President Trump and President Xi Jinping Meet For Dinner: Syrian Strikes as the Main Course

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/08/2017

2017-04-08 By Danny Lam

The top diplomats of both countries scripted the meeting between President Trump and Xi in order to avoid seemingly obvious problems that would obviously embarrass President Xi.

They wanted to avoid previous incidents such as when Fanlungong disrupted a press conference with President Hu Jintao and GW Bush and the anthem for Republic of China announced.

And so it was that such “gaffs” were avoided with the Trump-Xi visit.

nd Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together after their meetings at Mar-a-Lago in Florida. Photo: AP

What was very obvious is that no joint press conference (beside a photo opportunity) was held, no joint statement issued, and little of the normal congratulatory and laudatory statements normally conferred by heads of government on each other.

More awkward than the Trump-Trudeau summit that issued a joint statement that failed to mention Canada as an unrepentant defense free rider and steps to live up to Canadian commitments; or the missed opportunity for an on-camera handshake with Chancellor Merkel.

The most telling statement was when two Presidents arrived at about the same time, at opposite sides of the airport, and neither side took the opportunity to greet each other. Secretary Tillerson greeted President Xi’s arrival reminiscent of President Raul Castro’s snub of President Obama or Xi’s snubbing of Obama.

President Xi arrived in an Air China 747-400 that was removed from regular passenger service and converted with beds, sofas, etc. for the occasion. China, smarting from President Jiang Zemin’s purchase of a used American plane converted as Presidential transport in 2001 that was found seeded with listening devices, have satisficed with Air China passenger planes temporarily removed from service.

Not being a manufacturer of world class aircraft leaves China little choice but to utilize an aircraft that was clearly not properly equipped to defend itself against attacks, or to be a secure command post for Beijing China’s nuclear and conventional forces. Or to be free from “calling home” at anytime whether intentionally seeded with listening devices or not.

USS Porter Launches Strike Against Syrian Airfield

Contrast this with President Trump’s Air Force One that is well armed and defended against attacks, hardened against nuclear weapon effects, and capable of secure command and control of US Forces anywhere in the world in war or peace; and China’s status as an aspiring, rather than an actual superpower is clear. Future iterations of Air Force One will likely reinforce and strengthen this capability:   making it clear that the POTUS dealing with their counterparts IS the one that holds the nuclear trigger.

It is not at all clear who, or what are the command and control linkages for Chinese nuclear and conventional forces when President Xi is away from China traveling on his vulnerable transports. Nor is it clear who is in charge if the President of China were to meet an untimely demise.   President Xi exposed his government’s weakness for all to see.

Beijing China may be an economic superpower, but not a military superpower.

The visit was arranged at the behest of Beijing China.

While “China experts” derided President Elect Trump for his phone call with President Tsai of Taiwan after a less than cordial meeting with the PRC Ambassador and provocative missile barrage tests by PRC; the subsequent affirmation of “one China” by President Trump, it was clear that Trump did not expect the meeting to be friendly.

Beijing China, did, however, get the better of Secretary Tillerson on his visit, who failed to see the significance of using a Beijing drafted terms and speech when arranging the visit. Fortunately, when Beijing tried the same tactic on President Trump – offering to draft the joint statement – it was refused.

In any case, President Xi made the blunder of demanding and coming to a meeting with President Trump without prior-negotiations leading to substantial agreements to be concluded at the summit.  

While such “get acquainted” meetings was fine with a President Elect as Prime Minister Abe did to build a relationship, it is not the way for heads of governments to meet only to have President Trump candidly proclaim “So far, I have gotten absolutely nothing” from Xi.

The other telltale of the visit was the absence of social gatherings where the leaders can interact with each other in informal settings, getting to know each other away from the aides, and for President Xi that came such a long way, a time for him to get over jet lag. In past visits, schedules over many days enabled President Xi to gradually get acclimatized and ready. The Trump-Xi summit, spread over about 24 hours, made for a tough occasion.

This was made more difficult by the refusal to permit the Xi delegation to stay at Mar-A-Lago: A privilege that Prime Minister Abe enjoyed.

The Beijing China diplomats tried to put a good face on it by alleging that they are concerned about being wiretapped at Mar-A-Lago and instead opted for Eau Palm Beach Resort and Spa about 8 miles from Mar-A-Lago.

But come on, if the US can wiretap Mar-A-Lago, they can do the same anywhere in the US.

The real reason Xi was barred was concern that Beijing agents will use it as an opportunity to plant bugs everywhere — making for an expensive (and potentially not through) clean up after their departure. It is also a clear signal of the distrust between the US and Beijing China that they are not allowed there overnight.

Staying at Eau Palm Beach just about assured that Xi’s motorcade will have to travel past anti Beijing demonstrators and protesters many times to and from the meeting — and that is what happened. It is not known if the US State Department picked up the cost of Xi’s delegation at Eau Palm as per custom. Trump personally paid for Abe’s visit to Mar-A-Lago while Abe’s staff stayed off site. If not, that be a major departure from protocol. Notably, there were few (if any) anti-Trump protesters.

While President Trump did not follow through on his threat to serve McDonald’s hamburgers, the dinner was decidedly average by Trump hospitality standards. PM Abe and his wife had an intimate dinner with the Trumps and Robert Kraft in an open, relaxed setting, the dinner with President Xi and his delegation was decidedly a working, formal, business meal attend by large delegations on both sides. In a clear snub, Trump, a non-drinker, served modestly priced wine.

No effort was made to impress Xi with hospitality.  

The most telling moment was when President Trump informed President Xi of the Syrian missile strike at the end of the dinner — a decision he made 4 hours ago after 2 days of consultations.

Here is where the Beijing China was exposed as the paper tiger they really are. No aide interrupted the dinner to whisper to Xi about the attack before, during, or immediately after.

One is forced to conclude that either the Beijing China regime did not know, or their “allies” who did know like the Russians, Iranians, Syrians, etc. failed to warn them ahead of time or immediately after.  Or that warnings were not efficiently conveyed to Xi and his delegation.

None of this reflects well on President Xi.

Russia was warned before the attack by the US, and other allies like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, UK, France, Canada, etc. were also briefed well beforehand.

Despite this widespread knowledge, Xi did not get told before the missiles struck. Russia, wisely, decided to accede to it despite their perfunctory protests ex poste facto.

Significantly, Russians did not tip off the Syrians to foil the attack.

What this exposed is Beijing China in fact do not have an effective worldwide real time intelligence gathering, interpretation and dissemination system on the ground, and an efficient means to communicate with their President on a vital matter at all times.

Contrast this with the North Korean missile test during the Trump-Abe dinner, when US and Japanese aides simultaneously rushed to alert their leader in full view of the public.

Given this performance, and the fact that President Xi travels in an unsecured fashion; Can we truly be sure that President Xi is in fact, and at all times, in full command and control of Beijing China’s nuclear and armed forces?

If Xi is not in full control of the armed forces? Just what is the chain of command in Beijing China?

This performance raises serious questions as to the structure of command and control, readiness and credibility of the PRC nuclear and conventional arsenal. It does not resemble what we know of the Soviet/Russian, US, French, and UK nuclear arsenal.

Beyond this, there is the question of precisely what ability Beijing has to project power much beyond their borders and littorals unless they resort to things like ballistic missiles or economic instruments.   For all their prowess as cyber warriors, Beijing China was unable to detect on their own the launch of 59 cruise missiles off a hotly contested area of the Middle East. No PLAN units were nearby despite all their talk of “one belt, one road” and enhancing their Middle East presence. Russia can credibly threaten to block another US strike, Beijing China cannot. Nor can they defend sea lanes they depend on for trade.

President Trump’s Syrian strike did more.

American credibility was enhanced by how quickly Americans coalesced around the President with many “never Trumpers” muttering approval. Quarrelsome US allies, like Canada and Germany, abruptly shifted tact and approved with other allies.

Meanwhile, President Xi’s Beijing China was shown to be an impotent bystander who had no choice but to accept the fact despite their long stand stance that negotiations are the only solution to problems like Syria and North Korea. Indeed, North Korea deliberately provoked Trump and Xi just before the summit with another missile test: demonstrating Xi’s impotence.

On the other hand, America means it when President Trump say he will deal with North Korea with or without China. China exposed the rationale for their position favoring negotiations is because of their military impotency even with North Korea on their border. Perhaps Beijing China is deterred by the North Korean nuclear arsenal and their inability to militarily defeat it without risking a successful nuclear strike on China?

It sure looks that way.

Within 24 hours, President Trump unambiguously demonstrated to President Xi the attributes of a bona fide superpower: America did not ask for permission or consent from peer competitors like Russia or China. America was able to use force, and to do so legitimately and with the support of every major OECD nation to whom America is allied. No American allies, and even Russia, tipped off the Syrians.

Compare this with the lack of legitimacy when Russia and China used force both within and without their borders. Beijing China, in particular, has little legitimacy to their forceful sea grab campaign in the South China Sea, or their attempt to claim the Senkaku or Taiwan.

The limitations of President Xi and Beijing China’s power is exposed for all to see.

Militarily, China have little ability to project useable (conventional) military power more than a few hundred kilometers from their borders. Beijing China is ruling over a collection of very independent “local” governments who are trade and economic powers, but not military beyond their borders.   Absent the use of nuclear weapons, or economic power, Beijing China is a paper tiger.

This perspective raises serious questions as to President Xi’s Beijing regime ability to militarily (or economically) compel North Korea to denuclearize.  

It also raises doubts as to the willingness of Beijing to intervene militarily to prop up the Pyongyang regime — for such a campaign would leave Beijing China dangerously exposed to domestic revolt and rebellion.

President Xi’s visit exposed Beijing China’s dependence on the US and allies control of shipping lanes for the benefits of free trade. This is a relationship that Beijing China not only pays nothing for, but is actively disrupting and undermining with their military buildup against the US and allies.

There were some positive achievements out of the summit.  

Xi and Trump setting up a dialog on four major issues: diplomacy / security, economic issues, cyber security and law enforcement, and finally, social / cultural issues is a foolish game. For it is a tacit acknowledgement that existing channels failed and is in need of what President Xi termed, a “new starting point”. Xi noted: “There are a thousand reasons to make Sino-US relationship work, and no reason to break it.”

These are hardly the terms one should use for one of the largest trading relationships in the world.

But it is the right term to deal with Beijing China’s oppressive and protectionist trading regime and the lack of credibility of Beijing commitments in trade.

Beijing China will be, for the first time, put on the spot by a tough minded Administration to deliver the goods and open their markets, or else. No doubt that Ivanka Trump will find the widespread ripoff and registration of her trademark and brand name in China to be unamusing. Beijing China’s failure to control the synthetic narcotics manufacture and export, like cyber security, are issues that cast doubt as to their actual power.

President Trump’s must do task in the summit is to size up and weigh the credibility and power of President Xi and his regime before he “make a deal” with them.

Toward that goal, President Trump performed brilliantly. 

An Update on the Australian Wedgetail and Its Evolution: A Discussion with Group Captain Stuart Bellingham

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/07/2017

2017-04-07 By Robbin Laird

During my visit to Australia in April 2017, I had a chance to continue my discussions with Group Captain Stuart Bellingham, Officer Commanding Number 42 Wing, about the Wedgetail and its continuing evolution.

The Wedgetail has demonstrated in the Middle East and in high end warfare exercises that it is a very good fit for the shift to a fifth generation enabled air combat force.

Most recently, I heard from USAF and RAF personnel involved in the first Red Flag this year, how impressive they found the aircraft.

As one senior RAF pilot put it: “I would never fly with an AWACS if had a choice. I would only fly with Wedgetail.”

Obviously, Number 2 Squadron and Number 42 Wing have made an impact on air combat thinking.

In this year’s Red Flag 17-1, the F-35 and F-22 flew with RAF Typhoons and USAF F-15s along with the Sentinel UK aircraft and the Aussie Wedgetail, along with other assets as well.

A United States Air Force (USAF) F-22A Raptor lifts off from the runway at Nellis Air Force Base during Exercise Red Flag 17-1. Visible in the background (from left) are a Draken International Inc L-159 Albatross; a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) E-7A Wedgetail, and a RAAF C-130J Hercules. Credit: RAAF

But the exercise was notable in terms of the first appearance in Red Flag 17-1 an exercise in which one combat participant noted: “In this exercise, the F-35 reshaped how we are thinking about the use of our entire air combat force.

“The question was not what the F-35 could do for the rest of us; it was what can we contribute to the F-35 led air combat force?”

The Wedgetail certainly found its place in answering that question and in providing unique quarterback functionality to the force and to support functions from an ISR and C2 role as well.

Not only did the Wedgetail show up, but the Officer Commanding 42 Wing played a key role in the exercise as well.

According to an article published in Australian Aviation on February 14, 2017:

GPCAPT Bellingham was the first non-US participant to be Director of the CAOC, leading 250 American, British and Australian personnel. This was the first time a coalition nation has performed this role in such an exercise.

“We are integrated with these capabilities from start to finish, from planning missions, through to debriefing the missions,” GPCAPT Bellingham said.

“Australia has air battlespace managers from No. 2 Squadron and No. 41 Wing who are controlling the Red Flag airspace, and getting first-hand experience how these capabilities can be employed.

“We’re getting real insight into understanding the capabilities and what Australia’s future is going to look like.”

http://australianaviation.com.au/2017/02/exercise-red-flag-2017-concludes/

Question: I think Red Flag 17-1 is a good example of how we collectively are shaping a way ahead.

In effect, we are seeing the training of a network of operators who can shape high intensity air operations under the impact of fifth generation warfighting concepts.

The technology is crucial; the platforms are important; but it is the training towards where we need to go that is crucial, rather than simply training to the past.

Is that not where your experience with Wedgetail and working with allies comes in?

Group Captain Bellingham: That is a good way to set up the discussion.

I think the strength of everything we’re doing at the moment only comes from a strong cooperation with our allies. Obviously, we’re a tiny force, and our relevance and real strength becomes fully apparent when we tie our capabilities with those of our allies.

At Red Flag 17-1, we saw the US, the UK and Australia blending advanced assets together to make the entire force more lethal and survivable in the high end threat environment.

Question: The F-35 plays a key role in shaping the battlespace and target identification for other air assets.

What is the Wedgetail’s role in that context?

Group Captain Bellingham: As we evolve the capabilities of Wedgetail, we see key roles it can play as a quarterback in a high-end fight.

And as we upgrade the software and hardware capabilities, it is only by interacting with the other assets in that air combat environment that we can truly evolve new ways of doing things.

It’s not just we’ve updated the software and now we’ve got a great radar. That’s a continuous process, and every time we go to these exercises and go, “You know, that was kind of neat. How do we make that repeatable, and how do we embed that in our doctrine and TTPs?”

Our true strength comes from multiple nations working together and blending their capabilities for the fight, because it is simply very difficult for any one nation to fund and deploy all the high-end capabilities we need.

Our Wedgetail contribution can be seen in this light.

Question: Let us return to the concept of shaping a network of operators for 21st century high-end operations.

How do we best get this done?

Group Captain Bellingham: It is about deploying your new assets, and learning how to use them in an interactive context.

For us, it is starting with Wedgetail, and then moving to Growler, and then to F-35, to P-8, to Triton and so on, how do we shape an effective team to dominate in an air combat environment?

The platforms and technology is crucial but training to where we need to go and cross learning to evolve the combat force is absolutely essential for shaping the air force we need to deploy.

We see our new Air Warfare Centre as a key opportunity to do just that. One evolving aspect is that our Air Force used to conduct Fighter Combat Instructor courses; and we would send a ground controller to the course to participate.

Now the focus is on the evolution of holistic air combat capabilities and as part of that, we have a Wedgetail team participating in the Air Warfare Instructor course.

We’ve got several participants involved from the Wedgetail side: an electronic systems officer, a couple of the air battle managers, we have a pilot, and they’re all working as a team in the airborne early warning and control space.

During the course they will evolve AEW&C tactics which are complementary to the overall Air combat domain and they will all graduate from the course as Air Warfare Instructors.

They are working that quarterback space, to understand the needs and opportunities of that network of operators and how we can change our TTPs to make them more effective.

More broadly, we are focused on being an enabler not just for the air combat force but the joint force.

For example, we are working with the Navy and the Army with regard to supporting expeditionary blue water operations and operating in concert with the new LHD and its evolving concepts of operations in the littoral space.

The enabler function is the key Wedgetail strength in terms of supporting the joint and combined combat force more generally.

Question: Wedgetail is a software upgradeable aircraft and is undergoing modernization along existing lines but you have some expanded capabilities in mind as well?

Group Captain Bellingham: We are modernizing the aircraft to enhance current C2 capabilities but we are looking at ways to exploit its extraordinary radar (via its scalability) to expand into the non-kinetic warfare space.

And we will do that as well through the cross learning we talked about earlier.

We are working really hard at the moment in collaboration with our allies to get a team approach to accelerate our learning.

We are looking to build from the achievements we’ve done so far and build on that cooperatively with our allies.

We’re working to get to the next level, and we’re looking at the next generation of E-7, based on our operational experience and leveraging the collaborative networks we have established with allies moving into the fifth generation enabled air combat force.

Question: A final thought suggests itself.

Without the global engagement of Wedgetail in operations and exercises, the entire development process you described would not be possible.

And the Wedgetail would not be showing up if not for the presence of your KC-30A, a point that could be missed.

How important has the new tanker been to enabling Wedgetail to deploy and to shape its combat learning process?

Group Captain Bellingham: You have raised a very good point.

The two came into the force at about the same time.

Without the tanker, we don’t get the endurance and the ability to stay on task.

We would not have the reach and persistence.

And our part of the world we have vast distances and lots of open water, we need the expeditionary capability that a tanker brings, and a good tanker that can offload a good amount of gas and has great reliability.

The KC-30A, what it’s demonstrated on operations over the last two and a half years has again been phenomenal.

Whilst it had a few initial teething problems with the boom and other things, that tanker is going from strength to strength.

Without it, we’re irrelevant, because we can’t do that expeditionary work which we need to be able to do.

That’s important in the Middle East, but even more important in our part of the world.

Editor’s Note: At the conclusion of Red Flag 17-1, we published a short story built around a video where the senior airmen discussed the exercise.

https://sldinfo.com/an-overview-on-red-flag-17-1-usaf-raf-and-raaf-perspectives-on-the-evolution-of-airpower/

Red Flag 17-1 Commanders discuss changes to this exercise with participation from the F-35A.

A number of key perspectives are provided throughout, ranging from the key role of the reserves, to the important role of the Wedgetail, to the F-22 squadron having already learned from the Marines with regard to F-35 integration when the F-35Bs came last year, to the Typhoon pilot discussing the role of 4th-5th gen integration and off board targeting.

The sound quality is not always great; but the discussion is quite interesting talking about fifth generation aircraft, 4th-5th gen integration and the key role of Wedgetail working the air battle management across the spectrum of operations.

The USAF could cut the Gordian knot of AWACS replacement simply by buying the Wedgetail and option the UK is looking at currently. 

For earlier discussions with the Group Captain and related pieces see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-williamtown-airbase-the-wedgetail-in-evolution/

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-wedgetail-at-williamtown-airbase/

https://sldinfo.com/the-wedgetail-the-raaf-and-shaping-a-way-ahead-for-the-australian-defense-force-a-discussion-with-the-commanding-officer-of-the-42nd-wing/

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-red-flag-16-1-air-combat-integration-and-the-role-of-the-f-22-the-typhoon-and-wedgetail/

https://sldinfo.com/from-troubled-to-trailblazing-program-the-wedgetail-and-21st-century-combat-innovation/

https://sldinfo.com/the-wedgetail-as-a-trailblazing-program/

And we published the following piece on 2-4/17 about the RAAF at Red Flag 17-1.

Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel have deployed to Nevada for Exercise Red Flag 17-1, where they will train in the world’s most complex air combat environment.

Alongside counterparts from United States and United Kingdom, approximately 200 RAAF personnel will support and participate in missions involving up to 100 aircraft, flying over 31,000 square kilometres of the Nevada desert.

RAAF Contingent Commander and Director of the Exercise Red Flag 17-1 Combined Air and Space Operations Centre, Group Captain Stuart Bellingham said the Red Flag training environment was unmatched in its complexity and realism.

“Since RAAF personnel first participated in Exercise Red Flag in 1980, this exercise has informed both how we train our people and develop our air power,” Group Captain Bellingham said.

“Modern air operations must overcome not only ground and airborne threats, but also attacks in the electronic spectrum and the cyberspace domain.

“Exercise Red Flag was established by the United States Air Force to provide personnel with an experience of modern combat operations, and show them how to overcome the threats they might face.”

For Exercise Red Flag 17-1, RAAF has deployed an E-7A Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft, as well as a C-130J Hercules transport.

An essential aspect of the training focuses on personnel who are embedded within the Combined Air and Space Operations Centre, with RAAF personnel leading this key command and control node. This is significant as it is the first time a coalition nation has performed this role during a Red Flag exercise.

Also participating are Air Battlespace Managers from RAAF’s No. 41 Wing, who will control missions with up to 100 aircraft at a time in the exercise; and a Combat Control Team from No. 4 Squadron, whose job it is to ensure aircraft can seamlessly deliver support to ground forces during the exercise.

“Australia’s participation in Exercise Red Flag will enable Coalition partners to better understand how we operate, and likewise consolidates our strong working relationships,” Group Captain Bellingham said.

“This exercise is an ideal environment for our personnel to experience how the Growler and F-35A are integrated within a larger mission.”

Exercise Red Flag 17-1 will involve the United States Air Force’s F-35A Lightning II, and the United States Navy’s E/A-18G Growler – both about to enter Australian service.

“Both aircraft will provide new capabilities to the Australian Defence Force, and will play an important role for RAAF’s future operations.”

Credit: Australian Ministry of Defence:1/24/17

 

 

President Trump Enforces Proportionate Deterrence: Looking Ahead

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-04-07 By Richard Weitz

The US decision to launch a limited cruise missile strike against a Syrian government air base near the city of Homs looks to be a sensible move given limited US leverage and interests in a battlefield that Americans do not want to join in force.

The strike, which consisted of 59 Tomahawk missiles, was a calculated warning shot and means to restore deterrence against the further use of weapons of mass destruction in Syria, but it also targeted other audiences.

The US strike also aimed to restore credibility to US threats of military action that had eroded following the US decision to back down from similar action in Syria in 2013.

The USS Porter Launches Strike Against Syrian Airfield

Hopefully, the regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran will understand that they would face similarly decisive military action should they use, or prepare to use, weapons of mass destruction.

Since the target was the Syrian government units involved in the chemical weapons attack in Idlib, which killed almost one hundred civilians, the US strikes were, as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said, a “proportionate response” to a war crime.

They were prudently not extensive enough to create a power vacuum that the terrorists in Syria, who are being defeating, could exploit.

They also were appropriately coordinated with US allies in Europe and the Middle East, who generally applauded the strike.

Trump’s move fell within a well-established pattern of post-Cold War US foreign policy.

Guided-missile destroyer USS Porter (DDG 78) launches a tomahawk land attack missile in the Mediterranean Sea. Picture: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Ford Williams/U.S. Navy via APSource:AP

For example, the Clinton administration repeatedly launched cruise missiles against Iraqi WMD sites in the 1990s as well as al-Qaeda bases in Africa and Afghanistan—a policy that arguably produced better results than the large-scale US military interventions of the following decade.

The Trump administration still needs to manage the critical Russian-Syrian-Turkey triangle. Targeting a base where there were apparently no Russian planes or technicians was a good start.

Engaging in vigorous discussions now to avoid Russian-US military-to-military incidents is now even more essential.

For this reason, the Russian decision to suspend the mechanism to avoid Russian-US inadvertent engagements and collisions is unwelcome—though hopefully Moscow’s move represents merely a short-term symbolic step of protest rather than a long-term cessation.

The Kremlin’s denunciation of the strike was expected but manageable.

“President Putin considers the American strikes against Syria an aggression against a sovereign government in violations of the norms of international law, and under a far-fetched pretext,” The Washington Post quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov.

Leaving aside the fact that the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons represented a serious breach of international law and norms, the Russian concern about “causing significant damage to Russian-American relations, which are already in a deplorable state,” is indeed warranted.

The Russian decision to strengthen Syrian air defenses could present real problems should the United States, Turkey, or Israel need to attack Syrian targets, even those of ISIS, in self-defense.

For example, they may need to use force against terrorist chemical weapons assets in Syria.

At the end of last year, it was hoped that Syria would be one of many issues that would benefit from a general improvement in Russian-US ties under Trump. Even last month, Syria was one of the few areas of limited cooperation still available to both countries. Russia’s military presence in Syria guarantees Moscow some leverage with Washington.

For example, the Trump administration had supported the Russian-led peace talks in Astana and had downplayed criticism that, while the Russian forces in Syria sometimes fight ISIS, its main target has been other threats to Assad.

There were hopes that Russian and US forces could even work out a sectoral division of labor in Syria—though there would not be integrated Russian-US military operations in Syria, they might conduct separate operations in different parts of the country with appropriate de-confliction.

Of course, it was never clear if, even with Russian-Iranian help, an unreconstructed Assad regime could have restored control over all of Syrian territory.

And there was the problem of managing the Russian-Iranian military partnership in Syria and elsewhere. Now the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons has ended opportunities for Russian-US-Assad cooperation in Syria and we need to look for a new path forward.

The missile strike will provide a short-term fillip to troubled Turkey-US relations.

When Tillerson visited Ankara last month, Turkish officials bluntly denounced US actions, hinted at US plotting and conspiracies against Turkey, and demanded changes in US policies, especially the extraction of Muhammed Fethullah Gülen and an end to US support for the planned YPG-led assault on Raffa.

Despite Turkish concerns about the connections between the YPG and the PKK, the US military sees supporting the YPG as unavoidable due to military expediency. The United States lacks alternative strong military partners on the ground, despite years of trying to build them out of the disparate insurgent forces, so must support the YPG for now.

Notwithstanding their differences over Syria, US-Turkish ties have improved regarding other issues, such as Turkey’s reluctance to fight ISIS, terrorist financing, and Assad’s future.

The Turkish government will hopefully moderate its criticism of Western countries after its constitutional referendum is over, insofar as much of the anti-Western rhetoric appears driven by Turkish domestic politics.

The Trump administration could profitably re-engage Turkey on non-Syrian issues, such as Afghanistan and Iran. Although Turkish leaders have become increasingly disinterested in improving ties with the European Union, they remain committed to NATO, which provides the main foundation for Turkish-US defense ties.

China’s calling for calm and expressing opposition to the use of both chemical weapons and other uses of force was expected. Trump was taking a risk in launching the military strike while hosting President Xi, but his team looks to have managed the issue well.

It remains unclear why the United States could not have waited until after the Chinese President had left U.S. territory. Perhaps the Pentagon was worried that the Syrian military was dispersing its forces and activating its air defenses.

Still, the challenge with China is not to become so distracted by Syria that the US negotiators neglect to press Beijing hard on the more threatening issue of North Korean WMDs.

Editor’s Note: If you wish to comment on this article, please do so here:

Trump’s Next Steps: Looking Beyond Syria

And two years ago we argued that “Obama Must Act or Putin Runs the Show.”

Obama Must Act On Syria Or Putin Runs The Show

Predicting Failed States: Look for the Zoo Indicator

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-04-08 By James Durso

Every year official and unofficial Washington, D.C. spends a lot of time and money trying to divine the next big trouble spots.

Often called “failed states” or “fragile states”, they are scrutinized and the candidates for this dubious distinction wind up in serious tomes by think tanks, and governments.

The effort, which seems to employ legions of interns and every graduate of a local Master-level program in political science, analyzes many – too many – political, social, and economic factors in a contest to be the first to be called by CNN when country X “unexpectedly” goes down the tube.

It’s a lot of piffle, really. Sure, dictators, warlords, and oligarchs spend the public’s money on champagne, drugs, guns, fast cars, and faster women. Too hard! Get your zen on, dude! Simplify. All you need to know is: Does the ruler have a private zoo?

The ‘Tigers’ were first accused of war crimes during fighting in Croatia 1991 [Ron Haviv, Al Jazeera.
The proof:

We already knew Saddam was trouble, but if we entertained any doubts about his progeny, Uday Hussein relieved us of those. In addition to his interests in drugs, rape, torture, and murder, Number One Son collected lions, cheetahs and a bear.

Jean-Bédel Bokassa, the self-crowned emperor of the Central African Republic, bankrupted his country to pay for his coronation, which may account for his thriftiness: his political rivals were allegedly fed to lions and crocodiles in his personal zoo, thereby solving several problems at once.

Never one to disappoint, Libya’s Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, complemented his bizarre wardrobe and the meandering prose of his Green Book with a private amusement park and zoo.

Cuba’s President Fulgencio Batista was probably too busy with his zoo to notice some trouble maker named Fidel Castro…

The only guy who can give Russia’s Vladimir Putin fits is the Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov, who loves the big cats. And here’s a picture of Kadyrov with a cougar.

Ukraine’s absconded Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych left a lot behind when he hurriedly packed his bags. He since manned up and has taken responsibility for the violence surrounding his ouster, but he drew the line at criticism of his ostriches.

The late (and unlamented) Serbian gangster and warlord Arkan was serious trouble and his private army, the Serb Volunteer Guard, or “Tigers” had a, you guessed it, tiger for a mascot. I know – that’s not a zoo – but he was going places.

In the private sector division, drug kingpins pioneered Living Large and, when not pocketing government officials and gold-plated firearms, they like to get back to their rural roots by collecting a little nature.

Pablo Escobar has moved on to the big hacienda in the sky but his pet hippos are still alive and kickin’.

Jesus “The King” Zambada, former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, shares something with his 200 wild animals: both are in state custody.

Chapo Guzman is now an honored guest of the U.S. government, but his sons Ivan, Alfredo and Joaquin are like many Instagrammers – they love to share cat pictures. Why, he’s a member of the gang!

And if owning a zoo isn’t enough, you can always “eat a zoo” as did the 2000 guests at Robert Mugabe’s 91st birthday party which served “young elephant, and two buffaloes, two sables and five impalas.”

Why? Because Mugabe!

James Durso is the Managing Director of Corsair LLC.

He was a professional staff member at the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Mr. Durso served as a U.S. Navy officer for 20 years and specialized in logistics and security assistance. His overseas military postings were in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and he served in Iraq as a civilian transport advisor with the Coalition Provisional Authority. He served afloat as Supply Officer of the submarine USS SKATE (SSN 578).

Editor’s Note: I am sure that some consulting firm has either done research along these lines or will propose to the US intelligence community such a study. 

Zut Alors!

That is right we know foreign nationals and even speak several languages which certainly ensures we are not qualified to work with U.S. intelligence so guess we won’t get that Zoo indicator study anytime soon!

 

 

 

 

 

 

Weapons Testing for the Luftwaffe Provides Significant Impact on the Southern Cape of Africa

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-04-08 By Dean Wingrin

The testing of missiles and other weapons at the Denel Overberg Test Range (OTR) by the German Air Force (Luftwaffe) has contributed significantly to the economy of the small southern Cape region.

Germany deployed four Tornado fighter-bombers, along with 160 personnel, to AFB Overberg in the southern Cape for an exercise named Two Oceans 2017, enjoying the epithet of “Power Play.”

The three week campaign, commencing on March 13 and concluding on March 31, involved Tornados from Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 33 (Tactical Air Force Wing 33), based at Buechel Air Base near the city of Cochem. The eight aircrew (each with a pilot and a Weapon System Officer) are a mixture of experienced and inexperienced personnel.

Located alongside Air Force Base Overberg, home to the South African Air Force’s Test Flight Development Centre (TFDC), the OTR facilities at the site include tracking radar, optical missile tracking systems, cinetheodolites and a variety of land and sea-based targets.

“We have been coming to Overberg every second year since 2001,” German deputy defence attaché Commander Kai Brand said, adding “billions of Rand” had been spent by the visiting air force over that time. This figure not only includes the costs of using the OTR, but also logistics, accommodation and other ancillary expenses.

As one of the main customers at the OTR, the German contingent has no other agenda other than testing their weapon systems following upgrades.

As the Commanding Officer for the campaign explained, “At OTR we have the unique chance to evaluate the tactics and procedures we developed back home. A range with this big variety of targets (buildings, vehicles, moving targets, sea targets) and available airspace cannot be found anywhere else and gives a chance to practice different attack procedures and modes. Here we can expend weapons with a guidance kit which is not possible in Germany and the airspace gives us the flexibility to operate at all altitudes and directions.”

The Tornados involved in the tests have been upgraded with software and hardware to the latest ASSTA 3.0 (Avionics System Software Tornado in Ada) variant, meaning the aircraft are capable of using laser-targeted Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM).

The primary objective of the test campaign is to test the upgraded Taurus KEPD 350 (Kinetic Energy Penetration Destroyer) long-range air-to-surface missile.

They also made use of the OTR capabilities to drop guided munitions like the GBU-24 laser-guided and GBU-54 (JDAM) laser and GPS guided bombs, something which is not possible in Germany. Another objective was the firing of the Tornado’s Mauser BK-27 cannon.

The Taurus expert responsible for the readiness of the system has been planning the test campaign for the past two years.

Although the Taurus has been tested in South Africa and elsewhere many times, he notes that the recent tests were special as the Taurus recently underwent a mid-life upgrade with new hardware and software. Thus, the Germans are confirming the various uses of the upgraded missile, including the planning and programing processes which depend on the type of target.

“So that’s what we test, will the software do the correct calculations, will we reach and hit the target in the proper way, what can we expect? It’s the first time we really test this to see that everything is good and effective and that the system runs properly.”

Prior to the live firing exercises, an inert captive missile was flown under a Tornado, ensuring that all the systems and safeguards were in place. Thereafter followed four missile firings, with each identical missile containing a 500 kg (1,100 lb) warhead.

Speaking prior to the fourth and final missile firing, he said that the first three tests “went very well, it worked the way we expected.”

Although only static targets were used, the OTR team provided numerous targets, simulating buildings, a bunker, aircraft and vehicles.

For the bomb and gunnery exercises, both land based and sea-borne targets were used. For the first time in a local live firing exercise, the OTR team developed full-scale remote controlled vehicles which were also used as targets.

The detail planning for Two Oceans 2017 started more than a year in advance, with items such as site surveys, financing and logistics requiring attention.

At least four transport missions were flown by the large Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft, with a Luftwaffe Airbus A310 providing additional logistic and personnel transport.

The four Tornados were flown from Buechel Air Base to AFB Overberg via Gran Canaria (Canary Islands) and Ascension Island, supported by a USAF KC-10A tanker. The trip took three days with a flying time of about 16 hours.

The Germans are clearly happy with the support they have received from Denel and the OTR.

Says the Commanding Officer: “The support we get from Denel and the setup is the best you can have. The aims of our training objectives have been more than achieved.”

This is reinforced by the Taurus expert, who has experience using other test ranges internationally. “What we see is absolutely perfect: the friendliness, the accommodation, the feeling from OTR that they are here to support us. That makes it very easy compared with other ranges.”

The closeness of the airbase, test facilities with low air and marine traffic and accommodation all “makes it very easy for us to use the range.”

“It’s been very successful for us,” the Commanding Officer concludes, “we used all the possibilities we can have here at the test range. We enjoyed it.”

Republished with the permission of our partner defenceWeb.

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47431:german-tornados-boosts-southern-cape-economy&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

 

 

 

 

RAF Lakenheath Prepares for the Future: USAF F-35As and F-15s Combine With RAF Capabilities to Provide a 21st Century Deterrent Force

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/06/2017

2017-04-06 By Robbin Laird

During my visit to the United Kingdom in March 2017, I had a chance to visit RAF Lossiemouth, RAF Marham and RAF Lakenheath.

Here the UK is leading the way in shaping a new infrastructure for a 21st century air combat force and with its operational footprint at RAF Lakenheath, the USAF is well positioned to interact with this dynamic of change.

With the RAF and the USAF setting up four squadrons of F-35s between them at two nearby RAF bases, there is a clear opportunity to shape a common sustainment solution.

And the impact of so doing could be significant on the North Sea neighbors, namely, the Danes the Norwegians and the Dutch.

This is clearly a key way ahead in building out NATO capabilities going forward, which provides a 21st century example of burden sharing which delivers relevant capabilities.

http://www.sldforum.com/2016/05/leveraging-the-raf-marham-and-raf-lakenheath-strategic-opportunity/

I discussed this strategic shift last year with the wing commander at RAF Lakenheath. Col., now Brigadier General select, Novotny highlighted the importance of such an effort.

“I see there is great potential for two countries to develop in concert, side-by-side, and to set, set the model for joint operations.

“As we get this right, we can bring in the Danes, the Norwegians and Dutch who are close in geography and the Israelis and Italians as well to shape the evolving joint operational culture and approach.

“Before you know it, you’ve got eight countries flying this airplane seamlessly integrated because of the work that Lakenheath and Marham are doing in the 20 nautical miles radius of the two bases.”

https://sldinfo.com/synergy-and-building-out-extended-nato-defense/

During my visit this year, I had a chance to talk with Col. Evan Pettus, the Commander of the 48th Fighter Wing at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England.

Also, participating in the discussion was Lt. Col. Vause who is the 48th Wing F-35 program integration officer, and whom I met with last year.

Question: Most recently, you came from South Korea certainly an area of strategic interest for the United States. Coming back to Europe, what do you find different than before and analogous in some ways to the situation in the Pacific?

Col. Pettus: I completed my last assignment in Europe in 2012.

The big shift in the interim has been from a primary emphasis on building partnership capacity to improving interoperability and readiness.

In other words, EUCOM’s focus has changed from reassuring allies and partners to deterrence.

Question: So the F-35 is coming at a good time from your point of view?

Col. Pettus: Absolutely.

We do not have a closer partner than the UK.

We will both operate the F-35 from Marham and Lakenheath respectively, which are very close to one another.

Shaping synergy between the two bases is clearly an important objective.

We are working this process in a step by step manner, from understanding how we might operate F-35As from Marham and F-35Bs from Lakenheath, to deeper sustainment and training opportunities as well.

Computer Generated Image of the Maintenance and Finish Facility which is being built at RAF Marham, Norfolk, as part of a programme of works to prepare the station for the arrival of the F-35 Lightning II fleet in 2018.

We exchange pilots and officers all the time between the USAF and the RAF, and we share a great deal of information.

This provides a lot of opportunities for synergy in training, and opportunities to explore common support concepts for the F-35 as a fleet.

Question: You have working groups addressing these issues, which I discussed the last time I was here.

What is the process currently?

Col. Pettus: The working groups meet about every six weeks, and we are starting simple.

For example, how can we support one another if aircraft from one base divert to the other due to bad weather?

We are looking at basic maintenance support for launch and recovery of aircraft and shaping the proper agreements and the proper procedures to that end.

As we work through that, we can then proceed to other opportunities for operational cooperation.

Right now it’s all pre-decisional.

It’s very exploratory but we are talking about the right things, such as basic maintenance actions to support one another.

Lt. Col. Vause: I know you have written about the FACO in Italy and the kinds of maintenance support, which it could provide for the US and the allies.

We are looking at such possibilities in the UK as well at Marham and other support centers in the UK.

I would anticipate that some of our major level maintenance might be done at allied facilities.

That’s just a different model from what we do today.

Question: One impact of the standing up of an F-35 global enterprise is clearly the opportunity to cross learn.

I assume that is happening with regard to the standup of the F-35s at Lakenheath with regard to lessons learned from Marham and other F-35 bases as well?

Lt. Col. Vause: The cross learning is very important as we stand up our facilities here at Lakenheath.

We are visiting a number of facilities to see what their lessons learned are, and we then apply them directly to our standup here at Lakenheath.

Recently, we visited Yuma, Luke, Hill and Eielson to see what they have done and are doing in setting up or operating their F-35 facilities.

And our pilots at Lakenheath are already flying with the F-35s available in the force.

For example, Lakenheath pilots participated in the recent Red Flag exercise and flew alongside F-35s in the exercise.

So we do not need to wait until our own jets arrive to begin integrating lessons learned.

Col. Pettus: Put simply, we’re trying to leverage the best practices of other bases as we prepare our own.

The F-35 Lightning II flew in formation with two Typhoons in April 2014.

And of course, the experience, which you saw at Marham, is directly relevant. For example, when standing up Marham, the RAF had to look at modifications to their power grid.

Their experience alerted us to examine our own power situation, and we quickly learned we needed more capacity to beddown the F-35.

We would’ve gotten there eventually through the planning process, but we got there faster because we were talking to Marham.

Given our deterrence focus, getting their faster matters.

In short, our efforts to lay out the base is highly informed by lessons learned from other F-35 facilities.

Lt. Col. Vause: It is really nice to be able to follow the path of trailblazers and to leverage their real world operational experiences.

A United States Air Force (USAF) F-35A Lightning II (also known as the Joint Strike Fighter) climbs from the runway at Nellis Air Force Base during Exercise Red Flag 17-1. Credit: Royal Australian Air Force

And I would like to emphasize that the F-35 is active now and having impacts on Air Force and allied thinking from the outset.

When you were last here, it seemed that the F-35 was coming but had not landed.

Now it’s in the combat force and our pilots are getting the point of the significant impact it has.

They now understand that the challenge for legacy is to work with the F-35, and is not simply to operate as they have done in the past.

This is the challenge which needs to be met.

Flying with the RAF and its Typhoons and F-35s, or our F-15s with the F-35s, will be about shaping new integrated air combat capabilities.

Col. Pettus: The latest Red Flag is a case in point.

We are working hard on transforming the force.

Editor’s Note: For an interview last year with the team working on the infrastructure at RAF Lakenheath, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/building-a-21st-century-base-at-raf-lakenheath-a-fifth-generation-infrastructure-for-a-fifth-generation-enabled-force/

Biography of Col. Evan Pettus

Col. Evan L. Pettus is the Commander of the 48th Fighter Wing at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, the only wing in the Air Force with an official name, the “Statue of Liberty Wing.”

The Liberty Wing consists of approximately 4,500 active-duty personnel and over 1,000 British and U.S. civilians. The wing includes a geographically-separated unit at nearby RAF Feltwell.

The wing employs three combat-ready squadrons of F-15E Strike Eagle and F-15C Eagle fighter aircraft, as well as a squadron of HH-60G Pave Hawk Combat Search and Rescue helicopters and a squadron of Guardian Angel pararescuemen.

Prior to assuming his current position, Col. Pettus was the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Forces Korea, where he helped direct and plan current and future operations for Airmen, Soldiers, Sailors and Marines serving on the Korean peninsula.

Before serving in Korea, Col. Pettus was the Vice Commander, 4th Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, N.C. He earned his wings upon graduating from Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training at Sheppard AFB, Texas, and was first stationed at RAF Lakenheath as an F-15E pilot.

Col. Pettus received his commission from the U.S. Air Force Academy in 1994. He is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Weapons School and is a command pilot with more than 2,500 hours in the T-37, T-38, AT-38 and F-15E. He has flown combat missions in operations Northern Watch, Southern Watch, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom.

Col. Evan Pettus, the Commander of the 48th Fighter Wing at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England.

EDUCATION

1994 Bachelor of Science degree in aeronautical engineering, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colo.

2000 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

2004 Master’s degree in business administration, Bellevue University, Neb.

2004 F-15E Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev.

2005 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence

2008 Master’s degree in logistics sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology, Ohio

2008 Air War College, by correspondence

2013 Master’s degree in strategic studies, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

ASSIGNMENTS

  1. August 1994 – October 1995, student, Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training, Sheppard AFB, Texas
  2. October 1995 – April 1996, student, Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals, Sheppard AFB, Texas
  3. April 1996 – December 1996, student, F-15E Formal Training Unit, 334th Fighter Squadron, Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C.
  4. December 1996 – January 2000, F-15E pilot, mission planning officer and assistant chief of training, 492nd Fighter Squadron, RAF Lakenheath, England
  5. January 2000 – January 2002, air liaison officer, 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, Friedberg Army Installation, Germany
  6. January 2002 – July 2004, F-15E instructor pilot, flight commander, 391st Fighter Squadron, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho
  7. July 2004 – December 2004, student, F-15E Weapons Instructor Course, Nellis AFB, Nev.
  8. December 2004 – August 2005, Chief of Wing Combat Training, 366th Operations Support Squadron, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho
  9. August 2005 – March 2006, Chief of Wing Weapons and Tactics, 3rd Operations Support Squadron, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
  10. March 2006 – April 2007, Director of Operations, 90th Fighter Squadron, Elmendorf AFB, Alaska
  11. April 2007 – August 2008, student, Air Force Institute of Technology, Ohio
  12. August 2008 – February 2009, Assistant Director of Operations, 366th Operations Support Squadron, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho
  13. February 2009 – July 2009, Director of Operations, 391st Fighter Squadron, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho
  14. August 2009 – January 2011, Commander, 389th Fighter Squadron, Mountain Home AFB, Idaho
  15. March 2011 – June 2012, Chief, Commander’s Action Group, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Germany
  16. July 2012 – May 2013, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
  17. August 2013 – June 2014, Vice Commander, 4th Fighter Wing, Seymour Johnson AFB, N.C.
  18. July 2014 – July 2016, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Forces Korea
  19. July 2016 – present, Commander, 48th Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath, England

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: command pilot

Flight hours: more than 2,500

Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, AT-38, F-15E

Editor’s Note: In a story published on January 9, 2017 in Stars and Stripes, William Howard described the renovations at RAF Lakenheath:

Work on remodeling a central compound is expected to begin soon at RAF Lakenheath for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighters slated to begin arriving in 2021.

The U.S. Air Force in January 2015 announced RAF Lakenheath as its first base for the F-35 in Europe. The two squadrons of 54 F-35s will operate alongside two squadrons of F-15E Strike Eagles and a single unit of F-15Cs currently based there.

“We’re on track to bed down the F-35 here in the United Kingdom,” Col. Evan L. Pettus, commander of the 48th Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath told Stars and Stripes Monday.

“RAF Lakenheath offers a combination of several advantages: We have close partnerships with the United Kingdom who will also be operating the F-35, we have fighter jet experience, we have the room and a good training space.”

While the current airfield won’t be altered, new construction is planned for a squadron operations and maintenance facility and an F-35 training simulator. Some of the ramps will be extended and existing support facilities are receiving upgrades.

The new facilities are designed not only for the incoming F-35s but also the 1,200 airmen who will accompany them.

Missions will continue as normal even after construction crews break ground, Pettus said.

“Current operations continue unabated,” he said. “We are capable as construction begins of manipulating our flow on the airfield so we’ll be able to train and maintain our readiness without interruption.”

 

 

 

Technological Disjunctures and the 21st Century Icebreaker

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2017-03-27 By Danny Lam

Polar Ice Breaking is the epitome of industrial age technology. Traditional icebreakers is about the application of brute force and power to “break” through sea ice by powering through or up to 21ft in thickness by ramming. A physical process that is well understood, with decades of experience for the needed physical force and durability required in a icebreaker platform.

Icebreakers routinely places extreme stresses on hulls and systems, and rely on high safety margins (or overengineered) structures to withstand the stress or to rely on fail safe features like double hulls.   Even then, it is not enough and a significant cost of operating icebreakers is on board damage control and repair capabilities. Repair shops aboard adds to crew and facility requirements, further reducing “payload” on a given sized platform.

Consequently, icebreakers are historically costly to build, operate, and own, and governments recoil at the cost when a single heavy polar icebreaker (PIB) easily cost $1 billion.

The 21st Century, however, offers the opportunity to accomplish the mission more economically with information age technologies. Since the 1980s, commercial aircraft have employed sophisticated software, sensors for “Flight Envelope Protection”. Pilots “fly-by-wire” through software that have different modes (Flight Control Laws) optimized for different situations that prevents overstressing the airframe.

Similar operational software can be created for an icebreaker that dynamically integrate data on sea ice conditions, optimal route pathways with input from off platform sensors like UAVs, and simultaneously, minimize unnecessary stresses on the hull and risks:   Ice “Break Envelope Protection”, (BEP) is a feasible concept today.

However, Ice Break Envelope Protection technology has been slow in coming to the naval architecture community.  

It is technically feasible to install a dense system of sensors to measure the forces on the PIB’s hull and systems (like propellers) in real time, and to do what is now routinely done for civilian aircraft: software that ensure the vessel is operated within design and safety limits.

Something as simple as a sensor that detects excess ice and momentarily slow the propeller to reduce damage.

Automatic tracking of cumulative stresses and cycles will improve maintenance, and ultimately, enable lighter, less overengineered structures to be built. Integrating this system with a “look ahead” sensor system that predicts stresses from different ice formations ahead will automate and improve a process that presently rely solely on the skills, experience and expertise of the crew.

The Operational Requirement Document (Nov 2015, Industry Version) for the USCG icebreaker did not specify a requirement for a web of sensors that collect, analyze, and archive data for the PIB, nor did it suggest the use of software based “Break Envelope Protection”.

Adding this feature will only marginally add to the cost of the program and offer the potential to lower operating costs (e.g. by predicting and avoiding damage) and substantially improve on future Icebreaker designs. In due course, the acquisition of this data will ultimately enable each class of icebreakers to perform above their present limitations.

Alternatively, BEP software offer the prospect of upgrading existing no-ice capable vessels like the DDG-51 to operate as light icebreakers.

PIBs are expected to have a life of 30 years. It is a foregone conclusion that in that time, substantial changes in the IT environment will have occurred. Ease of upgradability is a long term performance enhancer that impact on almost every aspect of suitability requirements.   4.1.3 Reference this issue and specify open architecture and modularity. Prematurely stipulating modules may hinder designs, but by not specifying existing candidates may result in “one off” modules being proposed.

Pre-existing efforts at modularization such as the Electronics Modular Enclosure (EME) used in the Zumwalt Class, LCS Mission modules or StanFlex need to be evaluated. Even if it is deemed unsuitable, economies can be realized without adopting existing modules simply by retaining existing form factors and interfaces for the modules.

Likewise, provisions for future installation of a small, 4 cell VLS like the Mark 57 launcher that mounts on the side of the hull can be considered. VLS launchers can have many non-military applications such as launching UUV or UAVs delivered by rocket (a Russian innovation), or heft microsatellites into orbit.

Many of these applications are just beginning to be recognized. Or, they can be armed as required.

Rather than operating alone, future icebreakers will be tightly integrated into a web of space, aerial and other sensors and have a degree of situational awareness that is unimaginable as recently as the 1970s.

The USCG Polar Icebreaker Requirements (March 18, 2017) recognize that unmanned vehicles will play an increasing role (2.13.15) beyond the UAVs presently used for scouting routes. Unmanned platforms, particularly UUVs, will likely play a far greater role in the future as reliable high bandwidth communications with lasers make it feasible to operate a fleet of UUVs.

UUVs are ideally suited to scout out routes in pack ice, where, the proverbial iceberg is 90% below surface.

Other missions, like monitoring fisheries, detection of intruders and mine warfare and to requirements.

Thus, the ability to rapidly deploy, recover, and sustain unmanned platforms under all conditions may be a major consideration.

Requirement 2.13.15 at present stipulate UUVs to be launched and recovered from the deck. This is a task that can be hampered by ice.

What about capability to operate UUVs from a “Moon pool” or other below surface (and ice) system?

Finally, there is the question of propulsion.

If an electric propulsor design is chosen, it opens a discussion as to how best to supply the electrical power: conventional gas turbines or diesels, or potentially a modest nuclear reactor?

Much of the complexity and maintenance issues of nuclear powered vessels arise from the use of nuclear-steam turbines directly driving a propeller and the need to throttle power.

Once the decision is made to go “electrical”, energy storage can smooth out peaks and valleys and enable the power plant (whether conventional or nuclear) to be operated at close to its optimal.

Thus, it may be worthwhile to revisit the feasibility of nuclear power for its many advantages.

 

UK Opens New Logistics Center in Shropshire.

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
04/05/2017

2017-04-06 Shaping a 21st century approach to logistics is a key part of crafting an effective 21st century force.

The UK MoD has done significant innovation over the years with regard to how to do logistics support and is in the throes of major infrastructure renovation as well at places like RAF Lossiemouth, RAF Waddington and RAF Marham.

According to a story on the Ministry of Defence website published on April 4, 2017, the Minister for Defence Procurement, Harriett Baldwin, has formally opened a huge state-of-the-art £83 million MOD logistics centre in Shropshire.

The Minister for Defence Procurement, Harriett Baldwin, has today formally opened a huge state-of-the-art £83 million MOD logistics centre in Shropshire, which will streamline distribution and storage, delivering savings of around £500 million by 2028.

The 80,000 square metre Defence Fulfilment Centre (DFC) is the size of ten football pitches and will revolutionise the way we support our Armed Forces across the world. It will be a central hub for the storage and distribution of Defence’s £30 billion inventory, including spare parts, food, clothing, and medical supplies.

Minister for Defence Procurement, Harriett Baldwin said:

“The Defence Fulfilment Centre in Donnington will transform the way we store and distribute essential supplies to the Armed Forces who keep us safe. Supported by our rising defence budget, this £83 million investment and partnership with leading logistics specialists is concrete evidence of our determination to give our personnel the very best support wherever they are in the world.”

Harriett Baldwin (Min DP) and Chief of Materiel (Land) Lieutenant General Paul Jaques open the Defence Fulfillment Center in Donnington. This 80,000 fulfilment centre will be a step change in how we deliver defence inventory to our Armed Forces Globally.

The DFC has been delivered to time and on budget and consists of two warehouses and a support building.

The facility, based in Donnington and managed by Kuehne + Nagel on behalf of Team Leidos, will use new warehouse management systems to maximise value for money and manage the complex supply chains of the 21st Century seamlessly.

Alongside special environmental storage, the DFC’s automated storage and retrieval system will be capable of picking more than 1000 items an hour.

Chief of Material (Land) at the MOD’s Defence Equipment and Support organisation, Lieutenant General Paul Jaques said:

“The Defence Fulfilment Centre will transform the way we support our servicemen and servicewomen. Contribution to Operational Readiness through the provision of supplies and commodities to our Armed Forces will be on a par with industry best practice as a result of this investment in state-of-the art facilities.

“The opening of this centre on time and on budget is testament to the close and positive collaboration between Defence Equipment and Support, and Team Leidos. I very much look forward to seeing this fabulous facility fully operational in 2019.”

The site has been opened as part of the Logistic Commodities and Services Transformation (LCST) programme, which aims to deliver our Armed Forces what they want, when and where they want it as efficiently as possible. The programme is being delivered collaboratively by the MOD and Team Leidos and will build an efficient and agile support network with the ability to support current and future military operations.

Leidos Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Roger Krone said:

“The completion of the Defence Fulfilment Centre is an important milestone in our strategic plan to deliver enhanced information technology and logistics services to the Armed Forces.

“This state-of-the-art facility is a conduit to ensuring front-line troops can get what they need, when they need it, by offering a more efficient and effective processes across the supply chain.”

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-minister-unveils-new-83-million-state-of-the-art-logistics-site