Japanese Defense Budget 2018: Shaping Integrated C2 and Enhanced Allied Integration

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
01/06/2018

2018-01-06  On December 22, 2017, the Japanese government published their new defense budget on the MoD website.

Japanese Defense Budget, 2018

With an enhanced threat from North Korea and China and the continuing challenges posed by Russia, the Japanese have been strengthening their perimeter defense and are looking to more effectively integrate their defense capabilities with their closest defense partners, which increasingly includes Australia as well.

For example, Japan and Australia are in talks to establish a first-ever visiting forces agreement with an ally other than the United States.

http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/australia-closes-in-on-joint-defence-force-deal-with-japan-20171225-h0a12s.html

One of the more interesting features of the priority on defense modernization is shaping a more effective integrated C2 system to replace stovepiped service C2 systems.

Strengthening information and communications capability, which is a prerequisite for supporting nation-wide operations

Gradually introduce cloud technology to integrate the command systems that were developed individually by each SDF service. The integration will increase the system’s operational flexibility and resiliency, and at the same time, reduce the costs associated with development and maintenance of the system

  1. Replacement of the central command system (Design process from FY2017 will continue in FY2018) (¥400 million)
  2. Establishment/Development of common cloud computing infrastructure, etc. (¥600 million)
  3. Establishment/Development of cloud computing infrastructure for the GSDF (¥3.8 billion)
  4. Enhancement of the network surveillance function of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII*), etc. (¥7.4 billion)
  5. Significantly increase equipment for network surveillance in order to strengthen the security of DII * Defense Information Infrastructure

http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/291222.pdf

 

Shaping New Combat Con-Ops: F-35 and F-22 Cross Learning

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
01/04/2018

2017-12-29 As we end 2017, the team at Second Line of Defense would like to note that we have focused for MANY years on the re-norming of airpower associated with the coming of the fifth generation aircraft.

There have been many opponents along the way, and many of these folks still do not get it.

And when Secretary Gates and Senator McCain were in high attack mode on the F-35B we not only defended the aircraft but highlighted how significant the aircraft could become in rethinking combat capabilities and concepts of operations.

Notably, both South Korea and Japan are looking to the possibility of adding F-35Bs to their naval forces, something that would not be happening if Secretary Gates and Senator McCain’s barrage of criticism had led to the F-35 becoming another F-22 in terms of contract termination.

If you are going to do high tempo and high intensity operations, and your are a liberal democracy, you need to operate rapidly in response and with as much joint and coalition combat power as you can.

This is what the fifth generation combat capability enables.

It is a work in progress and affects the entire combat process, including the integration of offensive and defense systems in the kind of integration which Aegis with F-35 allows, or which the integration of Army ADA systems with fifth generation airpower will allow as well.

Four U.S. Air Force fighter jets practice the inauguration flyover at Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va., Jan. 19, 2017. The formation is comprised of two, fourth generation fighters (F-15 and F-16) along with two, fifth generation fighters (F-22 and F-35). (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Tristan Biese) (Photo by Airman 1st Class Tristan Biese)

The shaping, crafting and creation of integrated offensive and defensive forces is part of what are calling F-35 2.0.

Acquiring and operating the aircraft are not enough.

It is about working through how to reshape C2 and force integration overall with the F-35 as a key lever for change.

In an interview this Fall while in Copenhagen the new chief of staff of the Royal Danish Air Force put it particularly well:

To be blunt: to leverage every aspect out of the F-35 as a common coalition aircraft will be essential to defense in the Nordic region and the transformation of their forces to deal with the direct Russian threat.

This means leveraging common pilot training, leveraging pilots across the enterprise in case of shortages within a national air force, common logistics stores in the region, common maintenance regimes, common data sharing, and shared combat learning.

This clearly is a work in progress and what one might call F-35 2.0.

F-35 1.0 is getting the plane and operating it in squadrons; F-35 2.0 is leveraging the aircraft as part of an overall transformation process.

In my discussion during a visit to Copenhagen in October 2017, I had a chance to talk again with ERA (his call sign).

And he was clearly focusing on F-35 2.0, probably in part because the new Danish defense agreement in process if clearly focused on countering the Russian A2/AD strategy in the region.

“When I talk with F-35 pilots, the same message is drilled into me – this is not a replacement aircraft; this is not like any aircraft you have flown before.

“The aircraft enables our air combat forces to play a whole new ballgame.

“And from my discussions with Australians, the Norwegians, the Dutch and the Brits, it is clear that the common drive is to shape a fifth generation combat force, not simply fly the current 256 F-35s as cool, new jets.”

He clearly had in mind working on F-35 2.0 to trigger a broader transformation.

And this makes sense, because in large part the F-35 is not simply a fighter which you define but what it does by itself organically, but, rather by what it can trigger in the overall combat fleet, whether lethal or non-lethal payloads.

“We need to focus on the management of big data generated by the F-35 and other assets that will come into the force.

“How do we do the right kind of command and control within a rich information battlespace?

“We need to build self-learning systems as well.

“The F-35 is a revolutionary man-machine system and sets in motion not only the challenge of new approaches to working information and C2, but new approaches to combat learning.

“How do we get there?

“That is what generating a fifth generation combat force is all about.”

It is clear that the F-35 is part of a significant culture change.

“We need to be open to significant culture change.

“Many Danish F-35 pilots will be converted from 16s and will learn the new ways of operating.

“At the same time, s new generation of pilots will have F-35 as their first combat aircraft and have no operational experience on legacy aircraft and are open to radical changes in how the jet can be used and in working with the other combat assets.

“We need to facilitate and channel such open ended learning as well as we build out or force transformation with those pilots with F-16 experience and the new F-35 pilots as well.

“Part of that is captured by the notion of integrating legacy aircraft with the F-35, but that is too narrow of a concept.

“We are really looking at shaping a different kind of force, F-35-enabled but which incorporates the old which remains valuable and adds new systems which can expand the combat effectiveness of the evolving fifth generation force.”

“How do we make sure that we don’t settle with the reality that the F-35 is better than anything out there and it makes the fourth gen better?

“That will not get us to a fifth generation combat force.

“We need to leverage it to drive continuous transformation to ensure that we have the kind of capabilities which our demanding strategic environment requires.”

The cross learning between the F-22 and the Fp-35 is a key bedrock of such change being able to occur in the next five years among the allies as well as the U.S. joint forces.

A very good article by John Tirpak published in the Air Force Magazine provides a very good overview of how cross learning has unfolded and its significance for the way ahead for the combat force. We have excerpted from the article below but recommend reading the complete article.

A dozen years after the F-22’s operational debut and two years after the F-35 was declared ready for combat, the flow of lessons learned is running both ways. The two fifth generation fighter programs are working together to reduce costs and make both systems more effective.

The F-22 has been a pathfinder for the F-35: Its formations and methods of employment are a model for the junior fighter. In return, the small F-22 fleet is gaining economy-of-scale benefits by getting in on parts buys with the far larger—and growing—F-35 fleet. More advanced and hardier stealth features on the F-35 are working their way back to the F-22, the two aircraft share radar features, and operational and manufacturing experience with the F-35 are helping define upgrades for the Raptor.

“The F-35 and F-22 were always meant to operate alongside one another, so it makes a lot of sense to apply that same logic to the programmatic side of both platforms,” said Lockheed Martin F-35 program manager Jeff A. Babione. “We’re constantly taking advantage of newer, more advanced technologies and processes. If we can apply the same advances to the F-35 and F-22, we drive costs down and pull schedules to the left on both programs.”

The F-22 pioneered fifth generation tactics and those are being applied straight to the F-35, according to Col. Paul “Max” Moga, commander of the 33rd Fighter Wing at Eglin AFB, Fla. The 33rd trains new F-35 pilots, but Moga spent years in the F-22, as an instructor and demonstration pilot and later as a squadron commander, after starting out in F-15s.

Regarding employment techniques on the F-22 and F-35, “I would describe them as a direct transfer,” Moga said. In the F-22, the key to employment is “managing signature, sensor, and what we refer to as ‘flow,’ ” which he explained is how the plane and pilot sense the battlespace, steer between threats, and get into the optimum position to engage. That same concept applies to the F-35, he said.

Though fourth generation aircraft pilots have to manage visual and infrared signatures, “it’s not until you get in the fifth gen world that you really concern yourselves with radar signature management. … That is a core competency of any fifth gen platform, and that is a direct transfer over from the F-22 to the F-35.” Pilots of both jets must “manage our signature as we employ the aircraft and optimize our survivability and lethality,” Moga said.

The F-22 was a “generational leap” over fourth gen fighters such as the F-15 and F-16, and it took a conscious shift in culture to shed old tactics that were no longer relevant when the F-22 came online, he noted.

In a fourth generation jet, a wingman must provide “mutual support” within visual range, “welded” to the flight lead just a few miles away. But “pretty early on in Raptor tactics development, we realized that, based on the capabilities of the airplane, we didn’t need visual mutual support. We needed a mutual support by presence, which, for us, can be upward of 10, 15, 20 nautical miles away from one another,” said Moga.

For a former fourth gen pilot who has always depended on someone close by having his back, “it takes a while to get used to that,” Moga said…..

The F-22 has been a success story in Operation Inherent Resolve, Moga asserted. Though its high-end dogfight capabilities have never been tested in combat, “I think the F-22 has performed tactically better than most people thought it was going to in theater.” When not “gainfully employed,” dropping bombs or escorting packages of other aircraft, the F-22 has proved stellar in other ways, putting together “the electronic order of battle, … the airborne order of battle,” and then conveying that information “back to the platforms it may be more applicable to.”

A lesson learned—and one certainly being applied on the F-35—is “the importance of maintaining accurate and up-to-date mission data files,” Moga noted. This is another area where exhaustive information on regional threats is applicable to both airplanes. The software facility that loads both aircrafts’ mission data files is at Eglin. USAF and partner nations collaborate to populate the databases with every threat known to intelligence.

“There’s a lot of work to be done, and it’s a fast-moving ball game, but we’re making a lot of progress,” he said. Still, “we’ve got a little ways to go before we can raise the flag and say we’re where we want to be,” Moga added.

In short, 2018 will see further evolution of the combat capabilities for the combat force driven by the renorming airpower and we will certainly be reporting on those developments throughout the year.

Editor’s Note: For our earlier articles published in 2011, 2012 and 2015 which focused on both Gates and McCain and made the strategic case for the F-35B, see the following:

The F-35B: From ‘Probation’ To Transformation

McCain Misfires on F-35: Rushes Towards the Past

The Impact of the F-35B: Strategic Deterrence with Tactical Flexibility

Adding New Digital Capabilities to the F-35 Line

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
12/31/2017

2017-12-31 One of the advantages of having built a digital thread manufacturing line for the F-35 at Fort Worth is the capability which the system allows to add evolving digital capabilities to that line.

A recent example was highlighted in a story published on exectuvebiz.com on December 7, 2017:

Lockheed Martin has licensed an industrial internet-of-things platform from Ubisense as part of efforts to increase F-35manufacturing efficiency at Lockheed’s Fort Worth, Texas, facility.

Ubisense said Wednesday it designed the SmartSpace system to help manufacturers address schedule, budget requirements for aircraft production, as well as boost transparency on the manufacturing process with location technology.

SmartSpace employs an indoor radar built to tracks tools and assets to mitigate potential production delays as well as helps stage and schedule assets ahead of future production tasks, Ubisense noted.

The system also works to electronically audit tools and assets, generate detailed reports on the whereabouts of customers’ furnished equipment and help users comply with potential spot checks.

Richard Petti, Ubisense CEO, said the company aims to help Lockheed obtain visibility of its Fort Worth aircraft manufacturing process with the SmartSpace platform.

Earlier this Fall, we discussed the nature of the digital thread manufacturing approach and its capability to import digital advances as they unfold with Don Kinard.

2017-11-10 By Robbin Laird

The F-35 undergoes final assembly and checkout at three plants around the world – in Italy, in Japan and in Fort Worth, Texas.

The Italian and Japanese lines are low rate production lines whereas the Fort Worth line is the high rate production facility.

The Fort Worth line is truly a unique manufacturing facility, which highlights why the aircraft can be built in high volume and why innovation can continue in the future as the line evolves.

The line is based on a digital thread manufacturing model and as such can embrace evolving capabilities in the domains of automation as well as the various dynamics of change within the broader digital domain, whether commercial or military.

The current plan is to fill out the current manufacturing facility in Fort Worth by 2021 when full rate production is achieved at about 150 aircraft for the year.

I last visited the FAL in 2015 and a lot has changed with the ramp up in the past two years.

During my visit on September 25, 2017, I had a chance to tour the factory with Don Kinard, an F-35 manufacturing expert.

He has been my guide on previous factory visits.

I had a chance to interview Kinard after the visit.

And in that interview, he highlighted the ramp up process.

Question: What is the production rate this year?

Don Kinard: “There are more than 250 production aircraft in the field currently; there are 160 in assembly production across the globe, and the production rate at the Fort Worth facility this year is roughly five a month.

“The plan is 66 aircraft this year; more than 90 aircraft next year; and over 130 in 2019.

“And over the next 10 years about 50% of those planes are being produced for the partners.

Question: During the ramp up you are adding new staff.

What is planned during that period?

Don Kinard: “We have about 1,500 mechanics right now.

“We will roughly double that over the next three years.

“The mechanics are the touch labor personnel and we will increase the support labor by a few hundred people as well.

“During your tour of the training facility, you saw how we are augmenting training.

“The key in adding workers is to bring them up to speed prior to entering the assembly line to reduce downtime impact of integrating new workers onto the line.

“The mechanics are the main hire, and they’ll be going through three to six weeks’ worth of training on realistic components prior to going to the floor to do the jobs for which they are being trained for.

“Finding those mechanics has been something we’ve been working on now for years.

“We’ve had several hiring events all over the country.

“And we’re even starting to get people who have worked F-35 in the field.

“They’re now becoming available.

“They’re retiring from the military or leaving the service, and we’re now able to get people who actually worked F-35’s out in the bases as well as mechanics new to the program”.

Question: During the training facility tour, you highlighted ways the mechanics are being trained realistically prior to going to the final assembly line. How would you describe that process?

Don Kinard: “We are using a number of assembly simulators to provide hands on training necessary to ensure that the mechanics are receiving realistic experience prior to joining the assembly line team.

“We are working to make the transition from training to the real plane as seamless as possible.

“First of all, we hire trained aerospace mechanics.

“Secondly, we train them to be F-35 mechanics on realistic components, and then they go to the floor and get teamed up with people that have been on the floor a while, and that is the on-the-job, or OJT, phase of the hiring and training process.

“What we’ve seen so far with some of the classes that are complete is a tremendous improvement in quality on the mechanics first forays onto the floor.”

Question: In addition to adding mechanics and support labor, you are ramping up automation throughout the assembly line as well. What has been that impact?

 Don Kinard: “We have had a touch labor reduction of 75% over the last five years on the airplane.

“There are a couple of advantages we have with regard to modernization of the final assembly line.

“First, we are building a significant number of F-35s looking out into the future, so we’ve been able to invest, as a company, in technology to do more automation, something we didn’t have the opportunity to do in past programs.

“Second, the technology behind the digital thread has exploded in the past five years, meaning that, we started out with 3D solid models years and years ago and we planned for a certain amount of automation. Since program inception automation has gotten a lot better and less expensive.

“The ability to put the digital thread in the hands of the mechanics is something that’s evolved over the last five or six years, and now we are able to actually take 3D scans to compare the as-built aircraft directly to the as-designed aircraft.

“This capability has only been around for three or four years.

“There has been an explosion of digital thread technologies– augmented reality, laser projection, optical projection, the scanning white lights, scanning lasers–that we can leverage and work into the assembly line.

“We’re able to do that because we have 2,500+ more aircraft to go.

“So there’s a big economic incentive for us and our customers to make those investments through capital investments and the Blueprint for Affordability Program.

“And, by the way, digital technologies continue to evolve rapidly, and because we have a digital thread line and a Manufacturing Technology organization we can incorporate those technologies as appropriate.

“We’ve only started with augmented reality, but I almost guarantee you that in the next five years that’ll change everything. All of the Internet of Things, IToT, Industry 4.0, will be incorporated as appropriate. We will have the ability to automate a lot of reporting, automate a lot of data gathering, automate a lot of things today we do manually.

“Because of our digital thread approach we can incorporate innovations from the commercial space, which creates opportunities to improve quality and reduce costs.

“Our digital thread manufacturing process provides us with the opportunity to do so on an open-ended basis.

“This aspect of innovation built into the F-35 program is not widely appreciated.

“We’re able to harness the power of the major digital companies out there developing technologies in the commercial space, and spending enormous amounts of money, and all of a sudden those innovations are flowing our way.

“Having the three variants on the same assembly line has allowed the F-35Cs and Bs to benefit enormously from the evolutions of the largest production run of the three, the F-35A.

“The avionics and the software are the same across all three aircraft, which is a huge learning, and maintenance advantage.”

Question: Because of the digital thread approach, the changes on the manufacturing line are informed by and can inform the stand up of the global sustainment effort as well.

How would you describe this process?

Don Kinard: “One needs to look at sustainment much like you look at manufacturing learning.

“We’ve done a lot of learning over the past five years.

“We know how to build the aircraft now.

“That mystery is gone.

“Now, we’re learning how to sustain that aircraft, and that data will be captured by systems like ALIS (advanced logistics information system).

“We can then shape a global database as flight data accumulated so that everybody gets better.

“Everybody who has an F-35 gets better.

“With more than 250 planes out in the field, we are getting data from these aircraft and incorporating lessons learned into changes on the FAL itself.

“This is the advantage of having a digital data stream to work with from design to manufacturing to sustainment and back again.

“This allows for a digital learning curve, which enables both quality and performance to be enhanced.

“If customers take full advantage of the process, sustainment will be enhanced and sortie generation rates ramped up for the global F-35 fleet.

“In addition, many of the manufacturing technologies developed for Production have applications with our Sustainment business, additive manufacturing of tools and augmented reality delivery of maintenance instructions being a couple of good examples.”

During the factory tour, it was clear that ramp up was ongoing and that a number of changes and upgrades had occurred since my last visit in 2015.

First, throughout the factory there are a large number of overhead RFID panels which monitor the parts and tools throughout the factory so we can track by the use of digital devices where parts are and how they are being consumed, and also using our integrated business systems what the current manufacturing state status of each aircraft is at every production station.

According to Kinard: “The focus is upon providing data to those who use it on the floor, as well as to provide a data dashboard overview for management on aircraft status and performance.

“Much of this capability is currently available on our phones by use of an app called Plane-Site developed by our Production Control an IT departments and more capability is being added every year.”

Kinard emphasized during the tour that the 4th industrial revolution which revolves around leveraging data to get enhanced understanding of production processes to improve continuously the production process was a core focus of the overall data management effort.

During the tour we saw a new automated wing-drilling machine, which provides a significant improvement in how it operates, including waste material reduction, automated hole measurement, enhanced accuracy and improved speed.

According to Kinard: “Lockheed Martin is developing with the US Government a number of technologies to enhance performance and lower cost for the supply chain as well. One example in the factory was a new titanium cryogenic machining system.

“This cryogenic system was being tested to determine its effectiveness in cutting titanium and faster while increasing tool life. The Cryogenic machine tool uses a liquid nitrogen tank, which feeds liquid nitrogen to the cutter tip

“Given that 25-30% of the plane uses titanium, any reductions in tooling costs are significant for suppliers who are the targets of this machining technology.

“More generally, given the significant investments in machine tools to build a modern fighter aircraft, improvement in efficiency is a major plus.

“Enhanced use of robots could be seen throughout the factory.

“One example was Thor, a robot used in the finishing shop to inject coatings onto the airplane in the finishes area.

“The robot along with automated 3D scanning technologies is designed to manage the thickness of the coatings, which is part of building a low observable aircraft.

“This development leads to reduction of time and improvement in accuracy as well.

“One result of the use of automation and associated accuracy improvements can be seen in the significantly low defect rate. 80+% of F-35s from the FAL go to the Radar Cross Section (RCS) facilities with zero defects.

“Scanning technologies are clearly going to be leveraged for improvements in accuracy and speed as well.

“The basic approach is to use scanning technologies, which scan the plane as-built and then directly to the plane compare it to as-designed in the CATIA models. This process can identify any final adjustments needed. The goal is to use this more broadly to reduce the need for manual labor to perform these tasks.

“One example in testing is using scanning technology to 3D scan the bomb weapons bay as opposed to a manual fit check of simulated weapons.

“This is a work in progress but clearly one which can provide for further manufacturing improvements.”

“The broader point is simply because the FAL is built on a digital thread line it is possible to have open ended innovations and production learning, which can also be applied to the Sustainment process going forward, as well as learning from the performance of operational aircraft integrated with production process itself.”

For an overview on digital thread manufacturing, see the following:

http://www.industryweek.com/systems-integration/demystifying-digital-thread-and-digital-twin-concepts

https://www.dodmantech.com/ManTechPrograms/Files/AirForce/Cleared_DT_for_Website.pdf

Editor’s Note: The past discussions with Don Kinard can be found here:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-maturing-of-f-35-manufacturing-and-crafting-synergy-among-suppliers-the-final-assembly-line-and-maintainers-an-update-with-don-kinard/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/shaping-f-35-production-maturity-a-dialogue-with-dr-don-kinard/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/building-wings-for-the-f-35-israel-italy-and-fort-worth-shape-a-21st-century-capability/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/visiting-the-f-35-final-assembly-line-fort-worth/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/an-update-on-f-35-manufacturing-the-case-of-wing-assembly/

The photo above can be found here:

http://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/lockheed-esta-perto-de-fechar-venda-de-jatos-f-35-de-mais-de-us-37-bilhoes/

 

Preparing for 2018: Implementing the Trump Administration National Security Strategy

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Preparing for 2018: Implementing the Trump Administration National Security Strategy
12/28/2017

2017-12-28 By Stephen Blank

The Trump Administration’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) received a flood of public scrutiny even before it was announced.

Not surprisingly this flood morphed into a tidal wave once it appeared.

But virtually all of this commentary focused on the tone and major themes observers claimed to find in it at the expense of some of the more original aspects of this document that were expressed in the NSS’ discussion of regional security in certain areas. 

Specifically, commentators either missed or omitted the sections on Latin America and Central Asia.  These areas may not be priorities like Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East but they are increasingly important arenas  due to mounting challenges,  not only from terrorists, but also from Russia and China.

The NSS cited not only enhanced use of trade and financial tools to advance U.S. interests in Latin America, it also cited examples of glaring misrule like Venezuela and the expanding presence and interests of China and Russia there.

President Trump announcing the new national security strategy.

This, though commentators overlooked it, represents an original and positive development.

The Obama Administration was essentially uninterested in the Russian presence in Latin America, which is particularly sinister.  Whereas China’s presence is primarily expressed through huge trade relationships, Russia not only supports states like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua in their anti-Americanism it also seeks to expand its political,  intelligence, and military footprint in Latin America and to undermine American allies like Colombia.

Indeed, there are even concerns about a potential Russian effort to undermine  the integrity of Mexico’s forthcoming  2018 elections.

In 2008 Moscow actively solicited intelligence coordination among anti-American states in the region and  shipped weapons to Venezuela to undermine our ally Colombia.  Although those actions failed; they displayed Russia’s growing interest in striking at the U.S. through Latin America.

NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2

Today Moscow has not only enhanced security cooperation with Nicaragua, it is seeking air and naval bases in Latin America.  Venezuela proves to be a case in point.  The dictatorial Madero regime has not only brought Venezuela to the point of utter immiseration and destitution, Venezuela is on the verge of bankruptcy thanks to the regime’s corruption and misrule.  Moscow has capitalized on this to lend Venezuela several billion dollars in return for an enhanced stake in its oil and gas fields.

In this regard it is swapping debt for equity as it has done throughout Eurasia. But we should not be surprised if Moscow repeats the subsequent phases of its debt for equity swaps in Eurasia.

Namely when the time comes for Venezuela to declare itself unable to pay its debts that Moscow will use this equity or convert it into air and/or naval bases there in accordance with its longstanding designs.

This is on top of Russia’s well-established security cooperation with Nicaragua.  That cooperation takes the form of permanent bilateral consultations between each country’s security council, joint drills among troops, arms sales, Russia’s alleged training of Nicaraguan forces in anti-drug actions, and a Russian satellite station there to track U.S. aerial and naval movements among other things.

Since Moscow has also expressed its interest in access to Nicaraguan ports and airfields it too could become an object of Russian solicitations in the future for basing rights.

Therefore the NSS is right on target in singling out this penetration as something that we should both monitor and  oppose.

In Central Asia we are fighting in Afghanistan and allegedly making progress. But whereas the Obama Administration for the most part, i.e. till 2015, had no Central Asia policy other than the war in Afghanistan, that area was neglected.

Even Secretary of State Kerry’s initiative of a regular 5+1 format with his Central Asian opposite numbers is only a small part of what is needed.  Here too the NSS was much more forthright with its explicit message of opposition to Russian attempts to corner those states’ energy supplies and to undermine their sovereignty.

Not only do we oppose terrorism, the NSS also invoked upgraded trade and financial relationships with Central Asian governments and built upon its predecessors by championing India’s role as a facilitator for the more general process of South and Central Asian integration.

To show that these statements in the NSS are not merely words, President Trump also spoke to Uzbekistan’s President, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, in support of his efforts to reform Uzbekistan and to solicit grater U.S. foreign investment in his country.

These two examples show not only the global sweep of the Administration’s policy but also its increased sensitivity to challenges to America that do not receive a lot of publicity but which nonetheless materially affect our interests and security. 

Furthermore these indicators of a vigorous global policy using trade, economics, and all the other capabilities accruing to the government signify a growing resistance to challenges that might, in previous administrations, have escaped notice or presidential attention.

Therefore we would do well to watch the Administration for the balance of Trump’s term to see whether or not it can sustain the enhanced attention to these areas that often are laggards in the race for presidential attention.

These may not be the challenges we see in Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia, but to ignore them only abets the  efforts of our regional adversaries like China and Russia to multiply the threats to us so that they can continue to promote their interests at our expense and create more problems than we can handle.

By recognizing this project of our adversaries the Administration actually marks an advance over its predecessors.

However, now it has to make good on its ambitions to act on a global scale.  And that will be a real test of its ability and capacity.

Dr. Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. He is the author of numerous foreign policy-related articles, white papers and monographs, specifically focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia. He is a former MacArthur Fellow at the U.S. Army War College.

If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

A Different Take on Trump’s National Security Strategy

Preparing for 2018: The UN Sending States Agenda to Deal with North Korea

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Preparing for 2018: The UN Sending States Agenda to Deal with North Korea

On December 19, 2017, the United States and Canada said that nations from around the world would convene January 16 to show solidarity against North Korea’s nuclear program.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland, meeting in Ottawa, said the meeting would take place in Vancouver.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Canada’s Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland take part in a news conference on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, Ontario, Dec. 19, 2017. Credit Photo: Reuters

The meeting will involve the “sending states” that sent forces as part of a U.N. command to support South Korea during the Korean War. They’ll be joined by additional countries, including Japan, South Korea and India.

Tillerson said the meeting would seek to advance the pressure campaign on North Korea and send a unified message that the global community won’t accept the North’s becoming a nuclear state. He said the pressure campaign would keep intensifying.

https://www.voanews.com/a/nations-hold-north-korea-meeting-in-canada-in-january/4171272.html

What follows is an article by Danny Lam which looks at the agenda for the meeting and the challenges to be met by the “sending states.”

2017-12-28 By Danny Lam

Canada and the United States agreed on November 28, 2017 to co-host a meeting of the United Nations Command “sending states, ROK, Japan and other key affected countries.”

Initially, Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s foreign minister and her Global Affairs staff, took that to mean she can invite whomever she liked including PRC and maybe Cuba.

PM Trudeau have praised Castro’s Cuba for their close relationship with North Korea and viewed them as a valuable channel toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem for our time.

When Japan rejected Canada’s overtures and effectively declined to participate in a United Front Campaign advocated by Canada that almost certainly would have led to a dialog for the PRC and Russia’s proposal for “freeze for freeze”, the US had to step in.

US  Ambassador to China Terry Branstad unilaterally announced in Canton that Secretary Tillerson will travel to Canada and meet with PM Trudeau and Minister Freeland on the North Korea crisis on December 19th, delaying the “sending states” meeting from mid-December to mid-January.

Secretary Tillerson reset the direction and purpose of the meeting during the December bilateral meeting with Canada by stipulating that the meeting are between the “sending states” plus ROK, Japan, India, Sweden and others that Secretary of Tillerson think are important to engage.

Notably, this excluded PRC, Cuba, Russia and North Korea.   Communist China had to be disinvited by Canada.

The Hon. Mr. Tillerson described the purpose of the UN Command “Sending States” meeting as,

“[H]ow do we improve the effectiveness of the current pressure campaign? Are there other steps that could be taken to put additional pressure on the regime in North Korea, and how do we further take our diplomatic efforts forward? And then how do we prepare for the prospects of talk[s]?”

The purpose of the meeting is clearly about ratcheting up the pressure leading to DPRK entering negotiations for denuclearization in good faith.

It is a last ditch effort prior to military options.

An unspoken goal of the meeting is to cement and firm up a consensus that North Korea is an imminent existential threat that endanger the liberal international order, and not just a regional security problem for South Korea, Japan and the United States that must be resolved before it becomes too risky for a military option.

US officials must educate and inform the participants at the meeting on the extent of DPRK’s threat and how the US Government arrived at their consensus view that:

“North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has aggressive and offensive objectives. Pyongyang, they believe, will use its nuclear weapons to push U.S. forces out of South Korea and then force reunification of the Korean Peninsula on its terms.”

In other words, North Korea was, is, and will not be a status quo nuclear power that treat their nuclear arsenal as a defensive tool to guarantee regime survival.

DPRK’s nuclear arsenal is intended for offensive purposes to alter the status quo of not just the Korean peninsula, but the liberal world order.

This perspective would come as no surprise to anyone who fought the Korean war.

But very few (if any) officials attending the UNC Sending States meeting in Vancouver on Jan 16, 2018 have firsthand experience from that distant conflict.

Fading memories of the Korean war, together with a very active propaganda campaign by DPRK and PRC that portrays them as the “winners” of the Korean war, and the rise of the PRC as a successful communist peer competitor to the allies, have distorted the perception of the conflict since 1953.

Almost all the participants count the PRC as their top (or major) trading partner and is deeply concerned with upsetting the CCP.

PM Trudeau, in particular, failed to appease President Xi and Premier Li in December when he and his ministers was widely expected to be offered a Free Trade Deal.

Instead, he left virtually empty handed without securing the release of any Canadian prisoners or selling one Bombardier C-Series jet, not to mention having a joint press conference with Premier Li abruptly cancelled.

Managing the PRC’s relationship with the sending states and allies will be a key problem on the agenda.

A critical task before the meeting convenes is to refresh the participants and institutional memories of the UNC Sending States of what is really at stake when they collectively signed the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

This agreement is no less binding and enforceable than the Charter of the United Nations (1946) and other treaties that formally ended WWII.  It commits sending states to defend the RoK against aggression by the Korean People’s Army and Chinese People’s “Volunteers”.

Few (if any) officials and politicians who are belligerent “sending states” except the USA recognize their legal obligations.

Or their liability for “compensation” currently demanded by DPRK.

Armistice do not formally end armed conflict.

Peace treaties need to be concluded between belligerents that include, in theory, all members of the UN against the (then) non-recognized regimes of PRC and DPRK.  Without a peace treaty, the armistice can be ended legally by a party denouncing it and / or by any party restarting hostilities.

DPRK have denounced the armistice in 1994, 1996, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013 and most recently argued that the US has “effectively declared war” with UN sanctions.   North Korea’s position in turn, enable them to restart hostilities at any time without notice:   consistent with their past behavior.

North Korea’s actions have provided UN forces with ample justification to resume hostilities.

Resumption of hostilities by UNC will not, in this case, be regarded as pre-emptive war as such action presumes that a state of peace exist a priori.

The question is: under what circumstances might the UN Command resume hostilities legally beyond the use of force to uphold the Armistice?

All states have an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense providing that such actions meet the criteria for necessity and proportionality.

DPRK’s overt threats to the US and other states homeland, and the development of “push button” WMD capabilities during the past decade greatly strengthen the allied arguments in favor of military action for self-defense.

Specifically, DPRK’s development of solid fueled ballistic missiles that is capable of being launched with little warning, together with their intent to develop MIRV, MARV capabilities and announced goal of orbiting large satellites that can be fitted with nuclear warhead payloads, all point to highly destabilizing actions that enable surprise “knock out” attacks on allies with little warning.

North Korea will, in a few years, be able to hold most nations “at risk” from surprise attack with no or very little (i.e. 30 minutes) warning if their intentions and motivations as elucidated by top DPRK officials is taken seriously.

Many UNC sending states, like Canada, have not taken NK threats seriously and preferred to wish that they are neutral parties.

In the case of Canada, gullible and naïve officials and sycophants have taken assurances from DPRK officials at face value that Canada “is not a target” using fanciful “proof” like DPRK’s public “target maps” as “evidence”.

Like that Austrian corporal’s intentions and motives are interpreted in such a benign manner up to 1939.

Secretary Tillerson must marshal sufficient credible, disclosable intelligence at this meeting to persuade and align the allied consensus toward the actual present and future danger from DPRK.

At the same time, inform and educate the participants on US capabilities and viable, good, military options for eliminating the threat should diplomacy fail.

“Sending States” no longer just have their expeditionary forces at risk (if they send any this time), but their homelands are potentially all at risk from DPRK nuclear attack which can happen without warning.    It is no longer a simple matter to defend the Armistice but to defend all our homelands and to prevent extortion by a nuclear armed state backed by revisionist powers communist PRC and Russia.

The threat will only metalized over time as DPRK export WMDs worldwide.

Any discussion of enhancing pressure on North Korea with the goal to “bring them to the negotiating table” must be cognizant of the fact that such pressure can have the perverse effect of DPRK restarting the war with their nuclear arsenal — at any or all of the “sending states” and allies.

Recall this is how Japan responded to “pressure”, sanctions and the US oil embargo at Pearl Harbor. Japan was not deterred by the prospect of ultimately losing and thought they can negotiate a peace with a strong hand after their initial victories.

Could North Korea think similarly?

The question of increasing pressure will also expose the extent to which many allied nations have indifferently or not at all been serious about applying sanctions against DPRK.

For example, Canada, the co-host of this conference, have failed to implement any secondary sanctions on PRC and Russian entities and individuals (or those from other countries) that are well known NK agents or conduits to evade sanctions.

A self-study on this intentional Canadian “blind eye” is long overdue and essential before the conference.

Discussions need to be initiated for a consensus on mutual defense and mutual offense options should the pressure campaign fail to bring North Korea to the negotiating table expeditiously.

It is very hard to imagine a pressure campaign that is not backed by credible military force have any chance of success.

A sending states and allied consensus on the conditions and timeline for the use of force would be a welcome outcome and major achievement for this meeting.

Mutual defense require sending states that are very exposed and high value targets like Canada or New Zealand that are not presently participating in the Ballistic Missile Defense System to take the opportunity to expedite joining as quickly as possible.

Or be knowingly and willingly exposed to the risk and consequences as DPRK develop the capability to defeat or overwhelm defenses available to them.

All participating states need to be prepared for a discussion as to what they can and will contribute, including diplomatic, economic and military assets, for a lasting solution to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

A difficult and full agenda every bit or more important and critical as the Munich conference (1938).

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, see the following:

UN Command Sending States Meeting Agenda

The Return of ASW: The Canadian Perspective

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-16 By Robbin Laird

In an interview earlier this year, the Chief of Staff of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Lt. General Hood highlighted what he saw as a key area of competence for the Canadian Air Force and Navy, namely anti-submarine capabilities. He underscored that their new helicopter and their evolved P-3 which has been tagged the CP-140 provide core capabilities going forward until a new maritime patrol aircraft would be added a decade out.

“What do we need to put onto the new manned platform from the standpoint of the evolution of the network? Canadian industry has played a key role in shaping capabilities onboard the CP-140, and I would see that role continuing on our replacement manned aircraft. It’s less about the platform (than) the brains of that platform.”

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/08/who-stands-on-guard-for-thee-canadas-contribution-to-northern-defense/

I travelled with Murielle Delaporte to Nova Scotia to visit the 12th and 14th Wings of the RCAF to have a chance to talk with the helicopter ASW Wing (12th) and the CP-140 Wing located in Nova Scotia, namely, the 14th. It was clear that the Canadians are working the 21st century revival of ASW and thinking through where they would go next.

With the return of the Russian global engagement, and Putin’s skillful use of military power, the rude awakening of the second nuclear age with the North Koreans as nuclear extortionists, and the pushing out into the Pacific of the Chinese military, preparation for high intensity or high tempo operations has returned to the forefront. As skill sets are reshaped for the decade ahead, it is not simply bringing back older skill sets; it is about adapting historical lessons learned to 21st century technologies.

This is notably true with anti-submarine warfare, where the new skill sets adapt the alone and unafraid focus of the P-3 crews to the mastery of the new technologies, which allow for an ability to leverage reachback systems, robust networks, and distributed strike.

In the North Atlantic, the U.S. and its allies are shaping what the U.S. Navy calls a kill web approach.

In effect, a Maritime Domain Awareness highway or belt is being constructed from the Canada through to Norway.

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/allies-and-the-maritime-domain-strike-enterprise/

How best to meet the challenge in the presence of new 21st century technologies is a work in progress. Canada’s approach to engage in the revival of ASW systems, platforms and skill sets is to evolve the capabilities of its CP-140 and to add a new innovative helicopter to the mix in the North Atlantic and the Pacific.

The CH-148 Cyclone was crafted as a replacement for the Sea King, which could incorporate Romeo type technology into a larger aircraft, which could also do Search and Rescue. And the helicopter had to be designed to land on Canadian sized frigates in high sea states.   The helicopter also had to fit within the Canadian concepts of operations, whereby the crew could multi-task while in flight, without a need to return to the ship to reconfigure for changing missions.

The new helicopter is built on a commercial S-90 foundation but the defense customizations fit where 21st century technology was going, namely an information, communications and decision making transformation. This means that the CH-148 actually is not simply a replacement for the Sea King but rather the inclusion of a new platform within the new maritime domain awareness strike context.

Canada’s CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters are now well into test and evaluation. Crews are reportedly impressed with their anti-submarine and above-water warfare suites. MCpl Jennifer Kusche Photo

The work flow onboard the helicopter very much fits into what the Block 3 upgrade to Aurora provides along with the P-8 — the front end and back end of the aircraft shape a workflow for the entire flight and work crew. Screens in the cockpit of both the Cyclone and the Aurora bring the data in the back forward to the cockpit.

As Colonel Sid Connor, the 12th Wing Commander put it: “The tactical officers in the back of the aircraft are in charge of working the missions, while the pilot focuses on flying the aircraft.  That continues as a key thread but now there is a clear opportunity to move tasks around onboard the aircraft as appropriate to the mission.

“Depending on the mission, and the conditions and different flight regimes, we will choose to push tasks that are primarily done in the backend, we can actually push to the front end as appropriate.

“On an older aircraft, the two pilots in the cockpit focused almost exclusively on flying. Because the Cyclone is a fly by wire aircraft, depending on the regime of flight, the aircraft is flying the aircraft.

“There will be a primary pilot who’s monitoring aircraft flight and that frees up the second pilot to take on some of those mission tasks, to be operating the EOIR system, for example, or adjusting the radar or taking over tasks that maybe are not the primary task related to the mission you’re doing, but is still important with regard to augmenting information. It’s information flow, management of information, for sure, that’s going to be important to keep that crew dynamic going.

“The Cyclone is an information rich aircraft and managing the flow of information to determine how best to meet the task is a key challenge and opportunity generated by the new technologies onboard Cyclone.”

A work in progress is to determine exactly who does what, but SA for Search and Rescue is now available to the front end of the aircraft which obviously allows for better decision-making and outcomes. What the helicopter will connect to in terms of information flow is a work in progress, but the platform is coming to the force PRECISELY when the entire maritime domain awareness and strike enterprise in the North Atlantic is being reworked, and this helicopter has the information tools to both contribute too and leverage the new approaches being shaped.

Along with the introduction of the new helicopter, the CP-140 is evolving its capabilities, or to put into the words of the RCAF Chief of Staff, the “brains” of the aircraft. During our visit on September 19, 2017 we spent a full day on the base flying on the Aurora, being briefed on the evolving approaches to training for ASW and other operations, and discussing the way ahead with Lt. Col. Bruno Baker, Deputy Commander of the Wing, which provided insights with regard to the evolution of the Canadian P-3.

The various block upgrades have introduced new technologies for sensing, analyzing and communicating information for operations onboard the aircraft. Block Three is the game changer for the Aurora operationally. Block Three brought basically all new capabilities in the tactical side of the airplane for ASW, communications, and just a new way to look at things.

As Lt. Col. Bruno Baker noted: “The capability enhancements were such that we gave a new designator to the airplane.  Block Three modified airplanes are referred to as the CP-140M.

“Improvements were made in all areas, but the biggest change was in the acoustic sensing area. We added new computer and sensing capabilities.

“The technology onboard –notably the display screens and the interchangeability of data displayed on those screens including in the cockpit — now allowed for a different workflow as the cockpit crew could now see the information being generated in the back end so that enhancing SA to all stations, including in the cockpit, provided a greater synergy and potential for new workflows throughout the airplane.

“Block Three has also brought us an increased level of automation in the aircraft. So the sensors, as opposed to just spinning raw data that the operator needs to look at and analyze and make a decision what he’s looking at, there is a level of interpretation that is done by the systems that is actually tailorable by the operators: how much they want, how much they want to look at, what do they want, what type of information.”

As these new technologies are introduced, training needs to be provided to shape appropriate skill sets both to handle the information and to work in the evolving decision making environment. And this is being done as the transition is being made from the land war role of the Aurora as an overland manned ISR asset to a back to sea multi-mission ISR/Strike asset.

At the heart of working that transition is the training squadron in the 14th Wing of the RCAF. And within the 404 Squadron, the RCAF has an impressive simulation capability to shape the way ahead. During our visit on September 19, 2017, we had a chance to meet with and discuss the challenges with the key members of the 404 Squadron responsible for the simulation training within the Wing.

The team has years of operational experience and serve as Department of National Defence (DND) employees, rather than being contractors. Under the umbrella of 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron, the Thorney Island Simulation Centre is located adjacent to the Hornell Centre at 14 Wing Greenwood. Classroom instruction and administration for CP140 aircrew and maintenance personnel take place in the Hornell Centre, while aircrew simulation takes place at Thorney Island.

The Canadian government owns the source code for the simulation activity, so that the team can work the simulation environment directly to adapt to evolving developments facing the ASW force. They work closely with industry in shaping new scenarios for training as well as training on a regular basis to ensure that ASW skill sets are enhanced, even as the overland operations became a key element of what the Aurora force has been doing over the past few years.

It was clear from our discussions, that the team is leaning forward to thinking through how to deal with the new threats and context of the threats in terms of training crews for the decision making and information environment in which they are operating and will operate in the period ahead.  Even though the group has embodied knowledge of doing ASW in the Cold War years, they are keenly aware of the new technological and threat environment.

And like the rest of us, they are sorting what it means for concepts of operations for a 21st century combat force. The simulation training facility provides a significant complement to real world flying, something especially crucial when flying an older aircraft, even if it has seen a service upgrade on the airframe. As with other air forces, there is the challenge of striking the right balance between simulated operations and actual flying operations.

According to LCol Ray Townsend, Commanding Officer 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron

“We’re well positioned for the next decade to be a stopgap. We’re able to be the ones that can perform key 10’Oclock and 2’Oclock duties for Canada and North America in the ASW area.

“There are so many other nations that are transitioning right now with the introduction of the P-8 and Triton, from Australia to the UK to the Americans, to Norwegians. A lot of people are doing that transition right now, and as you know with any transition there is significant downtime. We can provide a major role as the transition unfolds.”

In short, the Canadians are working the return to ASW and the evolution to an MDA-Strike capability relevant to 21st century concepts of operations..

Lt. General Hood, referred to evolving the brains of the aircraft and the network in which it evolves and then sourcing a new platform.

Bombardier was always going to play a key role in determining what platform that might be into which the brains would be inserted, but now the new relationship with Airbus may broaden the choice.

Putting Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies in Perspective

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-18 Last year, the Chief of Naval Operations had enough with the growing emphasis on what our adversary’s might be able to do as opposed to focusing on U.S. and allied modernizations to support the freedom of action of the liberal democracies.

Adm. John Richardson in October 2016 argued: “We’re going to scale down the mention of A2AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial).

“It’s a term bandied about pretty freely and lacks the precise definition it probably would benefit from, and that ambiguity sends a variety of signals. Specifics matter.”

“The concept is not anything new – the history of warfare is all about adversaries seeking to one-up each other.

“Use of the word “denial is too often taken as a fait accompli when I fact it really describes an aspiration.

“The reality is far more complex.”

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2016/10/04/cno-bans-a2ad-as-jargon/

Richardson said seeing potential conflict through just the proliferation of guided weapons or a fortress of “red arcs” around mainland China in which the U.S. could not operate was also less than helpful.

“It’s also true that these systems are proliferating, they’re spreading but the essential military problem that they represent is largely the same that we’ve appreciated and understood for sometime.”

PATUXENT RIVER Md. (Jan. 13, 2016) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson sits in the cockpit of an F-35C Lightning II carrier variant joint strike fighter at Naval Air Station Patuxent River. Richardson also held an all-hands call, toured facilities and viewed aircraft and systems including the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft system. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nathan Laird/Released)

“It doesn’t mean that they don’t present a challenge but we fixate on A2/AD we’re going to miss the boat on the next challenge. We’ll fail to consider that thing right around the corner that will entail a fundamental shift and takes the contest and competition to the next level.”

https://news.usni.org/2016/10/03/cno-richardson-navy-shelving-a2ad-acronym

Earlier this year, Jyri Raitasalo, a lieutenant colonel, docent of strategy and security policy at the Finnish National Defence University and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, made a similar case as did the CNO.

His assessment was published on June 16, 2017 and posted on the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences website.

http://kkrva.se/en/it-is-time-to-burst-the-western-a2ad-bubble/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork

According to the mainstream western strategic narrative, Russia has since 2014 erected multiple Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) exclusion zones or “bubbles” around Europe and the Middle-East.

These bubbles supposedly hinder or even prevent western military action and troop deployments during a potential military crisis between the West (read: NATO) and Russia. Symbols of this new Russian A2AD policy can be found in modern long-range weapon-systems like the S-400 Triumf long-range surface to air missile system, SS-26 Stone (aka Iskander) short range ballistic missile system or the K-300P (aka Bastion-P) mobile coastal missile system.

It is true that Russia has been developing and fielding new long-range weapon systems lately. In addition it is true that these would pose a challenge to NATO forces in the case of a military conflict between Russia and the West.

However, I argue that the recent western A2AD discourse is as much a reflection of two decades of outright neglect concerning the development of real high-end military capability in Europe and within NATO against advanced state-based adversaries than it is about Russia’s new capabilities.

Russia has not developed a new brilliant policy or doctrine – either on the strategic or operational levels – that corresponds with the western notions of its A2AD capabilities.

Rather, in many cases Western states are projecting their own capability shortfalls onto Russia – shortfalls that are a product of over-focusing for almost two decades on multinational expeditionary military operations against weak third rate adversaries in the name of stability operations, military crisis management and counterinsurgency operations.

Bluntly put, for two decades many western states have focused on marginal military threats out-of-area to guide the maintenance and development of their militaries.

Now that Russia has brought back the traditional great-power perspective to international politics and military affairs in Europe and in the close proximity of Europe, many Western states have become surprised as they lack the capabilities – nationally and in many cases even in a multinational setting – to deter or fight conventional large-scale war. A2AD has become one western tool to manage the confusion and surprise that Russia’s actions have caused within the West.

Western A2AD narrative reveals how hollow many European military forces have become – when looked from the perspective of high-end warfighting. By deploying modern military systems to advance its interests Russia is allegedly doing something strategically brilliant and new. Within the West this deteriorating security situation has been called “the new normal”. Looking at the situation today it might be better described as the “old normal” – recognizing how great powers sooner or later drift to the opposing sides in international affairs.  The Cold War era great-power confrontation was a good example of that.

If anything, the two decades of the post-Cold War era (1990-2013) could in retrospect be called “the new abnormal”, at least according to the Western reading of this era. It was supposed to be a non-zero-sum world of managing common security threats in a globalizing and increasingly interdependent world. Former adversaries – Russia included – were engaged and cooperated with. This era coincided with the post-Cold War American unipolar moment – two decades of sheer western (read: American) dominance in international politics.

The events already in Georgia (2008) – but at the latest in Ukraine (2014) – brought a quick end to this western post-Cold war era strategic myth. Unfortunately during this 20+ years many western (read: European) states lost a good part of their military capabilities and the associated military ethos related to national and territorial defence by military forces.

The ongoing western A2AD discourse needs to be understood against this western predicament: having given up many of the high-end warfighting skills and capabilities, and faced with the resurgent (but very traditionally behaving) great-power Russia, western states need something that can explain away the conceptual surprise and the associated challenge that Russia’s actions have caused.

The western A2AD discourse has served precisely this function – it has facilitated the western states to come to terms with Russia’s confrontational actions, which have been contradictory to the post-Cold War era western outlook to international politics and strategic affairs.

At the heart of this western A2AD narrative are Russia’s new long-range military systems. They make easy headlines and their destructive potential can be easily represented by drawing circles on the map of Europe. As was reported in March 2015,

“The Iskander missiles deployment to Kaliningrad reflects Moscow’s readiness to raise the ante in response to NATO moves to deploy forces closer to Russia’s borders. The missiles, which are capable of hitting enemy targets up to 500 kilometers (310 miles away) with high precision, can be equipped with a nuclear or a conventional warhead. From Kaliningrad, they could reach several NATO member states.”

This kind of Iskander (or other) missile deployment news, focusing on the technical aspects of military systems, bring almost nothing new to the strategic equation in Europe. Russia (and the Soviet Union before its demise) has for decades had the possibility to target any city or military facility with conventional or nuclear warheads. Also, deploying mobile platforms has a sound military logic – mobile platforms are supposed to be moved and deployed where needed.

The down side of the western A2AD narrative is located in the fact that it has actually empowered Russia at the expense of the West. Today we face a situation where western media and even western statesmen react with frenzy whenever Russia deploys new military systems and by so doing creates new or reinforces its existing “A2AD bubbles”.

Iskander and S-400 Triumf launchers have become a way for Russia to communicate non-verbally its discontent about western actions. Moreover, Russia does not even have to actually deploy any “A2AD systems” in order to make a point. It is enough for Russia to declare its intent to deploy these systems. After such a declaration, Western media is guaranteed to deliver the message to a worldwide audience.

As an example, the Express published a story in November 2016 on an “ACT OF WAR: Putin deploys nuclear missiles IN EUROPE as he admits FURY at Nato expansion”. And the essence of the story was told upfront in the beginning of the piece: “AN ALARMING signal Vladimir Putin is preparing for war has come after his top military chiefs revealed the Kremlin is deploying much-feared Iskander and S-400 long-range missile defence systems deep inside Europe.”

The above-mentioned article relies on the mainstream way in the West to conceptualize one’s adversary’s military capability: focus only on the technical aspects of modern weapon-systems without any reflection about the dozens of ways to neutralize their “edge”.

For example, to thwart the combined threat posed by ballistic missiles and long-range air defence missiles – what in the western strategic parlance is called A2AD threat” – the following counter-measures can be used:

International cooperation, alliance-politics (expanding the area of operations, collective action/defence)

  • Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (analyze the threat, early warning),
  • Decentralization (multiply the number of targets, saturate the battlefield),
  • Deception (confuse the adversary),
  • Fortification (hardening targets to minimize losses),
  • Maneuver (difficulties for opponent to locate troops/systems),
  • Protecting the troops/systems (e.g. missile defence),
  • Taking out the threat directly (long-range fires, electronic warfare, special operations forces, cyber capabilities),
  • Minimizing the threat indirectly (degrading the opponents ability to control its systems, e.g. destroying C2-assets or degrading its electricity production),
  • Developing defensive systems (e.g. flares, chaff, HARMs, jammers, standoff capability, stealth, passive sensors), and
  • Developing TTPs (how to operate in a high-risk environment, e.g. tactical maneuver).

The list above is only indicative of the vast pool of strategic, operational, tactical and technical level means to counter the so-called A2AD systems or bubbles. But the bottom line is clear: focusing solely on the technical and/or tactical aspects of adversary’s military systems may make good headlines, but it does not by itself facilitate the formulation of sound strategy.

In addition, it should be noted that deploying military assets – any military assets – to the previously mentioned Kaliningrad is a real problem for Russian military planners or commanders, at least when the shooting war starts. Kaliningrad is a small exclave, surrounded by NATO member-states. Defending Kaliningrad without going nuclear is almost unimaginable.

The alternative for Russia would be a large-scale conventional military push west (and north from Belarus) in order to pre-empt any future military operation taking place from the area of the Baltic states. Even this would not be sufficient to secure the Kaliningrad area, as NATO would be able to stage forces using its strategic depth in Western Europe until sufficient reinforcements in terms of troop numbers and capabilities had arrived.

Much of the western A2AD narrative is located on the military-technical or tactical levels. It almost completely bypasses the operational, military strategic and grand strategic level thinking and logics. Being able to pinpoint A2AD bubbles on the map – containing some sophisticated long-range military systems – does not a good strategy make.

We would like to thank our partner, Hans Tino Hansen, for bringing this article to our attention.

If you would like to comment on this article, please see the following:

Bursting the A2/AD Bubble

The Russians Build Out Their Naval Bases in the Middle East

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-05 By Steven Blank

Western governments and commentators have both neglected to analyze Russia’s overall strategic campaign in the Middle East, rather than primarily focusing on its actions in Syria.

Focusing almost exclusively on Syria and/or on the issue of oil prices that Moscow is negotiating with OPEC and especially Saudi Arabia, they have ignored or simply overlooked the strategic dimension of Russia’s overall regional policies.

However, the recent announcements about Russian air and naval bases in Egypt and Sudan impel us to realize that across the Middle East and Eurasia, the Russian Federation pursues a deliberate strategy to negate Western (American) military capabilities while ensuring the expansion of Russian power in all its forms.

These recent announcements about an agreement to share air space in each country and the acquisition of an air base in Egypt and the concurrent discussions with Sudan for a naval base on the Red Sea coast highlight the range of Moscow’s objectives, the capabilities it can increasingly bring to bear in pursuit of those goals, and conversely Western strategic failure.

Air bases in Egypt and the use of Egyptian air space, along with a projected use of a Sudanese base on the Red Sea coast, allows Russia to expand its A2AD bubbles from the Arctic, Baltic, and Black Seas, the Caucasus and Central Asia regions into the Middle East.

Russian Air Force Sukhoi Su-24 Russian Air Force Sukhoi Su-24 at Latakia Air Base, Syria. Mil.RU

It now has naval and air bases in Syria and is angling for another naval base in Egypt; while potentially seeking access to naval facilities and naval and air bases at Cyprus, Libya, and Yemen; and it already has potential access to a base in Iran.

Moscow will undoubtedly use its Egyptian air base to strike at anti-Russian factions backed by the West in Libya.

It also now has for the first time direct reconnaissance over Israeli air space and increasing leverage through its Egyptian and Syrian air bases upon Israel, something Israel has sought to reject since its inception as a state.

And in addition to the projected base in Sudan it now has the capability to strike at Saudi targets as well.

But the dimensions of Moscow’s achievement go further.

These bases register Russian military and political influence throughout the region.

Moscow will now have strike and/or ISR capabilities across the entire Middle East. In practical terms this means that the bases in Syria, Egypt, and probably in Iran give it the capability, along with its other bases inside Russia, including the Crimea, and in Armenia, to project power across the entire breadth and length of the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Russia will probably deploy its fire-strike weapons and integrated air defenses across these bases.

Should Moscow outfit these naval and air bases with UAV, UCAV, UUV, EW, and ISTAR capabilities and long-range cruise missiles, as is likely, Russia could then contest Western aerospace superiority throughout the atmosphere over these areas.

In other words, given the bases already acquired and those that Moscow still seeks, a naval base in Alexandria, bases in Libya and Cyprus, Moscow would be able to contest the entire Eastern Mediterranean.

And given its strong ties with Algeria we should not rule out the possibility that it seeks a deal along these lines with that government as well.

With the ability to contest the entire Mediterranean it will place NATO land, air, and/or naval forces at risk.

The bases in Sudan and Egypt will also have a similar effect in regard to the Suez Canal and Red Sea if not the Persian Gulf’s western reaches. Meanwhile Moscow probably still has the potential to recover the use of an Iranian base as it had at Hamdan and is seeking another one in Yemen as it had in Soviet times at Socotra.

If those new bases come into play and Moscow can deploy its long-range strike capabilities and integrated air defense network there as it has done at its already existing bases, then it will have coverage of the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caucasus, and Central Asia that would make any Western operation in any of those theaters extremely hazardous and costly.

In this file photo taken on Tuesday, Aug. 12, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, visit missile cruiser Moskva ( Moscow) in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia. Russia is negotiating an agreement with Egypt that would allow its warplanes to use Egyptian air bases, according to a government document released Thursday, Nov. 30, 2017 a deal that would allow Moscow to further increase its military foothold in the Mediterranean. (Alexei Druzhinin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, file) less

Given the existing bases in the Black Sea, Caucasus, and the Levant, Turkey is already almost totally surrounded and Balkan states and Italy could be vulnerable as well.

Arguably Russia is attempting to create what Marshal Ogarkov once called a reconnaissance-strike complex across the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Suez Canal, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Persian Gulf.

This is not only an issue of challenging the West’s reliance on an aerospace precision-fire strike in the first days of any war and thus Western and American air superiority.

These capabilities also threaten international energy supplies because Moscow can then use the threat of its naval and/or air power in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Suez Canal, and Mediterranean to interdict or curtail energy supplies that traverse these waterways.

Thus completion of this network of naval and air bases not only challenge Western aerospace superiority and key NATO or Western allies, these bases also consolidate Russia as an arbiter within each country’s politics where it has bases and as a regional one too.

Moscow also stands to gain enormous leverage on Middle Eastern energy supplies to Europe because it will have gained coverage of both defense threats and international energy trade routes.

Undoubtedly it will then use all these situations and assets to free itself from sanctions and propose a vast but nebulous anti-terrorist campaign that legitimizes its seizure of Crimea and the Donbass.

Meanwhile at the same time, in the Middle East its main interest is not peace but the controlled or managed chaos of so called controlled conflict.

Since “power projection activities are an input into the world order,” Russian force deployments into the greater Middle East and economic-political actions to gain access, influence and power there represent competitive and profound, attempts at engendering a long-term restructuring of the regional strategic order.[1]

One wonders what it will take to arouse regional and Western governments from their continued refusal to think and act strategically before it is too late.

[1] Henk Houweling and Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, “Introduction,” Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling, Eds., Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2004, p. 15.

Stephen Blank is an internationally recognized expert on Russian foreign and defense policies and international relations across the former Soviet Union.

He is also a leading expert on European and Asian security, including energy issues.

Since 2013 he has been a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC, www.afpc.org.

From 1989–2013 he was a Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania.

In 1998–2001 he was Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the War College.

Editor’s Note: The Russians will probe, push and seek to expand their influence and ensure that the expansion East of Europe stops.

Clearly, Putin will achieve greater recognition for Russian interests and power, and his policies in the Middle East are part of that effort.

That is inevitable.

Watching some in Congress acting like children thinking they are playing a game in their minds akin to pin the tail on the Donald are missing the point — there is a need to debate and forge a new strategy to deal with the Russians.

What is a realistic approach to engagement and deterrence with Russia?

Editor’s Note: If you would like to comment on this article, please go to the following:

Russia and the Middle East: Building Out Bases and Presence