Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

Poland, Article III and Missile Defense: Shaping a Way Ahead in Alliance Capabilities

Posted on December 18, 2017 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

12/18/2017

2017-12-18 By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

We have a fundamental respect for the Poles and their history.

No people have learned more about the threats to national survival generated by European insecurities and the Russians than the Poles.

We each have a reach into Poland and its heritage but by different paths.

For Laird, it was the opportunity to work for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.

For Ed Timperlake, it was the opportunity to support Secretary Ed Derwinski, as his Presidential Appointee in arranging for the State Funeral and return to Poland of the great Musician and Primer of Poland Ignacy Jan Paderewski. Paderewski’s remains were returned to Warsaw and placed in St. John’s Archcathedral. Paderewski’s dying wish, while in America during World War II, was to be returned to a free Poland and that wish was granted by President Bush in 1992.

Article III of the NATO Treaty focuses on the need for a country to take its self-defense seriously in order for the rest of the treaty to have real effect, including the Article V clause with regard to an attack on one is an attack on all.

If a country has not prepared to defend itself, it is difficult to see how allies can do that for the given country.

Or put bluntly, if a country cares so little for its own defense that it spends its money and efforts and everything but, why should other allies take up the slack?

Or put even more bluntly, if a country is not working to defend itself, it has put itself into the military world of becoming an area upon which both allies and adversaries will operate to protect their own interests.

With Poland’s history and knowledge of the Russians, there is a clear understanding that they have little interest in being the forward edge of a battle.

But the challenge facing Poland and NATO has changed as the Russians have crafted a version of 21st century conflict, which is built around a significant missile strike force with adjacent combat capabilities.

The threat has been put well by Rear Adm. Nils Wang, former head of the Danish Navy and now head of the Danish Royal Military Academy recently introduced the reverse engineering approach to deal with anti-access and area denial.

Wang clearly argued that the Russian challenge has little to do with the Cold War Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat to the Nordics. The Soviet-Warsaw threat was one of invasion and occupation, and then using Nordic territory to fight U.S. and allied forces in the North Atlantic. In many ways, this would have been a repeat of how the Nazis seized Norway during a combined arms amphibious operation combined with a land force walk into Denmark.

In that scenario, the Danes and their allies were focused on sea denial through use of mines, with fast patrol boats providing protection for the minelayers. Aircraft and submarines were part of a defense in depth strategy to deny the ability of the Soviets to occupy the region in time of a general war.

He contrasted this with the current situation in which the Russians are less focused on a general war, and more on building capabilities for a more limited objective, controlling the Baltic States. He highlighted the arms modernization of the Russian military focused on ground-based missile defense and land- and sea-based attack missiles, along with airpower, as the main means to shape a denial-in-depth strategy which would allow the Russians significant freedom of maneuver to achieve their objectives within their zone of strategic maneuver.

A core Russian asset is the Kalibr cruise missile, which can operate off of a variety of platforms. With a dense missile wolf pack, so to speak, the Russians provide a cover for their maneuver forces. They are focused on using land-based mobile missiles in the region as their key strike and defense asset.

“The Russian defense plan in the Baltic is all about telling NATO, we can go into the Baltic countries if we decided to do so. And you will not be able to get in and get us out. That is basically the whole idea,” the admiral said.

Wang argued for a reverse engineering approach to the Russian threat. He saw this as combining several key elements: a combined anti-submarine (ASW), F-35 fleet, frigate- and land-based strike capabilities, including from Poland.

Another player in the region, Finland, looking out at the Russian threat is in the process of reworking their strategy to encompass allies in the region for self defense. And one Finnish defense official put the challenge very clearly:

“The timeline for early warning is shorter; and the threshold for the use of force is lower.”

Poland is approaching its Article III efforts by shaping a core missile defense capability, both medium and short range which allows it to deal with the threat as identified by the Finns and to contribute to broader regional defense in the way suggested by Rear Admiral Wang.

It is about building a capability which can defend Poland but link into the defense in depth which is necessary in the region.

The Poles are focusing on both building mid-range and short-range missile defense.

With regard to building out their mid-range missile defense, they are doing so with regard to ongoing modernization and building in capabilities for networking back to their own forces and to those of their neighbors and allies.

The system selected by the Poles to fill the mid-range missile defense system is a variant of the Patriot system.

But very noteworthy is the command and control aspect of the approach they are taking.

They are not pursuing a classic prime contractor provides all approach to a system but are opting for an open architecture system which will allow them to both have open ended modernization but also work the linkages to NATO neighbors and allies.

The Poles are acquiring the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System or IBCS.

Rather than buying a legacy proprietary C2 system, the Poles are leaning forward to procure an open architecture C2 system.

They won’t have siloed systems that require new or upgraded C2 with each new radar or interceptor.

This is important as other allies acquire missile defense systems going forward, and new air systems like F-35 become part of the extended defense equation, as Rear Admiral Wang suggests.

It is about shaping a defense in depth capability across Poland, German, the Baltics, Finland and the Nordics. Without shaping common C2 capabilities, defense in depth will be more limited than the defense capabilities could allow for.

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis hosts a bilateral meeting for Poland’s Minister of Defense Antoni Macierewicz Sept. 21, 2017, at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. (DOD photo by Air Force Tech. Sgt. Brigitte N. Brantley)

Siloed systems do their tasks but do less than they could to provide full up capabilities to the integrated battlespace.

The Poles are also moving in the direction the US Army is looking to transition as well.

Rather than buying whole systems, and being dependent on prime contractors for the complete integration of those systems, the US Army is looking towards a commodity approach.

What the U.S. Army is looking to do is be able to manage interactions among C2, sensors, and missiles and to plus whichever of these “commodities” needs to be plused up.

It is also crucial for the US Army to be able to integrate the defense systems in the maneuver force as well as to focus on what is necessary for the evolving integrated battle space.

It is not simply about after market integration; it is about building in integration from the ground up as new systems are added as well.

This means that the Polish approach is symmetrical with the strategic direction of the US Army itself.

Poland is working through the challenge of affordability with regard to missile defense, but senior Polish officials understand that the open architecture C2 system is not an add on but a core capability to the evolution of core Polish defense capabilities.

Asked about speculation that Poland could resign from the IBCS to lower the price of the Patriots, (Deputy Defense Minister) Kownacki stressed that the air defense management system obviously may be the subject of discussion, but “it’s not that it (IBCS) fundamentally changes the price proportions in the middle-range air defense system”.

“We are analyzing the document and we will be negotiating, but you must know that IBCS is what everyone will buy. This is the future that awaits all of us, and sooner or later we will bear this cost.”

http://www.defence24.pl/710584,kownacki-nieakceptowalna-jest-dla-nas-kwota-105-mld-usd-za-patrioty-mowilismy-to-od-poczatku

In short, Poland has demonstrated NATO leadership in pursing the most modern air and missile defense system available.

They are acquiring a system built not just for today, but to anticipate and counter future threats.

It is clearly in the US and NATO interests that the US and Poland work together to get to a price that satisfies both sides, while still preserving the investment in the future which IBCS represents.

Changing the Business Rules: Moving Beyond Slo Mo War Preparation

Posted on December 18, 2017 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

2017-12-18 By Brian Morra

The Department of Defense’s acquisition system is a major cause of the erosion of the defense capabilities of the United States.

This erosion is visible in high profile, fatal accidents like those the US Navy has experienced in the Western Pacific over the past two years.

Less visible is the long-term deterioration of defense capacity relative to peer competitors like China and Russia.

That decline is the product of both defense budget reductions since 2009 and the fundamental failure of the DoD to reform its antiquated acquisition system.

The DoD requires high-intensity acquisition to prepare for high-intensity conflict.

The growing importance and rapid evolution of cyber and digitally-enabled systems means that DoD can no longer operate with its traditional procurement and sustainment rules.

I will not attempt in this paper to offer broad remedies for acquisition reform.

Instead, I will address a specific aspect of the system that is not keeping pace with the advances we are observing in China and Russia.

The acquisition of major weapon systems comprises two major phases: acquisition/procurement and operations/sustainment.

Those phases follow a bi-modal budget distribution.

There is a large budget expenditure during procurement for a small number of years, followed by a much larger and longer-term expenditure during the many years of operation and sustainment.

The current system and matching budgetary method leave the United States vulnerable to adversaries that develop and deploy new capabilities at a much faster pace than the bi-modal approach offers.

Moving to a multi-phased acquisition method is required for the United States to keep up.

And, “keeping up” probably does not mean that the US will be able to retain its “over-match” position relative to peer competitors.

Changing business rules allows for strategic redirection and agile evolution of the combat force. Credit Graphic: IBM

Given the steady progress being made by adversaries, reforming DoD’s acquisition process is no longer just a smart thing to do; it has become existentially vital.

The digital nature of new weapon systems like the F-35 makes multi-phased development and multi-modal budgeting feasible.

This approach bears some similarity to the spiral-development approaches used in the past.

However, a new approach will need to be qualitatively different than traditional spiral development.

The ability to upgrade new weapon systems primarily through software upgrades makes this new approach possible.

The new approach would have shorter upgrade cycles or modes, based on 3-5 year centers.

Budget planning will need to change since each new “mode” would blend acquisition and O&S monies. Each new mode would require a business case to support decisions to deploy funds.

This is a very different approach.

It would require different business rules and procedures than are currently employed by the DoD’s acquisition centers.

The obstacles to this kind of reform are not technical, although some will assert that technical issues are insurmountable. The real obstacles are DoD’s current business rules and acquisition policies and budgeting procedures.

The question is will we reform these procedures now, or will we only do so when we are confronted with a crisis?

The US aerospace and defense industry maintains proprietary control over its core capabilities.

This is a key challenge that DoD confronts that China (in the main) does not. In order to have affordable, multi-modal weapons system development, DoD will have to establish new business rules to enable proprietary sharing or compartmentation schemes that create the conditions for development across proprietary stove pipes.

The need is clear.

The DoD requires business rules appropriate for high-intensity acquisition to meet the rapidly evolving threats represented principally by China and Russia.

The growing importance of cyber and digitally-enabled systems means that DoD can no longer operate with industrial-age procurement and sustainment rules.

Fortunately, the transition to digital systems lend themselves to a new, multi-modal approach that will help the United States keep pace with evolving threats.

Brian Morra is a retired career Aerospace industry executive, who currently serves on several corporate and academic boards.

If you would like to comment on this articles, please see the following:

Changing the Business Rules to Allow For High-Intensity Warfare Acquisition Models

Reflections on the Australian Foreign Policy White Paper: Facing the Challenge of Global Engagement, Conflict and Realignment

Posted on December 18, 2017 | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-05 By Robbin Laird

During my last visit to Australia, I spent time with colleagues in the Australian government discussing various aspects of the strategic environment in flux and what the impact of such an environment has on Australian interests.

The newly released Foreign Policy White Paper provides a public statement of how to look both at the environment in flux and the challenge of defining, and protecting Australian interests.

2017_foreign_policy_white_paper

Because of how dynamic the environment is, what can be shaped is an optic or a template at best to look at the environment and to focus on how best to navigate the way ahead.

The White Paper provides some insights into how Aussies are doing so.

We are in as profound a period of historical change as we faced with World War II and its aftermath, but hopefully not as deadly. In that transition, the Australian leadership moved from being a key part of the British empire and providing forces for the defense of the empire and its interests, to self defense and working with the strongest democratic ally in the region, namely the United States.

Now Australia faces a China, which fits no easy formula as either a mercantile or strategic military power, and an America which is facing significant pressures for change at home and abroad. How stable China will be is an open question and how America will navigate the new cold civil war it is going through domestically is an open question.

With regard to the defense of Australia, there is little question that the solid relationship they have had with the US military is the foundation of shaping their approach to deterrence in depth. At the same time, it is crucial to ramp up capabilities to work with other powers in the region, such as Japan and to find ways to deepen the ability to provide defense against the Chinese push and the second nuclear age North Korean nuclear power.

Will American nuclear deterrence remain credible enough to deal with China, Russia and North Korea?

What will Australia need to develop and deploy to make a significant impact on the perceptions of a China or North Korea?

At the same time, the prosperity of Australia rests on a global order where trade is open and fair.

The coming of Trump has jolted the broader liberal democratic discussion of what is open and fair, and what trade orders will emerge.

The Chinese have played the global trade game significantly unfairly with a clear strategic interest to build political influence on trade, but not as if they were 18^th Century Dutch traders.

They are playing the game to expand the unique vision of Chinese communism.

How best to define a rules based order?

How to intertwine security and trade interests in the shaping of an evolving or perhaps new version of what that means in the shift from liberal globalization to a more conflictual global order where defining the rules is precisely in play?

The Australian Prime Minister put it well in his introduction to the White Paper:

“We are creating the competitiveness and flexibility our economy needs to thrive in an interdependent, fast-changing world. But we must also acknowledge we are facing the most complex and challenging geostrategic environment since the early years of the Cold War. We cannot assume that prosperity and security just happen by themselves.”

What Turnbull calls for is enhanced Australian sovereignty in a world in flux.

“More than ever, Australia must be sovereign, not reliant. We must take responsibility for our own security and prosperity while recognising we are stronger when sharing the burden of leadership with trusted partners and friends.”

“As this White Paper makes clear, in a complex and uncertain environment we will have to work harder to maximise our international influence and secure our interests.

“We will need to keep reforming our economy, boost our competitiveness and resilience, and invest in the other domestic foundations of our national strength.”

This is more eloquently said than has been articulated by President Trump without the histrionics and tweeting but this is clearly resonant with a core instinct in the effort to enhance national competitiveness in a global order in significant flux.

“We must guard against protectionism and build robust support for open economic settings by ensuring all Australians have the opportunity to benefit from our growing economy. Our trade and investment agenda will assist by boosting jobs and supporting higher living standards.”

This would seem to be at odds with Trump’s stated agenda but what is in play is how the Chinese have distorted the global trade agenda and how best to respond to that distortion. It is not so much simply keeping in place an inherited rules based order, but shaping a realistic one for the period ahead.

The White Paper lays out a number of key attributes of how the Australian government sees the current global competition as well as ways to better achieve Australian sovereign outcomes.

The dichotomy of hard and soft power has often been used to describe the tools to be used, but if the 21^st century order is fundamental flux, there will be no dominant rules based order unless liberal democracy can defend its values and its interests.

A key part of shaping the way ahead is finding ways to expand Australian cooperation within what the White Paper calls the Indo-Pacific region, which makes a great deal of sense as both China and the United States are undergoing fundamental change.

A good statement of where we are currently is made on page 21 of the White Paper.

“Australian foreign policy in recent decades has focused on advancing our interests as globalisation deepened and economies in Asia grew strongly. In the decade ahead, both trends will continue profoundly to influence our prosperity and security.

“Other major trends will shape our world, including the pace and scale of technological advances, demographic shifts, climate change and new global power balances. The threats posed by North Korea and terrorism and other transnational issues will require resolute, long-term responses.

“The United States remains the most powerful country but its long dominance of the international order is being challenged by other powers. A post-Cold War lull in major power rivalry has ended.

“These trends are converging to create an uncertain outlook for Australia.”

The challenge will be to shape a template, which allows Australia to shape a sovereign solution in a world in conflict, a world in flux, and a world in which the rules of engagement, including trade are in fundamental flux.

The White Paper provides some statements of principle with regard to shaping the way ahead, but the antinomies of a number of these principles are clearly the challenge.

How to navigate what kind of future for Australia in a world which is neither dominated by China nor the United States, but in part by their competition and by the fundamental shifts in both of these societies as well?

It is difficult as well to understate the impact of the second nuclear age crisis evident with the nuclear force being built by North Korea. The North Koreans are not pursuing a deterrent force in a cold war sense, but an operational force to reshape the Pacific order.

How will Australia deal with this challenge?

In short, we have to deal with the world as it is becoming, not the world simply we would like to see.

Australia faces the challenge of shaping a sovereign way ahead in a world which does not easily fit into the templates of the past twenty years, but in which global conflict and struggle over the global rules of engagement are defined not in the think tanks, but on the global plane of struggle and cooperation.

Secretary Tillerson Goes to Canada: Trudeau’s Canada in Strategic Transition

Posted on December 18, 2017 | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-16 By Danny Lam

The United States seized on an opportunity co-host with Canada a meeting of the United Nations Command Sending States plus the Republic of Korea and Japan after the last DPRK missile test.

The stated purpose of the meeting for the US was to “discuss how the global community can counter North Korea’s threat to international peace.”

But there is no consensus between the co-hosts as to how this is to be achieved.

The US wants to Canada to host the “Tehran Conference (1943)” while Canada is trying for the “Paris Peace Conference (Versailles 1919)”, with the same predictable outcomes.

UN Command Sending States with ROK and Japan is a brilliant term of art that reminded all those who signed the Armistice Agreement with the Korean People’s Army and Chinese People’s Volunteers that they are all technically still at war and bound to uphold the Armistice agreement.

That is supposed to include Canada.

The 16 sending states that committed military forces that are legally bound to “their national commitment to the UNC in the defense of ROK should the armistice agreement fail” are: US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Colombia, Ethiopia, Turkey, Thailand and the Philippines.

Convening a meeting of “sending states” explicitly reminded all the participants that they were, and are, and remain belligerents as no peace treaty was ever concluded.

All of them (including Japan and ROK) have a military stake in the outcome and a treaty obligation to defend the Armistice.

Canada interpreted the mission quite differently from the US.

Chrystia Freeland, the Canadian foreign minister and her staff, did not know about or disregarded the angle of sending state’s legal obligations to uphold the Armistice and took the proposed meeting as a multilateral effort to bring “key players” together for a non-military solution.

Chrystia Freeland, discussed “in great detail” the proposed meeting with PRC’s foreign minister Wang Yi at the APEC meeting in Vietnam (Nov 6-11) and then went ahead to invited the PRC to the meeting in December.

This was almost certainly done without consulting with and obtaining the consent of the US or key allies like Japan.

It is hard to imagine how bringing PRC to this meeting can contribute to forming a consensus on under what circumstances will military options be the necessary.

Japan took exception to Canada’s stratagem.

No sooner had Canada issued an invitation to Japan in December, it was rejected by Foreign Minister Kono because “the pursuit of dialogue may take the emphasis away from pressure [on Pyongyang].”

Then in the classic Japanese diplomatic style, the timing of the meeting initially proposed by Canada in December was termed “inconvenient” as it conflicted with Minister Kono’s commitment in New York.

Finally, Japan objected to inviting all the “Sending States” and by insinuation PRC, because it is “out of step with Japan’s direction”.

For all practical purposes, Japan declined to participate in this Canadian led venture despite the risk of making the US uncomfortable and embarrassing Secretary Tillerson.

Canada basically sabotaged the meeting before it began by inviting PRC.

Just what did Canada do that so offended Japan and ensured the failure of this joint initiative with the US?

During the APEC/ASEAN meetings, Canada deliberately sabotaged the TPP11 free trade deal that was co-chaired by Australia and Japan.

Canadian Minister for International Trade François-Philippe Champagne deliberately mislead Japan and Australia that Canada agreed to sign TPP11, then issued a tweet stating otherwise at 9:30pm Danang Time the night before without immediately informing the co-chairs.

This resulted in an ambush where PM Abe was only told by PM Trudeau of his refusal to sign 20 minutes before the signing ceremony, ensuring the failure of the entire agreement.

Canada then followed the sabotage of TPP11 with an attempt to parlay an invitation to be an observer at the East Asia Forum into membership when Canada is viewed as “not adding substance to the Group”.

Left unspoken and unsaid is Canada have taken stances that turn a blind eye to the most pressing security interests in the region, namely, the PRC’s “sea grab” of the South China Sea as “territorial waters” in violation of UNCLOS, and similar moves in the East China Sea and dismissing the DPRK and PRC threat to North America and the liberal international order.

The sabotage (rather than graceful withdraw by Canada) of TPP11 and vociferous demands for Canada to join EAS and campaign to become a UNSC member under the Liberal regime makes sense if the intent of Canada is to align with the PRC and serve as their comprador on these forums.

Not surprisingly, right after these two events, Canada’s Liberal regime gleefully tried to get PRC to reward Canada for their efforts by formally starting negotiations for a Canada-PRC free trade deal which the liberals wanted to conclude in time for the 2019 Canadian Federal Election: Only to be disappointed because Canada failed to deliver Bombardier to PRC, and; will likely require a national security review of the PRC takeover of Aecon (Canada’s largest public A&E firm).

Furthermore, the Liberals was unable to guarantee existing NAFTA access for PRC enterprises via Canada despite the best efforts of Canadian officials to sabotage the NAFTA renegotiations to protect the status quo by default.

Canadian politicians and officials had no illusions as to how beneficial negotiating a free trade deal with PRC can be when the Australian Trade Minister and PRC-Australia FTA negotiator Andrew Robb got a A$880,000/year “confidential” contract with a CCP aligned Chinese firm for doing very little after concluding the deal and resigning from Parliament.

Such rewards are just not available from the US for Canadian officials re-negotiating NAFTA or from parties to TPP11.

Canada’s Liberals have expressed no concern or intention to review and strengthen national security, investment, and transparency laws to limit foreign influence and CCP subversion as Australia and other allies are presently doing.

Let us now turn to Canada’s stance on North Korea and consider this as a key part of the formula being generated by the current Canadian government.

Canada’s top defense official Chief of the General Staff General Jonathan Vance publically stated on December 1 that “I would say it’s [North Korea nuclear ballistic missiles] an emerging threat. It’s not yet developed to be an extant threat, a proven threat.”

He did not believe North Korea has demonstrated that capability and “It’s [the threat] theoretical at this juncture”.

Vance specifically and categorically rejected the idea that Canada should discuss with the US joining the American Ballistic Missile Defense system.

Likewise, the idea that Canada might be asked to contribute forces for a war on the Korean peninsula that require specific preparations now was summarily dismissed even as other close allies began mobilizing and making those preparations.

This is in line with Canada’s official position is that North Korea do not pose a credible existential threat to North America in terms of capabilities.

What about North Korea’s intent?

Global Affairs Canada have alleged that “There has been no direct threat to Canada” and “Pyongyang does not consider Canada as an enemy, but rather as a friendly and peaceful country”. Global Affairs official Mark Gwozdecky believe, “We must convince Pyongyang that it can achieve its goals through peaceful diplomatic means.”

And that DPRK’s only concern is with regime survival.

To sum up: Canada, categorically, do not see a threat from North Korea either in terms of their nuclear ballistic missiles capabilities, or hostile intentions toward Canada.

Nor do Canada see treaty obligations (UN, UNC, NATO, etc.) that will almost certainly drag Canada into any conflict on the Korean peninsula as binding on Canada.

Contrast this with the US Government consensus on the threat from North Korea: “North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has aggressive and offensive objectives. Pyongyang, they believe, will use its nuclear weapons to push U.S. forces out of South Korea and then force reunification of the Korean Peninsula on its terms.”

Canada’s official position on DPRK is similar to the PRC’s stance that seeks dialog.

All that remain is for Canada to openly advocate “freeze for freeze” together with PRC and Russia and talk the other participants into accepting it.

With this perception, is it a surprise that Canada took the initiative with Secretary Tillerson to mean that a military solution is off the table and only diplomatic means are viable when Canada’s top defense and security officials have a clear consensus that they do not see a threat (capability and intent) from DPRK toward Canada in the near term?

Indeed, some in Canada have advocated for Canada to be neutral in the conflict (disregarding treaty obligations), or in some cases, to seek protection from the PRC.

PM Trudeau only regard the risk of debris falling on Canada from US intercepts of DPRK missiles heading to America.

Moreover, PM Trudeau specifically suggested using Cuba as a channel to DPRK just because they have diplomatic relations with North Korea. (Singapore has diplomatic relations with DPRK.) Apparently ignorant of, or dismissing the risk of Cuba might leverage that into acquiring nuclear weapons from North Korea like what happened during the Cuban Missile Crisis before Justin Trudeau was conceived.

What about Canada as the champion of “rules based international order”?

Based on recent behavior, Canada do not appear to regard the legally binding obligations to defend the Armistice to be legally binding, nor do Canada see a binding treaty obligation under NATO Article 5 to defend allies like the USA if attacked, or NATO Article 3 obligations to provide for an adequate self-defense capability that include both mutual defense and mutual offense in general, and defense against DPRK ballistic missiles in particular.

Canadians have a belief that the US will come to Canada’s defense and take such American protection as an entitlement even as Canada is acting in violation of NATO Article 3 and 5 treaty obligations, and routinely sabotaging allied initiatives like the UNC conference often with PRC the prime beneficiary.

David Pugliese, a well-known Canadian defense correspondent and contributor to Defense News explicitly asked, “whether it is worth having an ally that has an official policy to sit back and let a catastrophic attack proceed on its neighbour and one of its closest partners even though it believes it has the means and technology to stop it.”

And called for Canada to find a new ally. PRC, perhaps?

Secretary Tillerson will have the nearly impossible task of fundamentally changing core Canadian beliefs and hallucinations on a brief visit: including rectifying Canadian dismissal of the near term nuclear ballistic missile threat from DPRK to Canada; the medium term threat from PRC that if not checked soon will irrevocably alter the liberal international order.

Critically, the problem of subversion of Canada’s political, government, academic and economic elites by CCP United Front organizations that have so far, been largely ignored by the Canadian Federal, Provincial and local governments.

If he can accomplish that on a brief visit, it be a miracle.

If not, perhaps it is time for a policy review.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

Secretary Tillerson Meets PM Trudeau about North Korea and China

Editor’s Note: To gain a sense of the significant gap between Canada and many allies, please compare the current Canadian government’s position to that of Australia.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-new-australian-foreign-policy-white-paper-the-perspective-of-the-australian-institute-of-international-affairs/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/reflections-on-the-australian-foreign-policy-white-paper-facing-the-challenge-of-global-engagement-conflict-and-realignment/

The Commissioning of the HMS Queen Elizabeth

Posted on December 16, 2017 | by Robbin Laird

12/16/2017

2017-12-082017-11-20 The new Queen Elizabeth class carrier is the largest warship ever built in the United Kingdom.

While most of the focus of the press coverage has been on the process of building the carrier and now its sea trials, the carrier is coming at a very interesting point in British history.

There is a clear need to shape a post-Brexit defense policy, and having a significant epicenter of national sovereignty able to operate throughout the region and beyond certainly can be worked into that as yet to be written policy narrative.

HMS Queen Elizabeth is currently on sea trials off the south coast of England.. Credit: UK Ministry of Defence

This narrative has begun to be written and was articulated as follows by the new defense minister in his visit onboard the ship earlier this month:

“This is very much about how Britain can project its influence and its power right across the world,” Mr. Williamson said.

“It is how we can say to the rest of the world, we are not a nation in retreat, we are a nation that wishes to play a significant part in world affairs.”

But it also also at the heart of integrating UK forces to deliver UK capabilities within the integrated battlespace, both in terms of an integrated carrier strike force as well as in terms of shaping the various war fighting systems which will come together onboard the ship.

It is however at the heart of shaping 21st century interoperability.

There is the interoperability being worked with the US Navy, as evidenced in the recent Saxon Warrior exercise off of Scotland.

There is the interoperability being worked as the USMC will operate its F-35Bs off of the ship.

This will require an ability for the ship to operate US weapons onboard as well as to accommodate USMC maintainers as well with their specific national maintenance approaches.

The ship is an F-35 carrier and will work its interoperability with other F-35s as well in the region, notably with the Dutch, the Norwegians, the Danes, the Italians, the Israelis, the US and perhaps others Europeans as well.

In other words, the carrier is at the vortex of a turn in British history, and a key element of shaping 21st century force integration and interoperability.

The Queen Elizabeth carriers have been built an innovative industrial consortium in which at the height of construction on any one day 12,500 workers were working on the carrier but of those only 2,500 we working in the actual shipyard.

According to an article published on the UK Ministry of Defence website, the HMS Queen Elizabeth was commissioned on December 7, 2017.

The Queen spoke at a ceremony in Portsmouth’s naval base this morning, attended by Her Royal Highness Princess Anne, Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson, Chancellor Philip Hammond and military chiefs.

In her role as the ship’s Lady Sponsor Her Majesty addressed guests before the Ship’s Commanding Officer, Captain Jerry Kyd, read the commissioning warrant. The iconic White Ensign was then raised, symbolising the commissioning of the nation’s future flagship into the Royal Navy’s fleet.

Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said:

“Today marks the start of a hugely significant chapter for the Royal Navy, and indeed the nation, as the future flagship is commissioned into Her Majesty’s fleet. It is an honour to witness the crowning moment of an extraordinarily busy year for the Royal Navy that has seen us name the second carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, cut steel on the first Type 26 frigates and launch the National Shipbuilding Strategy.

“Our new aircraft carrier is the epitome of British design and dexterity, at the core of our efforts to build an Armed Forces fit for the future. For the next half a century both carriers will advance our interests around the globe, providing the most visible symbol of our intent and commitment to protect the UK from intensifying threats, wherever they may come from.”

Queen Elizabeth at the Commissioning Ceremony of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, in Portsmouth, December 7, 2017. REUTERS/Chris Jackson/Pool

Having successfully completed her second stage of sea trials off the south coast of England, the carrier is back alongside at her home port of Portsmouth. Over 10,000 people across the UK have contributed to the delivery of the ship under the Aircraft Carrier Alliance.

Completing final build activity and preparing for helicopter trials in the New Year, HMS Queen Elizabeth will head to the United States for initial flight trials off the coast in autumn 2018. There are currently 150 Royal Navy and RAF personnel training in the US on our 13 F-35 jets.

The UK has worked closely on both the F-35 and carrier programmes with the US, our pre-eminent partner within NATO, enabling us to fly aircraft from each other’s ships. Both of the UK’s new carriers will be able to operate alongside NATO and coalition allies.

Admiral Sir Philip Jones, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, said:

“In hoisting the White Ensign from HMS Queen Elizabeth today, Britain has confirmed her place among the world’s great maritime powers in the most majestic and muscular terms.

“The Queen Elizabeth-class carriers will sit at the heart of a modernised and emboldened Royal Navy, capable of projecting power and influence at sea, in the air, over the land and in cyberspace, and offering our nation military and political choice in an uncertain world.

“But our greatest strength of all is the young sailors and marines upon whose shoulders our continued security and prosperity rests. They are starting their careers as a new chapter opens for the Royal Navy – and like all those who have gone before them, they are ready to serve their Queen and Country.”

Both new aircraft carriers will be able to perform a wide range of tasks, from humanitarian and disaster relief to fighting terrorism and high-end warfighting. In what has been termed, ‘the Year of the Royal Navy’ the second carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, was named in Rosyth and is structurally complete.

This year the Royal Navy has also had steel cut on the first of the Type 26 frigates and Dreadnought submarines, the launch of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, provisioning for a new class of frigate, the Type 31e, float out of the fourth Astute submarine, HMS Audacious, the naming of two Offshore Patrol Vessels and the arrival of our first two MARS Tankers in the UK.

Last month the Defence Secretary visited HMS Queen Elizabeth for the first time while at sea, meeting the crew and thanking them for their work towards UK defence.

Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Hillier, said:

“Congratulations from the Royal Air Force to the Royal Navy on achieving another important milestone in the UK’s Carrier Strike capability. I know the RAF and RN F-35 crews are looking forward to starting to fly from HMS Queen Elizabeth next year.”

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/queen-welcomes-royal-navys-largest-ever-ship-into-the-fleet

And an article published on the UK MoD website on December 2, 2017 focused on the industrial contribution to building the new carrier class:

HMS Queen Elizabeth, the nation’s future flagship and the first of Britain’s two new 65,000 tonne aircraft carriers, will be formally commissioned into the Royal Navy by Her Majesty the Queen next week (07/12).

But the construction of the 280 metre-long ship would never have been possible without the essential work undertaken by small and medium sized enterprises (SME) from around Britain.

Defence Minister Harriett Baldwin said:

“On behalf of Defence, the government and the whole of the United Kingdom, I would like to thank the hundreds of businesses around the country for the millions of hours they’ve spent equipping our ships in what has been an immense nationwide enterprise.

“Their Herculean efforts showcase our great British talent and saw HMS Queen Elizabeth complete her 2017 sea trials with flying colours as she prepares to project our interests right across the world.”

Over 700 British SME’s have supported the build of the aircraft carriers in what has been a truly national endeavour. The programme has brought together the best of British industry, with construction involving more than 10,000 people including more than 800 apprentices.

Britain’s Queen Elizabeth looks at a cake at the Commissioning Ceremony of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, in Portsmouth, December 7, 2017. REUTERS/Chris Jackson/Pool

Chief of Materiel Ships at the MOD’s Defence Equipment and Support organisation, Sir Simon Bollom said:

“I am incredibly proud of how DE&S and our colleagues across Defence have worked in collaboration with businesses across the UK to deliver a programme of such global significance.

“The success of the Queen Elizabeth class is a testament to the thousands of people who have worked on the programme and the vital skills they bring. I look forward to continuing our important relationship with industry to bring the second ship, HMS Prince of Wales, into service.”

In 2015/2016 the Ministry of Defence invested over £18bn with UK industry, supporting more than 120,000 full-time jobs, and benefiting local economies.

Last year saw the MOD’s direct spend with SME’s increase by over 10% across the country as it continues to make it easier for them to win defence business.

Defence Minister Harriett Baldwin has launched initiatives such as a new Supplier Portal, which brings together a range of useful information for new and prospective suppliers in one place for the first time, a dedicated Twitter account to flag opportunities to SMEs and simplified contracts for lower-value, less complex procurements.

Soon after the commissioning ceremony on Thursday 7th December, work will continue apace to ready Britain’s most advanced military vessel ever for the vital role it will play in projecting Britain’s influence around the world.

Next year the new F-35B Lightning II stealth jets, the most advanced warplane in the world, will start flight trials from the ship, and HMS Queen Elizabeth is on track to be fully deployable anywhere in the world by 2021.

Both of the UK’s aircraft carriers are being delivered by the Aircraft Carrier Alliance, a unique partnering relationship between industry and the UK Ministry of Defence.

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/business-contribution-to-britains-biggest-warships-recognised

The New Australian Foreign Policy White Paper: The Perspective of the Australian Institute of International Affairs

Posted on December 16, 2017 | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-05 By The Australian Institute of International Affairs

Australia’s first Foreign Policy White Paper in 14 years opens with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull’s declaration, “change, unprecedented in its scale and pace, is the tenor of our times”; and it is the changes in global power dynamics, international trade, security, technology and the environment that profoundly shape the document.

Adopting a 10-year horizon, the White Paper says the rapidly changing world presents Australia with new opportunities for free trade, security cooperation and transnational connections. During this time, it claims Australia’s interests will be supported by the continuing strong presence of the US in the region. However, the changes also bring challenges, including the upheaval to the existing order of the ongoing rise of China.

Within the context of this changing world, two main priorities underpin the White Paper. The first is Australia’s continued commitment to upholding the rules-based international order and pursuing increased trade.

The prosperity that the existing international order fosters is said to be closely intertwined with our security, making efforts to sustain it more important than ever. The White Paper maintains that, although a middle power, Australia’s resilient democracy and robust economy will ensure it continues to have considerable international influence. Importantly, that influence will be most strongly felt within the Indo-Pacific region.

The second priority of the White Paper is stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

The paper is full of references to the Indo-Pacific and Australia’s capacity to play a role in determining regional outcomes. It anticipates that emerging powers will be incorporated into the international institutional framework and cooperation between Indo-Pacific countries will increase as new markets emerge from Asia’s ongoing economic boom. Australia’s influence is highlighted as being particularly vital for its closest neighbours, including Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea and other Pacific island states.

The Great Powers

The ever-present influence of the US and China is recognised.

While the US is expected to remain the most powerful country in the region, its dominance “is being challenged by other powers”. China’s power and influence are “growing to match—and in some cases exceed—that of the United States”.

The power balance between the US and China make Sino-American relations of great strategic importance.

Australia will encourage China and the US to manage their economic divergences to ensure that the economic tension “does not fuel strategic rivalry” or “damage the multilateral trading system” in the region.

Australia seeks to engage both powers proactively to ensure regional stability and Australia’s security and prosperity.

Much emphasis is placed on the relationship with the US and the importance of Washington’s continued commitment to the region.

The defence of the existing rules-based order is central: “… the Government will place a high priority on protecting and strengthening the international rules that guide the conduct of relations between states.”

At the same time, the White Paper says Australia will seek to further engage China across different levels and on various issues.

Security

In response to a rapidly changing security situation the government has committed to a holistic and dynamic action plan. This includes a focus on new threats posed by cyber security and by activity in space, in addition to countering existing threats posed by North Korea, terrorism and irregular migration.

The White Paper identifies a number of “fault lines” that may prompt regional conflict, including the South China Sea and it restates Malcolm Turnbull’s comments from earlier this year that any attack on the US by North Korea would trigger Australia’s commitments under ANZUS. At the same time, the country will continue cooperating globally to combat international terrorist organisations both domestically and abroad, most notably the increasing regional threat in the Southern Philippines.

Australia will remain committed to combatting people smuggling and irregular migration with continued humanitarian efforts and by helping to maintain community support for refugee resettlement in Australia. By cooperating with regional partners, Australia will also continue its turn-back policy.

The White Paper reiterates the 2016 Cyber Security Strategy to partner with businesses, strengthen cyber defences, pursue global influence in the cyber sphere, foster growth and innovation, and create a cybersmart nation. This is coupled with a commitment to also pursue offshore cyber criminals.

The paper recognises the need to engage with new media platforms in strengthening national security and citizens’ safety.

There is a concern that these platforms allow foreign governments to spread misinformation and interfere with sovereign institutions to influence decision makers and public opinion. DFAT will pair with social media companies to make the most of technologies such as Facebook to ensure citizens’ safety in disasters abroad.

Interestingly, the government is also strengthening its space surveillance capabilities and developing a space agency to counter threats posed by foreign space innovation.

Trade

Australia’s economic interests are intertwined closely with its security interests. This convergence underpins the entire Foreign Policy White Paper, with emphasis on maximising trade and openness to mitigate the challenges that arise from an uncertain world.

The White Paper outlines a clear agenda for advancing the prosperity of Australia through increased trade and inclusivity.

By ensuring opportunity for business and workers in an expanding economy, reducing trade barriers and fiercely rejecting protectionism, the government aims to strengthen its economic hand.

Regional trade and investment arrangements that increase competition and transparency are outlined as key to mitigating strategic rivalry and great power dynamics.

One example is Australia’s commitment to the RCEP negotiations—a partnership that involves ASEAN alongside Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand. Emphasis is placed on both bilateral and region-wide integration as key to successful Australian foreign policy over the coming decade.

Asia’s continuing growth will provide ample opportunities for Australia:

“We live in the most economically dynamic region of the world and have the minerals, energy, goods and services sought by growing Indo–Pacific economies.”

Multilateral agreements are listed at length—trade and investment links such as AANZFTA, alongside FTAs with Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. With the obstacles to progress at the multilateral level, bilateral agreements with China, Japan and Korea are presented as paramount to Australia’s prosperity. The paper also outlines how the government will negotiate an ambitious FTA with the EU as well as the UK post-Brexit.

Aid and development

The White Paper establishes a clear commitment to advance human rights through development assistance and humanitarian support. There is an emphasis on how development assistance can catalyse economic outcomes in the region, in turn promoting Australia’s national interest.

It is argued that development aid, when used to support initiatives such as effective governance, will be the foundation for economic opportunity and poverty reduction. In turn, the increased stability of Australia’s neighbours will reduce vulnerability to “challenges such as irregular migration and extremism”.

This is consistent with the 2003 White Paper which emphasised that mature institutions and accountable systems were the objective.

The Pacific region is the largest recipient of the aid program receiving $1,097.8 million in funding for 2017-18. PNG alone receives $550 million in assistance. As a broad objective, Australia aims to enhance engagement with Pacific countries such as Timor Leste, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and particularly PNG, linked to shared security interests. PNG and the wider Pacific are “vital to our ability to defend…our borders and protect our exclusive economic zone”. Australia will continue to make substantial long-term investments in the region’s development.

Assistance has been allocated to build resilience to natural disasters and climate change. Australia is improving its capacity to respond to international natural disasters via 48 hours relief response units and the deployment of humanitarian specialists.

Additionally, Australia is also investing in “regional disaster preparedness” to mitigate impacts. In the face of unprecedented and worsening climate conditions, natural disasters will increasingly impede economic stability and national security interests. Australia is therefore investing “more than $1 billion over five years” to alleviate the costs of climate change in developing countries.

Zoe Halstead, Nicholas Taylor, Gillian Davenport, Breanna Gabbert, Adam Bell and Shixi Guo contributed to this report. They are all researchers at the Australian Institute of International Affairs National Office.

The Heron UAV, the Bundeswehr and the Joint Operator Support Model

Posted on December 16, 2017 | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-07 Airbus Defence and Space published a release today which highlighted the Bundeswehr mission in Africa, operating from a French base at Gao.

The Heron has been part of that mission and has completed its first year of operations in Mali.

According to the Press Release:

The Heron 1 UAV system, which is stationed at the Gao air base for the German Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support (BAAINBw) as part of the UN’s MINUSMA mission, logged its 3,000th flight hour in November 2017.

The system’s maiden flight took place in Mali on 1 November 2016 after the contract was signed in June 2016.

When added to the Heron 1’s operations for the German Armed Forces in Afghanistan, the Air Force’s UAV system has chalked up more than 38,000 flight hours.

Both places of deployment are being managed using a joint operator model between the Bundeswehr and industry.

As with the Heron 1’s operations in Afghanistan, the provision, maintenance and repair of the system in Mali is the responsibility of Airbus Defence and Space in Bremen.

Three Heron 1 aircraft are stationed at the air base in Gao, located in northeastern Mali. Given its reconnaissance depth of up to 800 km, the Heron 1 system has significantly enhanced the German Air Force’s aerial reconnaissance capabilities. The reconnaissance results are then made available to the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) for the MINUSMA mission, thereby contributing to the increased safety of all partners involved in the UN mission.

Reconnaissance tasks focus on the country’s crisis regions in order to provide the best possible protection for the country’s population as well as for the German troops and the contingents of other mission nations stationed in the country.

The operator model impressively demonstrated its performance capabilities during operations in Afghanistan and Mali, as emphasised by proven high system readiness of well in excess of 90%.

This is in addition to the system’s full compatibility and interoperability with Germany’s allies. The deployments of the Heron system in Afghanistan and Mali also help develop expertise within the Bundeswehr with a view to future MALE UAS.

Manufactured by the Israeli company IAI, Heron 1 is an unarmed medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UAS for the respective theatre of operations.

The aircraft has a wingspan of 17 metres and a maximum mission endurance of over 24 hours. The system’s military tasks include detecting booby traps from the air, accompanying convoys and patrols, assisting forces in combat situations, reconnoitring and surveilling routes, establishing movement profiles and long-term monitoring, supporting situation assessments, and protecting property and military camps.

The UAS is also used to support humanitarian missions.

Deutsche Welle has provided an overview of German participation in the UN mission in Africa which provides a broader strategic look at where German forces fit into an overall approach.

German interests in the broader Sahel region are tied to the fate of Mali. Berlin’s primary interests include supporting its ally France, combating extremist groups and preventing criminal human-trafficking networks from sending migrants north to Libya and on to Europe.

Fostering political stability and economic opportunity are integral parts of Germany’s broader Sahel strategy….

Around 875 German troops are currently taking part in the 13,000 strong UN peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA), aimed at stabilizing the country and supporting a peace agreement between the government and rebels…..

Germany joined MINUSMA from the beginning.

But it has increased its role in Mali over time, in part to support France’s broader counterterrorism operations, especially after a series of terror attacks in France over the past two years.

The importance of the broader Sahel region has also increased as criminal trafficking networks bring African migrants to Libya, using it as a springboard to reach Europe.

More than 600,000 African migrants, most with little chance of receiving asylum, have arrived in Italy over the past three years.

The Bundestag, or German parliament, therefore approved a stronger MINUSMA mission in January 2016 in the wake of the Paris terror attacks.

In January 2017, the German parliament approved an increase in the number of German troops that could be deployed to Mali, upping the number to 1,000.

The 2017 decision came after the Netherlands pulled its own helicopters out and Germany decided to fill the gap by deploying NH-90 transport helicopters and Tiger type combat helicopters.

The Bundeswehr contingent includes transport aircraft, refueling aircraft, anti-personnel tanks, and unmanned drones. The Bundeswehr’s role is primarily in a support and surveillance capacity.

In addition to the UN mission, Germany has about 350 soldiers based in the southern Mali as part of an EU training mission for the Malian army.

Separately, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – known as the G5 -are setting up a 5,000-strong combined force to combat smuggling and extremist groups in the Sahel region.

The EU is the main funder of this French-backed African force.

The G5 force is expected to complement France’s Barkhane operation and the MINUSMA mission.

For earlier pieces on the Mali mission, see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-german-military-in-mali-deployment-of-tigers/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/german-forces-participate-in-mali-operations-eu-looks-at-broader-support-for-african-operations/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-coming-of-the-a400m-the-mali-hypothesis/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-french-in-mali-shaping-the-logistics-element-of-the-operation/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-french-operation-in-mali-intervene-leverage-and-withdraw/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-french-in-mali-phase-two/

Redefining the Next Generation Fighter Aircraft: Build Out Air Combat Capability by Shaping a 21st Century Version of the Century Aircraft

Posted on December 8, 2017 | by Robbin Laird

12/08/2017

2017-12-01 By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

As the USAF looks to its evolving air combat capability for 21^st century operations, clearly continuing the path of innovation being shaped by the Pilot Operators of the capabilities of the fifth-generation aircraft is a crucial driver for change.

The introduction of sensor fusion aircraft with new secure communication systems and an ability to trigger a wide range of multi-domain combat assets is the foundation for understanding what comes next.

And what comes next is less a generational shift defined by the platform than by its inherent upgradeability to insert many user directed requirements furthering the ability to enhance the airpower revolution generated by the fifth generation aircraft and building out the C2 and multi-domain strike capabilities of the 21^st century combat force.

It is less about a platform than what is inside those platforms but also what those platforms can provide as a driver of broader combat capabilities.

With the entering of the software defined aircraft, a platform can be its own follow on with regard to evolving capabilities within and its ability to reach out to other assets in the combat space.

This in a very similar way that the iPhone 8 is an enhanced iPhone 7.

Recently, we had a chance to talk with Secretary Michael Wynne about a way to do a 21^st century version of the Century Series of tactical aircraft design and testing.

His vision would leverage the software upgrade revolution and built out from the significant strategic shift which fifth generation aircraft have introduced by using an F-22 as the initial test bed design.

This would allow hardware and software upgrades to drive the change that many Pilots are questing.

Combining the proven combat strengths of both the F-22 and F-35, Secretary Wynne is proposing an accelerator, building from lessons learned with existing assets, but taking full advantage of subsystem research to shape a force multiplier further empowering the air superiority/combat revolution.

Rather than simply design a paper aircraft and then fill in the dots, Secretary Wynne has forcefully argued the case for taking the F-22 and recrafting the aircraft to shape a follow on combat capability.

The F-22 is maturing; being used a lot more than expected and will need modernization; but rather than simply modernizing from the baseline mold lines of the current aircraft, Wynne suggest combining modernization with a measured science and technology effort to rethink what is inside the aircraft subsystems and relevant design or engine features.

F-22 Raptors from the 94th Fighter Squadron, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va. and F-35 Lightening IIs from the 58th Fighter Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. fly in formation over the Eglin Training Range after completing an integration training mission Nov. 5, 2014. F-35s and F-22 Raptors integrated throughout four missions to fight against T-38 Talons to improve employment of fifth generation aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo)

According to Secretary Wynne, “I need to evolve a better airplane than the F-22 to have the same command and control characteristics as the F-35.

“I need the F-22 flight characteristics to be marginally better, in the speed of flight; range and, and perhaps even stealth capability.

“But I need it to be massively better in the command and control, and targeting aspects.

“To get there, one could take two aging F-22s, give one to the Phantom Works and give one to the Skunk Works and ask them a simple question: how would you make this airplane better than it is?

“They would be given a budget for a three year effort and an open field in front of them.

“The USAF could send in crew and support teams to the two centers to enable them to determine what the pilots really want. But it is up to the Phantom Works and Skunk Works at the end of three years to deliver their best effort modified F-22.”

At the end of the three year period, the USAF would have two variants of the evolved F-22 to choose from and can compare those two modified aircraft with the extant one to determine if the modifications really make the kind of combat difference the USAF would want.

“It is apparent we have settled on stealth; we have settled on speed under control; we have settled on needs for C2 built into the aircraft. We do not need to go back and redefine those using the requirements process. Rather lets use them as massive beta tests with current and past operators as the critics.

“We know and are learning the parameters for the evolving F-35 and F-22 air combat force.

“Make this airplane extend the capabilities of the total force.”

“What is a sixth gen aircraft? Right now, it is an evolved gen five airplane, with plenty of feedback—and competition for the future.

“And what is that?

“The F-22 was optimally designed for penetration and speed.

“By leveraging as well what we are seeing in the F-35 we can shape its battle manager capabilities and roles as well.

“This allows one to jump the lengthy requirements setting process and gets the development teams focused on the ‘beta’ feedback for how to build out a better aircraft within the parameters of what a fifth-generation evolution is generating for the combat force.

“If you don’t like the outcome of this particular three-year study, you can commence a ten-year development program for what you perceive as the next generation air combat asset.”

“I would be very surprised, however if Skunk Works and Phantom Works did not come back with a very capable aircraft, one which can work with the extant F-22 as a baseline and by leveraging new electronics, new propulsion and maybe even modified designs make the F-22 a better contributor to the combat space.”

“I am paying homage to the requirements process which gave us fifth generation airplanes; I am not just revisiting what they did. I am building out from that to accelerate fielded innovation.”

“It also is not a done deal because what comes out in three years may be not as good as the current commanders want. I would be very surprised if that happens, and thus would encourage taking the risk.”

By working from the concluded fifth generation requirements process forward, user feedback would be driving the redesign of the evolved F-22.

“We now have the actuality of a software upgradable system. We have an air combat system that actually addresses all levels of military from a multi-domain perspective.

“And I can fly my modified F-22 against a fifth gen fleet of F-22s and F-35s and to determine the quality of the contribution of the modified aircraft to the combat force. It is not about an abstract platform development process; it is about taking the fifth generation revolution forward to a new level of capability and performance.”

“The gen 5.0 airplanes surprisingly brought our Combat Forces something different that I didn’t realize it was bringing. I thought it was bringing me advanced stealth and combat power, but what it really brought me was air battle management and ground battle management.

“The next generation may well be upon us with the evolution of C2 and battle management as we get re-task the big airplanes that have done battle management and basically subsume it in a web of fifth generation airplanes in contested battlespace.”

Editor’s Note: As the US and allied forces shift focus from slo mo to high tempo and high intensity operations, the proposal of Wynne to leverage the F-22 combined with the coming of the new bomber, and the foundational build out of US and allied F-35s can provide a significant shift in the capabilities available to the liberal democracies.

The illiberal powers are working hard to reshape the world order to their advantage.

And reshaping capabilities for the US and the allies rapidly is an option if one follows the F-35 buildout, the leveraging of the F-22 and integrating the bomber into the air combat revolution.

Editor’s Note: For earlier Wynne pieces which provide further understanding of how air power is evolving see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/airpower-in-the-next-two-decades-of-the-21st-century-secretary-wynne-looks-ahead/

https://sldinfo.com/the-usaf-thinks-about-the-wolfpack-the-renorming-of-airpower/

https://sldinfo.com/a-global-enabler-american-air-power-in-the-next-part-of-the-21st-century/

The F-35B in the Perspective of Aviation History