minister Gabriel Attal, described himself as shockedby the decision to call elections. He found out at the same time that everyone else does, through the news. When it came time to campaign, Attal’s posters showed no sign of the president’s face. Others in the presidential camp followed suit. This was the first time that Renaissance members declined to tout their president’s endorsement. He is now seen as a liability, not an asset. The future of Renaissance will be an important element to pay attention to on the road to the French presidential elections in 2027.
The president is allowed to dissolve the parliament once in a year. With a National Assembly incapable of passing legislation, he could be tempted to do it again. This would ensue further chaos in French domestic politics, and political stability would be a pipe dream for French citizens.
With this instability looming, the French are having debates on everything from podcasts to mainstream media on whether or not a Sixth Republic, i.e. an entirely new constitution, could be established. While this is still a burgeoning debate for some (though the NPF already has it in its current proposed political program), the conversation around the power of the executive is happening. Many are arguing for shifting more power to the National Assembly, away from the executive. While a Sixth Republic isn’t expected to happen tomorrow, these conversations have taken a new urgency.
As of now, with no prime minister announced, France is entering into unknown territory. Though the previous government recently resigned, it will remain in power until a new one is established. This transition has historically lasted around ten days, but word has it that the current government will last through the Summer Olympics in Paris.
Unfortunately, France cannot afford instability at the moment. In addition to hosting the Olympics this year, the country is facing an increasing amount of terrorist threats, and the government continues to fight rampant Russian disinformation campaigns. All while, the war in Ukraine threatens overall European security. As France figures itself out, there is no denying that this next government will define the future of French, and European, politics for years to come.
This article was published by the Fair Observer on August 9, .2024
Young Professionals in Foreign Policy produced this piece and is a partner of Fair Observer.
Chloe Ladd is YPFP’s 2024 Rising Expert on Europe. She is currently the Manager of Transatlantic Relations at the Bertelsmann Foundation. She holds a Master’s Degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.
Credit featured image: Copies of the Greek statues, the Venus of Milo, are installed on the steps of the French National Assembly to celebrate Olympics. PARIS, FRANCE – MAY 29, 2024: Copies of the most famous Greek statues, the Venus of Milo, are installed on the steps of the French National Assembly to celebrate Olympic spirit in Paris, France.
ID 324368507 © Zhukovsky | Dreamstime.com
On November 29, 2023 an Air Force Special Operations Command CV-22 impacted the water one-half mile off the coast of Yakushima Island, Japan killing all eight of the Air Force personnel aboard.
The crash caused the Naval Air Systems Command better known as NAVAIR, that has ultimate authority over the V-22 program, to ground all variants of the aircraft.
About three months later that grounding order was lifted with a number of training requirements placed on squadrons before they could return to full mission status.
And then two months after that, the Pentagon revealed that the Osprey was restricted from flying greater than 30 minutes away from home base, a severe operational limit. NAVAIR has been mum about root cause behind the fatal crash throughout the months following the grounding order, return to flight, and follow-on operational restriction, but now the U.S. Air Force has released the accident investigation board report.
Credit: Ward Carroll
By Robbin Laird
You have heard of the USMC Force Design 2030 as an adaptation to the threat environment. But with an emergent multi-polar authoritarian world, an even larger strategic redesign of U.S. forces is warranted.
The Osprey is important for the first; but is crucial for the second.
The United States and its allies are shaping a significant strategic redesign in the defense of Northern Europe coupled with the force projected from Norfolk and North Carolina.
In a way, what is being built with the Nordic region in terms of defense cooperation and integration (from Finland to Iceland) is being reinforced by the ability of the Norfolk-based fleet and the North Carolina-based Marines to work together in shaping a new strategic capability.
The three N’s (Nordics. Norfolk and North Carolina) are reshaping Northern European and North Atlantic defense, where the region is working its own defense and the United States (and Canada and Britain) provide reinforced capabilities to the overall strategic deterrence of Russia.
This is has come about with the interaction among three key dynamics:
All three developments I have documented in detail in recent book length publications, so those books can be examined for detailed looks.[1]
But for the purposes of this article, the key point is that these three developments are creating the opportunity for a significant strategic redesign of U.S. and allied forces whereby the United States is reinforcing key allies and not replacing capabilities they should but don’t have developed themselves.
It is open ended in the sense that as the Nordic allies work through how to use their territory as a common defense capability, the U.S. Navy and USMC can work on how to operate in concert with these allies whereby the fleet can operate in the High North as well as in support of air and missile defense of the Nordic region. Additionally, the Marines can work on how to embed themselves in the Nordic region whereby the Nordics are the “inside force” to use the language of the USMC force design effort.
I have frequently visited 2nd Marine Air Wing, and in one of the more recent visits (May 2024), the departing CO of 2nd MAW, MajGen Benedict highlighted how he saw the opportunity.
“I went to a senior commander course in Naples where we focused on maritime combined arms operations. It struck me that both the Navy and Marines almost solely focus on Marine capabilities being employed from the sea, but not so much on how we can come from the land to support the naval campaign.”
“The opportunity to work with the Nordics as they continue to enhance defense integration clearly allows us to demonstrate and take advantage of that opportunity and to shape innovative ways to do so. And we did that in the Nordic Response 2024 exercise as well. There is a lot we can achieve in littoral operations without solely operating from an amphibious ship.”
The Marines have moved from their classic Cold War role of arriving in Norway and pulling out equipment from storage facilities as part of the reinforcement of Norway to become increasingly part of an integrated Marine Corps-Navy team reinforcing the Nordics, who are enhancing their capability to defend themselves.
But what role can the Osprey play in this strategic redesign?
In what I am calling the “3N” strategic redesign, the Nordics are working collectively together to enhance their ability to operate in strategic depth across their region, in addition to enhancing local or national defense capabilities. 2nd Fleet and the NATO command are working to shape more effective maritime reach and cover over the region reaching back to North America.
The Marines can project into the region, and through their innovations in distributed operations, in concert with the Nordic nations, can work through various combat nodes across the region. Supplies can be pre-positioned across the region and flown by Ospreys from the land to the fleet.
And with the CMV-22Bs coming from Norfolk, and working from the fleet and within the fleet, they can work together with USMC MV-22Bs to shape a cross-linking logistical capability for the fleet operating in support of Nordic and Marine Corps operations in the Nordic region, including the High North.
The Osprey, whether operating from the ship or the land, becomes a key logistical connector in the operations that can link up Nordic land and air defense with maritime reach.
Because the Osprey can land virtually anywhere, and has speed and range, the logistical reach from sea to land or land to sea becomes a key enabler for the evolving strategic redesign of the defense of the Nordics and the reach into North Atlantic defense.
There is no other logistic link which can work the distribution of supplies embedded in the Nordic region with the range and speed of the Osprey in order to connect the various nodes of the warfighting force across an integrated land and maritime extended battlespace.
[1] Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21st Century Authoritarian Challenge (2020); Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century (2022); Robbin Laird, The U.S. Marine Corps Transformation Path: Preparing for the High-End Fight (2022).
Featured Photo: Aug. 17, 2023) A CMV-22B Osprey, assigned to the “Titans” of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30, returns to Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Vinson, Carrier Strike Group 1’s flagship, is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Isaiah B. Goessl)
U.S. Marines with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 153, Marine Aircraft Group 24, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, conduct flight operations as part of their deployment for training (DFT) at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Arizona, May 3 to 23, 2024. The DFT provides VMGR-153 pilots and aircrew unit level training that enhances combat readiness, aircrew progression, joint operational capabilities and continues progress toward full operational capability.
06.06.2024
Video by Lance Cpl. Dezmond Browning
1st Marine Aircraft Wing