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New Delhi. The age old debate rages on worldwide between strategists of both blocks, the ayes and naysayers, on the relevance of the aircraft carriers with respect to their combat power vs. vulnerability.
This has undergone periodic pendulous harmonics.
Whether it is the US, Russia, United Kingdom and now China apart from India, the debate is identical. Even in countries with fewer maritime ambitions, such as Italy, Brazil, Spain and Thailand, this debate has been used either to acquire or to scuttle the process.
The very famous critique of aircraft carriers John Lehman who articulated all ills of this platform when not part of the US administration, found himself appointed as the Navy Secretary by President Ronald Reagan after an administration change in the US.
He, after much briefing on strategy and geopolitical realities, authored the policy of 13-carrier Navy for the US.
This policy remains the driving policy document of force structure till date, although a couple of years ago, President Barrack Obama mentioned 11 carriers in his Asia-Pacific Pivot Policy.
The United Kingdom Navy aircraft carrier force was scuttled completely by none other than the Royal Air Force post demise of the Soviet Union and the Cold War by justifying diminished Soviet threat from long range maritime patrol aircraft.
The Strategic Defence Review document outsourced the fleet air defence and strike from seawards role of the Royal Navy to the NATO despite their carriers having proven their worth in the Falklands (Malvinas) conflict with the Argentines in 1982.
In the post Soviet era, Russia is also attempting to resurrect its naval power as a necessity towards greatness, but has only one aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, deployed in Mediterranean for operations in the ongoing Syria/ Iraq ISIS conflict.
Emergence of Chinese Naval power
China, which was not a great maritime player till not so distant past, has literally churned out numerous diesel/electric submarines as also several nuclear powered boats in pursuance of its near sea and apparently larger global ambitions.
In a White paper, China had declared in 2015 that it will now be concentrating on far sea Maritime capability, pre-positioning warships – like the way US Navy does.
Carrier Task Forces are apparently part of such a strategy, although China does not always give details.
Traditional thinking that land warfare is all important is irrelevant in Beijing today and China has decided to master far Sea Operational ability keeping in consonance with its growing stature in the world.
Acquisition of naval bases, Gwadar from Pakistan in the Indian Ocean, is its biggest strategic asset.
China commissioned its aircraft carrier Liaoning in 2012 and a number of pilots have qualified from her deck by now.
Construction of a second carrier is underway and there are reports that work on few more carriers is also in progress.
It is only matter of time that the Chinese Navy will emerge in the Indian Ocean in a big way with two naval bases, Djibouti and Gwadar, supporting carrier and submarine operations.
The recent agreement between China and Malaysia to develop the port of Malacca will lead to the Chinese Navy having major operational presence in all three critical choke points in the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR), i.e., Gulf of Oman (mouth of the Strait of Hormuz), Gulf of Aden (Exit from Red Sea) and Malacca Straits.
Its aircraft carrier (s) and submarines will provide capability to block and disrupt adversaries transiting through these crucial sea routes between the Atlantic and Pacific.
It may be kept in mind that China is building anti aircraft carrier missiles but then its own carriers will also face similar threats.
India Supersonic Brahmos cruise missile is a very potent weapon for both attack and counter measures.
US Naval Power
The US Navy has dominated the oceans for decades now.
It has a declared strong presence in the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific, and it has refused to accept the unilateral annexation of the South China Sea by Beijing.
The US Navy has 11 aircraft carriers, and this is the number that is likely to stay in the coming years.
The potency of the carrier based aircraft is bound to be strengthened by the induction of 5th Generation F 35 aircraft and land-based long range Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) like the General Atomics Predators and Northrop Grumman Global Hawks which can stay over the waters for nearly 30 to 40 hours.
China will take time to match the US strength but then, given an assertive intent and access to land bases like Gwadar, the Chinese Navy can cause enough of headache to the US and other navies.
Nonetheless, the election of a new president notwithstanding, the US Navy will continue to dominate the oceans with new generation of warships, submarines, aircraft and high technology assets, cyber disruptions included.
The US Navy will continue to be the most formidable force to check dominance of the waters by China.
The Role of Indian Navy
What does the rise of Chinese Navy and its collaboration with the Pakistani Navy mean for the Indian Ocean countries, particularly India?
The Indian Navy’s procurements have remained stymied by complicated procedures and internal roadblocks of the Finance and Defence ministries where many have shown lack of strategic foresight.
Fortunately, with the present political dispensation, there has been a welcome change and, in a recent seminar on submarines, the Indian Defence Minister has at least called for a larger number of underwater boats than earlier planned.
With that mindset, the direction towards aircraft carriers should also be positive.
Notably, a Carrier Strike Group remains the fastest means of deployment of forces whether it is in a show of force or in support of own land operations as well as for providing security to friendly countries in the IOR.
As India does not have a policy of overseas basing, a carrier force remains the only suitable alternative for a regional power like India to conduct out of area contingencies. In any case, foreign bases are expensive and difficult to get given the nature of political dimensions.
That increases the relevance of aircraft carriers.
With the arrival of the Chinese, their basing rights in Djibouti and Gwadar, Equity holding (likely) in Colombo South port, and Maldives increasingly falling in the Chinese lap and, importantly Pakistan becoming a proxy state of China, IOR maritime scenario has become more uncertain and complex.
With the de-induction of Sea Harriers and impending decommissioning of the Viraat, INS Vikramaditya is the only aircraft carrier that the Indian Navy has for operations in the entire IOR.
There is no doubt that Mig 29 K fighters and Kamov31 helicopters have provided force multiplication to the Indian Navy’s firepower.
The AEW capability of the Ka 31 and its data link compatibility with the Mig 29 K/ Vikramaditya combination has added speed to execution of both interception and strike tasks at, and from sea.
The longer endurance of the Mig 29K permits it to perform dual tasking in the same sortie.
With the Indian Air Force’s fighter force just about adequate for tasking in two front air warfare situation, till such time the Rafale gets inducted, Mig 29Ks will provide breathing space to the IAF’s downsized inventory by freeing it from certain maritime roles.
But the question is: Is it adequate?
The Indian Navy has 45 Mig 29Ks, much more than what Vikramaditya can operate.
The ship has two carrier borne squadrons, Numbers 300 and 303. A Training Squadron is also in the offing.
India’s Long Term Perspective Plan envisages at least two operational aircraft carriers at any one time with the third one as hot reserve to substitute during maintenance of either.
Therefore, the next two aircraft carriers become an urgent operational necessity,
The first indigenous aircraft carrier IAC-1 or Vikrant is being built at the Kochi Shipyard.
Due out in a couple of years, it will operate both the Mig 29K and the indigenous Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Navy as and when it becomes a reality some years later.
Significantly, there are reports that US experts have found Vikrant falling short of meeting operational tasks in her present state of construction.
These glitches are bound to occur given that it is the first time an Indian yard is attempting to build an aircraft carrier.
Processes of development are always slow and painstaking.
These may not produce a carrier of the class of the US, but it will be an Indian aircraft carrier. The next one would be better.
There is a technological and production engineering process gap of 70 years between the US and India.
We hope our shipbuilders learn fast to bridge the gap.
India has over 50 years of experience in maintaining and operating aircraft carriers and carrier borne aircraft.
A very confident return to tail-hook aviation after a VSTOL era of over 33 years bears testimony to Navy’s professionalism.
Building a carrier strong Navy is the only way forward.
Vice Admiral Sinha (PVSM AVSM NM & Bar – Gallantry) is a former Naval Aviator. He retired as Commander in Chief of the Western Naval Command.
First published by our partner India Strategic in December 2017 and republished with their permission.
2018-02-09 The Williams Foundation will continue its series of examining the transformation of military forces by looking at the challenges of the shift from the land wars to higher tempo, high intensity operations.
According to The Williams Foundation, the focus of the seminar is as follows:
Most Air Force and senior military leaders in the western world begin their military careers either around or shortly after the Falkland Wars which were watched globally as an epic air, sea, and amphibious campaign; conventionally fought at the ends of the earth and at the end of an immense supply chain for the British Forces.
The decades that followed saw warfare in the Balkans and Middle East, and counter insurgency operations in Afghanistan; warfare very different from that postured for during the cold war, and exercised in high end air combat exercises.
The Australian Defence White Paper 2016 and the associated Force Structure Review was written to an Office of National Assessment Strategic Environment to 2035 against this paradigm, whilst recognizing impending change. The subsequent rate of change in global security has shocked even pessimistic observers and we face the heightened risk of high intensity, non-permissive air environments non-discretionary wars”.
Questions to be addressed at the Seminar
What will be the impact on the delivery and expectation of 5th Generation systems as the world has changed so dangerously and so rapidly?
Have hostile forces been watching the development of our 5th generation systems and developed active asymmetry to defeat us?
Has the combination of our cold-war legacy and participation in irregular wars led us to make decisions that will limit our freedom of movement?
As we rediscover the concept of denied area (A2AD / beyond FEBA) and need to re-invest in strike capabilities, are there areas of concern?
[Range / Payload / Escort requirements / requirement to step non fast-air platforms / risk of hypersonic AD systems]
[Basing options / Life Support / Force Protection / Multi-domain threats]
Do we need to reconsider air campaigns in the light of Joint Force / Joint Strike options?
Do our national systems support the requisite battlespace awareness in denied areas to conduct effective targeting and effect generation?
We want to revisit this discussion to highlight key elements of the proposal, which are important in and of themselves but also underscore the changing nature of the role of fighter aircraft in both the air combat space and in Joint Battlespaces.
The introduction of stealth designed sensor fusion aircraft with new secure communication systems and an inherent ability to trigger a wide range of multi-service; multi-domain combat assets is the foundation for understanding what comes next.
And what comes next is driven by the inherent upgradeability to insert many user directed requirements furthering the ability to enhance the airpower revolution generated by the fifth generation aircraft and building out the C2 and multi-service, multi-domain strike capabilities of the 21st century combat force.
In this day and age of the commercial revolution in upgradeable technologies, it is important for platforms to provide a framework for driving broader combat capabilities. This adaptively can be considered a key driver of what some have called the Third Offset
With the arrival of the software defined aircraft, a platform can be thought of as its own follow on with regard to evolving capabilities within and its ability to reach out to other assets in the combat space.
Much like the shape of the Smart Phone, there can be a decision separation as to the need to alter the platform, which may be physics based, and upgrading the network and sensor capability, which might inform the Joint fight, and in particularly the emerging Joint/Coalition Air Combat fight.
What Wynne proposed was moving ahead with an approach which would combine modernization monies for the F-22 with R and D money to deliver in a very short time frame new combat capabilities built around the F-22 airframe and a potentially new propulsion system.
According to Secretary Wynne, “I need to evolve a better airplane than the F-22 to have the same command and control characteristics as the F-35 while retaining the speed advantage that the F-22 was optimized for.
“I need the F-22 flight characteristics to be marginally better, in the speed of flight; range and, and perhaps even stealth capability; emphasizing ‘what have we learned’ during the years of operations.
“But I need it to be massively better in the command and control, communications, and targeting aspects.
“To get there, one could take two aging F-22s, give one to the Phantom Works and give one to the Skunk Works and ask them a simple question: how would you make this airplane better than it is?
“They would be given a budget for a three year effort and an open field in front of them.
“The USAF could send in crew and support teams to the two centers to enable them to determine what the pilots really want. But it is up to the Phantom Works and Skunk Works at the end of three years to deliver their best effort modified F-22.”
At the end of the three year period, the USAF would have two variants of the evolved F-22 to choose from and can compare those two modified aircraft with the extant one to determine if the modifications really make the kind of combat difference the USAF would want.
“It is apparent we have settled on stealth; we have settled on speed under control; we have settled on needs for C2 built into the aircraft. We do not need to go back and redefine those using the requirements process. Rather lets use them as massive beta tests with current and past operators as the critics.
“We know and are learning the parameters for the evolving F-35 and F-22 air combat force, and their impact to combined warfare.
“Now, make this airplane extend the capabilities of the total force.”
“What is a sixth gen aircraft? Right now, it is an evolved gen five airplane, with plenty of feedback—and a forward look at competition for the future.
“And what is that?
“The F-22 was optimally designed for penetration and speed.
“By leveraging as well what we are seeing in the F-35 we can shape its battle manager capabilities and roles as well.
“This allows one to jump the lengthy requirements setting process and gets the development teams focused on the ‘beta’ feedback for how to build out a better aircraft within the parameters of what a fifth-generation evolution is generating for the combat force. This best commercial practice first forces a revolution in thought as to what is ahead for future platforms, then forces a revolution in thought as to how Joint Command and Control adapts to the flow of situation awareness at the edge of the battlespace and beyond, and what to do about that.
“If you don’t like the outcome of this particular three-year study, you can commence a ten-year development program for what you perceive as the next generation air combat asset.”
There are a number of key advantages to such an approach, which draw upon the current and anticipated state of air combat evolution.
First, this builds out the combat capable network enabling combat operations.
The USAF clearly is focused on shaping an advanced C2 network built around B-21, BACN, F22 and F-35 – this would draw upon, evolve and enhance a force insertion C2 combat force able to operate at the cutting edge of the operational space.
Put in other terms, one would get an enhanced capability in the short to mid term and not wait for a futuristic 6th gen aircraft.
The mesh nets of a flexible set of force packages enabled by fifth generation aircraft would be significantly enhanced.
Second, the approach would build on the reality that there is a long cycle airframe development but there is a very short cycle to the evolution of software upgradeable electronics, avionics and C2 systems.
Recognizing that the F-22 is already a superior airframe, the task would be to evolve the guts of the aircraft to work within and push out the “meshnet” and the combat capabilities, which it empowers.
Third, the manufacturing innovation introduced into the F-35 and evident in the open ended digital thread line at Fort Worth can be leveraged as one focuses on manufacturability as a key element of building out the air combat force.
As Donald Kinard, a key Lockheed Martin expert on aircraft manufacturing has put it:
“Because of our digital thread approach we can incorporate innovations from the commercial space, which creates opportunities to improve quality and reduce costs.
“Our digital thread manufacturing process provides us with the opportunity to do so on an open-ended basis.
“This aspect of innovation built into the F-35 program is not widely appreciated.
“We’re able to harness the power of the major digital companies out there developing technologies in the commercial space, and spending enormous amounts of money, and all of a sudden those innovations are flowing our way.”
Fourth, the digital approach encompasses significant change in how maintenance data can flow into the design and manufacturing process, and the innovations with the new F-22 variant clearly need to enhance that capability.
Or put another way, innovations in logistics and sustainment are part of the ability to have enhanced combat impact from software upgradeable combat aircraft.
Again quoting Donald Kinard:
One needs to look at sustainment much like you look at manufacturing learning.
“We’ve done a lot of learning over the past five years.
“We know how to build the aircraft now.
“That mystery is gone.
“Now, we’re learning how to sustain that aircraft, and that data will be captured by systems like ALIS (advanced logistics information system).
“We can then shape a global database as flight data accumulated so that everybody gets better.
“Everybody who has an F-35 gets better.
“With more than 250 planes out in the field, we are getting data from these aircraft and incorporating lessons learned into changes on the FAL itself.
“This is the advantage of having a digital data stream to work with from design to manufacturing to sustainment and back again.
“This allows for a digital learning curve, which enables both quality and performance to be enhanced.
“If customers take full advantage of the process, sustainment will be enhanced and sortie generation rates ramped up for the global F-35 fleet.
This shift in how logistics informs operations and manufacturing is a core cycle, which would need to built into the projected new variant aircraft.
Fourth, by funding at two development teams, Phantom Works and Skunk Works, innovations can be driven into the air combat force by rethinking what the inside of the aircraft and their connectivity can do to drive innovation throughout the overall combat force. Innovations done this way can proliferate into multi-service, multi-domain weapons, remotes and other key elements in the integrated combat space.
It would be recognizing a core reality – in a software upgradable age, combat capabilities are always evolving and cross learning across platforms is a key driver for mission success. There has been much discussion of what some call the Third Offset. But like Moliere’s famous line by the Good Gentleman that I have “been speaking prose all my life, and didn’t even know it!” the Department of Defense is already incorporating digital upgradeability into its software upgradeable platforms.
Fifth, user groups, including inputs from USAF F-22 pilots and all the F-35 combat pilots at Nellis, (USAF), Fallon (USN) and Yuma (USMC) would be integrated into the ongoing research and into the redesign of the F-22.
Participants would sign non-disclosure agreements to provide insights usable to the technological innovations of the two teams and user demand would be recognized as of central importance to driving acquisition development, rather than the older requirements mandated process.
We would see a direct link as well from the work of Skunk Works and Phatnom works with the surface navy and army ADA as the entire “meshnet” is worked and radar innovations and tron warfare innovations are opened up to cross learning, and cross platform adoption as well.
Here the USAF through a new approach to fighter development, one rooted in recognizing that fifth generation fighters are really not at all like legacy fighters can open up the overall innovation set of approaches within the services, but also deliver real combat capability along the way, rather than simply leaving these as future thoughts.
The Air Force under General Goldfein is provoking innovative thought, and the Air Force is responding.
As the ACC Commander, General Holmes has put it the Air Force needs to bring the future forward.
And this reworking by the USAF of its new variant of the F-22 would be informed by user groups involved in multi-domain warfare to broaden the aperture of what is desired and possible on the new variant as a core enabler of the joint combat space.
Clearly, the Wynne approach would do that in very concrete and doable forms.
Building out a significant F-35 fleet, with the services and the allies is a crucial part of the renorming of airpower and the Wynne approach can allow the modernized F-22 to take greater advantage of the impacts of the F-35 global enterprise and its significant effects on renorming.
2018-01-21 RAF Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) Typhoon aircraft scrambled from RAF Lossiemouth to monitor two Russian planes approaching UK airspace on January 15, 2018.
According to an article on the Ministry of Defence website:
The Russian Blackjack Tupolev Tu-160 long-range bombers were not talking to air traffic control, making them a hazard to all other aviation.
The RAF worked closely with NATO partners to monitor the jets as they passed through a variety of international airspace, before they were intercepted by the RAF in the North Sea.
Subsequently, our fighters escorted the Russian Blackjacks north, out of the UK’s area of interest. At no time did the Russian bombers enter UK sovereign airspace
Pictured is a Russian Blackjack Tupolev Tu-160 long-range bomber. Credit: UK Ministry of Defence
Defence Secretary Gavin Williamson said:
“The threats this country faces are intensifying and we will not hesitate in defending our skies from acts of aggression.
“Our excellent RAF tracked the Russian aircraft every step of the way, and they continue to police UK and international airspace every hour of every day, to help keep the British people safe.”
RAF QRA was launched today because the Russian Military aircraft were not talking to air traffic agencies.
The RAF routinely intercept, identify and escort Russian aircraft that transit international airspace within the UK’s area of interest and continue to be on call; 24/7, 365.
The recent intercept by the RAF of a Russian bomber approaching UK airspace raises the question of how a QRA squadron works?
During a visit to RAF Lossiemouth, we addressed this question to one of the QRA squadrons.
2016-11-13 By Robbin Laird
When I was a kid, I remember the images of deterrence which were provided by strip alert bombers against the Soviet threat.
Now we have images in the press of the strip alert Typhoons dealing with the air defence of the United Kingdom against a wider variety of threats than simply that of the Soviet Union, but which clearly includes the successor state, that of Russia.
When I visited RAF Coningsby, I learned that the base housed QRA South or Quick Reaction Alert South.
Question: The RAF has had to focus more on British airspace protection with both the terrorist threat and the upsurge in Russian airspace activity impacting on the UK.
What role has the Quick Reaction Alert force played in this process?
Answer: At RAF Coningsby, we are more focused on the terrorist threat whereas at RAF Lossiemouth we focus more on the Russian activities.
But the demand on resources is significant. Everything at each base, from equipment, to logistics to training is focused on maintaining the alert posture and ensuring we are ready 24/7.
The aircraft and pilots on QRA are only the tip of the pyramid of activity to ensure success in such an important mission.
When I visited RAF Lossiemouth in June 2016, I had a chance to visit the QRA based at Lossiemouth which is in addition to the one at RAF Coningsby
According to an RAF article published on September 19, 2014:
Royal Air Force aircraft at RAF Lossiemouth have launched the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) for the first time since the Moray base took on the role of defending the UK’s Northern airspace. Typhoon jets were scrambled to identify aircraft in international airspace.
The aircraft identified as Russian military ‘Bears’, did not enter UK airspace.
RAF Lossiemouth’s Station Commander, Group Captain Mark Chappell, said:
“This first successful launch for QRA North has been what all of the hard work by RAF Leuchars and RAF Lossiemouth personnel over recent months has been for.
“The relocation of two Typhoon squadrons was a significant challenge, one that was met by our whole team.
“The many months of preparation and infrastructure improvements have made us absolutely ready for this launch, and shows we are in the best position to provide the service to the United Kingdom that the Royal Air Force was primarily created for – that is, the protection of our airspace.”
Royal Air Force Lossiemouth began a new era in its history on the 1st of September when it assumed the provision of what the RAF calls the ‘Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptor) North’ task for the United Kingdom.
The role is carried out by crews from 6 Squadron. The pilot of the first launch said:
“It was an honour to be part of what is a milestone in the history of RAF Lossiemouth. With the move of Quick Reaction Alert from Leuchars to Lossiemouth, it has been a huge ask of many personnel.
“The fact that we had a flawless scramble and intercept of two Russian Bears was a testament to the hard work and commitment of all personnel involved.
“A very proud moment, not just for the pilots who did the intercept but the engineering crews who did a fantastic job, as well as many other station personnel involved in this constant commitment.”
During my visit, I was able to address the question of the nature of the pyramid necessary to launch QRA ready aircraft.
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Visiting the QRA area demonstrated the 24/7 quality of the operation.
There was the red button to generate the movement of pilots and personnel to launch the aircraft very rapidly.
Map published by the Daily Mail on 2/19/15 showing Typhoon intercepts of Russian aircraft in 2014 and 2015 up to that point.
There are ops areas and offices, crew rooms, a dining area and kitchen to serve the staff, bedrooms for the rotational crew and a gym to remain ready.
But the question of what the pyramid looks like beyond this is simply having two pilots ready 24/7 with 2 support staff and eight engineers for each week in support as well.
1(F) Squadron, II (AC) Sqn. and 6 Sqn. provide the aircraft, pilots and engineers for the 24/7 operation. The Air Traffic Control Center is manned 24/7 to enable aircraft to launch at any time.
The Ground Support System or GSS provides support to the Typhoons with mission data and computer systems used by the aircraft.
And chefs and catering staff are on station to cook and serve meals for duty personnel, three meals a day, 365 days a year.
To put it bluntly: to be 24/7 ready is a significant demand signal for the Typhoon fleet, and one which can be overlooked in terms of the number of aircraft which are required to remain ready for operational launch, 24/7 and 365 days a year.
According to the QRA North team, the Typhoon has performed its role well, but it requires maintainers, pilots and operations personnel to pay close attention to the rotation of aircraft into the demand side of QRA.
And when the RAF deploys to the Baltics, in effect, the UK is supporting three QRA efforts.
The pyramid is demanding; the photos of the planes on strip alert simply masks the significant level of effort to ensure that they are on strip alert.
This demand side is one which can be easily overlooked by everyone, except those providing the capability and the intruders into UK airspace.
When have you read a positive review of our combat experience in Afghanistan from the Pentagon’s Inspector General?
Not a common experience for sure, but very recently, the IG underscored a significant advance in how the battle in Afghanistan is going forward.
“Less than two years after flying its first combat mission, the Afghan Air Force’s A-29 Super Tucano aircraft are playing a key role in supporting Afghan soldiers on the ground.
“When they show up overhead, the Afghan National Army have the confidence to continue attacking on ground,” the deputy commander for Train, Advise and Assist Command-South said in a new Defense Department Inspector General report.
Absent sufficient air coverage, Afghan security forces who had grown reliant on coalition air power suffered a series of defeats to the Taliban.
Building a native air strike capability within the Afghan Air Force is the key to Afghan success in the future, Army Gen. John Nicholson, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2017.
“Close air support and aerial mobility are the most critical remaining gaps that need to be addressed,” Nicholson said. “At the tactical level, the [Afghan National Army] needs to improve its integration of fires and air power.”
In its report, the DoD IG praised the Afghan Air Force for the progress it has made…
This is surely good news, but one can ask why did this take so long?
It has been clear for a number of years, that close air support is a decisive factor in dealing with insurgency in Afghanistan.
Just look at this week’s new movie on Afghanistan with Special Forces riding in Afghanistan on horseback and calling in fire from the air to respond to the attack on the World Trade Center.
We have written from the beginning of Second Line of Defense of the need to shift from a Big Army defined Afghan War to a more effective partnership approach using flexible insertion forces to support the efforts of the Afghans.
Put in other terms, we have focused on how to shape an effective strategy in Afghanistan and one in which a capability like the Super Tucano would become a key building block.
SLD interviewee Johan Feckhaus, a former French military officer and an advisor of Massoud, seen with the leader shortly before Massound’s assassination.
It has been also obvious for a long time that the Super Tucano is a very effective close air support weapon in dealing with the fight against drug lords and terrorists alike.
The Super Tucano’s global track record is clear; and equally clear was the fact that it was the right tool for the United States to buy and get into the hands of the Afghans to empower their ground operations against terrorists.
And when you have shown this is how to fight – CAS with ground maneuver forces–you need to empower your partners to fight the same way.
As Marine Corps General Walters put it upon his return from Afghanistan in 2012
“The Afghan National Army and Afghan Security Forces understand from their perspective, how important air is.
“We have made them big consumers.
“They know that the air is there for them; they’ll go out and operate.”
But why did this take so long when it was very clear that this was the right course?
Or put another way, what lessons can be learned about how to deal with the impediments to getting combat capability into the force as rapidly as possible?
Four A-29 Super Tucanos arrive at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Afghanistan, Jan. 15, 2016. The aircraft will be added to the Afghans’ inventory in the spring of 2016. The A-29 Super Tucano is a ‘light air support’ aircraft capable of conducting close air support, aerial escort, armed overwatch and aerial interdiction. Designed to operate in high temperature and in extremely rugged terrain, the A-29 Super Tucano is highly maneuverable 4th generation weapons system capable of delivering precision guided munitions. It can fly at low speeds and low altitudes, is easy to fly, and provides exceptionally accurate weapons delivery. It is currently in service with 10 different air forces around the world. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Nathan Lipscomb)
The current Air Combat Commander has made it clear that the USAF needs to accelerate the deployment of future capabilities into the combat force, what lessons does the Super Tucano slow roll acquisition highlight?
Ignoring the Warfighter to Have a Competition
The first clear point is that ignoring combat requirements and sidelining urgent requests from key commanders involved in the fight is not something which Congress should aid and abeit.
And how does Congress do this?
By insisting that there be a competition when there is clearly no alternative from the standpoint of combat experience and capability to an existing platform or capability.
This is what Ed Timperlake wrote in 2010:
“General Mattis then Commanding Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) testified about a special forces effort called operation Imminent Fury II. The Department of Defense supported the effort and sent a request to Congress to act.
The entire action from testinomy to request took just a month, which is relative light speed.
But nothing occured.
Then a letter was made public in the Washington Times by Bill Gertz that showed General McCrystal solidly behind the rapid fielding of Imminent Fury II. General Petraeus in the chain-of-command as then CG Central Command forwarded the letter to the Chairman. But nothing happened.
“It turns out that, unlike the recent combat success in Colombia, Imminent Fury II was stopped by Congressional Action. An immediate request for a combat program was not approved by Congress because IF II was going to use the Super Tucano.
The ST is in direct competition with the attempt by the Hawker Beech to convert their T-6 Texan trainer into a combat aircraft–the AT-6.
The T-6 Texan trainer (the basis for the proposed AT-6) is manufactured in Kansas by Hawker Beach a Canadian-owned firm currently in dire financial straits.
There have been reports that, in order to stave off disaster, management has been considering moving some production lines to Mexico.
“It now appears, looking at the Congressional reporting, that stoping IF II was part of a bigger effort to give time, so a combat version of the T-6 could be developed and tested.
Unfortunately the Afghan War goes on and time is short.
Congress has earmarked millions to try and get the T-6 Texan, a US Air Force trainer aircraft, up to combat standards ahead of a pending fly-off competition for equipping the emerging Afghan National Army Air Corps.
This fly off will be a competitive test of ready-to-fly, non-developmental tactical light attack planes that are currently available.
The “AT-6B” version of the trainer is not yet ready.
The non-combat certified AT-6B’s competitor is Brazil’s Embraer A-29 Super Tucano, the FARC killer that has been operational for several years. including several combat missions schwacking FARC guerillas in the dead of night.”
The second lesson is to demonstrate once again that the refusal to buy foreign equipment when clearly our allies have the only or the best alternative undercuts our combat performance and endangers lives.
This practice provides a slow roll that hurts the combat force and slows down real combat capabilities simply for show trials, or, sorry, competitions held to slow down the ability to kill adversaries and save American and allied lives.
Competition for competition’s sake is a life killer.
Prioritize the User Community Not the Requirements High Priests
The third lesson is that the core driving opinion that should shape key thinking about enhanced and accelerated combat capabilities are those of the warfighters.
They will rarely have a complete consensus but the user community is more important a guide to the way ahead than is Congress or bureaucratic requirements setters. And this will be especially important in the era of software upgradeable capabilities, like F-35, Wedgetail, P-8, Triton and others, where the business rules need to change to allow the warfighters to more effectively drive change.
As no less an expert than the head of the Air Force Materiel Command put it last year:
“We have to change the way we think about requirements definition if we’re going to really adopt Agile Software Development.
“Maybe the answer isn’t this detailed requirements’ slow down.”
“By the way, once you put it in the hands of the operator maybe some of those requirements you had in the beginning, maybe they don’t make any sense anymore because the operator sees how they can actually use this and they change it.”
Reinforce Partners Rather Than Always Doing the Job Yourself
The fourth lesson is that in ground operational environments involving counter terrorism we should look to shaping partner ground air capabilities rather than focusing on our need to bring in the entire combat force.
It is time to think beyond the A-10 to the Super Tucano.
Hardly the End of Manned Aircraft
The fifth lesson is that a Super Tucano in the hands of the Afghans can be a more effective tool than UAVs run at great distances away in the United States or elsewhere.
Rather than getting carried away with the “end of the manned aircraft” mantra, the Super Tucano is a case study in a different way of thinking about the future.
In an interview in 2011 with Col. (Retired) Bill Buckey, former Deputy Commander of the NATO Airbase at Kandahar in 2009 emphasized what such an aircraft can do versus a UAV:
One of the things that the special operations forces, who started the idea of the whole Imminent Fury piece, wanted was the ability to have a partner in that light attack platform; a TAC-A or supporting arms coordinator that would be above them in the air and who, if things got ugly, could then marshal in other aircraft. The guys sitting at Creech can’t do that.
The individual in the backseat of the aircraft is the one that’s going to be communicating to these jets who are still 30 minutes away – 15 minutes away, an hour away – and giving them the target brief and the whole situational awareness piece of what’s going on while they ingress; which is something that your guy at Creech is not going to be able to do.
But now that’s the tactical piece. The operational piece is back to the whole COIN environment. Again, if what you’re trying to do in a COIN environment is drive your cost of doing business down as close as you can to the level of the other guy; right now, UAVs ain’t cheap.
You’ve got a tremendous logistics piece; you’ve got the sophisticated communications infrastructure required to fly them. You’ve got the whole piece back in CONUS in order to operate them. Your cost of doing business is huge and you also have reliability issues. The accident rates are not great with UAVs right now.
And in terms of that ability to act as FAC-A, that’s something that you just can’t get with a UAV.
The Obama Administration Punting the Football
The sixth lesson is that a much more rapid introduction of the Super Tucano along with associated transition in how the Afghan forces could fight would have been a good capability for the Obama Administration to leverage to accelerate progress in the “good war.”
But they simply did not do it.
It was slow mo, slow roll and a strategic failure of the first order.
In short, rather than an LAS experiment, why not get on with the lessons learned and find out what other systems are out there that can make a difference?
As Ed Timperlake notes: “When as a Marine I received my Navy “Wings of Gold” June 1971, a classmate Naval Officer volunteered to fly combat in Vietnam with The “Black Pony” Squadron, VAL-4 flying the OV-10 very up close and personal coma bat action.
“The tragic, the comic, the terrifying, the poignant are all part of the story of the Black Pony pilots who distinguished themselves in the Mekong Delta between 1969 and 1972. Flying their Broncos “down and dirty, low and slow,” they killed more enemies and saved more allies with close-air support during the three years they saw action than all the other naval squadrons combined. The U.S. Navy’s only land-based attack squadron, Light Attack Squadron Four (VAL-4) flew support missions for the riverine forces, SEALs, and allied units in borrowed, propeller-driven OV-10As.”
“Consequently when we began the quest to put the A-29 into Afghan combat operation, especially with three very impressive ground combat General’s Mattis, McCryatal and Petraeus all in support, I figured seven months to success not seven years!”
“Shame on the entire political process that is going on to today which will simply repeat this kind of strategic failure if it is not corrected.”
It has taken the USAF more time to acquire the Super Tucano than it took the United States to fight World War II.
And this in spite of the fact that the combat leadership clearly indicated its desires and intents to the political leadership in the last Administration.
But it simply did not matter in terms of getting capability in the hands of the warfighter and getting on with changing how the Afghan war could be fought.
Editor’s Note: At Second Line of Defense we pride ourselves on working on the emergence of key issues and capabilities important to the warfighter and that is why we called ourselves Second Line of Defense.
We focus on combat capabilities, and avoiding the Greek Chorus of critics of new systems, and capabilities, such as the barrage of criticism of the Osprey when it was clear to us that it was a core transformational capability, which would redefine the USMC and the joint force.
The focus on the Osprey whereby we engaged with the Marines as the Osprey was first stood up at Second Marine Air Wing and then went to Afghanistan and then became a key redefiner of the ARG MEU into the amphibious task force is a good illustration of our approach.
We have done that from the beginning of our publication and work.
The Super Tucano and its projected role in Afghanistan is also a good example of how we have addressed the opportunity to enhance combat capabilities and we saw the Super Tucano and its proven combat record as a low hanging fruit in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan.
Edward Timperlake played a key role in defining and shaping this story and the political roadblocks and needless competitions put in the way by the political system to creating ground truth in Afghanistan is stunning.
SLD: So to summarize your thinking about a COIN aircraft, you want to drive down the cost of providing close air support to the guys on the ground. You want manned air for the roles that you have described – to be involved with the ground commander, the ability to loiter, the engagement, the systems to provide the “find/fix” piece and the persistence to be there for the “finish.” You want sufficiently lethal manned airborne presence but at lower cost than a fast jet.
Buckey: We have the systems and the weapons to pair up with a turboprop aircraft that has the persistence to get us through the entire “find/fix/finish” process at a substantially reduced cost that is more appropriate for air operations in a COIN environment.
Is it not interesting that Boeing’s current effort to acquire or work more closely with Embraer could already have been built from a fighter decision which was driven in part by the negative politics of US defense acquisition over the Super Tucano?
And then the Chinese tried to enter the game by trying to buy the company working hard within Congress and the Administration to derail getting on with the Super Tucano acquisition.
Well, the Super Tucano is built by a FOREIGN company and even though the ST was to be built in the United States, an AMERICAN company and its supporters mounted a counter attack.
Sounds familiar. Northrop and then EADS North America were to build a FOREIGN designed tanker in the United States, but then Boeing and its supporters mounted the charge about FOREIGN or even worse FRENCH companies getting a share of a U.S. (read their) contract.
In both cases, the Kansas Congressional delegation has been heavily involved. In the first case, they were rewarded with their effort by Boeing pulling out of Wichita AFTER having won an initial tanker contract.
The Kansas Congressional delegation worked overtime to insure that THEIR AMERICAN company, Hawker Beechcraft, would get a contract for its AT-6 trainer (did someone forget the proven combat aircraft piece?) to supply the Afghans.
But along the way the AMERICAN company might well become Chinese. This is a new twist on BUY an American company to BUY American.
In 2013, “The Way Ahead for Airpower in Afghanistan”
Well we could not do it with Super Tucanos, but we could do it with Russian helicopters!
With all the many words on the Super Tucano versus AT-6 competition, what has been lost in the public debate is the real issue: equipping and training the Afghan Air Force to be an effective fighting force able to work with other Air Forces in providing for enhanced Afghan security.
The broad trajectory of change has been to move from a Russian-equipped force in disrepair to shaping a mixed fleet of aircraft able to support the various missions which the Afghans would need: transport, ground support and counter-insurgency ISAR and strike.
A new one is replacing the core fleet of aging Mi-35s and AN-32s.
In 2013, “Colombia Battles the FARC: Turboprops Provide Key Tools”
It is clear that at the critical point in the initial destruction of the Taliban, that the United States could have avoided a full blown engagement in Afghanistan.
The problem with occupying a country with such a radically different culture from that of the United States will always be clash of cultures, and the legitimacy challenge facing any outside power.
No amount of counter-insurgency theory can change the fundamental reality that occupation by a foreign power will always have a legitimacy problem built in…..
And where we are now in Afghan history, it is important not to provide once again the Big Army solution set of occupation, training and cultural failure.
Another option can be to assist those forces that have been trained, to the level possible, within the constraints of the viability of the political and legal systems.
In 2016, “First Super Tucano’s Heading to Afghanistan: Can the US Strategy Leverage Them?”
We will stop there but feel free to search the website and add more stories; these are just a few of the many we have published about ruggedized airpower and the case of the Super Tucano.
We have written extensively on the Afghan war and how to shift the strategy from a “Big Army” engagement with the other services providing support and jointness being defined to a strategy more likely to lead to longer term success.
Below is an article we published on the 10th anniversary of 9/11 which highlighted interviews we had already done which underscored how to shape an effective strategy and one in which a capability like the Super Tucano would become a key building block.
09/14/2011 As Americans observe the day 10 years ago when terrorists in hijacked planes attacked New York and the Pentagon, the people of northern Afghanistan remember what for them was a greater tragedy two days earlier on Sept. 9, 2001. It was then that two agents of Al Qaeda posing as journalists detonated a bomb hidden in a television camera during an interview with Mr. Massoud, killing him instantly.
For his closest aides, who first tried to keep his death secret, fearing the truth would sink the besieged Northern Alliance for good, the collapse of the World Trade Center towers was a sign of hope. They instinctively saw a nexus in the two acts — though one has never been proved — and knew that the Americans would soon be on their way.
“I sort of woke up out of this shock I had been in since Sept. 9,” Abdullah Abdullah, the Northern Alliance’s former foreign minister, recalled about hearing the news of the attacks in New York. “It automatically came to my mind that out of this tragedy, there might be an opening.”
Earlier we had an opportunity to discuss with Johan Feckhaus, a former French military officer and an advisor of Massoud about the way ahead in Afghanistan.
In our interviews with Freckhaus he connects two broad points.
First, the light footprint followed by the Bush Administration after 9/11 was the right strategy.
The piling on of foreign troops has stirred up a hornets nest of Taliban activity who are using the large scale foreign presence as a recruiting issue.
The point simply put is that Afghans distrust foreign motives and the large number of troops.
And the foreign troops are backing a centralized government, which is out of sync of broader Afghan national aspirations and objectives.
Certainly, recent events in the Middle East suggest that building up the power of the Presidency, as a focus of Western activity might well be counterproductive for political progress.
In a recent speech to the Kuwait National Assembly, on 22 February 2011, the UK Prime Minister admitted: “For decades, some have argued that stability required highly controlling regimes (…). [We] faced a choice between our interests and our values. And to be honest, we should acknowledge that sometimes we have made such calculations in the past. But I say that is a false choice.”
Johan Freckhaus also suggested an interesting lesson from history that might just work — a Swiss “neutrality” model from the time of Napoleon. His observations in his own words are extremely interesting.
The West can work with Russia, Pakistan and others to shape a neutrality treaty and can assist where appropriate in countering foreign fighters like Al Qaeda and the Taliban seeking to penetrate Afghan territory.
But the West needs to leave security to the provinces, and work with a much smaller central government tasked with dispensing aid to the provinces, control of the Army and collecting taxes. B
ut the provinces cannot, nor need, manage large police forces.
In the earlier interview, Olivier underscored the following remarks by Johan:
There is indeed an insurgency in Afghanistan because you have 30 000 or 40 000 rebel fighters – according to allied military intelligence – backed by millions of Afghan civilians, in growing numbers, who feed them, house them, transport them, protect them, give them information and so on.
These civilians are doing it foremost to drive foreign troops out of the country and in rejection of the system we are trying to impose, but do not want the return to power of the mullahs either.
Withdrawing our troops is therefore the right strategy to effectively drive a wedge between the rebels and their supporters.
This famous momentum, this magic moment where the power relationship can be reversed, will come from fair and complete withdrawal of foreign forces, because then the fate of the country will return to its population.
Then the Afghan security forces, as they exist today, would very well be capable, with the help of villagers, of chasing away those rebels on motorcycles mainly armed with Kalashnikovs and rocket launchers, whose most lethal know-how is simply to trigger explosives remotely.
The strategy of “always more” prevalent until today for the Afghan security forces is a dangerous illusion: more troops, more money, more power to the central government, all of this is counter-productive, it fuels the insurgency!
We are building oversized security forces in Afghanistan that the country is far from being able to afford.
We imagine a police state, supported from abroad, which would subject the population to the decisions of Kabul.
We imagine building in a few years, for one of the poorest countries in the world, an army that could successfully maintain in power a hyper-centralized system.
This is not sustainable.” Let’s remember, for the record, that the Afghan government, which now has 140, 000 military and 109, 000 police officers, aims at a 240,000 military and 240,000 police officers force. And that is for a country of about 20 million inhabitants.
In comparison, France, for a population three times larger, has fewer than 170,000 military personnel (ground and air) and 265 000 gendarmes and police officers.
2018-01-15 The title of a new report issued by our partner the Air Power Development Centre of the Royal Australian Air Force is entitled 5th Generation Air C2 and ISR.
A key aspect of the F-35 global enterprise is that air warriors are working throughout the enterprise to reshape air operations.
This paper is a core example of the kind of thinking going on in the enterprise.
The paper is written by a Dutch Air Force officer during his time in Australia.
The author is Lt. Col. Bart Hoeben of the Royal Netherlands Air Force.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bart Hoeben was born 3 March 1965. He joined the Netherlands Royal Air Force at age 21. After five years of military training and academic studies at the Royal Military Academy, Bart received his officer’s commission in 1991. After training as a Fighter Controller and Air Battle Manager, Bart spent the first part of his career serving in Air Command and Control positions in The Netherlands and Germany, including a four-year tour on NATO AWACS. He was deployed several times for NATO peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations.
In 2007 Bart moved to Washington DC, to work in the F-35 Joint Program Office in the Interoperability Integrated Product Team. After returning to The Netherlands in 2009, Bart was assigned to a Joint Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance requirements position in the Ministry of Defence. After a year of study at the Netherlands Defence College from 2012 to 2013, he returned to the Ministry of Defence to work as a Senior Staff Advisor in Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Space and Air Operations Control. In 2016, Bart filled the position of International Fellow at the Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Development Centre in Canberra, Australia.
In his paper, Lt. Col. Hoeben looks at the co-evolution of C2, ISR and the coming of the F-35 as a fleet air combat asset.
“The goal of 5th Generation Air C2 and ISR is to adjust military actions better as the situation unfolds and thus reach better and quicker effects and objectives…..”
He then cited another work where the authors “make the case that traditional command and control approaches lack the agility required for 21st century missions, that are simultaneously more complex and more dynamic. These authors conclude that C2 approaches that are agile and take full advantage of all the available information and assets, are better suited.
In their research they define three key factors that can be thought of as the dimensions of a C2 approach towards an edge (agile) organisation (see Figure 3). These dimensions are:
• Allocation of decision rights
• Distribution of information
• Patterns of interaction among the actors…
He then noted that although these authors “….take a slightly different approach through this decomposition of C2, they implicitly acknowledge the importance of new (Air) C2 and ISR concepts to achieve a higher degree of agility. After all, the fundamental function of ISR is to distribute information (‘getting the right information and intelligence, to the right people, in the right format, at the right time’13) and Air C2 is predominately about making decisions. By adding patterns of interaction among actors as the third dimension, they stipulate the importance of collaboration.
“This decomposition gives an opening to explore the utility of current and new systems (including the F-35) and processes for distribution of information (ISR) and their ability to collaborate with each other.
“Furthermore, decomposing (Air) C2…, gives opening for a discussion on allocation of decision rights that is relevant in relation to the introduction of the F-35. The F-35 will supply pilots with an, until now, unprecedented situational awareness through the use of on-board ISR capabilities (sensors).
“This leads to a greater ability to adjust actions upon the situation as it unfolds.
“In order to capitalise on this ability, F-35 may require more freedom to act. In other words, allocation of more decision rights at the tactical (F-35) edge may be required to enhance operational agility.”
The Lt. Col. adds argues that “the first 5th Generation aircraft by RAAF and RNLAF does bring unprecedented opportunities for situational awareness and the application of 5th Generation concepts for Air C2 and ISR. Together with the introduction of F-35, these concepts may very well become essential stepping stones towards creating a 5th Generation Air Force.”
One could argue that for the smaller allied air forces, the F-35 will be leveraged as a core ISR/C2 aircraft in ways that the larger USAF will not.
But this also means that the allies in the global enterprise may well drive innovation in ways the USAF might not as well, which provides a significant cross-learning opportunity.
The executive summary of the paper is as follows:
In future conflict, we may end up having to fight a peer adversary.
In such a fight, we will not have a decisive technology advantage.
Furthermore, it is likely that we will be physically outnumbered.
In that fight, the way we orchestrate our force will be vital in gaining us the advantage and ultimately to win the conflict.
Air Command and Control (Air C2) is all about orchestrating our Air Forces.
Through exercising Air C2, we strive for decision superiority.
A major stepping stone towards achieving decision superiority is achieving information superiority. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aims at just that.
The future operation environment in which we fight a peer adversary has the potential to become very complex and highly dynamic. In that environment, we need to be able to adjust our actions constantly to cope with any situation that may develop and react in real-time to emerging threats and opportunities.
We need to be agile; ready to resort to high degree of dynamic (re-)tasking to out-pace and out-manoeuvre the adversary.
This puts extraordinary strain on the real-time link between Air C2 and ISR to achieve and maintain decision superiority.
Both the RAAF and the RNLAF will significantly transform during the next decade, as captured in Plan Jericho and CLSK 3.0.1
Two F-35 Lightning IIs, F-001 and F-002, of the Royal Netherlands Air Force landed at Edwards Jan. 16, 2015 after a five-hour flight from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. The Joint Strike Fighters arrived for an operational test and evaluation phase here in the High Desert. (U.S. Air Force photo by Jet Fabara)
One of the driving factors for the transformation is the introduction of the F-35 Lightning II. To employ it effectively and efficiently,
RAAF and RNLAF will have to look critically at how we operate, and probably apply new concepts.
Both Forces have a vested interest in understanding how current and planned Air C2 and ISR systems and concepts support exploiting the RAAF and RNLAF combat potential to the max.
They furthermore share the interest in evolving Air C2 and ISR to suit F-35 employment in a future, 5th Generation Air Force to achieve the required agility to operations at the tactical, operational and strategic level. This paper explores these new concepts for Air C2 and ISR related to F-35 employment.
The paper provides tangible recommendations about improving Air C2 and ISR systems, their integration, collaboration and Information & Communication Technology (ICT) at the tactical level, including the possible application of a combat cloud, and towards F-35 employment and follow-on development.
It furthermore explores the possibility for distribution of control towards the tactical edge, concluding that RAAF and RNLAF should further pursue this concept.
The paper also looks at command and ISR at the operational level and strategic employment of F-35 and draws two conclusions: first, that new concepts for Air C2 and ISR related to F-35 employment deserve increased attention from RAAF and RNLAF, and second, that successfully employing F-35 requires strong(er) influence of RAAF and RNLAF at the operational and strategic level.
Overall, the paper recommends possible ways in which RAAF and RNLAF could cooperate to face the Air C2 and ISR challenges and opportunities that come with the transition to a 5th Generation Air Force. This could involve stimulation and facilitating international discussion on new concepts for Air C2 and ISR.
The paper provides a framework for 5th Generation Air C2 and ISR, which illustrates the importance of coherence among Air C2, ISR, collaboration and ICT when formulating requirements for system improvements, tied to enhancing Air C2 – ISR integration at the tactical level.
It can also be used as a framework to further discuss the new concepts for Air C2 and ISR related to F-35 employment. Furthermore, the framework supports a broader view of these concepts, including the required professional mastery, collaboration and ICT.
Hence, it could also be used as a point of departure for further Air C2 and ISR analysis and concept development to support the transformation towards a 5th Generation Air Force.
Editor’s Note: For an opportunity to read the complete paper, please go to the following:
The US military has been focused along with core allies in fighting counter-terrorism land wars for more than a decade, which represents a defining generation of combat experience for the joint, and coalition force.
There has been significant combat learning in shaping new approaches to counter-terrorism and land engagements.
But the strategic shift in the global situation, the rise of peer competitors in conventional forces and the return of the salience of nuclear weapons via second nuclear age powers, concepts of operations and technology developed for the land wars are challenged by the emergence of the next phase of warfare, one might characterize as a multi-domain spectrum of conflict.
There are several elements of the new situation which are recasting the spectrum of conflict within which high intensity warfare capabilities are being interwoven into political military realities facing the US and allies when dealing with peer competitors.
The Nuclear Dimension
Both Russia and China are nuclear powers, and certainly in the Russian case modernization of their nuclear arsenal is providing new capabilities within their operational force which could allow for earlier use.
And the North Korean nuclear efforts along with anticipated other second nuclear powers, perhaps Iran, have posed fundamental considerations about where exactly to find the nuclear threshold in potential global conflict.
Put in other terms, engagements with second nuclear age powers or with peer competitors will always have a nuclear dimension, either in terms of deterrence or engagement.
The return of Herman Kahn and thinking the unthinkable is upon us, whether we want it or not.
A nuclear device need not necessarily be a WMD with a more up to date definition used by the CCA that do not define nuclear as WMD by default.
Prevention of mass destruction & casualties may require the nuclear threshold to be crossed in a judicious and tightly controlled manner when there is no other feasible method.
It does not follow that crossing the nuclear threshold in such a manner will automatically lead to wholesale nuclear war.
There is no reason why an escalatory latter have to exist for a given adversary or for it to be operative.
On the contrary, nuclear explosives may be the only practical way to prevent war caused by indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons in dangerous hands like North Korea.
Technology and doctrine have evolved since nuclear weapons were used last in 1945 and WMD taboos became institutionalized in international law.
The laws are now obsolete.
The nuclear threshold as it was formulated in the 20th century may be no less an obsolete concept than the Pope Innocent III’s prohibition on the use of crossbows on Christians.
Peer Competitors and High End Conventional Capabilities in the Service of Global Engagement
A second key element is the changing nature of the threat posed by peer competitors, which has been characterized by some as anti-access area denial capabilities.
What this entails is shaping missile enabled air, ground and naval forces which can leverage both defensive systems such as the S-400 and strike missiles, for now cruise but with perhaps hypersonic systems in the mid term future.
The US and the allies engaging peer competitors with evolving capabilities is requiring nothing less than changing our own template of operations and introducing new capabilities, fifth generation aircraft, new C2 systems, laying down the foundation for distributed operations, developing enhanced multi-domain operational capabilities.
There is a major shift in operational foci for both peer competitors and the US and its allies, which is being empowered by new systems, new training, new concepts of operations, and new areas of conflict, such as in the cyber domain.
And this in turn in resetting the spectrum of conflict within which engagements are occurring and will occur.
As Admiral Wang put it with regard to how he saw the challenge to Denmark and to Northern Europe posed by the Russians and their advanced systems:
Wang clearly argued that the Russian challenge has little to do with the Cold War Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat to the Nordics. The Soviet-Warsaw threat was one of invasion and occupation, and then using Nordic territory to fight U.S. and allied forces in the North Atlantic. In many ways, this would have been a repeat of how the Nazis seized Norway during a combined arms amphibious operation combined with a land force walk into Denmark.
In that scenario, the Danes and their allies were focused on sea denial through use of mines, with fast patrol boats providing protection for the minelayers.
Aircraft and submarines were part of a defense in depth strategy to deny the ability of the Soviets to occupy the region in time of a general war.
He contrasted this with the current situation in which the Russians are less focused on a general war, and more on building capabilities for a more limited objective, controlling the Baltic States. He highlighted the arms modernization of the Russian military focused on ground-based missile defense and land- and sea-based attack missiles, along with airpower, as the main means to shape a denial-in-depth strategy which would allow the Russians significant freedom of maneuver to achieve their objectives within their zone of strategic maneuver.
A core Russian asset is the Kalibr cruise missile, which can operate off of a variety of platforms. With a dense missile wolf pack, so to speak, the Russians provide a cover for their maneuver forces. They are focused on using land-based mobile missiles in the region as their key strike and defense asset. “The Russian defense plan in the Baltic is all about telling NATO, we can go into the Baltic countries if we decided to do so. And you will not be able to get in and get us out. That is basically the whole idea,” the admiral said.
Wang argued for a reverse engineering approach to the Russian threat. He saw this as combining several key elements: a combined anti-submarine (ASW), F-35 fleet, frigate- and land-based strike capabilities, including from Poland.
The Russian takeover of the Crimea was the first step in the reshaping of the spectrum. Here the Russians introduced a multi-domain approach to victory, backed by having a significant combat force, which could deter NATO from doing much about it.
And as Russia looks to the Baltics or the Chinese look to expand their control over the South China Sea, tactics and strategy are relying on their new power projection tools in support of a proactive engagement to reshape the strategic situation to their advantage.
Put in other words, military means associated with high intensity warfare capabilities, combat ships, combat aircraft and a strong missile force are being combined with a proactive strategy of engagement and expansion.
Dealing with the Threat
The nature of the threat facing the liberal democracies was well put by a senior Finnish official in a recent briefing: The timeline for early warning is shorter; the threshold for the use of force is lower.
What is unfolding is that capabilities traditionally associated with high end warfare are being drawn upon for lower threshold conflicts, designed to achieve political effect without firing a shot.
Higher end capabilities being developed by China are Russia are becoming tools to achieve political-military objectives throughout the diplomatic engagement spectrum.
This means that not only do the liberal democracies need to shape more effective higher end capabilities but they need to learn how to use force packages which are making up a higher end, higher tempo or higher intensity capability as part of a range of both military operations but proactive engagement to shape peer adversary behavior.
For example, one is buying fifth generation aircraft not simply to prepare for an all out war to defend the democracies, but to provide tools for governments to defend their interests throughout the spectrum of warfare and co-associated diplomatic activity as well.
For example, as the Russians were consolidating gains from the Crimean seizure, we noted ways moving forward one might deal with this kind of behavior, which although not at the high end was, informed an enabled by the presence of higher end warfare capabilities, both conventional and nuclear.
An Air Force B-2 bomber along with other aircrafts from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fly over the Kitty Hawk, Ronald Reagan and Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike groups during the photo portion of Exercise Valiant Shield 2006. Valiant Shield focuses on integrated joint training among U.S. military forces, enabling real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces and in detecting, locating, tracking and engaging units at sea, in the air, on land and cyberspace in response to a range of mission areas. Credit: Headquarters USMC, 6/18/06
We wrote in 2014 about ways to leverage higher end capabilities into the spectrum of warfare introduced by the Russians into Ukraine in a way that would matter in perhaps both shaping more favorable political outcomes and laying a foundation for more robust ways ahead if needed.
Simply asking Putin to man up and take responsibility is not going to get the job done. The United States needs to shape its own capabilities for 21st century warfare.
We could start by trying to actually engage in the information war which the Russians are conducting. Clearly, leveraging intelligence assets and putting the story into the Western press in DETAIL is crucial to position oneself for an effective information war engagement.
This is not about feeling good; it is about defeating the Russian information war gambit, which is holding the West responsible to trying to take advantage of the crisis for political advantage. We may feel privately that his position is less than credible; but it can be clearly believed worldwide.
But we need a hard power response to go with the diplomatic kabuki dance in which we are not engaged. And one clearly is at hand.
We argued in our book with Richard Weitz on Pacific strategy, that U.S. military power needed to be rebuilt around a modular, scalable force that could be effectively inserted in crisis. We also argued for the economy of force, that is one wants to design force packages appropriate the political objective.
If this was the pre-Osprey era, an insertion might be more difficult, but with the tiltrotar assault force called the USMC a force can be put in place rapidly to cordon off the area, and to be able to shape a credible global response to the disinformation campaign of Russia and its state-sponsored separatists. Working with the Ukrainians, an air cap would be established over the area of interest, and airpower coupled with the Marines on the ground, and forces loyal to Kiev could stop Putin in his tracks.
In other words, countering Russian 21st century warfare creativity is crucial for the United States to do right now with some creativity of our own.
Again it is about using military force in ways appropriate to the political mission.
The approach described here only gets better with the coming of the F-35 to US and allied forces.
The multi-mission capabilities of the aircraft means that a small footprint can bring diversified lethality to the fight.
THAAD can play a role in the defense of Taiwan. The US Army deployed on Taiwan working with the ROC can provide a credible DEFENSIVE deterrence capability. Credit Photo: US Army
An F-35 squadron can carry inherent within it an electronic attack force, a missile defense tracking capability, a mapping capability for the ground forces, ISR and C2 capabilities for the deployed force and do so in a compact deployment package.
In addition, an F-35 fleet can empower Air Defense Artillery (ADA), whether Aegis afloat or Patriots and THAAD Batteries, the concept of establishing air dominance is moving in a synergistic direction.
An F-35 EW capability along with it’s AA and AG capability will introduce innovate tactics in the SEAD mission.
Concurrently, the F-35 will empower U.S. and Allied ADA situational awareness. The current engagement of the IDF employment of their Irion Dome in conjunction with aviation attacks is a demonstration of this type of emerging partnership being forged in battle.
To get a similar capability today into the Area of Interest would require a diversified and complex aerial fleet, whose very size would create a political statement, which one might really not want to make.
With an F-35 enabled ground insertion force, a smaller force with significant lethality and flexibility could be deployed until it is no longer needed for it is about air-enabled ground forces. A tiltrotar enabled assault force with top cover from a 360 degree operational F-35 fleet, whether USMC, USN, USAF or allied can allow for the kind of flexibility necessary for 21st century warfare and operational realities.
Reinforcing Ukrainian defense might be assisted by defensive weapons of the sort being considered but deployable allied offensive defensive force packages which could decisively stop Russian forces and lay down a foundation for expanded operations if the Russians did not desist.
F-35s, F-22s supported by integrated by a strong missile capability, both to defend and to attack, but integrated by a viable distributed C2 system is both part of high end warfare but what is needed to deal with lower ends of conflict as well as the power competitors shift the spectrum of conflict where mix and match of higher end, lower end and capabilities in between are conjoined into a force package to support political objectives.
The US and allied militaries face challenges to get to the point where they have operational multi-mission, multi-domain distributed C2 force packages fully available to decision makers.
But the acquisition of new systems, new training approaches, redesign of C2 systems, focusing upon abilities to the various services to operate more effectively in an integrated battlespace are underway.
The Missing Factor: Are Civilian Strategists and Politicians Up to the Challenge in the Liberal Democracies?
What is more problematical is whether the strategic elites in the liberal democracies and notably their political masters are ready for the shift in the global game away from diplomacy as an hermetically sealed art craft.
The non-liberal powers are clearly leveraging new military capabilities to support their global diplomacy to try to get outcomes and advantages that enhance their position and interests.
The systems there are building and deploying are clearly recognized by the Western militaries as requiring a response; less recognized is how the spectrum of conflict is shifting in terms of using higher end capabilities for normal diplomatic gains.
The decade ahead is bound to be interesting.
To be blunt, the distinction which Joe Nye suggested between hard and soft power is being changed by the military revolution.
21st Century military systems are really about hard power redesigned to be more useful in supporting political objectives, which if one wants to call that soft power then I am not sure the distinction has meaning.
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The USS Wasp has spent the last few years as the workhorse of F-35B testing for the amphibious fleet.
While it was doing this, the Osprey was revolutionizing the strike force onboard the amphibious fleet. And waiting in the wings is the coming of the new Super Stallion, which will add a whole new lift capability to the ampbhious strike force.
With the Marines deployed in Japan with the first F-35Bs and now the USS Wasp joining them, the F-35B now has operational sea legs. This means that the very flexibility, which a vertical lift aircraft has both on sea and on the land, has come to a theater where threats abound and challenges are certainly real,
As allies look forward to augmenting their capabilities, they are looking in part to new amphibious ships or adding to the “amphibiosity” of the combat fleet as one Marine Corps General put it.
The US and the allies engaging peer competitors with evolving capabilities is requiring nothing less than changing our own template of operations and introducing new capabilities, fifth generation aircraft, new C2 systems, laying down the foundation for distributed operations, developing enhanced multi-domain operational capabilities.
There is a major shift in operational foci for both peer competitors and the US and its allies, which is being empowered by new systems, new training, new concepts of operations, and new areas of conflict, such as in the cyber domain.
And this in turn in resetting the spectrum of conflict within which engagements are occurring and will occur.
The amphibious task force empowered by Ospreys and F-35s, and other key assets coming to the fleet provide an evolved tool set to operate in changing combat conditions and threats.
There is always the reactive enemy; then there is the innovation which the United States and its allies can deliver as well to affect an adversary’s calculus.
The USS Wasp and its crew along with any embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit is a key part of the innovation which the United States is bringing to the defense of the democratic world.
Pictured is a Russian Blackjack Tupolev Tu-160 long-range bomber. Credit: UK Ministry of Defence
Four A-29 Super Tucanos arrive at Hamid Karzai International Airport, Afghanistan, Jan. 15, 2016. The aircraft will be added to the Afghans’ inventory in the spring of 2016. The A-29 Super Tucano is a ‘light air support’ aircraft capable of conducting close air support, aerial escort, armed overwatch and aerial interdiction. Designed to operate in high temperature and in extremely rugged terrain, the A-29 Super Tucano is highly maneuverable 4th generation weapons system capable of delivering precision guided munitions. It can fly at low speeds and low altitudes, is easy to fly, and provides exceptionally accurate weapons delivery. It is currently in service with 10 different air forces around the world. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Nathan Lipscomb)
“This decomposition gives an opening to explore the utility of current and new systems (including the F-35) and processes for distribution of information (ISR) and their ability to collaborate with each other.
Two F-35 Lightning IIs, F-001 and F-002, of the Royal Netherlands Air Force landed at Edwards Jan. 16, 2015 after a five-hour flight from Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. The Joint Strike Fighters arrived for an operational test and evaluation phase here in the High Desert. (U.S. Air Force photo by Jet Fabara)
Projected S-400 range from Kaliningrad.
An Air Force B-2 bomber along with other aircrafts from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fly over the Kitty Hawk, Ronald Reagan and Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike groups during the photo portion of Exercise Valiant Shield 2006. Valiant Shield focuses on integrated joint training among U.S. military forces, enabling real-world proficiency in sustaining joint forces and in detecting, locating, tracking and engaging units at sea, in the air, on land and cyberspace in response to a range of mission areas. Credit: Headquarters USMC, 6/18/06
THAAD can play a role in the defense of Taiwan. The US Army deployed on Taiwan working with the ROC can provide a credible DEFENSIVE deterrence capability. Credit Photo: US Army