2017-08-29 By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to Australia, I had a chance to continue my discussion with Major General (Retired) Jim Molan. He is a frequent commentator in the press and on the media generally on defense issues and with the recently announced Trump policy on Afghanistan as well as the North Korean crisis we had a chance to discuss the evolving policy environment for Australia.

Question: One of the impacts of the Korean crisis is clearly to remind us once again that we need to ramp up our capabilities and focus on the threat of coming high intensity and high temp military operations to defend our democracies.

Given the nature of our evolving forces, how should we view the mobilization challenge underlying the shift towards high intensity warfare?

Major General (Retired) Molan: It would seem to me that mobilization in relation to highly advanced systems is all about increased utilization on them.

I’m not sure that we have even considered that in the ADF. We have a fantastic system for training pilots but in peace time we may aim to train 1.5 pilots per airframe or something along those lines. Whereas, we should at least have plans and capability to very quickly increase our training for an airplane like the JSF, which is easier to fly than the F-18.

The idea of mobilization through increased utilization or whatever must start with government and flow down from government because like all things, it costs.

Question: Perhaps government needs to set up a mobilization department for national security and to provide a funding line.  This would increase not only monies available to the Department of Defence for preparation but also enhance public awareness about the nature of the conflicts we are facing.

Would this make sense?

Major General (Retired) Molan: We clearly need to do something along this line. Mobilization is not focused upon.  For example, the work of John Blackburn where he highlights the relatively small stocks of fuel that we have in Australia provides an example of not being prepared for the kind of disruption which an adversary would clearly aim at in the case of the run up or execution of high intensity operations.

There will be little point of having JSFs in Darwin if you cannot provide them with fuel. This is more than just a Defence issue, it is a national issue like building up Defence Industry in Australia which we are doing relatively well.

To get at this kind of mobilization capability, it will require a significant focus by government on funding and focusing on the core requirements and not just in defense per se. It also needs to be the responsibility of a minister so that someone is accountable and visibility is greater.

Question: Recently, President Trump announced his new policy on Afghanistan.  It is a clear attempt to focus the attention on the broader strategic situation, notably Pakistan and India, and to get out of the endless war ghetto into which Afghanistan has fallen.

 What is your take on the Trump approach?

Major General (Retired) Molan:  This is the first time that we have tried a sustained military presence to train the Afghan Army and to pursue tough action on the neighbors. I think this is the best policy that I have seen, the question I have is, can President Trump implement this policy the way it reads?

I think it’s a good policy but as with every one of these policies, the devil is in the detail of the implementation.

Can he achieve whatever he wants to achieve within four years, or eight years?

It is certainly refreshing that he has said that he is no longer providing operational details in relation to troop numbers.

Question: With regard to Australia and the US approach to allies, what do think the best approach going forward might be?

Major General (Retired) Molan: The first thing I’d say is that the U.S. is too polite to its allies. Far, far too polite to its allies. If anyone is going to change that, President Trump is going to change that.

When military realists like us are saying things internally about supporting the U.S., supporting the allies, and improving our own defense, we don’t get backed up by visiting U.S. people who come to this country and are too polite to us.

I believe that’s a real problem because it creates in the mind of Ministers and Prime Ministers the fact the Americans are very happy with the current state of affairs.

The second one, I think that we need to do much more. The U.S. needs to be frank in relation to the threat. That can be very hard but you can do it at a confidential or secret level.  We need to be much more realistic about the high-level threat.

The third thing is that Australia needs to realize and possibly the U.S. can assist us to realize that a disjointed development of our defense force does not benefit the U.S., or the Western cause as much as a balanced development of our defense force.

What I mean by that is that we are in the process of producing a magnificent Air Force. The Army and the Navy are so far behind that it will detract from where we’re going. The results of producing a magnificent Air Force but an Army and a Navy that cannot keep up means that the only thing the U.S. gets is a squadron of Growlers and a couple of squadron of JSFs.

If the U.S. encourages Australia to produce a balanced force, then either we can operate independently as a balanced and integrated joint force, or we can operate as part of the coalition as a balanced and integrated joint force.

The ADF has never been better than it is now and that our defense policy has never been better. But the strategic environment is significantly worse than when we planned for our force modernization.

We need to develop a generic operational concept, which expresses how Australia should react to a significant threat below the level of a fight for national survival. In a fight for national survival, anything goes.

What I’m saying is that a significant war of necessity may require from Australia an equally significant force deployment, far in excess of what we have done for years and years and years, because the strategic environment is so challenging.

If we are serious about Australian defense then we need to be serious about such a contingency. The question we need to ask is: Are we really designing a force capable of joint and integrated operations or are we creating an ADF that is still only capable of sending small contingents to fight beside a major ally.

We have done various analytical assessments along this line which suggest that an objective force of about 15,000 to 20,000 personnel is the minimum that would be needed, involving most Navy and Air Force assets (but not necessarily personnel), but a third of Army personnel in units.

This force should be able to be mobilized in a relatively short period of time (my judgement as an objective for government would be in less than 6 months) to be capable of conducting joint sophisticated warfighting operations against a peer competitor, and be sustained before rotation in various levels of combat for at least six to 12 months.

For the earlier interview, see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/shaping-a-21st-century-australian-defense-major-general-retired-jim-molan-looks-at-the-challenges/

Editor’s Note: The following biography of Jim Molan was taken from Wikipedia:

Major General Andrew James “Jim” Molan AO, DSC (born 11 April 1950) is a former senior officer in the Australian Army.

During his career he was Commanding Officer of the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, Commander of the Army’s mechanised 1st Brigade, Commander of the 1st Division and its Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, and the Commander of the Australian Defence College.

In April 2004, he deployed for a year to Iraq to serve as the Chief of Operations for the new Headquarters Multinational Force in Iraq. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by the Australian Government, and the Legion of Merit by the United States Government. In August 2008 Molan released his first book, Running the War in Iraq.

Following his retirement from the army, Molan was appointed by the Abbott Government as a special envoy for Operation Sovereign Borders and was subsequently credited with being an architect of the coalition’s Stop the Boats Australian border protection and asylum-seeker policies.

In 2016 Molan was endorsed by the Liberal Party as a candidate for the Senate representing New South Wales at the 2016 federal election.

In August 2008 Molan released his first book, Running the War in Iraq. The book concentrated on his experience as Chief of Operations in Iraq during 2004–05, and contained some criticism about Australia’s capacity to engage in military conflict.

In an August 2008 speech, Molan stated that: “Our military competence was far worse than even we thought before East Timor, and people may not realise that the military performance bar has been raised by the nature of current conflict, as illustrated in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Writing in a February 2009 article, Molan called for a doubling of the Australian military presence in Afghanistan, from about 1,100 troops to 2,000.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Molan

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

Preparing for Future Conflicts: A Discussion with Major General (Retired) Jim Molan

2017-08-24 By Richard Weitz

Although Sino-U.S. military ties have showed surprising residence in the phase of numerous China-U.S. security differences, they lag considerably behind Beijing’s defense relations with Moscow.

During the last week of July, the Chinese and Russian navies conducted a week of joint drills in the Baltic Sea, representing the first stage of their planned two-phased bilateral maritime exercise for 2017.

These drills, held from July 21-28, are part of a comprehensive joint program to deepen Sino-Russian defense cooperation.

The July 2017 exercise in the Baltics was the latest iteration of a series of drills termed “Joint Sea” by the Chinese and “Naval Interaction” by the Russians.

The second phase will take place in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk in mid-September.

Following an opening ceremony and land-based planning phase, the active stage of the July Baltic exercise included a drill in which the dozen ships (three Chinese) formed two tactical groups, consisting of mixed Chinese and Russian detachments, which simulated offensive and defensive operations included ship-to-sea gunnery, maritime search and rescue, liberating vessels seized by pirates, joint air and anti-submarine defense, and underway cargo replenishment.

The Russian Defense Ministry stressed how these joint drills contribute to furthering the Sino-Russian defense relationship and improving binational naval interoperability.

The Chinese side held the same perspective. Wang Xiaoyong, deputy captain of a participating PLAN destroyer detachment, concurred that an operational objective of the exercise was “enhancing coordination and tacit understanding between commanders of the two countries.”

Russian analysts also emphasized the defense and deterrence value of drills.

Konstantin Sivkov, director of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems, said that the participation of Chinese warships at such distance exhibited a historic level of cooperation with Moscow on maritime issues.

In his view, “China is demonstrating to the world that in the event of conflict, it will conduct military operations on Russia’s side as its ally.”

Russian political commentator Alexander Khrolenko likewise commented that the exercises “demonstrate the significant potential for cooperation between the two countries in the area of defense, and will be sure to cool the hot heads of admirals and generals in Brussels and Washington.”

The Russian ambassador to China, Andrei Denisov, said that “the degree of cooperation in the military sphere is a reflection of the degree of political affinity and trust” between Moscow and Beijing. “If we see the same threats facing us and have a similar assessment of those threats,” he added, “it will be natural to attempt to compare our respective methods to counter those threats.”

Russia benefited from having the joint drills occur, for the first time, in the Baltics, an area of great military and political significance for Moscow. At the time of Naval Interaction 2017, some of Russia’s largest ships were maneuvering into the Baltic Sea for the July 30 naval parade at St. Petersburg.

Russia was then also preparing to hold its latest ZAPAD drill with Belarus in September; which, with a predicted 100,000 troops, worried NATO governments.

The Baltics are a vital region for the Alliance, due to NATO’s need to send reinforcements through the territory to protect Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

NATO has expanded its air and troop presence since the 2014 annexation of Crimea. NATO held its own military exercise, BALTOPS-2017, near the Polish-Lithuanian border in June 2017.

NATO had also recently announced its largest upcoming joint exercise with Sweden, “Aurora 17,” scheduled for September 2017. NATO leaders have criticized Russia for conducting provocative military maneuvers in the region, with military ships and aircraft operating close to the border without adequate notification or transparency.

The Russian and Chinese governments understand that the high-profile drills attract the attention of third parties. On this occasion, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevicius expressed concern that the Baltic drill could elevate regional tensions.

NATO allies monitored the PLAN flotilla as it moved through European waters-–for example, British, Dutch, and Danish warships accompanied China’s fleet through the North Sea and English Channel.

At the time of the drills, the Russian government issued a new doctrinal statement –“Fundamentals of Russia’s State Naval Policy Through 2030” –which profiles the importance of the Russian Navy in the defense of Russia’s global economic and security interests.

According to the doctrine, these interests include maintaining access to the energy-rich Middle East and Caspian Sea regions, as well as sustaining a permanent naval presence in the Mediterranean.

Although the Chinese Navy will likely surpass the size and diversity of the Russian fleet, the Russian Navy should be able to project power in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East –as confirmed by its extensive combat support role in the Syrian War.

The Chinese Navy also will strengthen its capacity and presence in coming years.

A 2015 Chinese government white paper states that “It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure commensurate with its national security and development interests […] so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.”

According to the PLA, China commissioned 18 ships in 2016, with a total displacement of 150,000 tons. In April 2017, China launched its first domestically built aircraft carrier; in June, its first destroyer took its maiden voyage.

In late June 2017, moreover, the PLA Navy launched its first Type 055 destroyer which, at 12,000 tons, is larger than the U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga-class cruisers. The Type 055 ships are expected to serve as the air defense control centers for future Chinese aircraft carrier battle groups.

China’s second carrier is expected to enter into service in 2020.

China plans to build four more carriers, giving the PLAN the second-largest carrier fleet after the United States.

Some forecasts indicate that the PLA will have a 500-ship fleet by 2030, compared with an estimated 350 vessels for the U.S. Navy unless U.S. shipbuilding rates increase significantly in coming years.

In short, the mass and reach of the Russian and Chinese Navies is on the upsurge.

What the impact of this will be in the future is a work in progress.

Editor’s Note: And the Russians are innovating with regard to their concepts of operations.

For example, they have operated their own version of a kill web with missiles launched from frigates in the Caspian sea against Syrian targets obviously guided by target acquisition and C2 nodes in Syria. 

Chris Cavas wrote about the Caspian fleet in this piece while he was at Defense News:

2017-08-22 By Danny Lam

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich believing that he settled the Czechoslovakian problem, “Peace for our time”.

Chamberlain earnestly believed that Hitler was like any other European statesman who is core concern is the survival of the Nazi German regime, and the rapid pace of rearmament by Britain, France and the USSR will deter any further adventures. No sane statesman want, or can risk another war so soon after the peace of Versailles.  Mein Kempf cannot be what Hitler really believes.

The rest, is history.

Diplomacy and negotiations relies on accurately gauging intent and long term goals of all parties.  That requires that analysts assume the perspective of the “other” side, see things from their point of view, understand their constraints, opportunities, perception of risks and rewards.

And exercise extreme caution when project our own calculus and biases onto others.

To do this requires detailed hands-on knowledge of DPRK.

Much of the institutional memory and knowledge about DPRK from the Armistice negotiations of 1953 have been lost. The Korean war armistice of 1953 was not followed by a Peace Treaty as negotiations were unsuccessful.    Few current allied officials have “first hand” experience with DPRK’s demands or negotiating stances from the 1950s.

That knowledge has been lost to allies.

DPRK have, on at least these occasions: 1994, 1996, 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2013; formally threatened to withdraw from the Armistice and resume hostilities.

This is in addition to overt acts such as the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and other incidents.

In each case, things settled down, leading to complacency about DPRK’s intent and long term goals.

Another more recent source of knowledge about DPRK intentions is from the negotiations leading to the 1994 “Agreed Framework”, Six Party Talks, and other initiatives (e.g. missile technology proliferation) since.

Each of these negotiations resulted in face-to-face meetings with DPRK negotiators and senior allied officials where DPRK presented their demands.

Dr Jane Harman who visited DPRK in 1997 with a Congressional delegation, recently recalled:

“I asked a senior [DPRK] minister what it would take to get his government to stop proliferating missile technology, something our intelligence community believed they were doing. “How much will you pay us?” was his immediate reply. That North Korea views proliferation in monetary terms is deeply disturbing.   An alternative to deploying its own nukes might be to sell some to ISIS’s willing buyers and willing users.”

Allied officials in general, and US officials in particular, together with their counterparts from PRC and Russia/USSR, have generally been discrete about the demands by DPRK made behind closed doors.

By dismissing the DPRK opening offer stance as “ridiculous” and then negotiating them down to what the possible and acceptable and then only publicizing the end product (e.g. “Agreed Framework”, or “Six Party Talks”), outside observers are deprived of insights into the thought process of DPRK’s officials.

Understanding the thought process of DPRK officials is critical in gauging their motives and long term goals. Allied officials that have firsthand experience with dealing with DPRK have occasionally broken the silence and revealed what DPRK really wanted or felt they are entitled to even as they dismissed them.

But generally, there is little discussion of DPRK motives and long term intentions as the Trump Administration openly warn of war.

DPRK’s propaganda on these issues are blithely dismissed.

Western experts on Korea in general, and North Korea in particular, have by and large been discrete in sharing their firsthand knowledge of DPRK behavior and intentions with the exception of scholars like B. R. Myers (“The Cleanest Race”) who take DPRK’s intentions and perspectives as expressed in their propaganda seriously.

The conspiracy of silence by the priesthood of Korean experts resulted in an intellectual vacuum, in which allied prejudices and preconceived notions about what Korea wants is filled by our own hallucinations.   American values and percepts are projected onto DPRK as a “given”:   North Koreans are presumed to be rational actors who place absolute priority on regime survival in general, and survival of Kim Jong Un in particular.

DPRK cannot possibly be willing to risk the destruction of North Korea by launching a nuclear attack on US and Allies that will result in American nuclear retaliation.

DPRK must be deterrable if the US only strengthened missile defenses and raised DPRK’s risk and costs.

Denuclearization of Korea is out of the question.

Therefore, let’s negotiate with DPRK and get it over with.

DPRK can become a normal nuclear power like every other one before them that only possess a nuclear arsenal for deterrence.

Let’s apply these projections and see how valid our prejudices are against history.

The Nazi regime of 1938, including their Axis partners, was militarily not equal to France, Britain, and USSR, let alone USA.  German rearmament was done in breath, not depth, and not slated to be complete before mid-1940s.   Nazi Germany was not ready for war.

Yet, this same regime was not deterred from going to war and defeating all but Britain – a “mop up” operation that did not have to be finished before going to war against USSR.   The roadmap laid out in Mein Kempf was followed despite expert advice from the General Staff and the risks.

The same analysis could have informed Japan’s decision to go to war against the US in view of the advice of Admiral Yamamoto, and Saddam Hussein’s decision to fight rather than withdraw from Kuwait in the face of overwhelming odds.

Historians and war gamers can debate how these historical conflicts ended, and alternate outcomes could have been produced had Hitler defended what he had before invading USSR.

Or if Nazis made common sense realist moves like recruiting Ukrainian allies to fight the USSR. Imperial Japan could have circumvented the US oil embargo or executed a limited campaign against the Dutch East Indies to secure their oil supply or coordinated an attack with Nazi Germany against USSR.

Saddam Hussein could have withdrawn from Kuwait and forced the US to make the tough decision of invading — and then quietly bid his time while developing a nuclear weapon.

The point is, it is not at all certain from the perspective of the historical losers that they must lose.  

The same goes for DPRK – it is not at all clear that DPRK will automatically lose a war against the US and allies.

DPRK’s professed goal of victory in the Korean war is not entirely unrealistic.

DPRK’s longstanding goal and objective for the Korean war (from 1950s) is, a) expel UN (US and allied troops) from the Korean peninsula;  b) reunification of the Korean race and homeland on DPRK terms;  c) victory.    These long terms goals have not changed in decades.

Regime survival and security, particularly if it means status quo of a divided Korea with US and ROK in alliance, is not the goal for DPRK.

Professor B. R. Myers argues:   “The only logical answer is that it’s pursuing something greater than mere security — and there’s only one logical conclusion as to what that is.”

The goal is, victory defined by DPRK.

What does DPRK want as the victor?

DPRK firmly believes that they are, or will be the victor of the Korean war.    Expulsion of US troops and ending the alliance with ROK is only the first, necessary step to a peace treaty with the US.

A peace treaty, however, will not be concluded without DPRK receiving sizable compensation from the US (and allied) forces.

As recently as 2010, DPRK have demanded US$ 75 trillion in compensation from the US for the Korean war and “six decades of hostility”.   That breaks down to US$26.1 trillion from US “atrocities” during the war, and losses from 60 years of sanctions for a loss of US$13.7 trillion to 2005, plus property damage of US$16.7 trillion. Damages from sanctions since 2006 is in addition.   (See:  N Korea seeks $75 trillion).

Note that the demand is for US$ 75 trillion, or roughly 4 years of US total GDP of $18.6 trillion (2016).

The demands from other allies that participated in the Korean war under the UN like UK, Thailand, Canada, Turkey, Australia, New Zealand, etc. are in addition to the USD $75 trillion from USA to 2006.

But do the demands end there?

DPRK is demanding from Japan compensation for colonialism and other wrongs.

Reviewing the ongoing debate over DPRK’s motives and long term intentions if they are allowed to develop a thermonuclear arsenal with the capability of reaching any place in the world, one is hard pressed to find any commentary or analysis that pay any attention to the financial / economic demands being made by DPRK, or, the consequences of DPRK being able to back up their financial demands with their thermonuclear arsenal.

The conspiracy of silence from “Korea experts” is deafening.

Let’s talk to DPRK, find out if their intent, motivations and long term plans have changed and make the findings public before we allow our governments to negotiate a Sudetenland compromise for “Peace for our time”.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

Conspiracy of Silence about DPRK Intentions