Preparing for 2018: The UN Sending States Agenda to Deal with North Korea

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Preparing for 2018: The UN Sending States Agenda to Deal with North Korea
12/28/2017

On December 19, 2017, the United States and Canada said that nations from around the world would convene January 16 to show solidarity against North Korea’s nuclear program.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland, meeting in Ottawa, said the meeting would take place in Vancouver.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Canada’s Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland take part in a news conference on Parliament Hill in Ottawa, Ontario, Dec. 19, 2017. Credit Photo: Reuters

The meeting will involve the “sending states” that sent forces as part of a U.N. command to support South Korea during the Korean War. They’ll be joined by additional countries, including Japan, South Korea and India.

Tillerson said the meeting would seek to advance the pressure campaign on North Korea and send a unified message that the global community won’t accept the North’s becoming a nuclear state. He said the pressure campaign would keep intensifying.

https://www.voanews.com/a/nations-hold-north-korea-meeting-in-canada-in-january/4171272.html

What follows is an article by Danny Lam which looks at the agenda for the meeting and the challenges to be met by the “sending states.”

2017-12-28 By Danny Lam

Canada and the United States agreed on November 28, 2017 to co-host a meeting of the United Nations Command “sending states, ROK, Japan and other key affected countries.”

Initially, Chrystia Freeland, Canada’s foreign minister and her Global Affairs staff, took that to mean she can invite whomever she liked including PRC and maybe Cuba.

PM Trudeau have praised Castro’s Cuba for their close relationship with North Korea and viewed them as a valuable channel toward a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem for our time.

When Japan rejected Canada’s overtures and effectively declined to participate in a United Front Campaign advocated by Canada that almost certainly would have led to a dialog for the PRC and Russia’s proposal for “freeze for freeze”, the US had to step in.

US  Ambassador to China Terry Branstad unilaterally announced in Canton that Secretary Tillerson will travel to Canada and meet with PM Trudeau and Minister Freeland on the North Korea crisis on December 19th, delaying the “sending states” meeting from mid-December to mid-January.

Secretary Tillerson reset the direction and purpose of the meeting during the December bilateral meeting with Canada by stipulating that the meeting are between the “sending states” plus ROK, Japan, India, Sweden and others that Secretary of Tillerson think are important to engage.

Notably, this excluded PRC, Cuba, Russia and North Korea.   Communist China had to be disinvited by Canada.

The Hon. Mr. Tillerson described the purpose of the UN Command “Sending States” meeting as,

“[H]ow do we improve the effectiveness of the current pressure campaign? Are there other steps that could be taken to put additional pressure on the regime in North Korea, and how do we further take our diplomatic efforts forward? And then how do we prepare for the prospects of talk[s]?”

The purpose of the meeting is clearly about ratcheting up the pressure leading to DPRK entering negotiations for denuclearization in good faith.

It is a last ditch effort prior to military options.

An unspoken goal of the meeting is to cement and firm up a consensus that North Korea is an imminent existential threat that endanger the liberal international order, and not just a regional security problem for South Korea, Japan and the United States that must be resolved before it becomes too risky for a military option.

US officials must educate and inform the participants at the meeting on the extent of DPRK’s threat and how the US Government arrived at their consensus view that:

“North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has aggressive and offensive objectives. Pyongyang, they believe, will use its nuclear weapons to push U.S. forces out of South Korea and then force reunification of the Korean Peninsula on its terms.”

In other words, North Korea was, is, and will not be a status quo nuclear power that treat their nuclear arsenal as a defensive tool to guarantee regime survival.

DPRK’s nuclear arsenal is intended for offensive purposes to alter the status quo of not just the Korean peninsula, but the liberal world order.

This perspective would come as no surprise to anyone who fought the Korean war.

But very few (if any) officials attending the UNC Sending States meeting in Vancouver on Jan 16, 2018 have firsthand experience from that distant conflict.

Fading memories of the Korean war, together with a very active propaganda campaign by DPRK and PRC that portrays them as the “winners” of the Korean war, and the rise of the PRC as a successful communist peer competitor to the allies, have distorted the perception of the conflict since 1953.

Almost all the participants count the PRC as their top (or major) trading partner and is deeply concerned with upsetting the CCP.

PM Trudeau, in particular, failed to appease President Xi and Premier Li in December when he and his ministers was widely expected to be offered a Free Trade Deal.

Instead, he left virtually empty handed without securing the release of any Canadian prisoners or selling one Bombardier C-Series jet, not to mention having a joint press conference with Premier Li abruptly cancelled.

Managing the PRC’s relationship with the sending states and allies will be a key problem on the agenda.

A critical task before the meeting convenes is to refresh the participants and institutional memories of the UNC Sending States of what is really at stake when they collectively signed the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

This agreement is no less binding and enforceable than the Charter of the United Nations (1946) and other treaties that formally ended WWII.  It commits sending states to defend the RoK against aggression by the Korean People’s Army and Chinese People’s “Volunteers”.

Few (if any) officials and politicians who are belligerent “sending states” except the USA recognize their legal obligations.

Or their liability for “compensation” currently demanded by DPRK.

Armistice do not formally end armed conflict.

Peace treaties need to be concluded between belligerents that include, in theory, all members of the UN against the (then) non-recognized regimes of PRC and DPRK.  Without a peace treaty, the armistice can be ended legally by a party denouncing it and / or by any party restarting hostilities.

DPRK have denounced the armistice in 1994, 1996, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013 and most recently argued that the US has “effectively declared war” with UN sanctions.   North Korea’s position in turn, enable them to restart hostilities at any time without notice:   consistent with their past behavior.

North Korea’s actions have provided UN forces with ample justification to resume hostilities.

Resumption of hostilities by UNC will not, in this case, be regarded as pre-emptive war as such action presumes that a state of peace exist a priori.

The question is: under what circumstances might the UN Command resume hostilities legally beyond the use of force to uphold the Armistice?

All states have an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense providing that such actions meet the criteria for necessity and proportionality.

DPRK’s overt threats to the US and other states homeland, and the development of “push button” WMD capabilities during the past decade greatly strengthen the allied arguments in favor of military action for self-defense.

Specifically, DPRK’s development of solid fueled ballistic missiles that is capable of being launched with little warning, together with their intent to develop MIRV, MARV capabilities and announced goal of orbiting large satellites that can be fitted with nuclear warhead payloads, all point to highly destabilizing actions that enable surprise “knock out” attacks on allies with little warning.

North Korea will, in a few years, be able to hold most nations “at risk” from surprise attack with no or very little (i.e. 30 minutes) warning if their intentions and motivations as elucidated by top DPRK officials is taken seriously.

Many UNC sending states, like Canada, have not taken NK threats seriously and preferred to wish that they are neutral parties.

In the case of Canada, gullible and naïve officials and sycophants have taken assurances from DPRK officials at face value that Canada “is not a target” using fanciful “proof” like DPRK’s public “target maps” as “evidence”.

Like that Austrian corporal’s intentions and motives are interpreted in such a benign manner up to 1939.

Secretary Tillerson must marshal sufficient credible, disclosable intelligence at this meeting to persuade and align the allied consensus toward the actual present and future danger from DPRK.

At the same time, inform and educate the participants on US capabilities and viable, good, military options for eliminating the threat should diplomacy fail.

“Sending States” no longer just have their expeditionary forces at risk (if they send any this time), but their homelands are potentially all at risk from DPRK nuclear attack which can happen without warning.    It is no longer a simple matter to defend the Armistice but to defend all our homelands and to prevent extortion by a nuclear armed state backed by revisionist powers communist PRC and Russia.

The threat will only metalized over time as DPRK export WMDs worldwide.

Any discussion of enhancing pressure on North Korea with the goal to “bring them to the negotiating table” must be cognizant of the fact that such pressure can have the perverse effect of DPRK restarting the war with their nuclear arsenal — at any or all of the “sending states” and allies.

Recall this is how Japan responded to “pressure”, sanctions and the US oil embargo at Pearl Harbor. Japan was not deterred by the prospect of ultimately losing and thought they can negotiate a peace with a strong hand after their initial victories.

Could North Korea think similarly?

The question of increasing pressure will also expose the extent to which many allied nations have indifferently or not at all been serious about applying sanctions against DPRK.

For example, Canada, the co-host of this conference, have failed to implement any secondary sanctions on PRC and Russian entities and individuals (or those from other countries) that are well known NK agents or conduits to evade sanctions.

A self-study on this intentional Canadian “blind eye” is long overdue and essential before the conference.

Discussions need to be initiated for a consensus on mutual defense and mutual offense options should the pressure campaign fail to bring North Korea to the negotiating table expeditiously.

It is very hard to imagine a pressure campaign that is not backed by credible military force have any chance of success.

A sending states and allied consensus on the conditions and timeline for the use of force would be a welcome outcome and major achievement for this meeting.

Mutual defense require sending states that are very exposed and high value targets like Canada or New Zealand that are not presently participating in the Ballistic Missile Defense System to take the opportunity to expedite joining as quickly as possible.

Or be knowingly and willingly exposed to the risk and consequences as DPRK develop the capability to defeat or overwhelm defenses available to them.

All participating states need to be prepared for a discussion as to what they can and will contribute, including diplomatic, economic and military assets, for a lasting solution to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

A difficult and full agenda every bit or more important and critical as the Munich conference (1938).

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, see the following:

UN Command Sending States Meeting Agenda

The Return of ASW: The Canadian Perspective

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-16 By Robbin Laird

In an interview earlier this year, the Chief of Staff of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Lt. General Hood highlighted what he saw as a key area of competence for the Canadian Air Force and Navy, namely anti-submarine capabilities. He underscored that their new helicopter and their evolved P-3 which has been tagged the CP-140 provide core capabilities going forward until a new maritime patrol aircraft would be added a decade out.

“What do we need to put onto the new manned platform from the standpoint of the evolution of the network? Canadian industry has played a key role in shaping capabilities onboard the CP-140, and I would see that role continuing on our replacement manned aircraft. It’s less about the platform (than) the brains of that platform.”

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/08/who-stands-on-guard-for-thee-canadas-contribution-to-northern-defense/

I travelled with Murielle Delaporte to Nova Scotia to visit the 12th and 14th Wings of the RCAF to have a chance to talk with the helicopter ASW Wing (12th) and the CP-140 Wing located in Nova Scotia, namely, the 14th. It was clear that the Canadians are working the 21st century revival of ASW and thinking through where they would go next.

With the return of the Russian global engagement, and Putin’s skillful use of military power, the rude awakening of the second nuclear age with the North Koreans as nuclear extortionists, and the pushing out into the Pacific of the Chinese military, preparation for high intensity or high tempo operations has returned to the forefront. As skill sets are reshaped for the decade ahead, it is not simply bringing back older skill sets; it is about adapting historical lessons learned to 21st century technologies.

This is notably true with anti-submarine warfare, where the new skill sets adapt the alone and unafraid focus of the P-3 crews to the mastery of the new technologies, which allow for an ability to leverage reachback systems, robust networks, and distributed strike.

In the North Atlantic, the U.S. and its allies are shaping what the U.S. Navy calls a kill web approach.

In effect, a Maritime Domain Awareness highway or belt is being constructed from the Canada through to Norway.

https://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/allies-and-the-maritime-domain-strike-enterprise/

How best to meet the challenge in the presence of new 21st century technologies is a work in progress. Canada’s approach to engage in the revival of ASW systems, platforms and skill sets is to evolve the capabilities of its CP-140 and to add a new innovative helicopter to the mix in the North Atlantic and the Pacific.

The CH-148 Cyclone was crafted as a replacement for the Sea King, which could incorporate Romeo type technology into a larger aircraft, which could also do Search and Rescue. And the helicopter had to be designed to land on Canadian sized frigates in high sea states.   The helicopter also had to fit within the Canadian concepts of operations, whereby the crew could multi-task while in flight, without a need to return to the ship to reconfigure for changing missions.

The new helicopter is built on a commercial S-90 foundation but the defense customizations fit where 21st century technology was going, namely an information, communications and decision making transformation. This means that the CH-148 actually is not simply a replacement for the Sea King but rather the inclusion of a new platform within the new maritime domain awareness strike context.

Canada’s CH-148 Cyclone maritime helicopters are now well into test and evaluation. Crews are reportedly impressed with their anti-submarine and above-water warfare suites. MCpl Jennifer Kusche Photo

The work flow onboard the helicopter very much fits into what the Block 3 upgrade to Aurora provides along with the P-8 — the front end and back end of the aircraft shape a workflow for the entire flight and work crew. Screens in the cockpit of both the Cyclone and the Aurora bring the data in the back forward to the cockpit.

As Colonel Sid Connor, the 12th Wing Commander put it: “The tactical officers in the back of the aircraft are in charge of working the missions, while the pilot focuses on flying the aircraft.  That continues as a key thread but now there is a clear opportunity to move tasks around onboard the aircraft as appropriate to the mission.

“Depending on the mission, and the conditions and different flight regimes, we will choose to push tasks that are primarily done in the backend, we can actually push to the front end as appropriate.

“On an older aircraft, the two pilots in the cockpit focused almost exclusively on flying. Because the Cyclone is a fly by wire aircraft, depending on the regime of flight, the aircraft is flying the aircraft.

“There will be a primary pilot who’s monitoring aircraft flight and that frees up the second pilot to take on some of those mission tasks, to be operating the EOIR system, for example, or adjusting the radar or taking over tasks that maybe are not the primary task related to the mission you’re doing, but is still important with regard to augmenting information. It’s information flow, management of information, for sure, that’s going to be important to keep that crew dynamic going.

“The Cyclone is an information rich aircraft and managing the flow of information to determine how best to meet the task is a key challenge and opportunity generated by the new technologies onboard Cyclone.”

A work in progress is to determine exactly who does what, but SA for Search and Rescue is now available to the front end of the aircraft which obviously allows for better decision-making and outcomes. What the helicopter will connect to in terms of information flow is a work in progress, but the platform is coming to the force PRECISELY when the entire maritime domain awareness and strike enterprise in the North Atlantic is being reworked, and this helicopter has the information tools to both contribute too and leverage the new approaches being shaped.

Along with the introduction of the new helicopter, the CP-140 is evolving its capabilities, or to put into the words of the RCAF Chief of Staff, the “brains” of the aircraft. During our visit on September 19, 2017 we spent a full day on the base flying on the Aurora, being briefed on the evolving approaches to training for ASW and other operations, and discussing the way ahead with Lt. Col. Bruno Baker, Deputy Commander of the Wing, which provided insights with regard to the evolution of the Canadian P-3.

The various block upgrades have introduced new technologies for sensing, analyzing and communicating information for operations onboard the aircraft. Block Three is the game changer for the Aurora operationally. Block Three brought basically all new capabilities in the tactical side of the airplane for ASW, communications, and just a new way to look at things.

As Lt. Col. Bruno Baker noted: “The capability enhancements were such that we gave a new designator to the airplane.  Block Three modified airplanes are referred to as the CP-140M.

“Improvements were made in all areas, but the biggest change was in the acoustic sensing area. We added new computer and sensing capabilities.

“The technology onboard –notably the display screens and the interchangeability of data displayed on those screens including in the cockpit — now allowed for a different workflow as the cockpit crew could now see the information being generated in the back end so that enhancing SA to all stations, including in the cockpit, provided a greater synergy and potential for new workflows throughout the airplane.

“Block Three has also brought us an increased level of automation in the aircraft. So the sensors, as opposed to just spinning raw data that the operator needs to look at and analyze and make a decision what he’s looking at, there is a level of interpretation that is done by the systems that is actually tailorable by the operators: how much they want, how much they want to look at, what do they want, what type of information.”

As these new technologies are introduced, training needs to be provided to shape appropriate skill sets both to handle the information and to work in the evolving decision making environment. And this is being done as the transition is being made from the land war role of the Aurora as an overland manned ISR asset to a back to sea multi-mission ISR/Strike asset.

At the heart of working that transition is the training squadron in the 14th Wing of the RCAF. And within the 404 Squadron, the RCAF has an impressive simulation capability to shape the way ahead. During our visit on September 19, 2017, we had a chance to meet with and discuss the challenges with the key members of the 404 Squadron responsible for the simulation training within the Wing.

The team has years of operational experience and serve as Department of National Defence (DND) employees, rather than being contractors. Under the umbrella of 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron, the Thorney Island Simulation Centre is located adjacent to the Hornell Centre at 14 Wing Greenwood. Classroom instruction and administration for CP140 aircrew and maintenance personnel take place in the Hornell Centre, while aircrew simulation takes place at Thorney Island.

The Canadian government owns the source code for the simulation activity, so that the team can work the simulation environment directly to adapt to evolving developments facing the ASW force. They work closely with industry in shaping new scenarios for training as well as training on a regular basis to ensure that ASW skill sets are enhanced, even as the overland operations became a key element of what the Aurora force has been doing over the past few years.

It was clear from our discussions, that the team is leaning forward to thinking through how to deal with the new threats and context of the threats in terms of training crews for the decision making and information environment in which they are operating and will operate in the period ahead.  Even though the group has embodied knowledge of doing ASW in the Cold War years, they are keenly aware of the new technological and threat environment.

And like the rest of us, they are sorting what it means for concepts of operations for a 21st century combat force. The simulation training facility provides a significant complement to real world flying, something especially crucial when flying an older aircraft, even if it has seen a service upgrade on the airframe. As with other air forces, there is the challenge of striking the right balance between simulated operations and actual flying operations.

According to LCol Ray Townsend, Commanding Officer 404 Long Range Patrol and Training Squadron

“We’re well positioned for the next decade to be a stopgap. We’re able to be the ones that can perform key 10’Oclock and 2’Oclock duties for Canada and North America in the ASW area.

“There are so many other nations that are transitioning right now with the introduction of the P-8 and Triton, from Australia to the UK to the Americans, to Norwegians. A lot of people are doing that transition right now, and as you know with any transition there is significant downtime. We can provide a major role as the transition unfolds.”

In short, the Canadians are working the return to ASW and the evolution to an MDA-Strike capability relevant to 21st century concepts of operations..

Lt. General Hood, referred to evolving the brains of the aircraft and the network in which it evolves and then sourcing a new platform.

Bombardier was always going to play a key role in determining what platform that might be into which the brains would be inserted, but now the new relationship with Airbus may broaden the choice.

Putting Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategies in Perspective

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-18 Last year, the Chief of Naval Operations had enough with the growing emphasis on what our adversary’s might be able to do as opposed to focusing on U.S. and allied modernizations to support the freedom of action of the liberal democracies.

Adm. John Richardson in October 2016 argued: “We’re going to scale down the mention of A2AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial).

“It’s a term bandied about pretty freely and lacks the precise definition it probably would benefit from, and that ambiguity sends a variety of signals. Specifics matter.”

“The concept is not anything new – the history of warfare is all about adversaries seeking to one-up each other.

“Use of the word “denial is too often taken as a fait accompli when I fact it really describes an aspiration.

“The reality is far more complex.”

https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2016/10/04/cno-bans-a2ad-as-jargon/

Richardson said seeing potential conflict through just the proliferation of guided weapons or a fortress of “red arcs” around mainland China in which the U.S. could not operate was also less than helpful.

“It’s also true that these systems are proliferating, they’re spreading but the essential military problem that they represent is largely the same that we’ve appreciated and understood for sometime.”

PATUXENT RIVER Md. (Jan. 13, 2016) Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John Richardson sits in the cockpit of an F-35C Lightning II carrier variant joint strike fighter at Naval Air Station Patuxent River. Richardson also held an all-hands call, toured facilities and viewed aircraft and systems including the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye and MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft system. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Nathan Laird/Released)

“It doesn’t mean that they don’t present a challenge but we fixate on A2/AD we’re going to miss the boat on the next challenge. We’ll fail to consider that thing right around the corner that will entail a fundamental shift and takes the contest and competition to the next level.”

https://news.usni.org/2016/10/03/cno-richardson-navy-shelving-a2ad-acronym

Earlier this year, Jyri Raitasalo, a lieutenant colonel, docent of strategy and security policy at the Finnish National Defence University and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences, made a similar case as did the CNO.

His assessment was published on June 16, 2017 and posted on the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences website.

http://kkrva.se/en/it-is-time-to-burst-the-western-a2ad-bubble/?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=twitter&utm_source=socialnetwork

According to the mainstream western strategic narrative, Russia has since 2014 erected multiple Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) exclusion zones or “bubbles” around Europe and the Middle-East.

These bubbles supposedly hinder or even prevent western military action and troop deployments during a potential military crisis between the West (read: NATO) and Russia. Symbols of this new Russian A2AD policy can be found in modern long-range weapon-systems like the S-400 Triumf long-range surface to air missile system, SS-26 Stone (aka Iskander) short range ballistic missile system or the K-300P (aka Bastion-P) mobile coastal missile system.

It is true that Russia has been developing and fielding new long-range weapon systems lately. In addition it is true that these would pose a challenge to NATO forces in the case of a military conflict between Russia and the West.

However, I argue that the recent western A2AD discourse is as much a reflection of two decades of outright neglect concerning the development of real high-end military capability in Europe and within NATO against advanced state-based adversaries than it is about Russia’s new capabilities.

Russia has not developed a new brilliant policy or doctrine – either on the strategic or operational levels – that corresponds with the western notions of its A2AD capabilities.

Rather, in many cases Western states are projecting their own capability shortfalls onto Russia – shortfalls that are a product of over-focusing for almost two decades on multinational expeditionary military operations against weak third rate adversaries in the name of stability operations, military crisis management and counterinsurgency operations.

Bluntly put, for two decades many western states have focused on marginal military threats out-of-area to guide the maintenance and development of their militaries.

Now that Russia has brought back the traditional great-power perspective to international politics and military affairs in Europe and in the close proximity of Europe, many Western states have become surprised as they lack the capabilities – nationally and in many cases even in a multinational setting – to deter or fight conventional large-scale war. A2AD has become one western tool to manage the confusion and surprise that Russia’s actions have caused within the West.

Western A2AD narrative reveals how hollow many European military forces have become – when looked from the perspective of high-end warfighting. By deploying modern military systems to advance its interests Russia is allegedly doing something strategically brilliant and new. Within the West this deteriorating security situation has been called “the new normal”. Looking at the situation today it might be better described as the “old normal” – recognizing how great powers sooner or later drift to the opposing sides in international affairs.  The Cold War era great-power confrontation was a good example of that.

If anything, the two decades of the post-Cold War era (1990-2013) could in retrospect be called “the new abnormal”, at least according to the Western reading of this era. It was supposed to be a non-zero-sum world of managing common security threats in a globalizing and increasingly interdependent world. Former adversaries – Russia included – were engaged and cooperated with. This era coincided with the post-Cold War American unipolar moment – two decades of sheer western (read: American) dominance in international politics.

The events already in Georgia (2008) – but at the latest in Ukraine (2014) – brought a quick end to this western post-Cold war era strategic myth. Unfortunately during this 20+ years many western (read: European) states lost a good part of their military capabilities and the associated military ethos related to national and territorial defence by military forces.

The ongoing western A2AD discourse needs to be understood against this western predicament: having given up many of the high-end warfighting skills and capabilities, and faced with the resurgent (but very traditionally behaving) great-power Russia, western states need something that can explain away the conceptual surprise and the associated challenge that Russia’s actions have caused.

The western A2AD discourse has served precisely this function – it has facilitated the western states to come to terms with Russia’s confrontational actions, which have been contradictory to the post-Cold War era western outlook to international politics and strategic affairs.

At the heart of this western A2AD narrative are Russia’s new long-range military systems. They make easy headlines and their destructive potential can be easily represented by drawing circles on the map of Europe. As was reported in March 2015,

“The Iskander missiles deployment to Kaliningrad reflects Moscow’s readiness to raise the ante in response to NATO moves to deploy forces closer to Russia’s borders. The missiles, which are capable of hitting enemy targets up to 500 kilometers (310 miles away) with high precision, can be equipped with a nuclear or a conventional warhead. From Kaliningrad, they could reach several NATO member states.”

This kind of Iskander (or other) missile deployment news, focusing on the technical aspects of military systems, bring almost nothing new to the strategic equation in Europe. Russia (and the Soviet Union before its demise) has for decades had the possibility to target any city or military facility with conventional or nuclear warheads. Also, deploying mobile platforms has a sound military logic – mobile platforms are supposed to be moved and deployed where needed.

The down side of the western A2AD narrative is located in the fact that it has actually empowered Russia at the expense of the West. Today we face a situation where western media and even western statesmen react with frenzy whenever Russia deploys new military systems and by so doing creates new or reinforces its existing “A2AD bubbles”.

Iskander and S-400 Triumf launchers have become a way for Russia to communicate non-verbally its discontent about western actions. Moreover, Russia does not even have to actually deploy any “A2AD systems” in order to make a point. It is enough for Russia to declare its intent to deploy these systems. After such a declaration, Western media is guaranteed to deliver the message to a worldwide audience.

As an example, the Express published a story in November 2016 on an “ACT OF WAR: Putin deploys nuclear missiles IN EUROPE as he admits FURY at Nato expansion”. And the essence of the story was told upfront in the beginning of the piece: “AN ALARMING signal Vladimir Putin is preparing for war has come after his top military chiefs revealed the Kremlin is deploying much-feared Iskander and S-400 long-range missile defence systems deep inside Europe.”

The above-mentioned article relies on the mainstream way in the West to conceptualize one’s adversary’s military capability: focus only on the technical aspects of modern weapon-systems without any reflection about the dozens of ways to neutralize their “edge”.

For example, to thwart the combined threat posed by ballistic missiles and long-range air defence missiles – what in the western strategic parlance is called A2AD threat” – the following counter-measures can be used:

International cooperation, alliance-politics (expanding the area of operations, collective action/defence)

  • Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (analyze the threat, early warning),
  • Decentralization (multiply the number of targets, saturate the battlefield),
  • Deception (confuse the adversary),
  • Fortification (hardening targets to minimize losses),
  • Maneuver (difficulties for opponent to locate troops/systems),
  • Protecting the troops/systems (e.g. missile defence),
  • Taking out the threat directly (long-range fires, electronic warfare, special operations forces, cyber capabilities),
  • Minimizing the threat indirectly (degrading the opponents ability to control its systems, e.g. destroying C2-assets or degrading its electricity production),
  • Developing defensive systems (e.g. flares, chaff, HARMs, jammers, standoff capability, stealth, passive sensors), and
  • Developing TTPs (how to operate in a high-risk environment, e.g. tactical maneuver).

The list above is only indicative of the vast pool of strategic, operational, tactical and technical level means to counter the so-called A2AD systems or bubbles. But the bottom line is clear: focusing solely on the technical and/or tactical aspects of adversary’s military systems may make good headlines, but it does not by itself facilitate the formulation of sound strategy.

In addition, it should be noted that deploying military assets – any military assets – to the previously mentioned Kaliningrad is a real problem for Russian military planners or commanders, at least when the shooting war starts. Kaliningrad is a small exclave, surrounded by NATO member-states. Defending Kaliningrad without going nuclear is almost unimaginable.

The alternative for Russia would be a large-scale conventional military push west (and north from Belarus) in order to pre-empt any future military operation taking place from the area of the Baltic states. Even this would not be sufficient to secure the Kaliningrad area, as NATO would be able to stage forces using its strategic depth in Western Europe until sufficient reinforcements in terms of troop numbers and capabilities had arrived.

Much of the western A2AD narrative is located on the military-technical or tactical levels. It almost completely bypasses the operational, military strategic and grand strategic level thinking and logics. Being able to pinpoint A2AD bubbles on the map – containing some sophisticated long-range military systems – does not a good strategy make.

We would like to thank our partner, Hans Tino Hansen, for bringing this article to our attention.

If you would like to comment on this article, please see the following:

Bursting the A2/AD Bubble

The Russians Build Out Their Naval Bases in the Middle East

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-05 By Steven Blank

Western governments and commentators have both neglected to analyze Russia’s overall strategic campaign in the Middle East, rather than primarily focusing on its actions in Syria.

Focusing almost exclusively on Syria and/or on the issue of oil prices that Moscow is negotiating with OPEC and especially Saudi Arabia, they have ignored or simply overlooked the strategic dimension of Russia’s overall regional policies.

However, the recent announcements about Russian air and naval bases in Egypt and Sudan impel us to realize that across the Middle East and Eurasia, the Russian Federation pursues a deliberate strategy to negate Western (American) military capabilities while ensuring the expansion of Russian power in all its forms.

These recent announcements about an agreement to share air space in each country and the acquisition of an air base in Egypt and the concurrent discussions with Sudan for a naval base on the Red Sea coast highlight the range of Moscow’s objectives, the capabilities it can increasingly bring to bear in pursuit of those goals, and conversely Western strategic failure.

Air bases in Egypt and the use of Egyptian air space, along with a projected use of a Sudanese base on the Red Sea coast, allows Russia to expand its A2AD bubbles from the Arctic, Baltic, and Black Seas, the Caucasus and Central Asia regions into the Middle East.

Russian Air Force Sukhoi Su-24 Russian Air Force Sukhoi Su-24 at Latakia Air Base, Syria. Mil.RU

It now has naval and air bases in Syria and is angling for another naval base in Egypt; while potentially seeking access to naval facilities and naval and air bases at Cyprus, Libya, and Yemen; and it already has potential access to a base in Iran.

Moscow will undoubtedly use its Egyptian air base to strike at anti-Russian factions backed by the West in Libya.

It also now has for the first time direct reconnaissance over Israeli air space and increasing leverage through its Egyptian and Syrian air bases upon Israel, something Israel has sought to reject since its inception as a state.

And in addition to the projected base in Sudan it now has the capability to strike at Saudi targets as well.

But the dimensions of Moscow’s achievement go further.

These bases register Russian military and political influence throughout the region.

Moscow will now have strike and/or ISR capabilities across the entire Middle East. In practical terms this means that the bases in Syria, Egypt, and probably in Iran give it the capability, along with its other bases inside Russia, including the Crimea, and in Armenia, to project power across the entire breadth and length of the Middle East.

Meanwhile, Russia will probably deploy its fire-strike weapons and integrated air defenses across these bases.

Should Moscow outfit these naval and air bases with UAV, UCAV, UUV, EW, and ISTAR capabilities and long-range cruise missiles, as is likely, Russia could then contest Western aerospace superiority throughout the atmosphere over these areas.

In other words, given the bases already acquired and those that Moscow still seeks, a naval base in Alexandria, bases in Libya and Cyprus, Moscow would be able to contest the entire Eastern Mediterranean.

And given its strong ties with Algeria we should not rule out the possibility that it seeks a deal along these lines with that government as well.

With the ability to contest the entire Mediterranean it will place NATO land, air, and/or naval forces at risk.

The bases in Sudan and Egypt will also have a similar effect in regard to the Suez Canal and Red Sea if not the Persian Gulf’s western reaches. Meanwhile Moscow probably still has the potential to recover the use of an Iranian base as it had at Hamdan and is seeking another one in Yemen as it had in Soviet times at Socotra.

If those new bases come into play and Moscow can deploy its long-range strike capabilities and integrated air defense network there as it has done at its already existing bases, then it will have coverage of the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Caucasus, and Central Asia that would make any Western operation in any of those theaters extremely hazardous and costly.

In this file photo taken on Tuesday, Aug. 12, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, visit missile cruiser Moskva ( Moscow) in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi, Russia. Russia is negotiating an agreement with Egypt that would allow its warplanes to use Egyptian air bases, according to a government document released Thursday, Nov. 30, 2017 a deal that would allow Moscow to further increase its military foothold in the Mediterranean. (Alexei Druzhinin, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, file) less

Given the existing bases in the Black Sea, Caucasus, and the Levant, Turkey is already almost totally surrounded and Balkan states and Italy could be vulnerable as well.

Arguably Russia is attempting to create what Marshal Ogarkov once called a reconnaissance-strike complex across the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Suez Canal, Caucasus, Central Asia, and Persian Gulf.

This is not only an issue of challenging the West’s reliance on an aerospace precision-fire strike in the first days of any war and thus Western and American air superiority.

These capabilities also threaten international energy supplies because Moscow can then use the threat of its naval and/or air power in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Suez Canal, and Mediterranean to interdict or curtail energy supplies that traverse these waterways.

Thus completion of this network of naval and air bases not only challenge Western aerospace superiority and key NATO or Western allies, these bases also consolidate Russia as an arbiter within each country’s politics where it has bases and as a regional one too.

Moscow also stands to gain enormous leverage on Middle Eastern energy supplies to Europe because it will have gained coverage of both defense threats and international energy trade routes.

Undoubtedly it will then use all these situations and assets to free itself from sanctions and propose a vast but nebulous anti-terrorist campaign that legitimizes its seizure of Crimea and the Donbass.

Meanwhile at the same time, in the Middle East its main interest is not peace but the controlled or managed chaos of so called controlled conflict.

Since “power projection activities are an input into the world order,” Russian force deployments into the greater Middle East and economic-political actions to gain access, influence and power there represent competitive and profound, attempts at engendering a long-term restructuring of the regional strategic order.[1]

One wonders what it will take to arouse regional and Western governments from their continued refusal to think and act strategically before it is too late.

[1] Henk Houweling and Mehdi Parvizi Amineh, “Introduction,” Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling, Eds., Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security, and Development, International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill, 2004, p. 15.

Stephen Blank is an internationally recognized expert on Russian foreign and defense policies and international relations across the former Soviet Union.

He is also a leading expert on European and Asian security, including energy issues.

Since 2013 he has been a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC, www.afpc.org.

From 1989–2013 he was a Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College in Pennsylvania.

In 1998–2001 he was Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the War College.

Editor’s Note: The Russians will probe, push and seek to expand their influence and ensure that the expansion East of Europe stops.

Clearly, Putin will achieve greater recognition for Russian interests and power, and his policies in the Middle East are part of that effort.

That is inevitable.

Watching some in Congress acting like children thinking they are playing a game in their minds akin to pin the tail on the Donald are missing the point — there is a need to debate and forge a new strategy to deal with the Russians.

What is a realistic approach to engagement and deterrence with Russia?

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Russia and the Middle East: Building Out Bases and Presence

 

 

Building out Missile Defense Capabilities: Working the US-Allied Relationship

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-15 By Richard Weitz

One problem with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018 (H.R. 2810) signed by President Trump on Tuesday is that the costs of defending foreign countries from missile threats is disproportionately paid for by American tax payers.

To sustain funding for the U.S. nuclear modernization, revitalization of the U.S. ground forces, expansion of the full F-35 fleet, and the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMDS) system, it is important to displace more of the costs of protecting foreign countries from missile threats onto those countries themselves.

These states need to spend more on missile defense and cooperate more closely in networking their regional systems

This would allow more of American taxpayer dollars to go to protecting the U.S. homeland.

In Europe, President Trump is but the latest U.S. leader who has decried the persistent imbalance in transatlantic defense spending. Having the United States account for some three-fourths of all NATO military expenditures undermines the long-term foundations of the alliance.

NATO countries need to follow the Polish example and spend more on their national missile defenses.

Poland is building one of the best integrated air and missile defense system in the world through its so-called Wisla program, including by spending billions of dollars on the U.S.-made Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System and U.S. Patriot air-and-missile defense interceptors.

In the future, Poland and Romania should, along with other NATO allies, pay a greater share of the Aegis Ashore SM-3 missile batteries that the United States has been building on their territories as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to Missile Defense that guided the Obama administration’s approach.
In Asia, South Korea and Japan need to invest more in their national defense to enable the United States to spend more on protecting its own homeland. If North Korean leaders believe that they can threaten the U.S. homeland with impunity, Pyongyang will escalate its provocations against Japan and South Korea.

For example, Japan and South Korea can rapidly enhance their defenses against North Korean missiles at modest cost by funding a new short-range hypersonic interceptor with already available unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

This proposed “High-Altitude Long-Endurance Boost-Phase Intercept Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (HALE BPI/UAV)” could patrol the airspace off the Korean Peninsula and destroy North Korean missiles soon after their launch.

South Korea and Japan could easily share the modest costs of fielding and maintaining national or joint networks of these systems.

Much of the technology for this system is already available or could be developed within a few years.

Missile defense experts have already developed detailed proposals for making the concept practical. Like the GMDSthe HALE BPI/UAV would destroy targets through kinetic energy generated by the force of a high-speed collision rather than through an exploding warhead.

Moving beyond their modest and infrequent joint missile defense exercises, Japan and South Korea can pool resources to develop new missile defense systems. They can draw on technologies from missile tracking and interception already under available or under development. Their enhanced cooperation would, by reducing the U.S. burden, make the U.S. forward presence more sustainable..

Middle Eastern partners that have also benefited from missile defense technologies developed and funded by American taxpayers.

Israel has received substantial research, development, and deployment subsidies, while Arab partners have been able to buy turn-key defense systems developed thanks to generous U.S. funding.

U.S. allies and friends should also assume a greater share of the costs of researching and developing next-generation missile-defense technologies.

These could include laser-based weapons suitable for boost-phase attacks on nearby missiles or enhanced use of F-35 sensors and missiles for close-proximity missile interceptions.

More F-35s would enhance the performance and networking capacity of the air and missile defense networks of Europeans, Asians, and Arabs facing the Russian-provided planes of potential regional troublemakers.

These systems would support other types of missile interceptors already deployed or under development by U.S. allies and partners for their national defense by adding another layer to the global missile defense architecture.

Furthermore, they would allow the United States to rebalance funding to increase the size and improve the performance of the Ground-Based Interceptors in Alaska and California.

For example, the Pentagon wants to start building additional silos at Fort Greely in Alaska, redesign the kill vehicle that rams into incoming warheads, deploy a new two-stage booster, and accelerate other key GMDS components.

Besides this long-term need to rebalance the defense burden between the United States and its allies, and between U.S. regional and homeland missile defense, the immediate priority is to rescind the 2011 2011 Budget Control Act that caps federal spending through mandatory sequestration.

Although the FY2018 NDAA would provide $700 billion for defense spending, the 2011 law restricts actual 2018 defense spending to $550 billion.

As Trump said when signing the NDAA, Congress needs to “finish the job” and end the crazy sequestration requirement for automatic, across-the-board spending cuts regardless of strategic logic or national priorities.

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Promoting Better Missile Defense Burden Sharing

 

Poland, Article III and Missile Defense: Shaping a Way Ahead in Alliance Capabilities

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Poland, Article III and Missile Defense: Shaping a Way Ahead in Alliance Capabilities
12/18/2017

2017-12-18 By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

We have a fundamental respect for the Poles and their history.

No people have learned more about the threats to national survival generated by European insecurities and the Russians than the Poles.

We each have a reach into Poland and its heritage but by different paths.

For Laird, it was the opportunity to work for Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.

For Ed Timperlake, it was the opportunity to support Secretary Ed Derwinski, as his Presidential Appointee in arranging for the State Funeral and return to Poland of the great Musician and Primer of Poland Ignacy Jan Paderewski. Paderewski’s remains were returned to Warsaw and placed in St. John’s Archcathedral. Paderewski’s dying wish, while in America during World War II, was to be returned to a free Poland and that wish was granted by President Bush in 1992.

Article III of the NATO Treaty focuses on the need for a country to take its self-defense seriously in order for the rest of the treaty to have real effect, including the Article V clause with regard to an attack on one is an attack on all.

If a country has not prepared to defend itself, it is difficult to see how allies can do that for the given country.

Or put bluntly, if a country cares so little for its own defense that it spends its money and efforts and everything but, why should other allies take up the slack?

Or put even more bluntly, if a country is not working to defend itself, it has put itself into the military world of becoming an area upon which both allies and adversaries will operate to protect their own interests.

With Poland’s history and knowledge of the Russians, there is a clear understanding that they have little interest in being the forward edge of a battle.

But the challenge facing Poland and NATO has changed as the Russians have crafted a version of 21st century conflict, which is built around a significant missile strike force with adjacent combat capabilities.

The threat has been put well by Rear Adm. Nils Wang, former head of the Danish Navy and now head of the Danish Royal Military Academy recently introduced the reverse engineering approach to deal with anti-access and area denial.

Wang clearly argued that the Russian challenge has little to do with the Cold War Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat to the Nordics. The Soviet-Warsaw threat was one of invasion and occupation, and then using Nordic territory to fight U.S. and allied forces in the North Atlantic. In many ways, this would have been a repeat of how the Nazis seized Norway during a combined arms amphibious operation combined with a land force walk into Denmark.

In that scenario, the Danes and their allies were focused on sea denial through use of mines, with fast patrol boats providing protection for the minelayers. Aircraft and submarines were part of a defense in depth strategy to deny the ability of the Soviets to occupy the region in time of a general war.

He contrasted this with the current situation in which the Russians are less focused on a general war, and more on building capabilities for a more limited objective, controlling the Baltic States. He highlighted the arms modernization of the Russian military focused on ground-based missile defense and land- and sea-based attack missiles, along with airpower, as the main means to shape a denial-in-depth strategy which would allow the Russians significant freedom of maneuver to achieve their objectives within their zone of strategic maneuver.

A core Russian asset is the Kalibr cruise missile, which can operate off of a variety of platforms. With a dense missile wolf pack, so to speak, the Russians provide a cover for their maneuver forces. They are focused on using land-based mobile missiles in the region as their key strike and defense asset.

“The Russian defense plan in the Baltic is all about telling NATO, we can go into the Baltic countries if we decided to do so. And you will not be able to get in and get us out. That is basically the whole idea,” the admiral said.

Wang argued for a reverse engineering approach to the Russian threat. He saw this as combining several key elements: a combined anti-submarine (ASW), F-35 fleet, frigate- and land-based strike capabilities, including from Poland.

Another player in the region, Finland, looking out at the Russian threat is in the process of reworking their strategy to encompass allies in the region for self defense. And one Finnish defense official put the challenge very clearly:

“The timeline for early warning is shorter; and the threshold for the use of force is lower.”

Poland is approaching its Article III efforts by shaping a core missile defense capability, both medium and short range which allows it to deal with the threat as identified by the Finns and to contribute to broader regional defense in the way suggested by Rear Admiral Wang.

It is about building a capability which can defend Poland but link into the defense in depth which is necessary in the region.

The Poles are focusing on both building mid-range and short-range missile defense.

With regard to building out their mid-range missile defense, they are doing so with regard to ongoing modernization and building in capabilities for networking back to their own forces and to those of their neighbors and allies.

The system selected by the Poles to fill the mid-range missile defense system is a variant of the Patriot system.

But very noteworthy is the command and control aspect of the approach they are taking.

They are not pursuing a classic prime contractor provides all approach to a system but are opting for an open architecture system which will allow them to both have open ended modernization but also work the linkages to NATO neighbors and allies.

The Poles are acquiring the Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System or IBCS.

Rather than buying a legacy proprietary C2 system, the Poles are leaning forward to procure an open architecture C2 system.

They won’t have siloed systems that require new or upgraded C2 with each new radar or interceptor.

This is important as other allies acquire missile defense systems going forward, and new air systems like F-35 become part of the extended defense equation, as Rear Admiral Wang suggests.

It is about shaping a defense in depth capability across Poland, German, the Baltics, Finland and the Nordics. Without shaping common C2 capabilities, defense in depth will be more limited than the defense capabilities could allow for.

Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis hosts a bilateral meeting for Poland’s Minister of Defense Antoni Macierewicz Sept. 21, 2017, at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. (DOD photo by Air Force Tech. Sgt. Brigitte N. Brantley)

Siloed systems do their tasks but do less than they could to provide full up capabilities to the integrated battlespace.

The Poles are also moving in the direction the US Army is looking to transition as well.  

Rather than buying whole systems, and being dependent on prime contractors for the complete integration of those systems, the US Army is looking towards a commodity approach.

What the U.S. Army is looking to do is be able to manage interactions among C2, sensors, and missiles and to plus whichever of these “commodities” needs to be plused up.

It is also crucial for the US Army to be able to integrate the defense systems in the maneuver force as well as to focus on what is necessary for the evolving integrated battle space.

It is not simply about after market integration; it is about building in integration from the ground up as new systems are added as well.

This means that the Polish approach is symmetrical with the strategic direction of the US Army itself.

Poland is working through the challenge of affordability with regard to missile defense, but senior Polish officials understand that the open architecture C2 system is not an add on but a core capability to the evolution of core Polish defense capabilities.

Asked about speculation that Poland could resign from the IBCS to lower the price of the Patriots, (Deputy Defense Minister) Kownacki stressed that the air defense management system obviously may be the subject of discussion, but “it’s not that it (IBCS) fundamentally changes the price proportions in the middle-range air defense system”.

 “We are analyzing the document and we will be negotiating, but you must know that IBCS is what everyone will buy. This is the future that awaits all of us, and sooner or later we will bear this cost.”

http://www.defence24.pl/710584,kownacki-nieakceptowalna-jest-dla-nas-kwota-105-mld-usd-za-patrioty-mowilismy-to-od-poczatku

In short, Poland has demonstrated NATO leadership in pursing the most modern air and missile defense system available.

They are acquiring a system built not just for today, but to anticipate and counter future threats.

It is clearly in the US and NATO interests that the US and Poland work together to get to a price that satisfies both sides, while still preserving the investment in the future which IBCS represents.

Changing the Business Rules: Moving Beyond Slo Mo War Preparation

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Changing the Business Rules: Moving Beyond Slo Mo War Preparation

2017-12-18 By Brian Morra

The Department of Defense’s acquisition system is a major cause of the erosion of the defense capabilities of the United States.

This erosion is visible in high profile, fatal accidents like those the US Navy has experienced in the Western Pacific over the past two years.

Less visible is the long-term deterioration of defense capacity relative to peer competitors like China and Russia.

That decline is the product of both defense budget reductions since 2009 and the fundamental failure of the DoD to reform its antiquated acquisition system.

The DoD requires high-intensity acquisition to prepare for high-intensity conflict.

The growing importance and rapid evolution of cyber and digitally-enabled systems means that DoD can no longer operate with its traditional procurement and sustainment rules.

I will not attempt in this paper to offer broad remedies for acquisition reform.

Instead, I will address a specific aspect of the system that is not keeping pace with the advances we are observing in China and Russia.

The acquisition of major weapon systems comprises two major phases: acquisition/procurement and operations/sustainment.

Those phases follow a bi-modal budget distribution.

There is a large budget expenditure during procurement for a small number of years, followed by a much larger and longer-term expenditure during the many years of operation and sustainment.

The current system and matching budgetary method leave the United States vulnerable to adversaries that develop and deploy new capabilities at a much faster pace than the bi-modal approach offers.

Moving to a multi-phased acquisition method is required for the United States to keep up.

And, “keeping up” probably does not mean that the US will be able to retain its “over-match” position relative to peer competitors.

Changing business rules allows for strategic redirection and agile evolution of the combat force. Credit Graphic: IBM

Given the steady progress being made by adversaries, reforming DoD’s acquisition process is no longer just a smart thing to do; it has become existentially vital.

The digital nature of new weapon systems like the F-35 makes multi-phased development and multi-modal budgeting feasible.

This approach bears some similarity to the spiral-development approaches used in the past.

However, a new approach will need to be qualitatively different than traditional spiral development.

The ability to upgrade new weapon systems primarily through software upgrades makes this new approach possible.

The new approach would have shorter upgrade cycles or modes, based on 3-5 year centers.

Budget planning will need to change since each new “mode” would blend acquisition and O&S monies. Each new mode would require a business case to support decisions to deploy funds.

This is a very different approach.

It would require different business rules and procedures than are currently employed by the DoD’s acquisition centers.

The obstacles to this kind of reform are not technical, although some will assert that technical issues are insurmountable. The real obstacles are DoD’s current business rules and acquisition policies and budgeting procedures.

The question is will we reform these procedures now, or will we only do so when we are confronted with a crisis?

The US aerospace and defense industry maintains proprietary control over its core capabilities.

This is a key challenge that DoD confronts that China (in the main) does not. In order to have affordable, multi-modal weapons system development, DoD will have to establish new business rules to enable proprietary sharing or compartmentation schemes that create the conditions for development across proprietary stove pipes.

The need is clear.

The DoD requires business rules appropriate for high-intensity acquisition to meet the rapidly evolving threats represented principally by China and Russia.

The growing importance of cyber and digitally-enabled systems means that DoD can no longer operate with industrial-age procurement and sustainment rules.

Fortunately, the transition to digital systems lend themselves to a new, multi-modal approach that will help the United States keep pace with evolving threats.

Brian Morra is a retired career Aerospace industry executive, who currently serves on several corporate and academic boards.  

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Changing the Business Rules to Allow For High-Intensity Warfare Acquisition Models

Reflections on the Australian Foreign Policy White Paper: Facing the Challenge of Global Engagement, Conflict and Realignment

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-12-05 By Robbin Laird

During my last visit to Australia, I spent time with colleagues in the Australian government discussing various aspects of the strategic environment in flux and what the impact of such an environment has on Australian interests.

The newly released Foreign Policy White Paper provides a public statement of how to look both at the environment in flux and the challenge of defining, and protecting Australian interests.

2017_foreign_policy_white_paper

Because of how dynamic the environment is, what can be shaped is an optic or a template at best to look at the environment and to focus on how best to navigate the way ahead.

The White Paper provides some insights into how Aussies are doing so.

We are in as profound a period of historical change as we faced with World War II and its aftermath, but hopefully not as deadly. In that transition, the Australian leadership moved from being a key part of the British empire and providing forces for the defense of the empire and its interests, to self defense and working with the strongest democratic ally in the region, namely the United States.

Now Australia faces a China, which fits no easy formula as either a mercantile or strategic military power, and an America which is facing significant pressures for change at home and abroad. How stable China will be is an open question and how America will navigate the new cold civil war it is going through domestically is an open question.

With regard to the defense of Australia, there is little question that the solid relationship they have had with the US military is the foundation of shaping their approach to deterrence in depth. At the same time, it is crucial to ramp up capabilities to work with other powers in the region, such as Japan and to find ways to deepen the ability to provide defense against the Chinese push and the second nuclear age North Korean nuclear power.

Will American nuclear deterrence remain credible enough to deal with China, Russia and North Korea?

What will Australia need to develop and deploy to make a significant impact on the perceptions of a China or North Korea?

At the same time, the prosperity of Australia rests on a global order where trade is open and fair.

The coming of Trump has jolted the broader liberal democratic discussion of what is open and fair, and what trade orders will emerge.

The Chinese have played the global trade game significantly unfairly with a clear strategic interest to build political influence on trade, but not as if they were 18th Century Dutch traders.

They are playing the game to expand the unique vision of Chinese communism.

How best to define a rules based order?

How to intertwine security and trade interests in the shaping of an evolving or perhaps new version of what that means in the shift from liberal globalization to a more conflictual global order where defining the rules is precisely in play?

The Australian Prime Minister put it well in his introduction to the White Paper:

“We are creating the competitiveness and flexibility our economy needs to thrive in an interdependent, fast-changing world. But we must also acknowledge we are facing the most complex and challenging geostrategic environment since the early years of the Cold War. We cannot assume that prosperity and security just happen by themselves.”

What Turnbull calls for is enhanced Australian sovereignty in a world in flux.

“More than ever, Australia must be sovereign, not reliant. We must take responsibility for our own security and prosperity while recognising we are stronger when sharing the burden of leadership with trusted partners and friends.”

“As this White Paper makes clear, in a complex and uncertain environment we will have to work harder to maximise our international influence and secure our interests.

“We will need to keep reforming our economy, boost our competitiveness and resilience, and invest in the other domestic foundations of our national strength.”

This is more eloquently said than has been articulated by President Trump without the histrionics and tweeting but this is clearly resonant with a core instinct in the effort to enhance national competitiveness in a global order in significant flux.

“We must guard against protectionism and build robust support for open economic settings by ensuring all Australians have the opportunity to benefit from our growing economy. Our trade and investment agenda will assist by boosting jobs and supporting higher living standards.”

This would seem to be at odds with Trump’s stated agenda but what is in play is how the Chinese have distorted the global trade agenda and how best to respond to that distortion. It is not so much simply keeping in place an inherited rules based order, but shaping a realistic one for the period ahead.

The White Paper lays out a number of key attributes of how the Australian government sees the current global competition as well as ways to better achieve Australian sovereign outcomes.

The dichotomy of hard and soft power has often been used to describe the tools to be used, but if the 21st century order is fundamental flux, there will be no dominant rules based order unless liberal democracy can defend its values and its interests.

A key part of shaping the way ahead is finding ways to expand Australian cooperation within what the White Paper calls the Indo-Pacific region, which makes a great deal of sense as both China and the United States are undergoing fundamental change.

A good statement of where we are currently is made on page 21 of the White Paper.

“Australian foreign policy in recent decades has focused on advancing our interests as globalisation deepened and economies in Asia grew strongly. In the decade ahead, both trends will continue profoundly to influence our prosperity and security.

“Other major trends will shape our world, including the pace and scale of technological advances, demographic shifts, climate change and new global power balances. The threats posed by North Korea and terrorism and other transnational issues will require resolute, long-term responses.

“The United States remains the most powerful country but its long dominance of the international order is being challenged by other powers. A post-Cold War lull in major power rivalry has ended.

“These trends are converging to create an uncertain outlook for Australia.”

The challenge will be to shape a template, which allows Australia to shape a sovereign solution in a world in conflict, a world in flux, and a world in which the rules of engagement, including trade are in fundamental flux.

The White Paper provides some statements of principle with regard to shaping the way ahead, but the antinomies of a number of these principles are clearly the challenge.

How to navigate what kind of future for Australia in a world which is neither dominated by China nor the United States, but in part by their competition and by the fundamental shifts in both of these societies as well?

It is difficult as well to understate the impact of the second nuclear age crisis evident with the nuclear force being built by North Korea. The North Koreans are not pursuing a deterrent force in a cold war sense, but an operational force to reshape the Pacific order.

How will Australia deal with this challenge?

In short, we have to deal with the world as it is becoming, not the world simply we would like to see.

Australia faces the challenge of shaping a sovereign way ahead in a world which does not easily fit into the templates of the past twenty years, but in which global conflict and struggle over the global rules of engagement are defined not in the think tanks, but on the global plane of struggle and cooperation.