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The USMC is changing significantly as it shifts from the land wars to its evolving role as the nation’s key full spectrum insertion force.
An entire generation of Marines has fought ashore and become a flexible land force; with the drawdown in the land wars in the Middle East, the Marines have returned to the sea and are for a new generation learning how to operate from the sea base.
But under the twin impact of the Osprey and the F-35B this is unlike any Navy-Marine Corps team to operate from the sea.
The Marines can operate at distance and with greater lethality from the sea.
And also, crucial to the reworking of the Navy-Marine corps team operating from the sea has been the evolution of the amphibious task force itself.
The classic ARG-MEU operating within a 200-mile operational box dictated by the rotorcraft onboard has changed dramatically as the Osprey has liberated the ships to operate at much greater distance from one another.
A new generation operational capability of the disaggregated force able to operate from the amphibious task force has emerged.
The amphibious task force is a work in progress as new capabilities are added to the force, such as the CH-53K, the new heavy lift element and unmanned systems.
These systems are being incorporated into the most flexible and lethal insertion force built in history.
For the Marines, unmanned systems have been utilized significantly during their participation in the land wars.
The Marines have operated the Shadow unmanned systems along with the Army in the Middle East; this UAV requires land basing and as such goes against the grain of the return to the sea and the evolution of the amphibious task force.
It is their other unmanned system – namely the ScanEagle, whose origin was at sea – that has formed to core experience being taken to sea.
And along with it the next round of unmanned development for the Marines, namely the Blackjack or as it is known in its commercial variant, the Integrator.
To understand the role of these systems within the overall evolution of the Marine Corps, I had a chance to talk with Art Crowe, a former Marine, now working with Insitu, the company responsible both for ScanEagle and Blackjack.
Civilian contractors from Insitu Inc., launch a Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle from the flight deck of the amphibious dock-landing ship USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44). Credit: Navy Media Content Services, 4/28/12
Art Crowe is a former Harrier pilot who was the Operations officer of VMU-2 in 2003-2004.
He participated in the first battle of Fallujah and his combat experience clearly guides his thinking on how remotes can provide a combat edge for Marines as they build out their amphibious capabilities.
UAS’ for the Marines are to be understood in the context of the overall evolution of the amphibious task force and the flexibility the commander of the force will be looking for.
He may operate the UAS from the ship to assist Marines inserting force for a short duration mission.
He may take that UAS from the ship and operate it ashore with deployed Marines.
It is the flexibility of the overwatch asset and evolving payload flexibility of the UAS that will be important to that commander going forward.
But this is a work in progress, much like the core system being deployed, the Blackjack is a work in progress.
Question: What was the origin of the coming of ScanEagle to the Marine Corps?
Crowe: General Conway, later Commandant of the USMC, was in Iraq in 2004 and was looking for support for his maneuver force.
He wanted a way to get support from an effective UAS without having to wait for a long acquisition process.
He got that through a services contract with Insitu whereby the company provided ISR services but operated the assets.
The Marines provided security and operational support; the company operated the asset and delivered the product to the Marines.
Question: This was the origin then of a company operated and company owned system. What was the advantage to both company and the Corps of such an approach?
Crowe: The company could evolve the capabilities of ScanEagle in concert with the feedback from their UAS Operators and Marines on their operational needs.
Rather than going through a long requirements generation process, the company could evolve the capabilities of the aircraft and the payloads to provide for the services the Marines required.
This allowed for rapid innovation and adaptation to customer needs.
The payloads then evolved over time to provide data to meet the evolving needs of the USMC, with the service contract delivering the payoff for the company.
ScanEagle’s latest generation of infrared/electro-optical sensors is the 900 series of turrets.
And this evolution of capability has been driven by the company in interaction with the USMC, the US Navy and other DoD and foreign customers.
ScanEagle has become a product and capability deployed worldwide.
The genesis of ScanEagle was in fact to support weather reconnaissance and commercial fishing fleets, so it has been a maritime-proven platform from the beginning.
The return to the sea for the Marines has provided a venue within which ScanEagle has returned home so to speak.
Question: One of the other deployed UAS from Insitu is the RQ-21A Blackjack.
How was this procured and how is it being used?
Crowe: The Navy and Marines procured The Blackjack through the traditional procurement model.
The Navy approved acquisition in 2010 and operated the first Early Operational Capability (EOC) Blackjacks in 2014.
The Program achieved Initial Operational Capability in 2016.
PACIFIC OCEAN, Calif., — Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 (Reinforced) attached to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit load the flight deck of the USS San Diego (LPD-22) with several air assets, April 11, 2017. The 15th MEU uses the air assets provided from VMM-161 to transport personnel and equipment from ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore efficiently. The 15th MEU’s rapid ability to mobilize people and equipment makes the amphibious force uniquely postured to respond to any mission around the globe. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Timothy Valero)
The Blackjack is different from ScanEagle.
While it operates with similar launch and recovery equipment, it is larger and designed to be an air vehicle that can operate a variety of payloads.
The aircraft is built around a center of gravity payload bay.
It is a modular set up where you can configure a variety of payloads.
There is room on the air vehicle for up to 39 pounds of payloads, which operate with up to 500 watts of power.
As long as you can meet those requirements and operate with the interface control, you can integrate various payloads.
The Marines have operated ashore and have now brought it to the amphibious force.
Blackjack is configured to operate off of San Antonio class L ships. It first deployed last year with the 22nd MEU and is currently operating with deployed forces.
Operating a UAS off of a ship can be more challenging than ashore.
Integrating the air platform within the workflow of the ship is one challenge; operating with the different operational impacts of the air fleet is another.
And working the launch and recovery can be more challenging in a dynamic shipboard environment. This continues to be a focus of effort for the Blackjack team.
Question: The sun setting of the Prowler has set the stage for another key development for the Blackjack, namely providing support for the MAGTF along with the F-35 for electronic warfare.
How do you see this challenge?
Crowe: The sun setting of the Prowler in 2019 is a key driver of needed capability.
The payload flexibility of the Blackjack means that it could be part of the EW capability for deployed Marines and because we are working the shipboard integration it could be part of that package as well for the at sea force.
It is a work in progress but a key part of the way ahead for the Marines and Blackjack.
Editor’s Note: With regard to the Scan Eagle and its coming to the Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan, then head of 2nd MAW, General “Dog” Davis, underscored that combining UAVs with Harriers at FOB Dwyer created a powerful combat capability:
From the time they left station and the time they were back overhead in about 30, 35 minutes.
That kind of performance and capability is unique for a TACAIR platform.
By investing up front in FOB Dwyer, we could take 10 STOVL attack aircraft and make 10 airplanes perform like 40 anywhere else.
FOB Dwyer was more than just a Harrier strip.
It was a combat strip.
We based some of our VMUs down there flying both Scan Eagle and Shadow UAVs.
We initially sized the length of Dwyer based on what it took us to get a fully loaded C130 with a full bag of gas and full logistics load in there.
And on a hot day, and at the filed elevations we are dealing with in that part of Afghanistan that comes out to about a 4,000 foot strip.
The template for the Marine Corps in the future should allow us to operate at full capability wherever we can put 4,000 foot strip.
We published a four part video series in 2013, which shoed the Scan Eagle from preparation to flight, to flight, and return as well as operators comments about the use of the Scan Eagle in Afghanistan.
At last weekend’s 16th annual Shangri-La Asia Security Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis focused on reassuring U.S. allies anxious about the sustainability of security commitments in the face of North Korean threats and China’s security ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region.
In his keynote speech, Mattis stressed that geography, ideology, socioeconomic ties, and concrete mutual economic and security interests invariably position the United States as an Asia-Pacific power.
He noted that he and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson had earlier made critical trips to the region to underscore that point.
The Defense Secretary affirmed that the administration would “work together with our long-time, steadfast allies to maximize regional security. … we will not use our allies and partners, or the capabilities integral to their security, as bargaining chips.”
SINGAPORE (June 3, 2017) Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis delivers opening remarks during the first plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue 2017 June 3. The Shangri-La Dialogue, held annually by the independent think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), is an inter-governmental security forum which is attended by defense ministers and delegates from more than 50 nations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Fulton/Released)
Mattis clearly described alliances as a positive good rather than as a security burden: “Alliances provide avenues for peace, fostering the conditions for economic growth with countries that share the same vision, while tempering the plans of those who would attack other nations or try to impose their will over the less powerful.”
He also reviewed how the administration was strengthening ties with key allies, noting that, “Our combined interoperability with allied forces – enhanced through force posture initiatives – ensures we are prepared to cooperate during real-world crises.”
With Japan, the Pentagon would continue to execute the 2015 defense guidelines, which expanded the functional and geographic scope of bilateral security cooperation.
Even as Mattis spoke, large-scale Japanese-U.S. military exercises were taking place in the Sea of Japan, with the participation of two carrier strike groups, from the USS Carl Vinson and USS Ronald Reagan, and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) destroyers Hyuga and Ashigara.
At the forum, Japan’s Defence Minister Tomomi Inada said Tokyo would take other measures to strengthen alliance ties and back whatever response the United States would pursue to end the DPRK threat.
With Australia, Mattis highlighted how Australian and U.S. forces have fought together in in every major battlefield over the past century and remained critical to contemporary regional stability.
With the Philippines, the United States would continue “to train, advise, and assist” the Philippine armed forces against common threats such as violent extremist organizations.
Mattis even expressed intent to sustain ties with Thailand, “our oldest ally in the region,” as the Thai military returned the country to civilian governance.
In terms of non-allied partners, Mattis singled out “India’s indispensable role in maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean region” but also noted that the United States was “conducting the first-ever transfer of a coast guard cutter to Vietnam, and we just completed the inaugural US-Singapore air detachment in Guam, which will help build interoperability between our forces.”
When a questioner said that Trump seemed like an “unbeliever” in a rules-based global order given his withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and from the Paris Climate Agreement as well as his critical tone at the most recent NATO summit, Mattis cited the President’s successful meetings in the Middle East, where he mobilized a massive coalition against terrorism, and his “standing with the NATO allies 100 percent” while in Brussels.
Another theme of Mattis’ presentation was “the deep and abiding [U.S.] commitment to reinforcing the rules-based international order… [and the] principles underwrite stability and build trust, security, and prosperity… like equal respect for international law, regardless of a nation’s size or wealth; and freedom of navigation and overflight, including keeping shipping lanes open, for all nations’ commercial benefit.”
In 2016, Ashton Carter called for a “principled security network” to build multilateral cooperation among individual and states to address shared security problems.
Carter promoted the pooling of Asian military resources “more effectively and efficiently than ever before” to build a “Asia-Pacific security network” that “weaves everyone’s relationships together – bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral – to help all of us do more, over greater distances, with greater economy of effort.”
Mattis neither repeated Carter’s formulation nor offered his own security architecture concept, but overtly welcomed allied and partner cooperation, with as well as independently of the Pentagon.
He stated that U.S. policies aimed to “empower countries in the region so they can be even stronger contributors to their own peace and stability.”
The Secretary acknowledged Americans’ historical reluctance to engage in global affairs and frustrations at having to bear the biggest burden in sustaining the current world order and existing security alliances, but said the administration was eager to pursue bilateral trade deals and sustain multiple forms of global security cooperation.
Mattis was surprisingly blunt in criticizing Chinese policies.
He singled out his concern for China’s construction of “artificial islands ….and indisputable militarization of facilities on features in international waters undermine regional stability for its “blatant disregard for international law” … “contempt for other nations’ interests; and its efforts to dismiss non-adversarial resolution of issues.”
Mattis dismissed Chinese objections to the U.S. THAAD deployment against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It was not done “to protect the South Korean people from an imaginary problem.”
If China does not want to see “more (U.S.) military capability into the Northwest Pacific, then we have to address the [DPRK] problem that “is driving regional defensive buildups.
However, Mattis did not spell out how the United States and its allies would induce China to change its disruptive regional policies, especially while concurrently seeking Beijing’s cooperation to pressure North Korea to change its own behavior.
There was also a difference in tone from previous secretaries regarding Taiwan.
Rather than ignore the question like previous secretaries at Shangri-La, Mattis overtly stated that, “The department of defense remains steadfastly committed to working with Taiwan and with its democratic government to provide it the defense articles necessary, consistent with the obligations set out in the Taiwan relations act, because we stand for the peaceful resolution of any issues in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan strait.”
In concluding, Mattis reviewed the steps the Trump administration strengthening U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and insisted that U.S. freedom of navigation operations would continue.
Mattis noted the critically of U.S. military power for achieving these deterrence, defense and diplomacy-related goals.
The Pentagon, he explained, wants to enable “our diplomats to address tough issues from a position of strength.”
Mattis related that the Pentagon now has 60 percent of all its ships in the Pacific Command’s AOR, as well as slightly over half the Army and proximately two-thirds of fleet marine forces.
By his reckoning, 60 percent of U.S tactical aviation assets deployed oversees will soon be in the Pacific as well.
However, Mattis might have shown more enthusiasm for Congressional initiatives to increase U.S. defense spending in the region rather than just expressing an openness to work with those members, such as Senator John McCain and Representative Mac Thornberry, who are pushing to reinforce U.S. military capabilities in Asia with a multi-billion dollar spending boost.
The Air Force plans to replace their aging UH-1N Huey fleet with up to 84 new helicopters.
The UH-1Ns are utilized for a continuous contingency response for the security of the nation’s ICBM complexes throughout Wyoming, Montana & North Dakota as well as the continuity of government mission in the Washington D.C. area.
The UH-1Ns age is showing, and they are unable to meet the key requirements for speed, range, payload and operations in a compromised environment.
Driven by urgency the replacement was initially sought as a sole source contract extended to Sikorsky for their state of the art HH-60U “Ghost Hawk.”
The contract is now open to manufacturers to bid platforms that meet the requirements outlined to date in the RFP.
However, the requirements and bid philosophy appear to be evolving, with a second draft RFP and industry discussions taking place to dial in the details.
It is anticipated requirements will be finalized this summer.
The Air Force plans to move quickly to award a contract in FY18, and take deliveries of the new helicopter in 2020.
While the list of contenders for this contract has not yet been finalized, two players have stepped forward.
Sikorsky has proposed their HH-60U, the latest version of their HH-60 line of military helicopters utilized by all 5 service branches.
Boeing has teamed (as prime contractor) with AugustaWestland to propose a militarized version of very commercially successful AugustaWestland AW139, namely the MH-139.
Given the military services widespread use of the Sikorsky military aircraft, there would appear to be obvious advantages to utilize the Sikorsky, such as fleet commonality and already established depot structures. These aspects would seem to sway the decision most naturally to the HH-60U.
Yet in the contract competition the Air Force does not allow an advantage to Sikorsky of offering a widely supported military aircraft already in service.
This means that the competition allows a commercial derivative that meets the performance requirements to have a place in the competition for the 84 helicopters which the contract envisages.
Boeing is offering such a derivative and projects savings from such.
According to David Koopersmith, Vice President and General Manager at Boeing’s Vertical Lift Division the selection of the MH-139 will provide a savings to the Air Force of $1 billion over its 30 year lifecycle.
The challenge for the USAF is to ensure that indeed any Sikorsky alternative meets the Air Force performance requirements and the bid meets the American content and any other specified requirements.
During a visit to Philadelphia I had a chance to take a closer look at the MH-139 platform and substantive aspects of the Boeing/AugustaWestland collaboration.
Origins
The AW139 originated from a Bell Helicopters and AugustaWestland joint development to replace none other than the Huey itelf.
The first helicopters manufactured were AB139s (Augusta-Bell).
Bell subsequently sold their share in the venture to AugustaWestland, and the helicopter become the AW139.
Subsequently AugustaWestland has been rebranded “Leonardo Helicopters” a division of the parent company Leonardo.
Rather than a design that has evolved and been upgraded over 40 years, the AW139 is a completely modern helicopter designed from scratch starting in the late 90s.
According to J.D. Clem, Director of AugustaWestland’s USAF Division, the AW139/MH-139 “does everything the Huey does – better.
“It flies 50 percent faster, it has a larger cabin, carries 5000 lbs more payload and it has much greater range.”
Featuring a modernized glass cockpit the MH-139 utilizes advanced autopilot, avionics, navigation systems and configurable MFDs.
Commercial Success
With over 900 aircraft delivered in 10 years, the AW139 is a resounding commercial success.
It is a type-certified FAA FAR Part 29 helicopter.
Clem notes that the model has now accumulated over 1.7 million flight hours.
Users include Military, Police, Fire, Search & Rescue, Security, Oil & Gas, VIP Transport and more.
The helicopter is widely used in the United States by such groups as the Maryland and New Jersey State Police, Los Angeles Fire Department as well as customers who provide VIP transport and services to the Oil and Gas industry.
The helicopter is quiet, smooth and fast.
With a smaller footprint (landing gear and overall dimensions), and relatively tall, spacious cabin it makes an excellent transport.
Given the current customer base the helicopter is frequently seen in the skies over and around Washington, DC.
Maintainability
Clem notes that the AW139 has been the leader in its segment since introduction.
Notching 1000 sales to 250 customers (many with small fleets) speaks to helicopters low operating costs and high maintainability.
Per Clem, the AW139 was “designed from the start to have condition based maintenance and designed from the start to have long MTBF on components.”
He continued, “In the commercial world, customers don’t make money if it is not flying.”
And it is flying. Clem noted several airframes that have very high hours, such as “a particular AW139 servicing the oil rigs that is 10 years old and has 12,000 hours. 1100 hours per year for 10 years straight.
“You can’t do that unless you’re very reliable.”
More specifically Clem noted that from a maintenance perspective, “The basic airframe does not go back to a depot.
The main gearbox is rated to 6000 hours, the tail rotor box to 7500 hours, the engine to 5000 hours.
The big components stay on the machine, and the machine keeps flying.”
Citing an example of the Maryland State Police Clem noted that every day they pull a 24 hour alert in 7 locations, with one machine in each location.
The relative small crew of pilots (2) paramedic and rescue technician push the helicopter out of the hangar and have it airborne in 7 minutes.
The helicopter is extremely reliable, and is doing it in all manner of climates all around the world.
Production Capability
If the Air Force selects the Boeing MH-139, all 84 aircraft will be built at the 275,000 ft2 AugustaWestland facility at Northeast Philadelphia Airport.
AugustaWestland has already built some 250 AW139s at the Philadelphia facility and per William Hunt, CEO of Leonardo Helicopters, Philadelphia, everything is already in place to handle the production of the 84 machines.
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As it stands today, customers utilize reconfigurable interiors, and a wide variety of equipment for the helicopters specific use.
All integration is done right on the production line, according to well established process.
Per Hunt, the helicopter could be rolling off production lines quickly once the contract is awarded, and would support 500 jobs in the United States.
Boeing Experience
The MH-139 “model” of the AW139 will ultimately be Boeings contract to fulfill.
“Boeing has tremendous expertise overseeing military-unique procurements, logistics support and support for equipment, test hubs and flight line maintenance,” said Rick Lemaster, Director, Global Sales and Marketing, Vertical Lift Programs, The Boeing Company
Boeing has supported Air Force platforms for 80 years, and is currently doing so with the V-22 Osprey, CH-47 Chinook, AH-64 Apache, and AH-6 Light Attack Helicopter.
Given the USAF approach to the competition, the MH-139 is clearly a compelling contender for the Air Force contract.
In any case, given the widespread utilization of the current contenders, a large body of data is available to evaluate the merits of each airframe.
Granted, the outcome may hinge on the final RFP released by the Air Force, but from the outside looking in – the Boeing MH-139 could be well positioned to win the competition.
Editor Note 1: Our colleague Colin Clark of Breaking Defense looked at the Sikorsky offering in the competition earlier this year:
WASHINGTON: The day before the Air Force Association’s annual winter conference begins, the newest wrinkle in the years-long saga of deciding what aircraft the Air Force would buy to secure America’s nuclear missile fields was announced.
Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky will offer — surprise! — an updated version of the Black Hawk helicopter, the HH-60U.
The helicopters are used at all three missile bases, Malmstrom, Minot and Warren AFBs.
A key requirement for the competitors to meet is the ability to carry a full load of nine combat-ready airmen. Lockheed says their HH-60U can carry indeed transport nine fully outfitted Security Forces specialists, special equipment and two special mission aviators for the Continuity of Operations mission, which is all about getting senior leaders out of harm’s way in a disaster or attack. Lockheed says that mission requires transport for eight. The company also says the HH-60U can carry 9,600 pounds “of useful load.”
The continuity mission is in addition to keeping the missile fields secure and responding to any threats to them or to their nuclear payloads.
Lockheed noted in its release that the HH-60U “shares 85 percent commonality with the service’s incoming fleet of HH-60W Combat Rescue Helicopters, and it will share the existing infrastructure that supports the Air Force’s retiring fleet of HH-60G Pave Hawks.”
There are already three HH-60U Black Hawk aircraft in the Air Force’s inventory.
Finnemeccanica’s subsidiary Leonardo (formerly AgustaWestland) pressed hard last year for the Air Force to open the competition to a traditional competitive acquisition. It wanted to offer its American-assembled AW139.
Editor’s Note 2: This competition for 84 helicopters as well as the competition set up for 17 JSTARS replacement aircraft both raise fundamental questions about the Obama legacy inherited by the Trump Administration with regard to USAF procurement.
Competition to get lowest price regardless of the logic of the mission dictated choice needs a serious relook, and the new Secretary of the USAF needs to look hard in this direction.
Boeing recently protested a USAF contract and the USAF response actually underscores the need for some serious strategic change in USAF procurement.
The contract in question is for the Compass Call aircraft completion where the USAF claims it does not have the relevant expertise to pick the aircraft for the mission!
According to an article published by Defense One on May 24, 2017 about the Boeing protest:
Boeing is formally challenging a U.S. Air Force decision that allows L3 Technologies to choose a new plane to replace the EC-130 Compass Call intelligence aircraft.
The firm’s protest is a public rebuke of the Air Force, a measure rarely taken by America’s largest aerospace manufacturer.
“The Air Force’s approach is inconsistent with Congress’s direction in the 2017 NDAA and seems to ignore inherent and obvious conflicts of interest,” Caroline Hutchinson, a Boeing spokeswoman, said in an email Wednesday.
“We believe that the U.S. Air Force and taxpayer would be best served by a fair and open competition, and that the Air Force can still meet its stated timeline of replacing the aging fleet of EC-130Hs within 10 years.”
Boeing filed the protest with the Government Accountability Office on May 19. The nonpartisan office is expected to make a ruling by Aug. 28.
Company sources said the conflict of interest stems from L3’s unique relationship with airplane manufacturer Gulfstream, maker of the G550 business jet. L3 modifies G550s for foreign air forces.
U.S. Air Force officials had wanted to buy the G550 in an earlier attempt to replace the Compass Call, and Boeing alleges that in choosing L3, the Air Force is implicitly picking the G550 again.
Boeing would much rather the Air Force to hold a competition in which the Chicago-based company could pitch one of its jetliner-based aircraft to hold the sophisticated Compass Call electronics…..
The Compass Call program is the first of an expected string of programs to replace various fleets of decades-old Air Force intelligence planes based on the 707 jetliner. Winning the EC-130 replacement job would allow Boeing to argue the merits of commonality in future contests…..
Earlier this year, the Air Force gave L3 the responsibility for selecting a new plane for the Compass Call mission, saying that the service’s own acquisition officials lacked the expertise to make the decision.
L3 is the company that installs the sophisticated intelligence equipment on the current Compass Call aircraft, 42-year-old C-130s. The Air Force says it urgently needs to replace the EC-130H with and aircraft that can fly further and higher and offer better reliability.
Boeing argues that it, too, has the expertise to be put in charge of the project.
OK let us repeat that USAF comment: “the service’s own acquisition officials lacked the expertise to make the decision.”
It is time to drain the swamp and reset the entire acquisition approach.
NATO members excluding the United States account for 21% of world GDP with a per capita income of $31,000. It is a wealthy collection of democracies that is very much a creation of the post war US grand strategy.
As such, NATO (x USA) is more than able financially to look after themselves in terms of security if they want to – at least since the 1970s when NATO members UK and France both fielded their own nuclear deterrent.
A century of dependence on the United States to come to the aid of Europe, beginning with World War I and II, and then post-war, have however created a dependent, parent-child relationship where NATO members continued to look to the United States to provide their security and solve all their problems.
NATO have become a spoiled child that is very much a product of the US nuclear umbrella mixed with the dominant social-democracy ideology of Europe.
Like NATO citizens looking to their social-democratic governments to solve their problems, NATO allies look to the United States and American taxpayers and expect Uncle Sam to provide.
Successive US Administrations have to deal with several NATO allies (e.g Canada, Germany, etc.) that behave like petulant 2 year old children, stamping their feet, shedding crocodile tears, or raising their voices when asked by the US to abide by their NATO commitments made to the Obama Administration most recently in 2014.
To be clear, not all of the NATO allies act in this manner — there are those who take their Article III commitments seriously, but the problem is that NATO as the Article V club does not.
Everyone cut back defense spending after the cold war was won, and in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crash, but a decade later, when the crisis is past and urgent new security challenges loom, there is no excuse but to raising defense spending back to at least normal historical levels.
Instead of doing so, several NATO leaders greeted President Trump with a temper tatum on his first visit to NATO headquarters.
President Trump presided over the dedication of the new NATO Headquarters and the 9/11 memorial. NATO leaders decided to make the centerpiece of the visit the fact that the United States was the sole and only member to invoke Article 5 after 9/11.
While this fact is true, the repeated nagging of the United States on this point reeks of a Leni Riefenstahl production more appropriate a century past. Or the kind of guilt trip that Israelis lay on Germans, or Beijing China heaps on Japan.
Seventy years after WWII, this is getting old.
US President Donald Trump, right, reacts as he sits next to Britain’s Prime Minister Theresa May, centre and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as they participate in a working dinner meeting, during the NATO summit of heads of state and government, at the NATO headquarters, in Brussels on Thursday, May 25, 2017. US President Donald Trump inaugurated the new headquarters during a ceremony on Thursday with other heads of state and government. (Thierry Charlier/Pool Photo via AP) THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
President Trump showed extreme restraint and diplomatic tact to not, in his speech, publically placed this fact (US invocation of Article 5) in the context of all the times that the US came to the aid of Europe before and after NATO without waiting for Article 5 being invoked.
Should President Trump have mentioned the Greek Civil War, Berlin Airlift, Hungarian Revolution, Cuban Missile Crisis, Invasion of Czechoslovakia, to name a few? Or enumerate the cost of each intervention?
In each and every one of these cases, the United States mobilized troops, put Americans, and CONUS civilian populations at risk to defend NATO and Europe without the formalities of Article 5 being invoked by a fellow NATO member.
What about the present and immediate future?
Presently, the United States is fully shouldering the burden of defense against Iranian & DPRK ballistic missiles in Europe and North America with only token participation from European partners and nil from Canada.
With the explosively growing nuclear ballistic missile threat from Iran via their collaboration with North Korea, might NATO allies have woken up from their willful blind eye and slumber and realized that a new, (non-Russian) existential threat is nearly upon them?
Do they need to wait for the equivalent of 1940 to rearm?
Will NATO “allies” like Germany (Defense: 1.2% GDP) or Canada (1% GDP before it is Sajjaned) honestly expect Uncle Sam to pay for the full bill of providing a Ballistic Missile Defense for them for free?
Indeed, the nuclear threat and its growing complexity in the Second Nuclear Age is a core element of what Article V really is all about, and Britain and France already possess nuclear weapons because they wanted to include nuclear weapons within Article III and not hope for the US to do an Article V commitment.
What about reciprocity?
What capacity do NATO allies except the US have to provide for “collective defense” obligations to Canada?
What aid can NATO provide the United States in the event of a North Korean or Iranian ballistic missile attack on North American cities?
Conversely, what capacity do Canada have to aid European NATO allies in the event of an Iranian ballistic missile attack — which was amply demonstrated during the past week by the North Korean proxy missile test.
NATO’s ceremony laid bare the fatal flaw of the organization: It is too much of a one way relationship. NATO Europe is not even taking care of problems in their own backyard (e.g. Russia, Middle East, Southern Flank, or Missile Defense against Iran) let alone pretend to offer all but a token expeditionary capability to aid the US, Canada, or non-NATO allies in a crunch.
Europeans and Canadians (who couldn’t care less about defending themselves adequately) argue that Russia’s territorial annexations / incursions are the top priority.
And with Brexit and the general crisis in Europe deepening, the future of European defense does not revolve around President Trump but devolves to the key European states to enhance their own defense capabilities as could be understood within an Article III context.
If it is so important for NATO allies to beat back Russia in the Ukraine “on principle”, please explain why the identical principle do not apply to the PRC’s “sea grab” of the South China Sea — unilaterally violating a signed and ratified treaty (UNCLOS) by Beijing China and grabbing a territory about the size of Europe from the Channel to Eastern Poland.
This is all the more puzzling as NATO member Canada seem to have no objection to Beijing China’s claims, or care enough to protest, let alone participate in FONOPS, even though all NATO allies, including Canada is dependent on freedom of navigation of SCS for trade.
President Trump could have affirmed his support for Article 5 and then publically invoked Article 3 in front of his NATO peers and pointed out that their failure to provide for their own self-defense is a necessary pre-condition for seeking aid under Article 5.
That would have sent a clear message that the mythical 2% GDP defense spending target is necessary, but not sufficient.
What good is 2% GDP spending that do not result in bona fide, credible, deployable, usable capabilities held at high levels of readiness for military contingencies and as deterrent?
The assembled NATO dignitaries did not take a hint when President Trump took note of the headquarters and pointed said he did not once ask about cost.
And the tradeoff between lavish HQs staffed with REMFs and useable NATO defense capabilities.
America’s NATO “allies” like Germany, rather than address this point, resorted to farcical arguments that spending on foreign aid, development, and others should be counted in NATO “defense” spending.
Canada, similarly, resorted to fictitious and fraudulent accounting “alternate numbers” to claim inflated defense spending and “contributions”.
While such arguments might have merit if ALL NATO members are given the same opportunity to apply the same rules once the rules are changed by consensus, which was not the intent of Canada or Germany: Effectively unilaterally implementing “new math” rules that only apply to them.
By making public Canada’s stratagem ostensibly to help NATO allies and Mexico reign in the Trump Administration, Canada opened the door for the same game being played by Russia, Beijing-China, Iran, North Korea, Jihadists, etc.: A consequence that may not have been anticipated by the Trudeau regime.
Ultimately, the US Administration and Congress will have to respond by blocking these moves that constitutes interference by foreign agents in domestic US politics.
President Trump could have addressed this issue of persistent dishonesty by unilaterally initiating the preparation of a semiannual annual report by US-DoD on every NATO member that rates their performance on meeting Article 3 obligations.
A report that would publically identify the threats facing each NATO member, and assess what they have done and actual readiness and preparedness to mitigate the threat. These facts, independently compiled by DoD, can be considered as a factor like progress toward 2% GDP spending in any consideration of Article 5 obligations beyond the requirement for “consultations”.
A semiannual Article 3 Report on every NATO member would be a much better gauge now that members have taken the lead in using Arthur-Anderson accounting. If exhortations to do the right thing have no effect, perhaps public shaming semi-annually to their electorate can do better.
At some future point, the Article 3 reports might delve into the capacity, readiness and willingness of NATO members to come to the aid of the United States, e.g., in the Pacific theater.
Wouldn’t it be a revelation and revolutionary for NATO obligations to be truly mutual?
The indisputable fact is that NATO xUSA, rather than President Trump, revealed themselves to be so described: An organization that is incapable of paying attention to the imminent threat from Iranian nuclear ballistic missiles (sent via proxy DPRK) days before. (Short attention span.) Unable to recognizing the importance of upholding UNCLOS / Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea. (No interest in in-depth policy issues.) Willfully blind to the imminent existential threats from DPRK to NATO allies USA and Canada. (No knowledge of NATO, esp. Article 3).
Should we even mention the dangers of jihadists or Syria obtaining nuclear weapons / missiles from DPRK?
The unabashed expression of European elite arrogance at the NATO summit toward the American leader of the untermensch could have been resulted in a less restrained and diplomatic President Trump walking out.
Instead, the statesman President Trump, rather than feed this self-serving elite’s demand for continued welfare payments from the American taxpayer, diplomatically told them to get on with investing in their own defense.
Or should the United States look for more credible bilateral relationships within Europe rather than having a running argument with those European states that are self-satisfied and preoccupied with their own economic development and social welfare rather than their own defense and use NATO as a club to protect themselves from the Russians with a low cost insurance loan?
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Here are the comments made by President Trump to NATO during his visit:
PRESIDENT TRUMP: Thank you very much, Secretary General Stoltenberg. Chancellor Merkel, thank you very much. Other heads of state and government, I am honored to be here with members of an alliance that has promoted safety and peace across the world.
Prime Minister May, all of the nations here today grieve with you and stand with you. I would like to ask that we now observe a moment of silence for the victims and families of the savage attack which took place in Manchester. (A moment of silence is observed.) Thank you. Terrible thing.
This ceremony is a day for both remembrance and resolve. We remember and mourn those nearly 3,000 innocent people who were brutally murdered by terrorists on September 11th, 2001. Our NATO allies responded swiftly and decisively, invoking for the first time in its history the Article 5 collective defense commitments.
The recent attack on Manchester in the United Kingdom demonstrates the depths of the evil we face with terrorism. Innocent little girls and so many others were horribly murdered and badly injured while attending a concert — beautiful lives with so much great potential torn from their families forever and ever. It was a barbaric and vicious attack upon our civilization.
All people who cherish life must unite in finding, exposing, and removing these killers and extremists — and, yes, losers. They are losers. Wherever they exist in our societies, we must drive them out and never, ever let them back in.
This call for driving out terrorism is a message I took to a historic gathering of Arab and Muslim leaders across the region, hosted by Saudi Arabia. There, I spent much time with King Salman, a wise man who wants to see things get much better rapidly. The leaders of the Middle East have agreed at this unprecedented meeting to stop funding the radical ideology that leads to this horrible terrorism all over the globe.
My travels and meetings have given me renewed hope that nations of many faiths can unite to defeat terrorism, a common threat to all of humanity. Terrorism must be stopped in its tracks, or the horror you saw in Manchester and so many other places will continue forever. You have thousands and thousands of people pouring into our various countries and spreading throughout, and in many cases, we have no idea who they are. We must be tough. We must be strong. And we must be vigilant.
The NATO of the future must include a great focus on terrorism and immigration, as well as threats from Russia and on NATO’s eastern and southern borders. These grave security concerns are the same reason that I have been very, very direct with Secretary Stoltenberg and members of the Alliance in saying that NATO members must finally contribute their fair share and meet their financial obligations, for 23 of the 28 member nations are still not paying what they should be paying and what they’re supposed to be paying for their defense.
This is not fair to the people and taxpayers of the United States. And many of these nations owe massive amounts of money from past years and not paying in those past years. Over the last eight years, the United States spent more on defense than all other NATO countries combined. If all NATO members had spent just 2 percent of their GDP on defense last year, we would have had another $119 billion for our collective defense and for the financing of additional NATO reserves.
We should recognize that with these chronic underpayments and growing threats, even 2 percent of GDP is insufficient to close the gaps in modernizing, readiness, and the size of forces. We have to make up for the many years lost. Two percent is the bare minimum for confronting today’s very real and very vicious threats. If NATO countries made their full and complete contributions, then NATO would be even stronger than it is today, especially from the threat of terrorism.
I want to extend my appreciation to the 9/11 Memorial and Museum in New York for contributing this remnant of the North Tower, as well as to Chancellor Merkel and the German people for donating this portion of the Berlin Wall. It is truly fitting that these two artifacts now reside here so close together at the new NATO Headquarters. And I never asked once what the new NATO Headquarters cost. I refuse to do that. But it is beautiful.
Each one marks a pivotal event in the history of this Alliance and in the eternal battle between good and evil. On one side, a testament to the triumph of our ideals over a totalitarian Communist ideology bent on the oppression of millions and millions of people; on the other, a painful reminder of the barbaric evil that still exists in the world and that we must confront and defeat together as a group, as a world.
This twisted mass of metal reminds us not only of what we have lost, but also what forever endures — the courage of our people, the strength of our resolve, and the commitments that bind us together as one.
We will never forget the lives that were lost. We will never forsake the friends who stood by our side. And we will never waiver in our determination to defeat terrorism and to achieve lasting security, prosperity and peace.
Thank you very much. It’s a great honor to be here. Thank you.
One issue President Trump will need to clarify at next week’s NATO summit is his strategy towards Russia.
To take one example, the NATO allies are divided over whether to focus on counterterrorism, as the President would wish, or on strengthening collective defenses against Russia.
Based on a visit by SLD to Moscow last month, which involved meetings with Russian foreign and defense policy officials, and a trip earlier this month to Italy for a conference with Russian academics, the opportunities and challenges of Russian-U.S. relations have become clearer following the uncertainties of the first hundred days of the Trump administration.
Russian officials and analysts are experiencing some “buyers’ remorse” regarding Trump.
They see him as pursuing traditional U.S. policies that make Moscow uneasy: unilateralism, aversion to international institutions, propensity to use force, and refusal to accept international constraints on U.S. freedom of action.
They also depict Trump as embattled at home by forces hostile to Russian-U.S. reconciliation–attacked by Democrats who used Russia as a political weapon against the incumbent President the same way that the Republicans employed the “Reset” against the Obama administration.
As a result, Russians view Trump as focused on other foreign relationships and has become preoccupied with securing his contested domestic initiatives like health care.
Furthermore, they complain about not knowing who runs Russian policy in the United States, due to the vacancies in the U.S. national security establishment, and the lack of clarity concerning Trump’s specific long-term goals regarding Russia.
Finally, they are upset by his reversal of his campaign rhetoric and reversion to conventional U.S. stances regarding NATO, Ukraine, and other issues.
In light of these developments, they have discounted the possible net gains from a Trump presidency.
In general geopolitical terms, proceeding in concentric circles, Russian goals regarding the United States are to limit U.S. involvement in Russian domestic affairs, attaining Russian security primacy in the former Soviet republics, and receiving U.S. recognition of Russia as a major player in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
When these goals are thwarted, the Russian government directly constrains U.S. involvement in Russian politics and society, challenges the U.S. presence in neighboring countries, and plays a spoiler role in nearby regions.
Initially following the November election, Trump advisors were arguing that one reason that they wanted to improve ties with Moscow was to wean Russia away from Iran and China.
For instance, they hoped Russia would curtail weapons deliveries to these two countries.
But Russian officials have now concluded that most of gains that Trump would bring Moscow would be limited, contested, and transient.
Given this calculation, Russian policy makers have ruled out making major concessions regarding Iran, China, or other issues.
The Trump administration’s changing policies towards Beijing are also affecting Moscow’s calculations.
Before his inauguration, Trump’s team were describing China as the main long-term threat to U.S. security. Russian analysts were looking forward to positioning themselves as a swing state in an intensified Sino-American struggle for global primacy, seeing it as an opportunity to sustain Russia’s status as a third pole in a global triangle.
But Russian policies watched the successful Xi-Trump summit with envy and unease.
They saw how Trump’s rhetoric with China subsequently improved and the U.S. suspended pressure on China’s foreign economic policies in return for Beijing’s pledges of support to curtail North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests.
Not only has this Sino-American reconciliation weakened Moscow’s leverage over both countries, but Moscow’s irritation at the long-delayed Trump-Putin summit has heightened.
Russian policy makers now see such a meeting as their best hope of breaking the stalled Russia-Trump connection.
The upcoming G-20 summit in Hamburg provides a logical venue for the first direct Putin-Trump meeting since neither president seems likely to visit the other country any time soon.
During Tillerson’s visit to Moscow, the parties agreed to create a Russian-U.S. working group to deal with bilateral issues that could be resolved below the level of presidential decision making.
However, Russian officials view the body skeptically, arguing that the format has not worked well in the past, with both sides exchanging points without making much progress.
They do however concur with U.S. assessments that for now the two sides can best focus on making small steps to improve the relationship rather than seeking to make grand bargains, which they see as unrealizable due to the deep distrust between the two countries.
Because of the continuing divide, they see such possibilities excluded such as extensive intelligence-sharing even against common terrorist threats, with continuing divergent Russian-U.S. views of a desirable world order, and the current Russian-U.S. preoccupation with whom is to blame for their poor bilateral relationship rather than addressing what is to be done to make the world better.
Another issue that concerns Russians is the diverging stances of President Trump and other senior administration officials.
Trump continues to say that he wants to improve ties with Moscow. However, his senior national security appointees are considerably more critical of Russia and openly skeptical of improving ties.
These discrepancies could reflect a deliberate strategy of having the President play good cop while his aides take a tougher public line.
Or they may reflect Trump’s encouraging his team to express their different opinions regarding Russia. These likely exist due to the different backgrounds of Trump, whose ties with Russia have focused on the business sector, and his senior advisors, who have a national security perspective.
But these divergences may also be due to poor management of the interagency process, with the White House failing to enforce a common policy line in the bureaucracy, which should be corrected.
Russian analysts still think Trump is a better partner for Moscow than any conceivable alternative U.S. leader.
They appreciate that Trump, unlike Obama, speaks about Russia and Putin with respect, has national rather than global ambitions, and is indifferent towards Russia’s domestic system (seen when Secretary Tillerson declined to meet with Russian opposition leaders during his visit to Moscow).
They also welcome what they perceive as Trump’s ending the Obama administration’s policy of trying to contain Moscow’s influence in neighboring countries—seen in decreased U.S. opposition to Japanese-Russian reconciliation, Trump’s aversion to siding with Ukraine against Russia, the U.S. participation in the Moscow-led Syrian peace process in Astana, and the paucity of Trump statements regarding Crimea.
Russian preferences were evident when Sergei Lavrov met with President Trump in the Oval office—the first visit by a Russian foreign minister to Washington in four years.
Lavrov praised Trump’s pragmatic, “businesslike” approach towards addressing Russian-U.S. differences, contrasting it with what he termed the destructively ideological stance of the previous administration.
Though Russian analysts recognize that American domestic politics make it improbable that Trump will soon remove sanctions on Russia, they hope that the Trump administration will not enforce them vigorously, limit their practical scope, and not engage in supplementary supporting activities such as discouraging other U.S.-Russian business ties.
Russian analysts have likely downplayed the U.S. approval of Montenegro’s accession to NATO and even the U.S. missile strikes in Syria as unavoidable and limited steps given U.S. alliance and domestic considerations.
Russian officials say that Moscow will eschew public confrontations with Trump, such as retaliating for the sanctions the Obama administration imposed on Moscow as it was leaving office and other steps that could further hamper the possibilities for Russian-U.S. reconciliation.
Russian officials are also looking for opportunities to give Trump some perceived quick wins (which could boost his domestic standing) in ways that won’t cost Moscow much concretely—though getting rid of Assad is excluded, a step like expelling Snowden from Russia may not be.
Editor’s Note: There is probably no issue more in play than US policy towards Russia.
The Trump Administration is under scrutiny for “ties” with the Russians, Washington critics are largely focused on the Trump dimension than the need to have a realistic approach to dealing with Russia in both Europe and the Middle East, and the lack of bench strength in the Administration makes unclear who would actually implement a Trump policy when there is one.
The disarray in Washington clearly provides Putin with an opportunity to shape some policy initiatives.
What might those be is a very good question for the policy community to puzzle over.
One recent action of note which seems to have been missed is an example of what needs to be noted and puzzled over.
North Korea’s increasingly frequent ballistic missile tests may have raised tensions globally over the country’s nuclear ambitions, but in neighbouring Russia, entrepreneurs are eyeing another prospect: tourism.
On Thursday, a ship that departed from the North Korean port of Rajin on Wednesday arrived in Vladivostok in Russia’s far east, marking the start of the first regular cargo and passenger ferry service with the “hermit kingdom”.
The Man Gyong Bong, which is owned by the Russian company InvestStroyTrest, was carrying Russians and representatives of Chinese tourist companies. The firm has said future passengers could include Chinese and Russian tourists, as well as North Koreans who work in Russia.
Russia is already one of North Korea’s most important economic partners, and the president, Vladimir Putin, said this week that the west should negotiate to end Pyongyang’s nuclear programme rather than threaten it.
The Trudeau regime promised Canadians a defense policy update on June 7 after PM Trudeau visit with his counterparts at NATO and G7.
Meanwhile, North Korea tested two ballistic missiles, (May 13&21, 2017), one that demonstrated a re-entry vehicle for nuclear warheads, and the latter a solid fuel MRBM that directly threatens much of Western Europe and the Middle East when launched from DPRK’s Axis collaborator Iran.
The “updated” Canadian defense policy will go down in history as the Gander Airport of Canadian Defense: Gander airport was the largest, busiest mid-North Atlantic refueling stop until the jet age.
Ottawa invested to upgrade the airport in 1971 even as longer ranged jet aircraft began to dominate air travel in the 1960s and bypassed Gander, creating a white elephant that only was used to full capacity exactly once: 9/11.
Canada is about to repeat the Gander story in Defense Policy with the “update” that will be shown by 2018 to have failed in identifying the main, imminent existential threat to Canadians, and with it, how the Canadian Armed Forces can address the challenges and what it will cost in 2017 and 18, not by 2030.
What are the failures?
North Korea under Kim Jong Un is a clear and immediate existential threat to Canada and allies. This is now generally recognized by Pacific allies like South Korea, Japan, Australia and the US but not Canada.
European NATO allies are in the process of joining the consensus after the most recent DPRK missile test that was a proxy for their financier and Axis partner Iran.
Yet, the Liberal regime of Canada put forward a Defense Policy that ignored the near term threat from North Korea’s nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles beginning 2019. By then, DPRK will be a credible thermonuclear ballistic missile threat to Canadian population centers like Vancouver.
Furthermore, Canada’s defense and foreign policy establishment failed to recognize the motivations that is driving the Kim Jong Un regime, preferring to be concerned with softwood timber tariffs and milk quotas.
DPRK is not arming with WMDs that can threaten Canada just for the sake of deterrence, but for the purpose of extortion. Extortion is the use of force or threat of force to obtain money, property. It is fundamentally and legally distinct from blackmail. (Bracken, 2017).
Nuclear blackmail has precedence with Israel’s threat to use nuclear weapons unless they received urgent conventional arms aid during the Yom Kippur War. Nuclear extortion has no known precedence EXCEPT DPRK.
If sanctions and military action failed to prevent Kim Jong Un’s North Korea from successfully practice nuclear extortion, it will be devastating to the existing world order. It is a matter of time before states like Canada become tribute paying vassals if DPRK prevails. Or nuclear blackmail will be applied to other issues like genocide, imposing religions by force, or other purposes that Anglo-Europeans abhor.
Canada need to urgently evaluate the extent and scale of threat in the Second Nuclear Age where Canada cannot solely rely on American extended deterrence as sufficient to deter regimes like North Korea in the near term.
The Defense Policy review is silent on what needs to be done in 2017 to have a deterrent and/or defensive capability in place by 2019 or sooner.
Allies like Australia, Japan, S. Korea, and the United States are giving Beijing China a last chance to curb the DPRK threat this year. Should that fail, Canadian Defense Policy must prepare for military options in concert with allies.
This is not a problem for the next decade or 2030, but a problem in 2017.
Near term military action against North Korea will strain resources from every NATO and Pacific ally including Canada. A prescient defense policy update would have recognized that on this short a timeframe, urgent action and expenditures need to be undertaken today to bring existing Canadian forces to a high level of readiness.
That is to say, everything from training, maintenance, to having adequate stockpiles of costly precision munitions.
Plans need to be put in place to rapidly improve and update capabilities ahead of a major, high intensity and long duration conflict that Canada has not fought in since World War II. Orders need to be placed yesterday for missile defense systems, which will be in short supply. To date, Canada’s DND have not even initiated a formal request for information to manufacturers of missile defense systems when they are within a year of being swamped with priority orders from other allies.
Canadian warfighting systems are not just underfunded, poorly equipped and antiquated that successive governments pay lip service to improve – and then break the solemn government-to-government pledges.
What the Policy Review does to improve Canada’s credibility (or lack thereof) in the short run (2018-2020) without concrete, irreversible action is an open question. If it is to happen, it should already be in the public record like the Canadian Federal Budget released in March, 2017.
Expeditiously acquiring 18 F/A-18s was an important enough issue to have Prime Minister Trudeau press President Trump during their February 2017 meeting for “immediate acquisition”. When the deal is questioned in May (not even 100 days later), no alternative was proposed to meet the former “capability” and credibility gap by Sajjan, Freeland, or the PMO.
Would Canadian commitments to NATO presented by Prime Minister Trudeau in Brussels May 25 do any better than his track record with President Trump?
Beyond the chronic problem of underfunding of Canadian Armed Forces, decades of engaging in low level conflicts and peacekeeping primarily against poorly equipped irregulars have weakened Canadian’s ability to fight in a high intensity war. A war against North Korea will not be a replay of Gulf War I or II against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Or a fight against rag tag armies in Afghanistan or Rwanda or Mali: It will not be a slow motion “war” that Canadian Armed Forces presently excel at.
Yet, Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia “freerider” Freeland apparently have no inkling that traditional Canadian Forces missions like UN Peacekeeping will be the least of Canada’s concerns once allied consensus crystalize about the DPRK-Iran threat.
War on the Korean peninsula is unlikely to be a limited war of high tech stand-off strikes touted by planners. Or a short duration war with Canadian troops “home by Christmas”.
Canadians and allied forces cannot automatically count superiority in quantity or quality (technology, doctrine, training, logistics, or anything else) taken for granted since World War II. Or the security of unprotected supply lines from Canada. Nor can Canada count on immunity from nuclear strikes against the Canadian mainland for which Canada presently have no defense. Will the Defense policy update talk of fielding a missile defense by 2030 when credible threats exist beginning 2019?
In order to have a missile defense in place by 2019, orders should have already been placed. None is known to be placed or planned for 2017.
In a likely high intensity conflict in the Korean Peninsula where DPRK will be supported by other peer competitor belligerents, Canadian and Allied Armed Forces will quickly discover that the cumbersome doctrines, tactics and rules of engagement built up over the half century of peace are not only an impediment, but have fatal consequences against first rate enemies with no such concerns.
A review of these quaint, outdated legacy codes, archaic as the Code of Chivalry, need to be urgently be undertaken and contingent doctrines and ROEs devised.
Finally, the Defense policy update failed to recognize that reform of the cumbersome, outdated, obsolete and costly procurement system that Canada (and most allies) operate is an urgent priority with or without the looming threat of a high intensity, long duration war in the Korean Peninsula.
Canadian defense procurement systems in its present form will collapse within months of a high intensity conflict; but not before failing to deliver Canadian forces in the field up-to-date gear needed to survive. Just how will the Canadian public react to Canadian Forces being outmatched 10:1 by DPRK precision munitions that are superior when it happens?
There is still time to sketch out contingency plans for the issues and eventualities and append it to the Defense Policy Update before it is released on June 7.
Or alternatively, to suspend release pending an update that address these contingencies in the Appendix.
Canada will have the opportunity to listen very carefully to allies at the NATO summit and consult with Pacific allies like Australia, Japan, South Korea to ensure that the draft Canadian Defense Policy is consistent with the consensus view about the DPRK threat before the document is finalized.
Canada cannot field a credible missile defense against without the participation of non-NATO allies Japan, South Korea, working with the US nor participate in a high intensity war in the Korean peninsula in their present condition.
The Trudeau regime need to act now lest we end up with another Gander Airport.
Note: The Liberal regime did not see fit or necessary to issue a statement, comment, tweet, or any other expression of Canadian government views after the most recent North Korean Ballistic Missile test on May 13th and 21st.
A curious omission for an aspiring member of the UN Security Council.
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2017-05-21 As a key part of shaping its enhanced defense capabilities, the Australian government has launched a comprehensive and long term shipbuilding program.
The plan was officially launched on May 16 at a ceremony held in Adelaide.
According to text and a video released by the Australian Department of Defence:
Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable Malcolm Turnbull, Minister for Defence, Senator the Honourable Marise Payne and Minister for Defence Industry, the Honourable Christopher Pyne MP, announced the release of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan at the Osborne Naval Shipyard in Adelaide on 16 May 2017.
The Naval Shipbuilding Plan provides the strategic direction for a significant national endeavour to secure Australia’s naval shipbuilding and sustainment industry.
It outlines the Government’s vision, significant investment and expectations of long-term partnerships and collaboration with key stakeholders to achieve this nation-building project.
5/16/17
Australian Department of Defence
During a visit to Australia last month, there was a chance to discuss with the Australian Chief of Navy, the way ahead in light of the commitment to a significant build of a new fleet.
2017-05-02 By Robbin Laird
During my most recent trip to Australia, the focus was upon how to shape an integrated ADF moving forward.
During my interviews surrounding the Williams Foundation seminar on that theme, I have had the chance to talk to key decision makers in shaping a way ahead.
Last August, I had a chance to talk with the Chief of the Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett.
A key speaker at the Williams Foundation seminar on air-land integration was the Chief of the Australian Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett.
Barrett’s speech focused on the opportunities and challenges of the largest recapitalisation of the Australian Navy since World War II.
New submarines, destroyers and amphibious ships and associated fleet assets are being built in Australia to shape a new maritime capability for Australia.
But this force is being built in the time of significant innovation in the Pacific whereby new force concepts are being shaped, such as kill webs, distributed lethality, and fifth generation airpower.
Barrett made it very clear that what was crucial for the Navy was to design from the ground up any new ships to be core participants in the force transformation process underway.
We picked up where we left off from our August meeting.
Question: How do fight with the fleet you have and prepare at the same time for tomorrow’s fleet, especially when you have several new programs in the pipeline?
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: You have to fight with the fleet you have now.
That is not an option; it is a necessity.
My focus to do that better and to lay the groundwork for the future fleet is to focus upon availability of assets.
Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN holds the floor, during the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs. Australia currently holds the Chairmanship of IONS. The regional forum was held during Sea Power 2015. *
How to we get our availability rates higher?
How do we get ships to sea more effectively and more often?
They are not going to make much difference sitting in drydocks.
One can provide for enhanced deterrence through enhanced availability.
Question: You certainly don’t win with Power Point slides, do you?
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: You certainly don’t nor with a connected force in those slides, represented by lightening bolts but not realized in practice.
For example, we have a small submarine fleet of six submarines; they are not going deter anybody if they are not available and capable of going to see.
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As we discussed last time, we have put a major effort in getting much greater availability from our Collins class submarines, and the ways we have done so will shape our approach, our expectations and our template for the operation of the new class of submarines.
We have seen a dramatic improvement in our Collins Class boats.
Question: In other words, by learning how to ramp up availability with today’s fleet you are preparing the template for future operations?
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: That is clearly our approach going forward.
We should be building our sense of availability in the design right now, so that when the future frigates arrive in place, we have maximized availability, and through that deterrence given their contribution to a distributed lethal force capability.
And this clearly is a key challenge for the workforce to shape enhanced availability.
We are reworking our work force to do so today, but must prepare for the transition in the workforce to do so in the future, recognizing that tomorrow’s platforms will be different, and different skill sets required ensuring enhanced availability.
Government has committed to a future navy in terms of key new platforms.
I have that as a target goal so can work from here to there rather than simply fighting for the need to have a future fleet.
This certainty is crucial in allowing me to work the transition.
As we shape task force concepts for the current fleet, we are working connectors to make the fleet more effective in our task force approach.
As we work those connectors we are also anticipating how to build those into the design of the new fleet, rather than having to work the problem after we have acquired the platforms.
Question: And this is not simply about Navy, you focus is broader?
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: It is; it is about working with industry; it is about working with the ADF; it is about working with government; in essence it is about the commitment of the nation.
We are a small force; smaller than the New South Wales Police Force.
We can not do this without a national commitment.
Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN, delivers the Ode of Remembrance at the Lone Pine commemorative service in Gallipoli.
Question: One aspect of change clearly is building 21st century defense structure.
I have just returned from the UK and witnessed their significant efforts at Lossiemouth, Waddington, Marham and at Lakenheath to have a new infrastructure built.
And certainly have seen that at RAAF Williamtown with the F-35 and at RAAF Edinburgh with the P-8/Triton.
How important in your view is building a new infrastructure to support a 21st century combat force?
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: Crucial.
And that is in part what I am referring to as an industrial and national set of commitments to shaping a 21st century combat fleet.
We spoke last time about the Ship Zero concept.
This is how we are focusing upon shaping a 21st century support structure for the combat fleet.
I want the Systems Program Office, the Group that manages the ship, as well as the contracted services to work together on site.
I want the trainers there, as well, so that when we’re maintaining one part of the system at sea, it’s the same people in the same building maintaining those things that will allow us to make future decisions about obsolescence or training requirements, or to just manage today’s fleet.
Minister for Defence Industry, the Honourable Christopher Pyne MP (centre right) at the announcement of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan in the presence of Acting Chief of the Defence Force, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, AO, CSC, RAN (left), Minister for Defence, Senator the Honourable Marise Payne, and the Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable Malcolm Turnbull.
I want these people sitting next to each other and learning together.
It’s a mindset.
It puts as much more effort into infrastructure design as it does into combat readiness, which is about numbers today.
You want to shape infrastructure that is all about availability of assets you need for mission success, and not just readiness in a numerical sense.
Getting the right infrastructure to generate fleet innovation on a sustained basis is what is crucial for mission success.
And when I speak of a continuous build process this is what I mean.
We will build new frigates in a new yard but it is not a fire and forget missile.
We need a sustained enterprise that will innovate through the life of those frigates operating in an integrated ADF force.
That is what I am looking for us to shape going forward.
Question: An example of your approach to the future is clearly the new submarine.
A French design house and an American combat systems company will be working together really for the first time.
And they are building a submarine which has never been built before.
This provides an opportunity for you to shape a new support structure along the lines you have described going forward.
How do you see this process?
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett: It is something new and allows us to shape the outcome we want in terms of an upgradeable sustainable submarine with high availability rates built in. We intend to see this built that way from the ground up.
It is not simply about acquiring a platform.
We will not be a recipient of someone else’s design and thought.
This will be something that we do, and we will work with those that have a capacity to deliver what we say we need.
I think the way you characterize the process makes sense.
The experiences we’ve had through Collins have taught us a lot.
With 12 of these future submarines in a theater anti-submarine role we think we can make an effective contribution to our defense and to working with core allies in the region, notably the US Navy.
Editor’s Note: Vice Admiral Barrett has published a new book this year entitled The Navy and the Nation and Ed Timperlake recently commented on this book as follows:
The Aussies are not just buying new equipment; they are rethinking how to integrated that force and make a more effective and lethal combat capability.
A recent publication by the Australian Chief of Navy illustrates the point.
Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable Malcolm Turnbull (left) speaks with Air Warfare Destroyer shipbuilders during a tour of NUSHIP Hobart.
Australia’s Vice Admiral Tim Barrett has written a brilliant book about maritime power.
It is what is known as a “good read” because it is written with great insights presented in easily understandable prose.
He shows the reader why “The Navy and the Nation” is a sacred bond.
This passage is one of the most powerful ever written about the role of a Navy and the connection with their citizens:
“Most People think the Navy is something else.
“They know it exists, the may even have a rough idea of what it is for, but they don’t think it’s got much to do with them.
“They’re wrong.
“The Navy is a national enterprise in which everyone is involved and which everyone is involved and which delivers peace and security to everyone in the country.
“This enterprise is a two-way street, and must be a two-way street.
“Going one way, the Navy offers peace and security. Going the other, the people offer support and contribution. Only when the street is a properly mutual two-way exchange between the Navy and the citizens can this bargain, this contract, deliver what it needs to.”
The slideshow above highlights the Collins class submarines and the photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.
In a piece published by Andrew Greener of ABC news with regard to the challenge of generating and sustaining the workforce with regard to the program, a number of key points were underscored.
The Naval Shipbuilding Plan outlines over $1 billion in infrastructure upgrades at the Osborne shipbuilding facilities and Western Australia’s Henderson shipyards, while confirming construction is scheduled to begin on Australia’s Future Frigates by 2020.
According to the plan the existing infrastructure at Osborne is “sufficient” to continue block assembly of Australia’s three air warfare destroyers, but “inadequate” for “high productivity construction” of major surface combatants such as the future frigate.
Design for the Osborne South facilities will continue to be refined by Defence “in coming months”, with construction of new surface ship infrastructure to commence in the “second half of 2017”.
Completion of the infrastructure development is expected to be completed by the “second half of 2019”, but the report warned “this is the most time-critical component of the Government’s planned infrastructure works to enable the future frigate construction program to commence in 2020”.
“This is the largest single Commonwealth investment in any single state … it is going to create another 5,000 jobs in shipbuilding directly again, almost all of which will be in South Australia, and another 10,000 in sustainment,” Mr Turnbull told ABC Radio Adelaide this morning.
“This is a massive commitment to South Australia and the proposition that the Federal Government is neglecting South Australia is frankly nonsense and it defies the reality of this incredibly substantial nation-building commitment.
“As the naval shipbuilding plan says with our shipbuilding in the past we have had a boom and bust cycle … it’s coming to an end.
“And it is coming to an end because of my Government , my leadership, my commitment.”
The document predicted by 2026 more than 5,200 workers would be needed in South Australia, but acknowledged foreigners would be “essential” to “fill middle management and supervisory roles”.
“It is expected that over time the number of skilled workers from international shipyards will decline as the Australian workforce becomes familiar with construction requirements and develops more specialised skills,” the document stated.
“This will be an important area of discussion with selected shipbuilders as projects develop.”
The document also flagged a future taxpayer-funded advertising campaign to attract workers to Adelaide.
“The Government will explore the potential for skilled workers to relocate from interstate to South Australia,” the shipbuilding plan said.
“A public communications strategy will be important to raise awareness of the long-term and sustainable careers which will become available in naval shipbuilding as a result of the Government’s investments.”
Defence Teaming Centre chief executive Margot Forster said the vast majority of the construction workforce would be sourced locally.
But she said the inconsistent nature of Defence projects has led to a shortage of workers for supervisory and middle management roles.
“Australia … has not had a continuous shipbuilding program,” Ms Forster said.
“So what we have suffered from is coming into these programs, learning the skills, delivering quality products and then having to dismantle the workforce because there isn’t a follow-on project.”
In a highly globally interactive world, crises in one part not only have an impact elsewhere, but can have an unanticipated set of impacts.
This is clearly the case of Brazil and its deepening political crises, which given the importance of the Brazilian economy and global ties, will have accelerating impacts worldwide.
This has already been seen in France where an investigation is underway with regard to the impact of corruption in Brazil on a submarine contract.
This is hardly where President Macron would like to start his mandate, but many other global leaders will be waking up to the knock on consequences of the deepening Brazilian crisis.
The Brazilian crisis is clearly deepening and rapidly so.
On Wednesday evening, 17th May, 2017, the Rio de Janeiro newspaper “O Globo” dropped a bomb-shell on Brasilia.
Its columnist, Lauro Jardim, reported on an explosive denunciation made by Joesley Batista, co-owner of JBS, which is Brazil’s largest private sector company.
During a meeting with Michel Temer, the president of Brazil, held late in the evening of March 7th at the Juburu Palace (which is the official residence of the vice-president, but where Temer prefers to live), the two men discussed the payment of hush money to Eduardo Cunha, who is currently imprisoned for 15 years and four months in Curitiba by Federal Judge Sérgio Moro in the ongoing “Lava Jato” (“car wash”) mega-corruption scandal.
This scandal involves kickbacks paid by Petrobras, the mega-Brazilian multi-national state controlled petroleum company, in bribes or inflated overcosts paid to Brazilian politicians, political parties and the political electoral campaigns, and to favored corporations for bloated and corrupt special deals.
Eduardo Cunha is the former president of the lower house of congress who orchestrated the impeachment last year of Temer’s predecessor, Dilma Rousseff.
Joesley told Temer that the bribe was intended to buy Cunha’s silence in the ongoing “car wash” (lava jato) anti-corruption investigation.
Joesley also said he had paid bribes to a federal prosecutor to receive inside information on the “lava jato” probes, and that he had two federal judges also providing him with inside information.
The president did not object at any point to this information.
Nor did he inform the judicial authorities that the conversation had taken place, or what they had discussed.
Joesley had turned secretly recorded tapes of the discussion over to the Attorney General on April 7th.
The day after “O Globo” published these recordings on 17th May, on Thursday, 18th May, Supreme Court Judge Edson Fachin, responsible for overseeing the “car wash” (lava jato) proceedings, which has already seen many Brazilian politicians and businessmen jailed for corruption, released the audio tapes.
In these tapes, President Temer said in response to being told of the bribe to Eduardo Cunha: “You’ve got to keep this up. OK?”
The audios are now available to anyone who wants to listen on the internet.
But more was to come.
Judge Fachin also released videos implicating Senator Aécio Neves, the leader of the PSDB, and former PSDB presidential candidate, who was narrowly beaten by Dilma Rousseff in the last presidential election, in bribe taking.
The videos showed the first installment of a large bribe being delivered to an intermediary for Andrea Neves, Aécio’s sister.
In an ongoing operation following the methodology used by the FBI for surveillance of the Mafia, the Brazilian Federal Police and the Attorney General followed and recorded the first payment of R$ 500,000 (in numbered notes and with a chip) part of a R$2 million bribe, being delivered by Frederico Pacheco de Medeiros, a cousin of Aécio Neves and the former coordinator of Aécio’s campaign.
There is a very heavy symbolic meaning to these revelations.
Aécio Neves is the maternal grandson of Tancredo Neves, the first president elect (by indirect vote) of the newly restored democracy. Tancredo Neves died before he could take office. But he has become a symbol of probity and democracy in Brazil.
By the end of the day Senator Aécio Neves had been “suspended” from the Senate by the Supreme Court and Andrea Neves was arrested and jailed in Minas Gerais.
President Temer appeared later that same evening in a nationally broadcast televised address to the nation: He declared angrily: “I will not resign, I say again, I will not resign.”
It was too Nixonian to be believed.
The only missing figure in the background was that eternal Nixonian eminence gris, Henry Kissinger.
JBS is the largest family owned private sector conglomerate in Brazil.
It began as a small butcher’s shop and slaughter house in Anapolis, in the interior of the interior state of Goiás in 1953. By 2016 it had a turnover of R$170 billion. 40 major Brazilian companies and brand names are part of its corporate business.
It is Brazil’s major beef and beef products exporter to 150 countries, and has 230,000 employees worldwide, with major markets in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
It is the largest producer of beef products in the world.
In 2007 JBS bought US based Swift & Company, one of the world’s major beef brands, for US$1.4bn. And in 2009 acquired the US chicken producer, Pilgrim’s Pride for US$2.8bn. Joesley Batista’s brother, Wesley Batista, is chief executive and head the holding company.
(Brazilians have a habit of adopting English pre-names, though it is very doubtful if the founder of Methodism, Charles Wesley, would have approved of Wesley Batista or his brother).
JBS grew and thrived during the construction of Brasilia, Brazil’s new interior capital, in the 1960’s, by catering for the workers.
Its operations expanded exponentially during the years of the Worker’s Party (PT) governments under president Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and president Dilma Rousseff, (2011-2016). JBS benefited as a “national champion” from soft loans from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES).
The operations of BNDES, which is larger than the World Bank, was the remaining “black hole” of the Brazilian corruption investigations.
The BNDES saw a dramatic increase in its financial resources after 2005 when the development bank was “internationalized” providing the financing for large scale overseas investments in Africa, Latin America, and in Europe.
Demonstrators protest Brazil’s President Michel Temer in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Thursday, May 18, 2017. Brazil’s political crisis deepened sharply on Thursday with corruption allegations that threatened to topple the president, undermine reforms aimed at pulling the economy from recession and leave Latin America’s largest nation rudderless. (Silvia Izquierdo/Associated Press)
BNDES provided JBS with R$8bn in loans and equity and raised its stake in JBS from 15% to 30%.
In 2014 JBS was the major donor to political parties and candidates in Brazil, spending R$391 m in support of 164 federal deputies, 6 governors, and the presidential campaign of Dilma and Temer.
JBS has been involved in the alleged bribery of government inspectors to issue health certificate for meat. The scandal had a major impact on Brazilian meat exports.
And JBS lost half of its value on the São Paulo Stock Exchange.
44.15% of JBS is owned by the Batista family. Temer said in his defense that Joesley had come to him to discuss the federal action against JBS, but the actions of the Federal Police (Carne Fraca) had in fact taken place ten days before, and JBS was under investigation for its connection to pension funds and loans from the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES).
This past week seven executives of JBS and its holding company J&F investments, agreed to pay fines of R$225m (US$68m) and to tell prosecutors all they know about corruption in Brazil in exchange for leniency.
The “delações premiadas” (plea bargaining) of the owners and executives of the other great Brazilian multinational private sector conglomerate, Odebrecht, has already led to many Brazilian politicians and businessmen being charged and jailed for corruption involving the the huge kick backs and bribery schemes at Petrobras, the state controlled petroleum multinational corporation, including Eduardo Cunha, the object of Joesley and Temer’s solicitous discussion during their secretly taped (by Joesley) late night session at the Juburu Palace.
The “delações pemiadas” of the JBS Batista brothers has already (according to leaks in the press) involved former President Lula, former president Dilma Rosseff, as well as the former PSDB presidential candidate and senator José Serra, and the former president of the senate Renan Calheiros (PMDB), in addition to Aécio Neves. The Federal police have been taping the Batista bothers for months.
The videos of their interrogations have also now been released.
On Friday, Rodrigo Janot, the Brazilian Attorney General (procurador geral da república) charged President Michel Temer with “corruption, obstruction of justice and criminal organization.” Judge Fachin opened an inquiry against Temer, Aécio and congressman Rocha Loures, the intermediary in the bribe transaction, and the man who has been Temer’s close aide both before and after he assumed the presidency.
On Saturday, “O Globo” in an editorial called for the resignation of President Temer and also condemned the “mega-businessman” (that is Joesley Batista) “who is subject of 5 operations by the federal police over millions of bribes paid to to public authorities.”
In the meantime, Joesley Batista of JBS a week before left for New York City on his private jet and was holed up in New York City, in his luxury apartment in the Baccarat Residences on Fifth Avenue at 53rd Street, overlooking the Museum of Modern Art.
He has apparently now left for another (undisclosed) location.
The reaction of the financial markets, both in Brazil and internationally, has been immediate following the publication of Temer’s comments. The São Paulo stock market (Bovespa) tumbled, losing 10.47 per cent of its value, and market regulators triggered a circuit breaker.
The value of the Brazilian currency, the “real”, slumped by nearly 8 per cent. The fear was that the reform package Temer was pushing though the Congress would stall.
The legislation was intended to curb the huge deficits in the social security and the generous Brazilian pension schemes and reform workers rights. There have already been (at times violent) protests against these reforms on the streets and from public sector workers, as well as from the police, the armed forces and prison officers.
Temer’s popularity (at 9%) is already at a historical low.
The São Paulo stock market and value of the Brazilian currency had recuperated by the end of the week. But the one month implied volatility of the currency, an indication of how much investors are willing to pay to insure against the real’s swing over the next thirty days, surged by over 70%.
The only Brazilian billionaire to benefit from the fall in the value of the real was Eduardo Saverin, whose net worth increased. Saverin was the Brazilian co-founder of Facebook with his Harvard classmate Mark Zuckerberg in 2004. He has since left the company and was the subject of the movie “social network.” He was worth US$8.6bn in 2017. Facebook in fact has become a major source in Brazil and beyond for information on the developing Brazilian crisis.
Will the crisis in Brazil get worse?
Undoubtedly it will.
One thing is certain.
Michel Temer’s presidency is now hanging by a thread.
He is now a Zombie president. His critics have long compared the 76 year old a butler in the film Dracula.
But to find a constitutionally acceptable successor is not at all straight forward.
If Michel Temer resigns he could well be arrested: As president he is at least protected from this eventuality.
The next in line of succession is the president of the lower house of congress, Rodrigo Maia, followed by the president of the senate (Eunicio Oliveira), and then by the head of the Supreme Court (Carmen Lúcia).
Another name mentioned is Henrique Meirelles, the economy minister, responsible for the pension reforms, and a candidate preferred by the bankers, investors, and the big Brazilian and foreign business interests. Meirelles lived for many years in US and was an executive of Bank of Boston and ended up as the head of Bank of Boston. He then headed of the Brazilian Central Bank under president Lula. He is a man with his own political ambitions.
But when he left the Central Bank he was recruited by the Batista bothers to become chairman of J&F their holding company. During Joesley Batista’s tapped conversation with Michel Temer the two men had discussed means of bringing pressure to bear on Meirelles.
There are other “delações premiadas” bombshells yet to come: From the executives of JBS, as well as the continuing investigations by Judge Moro in Curitba into the sprawling “lavo jato” cases.
The arrest and imprisonment of Sergio Cabral, the former governor of Rio de Janeiro, revealed more sordid details of the millions skimmed off in the cozy relationships between politicians and businessmen over the years. More revelations involving the major Brazilian pension funds, banks, and possibly military procurement, can all be expected in these metastasizing corruption scandals. Including above all the case of former president Lula and former president Dilma Rousseff.
Lula was according to the testimony of Renanto Duque, the former Petrobras director of services the”big chief” of the whole operation. Antonio Palocci was the “operator.”
That is the only one authorized to act of Lula’s behave in the Petrobas corruption scheme. Dilma was well aware of the scheme according to Duque, which is no surprise given the fact that she was the head of Petrobras, was the former minister of mines and energy, was the former chief of staff to Lula and was president of Brazil. And JBS also says that an offshore account was opened for Lula and for Dilma.
While Oberbrecht provided valuable unpaid work for Lula on the Atibaia estate where he and his wife enjoyed the swimming pool among other “free-bees.”
Judge Moro will be hearing testimony about the actions of Antonio Palocci in the coming week.
Pallocci has many secrets to spill if he strikes a plea bargain with Judge Moro. He was many years years Lula’s closest aide, is a former minister of the economy, was the intermediary in these dealings, as was his successor as minister of the economy, Guido Mantega.
Aécio Neves has denied the accusations against him and has requested his banning from the senate be lifted by the Supreme Court.
But on Monday 22 May, Neves left his position as a weekly columnist for “Folha,” the São Paulo based newspaper, and the major Brazilian mainstream media competitor of the Rio de Janeiro based “O Globo”, which first broke the Temer story.
President Michel Temer has also returned to the television to say that the Joesley tapes had been “doctored”, and that he had been a “ingenue” to have allowed Joesley to speak with him at the Juburu palace. And that he is the victim of “a conspiracy by subterranean interests.”
But if Temer is anything he is certainly no “ingenue.”
Like his former colleague the jailed Eduado Cunha, Michel Temer has been a permanent fixture and power broker in the back backrooms of Brasilia politics for the past thirty years. Over the weekend the Brazilian Bar association weighed into the dispute.
A day after Temer has rounded on his chief accuser, the bar association voted by 25 to 1 in favor of requesting that the congress begin impeachment hearings against Temer.
But the role of the judiciary has also come under question.
Particularly the actions of several judges on the supreme court have been questioned.
Supreme Court justice Gilmar Mendes.
Particularly the role of Supreme Court justice Gilmar Mendes.
He has called the federal prosecutors “a bunch of incompetent young boys” and he granted “habeus corpus” to Eike Bastita and José Dirceu, allowing both men to be released from custody over the objections of Supreme Court Justice Fachin who oversees the “lava jato” investigations for the Supreme Court. These two men are both central figures in the Brazilian corruption scandals. Eike Batista was the favorite poster boy of the boom years under Lula when he was (temporarily as it turned out) Brazil’s richest men. José Dirceu was the eminence grey of the Lula presidency.
A former radical student leader released from jail during the military regime as part of an exchange of the kidnapped American Ambassador. He then lived in Cuba and was infiltrated back into Brazil under an assumed name. He handled Lula’s (successful) approximation with the Brazilian and international business and financial elites after Lula’s election to the presidency, and he was the principal “fixer” and mastermind behind the buying off of congressmen and political parties during the first (the mensalão scandal) Lula presidency. The dispute has become very nasty with various judges being accused in leaks to the press of having relatives working for the accused, as indeed they do.
And the first interrogation of Lula by Judge Moro in Cuitiba made for dramatic video watching, but was inconclusive.
But no-one should have been surprised by this. Lula is a past master rhetorician. He was in any case appealing to his supporters outside Judge Moro’s courtroom. And he blamed any “irregularities” on Marisa Leticia, his late wife, who died last February 3 in São Paulo.
“Lula,” as Lula calls himself, said he knew nothing.
What is certain?
The crisis in Brazil will get much worse in the coming days and there is no clear path out of it.
The next deadline will be June 6th, when the superior election court is scheduled to rule on the validity of the election of Dilma/Temer in the last presidential election.
Temer’s election (as the vice-president on Dilma Rousseff’s presidential ticket) could be “cassado” (declared invalid). In which case Rodrigo Maia would assume as interim president for 30 days before indirect elections in the congress which would chose a new president to serve until December 2018. Direct elections would need the intervention of the Supreme Court, or a change in the constitution.
Former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) has evidently decided that Temer will not survive the political tsunami. He has begun “articulating” (which is a marvelous Brazilian euphemism for back room deal making) an alternative.
His choice is Nelson Jobim, a lawyer originally for Rio Grande do Sul, former minister of justice under FHC who appointed Jobim to the Supreme Court where he served from 1997 to 2011 ending as the president of the Supreme Court. He then became defense minister under Lula and Dilma (until he was sacked by Dilma.) Jobim has warned of the “intolerance and hatred which prevents dialogue.”
FHC believes Jobim could (potentially) bridge the chasm between the political parties in Congress. But FHC and Lula remain part of the problem. They both represent the great divide in Brazilian politics.
Both represent the different political coalitions which have dominated Brazilian politics over the past forty years. Both men are despised or loved in equal measure by their supporters and by their opponents.
Both are believed or disbelieved in equal measure.
They are unfortunately part of the “fear and loathing” and the suspicion and paralysis which gripes Brazil
But the stresses nevertheless have already led to violent protests in Rio de Janeiro and in Brasilia.
On the 25 May rioters demanding the repeal of the social security and labor reform measures, led by the labor unions, and calling for Temer’s ouster, stormed along the esplanade of ministries, the grand central boulevard of the capital, attacking and burning of part of the ministry of agriculture as well as invading the ministries of health, planning, culture where the demonstrators destroyed documents and computers, and the ministry of the economy, tourism, and mining and energy.
The staff had already been evacated.
Most ominously the innvoction by president Temer evoked his special “public order powers” powers.
The army was deployed to protect government buildings (the powers last until the end of the month).
In the Congess meanwhile a session of one of the senate committee’s presided over by the new head of the PSDB, the senator from Ceará, Tasso Jereissati, who had succeed Aecio as head of the PSDB in the Senate, and is one of the possible PSDB Senators mentioned as a possible successor to Temer if he falls from power, descended into chaos, as did a session in the lower house of the congress where opposition deputies stormed the presiding officers podium, demanding the resignation of Temer(“Fora Teme”).
One Brazilian has compared the investigations to a centipede with boots.
Each boot falling on an unsuspecting head.
And more boots continue to fall.
This week two former governors of Brasilia were arrested as the result of “plea bargains” by executives of Andrade Guitierrez, another major Brazilian construction company, involving vast over-payments for the construction of Brasilia’s “Mane Garrincha” football for the World Cup.
Judge Sergio Moro apparently took as his model the Italian magistrates who conducted the anti-mafia investigations during the 1990’s. It is in fact twenty-five years ago this week (May 23rd) that Giovanni Falcone was assassinated in Sicily while leading a successful anti-mafia campaign which brought hundreds of mafia members to trail, conviction, and long jail sentences.
And the Milan district attorney in the “clean hands” (“mani pulite”) operation, which used “preventative detention” to unravel the network of corrupt bribes and kickbacks between politicians and businessmen which had for decades underwritten the whole post-war Italian political system.
The political parties which had dominated Italian politics, the Christian Democrats and the Socialists, were destroyed as a result of the magistrates activities.
But one of the results was the rise of the populist Silvio Berlusconi, and the power of the magistrates was increasingly perceived as being an exercise in arrogance.
The risk in Brazil is not so much the immediate political struggle over Temer’s future, serious though this certainly is, but the result will only be a temporary stop-gap.
It is the prospect for the next presidential election in 2019 that is the real challenge.
The leading potential candidates are both outsiders.
Which may well be their attraction to a public tired of the chronic corruption of the present political system: Joao Doria, the newly elected mayor of Sao Paulo, and Jair Bolsonaro, a Rio de Janeiro congressman.
Joao Doria is a wealthy entrepreneur, publicist and television personality. He ran the Brazilian edition of “The Apprentice.”
But his American model is Michael Bloomberg, who he visited (with television cameras) recently in New York City.
Jair Bolsonaro is a extreme right wing nationalist and a former army major (he was a parachutist), who many Brazilians claim is homophobic, misogynistic, and racist. He is a vocal supporter of the military regime.
When he voted for the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff he praised Brilhante Ustra, who headed the notorious DOI-CODI where Dilma was tortured.
Editor’s Note: There will be many shoes falling from this centipedes feet. Pierre Tran of Defense News has reported on one of these in a recent Defense News article.
French legal authorities are conducting an inquiry into alleged corruption tied to the 2008 sale of Scorpene attack submarines to Brazil, French media reported.
“The national financial prosecutor has been investigating since autumn 2016 an arms contract between France and Brazil based mainly on five submarines,” daily Le Parisien reported May 20.
The preliminary inquiry concerns an alleged “corruption of foreign public officials,” relating to a Dec. 23, 2008, contract for Scorpene submarines, the report said. French judges are seeking to determine whether bribes were paid relating to the submarine sale with some of the money allegedly sent back to France in a “retrocommission.”
A DCNS spokesman told Defense News: “DCNS strictly abides by the provisions of international treaties and local laws in every country in which the company operates, as well as the highest level of compliance.”
In the deal with Brazil, DCNS agreed to the sale of four Scorpene boats, technology transfer and help to build the conventional part of a planned nuclear-powered submarine.
DCNS’ local partner, Odebrecht, is under investigation by Brazilian officials for alleged corruption. Executives of the Brazilian building company disclosed the name of the French partner, the weekly paper Journal du Dimanche reported.
Civilian contractors from Insitu Inc., launch a Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle from the flight deck of the amphibious dock-landing ship USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44). Credit: Navy Media Content Services, 4/28/12
PACIFIC OCEAN, Calif., — Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 161 (Reinforced) attached to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit load the flight deck of the USS San Diego (LPD-22) with several air assets, April 11, 2017. The 15th MEU uses the air assets provided from VMM-161 to transport personnel and equipment from ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore efficiently. The 15th MEU’s rapid ability to mobilize people and equipment makes the amphibious force uniquely postured to respond to any mission around the globe. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Timothy Valero)
SINGAPORE (June 3, 2017) Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis delivers opening remarks during the first plenary session of the Shangri-La Dialogue 2017 June 3. The Shangri-La Dialogue, held annually by the independent think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), is an inter-governmental security forum which is attended by defense ministers and delegates from more than 50 nations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Joshua Fulton/Released)
Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN holds the floor, during the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs. Australia currently holds the Chairmanship of IONS. The regional forum was held during Sea Power 2015. *
Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN, delivers the Ode of Remembrance at the Lone Pine commemorative service in Gallipoli.
Minister for Defence Industry, the Honourable Christopher Pyne MP (centre right) at the announcement of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan in the presence of Acting Chief of the Defence Force, Vice Admiral Ray Griggs, AO, CSC, RAN (left), Minister for Defence, Senator the Honourable Marise Payne, and the Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable Malcolm Turnbull.
Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable Malcolm Turnbull (left) speaks with Air Warfare Destroyer shipbuilders during a tour of NUSHIP Hobart.
