With the dynamics of change underway in the Pacific, Japan has been changing its defense and security policies to provide for more focus and capability to deal with threats and challenges in the region.

The latest element of the change is the new Japanese ocean policy.

According to an article published May 15, 2018 in The Japan Times, the new policy is discussed.

Japan approved Tuesday a new ocean policy that highlights maritime security, amid perceived growing threats from North Korea and China, in a reversal from the previous version which focused largely on sea resource development.

The ocean program cited threats from North Korea’s launching of ballistic missiles, and operations by Chinese vessels around the Japan-controlled and China-claimed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

“Amid an increasingly severe maritime situation, the government will come together to protect our territorial waters and interests at sea,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said in a meeting of the government panel on ocean policy.

The contents of the third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy are expected to be reflected in the government’s defense buildup guidelines that are set to be revised in December. Since its first adoption in 2008, the ocean policy has been reviewed every five years.

The policy pointed out that the maritime security situation facing the nation is “highly likely to deteriorate, if no measure is taken.”

The government also plans to make use of coastal radar equipment, aircraft and vessels from the Self-Defense Forces and the Japan Coast Guard, as well as high-tech optical satellites of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, to strengthen the nation’s intelligence gathering abilities.

The policy underscores the need for cooperation between the coast guard and the Fisheries Agency to enhance responses to illegal operations by North Korea and fishing vessels from other countries, amid a surge in the number of such cases in the waters surrounding Japan.

To ensure sea lane safety, it also stipulates the government’s promotion of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy advocated by Abe for maintaining and strengthening a free and open order in the region based on the rule of law.

And an article published on May 15, 2018 by Nikkei Financial Review adds further information about the new policy:

The new policy is the latest iteration of the plan, which the government began formulating in 2008. It is reviewed every five years.

 Ahead of the meeting, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is chairman of the maritime policy coordinating committee, said, “Amid intensifying tensions in ocean circumstances, the government should work as a team to protect our maritime territories and rights, as well as maintain and develop openness and the stability of the oceans.”

 The ocean policy plan details measures to be taken under the government’s leadership. The plan specifically calls for enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness activities, including monitoring suspicious vessels and sharing information with other countries.

Under the plan, the government will develop a platform to allow it to swiftly communicate information with vessels cruising in waters near Japan, and prepare for possible missile launches by North Korea.

The capabilities of vessels, aircraft and radar of the Self-Defense Forces and the Japan Coast Guard will be steadily enhanced. The government plans to beef up monitoring of unidentified vessels by using the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s satellites and by sharing information with U.S. forces and other organizations. It will also build a system to consolidate maritime information gathered by the SDF and the coast guard.

The plan also stipulates emergency security systems near the Senkaku Islands, Okinawa Prefecture, as part of its efforts to protect remote islands. The plan includes policies concerning the Arctic for the first time to make it easier for Japanese companies to utilize the Northern Sea Route through the Arctic Ocean north of Russia.

In accordance with the plan, the government will formulate specific actions to strengthen Maritime Domain Awareness.

The featured photo shows Prime Minister Shinzo Abe speaking at a meeting on the nation’s ocean policy at the Prime Minister’s Office on Tuesday. | KYODO

By Stephen Blank

Recent Pentagon deployments display a growing realism about the Russian military threat.

And the announced recreation of the II Fleet to be based at Norfolk to patrol the North Atlantic and counter the upsurge of Russian submarine and surface vessels probes there demonstrates this heightened awareness of the Russian military threat.

Despite the fact that most expert analysis argues that Russian activities in the Arctic have largely been and remain non-threatening, the Pentagon and the Administration have rightly dismissed this argument.

If one closely monitors the rising curve of maritime probes in the North Atlantic from ships based in the Arctic and the development of new conventional and nuclear capabilities there, the correctness of the Pentagon decision becomes very clear.

Yet there are still too many experts and even officials who believe that the Russian military threat is over-hyped and not credible given NATO’s superiority on paper. 

Unfortunately, as Michael Kofman of the Center for Naval Analysis observed, Excel spreadsheets do not win wars.

Therefore complacency about our paper superiority is misplaced.

Indeed, allied commanders know and expert studies like those of Rand report that in Baltic wars Russia would score impressive rapid victories forcing us to fight protracted wars under highly unfavorable circumstances.

Allies like Germany still cannot bring themselves to spend more than 1.3% of their budgets on defense despite this rising threat.

Some may take solace from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’ claims that Moscow last year cut defense spending by 20%.

But in fact, the cuts were much less and SIPRI disregarded the evidence that they were planned for some time and also the result of one off administrative measures that actually reduced spending by only about 7%.

Moreover, since Russia’s budget expected energy prices at $40/Bbl. and those prices are now $72 defense spending during 2018 has risen while other administrative measures initiated by President Putin have also helped that spending rebound.

And to the degree that energy prices remain around $70-80/bbl. we can expect defense spending to remain higher than even Moscow expected.

U.S. commanders long ago reported that allied forces in Europe were outgunned and inferior in areas like electronic warfare.

Neither has Moscow desisted from maritime threats beyond those probes into the North Atlantic.

In Ukraine it continues to disregard the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Ukraine’s sovereignty with respect to its Economic Exclusion Zone.

Such behavior presages what Moscow might do in the Arctic should the UN recognize its claims to a huge EEZ there and also serves as a precedent for Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

Since the two countries engage in regular staff and ministerial talks we need to be alert to the possibility of precedents launched by one country encouraging the other to act similarly in its own manner with regard to contested waters.

Likewise, as regards nuclear issues the Russian threat is very real. 

Not only has Moscow broken virtually every arms control treaty on the books, it now has over 20 nuclear programs underway, not the six, presumably the most terrifying ones, that Putin alluded to in his March 1 speech.

Those nuclear programs modernize existing systems and develop new ones, including hypersonics.

They also feature programs tailored to short-range, intermediate-range, and long-range weapons.

Moreover according to the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists’ annual report Russia “seems to be administering that strategy more dynamically and offensively than it did a decade ago.“

This report similarly observes that, “the fact that Russian military planners are pursuing a broad range of existing and new versions of nuclear weapons suggests that the real doctrine goes beyond basic deterrence and towards regional war-fighting strategies or even weapons aimed at bluntly causing terror.”

Thus, Russia is building what professionals call counterforce weapons against U.S. and allied nuclear and/or conventional forces and countervalue weapons against civilian targets.

And these activities do not begin to grapple with the threat posed by unrelenting information and cyber warfare, espionage, subversion, corruption of Western political institutions, including our own establishments.

Moscow may be looking for a temporary respite from the war, but as its leaders have declared since 2005 that they are in a war against the West, and their defense programs show no sign of letting up despite current pressures, complacency generated by reading spreadsheets or paper balances is unwarranted.

Establishing the II Fleet and a new NATO Joint Forces Command that may also be collocated in Norfolk signify a healthy reaction to this threat.

But we need to continue to take the challenge seriously, and to shape forces and a strategy which deals with the challenge effectively.

Lastly we need an energy policy that undercuts Russian energy in Europe and lowers prices while removing incentives from our Saudi partners to organize a new cartel at higher prices with Russia.

In other words, to defend Europe we must also have a Middle Eastern strategy and similar reasoning applies to Asia.

It is clear that there is a need for a well-conceived, multi-dimensional strategy to work along with the military re-set as well.

Stephen Blank, Senior Fellow, American Foreign Policy Council

The featured photo is credited to the Russian Presidential Press and Information Office.

Editor’s Note: For Chatham House’s assessment of the evolving Russian challenge, see the following:

Assessing the Russian Military Challenge: The Chatham House Perspective

It is also the case that the Nordics are clearly reworking a comprehensive strategy as well towards the Russians.

The Nordic Approach to the Strategic Shift

And overall, key players in the liberal democracies are focusing on the strategic shift as well away from the counter-insurgency wars.

The Strategic Shift Facing the Liberal Democracies

Finally, President Trump and his Administration have put center sights on deterring the non-liberal powers, and focusing on core threats, notably those associated with the Second Nuclear Age.

Iran : la logique de Donald Trump

By Robbin Laird

Last year, I visited Norway and had a chance to discuss with senior officials their thinking about the way ahead for Norway and North Atlantic defense.

The Norwegians are investing significantly in new systems, but just as importantly are re-focused on their total defense concept to ensure the capability to provide for defense in depth for Norway.

This means working effectively with allies in the region, but also to being able to integrate allied forces, which come to Norway to work in exercises as well, would come in times of crisis as well.

During my visit this April, I had a chance to visit air bases in the north of Norway as well as to continue my discussions with senior Norwegian officials.  One of those officials was Keith Eikenes, Director for Security Policy and Operations in the Norwegian Minister of Defence.

During our conversation last year, we focused on the changing strategic environment facing Norway and we picked up on our earlier discussion to relate that discussion to the preparation by Norway of its next defense white paper.

The Norwegians are half way through their current long term defense plan and are preparing the next one which will cover the period from 2020 through 2023.

Question: How would you characterize the current plan as well as the focus on the next one?

Keith Eikenes: The current long-term plan has a strong emphasis on regenerating combat power and on sustainability and readiness.

It is also about regenerating our ability to provide for and take part in collective defense in our region within the NATO framework.

The last whitepaper was written in a context where Crimea had just happened, but was relatively new. In other words, it was written in a context where we knew that there were fundamental changes underway and there was a more serious security situation that we were facing.

But we did not really understand then, for obvious reasons, the true nature of what the new security situation was. We have a clearer view now and that will inform the next long-term plan.

A new normal that has been created now, and the fact that that it is a new normal is an important finding in itself, and we hope that we will return to better relations and more stability, but we must prepare for the fact that we will be in a situation that will be unstable and characterized by high tension for a significant period.

Question: It is clear from my discussions among the Nordic powers, that there is a clear focus on the need to have more effective crisis management capabilities to deal with the dynamics in the region.

How do you view this aspect?

Keith Eikenes: It is clearly a crucial one. One of the key tenets of this new security situation, the new normal, is the speed of what will be happening.

And we will need capabilities to understand and respond in a timely manner as well.

This will require civilian policymakers and decision makers to address how to be effective in the new situation as well.

Question: This poses a significant integration challenge for Norway in facing crises as well.

 How do you view this challenge?

Keith Eikenes: Working with allies is crucial for Norway and working the integration piece is a key part of the effort. We have to be able to plug into something larger than ourselves for effective deterrence.

Having a security architecture for the region, with all of the key components – military and civilian — working seamlessly together, is an extremely important policy objective for Norway.

We are bordering the largest concentration of non-Western military power in the world in terms of the Kola Peninsula.

For deterrence to be effective, we need to have regular allied presence in our area as the new normal as well.

And part of the reason why we are strengthening our dialogue and increasing their incorporation with our Nordic partners, Sweden and Finland, is because we cannot view the challenges of the Baltic states as being isolated from the challenges in the High North or the North Atlantic.

I think any situation that occurs in the High North will have effects in the Baltic Sea, and vice versa, so any situation in the Baltic Sea that increases tensions will also be felt and have an effect in our areas.

That’s why we need to have a very close dialogue with our Nordic and Baltic partners on what’s going on in the Baltic Sea as well.

Question: In light of the evolving perspective in Norway, what are some of the key questions you are addressing as you prepare the next long-term plan?

Keith Eikenes: The key one clearly is what is the nature of deterrence in facing the new normal?

What type of assets, forces, structures, and cooperation with allies do we need in order to have effective deterrence in the future?

We must never lose sight of the fact that what we are trying to do is actually avoid a conflict. Getting the deterrence piece will be extremely important to shaping a way ahead.

For earlier discussions with Keith Eikenes, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/2017/10/a-norwegian-perspective-on-nordic-security-challenges-and-shaping-a-way-ahead/

https://sldinfo.com/2017/02/norway-national-defense-and-allied-collaboration-the-next-phase/

The featured photo shows Keith Eikenes with the former Norwegian Defence Minister who is now the Foreign Minister and is credited to the Norwegian newspaper Jarlsberg Avis.