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For Norway, the changing strategic environment includes not only an expansion of the Russian tool set to challenge Norwegian and European security, but the clear inclusion of the Arctic and its evolving role in North Atlantic defense and security,
We have focused on this evolution over the past few years and most recently highlighted the evolving strategic environment in a series of special reports. Recently, in a press release by the Norwegian government dated March 23, 2018 underscored the requirement to expand digital coverage in the High North.
Today, broadband coverage in the High North is poor and unstable. The Government now wants Norwegian satellites to make broadband communications available in the Arctic.
“Fast, stable internet is important to anyone operating in the High North, whether in shipping, defence, fisheries or research,” says Minister of Trade and Industry Torbjørn Røe Isaksen (Conservative Party).
Space Norway AS has been working to establish satellite-based broadband communications capacity in the High North since 2015. Space Norway’s project is based on a system of two satellites providing coverage 24 hours a day in the area north of 65 degrees N latitude. The expected lifespan of the satellites is 15 years. If all goes according to plan, the satellites will be launched in 2022.
For negotiations to proceed with customers, suppliers and banks, the company needs a promise that the Norwegian state will contribute, in its capacity as owner, about NOK 1 billion in equity capital if the company manages to negotiate good agreements.
The Government is therefore proposing a conditional pledge to Space Norway AS of about NOK 1 billion in equity capital to realise this project. This means the state will contribute equity if Space Norway lands agreements ensuring, among other things, the project’s commercial profitability. In addition, the customers must bear market risk by securing project income across the lifespan of the satellites.
“Space Norway AS’s project represents an exciting opportunity to meet society’s needs for broadband communications at low cost to the state. A solid communications system will also facilitate increased value creation in the High North,” says Røe Isaksen.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ine Eriksen Søreide (Conservative Party) added: “The High North is Norway’s most important strategic area of responsibility. It is quite natural that we take a leading role in establishing better communications in the region.”
Poor coverage in the High North makes it harder for the authorities to carry out security and emergency services such as search and rescue at sea, oil spill protection and crisis management. Not least, the Armed Forces requires stable and secure communications for operations in Norwegian waters.
“Space Norway’s project is important to the Norwegian Armed Forces, and can also serve the needs of our allies,” says Minister of Defence Frank Bakke-Jensen (Conservative Party).
The third of four new support tankers to be delivered to the UK has arrived in Cornwall for customisation and trials before entering service with the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and being deployed on operations with the Royal Navy.
The arrival of RFA Tidesurge comes just weeks after her sister ship, RFA Tidespring, met up at sea with aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth for the first time.
The 39,000-tonne tankers can carry up to 19,000 cubic metres of fuel and 1,400 cubic metres of fresh water in support of Royal Navy operations all over the world.
The detailed customisation work to prepare RFA Tidesurge and her sister ships for operations is being undertaken at the A&P shipyard in Falmouth, sustaining around 300 jobs.
Minister for Defence Procurement Guto Bebb said:
“The arrival of RFA Tidesurge in Cornwall marks another key milestone in the Tide Class programme. Tidesurge will soon join her sister ships in providing the integral support which powers our warships and helps our Royal Navy maintain a truly global presence.”
While in Falmouth RFA Tidesurge will be fitted with UK specific armour, self-defence weaponry and communications systems, with the total UK work content, including A&P, in the Tide Class programme worth around £150 million and sustaining further jobs at 27 UK-based companies.
The customisation work is expected to take around four months after which RFA Tidesurge will begin final sea trials before entering service in Autumn this year.
Meanwhile, RFA Tidespring, which was preparing to conduct a Replenishment at Sea (RAS) refuelling when it met with HMS Queen Elizabeth in February, is currently acting as the training tanker for the Navy’s Flag Officer Sea Training (FOST) and will take part in exercise Joint Warrior in the Spring.
RFA Tidesurge has arrived in Cornwall
RFA Tiderace, which is currently docked at A&P Falmouth, is undergoing preparations for her capability trials which are expected to commence in early April.
Sir Simon Bollom, Chief of Materiel (Ships) at Defence Equipment and Support, the MOD’s procurement organisation, said:
“I’m proud to say that the delivery of the tanker programme will provide vital support for the Royal Navy, providing it with fuel and fresh water, while also being able to undertake a wide range of maritime operations, including humanitarian relief.”
The fourth of the Tide Class vessels – RFA Tideforce – is expected to be delivered later this year.
A&P Group has held the contract to support and maintain RFA ships at home and abroad since 2008. Under the Cluster Support Programme, A&P Group provides maintenance support to groups of MOD vessels, which include RFA Argus and the RFA Bay Class vessels Mounts Bay, Cardigan Bay and Lyme Bay.
Most scholars writing about the Arctic’s place in world politics have contended that despite the mounting tensions with Russia on balance Russia and the West are primarily interested in preserving the Arctic as a zone of peace.
After all, Arctic sea ice cover is declining, temperatures are rising and the effects of climate change are so pervasive and dangerous that everyone understands what is at stake in failing to cooperate in regulating Arctic affairs.
Instead and despite the fact that Moscow continues to proclaim that its policy is to preserve the Arctic as a zone of peace and of international cooperation, it continues to militarize the Arctic, make threats against neighboring Arctic states, and thereby provokes the West into counter-moves.
Moreover, Russian and Western moves clearly involve nuclear contingencies.
Thus the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) recently revealed that in 2017 alone Moscow mounted three aerial probes against its installations in Northern Norway. The targets included a radar station at Vardo, a flotilla of NATO ships in the Norwegian Sea and various facilities near the northern Norwegian city of Bodo.
This was on top of the Russian efforts during the Zapad-2017 exercises to jam phones and GPS facilities across Northern Europe. The radar at Vardo attracted Moscow’s attention since it apparently can be used to monitor Russian submarine traffic in and out of the Arctic form Murmansk and Arkhangel’sk, home ports of the Russian Northern Fleet.
Clearly Russian probes are growing in number and scope.
Indeed, Russian activity has grown to the point that the NIS, in its annual public report has now labeled Russia a threat, warned, “we might be heading for different normal situation in the north.”
Lt General Morten Haga Linde, head of the NIS also warned that there will be greater Russian military activity in the North. At the same time the Russian digital threat of information warfare and of efforts to recruit Norwegians as spies is also increasing.
This assessment, in turn forces Norway to move forces back to the north and devote more attention to its cyber as well as kinetic defenses.
But beyond further Norwegian and NATO updating of defenses in the high north, developments that have been amply covered in this journal previously by Robbin Laird, the conclusions to be drawn from these episodes, taken together, are numerous and sobering.
First the threat posed by the “eruption” or dispatch of Russian submarines into the Norwegian Sea and North Atlantic is a serious one and one that Moscow is concerned to keep as an effective threat requiring an aerial attack on Norwegian and NATO radars to allow those subs unimpeded entry into those waters.
Second, it is pretty much accepted now that any Russian attack in the Baltic will necessarily spill over to and entail action in the Arctic and high North Theater as well.
Third, any such attacks clearly involve large-scale Soviet cyber and electronic warfare attacks on Scandinavian states and especially Norway and Denmark as NATO members.
Fourth, such attacks will clearly be combined arms attacks involving land forces, air and naval probes as well as these electronic attacks.
Moreover, Russia is clearly intimating that it will use or at least threaten to use nuclear weapons in either or both the Baltic and Arctic theaters, and potentially against Norway. Furthermore, it is likely to use these weapons in a first-strike mode.
At the very least the threat of a nuclear first-strike will be prominently brandished in order to intimidate Northern European states into quiescence with Russian actions and non-resistance to them.
Obviously these Russian actions and NATO counter-actions strongly suggest that the claim of the Arctic being primarily zone of peaceful interaction between Russia and the West Is dubious at best.
While it is true that the Arctic is not yet an area of direct confrontation unlike the Baltic and Black Sea zones, and that a conflict would probably not break out there between Moscow and the West, the fact is that Russia clearly insists on militarizing it.
Yet Moscow clearly cannot afford to do much about these threats even as it is pouring money into military construction and deployments in the Arctic. For example, in 2017 Russia’s precarious economic situation and stress on the budget has thus forced what amounts to an almost 90% cut in state funding for Arctic infrastructure that was originally envisaged to be built by 2020.
Thus the government is asking private transport and energy firms to bail it out to make up the investment needed to bring the entire government program for transportation to and through the Arctic to fruition.
Russia’s behavior may be inexplicable to Western analysts given these facts.
Nevertheless we must see things from Moscow’s standpoint. It has declared the West to be at war against it and this happened long ago, even before the invasion of Ukraine.
Moreover, it has therefore reacted to place itself in a state preparatory for war with calls for mobilization and major defense.
We might prefer to think otherwise but it is clear that the West must now include the Arctic as a theater in this conflict where its defenses need strengthening.
Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the American Foreign Policy Council.
13th March 2018 marked the return of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) E-7A Wedgetail aircraft to the Middle East to continue its service as part of Operation OKRA.
Operation OKRA is the Australian Defence Force’s contribution to the international effort to combat the Daesh (also known as ISIL) terrorist threat in Iraq and Syria.
The E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning, control and surveillance aircraft plays a critical role in Operation OKRA, as it contributes to the control and tactical movement of aircraft over Iraq and Syria to ensure safety and mission success.
Approximately 70 Australian military personnel are deployed to the Australian Air Task Group in the Middle East Region as part of Operation OKRA.
Australian Department of Defence
March 13, 2018
The RAAF E-7A Wedgetail has arrived back in the Middle East to support Operation OKRA. The aircraft and crew provide tactical command and control of the airspace above Iraq and Syria. *** Local Caption *** 13th March 2018 marked the return of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) E-7A Wedgetail aircraft to the Middle East to continue its service as part of Operation OKRA.
Operation OKRA is the Australian Defence Force's contribution to the international effort to combat the Daesh (also known as ISIL) terrorist threat in Iraq and Syria.
The E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning, control and surveillance aircraft plays a critical role in Operation OKRA, as it contributes to the control and tactical movement of aircraft over Iraq and Syria to ensure safety and mission success.
Approximately 70 Australian military personnel are deployed to the Australian Air Task Group in the Middle East Region as part of Operation OKRA.
The RAAF E-7A Wedgetail has arrived back in the Middle East to support Operation OKRA. The aircraft and crew provide tactical command and control of the airspace above Iraq and Syria. *** Local Caption *** 13th March 2018 marked the return of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) E-7A Wedgetail aircraft to the Middle East to continue its service as part of Operation OKRA.
Operation OKRA is the Australian Defence Force's contribution to the international effort to combat the Daesh (also known as ISIL) terrorist threat in Iraq and Syria.
The E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning, control and surveillance aircraft plays a critical role in Operation OKRA, as it contributes to the control and tactical movement of aircraft over Iraq and Syria to ensure safety and mission success.
Approximately 70 Australian military personnel are deployed to the Australian Air Task Group in the Middle East Region as part of Operation OKRA.
The RAAF E-7A Wedgetail has arrived back in the Middle East to support Operation OKRA. The aircraft and crew provide tactical command and control of the airspace above Iraq and Syria. *** Local Caption *** 13th March 2018 marked the return of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) E-7A Wedgetail aircraft to the Middle East to continue its service as part of Operation OKRA.
Operation OKRA is the Australian Defence Force's contribution to the international effort to combat the Daesh (also known as ISIL) terrorist threat in Iraq and Syria.
The E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning, control and surveillance aircraft plays a critical role in Operation OKRA, as it contributes to the control and tactical movement of aircraft over Iraq and Syria to ensure safety and mission success.
Approximately 70 Australian military personnel are deployed to the Australian Air Task Group in the Middle East Region as part of Operation OKRA.
What is the Nature of the Military Transition to Deal with Peer Competitors in a period of Significant Strategic Change?
In effect, the Williams Foundation just held a seminar which addressed this question.
The Williams Foundation has focused for the past few years on the modernization of the Royal Australian Air Force and its impact, with a key theme being the development of a fifth-generation approach to the transformation of the force.
From the outset, the overall approach has been to highlight the challenge and the opportunity to shape a more integrated force.
Seminars have been held highlighting how Australia and the allies have been working to shape a more integrated force, in terms of air-sea integration, air-sea integration and how to design an integrated force more effectively from the ground up, notably as new capabilities are considered in the transformation process.
Now the Foundation is focusing on the new strategic context within which this force will operate and the kinds of further changes necessary for Australia and allied forces in facing the challenges posed by peer competitors.
These challenges are posed both in terms of potential high intensity operations and the expanded gray zone area in which various tools are being and will be used to test the liberal democracies and for illiberal powers to seek to expand their influence and their interests.
Air Marshal Leo Davies, Chief of the RAAF, addressing the Williams Foundation Seminar.
On March 22, 2018, the Williams Foundation began to process of examining these key questions. The Williams Foundation laid out the following narrative in preparing the seminar along with the following questions:
Most Air Force and senior military leaders in the western world begin their military careers either around or shortly after the Falkland Wars which were watched globally as an epic air, sea, and amphibious campaign; conventionally fought at the ends of the earth and at the end of an immense supply chain for the British Forces.
The decades that followed saw warfare in the Balkans and Middle East, and counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan; warfare very different from that postured for during the cold war and exercised in high end air combat exercises.
The Australian Defence White Paper 2016 and the associated Force Structure Review was written to an Office of National Assessment Strategic Environment to 2035 against this paradigm, whilst recognizing impending change. The subsequent rate of change in global security has shocked even pessimistic observers and we face the heightened risk of high intensity, non-permissive air environments non-discretionary wars”.
Questions to be addressed at the Seminar
What will be the impact on the delivery and expectation of 5th Generation systems as the world has changed so dangerously and so rapidly?
Have hostile forces been watching the development of our 5th generation systems and developed active asymmetry to defeat us?
Has the combination of our cold-war legacy and participation in irregular wars led us to make decisions that will limit our freedom of movement?
As we rediscover the concept of denied area (A2AD / beyond FEBA) and need to re-invest in strike capabilities, are there areas of concern? [Range / Payload / Escort requirements / requirement to step non fast-air platforms / risk of hypersonic AD systems] [Basing options / Life Support / Force Protection / Multi-domain threats]
Do we need to reconsider air campaigns in the light of Joint Force / Joint Strike options?
Do our national systems support the requisite battlespace awareness in denied areas to conduct effective targeting and effect generation?
Presentations by senior Australian and allied military leaders along with those by civilian analysts provided a solid foundation for understanding the challenges and how profound the shift will be for the liberal democracies in the period ahead.
Future seminars will address the question of what capabilities need to be added to the Australian and allied forces to deal with the strategic shift as well as how those forces can train more effectively to deal with the new challenges.
Maj. General Sampo Eskelinen, Commander, Finnish Air Force, addresses the Williams Foundation seminar.
A report is being prepared to provide an overview of the presentations as well as the incorporation of interviews with senior Australian Defense Force leaders which will provide a detailed look at the presentations and key points developed throughout the seminar.
For now, what I want to do is to provide a sense of how one might best understand the transition.
It is clear that the kinds of peer competitors we are dealing with are engaged in broad political conflict with the liberal democracies. They are crafting a range of tools to disrupt and to influence domestic policies in the liberal democracies. It is also clear that the presence of Chinese and Russian economic interests in the liberal democracies provide a much broader opportunity than in the days of the Cold War to both establish and expand influence within our societies.
And the evolving tools sets associated with a core activity like information war or cyber conflict are designed not only to help competitors now but will be used in enhanced ways in the shape of any future high intensity conflict. They are already attacking our civil societies.
We are not facing an abstract future warfare scenario; we are already engaged in information war and cyber operations directed against the liberal democracies, and they certainly designed as well to undercut the cohesion of the liberal democracies to work against the interests of the illiberal powers.
A core point made at the seminar was that dealing with peer competitors was not just about preparing for an abstract future high intensity conflict but about dealing with various elements of that force already engaged against us.
The bulk of the seminar focused directly on the challenges of remaking the force to deal with higher tempo operations and possible direct high intensity conflict. Certainly, a key argument made throughout was that habits learned in the land wars would need to be unlearned; notably, notably that we can operate with air superiority and have information security.
Panel Including Vice Admiral Barrett and Lt. General Kenneth Wilsbach, Commander of the 11th Air Force, USAF, discusses issues with the seminar participants.
Contested operations meant that we need to significantly rework how information is used and how command and control is executed. This transition will be a major challenge and one which forms a bedrock of further transformation.
How should we organize our force in the face of enemies which will use a wide range of tools to disrupt it?
How will we deal with adversaries relying on significant strike assets to make fixed installations inoperable?
How can we deal with the mass at least one peer competitor is generating to try to both overwhelm us and to create the impression of inevitability of victory?
In other words, force structure construction is both about having a more effective and dominant force and persuading our publics and leaders in fact that we are capable of victory in a direct conflict.
How do we more effectively master new technologies to reinforce our core capabilities in dealing with peer competitors? How do we leverage the F-35 global enterprise to shape more effective Australian and allied forces going forward?
During both the RAAF Airpower Conference and at the Williams Seminar, one key technology discussed was that of artificial intelligence and decision making. One speaker made a very good point that the RAAF as a relatively small force but one which was undergoing significant modernization was in a good position to perhaps lead the way in leveraging AI to generate transformation of C2.
The question of deterrence of a peer competitor operating in the gray zone is a key challenge as well. One senior RAAF Commander put it this way after the seminar: “How do we deter China from further build out capabilities in the South China Sea?”
There can be a key challenge as well whereby we fail to leverage the new technologies we are already buying and deploying and to get full value from them as we reach too far in the future to pursue a technology that will not be there in time to matter for the battles we will have to fight.
We need to master what we are introducing and build from that as well as thinking longer range.
The RAAF is following a good approach here whereby they are incorporating the lessons learned from shaping their baseline transformed force of Super Hornets, KC-30As, Wedgetail and C-17s to one which will be encompassing F-35, Growlers and the new robotic boom on the KC-30A and working to proliferate communications assets within the fleet to reshape their C2 approach.
The question of what to add after that will be in part the focus of the next Williams seminar.
Such an approach is a solid way to build transformation which works but from a proactive perspective not just a legacy one.
Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Addressing the Williams Foundation Seminar.
I had some personal takeaways from the seminar, the interviews and the discussions which were discussed at the seminar or touched on but want to shape more sharply than was done at the seminar. And want to emphasize that these are personal conclusions.
First, Australia and the allies have to take mobilization much more seriously. If there is higher intensity conflict, clearly security of supply is both crucial and based on current policies questionable at best.
There clearly needs to be a major look within our societies and mobilization relevant to higher intensity conflict and to gain better understanding of our vulnerabilities.
Second, we need to understand our adversaries more effectively from a SIOP point of view. How would we undercut the dictators running these societies? How would we disaggregate these societies and undercut their abilities to fight?
Third, while the military leaders are trying to think through a transition, where are the civilian leaders and strategists? To operate in the gray zone clearly requires flexible military forces and capabilities. It also requires and ability for civilian leaders to use these tools and to be able to shape adversarial behavior in ways that protect and expand our interest. Currently, work on this side of the ledger is in short supply.
We are in a significant transition; and the Williams Foundation is to be applauded for encouraging a public focus on these issues.
Editor’s Note: The photo above is of ACM Sir Stephen Hillier, Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force. All photos are credited to Second Line of Defense.
The F-35A Heritage Flight Team at Luke Air Force Base teams up with Air Force Heritage flight exhibiting the professional qualities the Air Force develops in the people who fly, maintain and support these aircraft.
Here is the 2018 airshow schedule for the US Air Force F-35 Lightning II Heritage Flight Team!
Schedules often change during the year – for the latest updates please be sure to check our forums!
2018 Appearance Schedule – US Air Force F-35 Lightning II Heritage Flight Team
March 17-18: Luke AFB, AZ
March 23-24: NAS Kingsville, TX
May 25-27: Miami, FL
June 9-10: North Kingston, RI
June 15-17: Ocean City, MD
August 10-12: Offutt AFB, NE
August 17-19: Chicago, IL
August 31-September 2: Toronto, Ontario
Sepember 21-23: Sacramento, CA
The video shows the F-35 Heritage Flight team at the Luke AFB event held on March 17 and 18, 2018.
The Australian Defense Minister followed the opening address at the RAAF Airpower Conference 2018 given by Air Marshal Davies with an overview of how she saw the evolving global situation and its impact on the ADF.
Senator the Honorable Marise Payne, the Minister of Defence, noted at the outset that although it was only two years since she addressed the 2016 airpower conference, it seemed almost an age ago compared to the world of 2018.
The changes in Europe, the United States, and Asia have created significant pull in the strategic environment and shifting demand sets as well.
She underscored the core shift in how Air Forces receive and use information and with the coming of both Growler and F-35 this would be accelerated as well.
She underscored the important role which Australia played in the region and growing expectations of partners in the region for that role to remain central as well.
She reinforced the core message from Air Marshal Davies concerning the need to shape a 21st century workforce in Australia to support the ADF as well going forward, given the pace and scope of technological change in the commercial and defense domains.
She concluded her comments as follows:
“This year’s Air Power program is a graphic picture of the breadth of the challenges that face all of us in the decades ahead, from space to cyber, from energy security to digital advancement.
Through this period of intense disruption, the Australian Government is investing heavily in our Defence Force to ensure that it stays on the cutting edge and we are building a workforce that is able to exploit the full potential of this new technology.
We can’t master all the challenges alone and we will need to leverage our international partnerships.
We want to have the most effective Air Force possible.”
The 39,000-tonne tankers can carry up to 19,000 cubic metres of fuel and 1,400 cubic metres of fresh water in support of Royal Navy operations all over the world.
