In an effort to be in compliance with GDPR we are providing you with the latest documentation about how we collect, use, share and secure your information, we want to make you aware of our updated privacy policy here
Enter your name and email address below to receive our newsletter.
In April and June 2016, I had a chance to visit RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland and to talk with the base commander, and several officers involved with the combat operations and logistical support for the aircraft operating from the base.
As such, the interviews provide a slice of current activities and preparation for the transition associated with the evolution of the RAF combat aircraft, including the coming of the P-8.
RAF Lossiemouth has entered another significant period of its history. The Station remains an important fast jet main operating base within the Royal Air Force, with both Tornado and Typhoon squadrons based here.
RAF Lossiemouth remains the home to the Tornado GR4 Operational Conversion Unit, XV (Reserve) Squadron, who train all Pilots and Weapons Systems Operators to operate the Tornado GR4.
During the summer of 2014 two Typhoon squadrons, 6 Squadron and 1 (Fighter) Squadron, relocated to RAF Lossiemouth. The Station’s third Typhoon squadron, II(Army Co-operation) Squadron relocated from RAF Marham in early 2015.
As part of the changes, the Station assumed Quick Reaction Alert (Interceptor) North (QRA(I)N) duties from September 2014. RAF Lossiemouth is now primarily responsible for maintaining QRA(I)N – providing crews and aircraft at high states of readiness 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, to police UK airspace and to intercept unidentified aircraft.
Additional units at RAF Lossiemouth include No 5 Force Protection Wing of the RAF Regiment. 5 Force Protection Wing includes a regular field squadron, 51 Squadron RAF Regiment, and a reserve squadron, 2622 Squadron of the Royal Auxiliary Air Force Regiment.
RAF Lossiemouth currently is a Typhoon and Tornado base, but with the Tornados to be phased out within the next few years, the Typhoons will be joined by the P-8, which will operate as well from Lossie.
This provides the opportunity to integrate the Typhoons with P-8s with the F-35s, which will initially operate off shore from the new carriers or, in other words, shaping a offensive and defensive enterprise to protect the homeland and to anchor the defense of the Northern NATO countries.
In effect, Lossie will train to support the formation and evolution of a 21st century combat force in which a multi-mission combat fleet of Typhoons will work with the maritime-focused but land-based capable maritime combat system which is the P-8 (which will be based at RAF Lossiemouth), and which, in turn, will work with the multi-tasking flying combat system which is the F-35 which will be based at RAF Marham.
Typhoons from RAF Lossiemouth seen in Estonia as part of a Nato peacekeeping mission. Credit: RAF
It is clear that the base is well positioned to support the evolving dynamics of defense, not only for the UK homeland, but to provide a solid anchor within the defense system for the North Atlantic.
In this series, the 10 interviews will be published in turn and then a Special Report drawing together the various interviews with an overview published at the end of the series.
In that Special Report, the transitions at RAF Waddington and RAF Marham will be discussed as well with regard to the changing infrastructure to support 21st Century air operations from the United Kingdom.
We will include as well a discussion of RAF Lakenheath, and a look at how the USAF transition can provide for enhanced synergy with the US and other allied air forces transitions as well.
A Tornado GR4 aircraft flies high over it’s parent station of RAF Lossiemouth in Scotland. Credit: Wikipedia
We will start with the first interview with Group Captain Paul Godfrey, the base commander with regard to his perspective concerning the evolution of the base in preparing for the RAF airpower transition.
We will then present interviews, which look at the coming retirement of the Tornado, its legacy and its contribution to the transition as well.
We will then look at the Typhoon and its key role for the RAF, in Quick Reaction Alerts, Operation Shader and in the Baltic Air Patrol.
Insights are provided by interviews with the 1 (F) Squadron, 2 (AC) Squadron, and those charged with the responsibility of maintaining and supporting the Typhoon fleet at Lossie and in its expeditionary operations, which include deployments to the Falklands as well.
We will then publish an interview with an officer involved in keeping the skill sets alive while waiting for the P-8, which highlights how the RAF is handling a very difficult transition, namely. the retirement of the Nimrod PRIOR to receiving a replacement aircraft,.
We will then close the series from RAF Lossiemouth with the second interview with Group Captain Paul Godfrey, who will highlight the challenges and opportunities of shaping RAF transformation as seen from a key operating base for the RAF.
The small carrier carries four Su-33 fighter jets, 10 MiG-29K/KUB ground-attack planes and a dozen Ka-52 attack helicopters; these planes are armed with various air-to-surface missiles.
Along with some smaller surface vessels, several submarines equipped with Kalibr long-range land cruise missiles accompany the Kutnetsov. The recently launched Admiral Grigorovich frigate, armed with the same land-attack missiles, will join the battle group from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
The flotilla’s tactical mission is to provide maritime naval and air power in support of Assad’s ground offensive in the Aleppo city region and perhaps in the greater Damascus area and elsewhere.
The Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. Photograph: STR/AP
Yet, the strategic goals of the deployment are more important, since the Russian Air Force and Caspian Sea Flotilla can already provide comparable air and naval missile strikes against targets in Syria.
These strategic goals include exhibiting Russia’s naval power to foreign observers, ideally to generate more foreign arms sales, strengthening Russia’s image as a naval power, and compel the United States and other Western governments to negotiate with Russia and Syria on other issues.
At the Valdai Conference, former Russian ambassador and regional expert Alexander Aksenyonok introduced the panel on the Middle East by calling the situation increasingly confusing and lamenting how entire civilizations in this region were being destroyed. Aksenyonok hoped that the imperative of cooperation would override the competitive geopolitical dynamics dividing Russia from its Western partners.
Other Russian speakers at Valdai claimed that the region’s instability, designed to appear as an internally driven reform process, is actually being geopolitically engineered by the West in support of a campaign to overthrow undesired regimes there.
Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, Putin, and other Russian speakers maintained that the Western-led coups and the destabilization of existing regimes has created vacuums that terrorists, allegedly backed by the United States and its allies as instruments of regime change, rushed to fill.
In Putin’s words: “Attempts were made to train these terrorists and set them against al-Assad, because there were no other options and these groups were the most effective.
This continues today because these are the most effective fighting units and some think that it is possible to make use of them and then sort them out later. But this is an illusion. …
This is a very dangerous game and I address the players once again: The extremists in this case are more cunning, clever and stronger than you, and if you play these games with them, you will always lose.”
Bogdanov said this issue stymied Russia-U.S. cooperation in Syria. He related that, following U.S. criticism that the Russian Air Force was attacking both pro-Western insurgents and terrorists, the Russian military asked Washington for the location of the moderate forces. After months of back and forth, Moscow realized the problem was that the U.S.-backed forces were co-located with the extremist groups.
Given this situation, the Russian officials asked the Americans to separate the groups, which they agreed to do.
But Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that Washington had proven unable, or unwilling, to fulfill these pledges to Moscow.
In Putin’s assessment, “There were people in Washington ready to do everything possible to prevent these agreements from being implemented in practice.”
However, the Russians at the conference now viewed the West as experiencing a devastating blowback from terrorist attacks in many European cities. Bogdanov read from a long list of terrorist attacks in European and other countries. “Looking at the world as a whole,” Putin added, “there are some results in particular regions and locations, but there is no global result and the terrorist threat continues to grow.”
The Russian navy’s frigate, the Admiral Grigorovich, on its way to the Mediterranean. Photograph: Murad Sezer/Reuters
The Russian officials also believed their countermeasures in Syria and elsewhere made the West understand that it could not isolate Russia in the region. For this reason, Putin, Lavrov, and other Russian representatives renewed their offer of some kind of grand bargain in which Moscow and the West would set aside their differences and form a global coalition against terrorism.
Donald Trump has endorsed, in principle the Russian proposal. However, Hillary Clinton’s advisers, including some at Valdai, insisted that the United States could never support Assad, that the Russian and Syrian forces were deliberately attacking pro-Western insurgents and civilians using saturation bombing, and that Moscow’s policies in Ukraine and other places also had to change.
Both the Iranian and Turkish speakers at Valdai supported the grand coalition idea. Mehdi Sanaei, the Iranian Ambassador to Russia, believed the Middle East’s instability reflected the general transformation from a unipolar to a multipolar world. Due to this transition, the United States either could not prevent regional instability or fanned it as a means of sustaining its primacy by dividing potential rivals.
He argued that the United States and its allies needed to reverse course, respect the national sovereignty of other countries, and cooperate with Russia and China to manage terrorism and other mutual threats.
Former Turkish Foreign Minister Yaşar Yakış essentially apologized to the audience for the current Turkish government’s misguided policies towards the Syrian conflict. In his evaluation, Ankara mistakenly assumed Bashar Al Assad’s regime would soon fail. Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party, descended from the Muslim Brotherhood, saw an opportunity to establish a likeminded regime in Syria. Turkey therefore armed rebel groups to remove Assad despite growing evidence that extremists were assuming control of the insurgency.
According to Yakış, the Turkish government only recently changed its goals to now prioritize maintaining Syria’s territorial integrity by fighting the Kurdish militia in Syria, leaving the defeat of ISIS there to Russia and other foreign forces. Turkey’s recent Operation Euphrates Shield offensive sought to clear the Kurdish PYD (which he described as a re-formation of the outlawed Kurdish PKK terrorist group) away from Turkey’s border.
With a stretch of logical and overlooking divisive factors among them, Yakış argued that since preserving Syria’s territorial integrity has now become a shared goal among the United States, Russia, Iran, and the Syrian government, there is now a “golden opportunity” for international cooperation regarding Syria.
The Russian speakers bristled at the Western criticism of the large number of civilian casualties caused by the Russian air campaign in Syria. They saw these complaints as hypocritical, given the numerous civilian casualties in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and other Middle Eastern war zones.
They also blamed the West for failing to fulfill the requirements for a ceasefire, namely the separation of civilians and moderates from the extremist Al-Nusra Front (Al-Qaeda affiliated; now called Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), which at times the Russian speakers described as a more serious threat than ISIS, at least in Syria.
Putin made it clear that Russia would persist in its air strikes, which have been temporarily halted pending arrival of the flotilla, regardless of the civilian casualties:
“Do we leave the nest of terrorists in place there, or do we squeeze them out, doing our best to minimize and avoid civilian casualties? …
Look at Israel’s example. Israel never steps back but always fights to the end, and this is how it survives.
There is no alternative.
We need to fight.
If we keep retreating, we will always lose.”
The author would like to thank Lance Alred for his research assistance for this article.
2016-11-06 On November 2, 2016, Second Line of Defense visited the Spanish Eurofighter squadron based at Albacete, Air Base in Spain.
During the visit our hosts, Captains Antonio Duque Polo and Sergio Martinez Pėrez provided us an overview on Eurofighter, their recent deployment to Lithuania and the support structure on base for the Eurofighter as well.
We will provide our interviews and analyses in future articles.
In this article, we are focused upon the photos, which we took that day and associated narrative for the visit associated with the photos.
In an article published on January 11, 2016 by the Spanish Air Force, the deployment earlier this year to the Baltics, which involved our hosts, was described.
On January 4, four Eurofighter planes took off from Albacete Air Base with Siauliai in Lithuania as their destination. Their aim was to join the VILKAS detachment and therefore carry out surveillance missions of the air space of the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In this way, NATOs commitment to the carrying out of air policing in the Baltic has been continued.
Spanish Eurofighters leaving Albacete Air Base for the Baltic, January 2016. Credit: Spanish Air Force
After four hours of flight and the re-fuelling of an Italian KC-767 in German airspace, the aircraft arrived without stopovers and without event at Siauliai. Following the relief of the previous nation Hungary, the first alert service was in place within days. Ahead, there are four months of air policing in the Baltic, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Head of Force Juan Antonio Ballesta Miñarro.
The 14th Wing will act as the lead nation of the assets deployed in the Baltic; specifically, of the Belgian F-16s stationed at Amari, Estonia.
Deployment of VILKAS Detachment Personnel
On January 3, the act of bidding farewell to the first relief of the Air Force personnel that will form part of the VILKAS detachment, within the framework of Operation Baltic Air Policing, took place at Albacete Air Base.
The contingent is made up of 105 military personnel, as well as one other staff member, and it belongs mainly to the 14th Wing. It will unite with those that left from Spain with Siauliai Air Base, Lithuania, as their destination on December 27. The objective was to reach full operative capacity on January 8.
This is the third time that the Air Force has participated in this mission. From August 1 to November 30 2006, it did so from Lithuania and as the lead nation, with four C.14 Mirage F-1s from the 14th Wing. Later, from January 1 to May 4 2015, and with four C.16 Eurofighters from the 11th Wing, they carried out operations from Amari Air Base, Estonia. The Eurofighters from the 14th Wing will lead the missions during the first quarter of 2016: this time from Lithuania.
In total, approximately 230 personnel will form part of the detachment in the four months that the mission will last. Half way through it, a relief of crews, controllers, health workers and maintenance staff will take place.
The event was presided over by the Chief of Staff of Air Combat Command, Division General César Miguel Simón López, on behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Air General Francisco Javier García Arnaiz. General Simón, who was accompanied by the Head of the 14th Wing and Albacete Air Base, Colonel Julio Nieto Sampayo, offered Christmas greetings to the members of the contingent and their families in the name of the Chief of Staff. He also expressed the wish that the detachment´s tasks will pass without event. Echoing the recent words of the President of the government, the general also reminded the attendant personnel that they are the “best ambassadors for Spain” outside of our borders.
Baltic Air Policing
“Baltic Air Policing” is a NATO mission framed within the principle of collective defence. It has as its aim the protection of the air space of the Baltic countries that lack their own resources to carry out air policing tasks.
In our slideshow (photos credit to Chloe Laird, Second Line of Defense) we highlight a number of points during the visit.
Upon entering the base, the most recent historical aircraft flown by the squadron greet visitors. The next photos show our hosts Captains Antonio Duque Polo and Sergio Martinez Pėrez during the interviews.
We next walked to the Eurofighter simulator at the base where training is facilitated by time in an artificial intelligence environment. Duque is seen in the simulator as well as the SLD photographer and translator on the visit, Chloe Laird, currently studying in Spain in nearby Valencia.
We then went to the maintenance facilities where we had a chance to look at some second order maintenance on the engines and discuss with the crew chief the approach to maintenance of the engines. The Eurofighter engines are a solid achievement on the aircraft; because it is a modular engine, many of the repairs are done on base, but bench testing of engines is done at the Moron airbase. The Albacete air base is hoping to receive its own capability to bench test on base so that engines do not need to be sent to Moron for bench testing.
We then visited a maintenance hanger where Eurofighters were being worked on, including a two seat version of the aircraft.
We then crossed over to a hardened hanger where the latest two seat Eurofighter arrived, and is the latest software configured Eurofighter, namely, the version being flown by the RAF in the Middle East, which the RAF refers to as Operation Shader ready aircraft.
Because the simulator has not yet been upgraded to the latest version of software, training for this version is being done on this upgraded two seat aircraft on base.
And finally, on the way from the maintenance bays to the hardened hanger, we saw a Spanish Eurofighter in the process of landing at the base.
For Operation Shader, the RAF operates a version of Typhoon which they refer to as P1Eb. According to the RAF officer we discussed this modification with at RAF Lossiemouth, “P1 EB is a software upgrade, with minor hardware changes.”
According to November 27, 2014 article published on the RAF website:
“P1Eb is predominantly an air to ground capability upgrade; it provides enhancements to the Litening III Laser Designator Pod (LDP) and Helmet Equipment Assembly (HEA) (helmet mounted sight) integration, as well as with Paveway IV.
The LDP can now also be used seamlessly with the HEA to visually identify air tracks at long range, as well as identifying, tracking and targeting points on the ground.”
The Spanish are bringing a similar capability to their Eurofighters.
Earlier this year, the Spanish Air Force fired their first Paveway weapons from their Eurofighters.
A test team from the Air Force´s Arms and Experimentation Logistical Centre (CLAEX) has successfully carried out the first launch of an EGBU-16 (GBU-48) bomb from a Tranche-2 C.16.
The launch was carried out during the week of June 20 – 24 in the waters of the Gulf of Cadiz, and with the support of the CLAEX “El Arenosillo” experimentation centre. This was after the target was identified, a guided launch was performed by GPS signal, and laser illumination was used during the terminal phase by means of a “pod litening-III,” installed on the aircraft.
This event means that a significant increase in the air-ground capabilities of the C.16 fleet has been certified, and this permits the execution of high precision, totally autonomous, “any time” attacks. Moreover, the arms employed will enable the C.16 to carry out simultaneous offensives against several ground targets.
In combination with the evaluation of the integration of the air-ground arms, the launch of the first Iris-T in digital mode, executed from Tranche-2 C.16 aircraft, was also performed. In consequence, in the very near future this capability will be available for the Air Force´s entire Eurofighter fleet, and the use of the arms system for other users is also brought forward. This follows on from the previous integration carried out by CLAEX for Tranche-1 aircraft, verified in 2015.
Spanish Eurofighter in GBU-48 tests. Credit: Spanish Air Force.
These achievements demonstrate the strong will of the Air Force to maximize the capabilities of the C.16 arms system in the shortest time possible. They bring forward the entry into service of the Tranche-2 planes with new capabilities – aircraft that have been developed by means of an international programme and the parallel implementation of organic improvements made to the Tranche-1 aircraft.
Albacete, Air Base is also playing a key role in enhancing Eurofighter integration as well.
Four nations (Germany, Italy, Spain and UK) of the European Air Group (EAG) conducted a multinational exercise, VOLCANEX Eurofighter Typhoon Interoperability Project (ETIP) LIVEX 15, from 14 – 18 September at Albacete Air Base (Spain).
The aim was to strengthen Eurofighter/Typhoon interoperability and standardization between the EAG nations through the use of common Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and to familiarize ground crews on other nations AGE (Aircraft Ground Equipment) ,“Turn around” and QRA procedures.
The key to success in multinational operations is a common understanding and efficient coordination and communications between nations of what to do and how to do it.
The EAG, consisting of the Air Forces of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom, seeks to improve the operational capabilities of the Parties’ Air Forces to carry out operations in pursuit of shared interests.
One way of achieving this goal is by developing common doctrines and procedures. VOLCANEX is the European Air Group’s name for current and future multinational exercises on which it seeks to refine and validate its developed products and procedures.
But now that we operate more together, we need clear common operating procedures, notably with regard to maintenance of the aircraft.
In turn, this drives a wedge in common modernization which needs to be done with the broader fleet.”
The approach is based on sharing information and to get the pilots and maintainers to together to share experiences and to shape common standards.
And from our visit to Albacete, it is clear that shared information among the partners is important as well in operations such as the Baltic Air Patrol as well.
During a recent visit to Australia to participate in the Williams Seminar on air-land sea integration, I had the chance to visit with DCNS Australia and get their perspective on the way ahead in building a new class of submarines. I was able as well to discuss with senior Royal Navy officers how they view this new way forward, and will discuss that in later articles.
In mid-August 2016, I sat down with Brent Clark, Director of Strategy at DCNS Australia. An experienced submariner with the Royal Australian Navy, he wanted to continue to work on naval systems after retiring from the RAN. He found opportunities in the private sector, including at Thales Naval Systems in Australia. When DCNS Australia was created in early 2015, Clark joined the company to help guide the competitive bid, which won Australia’s submarine contract earlier this year.
Artist’s Conception of Shortfin Barracuda. Credit: DCNS
We started by discussing why he believed that DCNS won the competition. He emphasized that French domain knowledge in the submarine business and operations as well as the French commitment to sovereignty in the area had an important impact on Australian thinking. Clearly, the Aussies wanted a submarine that operates throughout the Pacific and one their own industry could build and support in a sovereign manner.
“There are actually only two countries in the West who still understand what sovereignty is and requires in the development and manufacture of military platforms – the United States and France. If Australia wants to learn what sovereignty in this area means, they clearly have to work with a nation that does know, and exercises such capabilities.”
Given that the United States does not build diesel submarines, the only other real candidate in Clark’s view was France, and hence DCNS. The competition was among three contenders: Japanese, German and French. Of these, only the French company, DCNS, had the kind of long-standing experience in operating a submarine at the distances that Australia wanted.
“The French had been operating submarines in a very tactical, fully-deployed way for a very long period of time, which is in clear contrast to either Japan or Germany currently. France deploys its submarines into the Western Indian Ocean and operates on long deployments similar to Australia or the United States. In contrast, Germany and Japan operate their submarines at sea for about a month at a time. And being able to support and sustain longer deployments is crucial to Australia for its next generation submarine as well.”
90153random1.05.0
We went on to discuss the impact of the Collins-class experience on how Australia is considering its next generation submarine. Clark underscored that Collins was a one-off variant of a Swedish submarine and, as such, meant that Australia had to operate in a sui generis space with regard to the evolution of these submarines.
“We had a Swedish exchange officer come to sea with us when I was onboard a Collins-class submarine and we deployed to New Zealand,” noted Clark in explaining this. “On Day-28 of the deployment he walked into the wardroom and stated that ‘I’ve now set a record as a Swedish submariner for the most continuous days at sea.’ We all looked at him and thought “we’re only at sea for 28.”
Clark contrasted the experience with the Oberon-class submarine, which preceded the Collins, in that there were 19 different countries using Oberon-class submarines, which constituted a comprehensive user group. This meant that Australia could leverage other nation’s operational experiences.
“With Collins, we ended up operating six boats by ourselves with very little reach back to Sweden because they didn’t operate the same way, and they hadn’t operated that submarine either. So it took Australia an awful long time to realize what that means.”
Clearly Australia does not want to pursue a sui generis program with a country that does not have extensive long distance operating experience. The DCNS offering allows Australia to draw upon French operational experience and evolving technologies, to be part of a larger submarine enterprise, and, with the combat systems being American, being able to leverage U.S. combat systems technology.
In other words, much like the rest of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) which is moving towards buying platforms where they are part of global fleets or systems, the Navy wanted to ensure that they did the same with regard to their new submarine class. And DCNS brings to the Australian Navy significant experience with regard to cooperative building and sustaining of submarines in the manner in which Australia will want to operate in the extended battlespace.
“We were very confident of the operating cycle of the submarine. We’re very confident of the maintenance of the submarine, and the maintenance philosophy. The French maintain their sovereignty exactly in the same sort of cycle that the Australians wanted.”
We then discussed the track record of DCNS in transferring the kind of technology Australia wants to build the new generation submarine, and particularly the ability to leverage what Australia has already invested in the infrastructure at Adelaide.
“The company is very good at transferring technology, which was a requirement for Australia,” noted Clark. “The Brazilian example was important for Australia as, in that case, DCNS provided the Brazilians with the ability to create a sovereign production capability for their Scorpion-class submarines. You don’t have to go back to France for anything if you don’t wish to.”
DCNS will be working with Australia to ensure a 21st century infrastructure for the build and the sustainment of the submarine. Clark also explained that DCNS builds submarines differently than do the Japanese and Germans.
“We vertically integrate sections as opposed to horizontally integrate them for a whole range reasons, including occupational health and safety. Having worked in a variety of shipyards, one of the big problems you have is lots and lots and lots and lots of eye injuries from dust and rubbish going to people’s eyes. That’s because welders end up welding on their back. The way we build is basically the welders stand up. So that’s it. It is more efficient and more productive.”
Reportedly, stealth, or the lack of it, also contributed to choosing the French Barracuda, but such details are classified.
A key part of the program is to shape a new way to build ships in Australia, which will almost certainly happen with the new air warfare destroyer as well.
Projected construction at Adelaide to shape the facility to build and sustain the new class of submarines. Credit: DCNS
The design contract between DCNS and Australia was signed on September 30th, and Australian technicians will move to Cherbourg and start the process of preparing for the technology transfer necessary to build the new submarine in Australia. Over time, the French manpower involvement in the program will decrease as the Australians ramp up their manpower numbers in the submarine build process. “Where the requirement for French supervision starts to end really depends on how quickly we can get the Australian workforce skilled, and productive,” noted Clark.
In late September, Lockheed Martin Australia was selected by the Australian government as the Combat Systems Integrator (CSI) for the submarine program, and DCNS Australia will work closely with them also.
“We have said the three entities – DCNS, the CSI and the Commonwealth – must work together to deliver a whole warship performance. We are going to co-contract with the CSI for performance.”
This evolving and integrated approach is also in contrast with the Collins class experience. “If we go back to the combat system on Collins which was basically supplied as government-furnished equipment (GFE) – the builder had no ability to interact – boxes would turn up and the builder was told to install them. The builder did that, but of course when the combat system was turned on, it didn’t work properly.”
These lessons have contributed to the DCNS message and way of doing business explained Clark. “We consistently and constantly said during the competitive evaluation process that we could not work any other way but collaboratively with the CSI – and that clearly is the way ahead for a successful program.”
The Australian Navy is in the throes of its largest recapitalization since the end of World War II – and it’s coming at a time when the Australian Defence Force (ADF) is working across the services to shape an integrated force.
This means that although the Navy will be acquiring new platforms (from the ground up), it is looking closely at the “integrateability” of those new platforms with Army, Air Force, and space capabilities as well.
In August, the Williams Foundation hosted a seminar in Canberra on new approaches to air-sea integration. I had a chance to interview a number of senior Navy, Air Force and Army officers before, during and after the seminar, and these interviews provided a comprehensive picture of how the Australian Navy is modernizing and how its service partners view the cross-modernization efforts among Navy, Army and Air Force.
The Aussies are shaping a transformed military force, one built around new platforms but ones that operate in a joint manner in an extended battlespace.
The goal is to extend the defence perimeter of Australia and create, in effect, their own version of an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy.
They also recognize a key reality of 21st century military evolution in terms of shaping an integrated information-based operating force. Interactive modernization of the force is built around decision-making superiority and that will come with an effective information dominant force.
Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, AO, CSC, RAN with Rear Admiral Adam Grunsell, AM, CSC, RAN (left) and Fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Stuart Mayer, CSC and Bar, RAN (right) seen conducting Navy’s day to day business from HMAS Stirling. Credit: Australian Ministry of Defence.
Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, Chief of the Navy, provided a strategic overview on how he saw the way ahead for the Australian Navy. His conference presentation underscored that “we are not building an interoperable navy; we are building an integrated force for the Australian Defence Force.” He drove home the point that ADF integration was crucial in order for the ADF to support government objectives in the region and beyond and to provide for a force capable of decisive lethality.
By so doing, Australia would have a force equally useful in coalition operations in which distributed lethality is the operational objective. He noted that it is not about massing force in a classic sense; it is about shaping a force that can “maximize the adversary’s vulnerabilities while reducing our own.”
Barrett reinforced, several times, that this is not about an ‘add-in, after the fact capability’; instead, he asserted the need to design and train from the ground up, to have a force trained and equipped to be capable of decisive lethality.
He modernized Patton’s great quote, saying that you fight war with technology; but you win with people. It is about equipping the right way with the right equipment, and training effectively to gain a decisive advantage. In this way, he believes the recapitalization effort created “a watershed opportunity for the Australian Navy.”
He sees this opportunity, not so much in terms of simply building new platforms, but the right ones. And with regard to the right ones, he had in mind, ships built from the ground up which could be interoperable with JSF, P-8, Growler, Wedgetail and other joint assets. “We need to achieve the force supremacy inherent in each of these platforms, but we can do that only by shaping integrated ways to operate.”
He highlighted that the Navy is in the process of shaping a 21st century task force concept appropriate to a strategy of distributed lethality and operations.
A key element of the new approach is how platforms will interact with one another in distributed strike and defensive operations, such as the ability to cue weapons across a task force.
When looking beyond simply connected platforms to a more integrated force, here is a way one might conceptualize the way ahead. Credit: Second Line of Defense
After his presentation, I had the chance to sit down with Vice Admiral Barrett and to expand the conversation. Clearly, a key element in his thinking is how to get the new build of ships right for an age in which one wants to build an integrated, but distributed force.
The Vice Admiral underscored that “We need agility in the process of changing ships through life, continuing to evolve the new ships, depending on how the threat is evolving. This means that we need to control the combat system software as well as build the hulls. We will change the combat system and the software many times in the life of that ship; whereas, the hull, machinery in the plant doesn’t.
“That might sound like a statement of the obvious, but it’s not a statement that’s readily understood by our industry here in Australia. We need to organize ourselves to have an effective parent navy capability. We need to manage commonality across the various ship build processes. That will not happen if we build someone else’s ship in Australia which is designed to operate in separate classes.”
He added that Australia needs a holistic approach. “I don’t want an individual class to be considered in isolation. I want to cross-learn and cross-operate throughout our various classes of ships, and notably with regard to software integration and development.”
The shaping a new task force approach as well as the challenge of building out a force capable of integration in the battlespace was underscored by Rear Admiral Stuart Mayer, Commander of the Australian Fleet. He points out that the Army, Navy and Air forces are evolving in the context of tapping shared networks to empower their platforms to form an extended battlespace. But the challenge, he observed, is to work through how to most effectively shape, coordinate and execute effects from the networked force while retaining decision authorities at the lowest practical level to achieve speed of decision.
He highlights that the Navy is returning to a task force concept but one that is 21st century in character, whereby Navy is tapping into ground and air assets as “part” of the task force, rather than simply focusing on Navy-operated assets.
This evolution of the task force effect and the networked approach, clearly in the mode of what the U.S. Navy refers to as the “kill web,” will require the evolution of capabilities, both in terms of connectivity, and training.
During the seminar he characterized the network as a weapon system with “no single master” and that one of the ADF’s challenges is to shape the evolving network in order to effectively operate in a distributed multi domain task force. “Each service is designing its platforms and enabling their potential through the elements of a common network,” he explains.
There is increased overlap for the air and sea forces, at the very least through the access and synergy provided in the network. “A fundamental question presents itself,” he continued, “how should we best develop, certify and deploy our joint network that must be cross domain in nature?”
RAdm Mayer argues that the Australian Defence Force is on a good track but needs to enhance its capability to work in a joint domain that recognizes that tactical effects are generated by Services, while operational outcomes are inherently Joint.
In effect, the Services provide the muscle behind the Joint intent.
If the ADF is to achieve its potential, it will need to design forces from the ground up that are interconnected by a single reference standard rather than simply connecting assets after the fact. But to do so requires an open architecture approach to building a joint network that recognizes the different needs of the participants.
The role of the network as a weapon system requires that it be designed, deployed and certified like any other weapon system.
“We are joint by necessity. Unlike the U.S. Navy, we do not have our own air force or our own army. Joint is not a theological choice, it’s an operational necessity.”
It was clear, both from his presentation and our discussion during an interview, that Rear Admiral Mayer is focused on how the build out of the Navy in the period ahead will be highly correlated with the evolution of the joint network. “The network is a weapons system. Lethality and survivability have to be realized through a networked effect.”
He emphasized throughout the interview that not enough work has yet been done to prioritize the evolving C2 and network systems that empower the platforms in the force, including but not limited to the amphibious force. He sees this area of development as a crucial one in creating a more interactive joint force able to deliver lethal effect.
“The potential of each of the individual platforms in a network is such that we’ve actually got to preset the limits of the fight before we get to it. The decisions on what we’ll do, how much we’ll share, and what sovereign rights we will retain have to be preset into each one of the combat systems before you switch it on and join a network. There is no point designing a combat system capable of defeating supersonic threats and throttling it with a slow network or cumbersome C2 decision architecture.”
The Navy is adding new capabilities with the amphibious ships, the new air warfare destroyer and a new submarine, but inherent in this effort is that the platforms they will build will be highly “integrateable” with Wedgetail, the F-35, the P8 and Triton – all of which are part of the evolving task force concept to operate with flexible and modular forces.
“The nature of the force we are shaping is analogous to a biological system in which the elements flourish based on their natural relationship within the environment. We have an opportunity to shape both the platforms and the network, but we will only achieve the flourishing ecosystem we seek if each harmonize with the other, and the overall effectiveness is considered on the health of the ecosystem overall.”
RAdm Mayer illustrated his point by discussing the evolving anti-submarine warfare approach.
“An ASW network will leverage the potential of the individual constituent platforms and that in turn will determine the lethality of the system. When the individual platforms actually go into a fight, they’re part of an interdependent system. The thing that will dumb down the system will be a network that’s not tailored to leverage the potential of the elements, or a network that holds decision authority at a level that is a constraint on timely decision-making. The network will determine the lethality of our combined system.”
This message meshed with what Rear Admiral Mead had to say from his office in Canberra. The joint capability manager for the Australian navy highlighted how the Navy’s new build of ships is solidly placed in a joint context. For example, with regard to the new submarines, the Navy is looking at its interactive role in the battlespace. “The new submarines and their combat systems will clearly be designed effectively to tap into the maritime warfare network. The task will be moving that information around so it won’t duplicate and so there’s no gaps in the coverage.”
An interview with Rear Admiral Tony Dalton, the head of the Joint Systems Division of the ADF’s acquisition and sustainment group, was next on my agenda.
RAdm Dalton talked of the importance of software upgradeable platforms. We discussed the Wedgetail aircraft, which is evolving from an air battle management system to a battle managements system with Army and Navy officers onboard – working the joint integration piece and evolving the software accordingly.
He went on to explain his perspective of the general evolution of navy platforms in the decade ahead. “The evolving maturation of the Wedgetail radar is bringing new capabilities to the joint force, and we are looking at other systems, such as the new systems on board our surface fleet, to evolve in a similar manner.
The locally developed, phased array radars onboard our Anzac-class frigates are good, but the next generation is on a different planet in terms of capability. It’s driving a change in the way we think. It’s not a classic radar at all; it’s a high power, highly sensitive transmitter and receiver array. You can do lots of things with it in the battlespace.
This is a reforming technology that will reshape the way we think about task groups, how ships communicate, how they operate, and where their blind arcs are.”
In short, the recapitalization of the Australian Navy is about adding new platforms, but with a very different approach than in the past. It is not about replacement platforms focused on narrowly-specialized functions.
It is ships built in the software-upgradeable age and able to cross-modernize with new Air Force and Army systems.
It is about shaping an integrated force that can deliver lethal effect in the defence of Australia when necessary, and work effectively with core allies.
The slideshow highlights ships involved in Exercise KAKADU 2016, held this past September.
Exercise KAKADU involves nations from around the Asia-Pacific region enhance interoperability, share knowledge and develop skills in responding to threats in the maritime and air domains with a multinational force.
The photos are credited to the Australian Ministry of Defence.
There are few territorial disputes as muddled as the South China Sea.
Republican China (ROC), despite its irrelevance from 1950 onwards, steadfastly maintained a claim – initially made in 1947 when the government was on the verge of defeat – to vast stretches of the seas in the 9, 10, or 11 dash line claim. The People’s Republic of China, as a UN member, acceded to the UNCLOS II in 1982 and ratified it on 1994 with only minor active disputes despite the overlapping claims of many states in the region.
Something changed around Year 2,000 coincidentally with the rise of China as a great trading power and the recognition of the value of undersea resources in the South China Sea.
Presently, China’s carrier is based in Dailian, but there are indications that a future Carrier base will be on Hainan island to house additional carriers under construction.
In parallel is the growth of the Chinese Merchant fleet, and acquisition of formal overseas bases and facilities.
Rational actor paradigms are generally problematic for net assessment. Nowhere is there more true than in divining the intent of the PRC regime.
Western analyst’s weakness in local and regional knowledge as to the concerns, calculus and constraints faced by regional PLA/PLAN commands severely hamper the ability to make sense of these deployments.
In the past decades, there are many tantalizing hints of the weakness of Beijing and their loose grip on their local military regions that at times, resulted in contradictory policies being pursued by the central and local military commands that mirror the inability of Beijing to exercise a strong grip on their Provinces.
During the initial search for Malaysian Airlines MH 370, Vietnam, Malaysia and Thailand were able to mobilize first. PLAN and other vessels mobilized slowly, with several units from Shanghai rather than the plentiful assets operating in South China sea.
The power of Chinese central authority is limited to when it is directly watching / inspecting and utilizing their theoretically absolute power to force compliance.
At other times, it can be safely and legitimately ignored.
Visit any Chinese dominated area in Asia, and this belief is operationalized in the preponderance of illegal structures, unlicensed or unlawful businesses, and generally “illegal” behavior with respect to the letter and spirit of the laws. Chinese law and regulations, in that respect, do not have the presumption of legitimacy in Western systems.
Central authority has little capacity to fully control or enforce the raft of rules and regulations even within Beijing.
To truly understand what is going on, one need to divine not just the formal assertions of the Central authority (Beijing), but the semi-illegitimate actions and aspirations of the local authorities which at most times, overpower the diktats of Beijing: as they did before Commissioner Lin tried to stop the formal opium trade.
Today, observers rarely question the official version of the cause of the first opium war as the Ching Court banning trade in narcotics then being humiliated by militarily stronger western powers.
Few western historians acknowledge that the pre-opium war British trade with China was widely supported by southern Chinese merchants who made fortunes form both legal and illicit trade at the expense of domestic inland Chinese opium producers.
From this perspective, the opium war was caused by a protectionist trade measure by inland Chinese opium producers who gained the ear of the Ching court against coastal southern Chinese merchants (compardors) allied with British merchants . This would make for a messy reading of history before consideration of the longstanding role of Chinese secret societies in undermining Ching authority.
Chinese society is abound with secret societies, whose in its most illegitimate form are triads or criminal enterprises, but also exist as innocuous but often illegitimate societies that can be based on religion, politics, similar ethnic, regional, or professional ties. All of these organizations exist in a state of semi-illegitimacy and in turn, exercise power with a subtle interplay with other (nominally illegitimate) authorities of the peasantry playfully referred to as the lao bai xing.
Hidden authorities are crucial in the maintenance of order in China, as is around the world.
Applying this approach to the South China Sea disputes, it is hard to see how the sea grabs is solely a product of Beijing policy to effectively unilaterally abrogate the UNCLOS treaty obligations of the PRC.
Local business interests, like the fishermen and other commercial interests, right to including the ship builders and their suppliers, that is benefitting from the naval buildup with business they would otherwise not have; and, the regional PLAN/PLA, the “Coast Guard” and “Fisheries Patrol” in the area are all major makers and executers of policy.
What about the criminal or semi-illicit enterprises engaged in piracy, extortion, smuggling, or illegal immigration that have extensive networks throughout Southeast Asia that no doubt play a key role in the disputes?
Or the competing grabs by all the formal and informal claimants?
Into this mix of competing authorities, demands on the Beijing regime of China to honor their UNCLOS treaty obligations and push back against Chinese activities like PLA/PLAN land reclamation and the building of bases on disputed territories have been at best, ineffective in moderating Chinese behavior at the local level.
Rare and occasional FONOPs by primarily US vessels and aircraft have had no impact and perhaps, made things worse by demonstrating the impotence of the US and allies in this policy area in establishing and maintaining a rules based order.
What this calls for is a different approach than the present strategy of parlee with Beijing as if Beijing is the sole and major problem for the South China Sea.
In order to develop a more nuanced and effective policy, the US and allies need to develop a far more granular and detailed picture of the non-Beijing actors in the policy area, whether it be the local branches of the PLA/PLAN, Coast Guard, Fisheries Patrol, or other units in the area, their ties to military owned or controlled businesses, and non-state actors.
Ideally, such expansion of the knowledgebase shall encompass actors from every other state in the area. But to do so will require a different skill set and allocation of intelligence resources.
Armed with better knowledge and information, the US will be able to forge a policy that cans precision target incentives and sanctions to support a UNCLOS compliant regime to all parties that matter in these disputes.
Western Foreign policy towards China have been focused on interactions with Peking since the Jesuits found a place in the Ming Court at the expense of understanding the dynamics of the vast civilization nominally ruled by present day Beijing.
Extending diplomatic recognition and permitting the PRC to assume the UN security council seat continued this pattern. For a brief period after the communist victory early in 1960s until the mid 1970s the Beijing regime can be said to maintain a credible grip on the Chinese civilization and dealing with Beijing was both necessary and sufficient for the problems of the time.
By the 2000s, Beijing’s monopoly on power has diminished to a more traditional arrangement whereby PRC based in Beijing retained only a monopoly on legitimate power in China except Taiwan.
Provinces, beginning with the coastal areas, began to break loose from Beijing.
Few Western observers noticed the increasing divergence, culminating in the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 that had modest, if little impact in the relatively prosperous southern provinces.
Within the past decade, the divergences in interests and policies between Beijing and the coastal provinces have escalated.
The disputes over South China Sea in the 2000s have regional drivers and origins that are ill understood outside of China. The western “China expert” priesthood, by focusing on interactions with Beijing, have largely missed this regional dimension.
In order to better understand regional dynamics, western analysts have to develop linguistic skills, contacts, and analytical perspective native to the Guangdong / Southern China region. Yet, few of the China priesthood are fluent in languages like Cantonese, tagalore, Bahasa, etc. – the lingua franca of south china sea nations.
Whereas it is generally reckoned that every electronic device within Zhongnanhai is in theory capable of being monitored, resulting in a good understanding of the personnel and decision making processes in Beijing, there is a paucity of intelligence as to the actors, motives, and intentions that are driving the moves attributed to Beijing in the South China Sea.
In many instances, we do not know much beyond the names of military commanders except for the top officials of the military region or regional constabulary (which is most likely a Beijing appointee).
Without details as to the personnel down to the third or lower tiers of command, their relationships to other interested parties (e.g. Coast Guard, Fisheries Patrol) and the businesses that have interests in the issue, particularly the local PLA/PLAN owned or controlled firms, and their relationship with regional counterparts, it is difficult to understand their behavior and policy making process.
For example, we cannot judge the relative weights of fisheries, hydrocarbon resources, local (vs. PRC) defense considerations, vs. face, pride, institutional momentum, and other motives that is driving the ostensibly PRC-Beijing policies for land reclamation and other sovereignty assertion activities.
Consequently, western analysts are strained to explain how the PRC can declare an expansive AIDC in East China Sea, and apparently have little interest to do so in the South China Sea that they claim as “blue earth” worthwhile enough to invest substantial resources to reclaim land and fortify.
Nor do we understand how the 9 dash claim was inherited by the PRC, with Beijing endorsing and adjusting the claim by placing it on passports and maps.
A plausible explanation of such divergences in behavior is there are at least three different local governments / local PLA/PLAN driving maritime policy, with different calculations and thought processes and different interactions with Beijing who strain to explain this as a consistent policy to the “barbarians”.
Thus, while the Shanghai clique have traditionally driven the policy of non-negotiable claims regarding sovereignty over Taiwan by Beijing, there is little impetus to push on the issue of Okinawan independence as an issue for Beijing from the local governments (Tsingtao/Qingdao) or the new Northern Command military region directly concerned.
Similarly, the deafening silence on PRC’s claims to lands ceded to Russia that in fact, have a stronger basis in their renegotiating opposition to unequal treaties is a contradictory policy that cannot be understood without consideration of local policies and calculations of cost and benefits.
The keys to solving these puzzles is recognition that the People’s Republic of China’s Beijing regime has evolved very much into a classical Chinese regime where the power of the central government is more symbolic than real.
It is, in that respect, best understood as a Master Franchisor in a relatively loose franchise arrangement with individual Provinces or local governments or military regions as franchisees.
The Franchisor have the power to command obedience on a limited number of highly visible and obvious issues that signal the symbolic obedience to the Beijing regime: flying the PRC flag, having the approved local government or military organization on paper, and the right of Beijing to name top local officials and occasionally, selectively enforce a few draconian laws. But what actually happens at the local level on a day to day basis is very much left to the devices of local governments or PLA regional commanders.
There is a striking parallel with the Ching Dynasty diktat that all adult males must shave their forehead and braid their hair into a queue as a symbol of obedience to the Ching court. Failure to comply with the Manchu queue was obviously visible and punished by death.
With the exception of those rare instances where the Ching dynasty was willing to enforce a diktat (e.g. banning cheap British opium imported from India that was undercutting Chinese opium), which directly led to the Ching Dynasty losing the opium war and compelled to settle on unfavorable terms, the Ching regime largely left the autonomous provinces alone provided that they remitted requisite taxes to the court. The real foreign policy of southern China was locally determined largely by the Cantonese themselves, with the wealthy merchants being key players.
This picture of de facto highly decentralized “foreign policy” leads one to ask very different questions as to what would work in working with the local authorities that are presently driving Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea.
Pressure on Beijing, per se, is counterproductive in two ways:
First, if pressure on Beijing managed to induce Beijing to act (after Beijing negotiated many concessions on issues that is likely irrelevant to the Southern Chinese provinces) and watered down the demands, it is likely to last only as long as Beijing pressure on the relevant actors are intense. That will come, and like any Chinese government campaign, go after a brief period, and then it is business as usual.
Second, a Beijing centric policy ends up strengthening Beijing, which directly countering western interests compared to the alternative of a more diffused China with competing interests that can be more reasonably dealt with.
Western foreign policy have a long tradition of pragmatism: dealing with counterparts that can credibly and reliably deliver the goods irrespective of their official standing or reputation for brutality or barbarism.
In this vein, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill saw nothing wrong with working with Stalin to defeat the greater evil of Nazi Germany.
Nixon and Kissinger exploited the divisions between communists to weaken the Soviets.
In this vein, working with the local interests and authorities that can deliver an acceptable solution to the South China Sea disputes that preserve the substance of UNCLOS may be more important than the symbols.
In order to do so, it will require a fundamentally new orientation away from the present Beijing centric strategy.
The hell that is the Russian-backed siege of Aleppo in Syria has forced the administration of American President Barack Obama to contemplate options it otherwise wouldn’t.
In early October, as the latest U.S.-driven effort at a real ceasefire in the country was falling apart, The Washington Post’s Josh Rogin reported that the Obama administration was contemplating air strikes against the Bashar al-Assad regime, with airfields being the most likely targets.
The rumored strikes have not yet materialized, for reasons having as much to do with the now daunting tactical and logistical challenges involved as they do the far more publicized political difficulties long associated with the Syrian battlefield.
The day before Rogin’s piece was published, Russia completed deployment of the S-300 (or the SA-23, in NATO parlance) surface-to-air missile system to its naval base at Tartus, effectively reaching what now appears to be a long-term objective of the Kremlin’s, the establishment of an expeditionary Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) in Syria.
The result of deploying such a modern, advanced platform, equipped with radar-guided hit-to-kill interceptors, is the finalization of an imposing anti-access/area denial web that envelops almost all of Syria as well as significant portions of the Middle East and, along with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vow to shoot down any jets threatening the Assad regime, significantly narrows the list of American military options in the theater.
There clearly is no free ride in terms of Western air strikes.
The Russian IADS in Syria
It was a significant move; the S-300, with a range of 150 km, joins a formidable roster of already deployed Russian SAM assets in Syria, the most powerful being the S-400 Triumf. Sent to Hmeymim Air Base near Latakia on Thanksgiving last year, and with a purported range covering up to 400 km (250 km confirmed), the S-400 forms the upper-tier of Russia’s Syrian IADS and can reach the American-used Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and the United Kingdom’s Akrotiri Air Base at Cyprus.
S-400 Russian mobile missile defense system in transit. Credit: Novosti
Additionally, Russia also operates the S-300FM, the sea-based equivalent of the S-300, off a Slava-class guided-missile cruiser in the eastern Mediterranean, the S-200, and the K-300 Bastion P coastal defense system out of Tartus; these intimidating long-range SAMs are layered with shorter-ranged systems like Pantsir-S1 and the Buk-M2E. On top of Russia’s assets, Syria also fields its own range of air defense platforms, though there is some dispute over the veracity of what Damascus brings to the table.
Russia’s Syrian IADS is truly expeditionary in nature, with a clear emphasis on survivability. The systems belonging to it are modern, disparate, interchangeable, and almost all road-mobile, and have the capability to operate independently of one another or together in an integrated fashion.
Taken together, the Russian-Syrian IADS presents serious tactical challenges to any prospective opposition air campaign (which, it must be pointed out, can only mean the United States and its coalition allies.
Neither the Syrian rebel groups nor the Islamic State have air assets of note, and no other regional adversary exists that could threaten Russia’s position in Syria beyond the coalition).
What must be understood is that these deployments are part of a Russian overarching strategic framework that strives to raise the disincentive for American intervention.
This is the essence of an access/area denial strategy, and it greatly complicates how America can respond to Assad’s depravities.
The imposition of a no-fly zone, a proposal bandied about for years (though, notably, not by the Pentagon), is now impractical.
As Mike Benitez and Mike Pietrucha recently outlined for War on the Rocks, “the success of a no-fly zone relies on the premise of conventional deterrence backed by the resolve to swiftly and ferociously enforce it if challenged”. The proliferation of Russian air defense systems greatly threatens US assets, whose saftey must be assured before a no-fly zone can be established, and thereby the entire premise of that deterrence.
A successful no-fly zone requires not just air superiority, but supremacy; 15 years of counterrorisim and counterinsurgency styled combat in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the greater Middle East, where American aircraft have enjoyed virtually uncontested dominance, has distorted the significant differences in what these principles mean.
Historically, the United States has could further its strategic interest through the utilization of a no-fly zone when, as Benitez and Pietrucha point out, the tactical goal is containment and the opposition cannot realistically challenge it.
Washington lost two jets and had to station intelligence assets further afield when its no-fly zone was challenged by the Serbian Air Force, hardly as sophisticated a foe as Russia, and its associated air defense platforms during the Kosovo War in 1999.
Suppression of the Russian IADS in Syria would require a far greater commitment of force than Washington finds tactically, strategically, and politically acceptable.
Following this line of thinking, any meaningful attempt to impose a no-fly zone in Syria now would likely result in capacity issues for the USAF as well.
The result of this is a far greater freedom of action for Russian and Syrian forces, as well as real restrictions in how the United States can respond to situations like Aleppo.
The lack of air supremacy is a tactical reality with major strategic implications for Washington; no-fly zone advocates have touted the humanitarian safe areas for Syrian civilians that could be created if the skies overhead are guaranteed (Turkey has long pushed for this).
Russian air defense made this impractical, which in turn forced America’s European allies, desperate to staunch the flow of Middle Eastern refugees streaming across their borders, to strike a dubious refugee bargain with Turkey that has greatly accelerated Ankara’s slide toward unchecked authoritarianism.
Policy prescriptions uninformed of this history and strategic complexity are both misleading in what is needed to accomplish the mission and likely to fail.
This is not 2013, when President Barack Obama’s threat to strike the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons was operationally credible. Russia was a central player in what passed for a resolution to that drama, and undoubtedly looked to the danger it posed to Russian interests in Syria when Moscow intervened in 2015 and began laying the groundwork for its air defense architecture.
A Wider Strategy
Typically, anti-access/area denial scenarios are almost always associated with China, and understandably so. International headlines have for years been filled with dramatic island reclamations in the South China Sea that have served as a direct way to organize and conceptualize such principles. Russia however, has instituted these principles across several regions that constitute the former Soviet periphery.
Most recently, the border regions of Ukraine have seen their own substantial Russian military buildup over the last several months. Groundless accusations of Ukrainian special forces infiltrating Crimea on August 7 were used as a pretext to rapidly deploy forces to Ukraine’s northern, eastern, and southern frontiers, as well as to the Crimean Peninsula; The S-400 was sent to Crimea on August 12, and the Peninsula was soon equipped with a K-300 coastal defense system alongside additional air, ground, and naval units and assets. It also has a powerful IADS network centered on the heavily fortified Russian exclave at Kaliningrad that covers large portions of the Baltics and northern Poland.
If one widens the lens, a familiar pattern has emerged all along the Russian near-abroad that has turned several such regions into effective A2/AD exclusion zones.
Moscow has carved out an integrated and layered missile defense web that dominates large swaths of not only the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean, but the Baltics, Eastern Europe, the Black Sea, and parts of the Caucuses (through the Joint Air Defense Network with Armenia, of which Belarus is also a member) and Central Asia as well.
Conclusion
One of Russia’s core reasons for intervening in Syria involved establishing a reinforced base for power projection into the Middle East. The year-long process of building a layered IADS on the Syrian coast has accomplished this by denying the American-led coalition its accustomed air supremacy and, to a certain degree at least, boxing out Washington’s influence.
The Kremlin has sought to do this through several regional exclusion zones in areas it considers to be in the core Russian interest, of which air defense is just one component.
From the direct military support it provides to separatist rebels in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk regions, to the heavy conventional force buildup on its southwestern border with Ukraine, to entrenched troop presences in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Transdniestria in Moldova, to its perennial pot-stirring in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan to, now, its intervention in Syria, Russia has built a political-military architecture for Russian relations with its near abroad that allows for substantial power-projection. This architecture is organized around a strategy of creating effective speed bumps that deter western influence and intervention, in whatever form it may take.
Garth McLennan is a freelance strategic analyst who has written on missile defense issues for The Diplomat, 38 North, International Policy Digest, and Second Line of Defense: Delivering Capabilities to the Warfighter. He graduated from Arizona State University in 2015.
Editor’s Note: The Chief of Naval Operations recently challenged the use of the anti-access/area denial concept as one which significantly overstates the capability of adversaries to deny U.S. entrance into an area of interest.
This is undoubtedly true if the area of interest is really of SIGNIFICANT interest and one involving strategic clarity, something that certainly is not the case in Syria.
But what has happened is that Russia has shifted its resources to shape a more expeditionary military within which air defenses are seen as a chess piece which indicates their strategic interest and to raise the threshold of force necessary to displace them.
In this sense, modern air defenses are viewed by Russian leaders as an effective chess piece, but, of course, when they are destroyed in combat they become less effective. The Bekaa valley experience in the early 1980s is never far away from the Russian leader’s memory bank.
Also of note is how the Russians have supported their air campaign. They have a limited airlift fleet but have not simply relied on that fleet to support operations, but have used their various naval assets to ship supplies to Syria.
Clearly, the Inside the Beltway discussions which assert concepts such as “no fly zones” as solution sets in the Middle East, need to be put aside in favor of understanding the Russians are not only back but that there has been significant air power modernization in the region which is non-American.
