Marines, the F-35B and CENTCOM

04/08/2018

Lance Cpl. Taryn Escott, Marine Corps Forces Central Command

The F-35B Lightning II aircraft arrived at U.S. Central Command on MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., April 4, 2018.

The purpose of the two-day visit was to inform CENTCOM senior leadership on the capabilities and limitations of the F-35B platform before it enters the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

The F-35B is fully operational, ready for combat and will make its first combat deployment aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Essex as part of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit increasing air dominance capabilities and meeting the demands of the complex CENTCOM environment.

“For all the versions of the F-35, we combine a very robust sensor package and probably the best group of sensors that’s being flown on any aircraft in the world right now in terms of how varied they are in their capabilities,” said Lt Col. Chad Vaughn, an F-35B pilot stationed at Marine Aircraft Group 11, out of Yuma, Ariz.

“This version of the F-35B, specifically because of its short take off and vertical landing capabilities, opens up a lot of basing options, specifically expeditionary basing operations that we haven’t had in the past.” 

The jet can conduct full spectrum combat operations from simple to complex for the Amphibious Readiness Group and the 13th MEU. The F-35B provides strategic attack capabilities that allow it to destroy or neutralize adversary targets that threaten ARG/ MEU Marines, Sailors and other U.S. or coalition assets. 

“What we want to do is make sure this jet helps out the entire MAGTF, specific for MAGTF operations, obviously the Marine rifleman but everybody we’re supporting on the ground,” said Vaughn. 

Advanced avionics equip the pilot with real-time access to battle-area information with overall coverage. With this technology, commanders in the air, on land or sea are able to receive data collected from the F-35B’s sensors that will empower them with a high-fidelity view of ongoing operations.

“The F-35B is more than just an aircraft,” said Lt Col. Jaime Macias, Chief of Plans at Marine Corps Forces Central Command. “It’s a system of systems that’s flying; its got sensors and anti-axis aerial denial capabilities.” 

The F-35B combines next-generation characteristics with radar-evading stealth and advanced logistical support with a wide-range sensor package over any fighter aircraft in history. 

With the addition of the F-35B, ARG/MEU missions will become more lethal and survivable on land, air, and sea. It increases the efficiency or ARG/MEU through next-generation technology, lethality, and battle-space awareness. 

The F-35B also provides war-fighting capabilities for the future of CENTCOM, ARG/MEU, and Joint Force.

“Today is a big deal not only for CENTCOM but for the Marine Corps,” said Macias. “This is the newest and most-lethal aircraft that the Joint Force has, and the fact that it’s coming into the CENTCOM theater and potentially seeing some combat operations is a big deal.”

This aircraft brings all of the access and lethal capabilities of a stealth fifth-generation fighter or a modern bomber. It is an all-threat environment air support platform.

“What the F-35B gives you is multi–role capabilities, so now you have one aircraft that can do a broad range of capabilities and do it to a level that none of the legacy aircraft have been able to do to this day,” said Macias. 

The aircraft’s capabilities have been demonstrated during training such as Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course, Exercise Red Flag, Agile Lightning, as well as day-to-day training across the fleet. The Marine Corps has activated four squadrons and has over 35,000 flight hours in the aircraft. 

“The jet is in the fleet, it’s here it’s now, it’s deploying, it’s deploying with the MEUs,” said Vaughn.

The Surveillance and Response Group Working to Enhance the Situational Awareness and Decision Making Capabilities of the RAAF

By Robbin Laird

During my visit with Murielle Delaporte to RAAF Williamtown in mid-March 2018, we had a chance to meet with Air Commodore (AIRCDRE) Craig Heap the Commander of the RAAF’s Surveillance and Response Group (SRG).

I have had a chance twice before to talk with AIRCDRE Heap as well as to visit other bases where the SRG operates to gain knowledge and understanding of how this diverse command, which is critical to the RAAF’s future capability integration as the RAAF evolves, operates.

Indeed, the various Wings in the command can be seen to be operating capabilities that significantly enhance the situational awareness of the Australian Defence Force and the C2 capabilities of any coalition operation. 

Several new capabilities are being added, along with the modernization of core competencies and skill sets to provide for an enhanced ability to protect Australian territory and wider interests as Australia faces dynamic changes in the Pacific regions strategic environment.

One key way that the SRG is contributing to greater capability in the new environment is redundancy and cross support of a variety of platforms and systems to provide greater assurance that the ADF can operate in a contested environment.

With the addition of the P-8A Poseidon, the Triton, of new space capabilities, enhanced ground-based radars, enhanced Air Traffic control radars and systems and the modernization of Wedgetail, the RAAF is seeing an enhanced capability to have greater situational awareness and information to inform and guide the force as Task Forces are assembled to support operations.

At the heart of the change in shaping a more integrated ADF is the ability to shape flexible task forces crafted to deal with specific missions and to do so in contested environments.

This is a work in progress, but the new and evolving capabilities of the SRG are key enablers of such an evolution.

Take Triton as a key example.

The RAAF is standing up its P-8A and Triton force at RAAF Edinburgh in South Australia.

The two are physically “replacing” the P-3’s classical maritime patrol and response capability, but are actually capable of much more than their predecessor, and therefore need to be considered through a different lens.

With regard to Triton, AIRCDRE Heap highlighted how the new platform would add a significant new capability not simply to provide greater SA but to drive more effective decision-making in the operation of the ADF.

Notably, it can operate over Australian territory or in the maritime reaches to provide a more persistent and rapidly deployable surveillance capability.

Triton will enable ADF task forces to gain swift and credible real time information to shape not just where to go, but how to build an appropriate task force for a specific mission.

“For example, in a HADR event, the first asset to arrive in the future would conceptually be a Triton.

“Currently, we would normally send a P-3 out to conduct  ISR.

“For a Pacific island scenario, with tasking and then extreme time and space issues, it can take about 12 to 24  hours to get an asset on station, let alone have an analysed product to inform higher decision making.

“With Triton it will deploy much more rapidly with tremendous persistence and an ability to push various critical pieces of information back in real time.

“The result is that we will know what to put on the C-17, or the amphibious ship as we send aide to the country suffering the HADR event.

“We will know that a hospital is damaged or an airfield unusable or degraded, including what we will need to restore essential services.

“And with that information we can better prepare an appropriate Task Force to support the nation”.

“The Triton piece is very important because it’s a different concept of operation, Wide Area Surveillance WAS (WAS).

“With manned P-3s and P-8s we have to go to the event. With Triton we can deploy the manned assets to the area of interest prior to engaging the rest of the force, to more efficiently and effectively assign resources and taskings”.

AIRCDRE Heap emphasized as well that Triton plus the manned response aircraft, plus space provides redundant capabilities, and such capabilities are crucial in contested operations.

Without redundancy, one has less assurance of the flow of information to deploy and execute the mission’s central to the force.

The SRG originated by combining two legacy forces in 2003; the P-3 force and the ground-based Surveillance and Control elements; both Air Battle Management and Air Traffic Control, including battlespace control. The P-3 capability was designed for classical maritime patrol and response such as ASW and ASUW, which then evolved into overland surveillance as well. The ground-based capabilities, which included the continually evolving Jindalee over the horizon radar and space capabilities.

There is a diverse portfolio of platform capabilities in the SRG, however, the digital nature of the force is shaping flows of information to manage and to support command and control regardless of the composition of the task force.

The new platforms and capabilities are not stove-piped but coordinated with stakeholders in the evolving integrated approach of the RAAF and the ADF.

The shift from P-3 to the P-8/Triton WAS dyad is a significant way forward as both are software upgradeable platforms with their data analyzed to provide a more cohesive and coherent SA narrative to the force as it operates regardless of location.

My visit to RAAF Edinburgh highlighted this point in terms of the infrastructure being built to support the two platforms.

At the heart of the enterprise is a large facility where Triton and P-8 operators have separate spaces but they are joined by a unified operations centre. 

It is a walk through area, which means that cross learning between the two platforms will be highlighted.

This is especially important as the two platforms are software upgradeable and the Aussies might well wish to modify the mission systems of both platforms to meet evolving Australian requirements. They are leveraging their cooperative partnership with the USN to maximise these outcomes, which is also tremendously beneficial to the USN. 

The ground-based radar capability will be significantly modernized with the intent to maximize support to the land and maritime-based missile systems acquired by the Australian Army and Navy, while also introducing an Air Force capability in accordance with the Australian government’s white paper intent.

And this piece is being actively worked between Army and the Air Force to ensure that their systems work together as an integrated blue force rather than exposing the force to fratricide risks.  The first Army junior NCO from 16 Air Land Regiment has recently graduated as an Air Surveillance Operator with SRG.

This trend of joint education and alignment, including the sharing of specialized skills across all Services, will be further normalized in the future, setting the ADF up well to maximize the future introduction and integration of these complex but decisive capabilities.

The goal is to work to ensure integration of Land 19 with Air 6500, two key Army and Air Force programs designed to provide for better integration of defensive capabilities.

Air 6500 will replace the legacy Vigilaire system, with a follow on system, while providing a much more capable integrated air defence system for the wider ADF, while Land 19 Phase 7B from Army will look at the closer range fight.

SRG is a key player in this effort and will assist in shaping a more integrated approach.

Number 41 Wing within SRG provides persistent (24/7) ground-based surveillance of Australia’s air space and air battle management for the ADF.  Number 41 Wing has the task of generating theRecognized Air Picture from all sources to inform higher ADF situational awareness and decision-making.

As this capability evolves with technology, mobility is being enhanced to provide support for a deployable force. This is important to deliver high intensity combat effects while supporting power projection of the force against threats from adversaries capable of operating at a high tempo.

Within SRG’s 41 Wing is also No. 1 Remote Sensor Unit or 1RSU. 1RSU is the Royal Australian Air Force unit responsible for operating the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) and many of Australia’s emerging space capabilities. While 1RSU’s operations center is located at RAAF Base Edinburgh, the JORN sites near Longreachin Queensland,Alice Springsin the Northern Territory, and Laverton in Western Australia provide the feeds. 1RSU is the first space operations unit in the Australian Defence Force as well.

The Australian government is also investing in new land based radar capabilities and to enhancing the redundancy of the systems, again looking forward to requirements of dealing with threats in the region.

During our visit, the Australian government announced funding for AIR 2025 Phase 6 which is a mid-life upgrade to JORN. The upgrade to the over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) network is designed to ‘open’ the system’s architecture enabling the insertion of next generation technologies and extend the operational life of JORN to beyond 2042.

As the RAAF adds new systems like P-8A and Triton, it is modifying other SA and C2 capabilities such as the ground-based C2 system and associated ground-based radar as well as a key asset operated by SRG, namely the E-7A or the Wedgetail system. 

Here the software upgradeable systems on board the aircraft along with hardware modifications will be crafted to both enhance, and be enhanced by changes in other parts of the force.

The airborne radar and how it operates on the E-7A is very effective, but it is the Electronic Support Measures System as well which provides enhanced SA for the force, notably in contested and complex operating areas. Knowing the electronic environment and exploiting this advantage through electronic warfare, and superior C2 is critical, and indeed potentially decisive, in any future high intensity operation.

And Wedgetail as a multi-mission system can switch from its primary radar role to a primary ESM role as the threat and need dictates. It is empowered as well by its ability to link with other systems but “if those links are jammed or degraded in a contested environment, Wedgetail is also positioned to enable a redundant C2 solution with the system which remains”

As we concluded our discussion, AIRCDRE Heap was asked how he would describe the difference in the threats he faced when he entered the force from the evolving threats today.

His answer was both clear and insightful.

“We have gone from dealing with relatively small tactical SA and strike bubbles, missile engagement zones in relative terms, around warships, airfields or other critical assets, to much wider, more complex and denser zones.

“We are shaping complimentary capabilities, which need to operate effectively, with levels of redundancy, in these high threat environments, while being able to defend against ever more capable threats across the spectrum of conflict.

“To achieve this aspirational goal, we need to engender a multi domain outlook, which includes not just hardware, but cross-domain education and operational practice, such as that we have seen being led through Jericho, and with the Air Warfare Centre.

“The other change is how radars operate.  Legacy radars generate wave forms which we could detect, identify, classify and engage; now the systems are more complex and harder to classify. They are very complex in waveform and are often fleetingly emitting. The new systems are delivering the effects at greater range and with more fidelity than the classical parabolic radars of the 20thcentury.”

“In a high intensity conflict, that all comes to a head in a technological contest to see who can achieve a sustained and decisive advantage in that electronic warfare fight.

“And then there is the parallel challenge of determining if, how, and when, through robust integrated C2 and a myriad of tactical options, you may want to effect this battlespace by kinetic or non-kinetic means”.

For the structure of the Surveillance and Response Group, please see the following:

https://www.airforce.gov.au/about-us/structure/air-command-headquarters/surveillance-and-response-group

For our earlier interviews with Air Commodore Heap, see the following:

Seeking Prudent Progress Through Arms Control, Not Disarmament

04/06/2018

Richard Weitz

The Trump administration is skeptical of nuclear disarmament, but supports arms control and strategic stability measures, under appropriate conditions, designed to keep state competition constrained.

Specifically, the administration recognizes that arms control, along with other measures, can bolster the security of the United States, its allies, and U.S. partners.

As described in its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), congressional testimony, and think tank presentations, the Trump administration will strive for a combination of diplomacy, arms control, and traditional military defensive measures to enhance national and global security:

1) limit the number of nuclear weapons states;

2) prevent terrorists access to nuclear weapons and materials;

3) control weapons-usable fissile material and related technology;

4) pursue verifiable and enforceable arms control agreements; and

5) use diplomacy to reduce future threats, including by pursuing “mutual restraints” that are verifiable and enforceable.

In the NPR’s view, arms control can help “manage strategic competition” by “foster[ing] transparency, understanding, and predictability”; minimize “the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation”; and limit the number of hostile nuclear weapons states.

The administration does insist that any arms control agreement be “enforceable.” Some complain that this standard is not adequately defined in the NPR.

However, this wording likely aims at excluding purely “declaratory” arms control, such as the Chinese government’s commitment not to use nuclear weapons first, the recently adopted Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which lack means of verification and compliance.

The Trump administration’s policies towards nuclear weapons testing are probably better than most arms control advocates could reasonably have expected. The United States does not intend to resume testing nuclear weapons any time soon and calls on all other states to eschew such testing.

The White House will also continue the practice of recent administration of deferring formal submission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for Senate ratification rather than abandon the treaty.

It will also sustain U.S. support to the CTBT Organization Preparatory Committee, the International Monitoring System, and the International Data Center. These three mechanisms, designed to monitor possible nuclear explosive testing by any state, have played an important role in confirming recent North Korean nuclear tests.

The Trump NPR praises the “positive role” of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in bolstering international support, at both the normative and operational levels, for preventing new nuclear states and enhanced nuclear safety and security standards.

It is true that administration representatives eschew references to the traditional “three-pillar” approach to the NPT. This framework links nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The perceived problem with this linkage is that many countries have traditionally used this connection to justify a right to pursue proliferation-sensitive technologies.

For example, countries pursue uranium enrichment, which can be used to make weapons-grade fissile material.

The new NPR should make nuclear proliferation less likely in the short term. Most of the countries that could most readily obtain nuclear weapons are U.S. allies: Japan, South Korea, Australia, and many NATO members have advanced civilian nuclear power programs or other critical foundations for launching a nuclear weapons program.

Insofar as these allies become more confident that the Trump administration will support traditional U.S. nuclear security guarantees, they will refrain from pursuing their own nuclear weapons. The NPR rightly notes that, “Credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be a cornerstone of U.S. non-proliferation efforts.”

Many foreign governments will be upset, or profess to be upset, that the Trump administration is not offering concrete steps toward nuclear disarmament or further reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security. They will probably criticize U.S. policies at the 2020 NPT Review Conference as well as its preparatory meetings.

However, Washington’s stance, by itself, is unlikely to lead these states to pursue nuclear weapons. Not only are they strongly opposed to nuclear proliferation, but regional security dynamics and internal factors usually have a much greater impact on such weighty decisions.

The NPR does not offer new arms control initiatives. It discusses the possible extension of New START and other arms control options, but does not endorse these or any other specific measures.

The general tone is that the United States will abstain from global arms control leadership for a while given the adverse global security environment, the need to recapitulate the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure and fortify U.S. deterrence guarantees, and the perception that unilateral U.S. nuclear reductions backfired in the past.

The Trump administration has not yet described the details of its counter-nuclear terrorism strategy, but there are reports that U.S officials will release a formal strategy document on this issue later this year.

The NPR does support projects that build “defense in depth” against nuclear terrorism. These activities include measures to secure and reduce WMD materials; limit the spread of nuclear technologies and expertise; and strengthen national defenses, preparedness, and resilience.

In particular, the United States will strengthen multinational control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group; improve nuclear forensics techniques and technologies to identify and deter state support for nuclear terrorism; and build resilience against any nuclear terrorism incidents that might occur—to limit the damage and overcome its consequences as rapidly as possible.

U.S. funding for countering WMD proliferation also remains substantial. For example, the administration is spending millions of dollars to train and equip foreign militaries to counter WMD threats. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) are overseeing these programs.

Some proposed changes—more tightly integrating conventional and nuclear forces in exercises and using strategic submarines for launching a single or couple low-yield nuclear weapons—could raise the nuclear threshold if not carefully executed.

It is true that Chinese and Russian forces and exercises employ similar conventional-nuclear integration, but it would be better to dissuade them from such a practice rather than imitate them.

Indeed, the Trump NPR expresses readiness to consider diverse measures “to increase transparency and predictability, where appropriate, to avoid potential miscalculation among nuclear weapons states and other possessor states [which might include India, Pakistan and other countries having nuclear arms beyond the five NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states] through strategic dialogues, risk-reduction communications channels, and the sharing of best practices related to nuclear weapons safety and security.”

The administration should employ the strategic stability talks with Beijing and Moscow, endorsed in the NPR, to discuss the implications of these issues with China and Russia as well as consider possible operational arms control measures to reduce miscalculations.

Photo above: President Trump on his first call to President Putin shortly after taking office. Credit: Getty Images

Editor’s Comment: In many ways the Trump Administration approach follows that of the Reagan Administration with regard to arms control. Here the approach to arms control really was seen as part of effective defense planning and risk reduction engaged in directly with the Soviet Union.

For example, see Robbin Laird and Dale Herspring, The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms (Westview, 1984).

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/soviet-union-and-strategic-arms-robbin-f-laird-and-dale-r-herspring-boulder-co-westview-press-1984-pp-x-160-2850-cloth-1695-paper/DAD155F74ABDFE1BD8D0B47B2BC567E3

 

African Arms Exports Down Over the Past Decade

04/05/2018

Over the last decade, African arms imports dropped by 22 per cent, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), but Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria continued to order large quantities of weapons and equipment.

According to an article published by our partner defenceWeb, the trends were discussed leveraging a recent SIPRI report.

In its Trends in International Arms Transfers 2017 fact sheet released this week, SIPRI said that African arms sales dropped 22% between 2008-12 and 2013-17. Much of the hardware that was supplied went to Algeria (52% of African arms imports), Morocco (12%) and Nigeria (5.1%).

“Major arms play an important role in the military operations by sub-Saharan African states, although, due to lack of resources, procurement typically involves small numbers of mainly relatively low-end weapons,” SIPRI said.

States in sub-Saharan Africa received 32% of total African imports in 2013–17. The top five arms importers in sub-Saharan Africa were Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, Cameroon and Ethiopia. Together, they accounted for 56% of arms imports to the subregion. Nigeria’s arms imports grew by 42 % between 2008–12 and 2013–17, SIPRI noted.

Russian arms exports to Africa fell by 32% compared with 2008–12, but despite the decrease, Russia accounted for 39% of total imports to the region. Algeria received 78% of Russia’s arms transfers to Africa in 2013–17.

China’s arms exports to Africa rose by 55% between 2008–12 and 2013–17, and its share of total African arms imports increased from 8.4% to 17%. “A total of 22 sub-Saharan African countries procured major arms from China in 2013–17, and China accounted for 27% of sub-Saharan African arms imports in that period (compared with 16% in 2008–12). In North Africa, China became an important supplier to Algeria in 2013–17, with deliveries including three frigates and artillery,” SIPRI reported.

The United States accounted for 11% of arms exports to Africa in 2013–17 – the transfers were mainly small batches of weapons and included eight helicopters for Kenya and five for Uganda, which were supplied as US military aid. In 2013–17 Kenya—which is fighting al-Shabab on its own territory and in Somalia— acquired 13 transport helicopters, 2 second-hand combat helicopters, 65 light armoured vehicles and a small number of self-propelled howitzers.

SIPRI lists Egypt’s acquisitions as falling under the Middle East – if these are included in the continent’s statistics they push up Africa’s imports significantly as arms imports by Egypt grew by 215% between 2008–12 and 2013–17.

SIPRI noted that the US has been Egypt’s main arms supplier since the late 1970s, and accounted for 45% of Egypt’s arms imports in 2008–12. “However, between 2013 and 2015 the US halted deliveries of certain arms, in particular combat aircraft, to Egypt. In 2014 Egypt signed major arms deals with France, and deliveries started in 2015. As a result, France accounted for 37 % of Egypt’s arms imports in 2013–17 and overtook the USA to become the main arms supplier to Egypt for that period. This was despite the fact that the USA ended its restrictions in 2015 and increased its overall arms supplies to Egypt by 84% between 2008–12 and 2013–17.”

Globally, SIPRI in its latest report said that the volume of international transfers of major weapons in 2013–17 was 10% higher than in 2008–12, a continuation of the upward trend that began in the early 2000s.

The five largest exporters in 2013–17 were the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China. The United States in 2013-17 had a 34% share of the global market, followed by Russia (22%), France (6.7%), Germany (5.8%) and China (5.7%).

The USA supplied major arms to 98 states in 2013–17. Exports to states in the Middle East accounted for 49 per cent of total US arms exports in that period. “Based on deals signed during the Obama administration, US arms deliveries in 2013–17 reached their highest level since the late 1990s,” said Dr Aude Fleurant, Director of the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure Programme. “These deals and further major contracts signed in 2017 will ensure that the USA remains the largest arms exporter in the coming years.”

The five largest importers were India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and China. Most states in the Middle East were directly involved in violent conflict in 2013–17 and consequently arms imports by states in the region increased by 103% between 2008–12 and 2013–17, and accounted for 32% of global arms imports in 2013–17.

“Widespread violent conflict in the Middle East and concerns about human rights have led to political debate in Western Europe and North America about restricting arms sales,” said Pieter Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure Programme. “Yet the USA and European states remain the main arms exporters to the region and supplied over 98% of weapons imported by Saudi Arabia.”

SIPRI said the flow of arms to the Middle East and Asia and Oceania increased between 2008–12 and 2013–17, while there was a decrease in the flow to the Americas, Africa and Europe.

Republished with permission of our partner defenceWeb.

The Centrality of Missile Defense as Part of a 21st Century Deterrent Force

By Richard Weitz

The newly enacted FY2018 Omnibus Appropriations Bill provides urgently needed funding for U.S. defense priorities.

The spending package signed by President Trump supports fighting terrorism, rebuilding the U.S. Navy, developing next-generation capabilities to manage emerging challenges, and protecting Americans from immediate threats.

North Korea’s emerging nuclear missile capabilities are the most serious of these menaces.

We can hope that sanctions or summitry will quickly resolve this crisis, but experience strongly indicates otherwise—Pyongyang’s provocation pauses rarely last. We will always need to look to our defenses against North Korean missiles.

Similar to past administrations, the current White House, supported by Congress, is developing a layered defense system to maximize opportunities for destroying enemy missiles.

This ballistic missile defense (BMD) architecture combines ever-improving regional systems; “left-of-launch” capabilities that target missiles before they ascend; and an expanding Ground-Based Midcourse Defense network—Americans’ primary defense against incoming Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM).

The current fleet of Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) offer the sole means of defending the continental United States from these missiles. The GBIs employ multistage solid-fuel boosters, based in Alaska and California, to propel “kill vehicles” into targets in outer space, obliterating them outside the atmosphere. They rely on a proven hit-to-kill technology to intercept incoming warheads and missiles.

The Pentagon’s senior evaluation and testing body has concluded that the U.S. BMD architecture has “demonstrated capability to defend the U.S. homeland from a small number of intermediate-range or intercontinental missile threats.”

To enhance this protection, the Omnibus Appropriations Bill boosts BMD spending to $11.5 billion, an increase of $3.3 billion from the previous year. The new resources will improve current capabilities, notably building a new long-range radar and deploying a Redesigned Kill Vehicle, and develop new ones, such as a Multi-Object Kill Vehicle that can attack many targets on a single flight.

Like all military systems, BMD has an imperfect test record.

Researching, developing, and deploying cutting-edge technologies is invariably difficult.

The solution to this challenge is more testing, under increasingly rigorous conditions.

Another less valid fear is that U.S. decision makers will presume invulnerability.

With an effective missile defense shield, this narrative runs, Washington can freely engage in wars of aggression.

President Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders have propounded this theory for over a decade.

Surprisingly, now even respected outlets such as The New York Times have taken up Moscow’s line.

A recent editorial in the paper acknowledges that, “Missile defense needs to be part of the United States’ strategy,” along with international sanctions, regional defenses, proliferation interdiction, and diplomacy.

But the paper warns that President Trump not “to take military action against North Korea on the ground that the system could save the United States from retaliation.”

The Times is attacking a strawman.

No U.S. decision maker would presume the infallibility of our missile defenses or any other strategic technology.

Missile defenses can help deter and defeat attacks, reassure friends and allies, and reduce crisis instability—but it is widely understood that they are only one critical tool for addressing threats.

In particular, U.S. strategists do not see BMD as a cure-all to the North Korean problem, much less as a basis for pre-emptive military action on the peninsula.

The Trump administration pursues a broad approach regarding North Korea–direct diplomacy, robust sanctions, intensified interdiction, and other action.

Indeed, enhanced missile defenses will bolster the hand of U.S. negotiations and make achieving a diplomatic settlement with North Korea more likely.

With lower prospects of success decreasing the value of ICBM investments, Pyongyang will more likely accept constraints on its missile arsenal.

Effective missile defenses could also increase crisis stability by reducing pressure on U.S. policy makers to conduct preemptive strikes. BMD further lessens demands in Japan and South Korea to develop national nuclear weapons.

Most crucially, better protection will diminish nuclear war risks by raising doubts in Pyongyang that they can bombard U.S. cities with missiles.

The value of a well-resourced BMD architecture extends beyond a simple calculation of the physical effectiveness of individual platforms; one must also consider how missile defenses shape adversaries’ thinking.

Fortunately, Congress recognizes these benefits.

There is scant evidence that missile defenses provide decision makers with a false sense of confidence, and few Americans embrace Moscow’s self-serving rhetoric.

With its new resources, the U.S. missile defense architecture can now recover from its rushed rollout in the early 2000’s and its builders can properly test, develop, and grow the system.

Geopolitics and Shaping a Way Ahead for the Liberal Democracies in the Pacific

04/04/2018

During the RAAF Airpower Conference, 2018, one key subject was the nature of the change geopolitical dynamics in the region and its implication for Australian and for its liberal democratic allies.

The keynote address by Bilahari Kausikan Ambassador at Large at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore provided a challenging overview to thinking about the dynamics of strategic change in the region.

03_Thinking-About-Geopolitics-in-East-Asia-Kausikan

This was a remarkable address given its breadth and pungent insights on the region, on the United States, on China and on the ASEAN countries.

He drove home the point that there is too much binary thinking in addressing the region, notably with regard to the US-Chinese competition. Developments and competition in the region is rarely zero sum; it is really a multiple-sum competition.

He started by addressing the significant analytical failures in the media and in the broader analytical community to grasp the reality of the Trump Administration.

Although his style leaves something to be desired, when one looks at the realities, the Administration has moved beyond failures of the Bush and Obama Administration to address some fundamental aspects of change globally.

He was concerned that the strategic achievements of the Administration militarily could be undercut by the Administration’s trade policy perspective, but at the end of the day there was significant continuity and the US was not going away.

He then focused on China and the consolidation of power by the Chinese leaders.

He saw the Chinese as trying to work an economic transition which will be difficult and the leadership will be focused on domestic challenges in the period ahead.

The leadership clearly would like to keep the current global system in place as they have more to gain than to lose from the current state of affairs but this is not at all clear will be the outcome.

Clearly, China would like to see its new status globally to be recognized and to shape a new china centric order with all roads leading to Beijing.

He saw the ASEAN states as seeking ways to leverage Chinese economic growth but at the same time protecting their autonomy.  A challenge but a necessity as well for the smaller states in the region.

He predicated that the period ahead would see significant great power competition and uncertainty but felt that although the Chinese are pursuing the path of persuading others that their rise was inevitable and the decline of the US equally inevitable, US allies in the region would work with the US to deflect such an outcome.

Another geopolitical presentation which focused on Australia was that of John Blackburn. 

His focus was on energy security and the absence of a policy in Australia looking at global realities that make security of energy in Australia a question mark, not a reality.

Obviously, military conflict in the region would lead to disruption of energy supplies, and disruption of energy would significantly impact Australian society and military operations.

Blackburn argued that not only should a comprehensive energy security policy be put in place but he argued for a “fifth generation” approach.

What he means by that is shaping an integrated approach which looks not simply at sources of fuel supply but how to integrated ways to supply demand with ways to reshaped demand in a crisis as well.

Indeed from the perspective of the discussion of the Williams Foundation seminar on the transition from the land wars to high tempo ops and high intensity conflict which was held the day after the RAAF Airpower 2018 Conference concluded, it is clear that the diplomatic skills highlighted by Bilahari Kausikan and the ability to provide for security supply highlighted by John Blackburn are both crucial to shape a way ahead.
Shaping, and providing for an effective and resilient infrastructure in the face of attack from the non-liberal powers threatening the liberal democracies is both a challenging  and crucial task facing the publics and the leadership of the liberal democracies.

The US Army and Preparing for Higher Intensity War

As the US and core allies shift focus from the land wars to dealing with peer competitions and higher tempo and higher intensity operations, the US Army needs to sort out its modernization objective sand approach to force structure development.

We have focused on what we believe is a key priority of any transition, namely enhanced ADA capabilities and integration of Army ADA with Air and Naval forces.

In February, Army leaders addressed some of the modernization priorities in a conference with industry held at Fort Sill.

In an article by Monica Wood published by the US Army on February 9, 2018, the observations of senior Army leaders were highlighted with regard to the way ahead.

Maj. Gen. Wilson A. Shoffner, Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill commanding general, addressed more than 180 defense contractors on the challenges the fires force face in preparing for future multi-domain battle. Shoffner spoke at an Industrial Breakfast at Cameron University Jan. 31.

According to Shoffner, there are two key issues to preparing the Army for a near-peer battle.

The first issue is identifying and acquiring the right weapons to put in the hands of the fires force and its allies in a timely manner.

The second is mitigating identified fires gaps to conduct large-scale combat operations against a near-peer competitor. FCoE leaders are looking to the industry as a think tank to assist in addressing these capabilities gaps.

“It is so important for us to work with you, for us to learn lessons and have a dialogue about how we need to operate and survive in the current operational conditions,” Shoffner said to industry vendors. “We talk about outreach a lot and working with industry, but the reality is that over the last 15 or 16 years the Army’s focus has been on the current fight and resources follow the current fight.”

In an effort to modernize, the Army must adapt to the battlefield of the future.

Shoffner said greater lethality is about capabilities, not platforms.

“The Army must innovate and adapt concepts, equipment and training to be ready for the next war. We face multiple challenges in defining force structure, doctrine and implementing training. Army leadership is establishing strategic partnerships with industry to cultivate innovative technologies to accelerate delivery of 10 times capabilities to the force,” Shoffner said.

The Army has six modernization priorities with the first being long-range precision missiles and the fifth is air and missile defense. Army senior leadership initiated two directives to prioritize resources and efforts to accomplish these priorities: cross-functional teams (CFTs) and refocused talent management.

In October 2017, the Army released a directive outlining the pilot program of the cross-functional team. It included who would comprise the team (members with expertise in science and technology, logistics, contracting, and more) and what the team would set out to accomplish, ultimately “to develop capabilities faster and in a less costly manner to enable our Soldiers to fight and win.”

“The challenges we face because we have so much capability and so much force structure, it’s going to take a long time to crawl out of that hole and it’s hard to do when the resources are uncertain,” said Shoffner.

Shoffner posed the question “What kind of organizations are needed for the force of the future?” He discussed three of the organizations developed by the FCoE: Division Fires Command to support division operations; the Operational Fires Command to support corps operations; and the Theater Fires Command to support a theater Army/Joint Force land component command.

“The idea is to converge the field artillery and air defense capabilities with cyber-electromagnetic activities, information operations and space-based capabilities into integrating headquarters with the authorization to coordinate and employ cross-domain fires at every echelon,” he said.

Multi-domain

One of the initiatives for the Army is the Multi-Domain Task Force. The primary mission of the MDTF is to protect the joint force by applying long-range artillery and air and missile defense capabilities. It is also designed to provide long-range precision fires to target critical enemy assets such as integrated air defense systems, cruise and ballistic missiles, aerial attack capabilities and surveillance capabilities.

“The biggest lesson learned in order to decisively affect the fight was that we needed long-range fires to break through the [anti-access area denial] bubble to allow their attacking agent to get in there,” said Shoffner.

Long-range fires and field artillery
Long-range precision fires is the number one priority on the Army’s list. Fires provides the ability to destroy, neutralize or suppress artillery targets at extended ranges, thereby shaping the close fight to a time and place of our choosing.

Brig. Gen. Stephen Maranian, Field Artillery School commandant, said the FA is working hard to educate the force.

“Our main focus is to enhance readiness in the operational force,” said Maranian.

Maranian described a ready fires force as manned, trained, equipped and well-led to conduct joint missions and employ cross-domain fires that enable unified land operations.

He said training will ensure dominance in range, munitions and target acquisition to ensure fires has superior lethality and range against near-peer threats.

Air missile defense

Air and missile defense is one of the Army’s top modernization priorities and it’s critical to winning a fight against a “great power,” or near peer adversary. In order to achieve overmatch, the AMD force must retain the ability to defeat the full range of missile threats.

“The Army will achieve its objectives through its air and missile defense modernization strategy — to rapidly integrate and synchronize the requirements development process, acquisitions process and resources to deliver AMD capabilities to the warfighter faster,” said Shoffner.

Shoffner said the idea is to have multiple ways to deal with threats like unmanned aerial systems (UASs) including how to determine if it’s a friendly UAS and how to deal with enemy UASs.

“It’s a question of what sensors do we have and what ability do they have to feed the information into our systems? We’re at a point now where our missiles outperform our sensors,” said Shoffner.

“There’s no one silver bullet, there’s no one single system that’s going to get this done. There are some healthy discussions going on and you guys can help us see what the options are and see what can help us with the counter UASs,” he said.

“One of the things we can all agree upon is that it doesn’t make any sense to fire a missile that costs $114,000 at a UAS that costs a thousand dollars. There are other ways to get at the UAS whether it’s guns, or directed energy or a combination of those things. My point is to do what is sensible,” he said.

Brig. Gen. Randall McIntire, Air Defense Artillery School commandant, emphasized the importance of air defense artillery to protect the maneuver force and for preservation of key combat power.

“The main priority for us is maneuver short-range air defense (M-SHORAD). The maneuver force lacks the ability to detect, identify and engage threat UAS, cruise missiles, rotary wing and fixed wing aircraft,” said McIntire. “M-SHORAD will be employed as part of a tiered and layered approach to establish cross-domain dominance of tactical airspace.”

M-SHORAD employs a mix of sensors and shooters.

The directed requirement for an initial M-SHORAD capability is to address the urgency of need to provide air and missile defense protection of maneuvering forces. In the future, M-SHORAD will contribute to the maneuver force’s employment of lethal and/or nonlethal capabilities to detect, track, identify and defeat the threat.

 

 

Reviving Roving Sands: Shaping a Way Forward for ADA

The role of Army Air Defense Artillery is crucial in providing for key defense assets in the evolving offensive-defense enterprise.

Part of the shift from a primary focus in the land wars to the Middle East to dealing with a wider spectrum of conflict, including peer to peer conflict,  is ramping up capabilities and training of the modernizing ADA force.

The revival of Roving Sands is a key part of the ramp up as well.

According to a US Army press release dated February 26, 2018, the Army has revived Roving Sands, a key training exercise for the Army and Marine Corps ADA community.

What is it?

Exercise Roving Sands is a three-week long joint air defense exercise held at Fort Bliss, Texas that focuses on training and certifying the Air Defense Artillery units of the 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command. The exercise focuses on providing a combat training center-like evaluation where units simulate combat operations in an austere environment and refine their air defense skills in preparation for real world global response.

As part of the joint training, the Marines and Air Force also take part in the exercise as simulated enemy air threats.

What is the Army doing/has done?

The Army, specifically the 32d AAMDC, is reviving Exercise Roving Sands, after a 13-year hiatus. This was an annual exercise that ran from 1989 to 2005. Roving Sands 2018 is set to take place in the February-March time frame.

Units taking part in Roving Sands 18 involve elements of all four of the command’s brigades. Units are “deploying” to Fort Bliss to be tested in a real-world, expeditionary type scenario as forces and equipment flow into “theater” via air and rail movement. In Fort Bliss they will conduct Reception, Staging, Onward-movement and Integrations operations prior to executing their missions.

During Roving Sands 18 units involved will focus on their ability to move, communicate and sustain over a large operational distance while providing air missile defense to protected assets. Throughout the exercise, units involved will be under the close scrutiny of Observer/Controller-Trainers, who will assess and ultimately validate them.

Major platforms involved in the exercise include the Patriot, THAAD and Avenger Systems and will culminate with a live-fire exercise to take place at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.

What continued efforts does the Army have planned for the future?

The goal is for Roving Sands to remain as an annual exercise that creates a venue forcing staff refinement of internal operational readiness procedures throughout the Air Defense Artillery community. This exercise will be a vehicle for 32d AAMDC to exercise mission command outside of the bi-annual Air Missile Defense Exercise conducted in the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

Why is this important to the Army?

Roving Sands creates an opportunity for the Air Defense Artillery community to conduct joint, maneuver-based exercises in a dynamic environment while validating readiness. With the growing threat from missiles, rockets, artillery and mortars, as well as unmanned aerial systems, Air Defense Artillery forces will continue to be forefront in the defense of America and her allies.

The background to reviving the exercise was highlighted in an article by C. Todd Lopez and published February 9, 2017.

The Roving Sands air and missile defense exercise, last held 28 years ago, served as a platform for doctrine development, a demonstration of technology, and ultimately as a validation of the expertise of the units who participated.

These days, Army air and missile defense exercises of that sort are a thing of the past, but that soon may change, if Brig. Gen. Christopher Spillman has his way.

“One of the things we in the air defense community don’t have … is a combat training center-like evaluation,” said Spillman, who serves as commander of the 32nd Air and Missile Defense Command. “We don’t have external evaluation.”

Speaking at an Association of the U.S. Army event Tuesday in Arlington, Virginia, Spillman said the air defense community needs that validation back to demonstrate to the rest of the Army what the defense community already knows.

“Only we know if we are good or not,” he said. “The rest of the Army doesn’t, because they lack the expertise. We in the air defense artillery, we have the skills; we have the expertise; we know whether or not we’re good. So we need an external evaluation. We need a combat training center-like evaluation.”

The general said he has already made efforts toward rebuilding a large, collective training exercise like Roving Sands, and he speculated that such an event could be held at Fort Bliss, Texas.

“I’m going to try to figure out a way to resource that thing and demonstrate from a 32nd [Army Missile Defense Command] down to the lowest fire team … our ability to execute air and missile defense … So it’s something I’m going to tee up here fairly soon,” Spillman said.

Roving Sands involved multinational partners working together to hone their air and missile defense skills, and that’s something Spillman said must return — but it won’t happen right away.

Initially, Spillman said, efforts toward rebuilding an air and missile defense training and validation exercise will involve “baby steps,” but it’s a goal worth working toward.