Europe: Illusions and Reality

11/16/2017

2017-11-10  Dr. Harald Malmgren

Europe is in a period of fundamental transition.

French President Macron has put great energy into what sees as the next phase of European development, namely intensified integration of the EU member states into a common framework of governance.

He has even called for a common security effort backed by an EU military.

French President Emmanuel Macron delivers a speech on the European Union at the amphitheater of the Sorbonne University on September 26, 2017 in Paris. Credit: CNN

Macron’s proposals have had strong backing from the European Commission, which sees itself as the likely governing body in a more fully integrated European Union. The Commission is also busy devising a wide range of initiatives that it might take that would reduce or eliminate remaining rights of member governments to ignore or overrule EU Commission regulations and mandates.

What Macron seeks for the EU is not very different from what previous French governments have been seeking for many years, namely consolidation of budgets into a single EU budget, with debt sharing among members. It has long been Germany’s position that debt sharing remains illegal under existing EU treaties, as well as under the German Constitution.

To be cynical, Macron wants to distract French voters from focus on internal needs for economic and labor market reforms, and instead shift focus to consolidation of the EU or Eurozone financial structure. On the one hand, Macron seeks greater French budget flexibility than the Maastricht Treaty provides, and hopes that a new German coalition would be less resistant to some form of debt sharing among all EU governments.

The timing of these new ideas for EU unification is inconsistent with what is happening politically and economically at the EU national and local levels.

Brexit opened a huge crack in EU cohesion, but it is not the only crack to be found.

An array of lesser cracks is appearing both between and within the member states.

There has been little media attention to Belgium, which has long been engaged in the formulation of a divorce agreement, with settlement of assets and future obligations, between Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia. With separate budgets already operational, Belgium has one flag flying over two separate societies, keeping for now the illusion of one nation.

Historical differences played a role in the peaceful separation of the Czech Republic from Slovakia less than 25 years ago. Rifts are emerging in several places: Catalonia vs. the Spanish central government; regional governments in Italy seeking greater autonomy from Rome; Scots from the UK. Merkel’s open border policy for refugees has even generated strains between Bavaria and Berlin.

Merkel’s open borders policy resulted in hordes of refugees migrating from the Middle East to EU countries. Many of the refugees are resistant to any form of legal or social assimilation, insisting on their own forms of maintaining social order. They continue resistant to conformity to the laws of nations to which they have fled. The sanctity of Schengen rules within the EU has broken, resulting in a widening gap between some of the Eastern European members and the rest of the EU.

This refugee crisis has also intensified increasing political pressures for pushback on Brussels “overreach” in its seemingly relentless effort to enlarge its regulatory grip on member states and even local governments. The EU Commission in practice has become maker of European laws, by promulgating directives and then sending national appeals to those directives to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for review. In turn, the ECJ routinely upholds the EU directives and overrules national objections, effectively establishing laws without parliamentary consideration.

Spain’s Constitution was written to bring to an end the vestiges of Franco and his followers. The Constitution included powers for the central government to prevent any form of separation of regions of Spain from the central government. When the Catalonia referendum was called, PM Rajoy reacted with thuggish physical force to disrupt the referendum. When independence was declared, Rajoy acted not only to oust the Catalonia elected government, but ordered arrest of elected Catalonia legislators and officials under charges of sedition and treason.

Although acting within his Constitutional rights, Rajoy sought to suppress freedom of speech by charges of sedition and treason. His actions drew silence from the EU Commission and Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, even though Rajoy’s actions appeared to violate human rights provisions of the Lisbon Treaty of the EU.

Rajoy’s actions to coerce compliance by use of police and court powers to suppress independent political views now pose hard questions about the credibility of the Lisbon Treaty or any other EU treaty.

The big anti-EU and anti-Euro push by Le Pen and her FN party failed in France, but the extreme nationalism sentiments remain, like hot embers, ready to flare up again in France as Macron’s Presidency continues to lose popular support.

The 5 Star movement is still strong in Italy, and now even Berlusconi is seeking to return to politics and capitalize on growing anti-EU political sentiment in Italy together with regional unrest and pressures to restore greater autonomy to the local governments.

Macron and the EU Commission are effectively discussing the future of the EU without regard to security issues, except to talk positively about the idea of an EU army which is beyond the financial means of most EU member states.

A new “cluster” of European nations with a common security objective has quietly emerged recently in the form of focused military cooperation and coordination among the Nordic nations, Poland, the Baltic States, and the UK.

This cluster is operating in close cooperation with the US military.

The Danes, Norwegians, the Swedes and Finns are cooperating closely together on defense matters.

Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the official inauguration of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats in Finland

Enhanced cooperation is a response to fears of Russian incursions which are not new, but have roots in centuries of Russian interaction with Northern Europe.

It is also a response to the weak defense and security policies of most of the rest of Europe, notably the emasculation of any meaningful German military by the German government.

The Norwegians and Danes notably and reaching back to the UK are adopting the concepts of warfare pursued by the US military in its new focus on conflict in a fully integrated battle space operating in high intensity and at high speed.

At the heart of this integrated approach to building a credible deterrent to Russian “adventurism” and territorial incursions are the 5th generation F35 aircraft capable of coordinating and applying firepower from land, sea an air simultaneously.

Norway, Denmark and the UK are all acquiring the F-35 as part of the evolving collaborative approach.

The pilots in this assemblage of F35s are all trained in the same locations in the UK and the US, and are able to fly each other’s aircraft without adaptation.

It should be noted that Italy’s military wants to find a way to interact with the Northern Europeans as well as the UK and is acquiring F35s for itself to enable participation on short notice.

Will other political or security clusters appear elsewhere in Europe?

Fundamental divisions are emerging among Eurozone members regarding monetary and economic policies.

Countries like Austria, Slovenia, the Netherlands and the Baltic States are aligning with Germany and its Bundesbank, against the continuous pressure from Italy, France and Spain for greater flexibility in dealing with their crumbling banking structure.

Much of the mainstream media ignores the pervasive sickness of the Eurozone banking system, rarely giving brief recognition to problems of non-performing loans.

The reality is that hardly anyone knows the scope and depth of the bad loans of the Eurozone banks, because mark to market was long ago suspended.

There is no broad municipal bond market similar to that of the US. Most local governments in Europe operate within financing arrangements with banks.

One is reminded that the first European Banking Authority stress tests a few years ago declared Dexia, a Belgian-Luxembourg bank, as the safest of all major European banks. When the Great Financial Crisis took effect, Dexia was one of the first to fail. Most noteworthy, the Federal Reserve and Treasury became actively engaged in the rescue of Dexia, and Dexia became one of the largest beneficiaries of Treasury funding for troubled banks.

The reason was that Dexia had developed specialization in financing of local governments, and in doing so had even become an important supplier of funding for the US municipal bond market. Dexia had also become the principal funder for much of northern France, Belgium and Luxembourg.

Most of the European banking system is exposed to risks that are not readily visible, support of local governments being but one. All of the Eurozone banks are dependent on “Eurodollar” funding, and from time to time short-term funding shortages of liquid dollar denominated assets erupt. The European Central Bank was only able to keep its banking system alive at the peak of the post-Lehman crisis with the support of Federal Reserve swap lines to overcome insufficient dollar liquidity.

The fragility of the Eurozone banking system has not been repaired since 2008. Instead, the ECB has used its QE to buy up sovereign debt and corporate debt in order to compress risk spreads and create the appearance of a functioning financial market. The ECB, operating as a kind of gigantic waste management facility has transferred trash from all over Europe to the ECB’s balance sheet.

The ECB can postpone unwinding that balance sheet a few more years, but eventually the pile of trash will have to be dealt with. In the meantime, financial markets operate as if the ECB had actually cured the Eurozone debt market sicknesses and revitalized Eurozone banks, when in reality the shifting ownership of trash from one owner to another, with Germany the ultimate backer, has simply created an illusion of stability.

As a result of the most recent elections, German politics looks to be turning towards greater nationalism and growing unhappiness with the EMS, the ECB, the European Commission ambitious overreach, and even the weakness of the European Council.

Apparent weakening of Merkel’s grip on German politics suggests that the occasional financial rescue summits under Merkel and Schäuble leadership are unlikely to recur in future Eurozone crises. Nearing the end of 2017 Italy looks likely to be the ground zero for a financial earthquake that is likely to shake all of the Eurozone.

The European Union has turned a corner and is now likely to experience disintegration, at first slowly, but when financial markets become stressed, rapidly.

Like bankruptcy, a process of decay developing slowly, and then all at once.

Editor’s Note: In a recent article by Lisbeth Kirk published in the EUObserver on November 10, 2017, the reworking of a European approach seen from the perspective of Northern Europe was analyzed reinforcing much of Dr. Malmgren’s analysis in this article.

In Greek mythology, the hero Odysseus was sailing home from the Trojan War through the Strait of Messina (which separates Italy from Sicily) when he was beset by two monsters – Scylla and Charybdis – one on either side.

Odysseus had to figure out which was the lesser of the two evils as he passed through the strait to reach home.

The old trope came up again when Nordic countries recently met in Helsinki for their annual session.

Odysseus’ story can be used to describe how smaller countries are preparing to navigate between Germany and France in future, when Britain is no longer a member of the EU, one MP noted.

French president Emmanuel Macron laid out his vision for an overhaul of the EU in September.

His EU would include a more integrated eurozone with its own budget managed by a finance minister who would be held responsible by a eurozone parliament.

The European Commission would be reduced to 15 members and half the members of the European Parliament would be elected through trans-national lists already in 2019.

Macron kindly waited for the Germans to hold their national elections before presenting his big plan and he is still waiting for Berlin’s answer, because Germany is locked in ongoing coalition talks.

“There is a wide agreement between France and Germany when it comes to the proposals, although we must work on the details,” was the only comment from chancellor Angela Merkel so far.

Meanwhile, other EU countries are considering what the new European set-up might look like and how they fit in, when the UK leaves the bloc at 23:00 GMT on Friday 29 March 2019.

“I think we are going to see even more and closer UK-Nordic co-operation as a result of Brexit and I think that is also what the UK understands because we are very like each other. I mean, sharing lots of common values,” Swedish conservative MP and Nordic Council presidium member, Hans Wallmark told EUobserver in Helsinki.

“What we are probably going to see also is this new power between Merkel and Macron and we need to sail in between those Scylla and Charybdis,” he said.

“The UK has been a very close ally to all our countries, especially Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. It has been a natural partner. We have balanced the UK against Germany and we have been in the middle. With the UK out of the EU, we suddenly risk looking like the ‘extremists’ on issues like being pro-market economy, pro-free trade – the kind of things that the UK has promoted”, he added.

“We need to build new alliances and for us it would be natural to do that between Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, but also the Netherlands and hopefully Germany,” Wallmark said.

New leadership

The Nordic council has existed since 1952. Its assembly of 87 national parliamentarians meets annually. This year it met in the Finnish parliament.

Bertel Haarder, a Danish MP and Nordic council member, told this website that Europe needed leadership and that Merkel and Macron could not do it by themselves.

“I think they would both love it if Nordic countries and Benelux countries took a leading role,” he said.

“Brexit has left us in a Union with 27 countries where the Nordics as well as the Benelux countries may feel a bit more alone,” he said.

“We have a very good friend in Germany and may also get a very good friend in Emanuel Macron’s France, but you never know,” he added.

“Southern European countries of course have their own agenda and the Central and Eastern European countries have rising nationalism and more of those countries are not so easy to co-operate with anymore. So it is time for the Nordics hopefully together with the Baltics and the Benelux to take a leading role”, the MP said.

The three Baltic prime ministers, by tradition, already meet Nordic leaders for a summit during the Nordic council session. A representative of the Benelux parliament was also present at the event.

The Benelux Parliament was established in 1955 and is composed of MPs from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

Its seat rotates among the cities of Brussels, The Hague, and Luxembourg for two consecutive years at a time.

“We come together three times a year and more often in committee sessions to discuss our Benelux agenda,” said Andre Postema, a deputy who represents Labour in the Dutch senate and who is currently president of the Benelux parliament.

“There was always a balance of power between France and Germany, and Great Britain, which had a more transatlantic view. Now, that they are leaving, we will be missing a partner in that because that’s also the case for the Netherlands and for many Nordic countries – of course we are Europe-oriented, but we are also Atlantic oriented,” he said.

“With Brexit we lose a powerful partner … that’s a reason to join hands between the countries of the Nordic, the Baltic, and the Benelux,” he told the EUobserver in Helsinki.

“The German-French axis is quite determined now, quite powerful and it is not that their ideas are necessarily bad, but it is always good to have our voice also heard,” he said…..

Ireland’s prime minister met his Nordic and Baltic counterparts in the margins of the EU summit in Brussels in October.

The Nordic countries form together the world’s 11th largest economy and share many of the same values.

“The Nordic region is part of Europe. Nordic co-operation is also taking place in a European framework,” Norway’s conservative prime minister, Erna Solberg, said in a speech Helsinki.

“when Europe stands in a demanding recovery period, it is important to voice clear Nordic support for European cohesion and cooperation. We are seeing more and more people looking to the Nordic countries, as Britain withdraws from the EU,” she said.

“This provides opportunities. In climate and environment, we see that Nordic solutions become European solutions,” she added.

“We have something to give, when Europe is being tested,” she said…..

 

 

 

The Honorable Edward Timperlake

The Honorable Edward Timperlake is the former Director Technology Assessment, International Technology Security, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and served on the Board of The Vietnam Children’s fund a pro-bono project that has built 48 Elementary Schools in Vietnam.

Secretary Wynne, Ed Timperlake and Karen Roganov, then PAO of the 33rd FW During Our Visit to the Warlords September 2013. Credit: SLD

Previous positions include serving on the Professional Staff, House Committee on Rules focusing on illegal foreign campaign donations to the American political process.

As an Assistant Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, he was a member of The White House Desert Shield/Desert Storm Communications Task Force.

He created the “TASCFORM” analytical methodology for measuring the modernization rate of military aircraft world wide for both

The Director Net Assessment and Central Intelligence Agency, and was Principal Director Mobilization Planning and Requirements/OSD in President Reagan’s first term.

His Bachelor of Science is from the US Naval Academy, and  MBA from Cornell University.

He is a carrier qualified US Marine Fighter Pilot finishing his tour as Commanding Officer VMFA-321.

He co-authored the New York Times Best Seller, Year of the Rat, along with co-authoring  Red Dragon Rising and Showdown.

Most recently, he coauthored with Robbin Laird and Richard Weitz, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy.

Bringing the Future Forward: Accelerating U.S. and Allied Combat Power

11/15/2017

2017-11-10 By Robbin Laird

In a visit to Langley AFB on October 31, 2017, I had a chance to talk with Brigadier General Novotny, Deputy Director of Plans, Programs and Requirements at the Air Combat Command.

I first met “Blend’r” when visiting RAF Lakenheath where he was the CO of the Liberty Wing based in the UK.

During that conversation, then Col. Novotny provided a forward leaning look at how the USAF working with allies could transform crucial military capability going forward.

During my visit last year I discussed the impact of the synergy of the US and the allies standing up at the same time the new air combat force with then Col. Novotny, the 48th Fighter Wing Commander, and now General Novotny at the Air Combat Command.

“We are not flying alone; but joined at the hip. We will be flying exactly in the area of interest for which the plane was designed and can fly together, maintain together, and operate together leveraging the air and sea base for which the F-35 B will fly from as well. It is a unique and strategic opportunity for the USAF and for the nations.”

General Novotny added that the two bases joined at the hip can provide a key strategic impact as well.

“As we get this right, we can bring in the Danes, the Norwegians and Dutch who are close in geography and the Israelis and Italians as well to shape the evolving joint operational culture and approach. Before you know it, you’ve got eight countries flying this airplane seamlessly integrated because of the work that Lakenheath and Marham are doing in the 20 nautical miles radius of the two bases.”

The RAF, the RAAF, the USAF and the USMC are already learning how to integrate the F-35 into the air combat force at Red Flags, and recently have included the French Air Force in a Langley trilateral training exercise. But integration will be accelerated by the integration of normal operations from common bases throughout the European region as well.

As Novotny put it: “Doing Red Flags requires bring forces to Nellis and expending monies to come to the exercise, clearly an important task notably in learning to fly together in high intensity warfare exercises. But what can be shape from the RAF Marham and Lakenheath bases is frequency of operations with core allies flying the same aircraft.”

“The same aircraft point can be missed because the UK did not fly F-16s, the Norwegian, the Danes and the Dutch do. And the USAF does not fly Typhoons and Tornados; the UK does. Now they will ALL fly the same aircraft.”

“I did two OT assignments and we worked to get into Red Flag when we could to do joint training. Here we can do that virtually every day. We reach the Dutch training airspace, and can work with the Dutch, with the Brits, with the Germans, with Typhoons, with F3s, with the NATO AWACS. We take off and we fly 30 minutes to the east and we make it happen. It is Red Flag as regular menu; rather than scheduling a gourmet meal from time to time.”

https://sldinfo.com/synergy-and-building-out-extended-nato-defense/

Given his ability to think forward, it is not surprising to find him doing just that at ACC.

We started our conversation by focusing on a key them, which the Second Line of Defense team is highlighting going into next year, namely, the challenge of shifting from slo mo to high intensity operations.

And the Williams Foundation in Australia will be hosting two seminars on this challenge as well.

As we have put the question: How will the US and the allies make the shift towards high-intensity warfare, and to take the force we have and make it more high intensity combat ready and ensure that modernization going ahead enhances the capability to engage in and win high intensity conflict?

http://www.sldforum.com

As General Novotny underscored, the ACC Commander is clearly focused on this challenge and discusses the significance of bringing the future forward much more rapidly in terms of force transformation.

“General Holmes highlights that global adversaries are clearly modernizing and recapitalizing their forces and that we must get better at setting the bar and get in front of the modernization curve.

“If we continue to modernize, and we try to buy software the way we buy hardware, we’re going to be behind the power curve.”

https://sldinfo.com/software-upgradeability-and-combat-dominance-general-ellen-pawlikowski-looks-at-the-challenge/

Novotny added: “Secretary Mattis came out with some new national defense strategy guidelines that told everybody to focus on the high-end portion of the fight and to do the low-end fight economically.

“We’re using that as our go to guide.”

The normal perception of ACC and how it thinks about requirements revolves around fighter aircraft. How to modernize and what comes next?

But it is clear from talking with General Novotny, that this is clearly the wrong way to think about how ACC is thinking today.

The focus is upon airpower within the overall combat modernization effort.

One way to look at this broader effort is to consider the warfighting dossiers which the ACC deals with.

“General Holmes has five core function portfolios that he husbands for the United States Air Force: air superiority, global precision attack, command-and-control, a globally integrated ISR portfolio, and the last is personnel recovery.

“The challenge is to accelerate our combat power.

“For General Holmes, what can be delivered in the next five to seven years is a crucial driver of change.

“And getting on top of the software upgradeability cycle is a key part of the challenge, which needs to be met.

“For example, with regard to the F35, the mission data file system is so expansive, we’ve got to be able to rapidly reprogram, because the reality is, the mission data file we take to war will need to evolve within the context of the fight itself.

“Ultimately you would like it to be an interactive learning system.

“Which, to us, is where we would like to go with the advanced battle management surveillance system.”

The Waze Analogy

The way Novotny then characterize a way to think about ABMS and more generally about shaping an interactive and evolving force is an analogy to the WAZE software system.

Waze is really a common operating environment that is only good if people put information into it. It’s completely agnostic to your platform. It doesn’t care if you have a Samsung galaxy, or an iPhone, or a Google phone, it doesn’t care. It doesn’t care about your data connection. It doesn’t care if you’re on Verizon, or AT&T, it didn’t care if you’re on Wi-Fi or cellphone, 4G or LT.

“All that matters is that you participate in the network. As you participate in the network, it becomes greater fidelity, and allows you to make decisions, and sometimes Waze makes decisions for you as far as plotting your route of travel.

“It identifies threats, okay that road’s closed, there is a police officer there, there’s a car accident, and it will reroute you. It will allow you to push data in. It also pulls data from you. Not only does it have your overall geolocation and speed, but it will actually interact with you as the user, and it will say, “Hey, I’m sensing you’re slowing down, are you in traffic?” It will say, “Hey, you’re slowing down, that usually means you might be in traffic. Are you in traffic?” You go, “Yes, I am in traffic.”

“Immediately the road turns yellow, or orange, or red, and it will begin to reroute.

“For us, the advanced battle management system in the future is very similar to Waze. Every single platform is a sensor agnostic.

“I don’t care if it’s a frigate radar, I don’t care if it’s a submarine, I don’t care if it’s overhead, I don’t care if it’s F35, I don’t care if it’s fourth-generation, I don’t care if it’s Army MLRS sensor. I don’t care if it’s commercial. We have ATT radars, we have DirecTV making transmissions, we have weather radars.

“A Common Operating Picture is generated which then can be leveraged as the task demands.”

“And in a system where every platform is a sensor, then when a force package is tasked to do a mission, other users can leverage data generated by the force package participants in the system to do their missions as well.

“The system will recognize that there is data missing on a potential target. Based on idle time, let’s say a sniper pod out a strike Eagle, as the pilot’s flying to the tanker, the sniper pod is usually in idle status, it’s not doing anything, but now in advanced battle management system says, “Hey, you have an opportunity, based on your location, and what I know about your system, and the fact that I can communicate, that you can potentially surveil that target.”

“It just commands the sniper pod to go take a look at it.”

Advanced Battle Management Evolution

“Increment one of Advanced Battle Management is taking current systems, or systems under development, or current things we’re working on, and make sure that they able to talk to each other.

“The task here is refining some incremental development in their capabilities to what they can provide to the network.

“Increment two would be fusing the whole thing together and that fusion goo can be leveraged by a force package tasked to do a mission.

“Increment three would leverage the earlier increments and shape a capability to leverage data from platforms engaged in a mission to deliver data useful for other mission.

“If your systems can provide some data to the overall architecture, it would be possible actually to command your radar to go over and take a SAR map, even though you’re not using it.

“I’m driving 200 miles to my push point, so I have 200 miles of semi idle time for my systems, whether that’s my DAS, or or my radar on an F35 for example and that data could then be leveraged for other missions or other players in shaping missions.

“The advanced battle management system can then build an evolving mission data library and that data can be leveraged for future tasks and missions.”

“To get there, clearly there is a need to drive software innovation more rapidly and to reshape the requirements process to facilitate rather than to impede to evolution of software upgradeable platforms and their ability to work together in an interactive combat space.

Currently, the JCIDS or the Joint Combat Integrated Development System is an impediment to getting the software innovation job done understood in the 21st combat context.

“It was built to design battleships or for platforms which are relatively static over a significant period of time.

“It is not designed to provide for the software transient advantage needed to deal with today’s and tomorrow’s high tempo and high intensity operations.”

One solution would be to fund on a three year basis the software development of key platforms and to let the warfighters and software code writers evolve their capabilities within the budget and the results could then be briefed to Congress.

But clearly, the business rules need to change to allow for interactive software upgradeability to be facilitated.

As I wrote earlier with regard to changing the business rules to enhance the capabilities for airpower integrated battlespace 21:

With the cross learning among the combat forces as they shape more effective integrated combat forces to prevail in a contested environment, the business rules need to change to adapt platforms more rapidly to evolving combat requirements.

The force will be built around core multi-mission platforms, which are software upgradeable.

The challenge will be to ensure that those platforms are more rapidly upgraded and modernized.

The answer is large part to shape business rules that allow the combat users to work directly with the software code writers to provide for what the RAAF refers to as gaining software transient advantage.

The legacy requirements setting process in DoD needs to be replaced by a new set of business rules which allow for such cross development and modernization. 

Put bluntly, DoD is not in the software age even though several of their cutting edge platforms are.

Let me be even more blunt: our own business rules guarantee that we will not take full advantage of the software upgradeable platforms we are ALREADY buying.

https://sldinfo.com/changing-the-business-rules-enhancing-the-capabilities-for-airpower-ib-21/

Clearly, the nature of the modernization enterprise needs to be recrafted to ensure that the future can be brought forward in the way General Holmes envisages.

Editors’ Note: The slideshow above highlights Col. Novotny’s last flight as the Liberty Wing Commander.

The Coming of the CH-53K: A Test Pilot’s Perspective

11/13/2017

2017-11-10 By Robbin Laird

The transformation of Marine Corps aviation and with innovations in terms of the ability of the Marines to operate at greater distance, speed and more effectively in distributed operations began with the Osprey.

The F-35B is now being added to the force and it provides, sensing, C2 and strike capability for a distributed force.

Coming next is the CH-53K, which is no more of a replacement for the CH-53E than the Osprey replaced the CH-46 or the F-35B is replacing Harriers and Hornets.

And next up will be a new vertical life class four UAV, which will further enhance the ability to support the Marines at sea and at shore in the distributed battlespace.

CH-53K in flight. Credit: Sikorsky.

And the K is arriving as the Marines are transitioning the MAGTF with a wide-ranging emphasis on digital interoperability.

The most recent Weapons Training and Tactics course at the Marine’s cutting edge Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One was the first WTI where digital interoperability was tested in every aspect of the training.

https://sldinfo.com/evolving-the-capabilities-of-the-magtf-the-case-study-of-the-f-35-and-himars/

The K unlike the E is a digital aircraft.

It is coming as the software upgradeable F-35B is shaping a rethinking process about what digital capabilities built into a modernization process might mean for the evolution of the force as well.

Recently, I visited the Sikorsky West Palm Beach facility to get an overview on the K as it moves on to its next and final phase before entering the combat force.

While there I had a chance to look at the manufacturing process, the maintenance approach built into the aircraft, the digital nature of the aircraft and its impact on the operational capability of the aircraft as well.

https://sldinfo.com/software-upgradeability-and-combat-dominance-general-ellen-pawlikowski-looks-at-the-challenge/

In later pieces, I will focus on the various aspects of change, which the aircraft embodies and discuss ways in which the aircraft both draws upon the digital transformation of the MAGTF as well as enables its further evolution as well.

I discussed the K and its operational performance with two senior test pilots, each of whom emphasized complimentary but different aspects of what the K brought to the fight.

My first pilot interview was with Chief Experimental Test Pilot Stephen McCulley who now works for Sikorsky but is a former Marine with extensive CH-53E experience.

In our discussion, he highlighted the significance of the shift to a digital aircraft in terms of safety, reliability and performance in the hands of the crew.

The significant changes in how it performs versus the mechanical CH-53E underscores that the shift in aircraft is generational and not simply a final letter change.

During various visits to F-35 bases, the P-8 and Triton base at Jax Navy, and most recently to the Cyclone base in Nova Scotia, the new digital systems which characterize the brains of the new aircraft yield a major change in the workflow onboard the aircraft as well as provide foundations for significant advancements in how systems can work more effectively with one another as the force evolves and gains combat experience.

We are talking about an across the board generational shift which is central to ensuring that U.S. forces can fight and prevail in the distributed battlespace which the U.S. military is transitioning to for the high intensity fight associated with anti-access and area denial environments.

It is clear that the CH-53K is a key part of the generational shift.

We started by discussing the cockpit and the fly-by-wire system, which provides the computational brains for the K.

“We built the CH-53K with a focus on reducing pilot workload. By making the helicopter easier to fly we allow the crew to focus on executing the mission.

“The cockpit has five displays all of which can be used to display flight and mission data.

“This provides both redundancy and flexibility in executing missions and drives the crew’s situational awareness up.

“Missions can be planned at a ground based planning station and uploaded to the helicopter at the start of the mission.

“Routes, communication plans, troop and cargo weights can all be loaded through a data card – we used to have to type all of this into the aircraft manually.

“The aircraft can use this data to calculate my power requirements throughout the mission.”

Obviously, this provides for a much safer situation for the crew and the ground landing handlers as accuracy and time to offload is reduced.

This enhances as well the critical time factor in delivering to mission which is so central as the US military shifts from slo-mo to higher intensity and higher tempo operations.

McCulley contrasted his experience in the E with what he is seeing with regard to the K.

“In the E, the pilot and co-pilot are focused on flying the aircraft, doing fuel calculations (using a calculator) and landing in areas where I actually can not see the ground. Navigation used to be the hardest thing we had to do next to dusty landings.

“In the K, the automated systems take care of much of this.

“The helicopter can couple to the flight plan allowing it to essentially fly itself to the destination and once we arrive, it can fly the approach down to a hover at a point I specified during planning. ”

“The 53K provides a position hold capability that allows us to hover in DVE (degraded visual environments) – a significant improvement from the CH-53E which relied on the pilot to hold position based on visual reference with the ground.

“This capability will greatly improve safety when operating in dust or snow and at night.”

We then turned to a discussion of how the K might then fit into the digital interoperability transformation of the Marines.

He emphasized that because the K is built on a digital bus and is software upgradeable the systems onboard can migrate through a built in modernization process, so to speak and provides a foundation for working the digital networking which the other new systems were enabling as well.

“The mission of the 53K is to provide heavy lift in the battlespace.

“To that end we have focused on increasing the aircraft’s lifting capacity as well as improving the external load system.

“We now have a triple-hook system that allows us to support multiple sites, which will allow us to better support troops on the ground.

In other words, “I could drop a load, I could drop ammunition, I could drop fuel, and I could just keep going to distribute those loads with this cargo system.

“And it’s real-time, and improves the crew safety because I have a center-of-gravity real-time cargo-load calculating system.”

To repeat: the shift from the E to the K is not simply a shift in the last letter; it is a shift in generations and not just for the aircraft but for the combat force.

Editor’s Note: The photos in the slideshow start with highlighting Chief Experimental Test Pilot Stephen McCulley with the aircraft and the remainder of the photos highlight the CH-53K fleet involved in the test process and are credited to Lockheed Martin. 

First Cameri Produced F-35B Takes Initial Flight

11/12/2017

2017-11-12 An important aspect of the F-35 final assembly facility in Fort Worth is the capability to produce three variants of the aircraft on the same assembly line.

Now that capability has been demonstrated off of the Italian line as the first F-35B built outside of the United States came off the Cameri line in May 2017.

That aircraft took its maiden flight late last month as well and will fly to Pax River in the United States early next year to conduct required Electromagnetic Environmental Effects certification.

Italy’s first F-35B Lightning II, a Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant assembled at the Final Assembly and Check Out (FACO) facility and known as BL-1, flew and hovered here for the first time today.

Lockheed Martin F-35 test pilot Paul “Hat” Hattendorf, flew BL-1’s first flight on Oct. 25. On Oct.30, during the third and final acceptance flight, Hattendorf successfully operated the jet in all STOVL modes, to include hovering over the runway

To date, eight F-35As have been delivered from the Cameri FACO; four of those jets are now based at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, for international pilot training and four are at Amendola Air Base, near Foggia on the Adriatic coast.

After delivery to the MOD later this year, an Italian pilot is programmed to fly Italy’s first F-35B jet to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, early in 2018 to conduct required Electromagnetic Environmental Effects certification.

On Sept. 7, 2015, the first Italian-produced F-35 built at the Cameri FACO made the first international flight in F-35 program history, and in February 2016, the very same aircraft was flown by an Italian Air Force pilot to the United States, making the F-35 Program’s first-ever trans-Atlantic crossing. In December 2016, the Italian Air Force’s first F-35As arrived at the first in-country base, Amendola Air Base.

In an interview with the then chief of the Italian Air Force, Lt. General Preziosa , the head of the IAF explained his thinking about the F-35B and how it fit into 21st century concepts of operations.

“We studied the issue carefully and for the kind of missions we face we needed the flexibility which the B can add to the fleet.

“We need to go to the mission not the airfield.

“We will operate in many areas where there are only short runways; the B allows us to operate in those conditions.

“We can mix the fleet and operate at sea on land, on our own ships or own others.

“It is the kind of flexibility, which we see as crucial to a 21st century setting.

“I will give you an example of what we don’t want.  We planned to operate with the USMC in Afghanistan.  But we were three months later in the deployment than we intended because our Tornados could not operate in the same conditions as the USMC.  We had to take three months to build out the air base from which we would operate with them.

“Time is crucial to many of the missions in which we will be engaged.

“The Bs give me a more rapid insertion aircraft.”

Another Italian First: The First F-35B Built Abroad

 

 

Shaping a More Effective Deterrent Capability: NATO Modernizes Its Command Structure:

11/11/2017

2017-11-11 At the recent NATO Defense Ministers meeting held on November 8, 2017 in Brussels, the Ministers decided to modernize the NATO command structure.

As a story published on November 8, 2017 by Radio Free Europe noted:

NATO defense ministers have endorsed a plan to establish two new military headquarters designed to improve the movement of troops across the Atlantic and within Europe, as the alliance looks to counter the growing threat from Russia.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg made the announcement on November 8, the day before an expected decision to boost NATO’s mission in Afghanistan by some 3,000 troops.

Speaking after the ministers’ first day of meetings during the November 8-9 gathering in Brussels, Stoltenberg provided initial details on the two new commands, although he said military commanders would “flesh out the details” and present them to defense ministers in February 2018.

It is the first time the 29-member alliance is expanding its command structure since the end of the Cold War, when 22,000 personnel were working at 33 commands. Numbers have been slashed since to fewer than 7,000 people and seven commands.

In recent years, Russia’s military actions in Ukraine have increased concerns about Moscow’s intentions in NATO nations, particularly former Soviet republics or Warsaw Pact satellites of the Soviet Union.

Russia occupied and seized Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula in March 2014 and backs separatists whose war against Kyiv’s forces has killed more than 10,000 people in eastern Ukraine since April of that year.

A series of potentially dangerous close encounters between Russian and NATO warplanes and navy ships in recent months has added to the tension, with the alliance accusing Moscow of aggressive maneuvers in the air and at sea.

Those actions have prompted NATO to step up its defenses in the east, deploying four multinational battle groups in the three Baltic states and Poland — totaling approximately 4,500 troops.

One of the planned new NATO command centers will be tasked with ensuring that “sea lines of communication” between North America and Europe “remain free and secure,” Stoltenberg said.

The other command will “improve the movement of military forces across Europe” and strengthen logistical functions across NATO.

https://www.rferl.org/a/nato-defense-ministers-afghanistan-command-structure-stoltenberg/28842517.html

In his speech to the Ministers, The Sec Gen of NATO had this to say about the change:

We took further decisions to continue NATO’s adaptation to the challenges we face.

A key component of our adaptation is a robust and agile command structure.  This underpins both our strengthened deterrence and defence posture and our ability to project stability beyond NATO’s borders.

At the Warsaw Summit last year, we decided to launch an assessment of the NATO command structure in light of the changed security environment. To ensure it can do the job across the full spectrum of Alliance missions. Today, we agreed on the outline design for an adapted NATO Command Structure, which will be the basis for further work.

Let me mention some key elements.

A Command for the Atlantic, to ensure that sea lines of communication between Europe and North America remain free and secure. This is vital for our transatlantic Alliance.

A new Command to improve the movement of military forces across Europe. And ways to strengthen the logistical function across the NATO Command Structure. Our military commanders will now flesh out the details. And the results of their work will be presented to Defence Ministers next February.            

The adaptation of the NATO Command Structure will further strengthen our ability to reinforce Allies quickly and effectively. But military mobility is not only about new commands. It’s also about the ability to move forces and equipment quickly, with the right transport means and the right infrastructure. Since 2014, we have made good progress in improving national legislation. Removing many bureaucratic hurdles to allow us to move forces across Allied territory. But much more needs to be done. We need to ensure that national legislation facilitating border crossing is fully implemented. We need enough transport capacity at our disposal, which largely comes from the private sector. And we need to improve infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, railways, runways and ports. So NATO is now updating the military requirements for civilian infrastructure. 

Of course, military mobility is not just about the military. It requires a whole-of-government approach. So it’s important that our defence ministers make our interior, finance and transport ministers aware of military requirements.  

It’s also important that NATO coordinates with the European Union and we are indeed working closely and actively together on this issue. For instance, we share information on standards, requirements, as well as challenges related to civilian infrastructure. So I envisage that military mobility could become a real flagship of NATO-EU cooperation.

Finally, we discussed ways to strengthen our cyber defences. We must be just as effective in the cyber domain as we are on land, at sea and in the air, with real-time understanding of the threats we face and the ability to respond however and whenever we choose. Today, ministers agreed on the creation of a new Cyber Operations Centre as part of the outline design for the adapted NATO Command Structure.

This will strengthen our cyber defences, and help integrate cyber into NATO planning and operations at all levels. We also agreed that we will be able to integrate Allies’ national cyber capabilities into NATO missions and operations.

While nations maintain full ownership of those capabilities.

Just as Allies own the tanks, the ships and aircraft in NATO missions.

 

 

The Catalan Crisis and Its European Context

11/10/2017

2017-11-01 By Kenneth Maxwell

The declaration of an independent Catalan Republic by the president of the Catalan parliament, Carles Puigdemont, on Friday 27 October, was immediately followed by the imposition of direct rule by Madrid.

The Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, following the vote in the Spanish Senate to invoke article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, sacked the Catalan government, and placed himself and his ministers in charge.

This has plunged Spain into its deepest political crisis since the end of the Franco dictatorship, and for EU, its most challenging dilemma since the vote for Brexit in the UK.

Britain wants to leave the EU.

The independent “Catalan Republic” wants to remain within the EU.

But the EU is already making the exit of the UK as difficult as possible.

And the governments of all the nations within the EU, including the UK, are opposed to Catalan aspirations for independence from Spain.

France in particular has led the way in this opposition.

Carles Puigdemont making a statement in Barcelona last week.

As well it might. Catalonia, after all, once incorporated cross-frontier areas of southern France. The Basques, where violent armed opposition to Spanish rule by ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty), dating from the Franco period (and at the cost of 800 deaths), has only recently been mitigated, also live in a territory which historically covered cross-border regions of both Spain and France.

The repercussions of events in Barcelona is already rippling through the EU.

Scottish nationalists (who want to remain within the EU), have not given up on their aspirations to see an independent Scotland, and they have been following developments in Catalonia with more than a passing interest. Meanwhile Northern Ireland (which also wants to remain in the EU) is still without a functioning devolved administration, given the continuing impasse between the Irish nationalists (Sin fein) and the Ulster Unionists (DUP), as well as uncertainty over the Brexit negotiations in Brussels, and the future land border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic.

The “Northern League” in Italy has recently fortified demands for much greater autonomy from Rome.

Even the recent elections in Germany have dramatically revived the resilient differences between the political outlook of the territories of the former “west” and “east” Germany, with the rise of the far-right, and its representation in the Budestag for the first time since the ending of Nazi rule in 1945.

In Belgium the Wallons are restive.

Carles Puigdemont, while everyone thought he was in his home town of Girona (where he had been mayor), and while Girona was beating Real Madrid in the soccer stadium in town, was in fact crossing the border into France on Sunday 29th October, and then caught a flight from Marseilles to Brussels.

In Belgium he has been offered “asylum” by Theo Francken, the Belgium secretary of state for immigration. Mr Francken is a member of ther Flemish nationalist party.

He said that Mr Puigdemont and other Catalan officials who felt they were “threatened by the Spanish authorities. could apply for asylum in Belgium.”

The Peoples Party (PP) in Spain were outraged, declaring that this was an “unacceptable attitude.” Mr Puigdemont and five of his ministers appeared at a chaotic press conference at the Brussels press club, in what he called the “capital of Europe,” where he again said he was seeking dialogue and guarantees which Spain, he said, has consistently rejected. He is not he said seeking asylum.

Ironically, while the EU emphasizes it is moving towards a “post-national” future, it is also clear that  “national” identities still matter.

The Brexit vote, the resurgence of nationalist parties in France, the Netherlands, and Poland, all suggest that “federalist” agenda for “more Europe” promoted by Mr Jean Claude Juncker (and by President Macron) needs to be treated with some caution.

Puigdemont said he wanted to avoid a “traumatic split” from Spain and appealed to the EU to help mediate with Madrid.

But the EU in Brussels is poorly equipped to play a mediating role between Barcelona and Madrid.       .

Mariano Rajoy has appointed the deputy prime minister of Spain, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, to administer Catalonia (she has been the long time point person in the Spanish government for Catalonia), and he has called elections in Catalonia on December 21.

It is not clear yet if Puigdemont and other pro-independence coalition leaders of the deposed Catalan government, will be able, or will be permitted, to compete. Prosecutors in Madrid have filed charges of “rebellion, sedition and embezzlement” against Puigdemont that carry a penalty of 30 years.

They have been summoned to court in Madrid. But it is highly unlikely that any will respond.

Certainly not Mr Puigdemont and the five deposed minister who are in Brussels.

The Spanish Constitutional Court is expected to rule that the Catalan declaration of independence by the Catalan assembly was illegal.

All 70 MPs who voted for it potentially face arrest, as do the Catalan civil servants and police officers who reject direct rule.

Calling new elections in Catalonia is gamble for Rojoy.

The day that Catalonia voted in their controversial independence referendum on October 1st was marked by violence.

The Spanish national police and the Spanish Guardia Civil, which had been deployed from ships in the harbor, attempted to prevent citizens from voting by heavy handed actions, removing ballot boxes, and physically assaulting citizens at polling stations.

These clumsy actions were widely televised and shared over social media and led to international condemnation.

But although of the 2.26 million votes cast, 2.02 million were in favor of independence, this represented less than 40% of the Catalan electorate.

In fact the numbers voting for independence has been broadly stable since 2014 when 80% voted for independence but with only a 40% participation.. .

It is this presumed pro-union “silent majority” that Rajoy is counting on in December.

But although some 3.5 million Catalans are assumed to form a “silent majority,” unity among them is hard to find, other than in rejecting secession.

Many have nothing in common with the Partido Popular of Mariano Rojoy.

They see the current Spanish government as never having addressed Catalan concerns, or providing for a new system of regional funding, or of being open to an overhaul of the Spanish Constitution to recognize Spain’s “pluri-national reality.”

Other opponents of independence include radical leftists opposed to Catalan nationalists as much as Spanish nationalists.

Pro-union forces are also presumed to include business leaders worried about the stability of the Catalan economy, and the two major Catalan banks (Banco de Sabadell and CaixaBank).

Some Catalan companies have already moved their headquarters to Madrid or to other regions of Spain.

As well a the large group of people in Catalonia feel themselves Spanish and not Catalan, or are comfortable with dual identities.

These opponents of independence turned out by the tens of thousands in a massive flag waving pro-Spanish demonstration in Barcelona on Sunday 29th October.

But the intervention of King Felipe VI on October 24th  did not help matters.

His criticism of the Catalan separatists made a compomise even less likely.  The King’s father, Juan Carlos, who abdicated in 2014, had famously intervened on television at the time of the 1981 military coup attempt against Spain’s new post-Franco democracy.

But even the mayor of Barcelona . Ada Colau, who is not pro-independence, called King Felipe VI’s  intervention an “irresponsible and unworthy speech of a head of state” for not mentioning the hundreds of  ordinary citizens hurt by the Spanish national police as they tried to cast their votes.

Though King Felipe’s speech did rally the national political parties in Madrid, the PP, the opposition socialists (PSOE), and the liberal Ciudadanos party, to support the evocation of Article 155.

But the declaration of a “Catalan Republic” by Carles Puigdemont was not accidental.

He had refused to pledge loyalty to the Spanish Constitution when he was inaugurated as premier of Catalonia, and the portrait of King Felipe on the chamber wall was veiled.

The supporters of Catalan independence are also a coalition.

The Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP)  holds ten seats in the regional parliament and without their support Carles Puigdemont has no majority.

It is a far-left  separatist party whose spokewomen is Anna Gabriel. The mainstream politicians began the call for secession a decade ago, but now the  focus has moved to mobilization not negotiation, with power shifting to the streets and to pro-independence movements like the Catalan National Assembly (ANC) led by Jordi Sanchez which has branches in every part of the region, and is the principal grassroots movement for secession, and the Omnium Cultural, led by Jordi Cuixart, a veteran activist for Catalan culture and language, both are collectives of local groups rather than a traditional political party. The Republcian Left and the PdeC which form the Catalan government many believe has ceeded the agenda to groups like the ANC, Omnium and the CUP.

There are also deeper factors at work here which are evident as well throughout Europe as a whole. 

Barcelona is very much a part of a new conflict between an internationalized and cosmopolitan city, much like London, and the hinterland.

Catalonia is one of  most developed regions of Spain, comprising almost 20 per cent of Spain’s GDP. (Catalonia’s economy larger than Portugal for instance.) Catalonia and Barcelona, moreover, attract millions of foreign tourists each year.

Barcelona is very much a part of the cosmopolitan new world order, which has developed since the emergence of European Buget Airlines and mass package tourism in the 1980s, which Spain in general, and Catalonia in particular, has benefited, especially after the Olympic Games were held in Barcelona in 1992.

Barcelona with a population of 1.6 million out of a Catalan population of 5 million and contributes 31% of Catalonia’s GDP, and has become a tourist mecca.

Its international airport saw 51 million air passengers in 2014.

It has a sophisticated port, trade fair facilities, a zona franca free trade zone, and ranks 34th in a listing of 123 global cities.

It is in many respects as divided from its immediate hinterland as is London.

Spain has also only recently emerged from the deep post-2008 recession and banking crisis.

The political consequences have been the rise of the Popular Party (PP) led by Mariano Rojoy to power. replacing the social democratic (PSOE) government of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero in 2011.  Rojoy is a dour Galician who finds compromise difficult..

The conflict between Catalan nationalism and Iberian centralism is a very old one, but it has revived in recent years.

Catalonia, in fact, already enjoys a great deal of autonomy, and since 1980 the Catalan police force (the Mossos d’Esquadra.) has been under the command of the Generalitat (the Catalan government), and was expanded in 1994 to 17,000 to replace the Civil Guard and the National Police Corps. Jodi Pujol who founded the Catalan Nationalist Party (CiU) ruled from 1980 until 2003 was a leader of a “Europeanist” regime.

But in 2006 Madrid’s reaction to a new generation of  Catalan leaders allowed a dispute which began over fiscal affairs to escalate into a constitutional crisis.

Under leader Artur Mas of the CiU, the Catalan electorate supported a new “statute of autonomy” which called Catalonia a “nation” and sought greater control over Catalan finances.

This was approved by the Spanish parliament in Madrid, but the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal after 4 years of deliberation, ruled against the statute’s main components.

The central government’s position hardened when Rojoy became prime minister and the PP successfully urged the constitutional court to annul or reinterpret parts of the statute ensuring that  Catalonia was not recognized as a nation within Spain and the Catalan language was not given precedence over Castilian.

In Catalonia in the meanwhile the nationalists had coalesced in 2015 behind a Junts pel Si (Together for Yes), and emerged triumphant in the 2015 regional elections, and Carles Puigdemont became premier.

But Mariano Rajoy and his minority PP government bear a large part of the blame for the escalation of the crisis. The use of the national police to disrupt the Catalan referendum was ill-judged to say the least.

And in particular for Spain’s central authorities and Mr Rojoy’s conservative Popular Party to torpedo the revised statute of autonomy agreed in 2006. and in wasting opportunites after 2011 to make a fresh start.

Support for Catalan independence grew as the financial crisis gripped the country and corruption scandals tainted the established political parties in Madrid and Barcelona.

Rajoy stands on solid technical legal constitutional grounds in resisting Catalan separatism to be sure.

But the great challenge for Spain and for Catalonia now requires political initiative, flexibility, and compromise, which Rojoy has so far not demonstrated.

And it does not help when Pablo Casado, the spokesman for the PP, said at a press conference on the 9th October, that Mr Puigdemont could “end up” like former Catalan leader, Lluis Companys, who declared Catalan independence 1934, and who was shot by the Franco regime firing squad in Barcelona in 1940 after the end of the Spanish Civil War.

Catalonia had played a decisive role in that bloody conflict and Catalonia was where Generalissimo Francisco Franco imposed a bitter, brutal, and repressive and dictatorial, and unforgiving system of government, which outlawed the Catalan language and culture, and which is far from forgotten in Barcelona, even if it is apparently forgotten by Mr Rajoy and the PP in Madrid.

So far the demonstrations and counter demonstrations in Barcelona have been largely peaceful.

But it will take great patience, as well as compromise on both sides, to find a mutually acceptable and peaceful solution.

Something both sides currently seem unable or unwilling to do.

Putting the Niger Ambush Into Perspective

2017-11-06 by Murielle Delaporte

The Niger Ambush puts the fight against Islamic terrorists into perspective.

During an ambush, in early October in Niger, American and Nigerian soldiers encountered terrorist fighters who caused the deaths of nine of the counter-terrorist forces.

It is also a reminder that fighting global terrorism requires working together in spite of our differences; divided indeed we shall fail.

But instead of a Ben Franklin, moment some news stories simply choose to support the efforts of the terrorists to divide us.

For example, on November 4th, Breitbart News (echoing) an article published by the Guardian that same day, claiming that the pilots of “French warplanes sent from neighboring Mali to engage the enemy (…) refused to attack due to poor weather, rough terrain and an ability to differentiate friend from foe.”[ref]https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/04/special-forces-unit-ambushed-in-niger-desperately-called-for-help-sources-say ; http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2017/11/04/guardian-american-troops-fought-ambush-alone-allies-fled/[/ref]

That kind of statement is not only wrong in its formulation, it is certainly not helping at a time when the “fog of war” against Islamic Terror Groups is already dense or thick enough.

It is clear that a strong Coalition is needed to keep up the fighting in areas where terrorists are pouring in following the debacle of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Preparing the armament for the Mirage 2000 for the Mali operation, January 9, 2013, at the airbase in N’Djamena, Chad. Credit: French Ministry of Defense.

A debacle by the way made possible because of the strength of an ad hoc coalition, which succeeded in spite of incredible political divergences to implement a successful military strategy leading to the genuine and symbolic falls of Mosul and more recently Raqqa.

Winning these battles against terror has been possible because of a joint and united approach (even if temporarily) in the region.

The war against terror unfortunately goes on, and, as a result of those victories, with even more vigor in other parts of the world and especially the Sahel area.

According to a recent United Nations report, the number of attacks in that part of the world has increased by more than 100% between June and September of this year, while in October both Niger and Mali, and their border where the ambush occurred, have been the theater of increasing recruiting and violence by Al Qaida-linked Jihadists)(part of  “Jamaat Nosrat al-Islam wal-Mouslimin.”)[ref] http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/04/selon-lonu-17-militaires-francais-ont-ete-blesses-au-mali-au-cours-des-trois-derniers-mois.[/ref]

What has been characterizing this region for centuries is complex marble cake of multiple infighting, battles and trafficking which are constantly going on.

The current enemy – or more to the point, the enemies – have no border, are polymorphic, are always on the move and constantly adapt.[ref]See for instance General Brethous interview in >>> http://www.sldmag.com/fr/archives/issue/23/operationnels-slds-33-34-printemps-2017[/ref]

This observation has led to the way both US and French military forces have been operating in a theater, which other characteristics are its size and roughness.

Following the death of U.S. Green Berets in Niger, the political debate in Washington shifted once again about the War Powers Act and the need for an “africanization” of the fight against terrorism.

But this is exactly what has been going on in the past years with efforts to train and equip African partner nations and conduct trans-border mixed patrols.

Indeed, it is interesting to note that the ambush just took place when the armed force of the G5 countries – i.e. the five African countries involved in the fight against terrorists in Sahel (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad) under a 2014 French initiative and military support via Barkhane Operation[ref]See for instance >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barkhane[/ref]- had been preparing their very first joint military operation called Haw Bi[ref] http://www.opex360.com/2017/11/02/la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-lance-sa-premiere-operation-anti-jihadiste/[/ref] and when Washington was taking a decision whether or not to fund the G5 initiative.

So much for that calculation, if true, since Haw Bi did take place at the end of October and the Trump administration just decided to add some 60 million dollars to match the European Union and French financial support.[ref]See for instance >> https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/deaths-of-four-us-soldiers-in-niger-hint-at-the-shadow-war-against-isis-in-africa/2017/11/03/abfd2d2f-be00-4d50-a4e8-b8b5f1151bf4_story.html?utm_term=.8c188c012357 ; http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/30/les-etats-unis-vont-financer-la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-hauteur-de-60-millions-de-dollars/[/ref]

As for trying, through a false debate, to decouple the action of the two mains allies in a Coalition in which the Spanish and the German armed forces also participate, facts speak for themselves.

The truth is the truth.

Franco-American cooperation has been very successful over the past years, with the U.S. supporting the French forces in terms of ISR and logistics and the French maintaining a 3ooo to 4,000 men presence ever since 2014, while suffering casualties on a regular basis.

In the case of the October 4th ambush specifically and the question of French close air support, General Mattis himself rebuked any hint of criticism stressing that French jets were on site within thirty minutes of the call for help initiated from the ground.

And Colonel Patrick Steiger, spokesman for the Chief of Staff of the French armed forces, explained that the reason the Mirage 2000 only did a “show of force” and did not shoot was because of the imbrication of the fighters.

When you cannot distinguish between friends and foes, it is better to abstain from killing them all, isn’ it?

Military rules of engagement are the same for everybody on this one.

This reason alone is enough; but to go back to the Guardian’s asserted quote, poor weather could also be held responsible, since according to some published reported accounts of the ambush, one of the Green Berets’initial missions had been cancelled earlier on, precisely because of bad weather.

When the Mirage 2000 arrived although not on alert for that specific mission, the fight stopped and the enemy was dispersed limiting the number of casualties, while French Puma helicopters coming from Gao in nearby Mali evacuated injured soldiers.

A joint counter-offensive was organized right in the aftermath of the deadly attack.[ref]See for instance >> https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/deaths-of-four-us-soldiers-in-niger-hint-at-the-shadow-war-against-isis-in-africa/2017/11/03/abfd2d2f-be00-4d50-a4e8-b8b5f1151bf4_story.html?utm_term=.8c188c012357 ; http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/30/les-etats-unis-vont-financer-la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-hauteur-de-60-millions-de-dollars/[/ref]

Using the death of American soldiers for various domestic political agendas the way it is currently done inside the Beltway is nothing new, but it is no less revolting as well as aiding the terrorists more than focusing on ways to prevail.

References

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/04/special-forces-unit-ambushed-in-niger-desperately-called-for-help-sources-say

http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/04/politics/us-forces-hostile-fire-niger/index.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/04/selon-lonu-17-militaires-francais-ont-ete-blesses-au-mali-au-cours-des-trois-derniers-mois/

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/26/quinze-jihadistes-mis-hors-de-combat-par-les-militaires-francais-dans-le-nord-du-mali/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barkhane

http://www.france24.com/en/20171105-diverging-stories-account-niger-attack-killed-4-us-soldiers

https://www.wsj.com/article_email/u-s-forces-in-niger-were-denied-armed-drone-1509146561-lMyQjAxMTI3NTI3ODUyMzg0Wj/

http://www.france24.com/fr/20171005-mort-trois-soldats-americains-niger-revele-presence-sahel-forces-speciales-terrorisme

http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/05/des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-au-niger_5196282_3212.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/20/le-pentagone-ouvre-une-enquete-sur-lembuscade-qui-coute-la-vie-4-commandos-americains-au-niger/

http://time.com/4986918/us-military-niger-soldier-deaths-investigaton/

http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171005-niger-tongo-tillabery-nord-mali-frontiere-embuscade-bsr-soldat-mort-americain-sahra3/4Surlem%C3%AAmesujet%EF%84%B7%EF%84%B8Floren

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/04/world/africa/special-forces-killed-niger.html

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/la-david-johnson-niger-ambush-may-have-been-captured-islamic-militants/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/deaths-of-four-us-soldiers-in-niger-hint-at-the-shadow-war-against-isis-in-africa/2017/11/03/abfd2d2f-be00-4d50-a4e8-b8b5f1151bf4_story.html?utm_term=.8c188c012357

http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/05/des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-au-niger_5196282_3212.html

http://www.jeuneafrique.com/481109/politique/embuscade-meurtriere-au-niger-un-quatrieme-soldat-americain-retrouve-mort/

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/10/29/death-us-soldiers-in-niger-restarts-debate-about-military-involvement-post-vietnam.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/05/des-commandos-nigeriens-et-americains-sont-tombes-dans-une-embuscade-pres-du-mali/

http://www.rfi.fr/ameriques/20171024-embuscade-niger-trump-polemique-soldat-tue-myeshia-johnson

https://af.reuters.com/article/africaTech/idAFKBN1CA14U-OZATP

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-usa/french-nigerien-forces-operating-where-three-u-s-soldiers-killed-idUSKBN1CA14K

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/hours-before-death-in-niger-us-soldiers-were-targeting-militants-in-mali/2017/11/05/57861ad2-c243-11e7-9922-4151f5ca6168_story.html?utm_term=.1d96ea7fa9fd

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/world/africa/niger-ambush-isis.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/11/02/la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-lance-sa-premiere-operation-anti-jihadiste/

http://www.france24.com/fr/20171005-mort-trois-soldats-americains-niger-revele-presence-sahel-forces-speciales-terrorisme

http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/05/des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-au-niger_5196282_3212.html

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/20/le-pentagone-ouvre-une-enquete-sur-lembuscade-qui-coute-la-vie-4-commandos-americains-au-niger/

http://sldmag.com/fr/archives/issue/23/operationnels-slds-33-34-printemps-2017

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/17/le-secretaire-general-de-lonu-plaide-pour-un-soutien-accru-la-force-du-g5-sahel/

http://www.opex360.com/2017/10/30/les-etats-unis-vont-financer-la-force-conjointe-du-g5-sahel-hauteur-de-60-millions-de-dollars/

http://s.ouest-france.fr/labs/grand-format/operation-barkhane-desert-malien/

http://time.com/4986918/us-military-niger-soldier-deaths-investigaton/

https://www.cbsnews.com/news/new-details-ambush-niger-soldiers-dead/

http://www.jeuneafrique.com/480547/politique/niger-des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-a-la-frontiere-avec-le-mali/

http://www.bbc.com/afrique/region-41507683

https://qz.com/1110216/niger-ambush-after-us-and-nigerien-soldiers-were-killed-questions-linger-for-trump-administration/

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-forces-in-niger-were-denied-armed-drone-1509146561

http://www.lepoint.fr/monde/niger-la-mort-de-trois-soldats-americains-revele-leur-presence-au-sahel-05-10-2017-2162355_24.php

http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171005-niger-tongo-tillabery-nord-mali-frontiere-embuscade-bsr-soldat-mort-americain-sahra

http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2017/10/05/97001-20171005FILWWW00025-niger-huit-soldats-tues-dans-une-embuscade.php

http://nypost.com/2017/10/23/top-us-general-soldiers-in-niger-called-for-help-1-hour-after-ambush/

http://afrique.le360.ma/autres-pays/politique/2017/10/05/15558-secretement-presents-au-niger-des-soldats-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-155

Murielle Delaporte is the editor of the French journal OPERATIONNELS and has been embedded with French forces in Mali and other areas in Africa and the Middle East.