Group Captain Braz on the RAAF and the Way Ahead on Electronic Warfare: Shaping a Core Distributed Capability for the Integrated Force

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/31/2017

2017-08-28 By Robbin Laird

On August 23, 2017, the Williams Foundation held a seminar on the future of electronic warfare.

At the heart of the Seminar and the discussion were the presentations by Group Captain Braz of the RAAF, a key figure in the introduction of the Growler into the RAAF, and CDR Mike Paul, Electronic Attack Wing, US Navy Pacific Fleet.

The two provided a significant look inside the standing up of the RAAF capability and the key role of the US Navy in this effort, and in turn the ability to standup up a joint capability.

The US Navy has provided an important lead in working the relationship with the RAAF in standing up this capability and in a rapid manner. In many ways, the Growler dynamic between the two forces provides a model of how capabilities can be generated rapidly in a coalition context to deal with an evolving threat environment.

For the RAAF, Growler represents a jump start to a 21st century EW effort, which includes Wedgetail and F-35. For the US Navy the cutting edge work which the RAAF is doing with regard to shaping a 21st century integrated force helps the US Navy to think through ways to break through stove piped thinking.

In this article, I will look at Group Captain Braz’s presentation with regard to the RAAF approach.

I had a chance to meet with him last Spring at Amberley Airbase where the RAAF is standing up the Growler capability.

So for me, it was a real pleasure to see him again, but this time, in the context of a broader discussion of evolving capability with other core players in the effort as well.

Group Captain Glen Braz, OC of the 82nd Wing.

The nature of the working relationship between the US Navy and the RAAF was highlighted during that interview as follows:

We couldn’t have done this without a huge commitment from the U.S. Navy. There’s simply no other way to describe that.

They have wanted us to be on this journey, and they have supported us wholeheartedly throughout it, both on what we do with the Growler training and the operational experience, the exchanges we’ve established, and how we prepare the team.

That’s furthered by exchange opportunities. We have U.S. Navy Growler aircrew joining us here, but we’ve also used folks connected to intelligence organizations and data management organizations and used U.S. Navy expertise in those areas to bring us along and further on the journey.

It’s no accident that when the Growler officially arrived in Australia at Avalon International Air Show a month or so ago, one of the four humans to step out of those two aircraft was a U.S. Navy aviator.

That was very deliberate, because we wanted both to recognize the amazing support we have had so far from the US Navy and the fact that we’re in this together.

It’s a partnership for the long term with cross learning on all sides.

https://sldinfo.com/group-captain-braz-and-the-coming-of-the-growler-to-the-australian-defence-force/

Captain Braz noted that the Aussie Growlers were on track for IOC next year and that “6SQN took part in Talisman Sabre, and they are busy baselining their operations to align with wider Air Combat Group and 82Wing standards.”

https://sldinfo.com/a-look-at-talisman-sabre-2017-the-perspective-of-air-commodore-craig-heap-commander-of-the-surveillance-response-group/

He underscored that the RAAF was focused on taking EW from a niche capability within the ADF to working into a core competence within the integrated force.

“How we might drive this jet, and wider EW and cyber thinking, into the mainstream?

“Please note my use of the word drive. We need to take this thing and forcefully insert it into our daily business.

“To let it drift or meander into some equilibrium would be a lost opportunity.

“It’s time to be bold.

“The arrival of F-35 in the next year or so is one prime opportunity, and one that will need bold leadership to harness.

“The F-35 brings unprecedented EW capability, it can fight like no other fighter we have owned.

“Growler is an exceptional complementary capability and crossing personnel over between the teams will bring amazing results.

Group Captain Braz at the Williams Foundation Seminar on Electronic Warfare, August 23, 2017

“A good friend of mine from the US Navy planted this idea in my mind some months ago and it has significant merit.

“Setting up a Growler to F-35 exchange program won’t be easy, it won’t fit well into a transition plan and it will challenge some outdated mindsets, but it will be a brave move that will put innovation into overdrive.

“It’s an example of the new thinking we need to reshape the way we fight air combat.”

Group Captain Graz then dealt in the rest of his presentation on the challenges as he saw them in managing the way ahead.

First, there is the challenge of managing growth.

Growler is a low density, high demand asset. Shaping and managing a workforce and ensuring its integrated beyond the platform is a significant challenge.

Second, Growler will operate under significant constraints in spectrum licensing and security.

Third, “Growler is part of the overall rethinking necessary with regard to targeting or rethinking with regard to payloads for the RAAF operating as part of an integrated 21st century combat force.

“Growler is a flexible system, manned by expert crew.

“It takes the initiative whenever possible but is by design a flexible sense and respond asset that is at its best when given significant latitude in targeting.

“Being overly tied to our kinetic and lethal effects targeting mindsets will not give you the Growler you need on the day.

“New thinking in terms of dynamic targeting, particularly of non-lethal effects, many of which may be temporary in nature, will be a key to success.

“Delegating these engagement authorities forward will be essential.”

Fourth, training to ensure that EW becomes part of the force, rather than a stove piped on call capability is a major challenge.

“We have invested heavily in training and rightly so; we are not there yet but the future is positive.

“Importantly, the rapidly evolving Electronic Warfare capabilities across the ADF need new ways of thinking to get the most from our family of systems.

US Growler Operating at RAAF Base Amberley from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

“New training areas that test our ability to find, fix, track, target and engage adaptive threats are fundamental to our force.

“Of course, with the constraints already mentioned, live virtual and constructive environments are being enhanced and expanded to serve our needs.

“Ultimately fifth generation forces need fifth generation training.”

Fifth, the Group Captain emphasized the importance of what he called commonality both across the ADF and the allied forces using Growler.

“We have made changes to these jets (RAAF Growerls) based on Australian needs but they have changed the US Navy common baseline.

“Careful investment has given our Growlers targeting pods and Infra-red missiles.

“Not because it’s a fighter but because they help our active and passive kill chains.

“The US Navy is joining this path; it’s a team effort and our differences bring useful diversity to shape the growth of this aircraft.”

And the final challenge he addressed really flowed from how he saw the introduction of Growler as part of the broader evolution of the RAAF to support a payload revolution.

“Our thinking needs to cover payloads not just platforms and be driven by creative technical thinkers, connected with operators.”

Group Captain Braz ended on a very forceful note – don’t built a community of Growler operators; build a joint force within which EW is a core distributed competence.

“Our true challenge, as swimmers in the mainstream, is to acknowledge the currently niche players in EW, assist their real and important growth and to drag them into our swim lane; to roll their input and concepts into every plan, to seek to understand more and engage better.

“Our new thinking must be beyond labels like EW operators but that this expertise permeates our business as an assumed skill.

“So, as a strike fighter native, I am happy to wear an EW tag but I want it to be a temporary one.

“The day where we are all suitably learned in EW that it no longer becomes a label is what we should strive for.

“That would signify success.

“That would have seen the mainstream embrace EW and cyber.

“So, my challenge to you is, regardless of your organisation, are you an operator in our age of EW?”

Inherent Resolve and the A400M: Providing a Regular Shuttle Capability

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-30 By Murielle Delaporte

Onboard the MSN 31 (April 2017)

It is just a matter of fact, but not such a well-known one, that the A400M has been used for months as a regular weekly multi-stop shuttle on all the theaters where French armed forces are present.

“Ever since it has been available, the A400M has been used on all theaters of operation: it is a priority and what is important for us is that the aircraft fulfills the requested missions it has been assigned for,” saidCaptain Cyril, 61st Wing, Operations Cell.

His mission at the time of this interview was to fly about 40 passengers with their luggage, as well as various military equipment and spares, including a Mirage 2000 engine and a generator, through four destinations: Solenzara in Corsica, Jordan, the Emirates (Al Dhafra Air Base) and Djibouti.

Restructuring With Direct Flights In Mind

Because of the range of the A400M and its ability to carry both passengers and load, the coming of the new generation of transport aircraft has led to a major restructuring of the infrastructure of the mother base, i.e. Orléans-Bricy.

“The goal is of course to carry the maximum load, i.e. up to 25 tons, in one trip.

“We have aimed at concentrating all the necessary competences at French Air Base 123, which hosts a simulator organic to the Center of instruction of transport crews called CIET (“Centre d’instruction des équipages de transport”), where a crew can train up to the day preceding a mission,” explains Captain Cyril.

By comparison the average load is 15 tons on a C130 and 6 tons on a C160, while on a 5,000 km flight, the A400M allows to skip a stop and can therefore be done in one day, when it takes two days for a Transall.

This A400M shuttle runs almost weekly to serve Chammal (i.e. the French component to Inherent Resolve), as well as Barkhane (i.e. the Sahel-Saharan theater where terrorists are being fought as well).

For the latter, airdrop capabilities are in the process of being certified to allow fret deliveries closer to the troops.

The same goes with night goggle and decoy capabilities.

But, as stressed by Captain Cyril, “a signed capability is not enough to implement it”.

Once certified, there is indeed a lot of documentary work to be done in order to make sure the right processes are being set in place to best use the new capability at the right time, so that a test pilot, an office designer or a young pilot can understand in exactly the same way.

Becoming an “Aircraft Whisperer”

From the viewpoint of the MSN31 crew, pilots and mechanics all together, the ongoing improvement of documentation in close cooperation with both the French Air Force (FAF) and Airbus Defence and Space is what has allowed for the ramp up of the A400M readiness over the last two years.

“We are currently able to fly four aircrafts, which may sound very little, but we have eight on base and three being maintained.

“Our overall readiness rate has reached 50% of the fleet, when it started at 15% and increased little by little as we integrated more aircrafts in the fleet”, notes the Captain.

By the end of 2017, the FAF should be able to rely on thirteen aircraft, fifteen by the end of 2019 out of a total order of fifty.

Even if things are tight and if crews would not mind an extra two aircrafts to ease their mission management, such a trend in readiness is totally compatible with the Gaussian curve characteristic of any armament program’s early stage and end of life cycle.

A temporary solution has been founded to solve the engine issue, while Airbus is working on a definitive version better adapted to the power of the aircraft.

But the major change over the last twelve months according to pilots and maintainers alike has to do with management of any breakdowns, as experience and practice confirmed that many initial breakdowns, as detected by very sensitive sensors, were only temporary malfunctions in need for an update.

For maintainers such as Sergent P and G from Orléans support squadron ESTA (for “Escadron de soutien technique aéronautique”), it is necessary to learn “to talk with the plane”, to become an “aircraft whisperer.”

The communication mode of the aircraft has fundamentally changed in the world of French transport aircraft the same way as the Rafale changed the world of French fighters.

“Before, since we had so few planes, we could only react to breakdowns.

Today breakdowns do not dictate mission tempo anymore!

This morning, we had one, we did a test, lost five minutes and off we went…

That same alert only eighteen months ago would have grounded us while waiting for the maintainers’ diagnostic at the mother base.

We would have left in the afternoon instead of the early morning…”

This new level of performance in logistics management has allowed the A400M to have become a solid asset and a regular shuttle on which French forces.

And this also true for the other A400M European allied forces via the European Air Transport Command mechanism.

In short, these air forces can now rely on and build their operations with the A400M for any theater of engagement.

The slideshow highlights the A400M during the Middle East engagement on which Murielle Delaporte flew. And the photos are credited to her.

Editor’s Note: The A400M is emerging at an interesting juncture affecting lift and tanking aircraft.

They are becoming part of the integrated battlespace, and whether reworked within a contested air combat environment, or becoming part of the weapons revolution, or part of the shooter-sensor reset, or part of the evolution of multi-mission aircraft for force insertion, the A400M configured for the new epoch ahead can become a very interesting asset indeed. 

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/8/25/global-demand-for-special-operations-aircraft-grows

The A400M Debuts at Mobility Guardian 2017: The Premier USAF Global Reach Exercise

Canada and North Korea: How to Meet the Threat?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-29 By Danny Lam

Canada is a participant in the Korean War under UN Security Council Resolution 84.   The war is paused by an Armistice in 1953 but never formally ended with a peace treaty between belligerents.   Since then, the Republic of Korea (South) have developed into the 11th largest in the world, just after Canada.

The Democratic Republic of Korea (North), have developed into a heavily armed regime with an arsenal that within two years, will be able to credibly conduct thermonuclear missile strikes anywhere in the world including Ottawa, Canada.

Canadas remain technically at war with DPRK today.

Defending Canada and Canadians against existential threats is the duty of any Canadian Government. Existential threats are not just limited to threats to existence (e.g. annihilation with nuclear weapons), but “permanently change another group’s values and the way it governs itself against the latter’s will”. (Phil Waller, 2016)

DPRK’s thermonuclear ICBM arsenal capability is necessary but not sufficient to be an existential threat. Few Canadians would regard (e.g. U.K. and France’s) nuclear missile arsenal to be a threat to Canada.

What is different about DPRK’s nuclear arsenal is their motivations and intentions: What are they going to, or likely to do with their nuclear arsenal?

If DPRK is to become a conservative “establishment” nuclear weapons power that used their arsenal as a deterrent against regime change, that leads to one set of strategies for dealing with DPRK.

On the other hand, if DPRK’s motives and intentions are not defensive, but have greater ambitions that include the offensive use of their nuclear arsenal, it would, a) represent a fundamental break from all first nuclear age power; b) require very different strategies for Canada to defend against this existential threat.

Existential threats from North Korea against Canada, accordingly, do not necessarily require the use of nuclear weapons. It can involve the threat of using nuclear weapons that compelled Canada to pay tribute, or protection money, pay indemnities from the Korean war or compensations for sanctions against DPRK, or whatever injustice the North Korean mind can conjure.

DPRK demanded US$75 trillion in compensation or war indemnities from the US alone for the Korean war and damages from sanctions to 2006. If Canada is assessed a proportionate share, that will be in the range of US$ trillions.

Should North Korea compelled Canada with the threat of nuclear annihilation to pay tribute or indemnities of this magnitude, it would fundamentally alter Canadian values and how Canadians govern ourselves.

If allowed to become institutionalized, DPRK modus operandi will be copied by other powers and alter the liberal international order upon which Canadian prosperity depend.

Thus, it is fair to say that DPRK’s motives for their nuclear ICBM arsenal, when confirmed to be financial and economically motivated, represent a fundamental break in post war international norms. DPRK is about war for profit.

That is not just an existential threat to Canada, but to the post war liberal international order that the Trudeau regime appear to be so proud of participating in.

Canadian defense policy against North Korea must be cognizant of both the rapid growth / development of the DPRK nuclear ICBM threat, but also their motives and posture. DPRK have adopted an offensive, or surprise first strike posture with their nuclear ICBM arsenal that makes it an urgent issue for Canada to field a credible defense by all means necessary within a year or two, before DPRK can credibly threaten Canada and the allies with a thermonuclear ICBM force.

A credible existential threat to Canada from DPRK nuclear missiles by 2020 or sooner leaves little time and few options for Canada.  

Canada is not a partner in the US missile defense system. NORAD does not include ballistic missile defense in its mandate.

Canada cannot count on NATO members’ assistance (including USA) under Article 5 as Canada have not met Article 3 obligations for self-defense.

Canadians are deluded if they think the US Missile Defense system is like Girl Guides or Boy Scouts that they can join at will.  The option to join the US missile defense system is moot as becoming a partner (via the existing formal process) is a long, drawn out process even if Canada appropriated substantial funds up front, decided to join today and the US MDA agreed immediately.   Membership in the US missile defense would not deliver a usable Canadian capability for years — if that.

What about procuring a missile defense system?

In order to meet the DPRK threat by 2020 or sooner, Canadians have no time for the usual multi decade debate, politics, and slow motion defense procurement that have bedeviled Canadian DND and Public Services and Procurement in almost every recent major defense program including the Canadian Surface Combatants, Fighter Aircraft Replacement, Maritime Helicopters, etc.

Moreover, there is zero chance that any major government, let alone supplier of state-of-the-art missile defense systems will entertain standard Canadian procurement terms like 100% offsets (Industrial and Technological Benefits), or demands for proprietary information including intellectual property and software source code.

Even the smoothest, most expedited traditional procurement in recent Canadian history would not be sufficient.  An expedited process that require elimination or waiver of many extant Canadian defense and public procurement rules is a must if Canada is to procure a missile defense capability expeditiously.

Suppose Canadian Parliament achieved an all-party consensus and unanimously voted to fund and urgently procure a missile defense system including waiving many rules?

It is not clear that vendors will have the available capacity to deliver in the short term given existing factory capacity and orders.

Additional orders from allies will further constrain manufacturers.

US-DoD will likely veto any foreign orders that compete with DoD priorities without a political decision by the Trump Administration and Congress.

Canada is in a weak position to secure scarce defense resources from the Trump Administration for missile defense for many reasons. Canada has virtually no relationship with Japan and South Korea in missile defense.

Missile defense in depth begins with not just US systems like the Space Based Infra Red (SBIR) system and other assets, but also on Japanese and South Korean ISR that give early warning of missile launches.   This will likely extend in the future to engaging missiles during the boost phase or mid-course from forward deployed assets and allies working close together to defeat missiles at the earliest opportunity.

By the time intercepts default to using scarce Ground Based Missile Defense Missiles, the risk of a successful strike rises sharply.

On what basis can Canada have a claim to US allies like South Korea and Japan sharing data, let alone the thought of using up one of their valuable interceptors to shoot down an ICBM heading for a Canadian target?

Joining the US missile defense in no way address the problem of Canada having no claims on allied defense capabilities for the benefit of Canada unless Canada is prepared to offer them a quid quo pro.

Do Canadian politicians understand this?

Japan and S. Korea certainly do.

Beyond negotiating a claim on allied assets for missile defense, it is technically impossible to field a missile defense alone (defeating arrows) without participating in an allied campaign to eliminate the archers.

That would require Canadians commit to an expeditionary capability to the Korean peninsula — something few Canadian leaders have contemplated or have prepared the Canadian public for.

The flippant and lackadaisical attitude Canada have demonstrated to key US allies security concerns is illustrated by Canada’s disregard and ignorance of DPRK threats — barely warranted a mention in the Canadian defense and foreign policy unveiled in June, 2017 that failed to recognize the existential threat to Canada from DPRK.

Both documents were obsolete before they were made public.

On a majority of occasions in recent years, Canada could not even be bothered to issue a statement as DPRK undertook provocative acts like nuclear or missile tests that directly threatened the security of Canada, USA, Japan and S. Korea.

Nor did as provocative an act as a missile test coinciding with a NATO meeting in May 2017 awaken Canada to the threat.

It took until August 11, 2017 for that Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland to call North Korea “A Grave Threat” to the World. Freeland then pledged support to the US (but not other allies) verbally without any specifics or deliverables.

Canada did not bother to protest the missile barrage test of August 25, 2017 though Global Affairs found time to announce Minister Freeland’s meeting about NAFTA in Montreal.

An oversight that might also afflict verbal commitments to the US?

This Canadian attitude of being disconnected from Northeast Asian security concerns is reflected in defense policy. Canada do not regularly participated in major regional military exercises (except RIMPAC) with Japan (except PASSEX) or S. Korea (except 15 troops to ULCHI Freedom Guardian).

When this is compared to Canada’s deployment to EU and Ukraine, it is understandable that allies regard Canada as a not so credible partner in the region.

There is still time to turn this around, beginning with building an all-party consensus in the Parliament of Canada that North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and war aims is an existential threat to Canada, and then, begin to consider what can be done in time to meet the threat.

Future articles will explore how Canada can field a credible defense against DPRK quickly and affordably.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, you can see the following:

http://www.sldforum.com/2017/08/meeting-north-koreas-existential-threat-canada/

 

The Williams Foundation Seminar on Electronic Warfare

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/30/2017

2017-08-26 By Robbin Laird

On August 23, 2017, the Williams Foundation held a seminar on the future of electronic warfare.

With the introduction of the Growler, this has provided a natural hook into the broader discussion of the evolving payloads which need to be part of an integrated 21st century combat force.

The seminar background and focus was described in the run up to the seminar as follows:

An increasingly sophisticated and rapidly evolving threat with ready access to advanced, commercially available off-the-shelf technology is transforming the operational context in which the Australia Defence Force must now survive and fight. 

Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, Chairman, Williams Foundation

The next generation battlespace will be contested across multiple domains with control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum becoming just as important as control of the Air if the Joint Force is to operate with the freedom of manoeuvre necessary to ensure campaign success.

This Seminar seeks to build a common understanding of how the EA-18G Growler, in particular, will impact the Australian Defence Force at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and how Airborne Electronic Attack is likely to shape future Australian Defence and Security policy. 

It will provide a historical perspective on the development of the Royal Australian Air Force’s Electronic Warfare capability dating back to World War 2, and describe how today’s Air Force personnel are raising, training and sustaining the Growler Force in partnership with the United States Navy. 

We will hear the perspectives of the Australian Army, Navy, and the Joint Commanders, as well as contributions from our senior coalition partners in the United States and the United Kingdom.  The emphasis will be on gaining a better understanding of the key enablers and technologies, such as C4I, Electronic Warfare Battle Management, and training systems, which turn the manned and unmanned platforms into Joint Capability delivering sophisticated battlespace effects.

The Seminar will also serve as an opportunity to provide an industry perspective on Electronic Warfare and, in particular, the role they can play as a Fundamental Input to Capability. It will highlight the importance of disruptive technologies, speed to market, and the increasing emphasis on non-kinetic effects to gain operational advantage. Industry participants are invited to address topics including Electronic Warfare Battle Management, training, and the emerging technologies associated with networked, force level effects.  

Above all, the seminar will emphasise the need for a new attitude to Electronic Warfare and, in particular, a need to embrace the arrival of the EA-18G Growler as a catalyst for change.  In doing so, it provides an opportunity to make Electronic Warfare more accessible and understandable to the Joint Force, and develop the Information Age Warfighters necessary to deliver campaign success on future operations.

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/event-2527349

The Williams Seminars now for several years has been looking at the emergence and potential evolution of a fifth-generation combat force.

The most recent seminars have focused directly on shaping and integrated force; and the last one upon how to design an integrated force, rather than to simply shape after market platform integration.

The next seminars will address the challenges of transitioning and shaping a combat force able to operate in and prevail in high tempo operations up to and including high intensity warfare.

In effect, the recent seminar was a case study of the tron warfare piece of building an integrated force which can operate a variety of payloads in a diversity of conflict situations.

At first blush, the Growler and its integration was the focus of attention; but in reality, the seminar was much broader than that due to the focus of attention of the speakers and the interactions with the audience throughout the day.

Group Captain Braz

A report will be produced and along the way articles will be published on Second Line of Defense highlighting the seminar presentations.

In this piece, I simply want to give a sense of the day, rather than to provide detailed reportage on the comments, for that will come in the next few weeks.

The heart of the seminar was provided by a fascinating and wide ranging presentation by the RAAF and US Navy Growler participants.

The presentations highlighted the very flexible and innovative working relationship between the US Navy and the RAAF in delivering Growler to Australia.

This effort provides a model of how to deliver joint combat effects by an allied force.

But both highlighted, that Growler was in many ways a means to an end.

Group Captain Braz emphasized that the RAAF did not want stovepipe EW specialists but rather the delivery of EW or what we call Tron Warfare payloads in the battlespace.

CDR Mike Paul

And even though the Aussies are just now getting Growler, the US Navy is just now working beyond the land wars to sort out how Growler fits into the high intensity battlespace.

And it is clear that the US Navy has much to learn from Australia, a point driven home by the US Navy representative, CDR Mike Paul, Electronic Attack ‘Wing, Pacific Fleet.

In an interview which I did with Group Captain Graz last Spring in Amberley, he highlighted how he saw the Aussie approach.

We need to get the experience which Growler can deliver and share the knowledge.

The difficult thing with Growler is that it delivers non-kinetic effects, and sometimes they’re difficult to measure. We’re used to being able to deliver effects through other systems where the outcome is tangible and measurable.

For a Growler, if you’re attacking a threat system or the people operating that threat system, then often it’s difficult to truly assess how much you’re affecting that system.

You can do trials and tests in certain scenarios, but it’s never quite the same, and so you get a level of confidence about what immediate effect you can achieve, but it’s the secondary and tertiary effects that we’re often looking for that are sometimes harder to measure.

The difficult challenge will become knowing how degraded the network is and how reliable the information is at any given point. 

If you create enough uncertainty in the operators, then you can achieve an effect even if it’s not degraded.

https://sldinfo.com/group-captain-braz-and-the-coming-of-the-growler-to-the-australian-defence-force/

Lt. General (Retired) Davis, recently the Deputy Commandant of Aviation, built from the core perspective of these two Tron Warriors to emphasize that for the USMC, electronic warfare capabilities are something which the insertion force needed as a core capability, not a specialized asset to be flown in from time to time.

He highlighted the Marine Corps approach to enabling the MAGTF with integrated EW capabilities, ranging from Intrepid Tiger pods on aircraft, to the F-35B, to the payloads on Blackjack, and to the coming new UAV which will be payload configurable.

The seminar organizer, John Conway, highlighted during the seminar and in talks after the seminar, the centrality of building EW into the operational art for the evolving combat force.

It is about reshaping the payloads which can be delivered by the integrated force across the spectrum of warfare.

The introduction of the Growler is an important jump start to Australian capabilities, but it comes into the force as the Aussies are working force integration hard.

This effort will inform how they use Growler and according to CDR Mike Paul will be very helpful as the US Navy transitions from a kill chain to a kill web focus.

In short, the seminar provided a case study of shaping a way ahead for broadening the capability which the evolving 21st century combat force can deliver.

Lt. General (Retired) Jon Davis

And as Lt. General (Retired) Davis put it with regard to the Williams Foundation contribution:

“Hats off to the Williams Foundation for what you do.

“You provide a venue where you can share your ideas, be challenged, and to do so in a joint community.

“And it is done in public so can inform a broader discussion.”

Meeting the Challenge of Preparing for Future Conflicts: An Aussie Perspective

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-29 By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to Australia, I had a chance to continue my discussion with Major General (Retired) Jim Molan. He is a frequent commentator in the press and on the media generally on defense issues and with the recently announced Trump policy on Afghanistan as well as the North Korean crisis we had a chance to discuss the evolving policy environment for Australia.

Question: One of the impacts of the Korean crisis is clearly to remind us once again that we need to ramp up our capabilities and focus on the threat of coming high intensity and high temp military operations to defend our democracies.

Given the nature of our evolving forces, how should we view the mobilization challenge underlying the shift towards high intensity warfare?

Major General (Retired) Molan: It would seem to me that mobilization in relation to highly advanced systems is all about increased utilization on them.

I’m not sure that we have even considered that in the ADF. We have a fantastic system for training pilots but in peace time we may aim to train 1.5 pilots per airframe or something along those lines. Whereas, we should at least have plans and capability to very quickly increase our training for an airplane like the JSF, which is easier to fly than the F-18.

The idea of mobilization through increased utilization or whatever must start with government and flow down from government because like all things, it costs.

Question: Perhaps government needs to set up a mobilization department for national security and to provide a funding line.  This would increase not only monies available to the Department of Defence for preparation but also enhance public awareness about the nature of the conflicts we are facing.

Would this make sense?

Major General (Retired) Molan: We clearly need to do something along this line. Mobilization is not focused upon.  For example, the work of John Blackburn where he highlights the relatively small stocks of fuel that we have in Australia provides an example of not being prepared for the kind of disruption which an adversary would clearly aim at in the case of the run up or execution of high intensity operations.

There will be little point of having JSFs in Darwin if you cannot provide them with fuel. This is more than just a Defence issue, it is a national issue like building up Defence Industry in Australia which we are doing relatively well.

To get at this kind of mobilization capability, it will require a significant focus by government on funding and focusing on the core requirements and not just in defense per se. It also needs to be the responsibility of a minister so that someone is accountable and visibility is greater.

Question: Recently, President Trump announced his new policy on Afghanistan.  It is a clear attempt to focus the attention on the broader strategic situation, notably Pakistan and India, and to get out of the endless war ghetto into which Afghanistan has fallen.

 What is your take on the Trump approach?

Major General (Retired) Molan:  This is the first time that we have tried a sustained military presence to train the Afghan Army and to pursue tough action on the neighbors. I think this is the best policy that I have seen, the question I have is, can President Trump implement this policy the way it reads?

I think it’s a good policy but as with every one of these policies, the devil is in the detail of the implementation.

Can he achieve whatever he wants to achieve within four years, or eight years?

It is certainly refreshing that he has said that he is no longer providing operational details in relation to troop numbers.

Question: With regard to Australia and the US approach to allies, what do think the best approach going forward might be?

Major General (Retired) Molan: The first thing I’d say is that the U.S. is too polite to its allies. Far, far too polite to its allies. If anyone is going to change that, President Trump is going to change that.

When military realists like us are saying things internally about supporting the U.S., supporting the allies, and improving our own defense, we don’t get backed up by visiting U.S. people who come to this country and are too polite to us.

I believe that’s a real problem because it creates in the mind of Ministers and Prime Ministers the fact the Americans are very happy with the current state of affairs.

The second one, I think that we need to do much more. The U.S. needs to be frank in relation to the threat. That can be very hard but you can do it at a confidential or secret level.  We need to be much more realistic about the high-level threat.

The third thing is that Australia needs to realize and possibly the U.S. can assist us to realize that a disjointed development of our defense force does not benefit the U.S., or the Western cause as much as a balanced development of our defense force.

What I mean by that is that we are in the process of producing a magnificent Air Force. The Army and the Navy are so far behind that it will detract from where we’re going. The results of producing a magnificent Air Force but an Army and a Navy that cannot keep up means that the only thing the U.S. gets is a squadron of Growlers and a couple of squadron of JSFs.

If the U.S. encourages Australia to produce a balanced force, then either we can operate independently as a balanced and integrated joint force, or we can operate as part of the coalition as a balanced and integrated joint force.

The ADF has never been better than it is now and that our defense policy has never been better. But the strategic environment is significantly worse than when we planned for our force modernization.

We need to develop a generic operational concept, which expresses how Australia should react to a significant threat below the level of a fight for national survival. In a fight for national survival, anything goes.

What I’m saying is that a significant war of necessity may require from Australia an equally significant force deployment, far in excess of what we have done for years and years and years, because the strategic environment is so challenging.

If we are serious about Australian defense then we need to be serious about such a contingency. The question we need to ask is: Are we really designing a force capable of joint and integrated operations or are we creating an ADF that is still only capable of sending small contingents to fight beside a major ally.

We have done various analytical assessments along this line which suggest that an objective force of about 15,000 to 20,000 personnel is the minimum that would be needed, involving most Navy and Air Force assets (but not necessarily personnel), but a third of Army personnel in units.

This force should be able to be mobilized in a relatively short period of time (my judgement as an objective for government would be in less than 6 months) to be capable of conducting joint sophisticated warfighting operations against a peer competitor, and be sustained before rotation in various levels of combat for at least six to 12 months.

For the earlier interview, see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/shaping-a-21st-century-australian-defense-major-general-retired-jim-molan-looks-at-the-challenges/

Editor’s Note: The following biography of Jim Molan was taken from Wikipedia:

Major General Andrew James “Jim” Molan AO, DSC (born 11 April 1950) is a former senior officer in the Australian Army.

During his career he was Commanding Officer of the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, Commander of the Army’s mechanised 1st Brigade, Commander of the 1st Division and its Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, and the Commander of the Australian Defence College.

In April 2004, he deployed for a year to Iraq to serve as the Chief of Operations for the new Headquarters Multinational Force in Iraq. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross by the Australian Government, and the Legion of Merit by the United States Government. In August 2008 Molan released his first book, Running the War in Iraq.

Following his retirement from the army, Molan was appointed by the Abbott Government as a special envoy for Operation Sovereign Borders and was subsequently credited with being an architect of the coalition’s Stop the Boats Australian border protection and asylum-seeker policies.

In 2016 Molan was endorsed by the Liberal Party as a candidate for the Senate representing New South Wales at the 2016 federal election.

In August 2008 Molan released his first book, Running the War in Iraq. The book concentrated on his experience as Chief of Operations in Iraq during 2004–05, and contained some criticism about Australia’s capacity to engage in military conflict.

In an August 2008 speech, Molan stated that: “Our military competence was far worse than even we thought before East Timor, and people may not realise that the military performance bar has been raised by the nature of current conflict, as illustrated in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Writing in a February 2009 article, Molan called for a doubling of the Australian military presence in Afghanistan, from about 1,100 troops to 2,000.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jim_Molan

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please see the following:

Preparing for Future Conflicts: A Discussion with Major General (Retired) Jim Molan

 

 

Australian Defense Industry at the Cutting Edge: The Case of CEA Technologies

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
08/29/2017

2017-08-23 By Robbin Laird

I have been writing for some time about the strategic shift or one could call revolution to building software upgradeable systems.

The new multi-mission platforms on sea or in the air such as the Australian ANZAC Class frigates or the Wedgetail are simply different from legacy platforms for they are modernized differently.

A key challenge for the acquisition and policy community is to adjust their thinking to the new reality and to understand how radically different the new “platforms” are compared to the legacy ones.

Recently, the head of Air Force Materiel Command highlighted how significant the challenge of changing the mental furniture and acquisition procedures to get out of the way of technology, and rather than retarding progress, accelerate it.

Recently, General Ellen Pawlikowski, Commander of Air Force Materiel Command, provided a hard-hitting overview on how important and necessary she believes a breakthrough is on the management of software upgradeability.

At a Mitchell Institute breakfast meeting on July 14, 2017, she focused on the barriers and the need to shape a combat force that is empowered by agile software development.

Her presentation focused on what she referred to as the cultural barriers to change. She bluntly asserted that the current acquisition approach guarantees that unnecessary review and control layers in the bureaucracy will persist and continue to slow software upgradeability. 

One could easily ask how many acquisition officials can even read let alone write code, but the broader point is that the so-called oversight system needs to be radically changed.

The General was kinder and gentler than I am being here.

The General was kinder and gentler than I am being here.

But she was certainly direct enough in her outstanding presentation on the challenge and how to meet it.

The acquisition system has been built around a 20th century systems engineering model, one which sets requirements and designs the way ahead in a manner in an iterative requirements process which is simply inappropriate for a software driven force.

“We are very much enamored with our systems engineering processes in the Department of Defense.

“We have processes that drive us to start with requirements and continue to work those requirements through rigorous testing.

“When I was on the job at SMC I learned that OCS had failed their preliminary design review.

“But preliminary design reviews don’t make any sense when you are doing software development.

 “Agile Software development is all about getting capability out there.

 “The systems engineers approach drive you to a detailed requirements slow down.”

 She highlighted that this cultural barrier, namely reliance on the historical systems engineering approach, needed to be removed.

 “We have to change the way we think about requirements definition if we’re going to really adopt Agile Software Development.

 “Maybe the answer isn’t this detailed requirements’ slow down.”

 “By the way, once you put it in the hands of the operator maybe some of those requirements you had in the beginning, maybe they don’t make any sense anymore because the operator sees how they can actually use this and they change it.”

 She went on to highlight what the Aussies are doing in Willliamtown with Wedgetail without mentioning them at all. 

 “You need to put the coder and the user together…

“We have to empower at the right level, and that has to be at the level of the person that’s going to use the software, and we have to stop thinking about independent OT.”

She then went after the way sustainment is thought about for the software enterprise.

“The other thing that we have is this idea that software is developed and then sustained.

“What the heck does that mean?

“Software doesn’t break.

“You may find something that doesn’t work the way you thought it was, but it doesn’t break.

“You don’t bring it in for corrosion mitigation or overhaul on the engines.

“When you’re look at what we do in software sustainment a lot of it is continually improving the software.”

https://sldinfo.com/software-upgradeability-and-combat-dominance-general-ellen-pawlikowski-looks-at-the-challenge/

I will focus again on the Wedgetail case in my most recent interview with the Wing Commander in charge of Wedgetail, but during this visit to Canberra had a chance to visit a leading center on developing software based radar technologies for the Australian Defence Force, and to view how the company builds its radars and evolves its technologies.

CEA Technologies was founded in 1983, and specializes in the design, development and manufacture of advanced radar and communications solutions for civil and military applications.

I had a chance during this visit to Canberra to discuss CEA and its approach with Ian Croser, Technical Director, CEA, with more than 30 years of experience in the radar business, a period in which radar technology has been transformed into a multi-function, multi-mission software enabled even defined combat capability.

Question: What is CEA Technologies?

Ian Croser: It’s a private Australian company, but it has a significant shareholding from Northrop Grumman. It is an Australian controlled company. CEA works closely with Defence to achieve National strategic outcomes.

Question: During the tour of the facility, it was clear that you tightly control the development and manufacturing process, in part certainly to enhance the security of the product and the process. Could you describe your approach?

Ian Croser: It’s hugely important to control the development and manufacturing processes because, the design and the development of individual modules and subsystems don’t all come together at the same time. And that brings with it some real issues when you subcontract out design to subcontractors.

Because the moment you subcontract them out, you’ve effectively lost daily control over them.

Having the ability for our teams to be co-resident, and all talking to each other, solves so many problems for us. In time, in quality, in functionality, you end up with a better, lower cost and more secure solution.

Question: When you viewed the racks and the boards, you noted that none of these boards was COTS and that they all are built internally.

 How important is it to control that board, from a security and also a performance point of view?

Ian Croser: From both points of view it’s extraordinarily important because, if you are buying a board, you don’t necessarily have all the controls over where the components come from, how they got to you, and how they’re treated, before they actually get embedded in the board.

And they’re all points at which somebody may do something that you don’t desire.

From a performance point of view, COTS boards are all things for all people. Our boards are formed to fit into our space and weight and technology requirements, and we can better fit them into a smaller space.

For example, in the array digital backend area, if we had used COTS boards, it’d be many times larger than it is now, and it wouldn’t actually fit into our design baseline.

You wouldn’t be able to implement our approach.

There’s really no choice but to build our own boards and embed them in the system.

Question: Let us turn to the radar revolution in which we have moved from building a largely single purpose commodity into a multi-mission, multi-function upgradeable system.

How would you describe the shift?

Ian Croser: A conventional, mechanically-scanned radar, for example, is comprised of a large number of configuration items, all of them different and very few are used in multiple positions.

That means that in design and in build there is a lot of effort to mature those different elements.

These separate pieces have to be integrated and failures in just one subpart, generally impacts availability of the whole system. Integration requires significant time and effort to bring together the separate parts to form the whole.

It is completely different with active phased array radars.

The high density functional modularity has suddenly become available and implementable. As a result we are building a very small number of unique configuration items, but building lots of them.

When we put them together, we get the resilience of parallelism, so if one module fails, it’s just one of a large number operating in parallel.

The functional and physical modularity along with the independence of modules means that the resilience to damage and the resilience to occasional failures, is very high.

This has enormous beneficial impact on the sustainment process. Individual failures no longer force repairs before or during a mission; you can just carry on with a small proportion of the array that might have failed or have been damaged.

The repair can then be scheduled at a time and place of convenience.

It shapes a whole new way of sustaining capability at sea, for example.

Question: This new generation of radars is software defined and software rich. How does the software approach change the nature of the development and modernization game?

Ian Croser: The modularity of the hardware has to be matched by the modularity of the software and the firmware.

If you can isolate the application specific personality of the radar from the software base, then the software and the firmware becomes similar to an operating system.

It supports the rapid application change process without itself needing to change.

It’s sitting there underneath, and interfacing into the hardware, and when you tell it to do something, it does it. So if you tell it to point a beam in a given direction, then all of the distributed functionality that is across the array will do that, without needing to be ‘hard programmed’ to achieve new outcomes.

The radar personality, the application specific functionality is built into a small dataset that informs the system how it should operate under a given circumstance.

All of the software/firmware functions are just waiting to be organized in different directions and different sequences and with different parameters to be able to do their desired functions.

It is that small dataset running in an organizational set of boards that tell the system what to do, when to do it, how to do it, without changing the software and firmware.

Question: This provides for inherent transferability across radars operating in air, sea or land and can allow for enhanced efficiency in joint capabilities and joint investment.

How would you describe this process or approach?

Ian Croser: The objective is to reduce the number of software baselines being maintained across multiple platforms and operating domains.

This approach frees up a lot of development capability, and it means that the commonality and the interoperability is inherent and enhanced.

Even if you haven’t brought forward a particular function in a particular application and platform, if it’s in the common software base, then it’s a really simple thing to bring forward and use.

It’s more about integration with the rest of the platform capability than it is about the radar itself.

Implementation of a ‘Task Based Interface’ and control methodology has effectively insulated the Combat Management System from major change cycles in response to new applications.

This software baseline, when combined with the modularity of the hardware, allows the design and build of scalable radar, which can readily fit into different platforms across land, sea and air domains.

There is not a lot of work to bring a new application online.

It changes the whole way in which you think about multi-function capabilities, different applications, and how those applications interact with one another.

Question: The US Navy is starting to move forward with procuring a new frigate. I have written about the significant opportunity for the US forces to leverage allied investments and capabilities in accelerating the modernization of US forces as well.

It would seem to me that the frigate is an ideal case not only in terms of taking a foreign design but most certainly with the outstanding and combat tested frigate equipment already deployed on the frigates of our allies.

It would seem to be a no brainer to look seriously at your radar for this program so that the US Navy can ramp up the time when they could get a functioning frigate at sea.

After all, powerpoint slides for potential systems kill audiences, not adversaries.

What are your thoughts along these lines?

Ian Croser: It could make sense for the US Navy on several grounds.

Cost is a clear advantage and risk is contained by having operational systems already in place.

Shared investments with a core ally can also accelerate joint capabilities.

Interoperability is built in and the Australian Navy is already shaping the Conops of the system at sea.

It is only in the past decade that navies have looked beyond the organic role of radars onboard ships to think of fleet interactivity among radars at sea.

CEAFAR certainly is designed to do this and with the inbuilt multifunction capability and commonality there is significant enhancement to distributed lethality.

Question: With the shift in focus towards, high tempo and high intensity operations, mobilization becomes as important as modernization to combat success.

It is clear in walking around the plant and looking at your approach, mobilization capabilities are built in.

Could you highlight this aspect of the inherent potential of your manufacturing process?

Ian Croser: The key to ramp up is to embed high functionality and high performance at printed circuit board level.

Because now, component reliability has far outstripped system availability, it is possible to provide programmable and function rich systems with wide and inexpensive growth factors.

If you put all the effort into embedding rich functionality into the board itself, the flow on sustainment costs also benefit, that’s the really key process.

Now once you’ve got the board, if you’ve designed it right, it can be manufactured on standard automated production lines at very low cost.

Because of the modularity and building lots of a small number of configuration items, you can now build the synergy in manufacturing to push through large volumes of work, very quickly.

And of course, all of the test jigs and all of the capability to manage those few items also benefit from the modularity.

So you end up with a whole different way of manufacturing, testing, integrating, and delivering high capability at low cost.

Appendix: CEA Company Profile

CEA Technologies was established in 1983 by two former Naval Officers with a goal of creating a centre of excellence for the design and support of systems for the Australian Defence Force. From the outset, CEA Technologies was based on the provision of uncompromising design principles and robust through life system support, this philosophy became an enduring driver of CEA’s business.

“Solutions with Commitment” was established as a pivotal tenet of CEA practices and remains the company’s primary driver in business conduct ensuring that the company continues to be at the forefront of innovation. Throughout its brief history CEA’s achievements have continued to accumulate resulting in the company growing to become an internationally recognized, world-leading radar and communication systems supplier.

The company continually endeavors to expand its reach into the international market and successfully exports to the USA, Europe, the Middle East and Pacific countries. A steady and continuous corporate growth has resulted in a corporate staff exceeding 270 people located across its four facilities in Australia (Adelaide, Canberra [HQ], Melbourne and Perth) and in the USA.

One of the company’s greatest achievements came about in November 2010 when CEA delivered to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) a world first – the first fourth generation Active Phased Array Radar (PAR) System to be brought into service.

http://www.cea.com.au/!Global/Directory.php?Location=Home:Home

An Update on Wedgetail: And Shaping a Way Ahead with a Software Upgradeable Multi-Mission 21st Century Combat Capability

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-23 By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Canberra in August 2017, I was able to continue my discussion with Officer Commanding No 42 Wing, Group Captain Stuart Bellingham about the Wedgetail and its evolution.

After the recent presentation by the head of the USAF Materiel Command underscored the challenge of agile software development for DoD, I had a chance to pick up some of the same themes from the Wedgetail experience which provided some useful insights into the way ahead.

“As we have discussed before, we have a software upgradable jet.

“This is brilliant and gives us a lot of agility.

“And leveraging the software has meant that we come from being a program of concern back in 2009 to becoming a cutting edge airborne command and control capability.

“We are not just focused on ourselves, but how we can evolve our jet to be a greater contributor in the joint and coalition space.

“In order to write software that supports us being able to share ones and zeros effectively is dependent on an agreed understanding on tactics techniques procedures and standards that support how we are incorporate software and how we build it to make sure we’re actually all aligned so that when we go out and work together we’re on the same wavelength, so to speak.

“That is a significant challenge.

“To do so, we are focused on engagement and education, trying to get people to understand the capability that we bring to the fight.

“With E7, everyone straight away just thinks traditional AWACS vice what we’ve got, which is a dynamic software upgradable aircraft with a very different system and approach than the legacy AWACS.”

Question: When we went to Fallon, it was clear that if the TTP efforts could be combined with software code rewrite at a place like NAWDC, the Navy’s path to a kill web would be accelerated.

What is your thought about that kind of cross-linking?

Group Captain Stuart Bellingham: “It is essential.

“As we pair up the new platforms and sort through how to work together, we will shape the TTPs, for example, operating P-8s and Wedgetails.

“As our procedures evolve, we need to rewrite the software on each platform to maximize the ability to work together.

“In fact, later this year we are holding our first two day working sessions between the P-8 and Wedgetail communities which will be a foundation towards working towards that goal.

“When one looks towards the prospects of high tempo and high intensity operations, we will need well developed interoperability and that requires the new platforms, TTPs and software development all working hand in hand before we are in combat.

“Otherwise, we are at significant risk.

“If we can already have the same base line for how our ones and zeros communicate, that’s half the battle to get there.

“Then we can just develop and evolve from that.

“I think it’s going to be increasingly important.

“It’s fundamental to how we’re going to go forward because what is clear to me from recent involvement in Talisman Sabre 17, is that if we’re not doing joint/combined, if we’re thinking component or thinking single-nation type approach, we are vulnerable and we’re not going to succeed.”

Question: The SPO is next door to your hangar. 

Could you talk about the working process between the code rewriters and the operators?

Group Captain Stuart Bellingham: “It’s a tight team.

“We have a budget within which we have funded builds of software but we have a great flexibility within each build to provide the operators with their most urgent requirements.

“We have just incorporated what we term our in-service build or ISB, 5.0 onto our Aircraft, which is a new software build.

“We’re already working on the next software build. It’s not something that we do in a reactive sense.

“These are all proactive / predictive options that we have in place and that we will utilize to continue to enhance the capability of the aircraft.  They’re roughly at about 18-month apart for the block upgrades.

“Most of the great changes come from not just the engineers but from the guys who are actually operating the radar in combat.

“It’s really challenging, not just for the engineers and the operators here in the wing as we try to harmonize and make sure that the programs are working but it’s also a challenge for the people out flying the airplane because they need to keep current with the software builds.”

“We forecast forward and we request budget allocation to support these upgrades.”

For earlier interviews with Group Captain Bellingham, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-the-australian-wedgetail-and-its-evolution-a-discussion-with-group-captain-stuart-bellingham/

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-williamtown-airbase-the-wedgetail-in-evolution/

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-wedgetail-at-williamtown-airbase/

https://sldinfo.com/the-wedgetail-the-raaf-and-shaping-a-way-ahead-for-the-australian-defense-force-a-discussion-with-the-commanding-officer-of-the-42nd-wing/

The first slideshow highlights the recent visit of the Indonesian Air Force to Williamtown Air Base and going onboard the Wedgetail.

The second slideshow highlights the Wedgetail at Red Flag 17-1.

The photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.

 

The Chinese Challenge WITHIN Australia

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-08-29 The PRC is not simply playing classic global power politics.

They are working within key allied nations, including key ones like Australia and the United States, to achieve their power ambilitions.

In an interview earlier this month, Ross Babbage, the Australian strategist discussed the challenge as follows:

We then discussed the nature of the challenge posed by the illiberal powers.

“If we focus on the Chinese and the Russians, they’ve had a substantial level of success in the last decade because they’re applying many more instruments of national power in a focused way and taking greater risks to achieve strategic success.

“They are applying economic tools, information warfare tools, geo-strategic tools, espionage, cyber as well as diplomatic and military tools, working within the liberal democracies to influence public opinion and coerce governments and they are doing so within integrated strategies.

“And even if they themselves are rivals, they are playing off of each other’s efforts to create a learning curve with regard to how to enhance their power at the expense of the liberal democracies.”

“In contrast, the liberal democracies have yet to recognize neither the true nature of the challenges nor the need to enhance their arsenal of integrated tools to deal with them.

“And notably, governments are not focused on the internal challenge which the penetration of the Chinese and Russian operations into European, American and Australian societies is posing.”

And here there is a clear parallel to what the German government did in the run up to World War II in terms of augmenting their domestic influence in France, Britain and other European societies.

“In spite of leadership differences, the liberal democracies have far more in common than they differ. There is also a generational challenge. Since the end of the Cold War, the stark contrast between democratic and authoritarian values have not been as clear to our publics, especially to our younger people.

“Yet the Chinese, the Russians, the North Koreans and the Iranians, just to mention the most prominent authoritarian powers, have little in common with our values. We are paying a big price for not highlighting the true nature of the illiberal regimes to our publics.

“Recently, the Prime Minister of Australia, despite his difficult initial discussion with President Trump, made it clear that the North Korean threat to the United States and Australia created common cause and the need for a common response.

“The fundamentals of the ANZUS alliance remain as relevant as ever. The PM was very clear that a thuggish regime with nuclear weapons threatened our way of life.

“We need more recognition of this and preparation for the contest and conflict starring us in the face. This is the real world; not the world we wish we were living in.”

“Part of the problem here, in my view, is that we have not done a good job of telling our publics about the appalling track record of the Russians, and the Chinese, and the others.

“There are some notable exceptions.

“For example, a really good series of reports on ABC Australia in June highlighted the Chinese penetration of Australia, their cyber operations, their attempts at bribery and corruption and the threat which these operations pose to Australia.

“This series triggered further press reporting and to government decisions to review policies and legal frameworks to deal with the internal espionage, cyber and broader challenge posed by the Chinese and others.”

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-04/the-chinese-communist-partys-power-and-influence-in-australia/8584270

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-06-11/china-communist-party-seeks-news-influence-australia-deals/8607754

 

Credit: ABC News, Australia

“There is, however, a long way to go. We need to focus much more strongly on the global competitors who don’t share our values and who are working actively to damage us seriously or bring us down. We need to make our own public’s aware of what’s going on, but also project information and other operations back into the counties that are dominated by these kinds of regimes.

An article published in the Australian Financial Review and dated August 29, 2017 focused directly on the challenge posed by Beijing stirring up “red hot patriotism: among Chinese students studying in Australia.

“The challenge for [Australia] is, how do we cope with the fact that our single biggest customer is instructing students and teachers to have red hot patriotic sentiment when they are in Australia,” said Mr Garnaut said.

He was quoting President Xi, who has previously listed “red hot patriotic sentiment” alongside economic power, abundant intellectual resources and extensive business relations as important strengths that will help realise the collective Chinese “dream”.

“One of [Chinese President] Xi Jinping’s objectives has been to ensure that the party can project its interests into the world, including following Chinese people wherever they go.”