The Strategic Shift from Counter-Insurgency and Stability Operations: High Tempo Ops, High Intensity Operations and Deterrence

04/26/2018

Since 2014, the Williams Foundation has held a series of seminars, which have looked at the nature of military transformation enabled by new platforms, new technologies and new approaches.

Shaping of a fifth generation warfare force has been at the heart of the conversation, and the challenge of crafting, shaping and building a more integrated force has been a core focus.

Building a more integrated force is required to operate with more flexibility, more scalability, and with more effectiveness, using either kinetic or non-kinetic means.  This force needs to be more integrated because it needs to operate in a multi-domain space to achieve combat effectiveness, and to achieve strategic objectives set by the political leadership.

This year the Williams Foundation has shifted focus to look at the demand side of the equation.  The Foundation is focusing on the new strategic context within which this force will operate and the kinds of further changes necessary for Australia and allied forces in facing the challenges posed by peer competitors.

On March 22, 2018, the Williams Foundation began the process of examining these key questions.  The Williams Foundation laid out the following narrative in preparing the seminar along with the following questions:

Most Air Force and senior military leaders in the western world begin their military careers either around or shortly after the Falkland Wars which were watched globally as an epic air, sea, and amphibious campaign; conventionally fought at the ends of the earth and at the end of an immense supply chain for the British Forces. 

The decades that followed saw warfare in the Balkans and Middle East, and counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan; warfare very different from that postured for during the cold war and exercised in high end air combat exercises.

The Australian Defence White Paper 2016 and the associated Force Structure Review was written to an Office of National Assessment Strategic Environment to 2035 against this paradigm, whilst recognizing impending change. The subsequent rate of change in global security has shocked even pessimistic observers and we face the heightened risk of high intensity, non-permissive air environments non-discretionary wars.”.

Questions to be addressed at the Seminar

What will be the impact on the delivery and expectation of 5th Generation systems as the world has changed so dangerously and so rapidly?

Have hostile forces been watching the development of our 5th generation systems and developed active asymmetry to defeat us?

Has the combination of our cold-war legacy and participation in irregular wars led us to make decisions that will limit our freedom of movement?

As we rediscover the concept of denied area (A2AD / beyond FEBA) and need to re-invest in strike capabilities, are there areas of concern? [Range / Payload / Escort requirements / requirement to step non fast-air platforms / risk of hypersonic AD systems] [Basing options / Life Support / Force Protection / Multi-domain threats]

Do we need to reconsider air campaigns in the light of Joint Force / Joint Strike options?

Do our national systems support the requisite battlespace awareness in denied areas to conduct effective targeting and effect generation?

Presentations by senior Australian and allied military leaders along with those by civilian analysts provided a solid foundation for understanding the challenges and how profound the shift will be for the liberal democracies in the period ahead.

Future seminars will address the question of what capabilities need to be added to the Australian and allied forces to deal with the strategic shift as well as how those forces can train more effectively to deal with the new challenges.

It is clear that the kinds of peer competitors the liberal democracies are dealing with are engaged in broad political conflict with the liberal democracies. They are crafting a range of tools to disrupt and to influence domestic policies in the liberal democracies.

It is also clear that the presence of Chinese and Russian economic interests in the liberal democracies provide a much broader opportunity than in the days of the Cold War to both establish and expand influence within our societies.

And the evolving tool sets associated with a core activity like information war or cyber conflict is designed not only to help competitors now but will be used in enhanced ways in the shape of any future high intensity conflict. They are already attacking our civil societies.

We are not facing an abstract future warfare scenario; we are already engaged in information war and cyber operations are being directed against the liberal democracies. These operations are certainly designed as well to undercut the cohesion of the liberal democracies to work against the interests of the illiberal powers.

A core point made at the seminar was that dealing with peer competitors was not just about preparing for an abstract future high intensity conflict but about dealing with various elements of a force already engaged against us.

The bulk of the seminar focused directly on the challenges of remaking the force to deal with higher tempo operations and possible direct high intensity conflict.

Certainly, a key argument made throughout was that many habits learned in the  the counterinsurgencies and stability operations of the past two decades would need to be modified; notably, notably that we can operate with air superiority and have information security as a given.

One-Third Up the Escalation Ladder

04/25/2018

By Paul Bracken, Yale University

The United States has recognized a return to major power rivalry in recent official documents such as the National Security Strategyand the Nuclear Posture Review.

This is a useful step that catches up to a reality that analysts and many others have argued has been underway for some time.

It is especially important because it opens up new pastures for exploring strategy that have been overlooked because of the nature of American involvement in low intensity wars of counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism for nearly two decades.

In low intensity environments certain things are taken for granted, like air superiority, cyber dominance, and freedom of strategic access.

Obviously, these conditions cannot be assumed to hold in an environment of major power conflict.

Recognizing the change from a low to a more intense conflict environment in official documents is one thing.

But reshaping operations and strategy for this environment is something else altogether.

One of the main reasons the outbreak of World War I was such a surprise to everyone was that the preceding two decades had seen repeated political crises where there was a show of force – but no actual combat between the major powers.

They had grown accustomed to this and believed that every crisis would play out this way, with strong messages and force maneuvering, but without combat.

There was no crisis management that existed for actual combat, especially the early clashes of the campaign.

No one, for example, had conceived of limited strikes or retaliation, force disengagement, or messaging once the shooting started.

The result was that the generals and mobilization plans took over.

The key point for today is that there are many levels of intensity above counterinsurgency and counter terrorism, yet well short of total war.  In terms of escalation intensity, this is about one-third up the escalation ladder.

Here, there are issues of war termination, disengagement, maneuvering for advantage, signaling, — and yes, further escalation — in a war that is quite limited compared to World War II, but far above the intensity of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While a full-scale replay of a “1914 scenario” is always possible, there are several reasons to think that a limited war is more likely than an all-out one.

Two factors stand out.

First, the fact that an actual shooting war had started between the United States and Russia or China might produce a mutual shock reaction that swamps politics.

Whatever the differences were – protection of Taiwan or the Baltics – would pale in comparison to the fact that the United States and Russia were fighting.

Second, while we are talking about limited war, it is a war between thermonuclear powers.

The political focus in an early clash is going to be on “where things might go” if it goes on.

There are many implications of focusing on “one third up the escalation ladder” wars.  Attacks are designed more to end the conflict than to destroy enemy forces outright.

A particular area of focus should be exemplary attacks. 

Examples include select attack of U.S. ships, Chinese or Russian bases, and command and control.

These are above crisis management as it is usually conceived in the West.

But they are well below total war.

Each side had better think through the dynamics of scenarios in this space.

Deep strike for exemplary attacks, precise targeting, option packages for limited war, and command and control in a degraded environment need to be thought through beforehand.

The Russians have done this, with their escalate to deescalate strategy.

I recently played a war game where Russian exemplary attacks were a turning point, and they were used quite effectively to terminate a conflict on favorable terms.

In East Asia, exemplary attacks are also important as the ability to track US ships increases.

Great power rivalry has returned.

A wider range of possibilities has opened up.

But binary thinking — that strategy is either low intensity or all-out war – has not.

This lesson is too important to learn in the real time pressures of war.

The featured photo shows  Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, flanked by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, left, and Federal Security Service Chief Alexander Bortnikov, right, arrives on a boat after inspecting battleships during a navy parade marking Victory Day in Sevastopol, Crimea. (AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev, File) Friday, May 9, 2014,

Defense.Info Website Launched April 18, 2018

Recently, we have launched a new companion website to Second Line of Defense.

Defense.Info is a website that provides cutting-edge analyses of global strategic challenges and developments as well as of defense platforms and systems.

We are taking an approach different from what we have done and are doing on Second Line of Defense.

There we are focused on the warfighter and support to the warfighter both in terms of current capabilities and new capabilities.

On new website, we are focused on the changing global strategic environment, and the intersection between that changing environment and the transformation of military and decision making capabilities in the US, among the allies and the non-liberal powers as well.

We will refresh the website completely in a 7-14 day cycle with each “weekly” posting providing a de facto magazine snapshot of developments of note.

We will focus as well periodically on publishing a set of pieces relating to a core topic such as the A-29 and related issues, going back into history and posing some tough questions concerning why we are doing this competition all over again.

We have two boxes devoted to partners, the first a Partners Corner, where we will republish key pieces from our partners and the second, a Williams Foundation Corner. where we will bring together the reports we have done for the Foundation as well as Williams Foundation publications.

This will allow for a one-stop look at what the Foundation has done and is doing to generate a broad look at the fifth generation warfare transition and effort unique among the allies, including the US as well.

We will focus on a key defense system, one at a time, and bring together in one place our work with regard to that particular defense system. In effect, we can provide a concentrated look at that system and provide journalists, analysts and our readers with a comprehensive look at key defense systems or capabilities as seen through our interviews on Second Line of Defense which are scattered throughout that website.

We are starting with the CH-53K as this is a key new system coming into the USMC and which is of interest to core allies, such as Germany and Israel, and we can provide support to policy makers in those countries looking at the new system as well.

We will provide weekly interviews and videos highlighting the most recent interviews we have done or gone back to key ones we have done in the recent past which highlight a key aspect of change either in the strategic environment or in the evolution of militaries to that strategic environment.

We will as well have a weekly comment section in which we will focus on a development of note, either of significance or of amusement in the past week or so.

And we will have an op-ed section which will highlight key issues which deserve comment. It is named in honor of our former colleague Danny Lam and the hard-hitting analysis of Lam is being honored here by continuing his tradition on our new website.

We are including special reports as well.  We will provide free reports which highlight key developments which we are doing on our various websites.

In addition, Defense.info will produce on a regular basis featured reports providing in-depth analysis of key drivers of strategic change.  We will focus on significant developments, trends or policies which are generating strategic change in the global competition among the great powers.

Each report will highlight a key cluster of developments which constitute a driver for further strategic change with impacts beyond the country or sector facing change. We will draw together several crucial trends which are playing a reshaping function for generating further change in the global completion. We will draw implications for the United States as appropriate in each report with regard to the impact of the particular strategic driver for change being examined.

And we will as well do periodic reports on Strategic Drivers generated by the US which are impacts on allies and adversaries alike in driving fundamental change as well.

We will look at developments which together trigger broader changes in the global strategic completion. The world has become highly interactive and we will focus on a key factor or cluster of developments which together have consequences beyond themselves driving further change in the global competition.

How best to understand the nature of the strategic completion?

How best to position the West for effective outcomes in the completion?

What strategies can we expect from China, Russia and others and how will those strategies affect the reshaping of the military and the policy tools which the West is developing and needs to develop?

How best to position our companies to build the right products and capabilities to support the strategic redirection underway?

What strategic inflection points emerge from the impact of strategic drivers for change on the global competition?

What global developments, events and actions by leaders are driving what kinds of strategic inflection points?

And how do inflection points drive further change?

Each of our featured reports will focus on a specific cluster of developments which both reflect and drive further strategic change globally.

These reports will be available for download on our website and will be available to our readers at the cost of $12.99 per report.

These reports are intended to be read by the person who downloads the report and are not intended to be distributed freely thereafter.

The Allied Transformation Command: Shaping A Common Technological Awareness Within NATO

04/24/2018

By Murielle Delaporte

Being ready for the next battles and imagining new forms of combat beyond Maginot lines require to “bring tomorrow’s topics to the table ,“ and especially the tables where national political decision-makers meet.

For General Mercier, one of ACT’s main missions is indeed to raise the Western leaderships’ technological awareness.

There are two goals for such an activity.

First, no one wants to be caught by surprise by an adversary’s potential breakthrough in developing or capitalizing on a new technology.

Second, it is important for alliance operational cohesion that each nation is comfortable with the set of rules framing the use of disruptive technologies, and in some cases shaping new concepts of operations generated by those innovations.

ACT has developed in the past seven years an “innovation hub “with a mission “to monitor and master all topics related to disruptive technologies, “explains Major Cedric Sauvion, Staff Officer in the Future Solutions Branch[1].

Here ACT joins forces with industry, academia, think tanks etc, in particular via NATO Industry Forum or NIF branded events, but also holds video conferences held on a regular basis with a large number of participants and experts.

And, if there is one single issue which the Transformation Chief is focused on it is dealing with and mastering the challenges and leveraging Big Data trends.

Big data is THE strategic resource by excellence.

It is everywhere.

Why do we interoperability?

In order to share data via connected systems.

Why do we do cyber?

To protect data as well as data exchange, and be aware of an attack, so that there is no doubt about the reliability and accuracy of the latter.

But the real issue is how do we manage an increasing amount of data the human brain cannot process alone anymore: in other word, to which extent do we introduce artificial intelligence (AI) in our military digital architectures?

That is, from my point of view, the key issue we need to address beforehand.

And that is what our “Autonomy project” is all about, since I am not convinced every nation will accept the same level of AI,” General Mercier underscored.

The shift from “data management” to “data managing” and the human-machine teaming evolution brings a genuine deontological ethical debate to the forefront.

This debate has already partially addressed a posteriori when the Obama administration used armed drones on a regular basis against terror groups provoking numerous voices of opposition in various parts of the world.

Indeed, for François du Cluzel, CAPDEV/CEI/Future Solutions Branch, “what one has to be aware of is that all these technologies overlap with each other.

When you speak about autonomy, you cannot envision it without artificial intelligence, since it is a mean to an end to gain in autonomy.

With big data, the goal is to: first, protect our data; second, access our adversaries’data ; and three, manage data flow to obtain a Big Data Analytics via AI precisely, which will ensure that we can access quickly the right and useful information and are able to send it to the right recipient.

That is what is at stake.“[2]

Anticipating the impact of lethal autonomous weapon systems is a key task.

Many Western scientists consider this a “third revolution “ in military affairs.

Indeed this coming generation of “fast leaders “ is already confronted with tomorrow’s challenge, since the systems already exist and have been used.

These systems can actually – if used appropriately – save lives in operations, while AI is a fantastic opportunity to improve responsiveness in drastic ways.

Because it is a great resource equalizer since algorithmic warfare is cheaper than conventional weapons, even small nations within NATO do not have to be left out from this warfare revolution.

Furthermore, it is already alleviating the previously discussed problem of gaps in security levels among allies, by demonstrating the fact that it allows them to work together by using various sources of intelligence with different levels of clearance.

It has been the purpose of the last Unified Vision exercise, which is to be re-enacted this year and more generally of NATO’s Federated Mission Network to work this challenge unleashed by the “third revolution.”

For General Mercier, “Unified Vision can be considered as the successful first trial of the Federated ISR NATO Transformation Command is striving for.“[3].

The same way NATO is said to be “interoperable by design “, NATO Chiefs want to make it “Flexible by design.“

The goal is to have both the Command Structure on the one hand, and the nations’ armed forces, on the other hand, working closely together to face any type of military scenario thrown at them in the not so far away future.

Technology seems to allow such a vision and that is the whole point of the command structure reform announced at the recent NATO defense minister’s summit.

Footnotes

[1]Interview with General Mercier, ACT, Norforlk, January 2018

[2]Interview with Major Cedric Sauvion, Staff Officer in the Future Solutions Branch , ibid

[3]Interview with François du Cluzel, CAPDEV/CEI/Future Solutions Branch,, ibid

The reforms to NATO’s command structure are reviewed in the following NATO document released in February 2018.

1802-Factsheet-NATO-Command-Structure_en

A version of this article was first published by our partner:

AT NATO Transformation Command, the 3C’s Rule (III)

A version encompassing this article and the previous one was published as one article by our partner Front Line Defence in Issue 2, 2018.

The featured photo is credited to © http://hpc-asia.com

The first of this two part article can be read here:

NATO’s Allied Transformation Command: The Challenge of Shaping a Way Ahead

 

 

Macron, De Gaulle and Working with the Americans and the Russians

04/23/2018

President Trump has already visited Paris; now President Macron is visiting Washington.

It is a difference in styles, approaches and perhaps temperament,

But President Macron has arrived in the midst of crisis within France and wider one within Europe.

And both have one key political accomplishment – no one expected either one to become President.

If President Trump can be described as a political icebreaker in American politics, certainly one could describe President Macron much the same way.

And in each case, one can pose the question of the their long term impacts within each of their socities.

Both President Macron and Trump promise to generate growth in their own societies and enhance the security of those societies while leading fundamental change globally.

In Trump’s case it is resetting American power; in Macron’s case it is resetting France with a broader European reset.

While they seem to be engaging in what Piaget might call parallel play, the impacts of the policies of one on the other are very significant but perhaps not managed in ways that would most effective more generally.

President Macron is taking on his civil servants by in effect trying to make them civil again. Without taking on the privileges of civil service unions and creating more realistic work conditions, unemployment will remain high and the younger generation which voted for him in droves will not gain much traction in shaping viable economic futures and the lives they might wish to live.

For example, the rail workers who have incredibly privileged retirement benefits are fighting against President Macron’s very reasonable attempt to write new benefit packages for new workers joining the SNCF work force.

But the result is serious disruption.

In this April 3, 2018 story CNN highlights the stance of the rail workers and their actions.

Rail workers across France have gone on strike for the first day of a three-month rolling walkout, the latest and potentially biggest battle over labor laws in the country since President Emmanuel Macron took office last May promising to transform the jobs market.

Train services have been severely disrupted, with around 87% of high-speed trains and 80% of regional services canceled Tuesday, according to SNCF, France’s state-owned rail company.

Eurostar services were also affected, with one in four services from Paris canceled. High-speed Thalys trains towards Belgium and the Netherlands were operating almost as normal, but there were no services towards Switzerland, Spain or Italy.

Disruption of air traffic is also significant and designed to put pressure on the President to end his efforts at reform.

And with those disruptions comes massive traffic jams in the Paris area and enhanced pollution and all for the climate change aware public in France.

These actions might well have more impact on climate change than anything President Trump has actually done.

The social networks, which helped elect President Macron, are fighting back and shaping a civil society negative reaction to the unions and the strikes.

Indeed, there is not much support within France for what are essentially actions designed to hold up the French state and public and block vitally needed economic reform in France.

President Macron has articulated the need for broader European reform and is seeking with Chancellor Merkel to get the European project moving again.

But his own internal difficulties and the coalition government in Berlin may make this very difficult indeed.

Perhaps President Trump might become an ally in dealing with the global problems and challenges for President Macron in spite of whatever stylistic and ideological differences they might have.

After all they are a couple of icebreakers within their own systems, and represent the significant change going on in America and in Europe.

Rather than looking at Macron as the European leader who can talk “Trumpese,” or to look at Macron as the globalist operating as a buffer against the winds of Trump buffeting the West, Macron is clearly trying to leverage Trump for domestic advantage and within the major struggles ahead as Europe reshapes and redefines itself. 

And working with Trump is clearly of interest to Macron as he works to augment France’s role within Europe and outside of Europe. The timing of his visit coincided with a crisis involving the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime against its own people.  President Trump made it very clear, notably via his unique method of pounding the table, namely tweeting, that he wanted to hold the regime responsible for its actions.

It is very clear that for President Trump, that the question of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are seen as a much higher priority than the last two Administration’s focus on stability operations in the wake of the invasion of Iraq.

And chemical weapons use is something which he as already authorized the use of force against in the case of the Syrian regime.

The President of the Republic, has been in a position to influence the US President with regard to options and choices with regard to Syria.  His own advice dovetailed nicely with internal debates within the Trump Administration as well.

Here Macron can be seen working closely with the US President, shaping a nuanced response, and de facto representing European interests.

He then could work with the UK to shape a joint response to the proposed US actions.

The UK is important to President Macron on several levels, including on defense.

And the Brexit negotiations could well threaten cooperation between British and French defense firms, something which clearly neither the British Prime Minister nor the French President would wish to see happen.

Notably, the weapons used by Britain and France in their strike on Syria are built by a company which benefits significantly from joint French and British investments, and the missile used in fact is a joint French-British missile.

As the UK Ministry of Defence noted:

The UK element of the carefully coordinated joint action was contributed by four Royal Air Force Tornado GR4s and four RAF Typhoon FG4s in support.

The Tornados launched eight Storm Shadow missiles at the Him Sinshar chemical weapons storage site.

The military facility was a former missile base, located some fifteen miles west of Homs, where the regime is assessed to keep chemical weapon precursors stockpiled in breach of Syria’s obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Very careful scientific analysis was applied to determine where best to target the Storm Shadows to maximise the destruction of the stockpiled chemicals and to minimise any risks of contamination to the surrounding area.

The facility which was struck is located some distance from any known concentrations of civilian habitation, reducing yet further any such risk.

And the French used Storm Shadows fired by their Rafale fighter jets and another key MBDA strike missile from their frigates.

The new FREMM frigates are armed with MdCN (Missile de Croisière Naval) cruise missiles, which are derivates of Storm Shadow, with 16 launch tubes for them on each ship.

And President Macron has been involved in sorting through the Russian angle in the crisis as well.

He is visiting Moscow next month and repeatedly has been involved in the reassurance process with regard to Russia about the strikes in Syria.

Put in blunt terms, Macron’s performance and timing would warm the heart of the late General de Gaulle.  Work the Americans and reassure the Russians, and all the while representing Europe as the strong force shaping as good an outcome as one might expect in a nasty situation.

As the French government stated after the strike:

The red line set by France in May 2017 has been crossed.

I have thus ordered the French forces to intervene tonight, as part of an international operation with the United States of America and the United Kingdom, directed against the hidden chemical arsenal of the Syrian regime.

Our response has been limited to hitting the capacities of the Syrian regime that permit the production and use of chemical weapons.

We cannot tolerate the trivialization of chemical weapons, which is an immediate danger for the Syrian people and our collective security.

This is the direction of the diplomatic initiatives put forward by France at the United Nations Security Council.

From tweets to policy, Macron steadies the ship, certainly a view which he can leverage back home.

Not a bad outcome from his work with Trump.

Let us see what happens on his current visit.

Although Iran is not far from Syria, we shall see how the Iran policy dynamic shapes out between Washington and Paris.

Credit Photo: Photo 1 shows President Trump and President Macron on the South Lawn of the White House, April 23, 2018 and is credited to Getty Images.

The second photo shows U.S. President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump escorting French President Emmanuel Macron and Brigitte Macron as they arrive for a dinnertime visit to the estate of the first U.S. President George Washington in Mount Vernon, Virginia outside Washington, U.S., April 23, 2018. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

The Chief of the Royal Australian Navy Looks at the Future

04/21/2018

By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to Australia, with a clear focus on supporting the Williams Foundation effort to look at strategic transition facing the allied militaries, I had a chance to continue my discussions with Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Chief of the Royal Australian Navy.

The Vice Admiral was very visible during my week in Canberra as he presented at both the RAAF Airpower 2018 Conference as well as at the Williams Foundation Conference.

Prior to those presentations, I had a chance to meet with him in his office to get his perspective on the way ahead.

The challenge for the Australian Navy is that it is starting a significant recapitalization effort in the wake of the modernization of the RAAF, but Vice Admiral Barrett and his team have clearly focused on Naval recapitalization which leverages and aligns itself with the fifth generation warfighting transition being spearheaded by RAAF modernization.

Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Addressing the Williams Foundation Seminar.

It was clear from his presentation at the Williams Foundation that the threat of high tempo ops and high intensity conflict could emerge from either deliberate or inadvertent actions in the region.

As he put with regard to the future: 50% of all submarines and advanced aircraft will operate in the region, and the challenge from the illiberal states building up capability or deliberately subverting the global peace is a clear one.

And one for which Australia must be prepared.

In the discussion we had in his office, he highlighted the challenge of being prepared and reshaping the Navy in the context of a modernized Australian Defense Force (ADF).

The broad point is simply gaining public understanding and appreciation for how important the maritime domain is for Australian national interests, indeed for the Australian way of life.

“We sing about Australia being a sea nation. It’s in the fourth line of our national anthem.  But most people don’t look beyond the breakers.

“They don’t realize the significance of maritime trade.

“But more importantly they don’t understand the significance of what, not just Navy, but Air Force is doing at the moment in terms of representing the national in keeping the sea lanes open in our region.”

He emphasized in his presentation at the RAAF Airpower Conference and in our discussion the importance of standing up a significant industrial capability in Australia to generate the modernization necessary for the navy.

This was true on several levels for the Vice Admiral.

The first is the need to shape an industrial base that is not building a current ship, but evolving the skill sets to design, support and build the next ship.

It is about continuous shipbuilding; not simply building a ship.

“I like to think that our regeneration is not just around platforms for today, but it is around recognition of where we will need to adapt and evolve over the next 30 to 50 years.

“The ship building model that we’re bringing into place now needs to be a catalyst for our future figures and future submarines.

The second is clearly related to the changes in the strategic environment whereby Australia clearly will need to sustain its force in a time of crisis.

It is about mobilization and support or what one might call sustainment in the context of a contested environment.

The Vice Admiral noted in his comments at the Williams Foundation that high intensity conflict is not about separate services showing up and doing their best; it is a test of the capabilities of conflicting military systems.

The third point flows from that realization, namely that building out of navy clearly needs to be done in broader multi-domain systems approach.

He argued that the decisions being taken with regard to the battle management systems onboard the fleet were being taken from the standpoint of enhancing collaboration across the fleet and across the ADF, more generally.

“We made a significant decision last year concerning our future combat management system and we did not take this with just regard to the new Frigate, but with regard to the current Air Warfare Destroyer and we are focused on our ability to combine the efforts in a distributed sense.

“This will need to encompass  our offshore patrol vessels, our supply vessels, but also out LHDs, in terms of how we will provide a domain awareness across the battle space.

“We centered on Aegis with the view that that will be part of an engaged battle space awareness with Air Force. You spoke earlier about the U.S. Navy and the approach of JSF and where they will go with Aegis.  We have that same view.

“This not just this piece of equipment, it’s a lineage.”

In earlier discussions with Vice Admiral Barrett, he underscored the importance of shaping maritime capabilities, which can operate at the national task force level, rather than simply providing a ship to a larger ally’s task force.

He argued in our discussion this time that Australia is focused on shaping a “meaningful contribution” of its allies in the region.

He used the example of the way ahead with theater ASW.

“Our 12 new submarines will provide better deterrent capabilities for us but it should be seen as building a meaningful contribution for the US and our allies in the region.

“And by participating in a broader information-sharing framework, we can deploy our submarines to have an appropriate effect.

“In other words, we are focused on making meaningful, not a trophy, contribution to an alliance effort.”

Human Synergistics Australia & New Zealand Published on Jan 5, 2016

Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett will share the excitement of the New Generation Navy programme and the challenges of shaping a culture that is reflective of organisational and community values, and aligned to corporate strategy. 

This is a story of renewal, profound change and the challenge of maintaining a ‘command’ structure while providing genuine motivating leadership and building a culture where individuals and groups can achieve their full potential so the Navy can achieve its Mission to Fight and Win at Sea.

Video is from the 2014 Human Synergistics Australian conference.

 

NAS Fallon: Where Naval Aviators Become Warfighters

04/20/2018

By Todd Miller

The wide open ground and air space of west central Nevada host Naval Air Station (NAS) Fallon and the Fallon Range Training Complex (FRTC).

Together they form the epicenter of air to air and air to ground training for the Naval Aviator.

NAS Fallon is also a prerequisite stop for all Carrier Air Wings (CVWs) during their work-ups prior to deployment.

It is the home of the Naval Air Warfighting Development Center (NAWDC).

The NAWDC provides high level training that transforms tactical naval aviators into superior warfighters.

Recent visits by the Second Line of Defense provide valuable insights on NAWDC and I have highlighted those visits in the links at the end of the article.

What was once a dedicated “TOPGUN’ school for naval aviators has become a much more complex and arguably important center.

Today NAWDC features 4 primary courses, TOPGUN (Strike Fighters F/A-18 Hornet & Super Hornets); HAVOC (EA-18G Growlers), TOPDOME (E2-C/D Hawkeyes) and SEAWOLF (MH-60R ASW Seahawks).

NAWDC develops and trains tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for the evolution of warfighting from platform driven tactics to information enabled dominance that utilizes distributed operations and kill webs across platforms.

NAWDC training is led by seasoned weapons tactics instructors (WTI) and involves the complexity of mastering ones’ own platform and integration with other Naval platforms (those within the other schools and including additional such as AEGIS, P-8A, MQ-4C and more).

While NAWDC is focused on actively deployed platforms, there is significant prework taking place today to develop TTPs for the incoming F-35C and its’ game changing capabilities.

NAWDC alone may be more than enough to keep a single naval air station busy, however it only represents a portion of the activity at the Fallon.

NAS Fallon and the associated FRTC is the one place where complete CVWs come together and learn to fight together prior to deployment.

This can be particularly challenging for units as Carrier deployments are not optimized for training schedules – rather units must train to deployment!

A visit to NAS Fallon will often encounter one of the CVWs in their pre-deployment phase, such as F/A-18E/Fs in Strike Fighter Advanced Readiness Program (SFARP).

During our visit VFA-102, the Diamondbacksfrom Atsugi, Japan part of CVW 5 where wrapping up their SFARP.

Many other units had Hornets, Super Hornets and Growlers on the ramp, including VFA-25, VFA-86, VFA-87, VFA-154, VFA-204 and I suspect some we missed.

Given the activity and progression, NAS Fallon is undergoing expansion of the NAWDC facilities, as well as putting forward a request to expand the FRTC.  Warfighting has transitioned to dominance of the information battlespace by means of the network enabled capability of modern platforms.

The modern fighting force requires new approaches to ensure readiness and success to both defend and defeat adversaries.

To this end the US Navy is working with NAWDC and NAS Fallon to build a wordclass center utilizing live virtual and constructive training (LVC).

While LVC training can be very effective in introduction of TTPs, force integration and reducing training costs, nothing can replace actual flying.

The FRTC is limited by constraints that were developed to facilitate platforms and weapons from the previous generation.

Additional air and ground space is sorely needed to provide realistic and critical training for aircrews, Navy Seals and other associated operational units.

The Navy has submitted a request to expand the FRTC, with explanation clearly provided by video here.

By design, NAS Fallon is off the beaten track.  By design, it is the track where the U.S. Naval aviator becomes a warfighter.

Todd Miller – Second Line of Defense

The Second Line of Defense expresses gratitude to PAO Zip Upham, and the PAO team for their support visiting the NAS Fallon.

The Way Ahead for NAWDC: Naval Aviation and Working the Kill Web

An Introduction to NAWDC: Captain Steinbaugh Provides and Interview

NAWDC and Shaping a 21stCentury Combat Force: The Perspective of Admiral “Hyfi” Harris

 

The US Army, Innovation and Shaping a Way Ahead for Missile Defense

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

We had a chance recently to visit Fort Sill and to experience first hand the efforts and thinking of Army innovators shaping a way ahead for Missile Defense.

With the Army’s focus on insertion of new capabilities as rapidly as possible and doing so in a way that lays an evolving foundation for further innovation, Fort Sill provides a key focal point for understanding the perspective of the Army’s silent service.

Just like the tactical and strategic mission of the USN Submarine fighting force, skilled and dedicated Army ADA combatants serve the nation every day and every minute both tactically and strategically. At Ft Sill we found dedicated Army soldiers preparing to go forth to stand their silent vigil on the ramparts in defense of all free people.

You only hear about them when there is a crisis but if they were not there the result would be catastrophic in a time of war

As one ADA officer put it during the visit with regard to the deployment of Ground Based Missile defense in Alaska: “It is a case of the 300 working to protect 300 million.”

Innovation is being pursued on several levels with regard to the Command at Fort Sill.

It starts from the core dynamic whereby Brigadier General Randy McIntire, 41st Commandant of the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School and as the Chief of Air Defense Artillery, is also working as the head of the Army’s Cross Functional Team (CFT) dedicated to air and missile defense.

This intersection of responsibilities provides a key opportunity for driving innovation.

The School is focused on training the ADA warriors; and the CFT is working to drive innovation and prototyping of technology forward in a timely manner.

For 21st century capabilities, having strategic direction but informed by bottom up experience, thinking and training is clearly a very commendable way ahead.

According to the US Army, the role of the CFTs is to “compress the timeline to modernize and procure new equipment by involving the end user, defining the requirements, integrating, prototyping and validating a concept prior to low-rate initial production”

The intersection of this mandate with the training going on at Fort Sill can drive innovation over all, in a core combat capability for not just the US Army but the joint combat forces around the globe.

A core area of strategic interest is ramping up as quickly as practical enhanced short-range missile defense for the maneuver force (SHORAD).

This effort can be viewed as a template for driving innovative change for Army and joint service commanders who will put the US Army OTM in combat -on the move-to engage any enemy.

Rather than debating endlessly which vehicle to put the new systems the “track” vs. “wheel” debate, the Army chose to proceed in rapid fielding to pick a variant of Stryker. By so doing, they are able to leverage existing logistics systems and deployment experiences.

As BG McIntire put it: “We will get the modified vehicle; and work with the evolution of the capabilities on top of the vehicle as we use it.”

This allows for both fielded technology and evolving con-ops to merge as the Army prepares to modernize with a future ground vehicle.

The European theater is viewed as the near term driver for the deployment of this new evolving SHORAD systems.

And here the Command is also driving significant change with regard to preparing those capabilities, with a significant focus on deployment of lasers, notably to deal with various threats from unmanned aerial vehicles.

In looking to the future the Army has also proven to be very innovative in fielding prototype Directed Energy (DE) systems.

Last year, experiments were held at which several contractors participated in working with the Army to shape DE laser capabilities.

And last year, the first US Army soldier destroyed a UAV with a ground-based laser.

A drone appears just below the horizon, its small frame camouflaged against the trees. Soldiers track the drone, lock on and, with the push of a button, a laser destroys the enemy aircraft.

Sounds like something from a galaxy far, far away, when in fact a Soldier, for the first time, shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle with a laser during the Maneuver Fires Integrated Experiment, April 3 through 13 at Fort Sill.

The shot was made by Spc. Brandon Sallaway, 2nd Battalion, 12th Field Artillery, part of 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. Sallaway, a forward observer, came from Fort Carson to help experiment on the Mobile Expeditionary High Energy Laser (MEHEL) which is a 5-kilowatt laser mounted on a Stryker armored vehicle. Sallaway had no prior experience with the equipment and was trained on how to use the MEHEL once he arrived at Fort Sill.

 Additionally, we found that the allied dimension is present and seen as crucial to the command. We learned that working with allies on SHORAD in Europe has now been seen as essential to the US Army in Europe.

Indeed, we were told that contributions from core allies, notably from the newest members of NATO, were integral to the operations of the US army in Europe.

The skills and lessons learned from existing Allied SHORAD teams was commented on as being truly noteworthy.

The “cross-learning process” is clearly underway with regard to SHORAD but we also learned how extensive the Patriot global cross learning network is as well.

The latest member to join the Patriot global alliance is Poland.

As Poland deploys Patriot other allied Patriot forces, not just US can synergistically deploy in support of Poland to enhance deterrence.

For example, the Germans deploy one of the best Patriot forces in the world, according to the experienced soldiers we visited at Fort Sill.

In a crisis, the German government could chose to deploy Patriot to Poland and work with the Polish Patriot systems to shape a more capable defense force in the face of any enhanced Russian threat.

It is a defensive move, which provides significant strategic and tactical deterrent advantage to NATO.

It is important to also note that the command is working on a practical way ahead to shape a kill web approach to missile defense.

The classic missile defense approach was founded on the kill chain – linear thinking of essentially a silver bullet against incoming.

Clearly, as the threat advances, better integration of offense with defense and reshaping the sensor shooter relationship is crucial. Essentially recognizing the Kill Webs payload utility dynamic.

Shaping a Way Ahead to Prepare for 21st Century Conflicts: Payload-Utility Capabilities and the Kill Web

This visionary shift from the kinds of land wars fought in the past decade and a half to operating across the range of military operations to insert force and to prevail in a more rapid tempo conflict than that which characterized counter-insurgency operations carries with it a need to have a very different C2 structure and technologies to support those structures.

The shift to higher tempo operations is being accompanied by platforms which are capable of operating in an integrated battlespace where hierarchical, detailed control simply does not correlate with the realities of either ops tempo of combat requirements or of technology which is part of a shift to distributed operations.

ADA troops at time must deal with threats in seconds to minutes and that is a very significant evolving command and control issue.

Distributed operations over an extended battlespace to deal with a range of military operations require distributed C2; not hierarchical detailed micro management.

In effect, the focus is upon shaping the commander’s intent and allowing the combat forces to execute that intent, and to shape evolving missions in the operations, with the higher level commanders working to gain an overview on the operations, rather than micro-management of the operations.

For the US Navy the move is from a linear kill chain to a distributed fleet able to tap into capabilities available throughout an integrated force.

For the US Army, it is reshaping a maneuver force that can tap into a variety of strike, ground and air, and defensive systems to get the desired effect.

And this will not happen without integration of the ground based missile defense systems.

This is precisely what the Command is working on with regard to a core program called Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System or IBCS.

By shaping integration initially of THAAD with PATRIOT, the US Army is laying a solid foundation for new systems in the future, which will become part of the kill web, rather than simply being developed and deployed as stove piped shooters in a kill chain.

The kill web approach is not simply a conceptual idea; the Army is working on making it a reality as it introduces IBCS.

And the allied dimension is reinforced as the Army does so, because Poland is committed to an IBCS approach to the missile defense systems they deploying and buying.

The government of Poland has signed a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) with the US government to purchase Northrop Grumman’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Battle Command System (IBCS).

The LOA allows the US government to start contracting with Northrop Grumman for production and delivery of IBCS that enables Poland’s modernized air defense capabilities.

Poland becomes the first international partner country to purchase the IBCS. By implementing IBCS, Poland will transform its IAMD capabilities in a manner consistent with how the U.S. Army is revolutionizing IAMD. Poland will also ensure seamless integration of its air defense forces in allied operations….

With its open systems architecture, IBCS enables incorporation of current and future sensors and weapon systems and interoperability with joint C2 and the ballistic missile defense system.

The impact of IBCS on the overall innovation being shaped at Fort Sill and in the Army’s missile defense commands was highlighted in a statement made by BG McIntire last Fall after a successful test of the system.

Brig. Gen. Randall McIntire, commandant, Army Air Defense Artillery School, and chief, Air Defense Artillery, explains the importance of IBCS for the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) program:

“It is going to open up the aperture in terms of how we will be able to fight in the future.

“What we are working on today will be key for decades to come in our ability to combine offensive and defensive fires into one entity that is fast and agile.”

Finally and actually most importantly, we were surprised to learn of unheard of sustainability of the missile defense systems deployed by the Army.

Dependent on the system, the rates of availability ranged from 95-98%.

This is an incredible performance metric, and is supported by an approach to ensure priority of supply to the force, but also working an effective supply chain and well-trained soldiers.

Of course, as the US forces have to consider conflict with a peer competitor, shaping a mobilization supply base for the force is a key consideration.

For the future there is a lot of discussion about the importance of artificial intelligence for the force. But again it must be noted is how much AI is ALREADY in the force.

Clearly, the missile defense warriors rely on and train in simulation with AI decision aides and could in combat extremis turn the system over to an automatic release system.

It was very clear that going forward there will be enhanced attention to AI and its role in the “decide, act” phase of the famous OODA loop during high intensity combat operations.

It is also clear as the Army works the fires capability, that it is both defense and offensive fires integrated in terms of its effect.

ADA is the transformational part of that technology equation, while offensive ground based strike is the linear technology modernization part of that equation. Working integration, between innovation and modernization may require significant organizational change as well to get the outcomes desired.

During our discussion with the BG McIntire, he highlighted a success story the Army had in the Middle East in developing and deploying the Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar (C-RAM) system within 11 months from the Warfighters call for a solution.

Soldiers and Sailors working together on the C-RAM system quickly developed capability from an existing Navy system, Phalanx – Close-in Weapon System, connected with Army command control systems.

The C-RAM system was designed to defeat the enemy’s incoming rounds launched at our friendly Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Iraq.

According to BG McIntire, they were effectively working integration of defense fires with offense fires within the Army just prior to a ramp off of the control of operations and response efforts from the US Military to the host nation Iraqi government.

“We already started working offensive and defensive fires with the C-RAM system. We linked C-RAM into a network of sensors by leveraging the field artillery sensors and the air defense radars and we were able to determine where the enemy rounds were coming from, the point of origin (POO).

“Then, we were able to effectively provide localized warning for our troops in the vicinity of the Point of Impact (POI), while intercepting the incoming round when it was appropriate to protect the defended asset.

“Simultaneously, we responded with an appropriate level of reaction force: counter-battery fire, Army attack aviation or local ground forces towards the launch point for further investigation or defeat.

“Now, we need to take these Fires concepts already demonstrated at the Tactical level and experiment with them at the Operational and Strategic levels.”

In short, we found Fort Sill, to be a place of significant ADA efforts and big Army innovation crucial to the evolution of not just the fighting US Army but the joint and allied forces as well.

Editor’s Note: The featured photo shows ADA officers during a test of the IBCS C2 system last year and is credited to the US Army.