We have just published our latest book, this one bringing together our work on Second Line of Defense with regard to the evolution of French defense policy under President Macron during his first term.

Here is what Robbin Laird, the editor of the reader, wrote about the book:

Emmanuel Macron became the President of France on May 14, 2017. He is the youngest President of France in the Fifth Republic and the youngest Head of State in France since Napoleon. The legislative elections following his election were dominated by the party that he established to support his reform agenda and policies.

He represented in this sense the spirit of the founder of the Fifth Republic, General de Gaulle. De Gaulle wished to brake from the traditions of parliamentary dominance in favor of a strong Presidential system. Macron’s election along with the victory of his own generated party certainly represented a shift away from his immediate predecessor Francois Hollande. Under Hollande, the Fifth Republic was dominated by the Socialist Party and was taking on the trappings of the Fourth Republic.

As Alastair Cole put it: “The Macron project is above all a hybrid political and economic project. Macron has set out to reaffirm the centrality of the presidency and rehabilitate the discourse of the State. His presidential practice has renewed with traditional visions of the Fifth Republic, whereby the president is at the heart of a centripetal and hierarchical system.”

In the Fifth Republic, defense and foreign policy are the sectors dominated by the President, and his team. And, Macron has certainly done so. He was elected with a strong emphasis on reform of the French state and society and relaunching France as the leader of Europe.

He became President in a period of significant global change. His focus has been from the outset to reinforce France’s global role and to do so through an expansion of what he refers to as European sovereignty. He has played off global events to provide ways to do so.

With President Trump providing rhetoric that challenged Europe, he could play off that rhetoric to articulate a neo-liberal role for Europe in the global environment. He could also work with Chancellor Merkel to defend Germany from Trump’s frequent attacks on the Chancellor. At the same time, the Trump Administration invested significantly in European defense and reinforced the capabilities for the direct defense of Europe, and France worked closely with the United States where possible and appropriate to enhance France’s role within NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization) as well. Trump in many ways provided the foyle necessary for the Macron of the first term; Biden with his ability to not know what country he is in, makes more to be pitied than a strong partner a Macron can spar with.

Regarding the growing global role of China, over the duration of his first terms as president, President Macron increasingly asserted a Pacific role for France. He did so through military exercises, visits and deepening France’s relationship with Australia. Regarding Australia, the program to build new generation diesel submarines which was led by France’s Naval Group was a key part of this approach. The abrupt termination of the program has been a shock to his Pacific approach. The launch of the so-called AUKUS trilateral partnership at the time of the announcement by Australia that they would jettison the French agreement to build a nuclear submarine, has accelerated anti-Anglo-Saxon sentiment in France which has certainly not been helpful for the course set by Macron regarding his global defense policies and approach.

The European sovereignty piece has seen several challenges, which President Macron has played off; he has also generated initiatives. Regarding the UK and BREXIT, the withdrawal of the most important European defense ally of France from the European Union has posed challenges and opportunities. The challenge is to keep the close defense relationship on track, including defense industrial cooperation. The opportunities are generated from the withdrawal of Britain, which gave way to the opportunity to deepen the European Union along French ideas of how to do so.

And, in the defense realm, the defense industrial collaboration side of French policy has been reinforced by a major initiative, the Future Combat Air System. The Future Combat Air System (FCAS) is a core initiative of the Macron Administration for both defense modernization and building out defense cooperation with its core Airbus allies, Germany and Spain. The Administration is committed to the modernization of their core combat fighter aircraft, the Rafale, for the next thirty years. FCAS is designed to deliver a next generation fighter aircraft.

We have published a separate report in 2021 consolidating all the key pieces that we have published on FCAS; too many pieces to include in this book. We can refer our readers to that report. But, in this chapter, we have included highlight pieces that provide for understanding the scope, nature and significance of the program.

This project is designed to replace both the Rafale and the Eurofighter with a “combat cloud” ready aircraft. A “combat cloud” ready aircraft is one that is designed to work interactively with other air assets in delivering the desired combat effects. It is a clear response to what the Macron Administration views as the F-35 challenge to European sovereignty. And indeed, European sovereignty is a key part of the Macron version of Gaullism, much like the General launched the independent nuclear deterrent.

Defense policy is never simply about the external operations of a defense force but are closely integrated with domestic developments as well. With regard to defense policy under Macron, the threats from the Middle East and North Africa, which lead to imported brands of terrorism, or have generated significant migratory pressures are key parts of the evolution of Macron’s defense policies. How to engage in the threats in the immediate vicinity of France with enhanced European collaboration? How to protect French society from importing Islamic terrorists’ threats into a society increasingly populated by Muslims?

During the Macron Presidency, there has been a clear focus on maintaining a balanced force structure, in the face of economic growth challenges and reform efforts. The nuclear force remains a key part of the French policy, but increasingly France is working with the United States, NATO, and its European allies on ways to better integrate French forces into a broader defense set of capabilities. The NATO-Russian war only has accelerated such efforts.

This book provides a detailed look at the evolution of defense capabilities and policies under President Macron during his first term. The essays are drawn from our two key websites Second Line of Defense and Defense.info. For each article that has been published on one of our websites, the date it was published is listed after the author of the article. I have drawn as well from our book published in 2020 by myself and Murielle Delaporte entitled The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21st Century Authoritarian Challenge. In addition, there is some new material not published earlier on the websites as well.

The last time I published a reader on French defense policy it was at the end of the Cold War. That book was entitled: French Security Policy: From Independence to Interdependence and was published in 1986 by Westview Press. It has been reissued in 2019 by Routledge. Obviously, much has changed since then and this book highlights how the latest French government has reset its defense policy as the Russians are back and the Chinese have stepped up their global game, and the alliance has changed fundamentally. To gain a sense of the change in these periods, one can read the earlier book in conjunction with this one.

This book is organized into seven chapters.

The first chapter provides an overview of the approach of President Macron to defense. It also includes Murielle Delaporte’s chapter from our book on The Return of Direct Defense in Europe and her assessment of the 2021 strategic review published by the French government.

The second chapter provides perspectives on Macron, including comments on his famous 2019 Economist interview.

The third chapter provides detailed examinations of the modernization of French forces under Macron. Many of those efforts are to be done in the future, but the Administration laid down paths toward those future modernizations. The focus in the chapter is upon the French Air Force, Navy, the space force and weapons development.

The fourth chapter focuses on a very central part of French defense policy. France has a strong defense industrial sector but to do so, the French need a robust arms export policy. And increasingly, given the complexity of defense programs, there is a need to return to the earlier roots of significant European defense collaborative programs.

In chapter five, we focus on French policy toward allies. Under President Macron there has been a very active engagement with allies. The United States is certainly a key one, and we highlight several practical French engagements with American forces. President Macron has focused on global reach into the Pacific and with Australia, which has been sharply challenged by the precipitous withdrawal of the Australians from the submarine deal with France that had been labelled by the French government as the “deal of the century.” There is an historic and continuing engagement in the Middle East. And new flashpoints, such as with Turkey, are highlighted as well.

In chapter six, we provide several essays that lay down updates on specific aspects of French defense policy, including updates by the French defense minister. We have included yearly assessments of French defense exports under the Macron Administration here as well as updates of French support to the arms industry under COVID-19.

We conclude with interviews conducted in September 2021, which provide a look back and look forward for the Macron Administration’s defense policy. Defense policies and efforts under the youngest President in the Fifth Republic have been significant.

President Macron was re-elected in 2022, and with the coming of the NATO-Russian War in Ukraine many changes are underway. But that is the subject for a future book. Here we are looking back at Macron’s first administration and his defense policies crafted in this period.

 

By Pierre Tran

Paris – President Emmanuel Macron welcomed on July 14 the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi, as guest of honor to a prestige-laden military parade marking the 1789 French revolution, a day after New Delhi green lighted high-level talks to order 26 Rafale fighter jets and three attack submarines for the Indian navy.

Modi attended the televised event to mark the sun-soaked national holiday which celebrates a storming of the Bastille prison, sparking a revolution which led to the execution of King Louis XVI by the guillotine.

Three Indian air force Rafales flew with a Rafale from the French service in the highly orchestrated fly past, and 240 personnel from the Indian air force, army, and navy marched in the parade down the Champs Elysées.

Foreign tourists attended the parade, and French nationals were heard questioning why public spectators were barred from entering the famous avenue to watch the parade close up, rather than catch glimpses of the military showcase from neighbouring streets.

It has been on, off, then on again for the Indian arms announcement to coincide with Modi’s two day official visit, with the Bastille day parade serving as the media high point.

Finally, Indian defense minister Rajnath Singh said July 13 the high-level Defence Acquisition Council had that day approved plans to order 26 Dassault Aviation Rafale, and three more diesel-electric Scorpene boats from Naval Group, a French warship builder.

It remains for the Indian and French authorities to negotiate financial details, in what looks like a government-to-government deal, with Reuters reporting the total deal for fighters and submarines could carry a price tag of $9.75 billion.

“The price and other terms of purchase will be negotiated with the French government after taking into account all relevant aspects, including comparative procurement price of similar aircraft by other countries,” the Indian defence ministry said in a July 13 statement.

The prospective order consists of 26 Rafale M, a naval model with strengthened undercarriage for flying from an aircraft carrier. That planned order includes four Rafale for training navy pilots, Reuters reported.

France winning that fighter deal suggests India could order more French missiles and powered smart bombs, opening up sales prospects for MBDA and Safran.

This year marks 25 years of a French strategic partnership agreement with India, which includes defense cooperation, a senior officer of the Direction Générale des Relations Internationales et de la Stratégie (DGRIS), told journalists July 6. DGRIS serves as a think tank for international relations for the armed forces ministry.

Paris is keen to promote close ties with New Delhi to help strengthen the French presence in the Indo-Pacific region.

French Fighter for Indian Aircraft Carrier

The Indian navy will fly the Rafale from its new Vikrant carrier, built with a ski lift deck for short take-off and landing. The navy also sails the Vikramaditya, a modernized version of a Russian carrier, which dates back to the Soviet era.

For France to win an export deal for its carrier-based Rafale has been reported as an extraordinary feat, beating out the Boeing F/A-18 E/F Super Harrier.

The contracts with France could be signed next year, media reports said, but it remains to be seen when the deals will be sealed as it has been previously noted New Delhi is inclined to stretch out negotiations.

Three Indian air force Rafale flew with a Rafale from the French service in the Bastille day fly past, just after the Patrouille de France display team opened the public event, flying the Big Nine formation.

A British RAF Typhoon and two Polish F-16, elements of the Nato enhanced air policing team, took part in the fly past, flying with a Rafale and Mirage 2000-5.

The French Rafale fighter had competed in the Indian navy competition against the Super Hornet, and Russia had reportedly offered its MiG-29K and MiG 29KUB carrier fighters for the Vikrant and Vikramaditya.

If New Delhi had picked the MiG fighter, even upgraded with a more powerful engine and active electronically scanned array radar, that would likely have drawn severe criticism from western allies, which have rallied around Ukraine’s struggle against Russian forces.

There were reported Indian concerns over the Super Hornet, which is nearing the end of manufacture in 2025 – unless Boeing won an export order.

There was a strong U.S. presence at the Bangalore air show in February, Reuters reported, with Boeing pitching its Super Hornet to the Indian navy, and Lockheed Martin presenting its F-21, an F-16 modified for the Indian air force.

There was close interest on social media of the Indian navy’s ski-jump tests of the Super Hornet and Rafale at the shore-based test facility at Goa, western India.

More Scorpene Boats

The planned order for three more Scorpene boats would be in addition to the six Scorpene subs ordered for the Indian navy in 2005. Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders will build the three new boats if the deal goes ahead.

The navy has commissioned five of the Scorpene diesel-electric boats, with the sixth sub undergoing sea trials and due to enter service next year.

India awarded that Project 75 deal, worth $3.75 billion, to Naval Group in 2005. The submarine project ran some four years behind schedule, and was part of Modi’s Make in India policy drive, seeking to boost jobs and secure transfer of technology.

The India navy is looking to add a further six, more advanced attack submarines with its competition for Project 75 (India). German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems is seen as a serious contender in that tender, which seeks extensive technology transfer, an advanced air independent propulsion system, and advanced missiles and torpedoes.

Dassault last year completed delivery of 36 Rafale fighters to the Indian air force, meeting the timetable despite the lock down stemming from the Covid pandemic.

The French family-controlled company won the 2016 fighter order, worth €7.8 billion ($8.7 billion), and the Indian air force is looking to add more fighters to the three Rafale squadrons.

India has previously had effectively two air forces, namely French Mirage, and Russian MiG and Sukhoi fighter fleets, pursuing its policy of non-alignment in the Cold War.

That reliance on Russia has waned, as could be seen with Modi going to Washington D.C. last month to meet president Joe Biden, part of India’s plan to boost its place in the world, counter the power of China, and strengthen its border with Pakistan.

Featured Photo: PARIS, FRANCE – JUNE 3, 2017 : The President of France Emmanuel Macron welcoming the Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi for a working visit. Credit: Shutterstock.