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The United States Congress is contemplating changes to the standards it uses to define its defense architecture against ballistic missile threats. Any such changes are likely to be more symbolic than substantive in the short term, but over time will create more political space for the development of new ballistic missile defense systems (BMDS).
At the same time, any moves to strengthen Washington’s ballistic defense posture will be met with opposition from Russia and China.
A key element of cross domain synergy is F-22s and then F-35s cuing up the strike fleet whereby Aegis becomes a wing man for the airborne sensor and strike fleet. The photo is of a Tomahawk launch in the Pacific from the USS Sterett in 2010. Credit Photo: USN
More immediately, real revisions to the way Washington defends against potential missile threats will develop as facts on the ground outpace existing structures more so than through congressional mandate.
Regardless of any rhetorical changes made or considered to America’s ballistic defence architecture today, the future of missile defense more generally is in for significant change.
This dynamic will be driven by technological advancement, particularly in the domain of hypersonic missiles capable of traveling as fast as Mach-10.
The United States and China have been successfully conducting experimental hypersonic tests for several years, and both are aiming to test a fully field-ready prototype by 2020, and Russia is not far behind[1]. The introduction of such weapons, which follow different, far less predictable flight patterns that exceed the capacity of existing missile defence systems designed to counter incoming ballistic targets, will change how countries organize, structure, and resource their defence strategies.
Politically, these manifestations are already becoming apparent; with Beijing testing its DF-ZF hypersonic platform a full seven times in the last two years, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) included amendments to the 2017 NDAA tasking the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with building the doctrinal frameworks needed to guide and regulate America’s approach to defending against such hypersonic attacks, as well as to bolster US space-based interception capabilities[2].
Financial changes have and will continue to come as well with significant investment in the development of directed energy weapons; the House’s NDAA bill passed on May 18 included $15 million for the stalled directed energy low-power laser demonstrator, and another $25 million for joint research work with Israel[3].
The imperative of organizing and maintaining a layered dense in depth against a multitude of threats will nonetheless ensure the continued prominence of ballistic defense systems (sky-high development and acquisition costs will leave hypersonic missiles beyond the reach of many American adversaries for years to come), but the unique threat of hypersonic weapons equipped with nuclear warheads could lead to new doctrines built around ideas of pre-emptive military action before an enemy can use, or possibly even acquire, them. The likelihood of such a scenario will only increase if effective tools in countering hypersonic missiles are slow to develop.
A key element forging an effective aerospace combat cloud is the ability to combine defensive and offensive capabilities into an attack and defense enterprise. THAAD working with Aegis and with “Aegis as the wingmen” or the F-35 fleet is an important building block.THAAD being fired as part of exercise. Credit: Lockheed Martin
The proliferation of precision-guided, medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly to state and non-state actors across the Middle East, is a viable rationale for stronger BMDS networks[4]. The spread of precision-enhancing terminal guidance technology has lowered the previously prohibitive cost of obtaining such weapons.
As these and other technologies proliferate, US and allied defense frameworks must keep pace; existing structures like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) may find their bandwidth taxed. The spread of medium-range ballistic missile capability could result in more countries armed with smaller quantities of such missiles, resulting in a lowered threshold for conventional combat.
For core US allies like Israel, this is a principal national security threat (something that should be factored in as well when determining the scope of American missile defense in Washington). Ten years ago, when the Jewish state went to war with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the inaccurate nature of Hezbollah rockets prevented them from posing a major strategic threat.
Today, however, with a battle-hardened Hezbollah now possessed of offensive organizational experience in support of the al Assad regime in Syria[5] and in control of an increasing stockpile of Iranian-provided missiles, the threat of precision-guided rockets raining down on cities and critical infrastructure like power plants anywhere in Israel is both terrifying and very real.
Likewise, the evolution of direct-ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite missiles capable of threatening Washington’s C4ISR infrastructure will mean new priorities, with the attendant funding that comes with them.
With China having conducted extensive testing in this domain, showcasing an ability to reach targets into the High Earth Orbit (35,700 km and up) in the process[6], and with Russia, North Korea, and Iran all aggressively working to augment their own space-based launch capabilities, proposed countermeasures have included calls for the development of a space-based interceptor (SBI) platform that can destroy targets in their ascent and boost phases over enemy territory[7].
In opposition to threats emanating from countries like Iran, which attempts to thinly cloak its efforts at ballistic missile development under the guise of testing for its national space program, an SBI system can be viewed as a particularly attractive solution.
Guidance from documents like the 1999 Missile Defense Act, which calls for defense against limited ballistic missile attack, also serves as an acknowledgement of the fact that no system capable of offering a perfect defense against long-range ballistic missile threats exists, but that reality does not diminish the potency, depth, and absolute strategic necessity of America’s BMDS.
Comprised of formidable Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) platforms, Aegis SM-3 missile interceptor systems like the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) deployment to eastern Europe, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in conjunction with the road-mobile PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptor recently sent to South Korea, the depth of America’s ballistic defense shield should not be in dispute.
If anything, the requirement of a “limited” ballistic missile defense capacity affords Washington a greater degree of political and diplomatic flexibility. The Obama administration found this beneficial when it felt the need for room to maneuver on the EPAA deployment and a Bush administration-led initiative for a GBI site in Poland.
That said, at a time of great uncertainty amid unprecedented military aggression by Moscow in multiple theaters, few signs would be stronger in response than strengthening American missile defense networks.
The removal of “limited” and the adoption of “robust layered” from US missile defense doctrine would provide the conceptual underpinning that allows for the political space needed to accelerate SBI development, but shaping an effective way ahead requires investments in key technologies, deployment decisions and commitments by the next Administration.
Garth McLennan is a strategic affairs analyst who has written previously for Second Line of Defense and 38 North. He graduated from Arizona State University in 2015, and currently resides in Vancouver, British Columbia.
The most negative expectations for the Rio Olympic Games did not materialize.
Zika did not impact tourists or athletes as expected (at least not so far). The number of foreign visitors was less than anticipated, though those that came to Rio enjoyed the competitions. Many stadiums were often only half full, but the spectators who did make it applauded noisily.
And the direst warnings over security, health threats, polluted sea water, and generalized disorganization, did not come to pass.
Despite rain and high winds the games ended spectacularly with a joyful and colorful festival of Rio Carnaval and fireworks at the famous Maracana stadium. The “Cariocas,” as the residents of Rio de Janeiro are known, certainly know how to organize a very good party.
And they did so.
Great Britain came in second in the medal count, after the United States, and ahead of China. It was an amazing performance. It was the best for Great Britain since 1908.
And it owed much to allocation of British Lottery funding to elite British sports. At the closing ceremony the British team wore flashing footware, their shoes with sparkling soles which flashed red, white and blue. A spokeswoman for British prime minister Teresa May, said there would be no limit on the honors given for the Olympic champions.
A time perhaps when the British honors system will be used to actually reward talented sporting achievement and not political cronies!
The US triumph, however, which saw 121 medals won, was tarnished by the behavior of drunken members of the US swimming team, who got involved in a fracas on their way back to the Olympic park after a late night party. They lied about what happened. They claimed armed robbers held them up. In fact they had vandalized a gas station bathroom.
But the one thing Brazil is good at is surveillance.
It quickly became “l’Affaire Lochte” and fed into Brazilian preconceptions about the (bad and arrogant) behavior of the US in general.
CCTV cameras soon revealed the truth about the whole sorry affair. But this was not before damage had been done to the reputation of the US contingent as a whole, despite the later apologies.
And it tended to overshadow the major achievement of Michael Phelps for example, and the overall successes of the US team in Rio.
The great multiple gold medal winning Jamaican sprinter, Usain Bolt, however, endeared himself to Brazilian public with his athletic success, his grace, and his good humor. This will be his last Olympic Games, and international athletics will miss him mightily.
But on the whole the Rio Olympic Games were a success.
The upcoming para-Olympic games may be a different story. Already promised funding has been cut. Stadiums promised are already being “de-commissioned.” Tickets have not sold. And currently it is doubtful even if some of the para-Olympic participants from the poorer nations will be able to afford to attend.
For Brazil the Olympics have certainly produced some benefits. There was improved infrastructure in Rio in terms of transportation links for example in the down town area, and a new metro link, and the reconstruction of the old port area into a new tourist destination with the new museum of the future.
And in the soccer competition, Brazil won on penalties against Germany, erasing their humiliating loss to Germany in the World Cup by seven to one two years ago. Though Neymar, the Brazilian star (who like many Brazilian soccer stars plays abroad for Barcelona), and who was the captain of the Brazilian national squad, got into a bad tempered contretemps with spectators as he left the pitch. And he wore a prominent “Jesus” bandana, which broke Olympic rules against the overt profession of faith.
Overall Brazil came in thirteenth in the medal count, which was not a bad result.
That is if it were not for the ominous number “thirteen.” Brazilians tend to be superstitious. And unfortunately as the euphoria evaporates, as it undoubtedly will, there are very hard political, and economic, and fiscal realities ahead, not only for Rio, but also for Brazil as a whole.
And, as has been the pattern with Olympic Games elsewhere, including in London four years ago, the euphoria is likely to be ephemeral.
Public finances remain fragile, especially in Rio, where the salaries of many public employees have not been paid, and are likely to be further delayed. The billionaire who built the Olympic park and “village” expecting to cash in by selling off the apartments in what he calls his new “Isla pura” (“pure island”), is struggling to make sales in his now empty buildings.
And without an improvement in the real economy, the last months of 2016 are also likely to be difficult.
The ever-widening corruption scandals enveloping the state petroleum giant, Petrobras, and the workers party, and the leading construction companies, and numerous politicians, and businessmen, will continue to expand, as judge Moro’s anti-corruption operation continues to uncover and convict more culprits. None of which will soon help Brazil find its feet again in the near term.
And this coming weekend after three months and 13 days since her temporary suspension from office, the impeachment trail of Dilma Rousseff will begin in the Brazilian senate under the chairmanship of Supreme Court chief justice Ricardo Lewandowski.
This coming Thursday, (August 27th) the Senate will hear witnesses. The final judgment will then take place on Saturday (August 28th), or into the weekend if need be.
On Sunday demonstrations by “social movements” in support of Dilma are scheduled for Brasilia. It is very unlikely she will be exonerated. There needs to be a vote of two thirds of the senate and already the pro-impeachment forces think they have sufficient votes to carry the day.
But it will be a very messy and complicated outcome.
Dilma, whatever her faults as a political leader, and they are many, will not go away quietly, and she can claim, with some justification, that she is the victim of a “constitutional coup.”
She intends to appear personally to defend herself. But her successful impeachment will remove the workers party (PT) entirely from power. Ending in effect their rule over two terms under president Lula, and one and a half terms under president Dilma Rousseff.
Acting president Michel Temer, who will then become president, is an old time political operator from the centrist PMDB. But he is not much more popular than the president he replaces.
And in a shift of alliances he will have to work closely with the PSDB which lost the last presidential election to Dilma, and which now provides Temer’s very ambitious foreign minister, Jose Serra, a previous presidential candidate for the PSDB, who is the former São Paulo governor, and is a politician notorious for his own perennial presidential ambitions.
But there will at least be some political clarity after the impeachment vote in the Brazilian senate next weekend.
And with the formal removal of Dilma Rousseff from the office, the newly installed President Michel Temer, will be able to travel abroad while the president of the lower house of congress, Rodrigo Maia, will substitute for him while he is out of the country.
President Temer will have two years to make good on his promises of economic and political reform before the next presidential elections.
But one thing is certain: With the Olympic Games over, Brazil still faces a very rocky political and economic road ahead.
And while the old problems have been temporarily on hold: Now they will be back with a vengeance.
When I last visited Amberley airbase two years ago, the KC-30A was a project of concern.
Now it has become a key combat asset within the RAAF contribution to current Australian and allied Middle East operations.
This time with those operations ongoing, Pitch Black 2016 ramping up and the RAAF participating in Red Flag Alaska, there were few of the tankers and lifters at home in Amberly.
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Group Captain Adam Williams, the Officer Commanding of 86th Wing as well the CO of the 33rd Squadron (KC-30A) were able to provide updates on the Wing and the Squadron respectively.
In this piece, I will focus on the discussion with the Wing Commander on August 3, 2016.
Group Captain Williams has a broad background in the air lift community, including time with the Caribous and then on to C-17s as well as being part of the team which set up the Aussie version of the TACC, namely, the Air Mobility Control Center of the AMCC located at Richmond Air Base.
We started by discussing the impact of the C-17 and then the KC-30A on the RAAF.
Clearly, moving from a C-130 ranged force to one with global reach has had a significant impact on the RAAF as well as upon policy makers.
But it also changes the nature of the challenge facing the AMCC as well.
Namely, the staff needs to have a global reach including working with various allied links in a global operation as well.
As Group Captain Williams put it: “The ability to reach out and affect the world has changed significantly for Australia.
“The idea a decade ago that we could effectively lodge a force anywhere in Europe and operate at short notice was unimaginable.
“For example, in our response to the downing of Malaysian airlines Flight 17, the KC-30 and C-17 force, in terms of seat miles and ton miles, did more lifting in 15 days than Australia did in the Berlin Airlift and we were in the Berlin Airlift for a significant period of time.”
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We discussed the challenges of operating a global fleet from a sustainment perspective and he highlighted that the C-17 is a relatively mature system in this regard whereas the KC-30A support structure was a work in progress.
“The C-17 is a mature weapon system.
“The KC-30A is a world class tanker but the support structure is being worked.
“The effects that we generate for C-17 through life support are effects that I would very much like to see embedded in the KC-30 enterprise.
“We have recently renegotiated, through our systems program office, our contract with Northrop Grumman Integrated Defense Services to move towards that goal.”
The importance of getting the sustainment right is central as an enabler for the KC-30A as a global weapons system for the Australian Defense Force (ADF).
“We’re very ambitious in the way we use the KC-30, but the sustainment enterprise is fragile.
“Whenever ambition and fragility meet, it takes a lot of management.”
Clearly, having the C-17 and KC-30 dyad has changed the way the RAAF can support the Australian Defence Force (ADF).
And I asked him to explain how the dyad works in terms of shaping RAAF operations.
“As a dyad, it’s an incredible enabler.
“For example, with regard to a ground force you can put the heavy equipment and heavy spares in the C-17, which specializes in outsized, overweight cargo.
“The KC-30, which can put most of the maintainers and ground combat force upstairs, most of their tooling downstairs and grab a couple of the jets on each wing. It gives you a much better way to hit the ground running.”
The dyad in other words provides flexible support to various ways to mix and match an insertion force.
And this kind of task force projection capability is central to the way the ADF is being transformed overall.
“There’s not many missions that we envisage for the land force that don’t involve them having organic mobility when they hit the ground, so definitely C-17’s a must for any trip Army will take on the KC-30.”
And the Group Captain described an example of how the dyad can support change with regard to the case of Australian Antarctic missions.
“The Australian Antarctic Division currently spend nearly a month in the scientific season leapfrogging helicopters towards the Pole to set up forward stores of fuel and food so that the over-land mission can get its way to the Pole to go and do the science.
“With a KC-30 and C-17 dyad, we could airdrop the science team’s support caches in one mission and provide them an extra month of time to do the science mission.
“That sort of enabler is the creative ways that these two aircraft can offer to government.
“We’re thinking about how that pairing can contribute to the ADF and any of the missions we might be doing, as well as any of the missions that government wants as options.”
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Group Captain Williams underscored that he believed that air-ground integration was in a very creative phase right now as the air lift force looked at ways to modernize and add capabilities onboard their aircraft to support more flexible ground operations.
He then highlighted the progress in getting clearances for the KC-30A to refuel fighter aircraft which expanded its contribution in the allied operations in the Middle East.
He highlighted as well the Training, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs) being executed by the tanker force in operating in the battlespace.
“We utilize as much freedom of action as we have inside that managed battle space to make ourselves as useful as we can be.
“The crews are profiting from enhanced communications and that broad situational awareness it offers by becoming a tanker that actively seeks to enable fighters in the battle space.
“The crews will be watching in their holding pattern while they’re waiting between tanking brackets.
“They’ve got a customer booked at 2:00.
“It’s 1:00.
“They’re watching, and they can tell from Link 16 that there’s a fighter up here or over there that’s getting low on gas.
“They’ve got this whole space to play in.
“They go and position themselves over the top and wait in case those fighters need gas.
“Currently, half our flight hours in the tanker is occurring in the Middle East.”
He discussed the future of the tanker in terms of getting on with the boom.
“Three years ago we had problems with the pods; now they work fine.
“We are having some issues with the boom, but those problems will be worked out and I am looking forward to a future that could even include an autonomous boom.
“The pilots are sitting at the front doing a bit of forward planning of how they’re going to refuel next, who they’re going to refuel next, where they have to move, and making sure we don’t suffer any losses from our biggest threat in the Middle East, which is congested air space.
“The pilots can focus on that task but the guy who gets fatigued first, he’s actually the boom operator.
“We are learning where our limits are and what we can target to move those limits further. What interests me with an autonomous boom is get more contacts out of the tanker during its time on station.”
Another capability he would like to see on the tanker is beyond line of site communications for the ground and naval forces.
“I look forward to us becoming an information provider within the battlespace as well.”
Finally, he discussed the recent visit to Europe whereby the KC-30A crew supported the ADF contingent which was attending the Bastille Day parade and also visited RIAT, the UK, French and Italian air tanking bases as well.
“We are learning from each other and we look to the A330MRTT Users’ Group to provide ways to learn in the future as well as the fleet grows in size and experience.
“I definitely see a role for Australia in that forum.”
Editor’s Note: The first slideshow shows the KC-30A during Pitch Black 2016.
The second slideshow shows Group Captain Williams engaged in his command activities.
The third slideshow shows the KC-30A as enabler of other air platforms and photos from the day at Amberley Airbase.
The first two photos are credited to the Australian Ministry of Defence and show the KC-30A refueling a Wedgetail and then the C-17.
The remaining photos in the slideshow are credited to Second Line of Defense.
2016-08-19 According to Air Commodore Richard Lennon, Commander of the RAAF’s Air Mobility Group, the C-130J played a prominent role in Pitch Black 2016.
Our first attempt at using C-130 equipped with Link 16 on Exercise Pitch Black 16 has been very successful.
For the first time the C-130 crew have a great picture of blue air and red air dispositions.
The crews’ situational awareness (SA) has been increased enormously and their eyes have been opened.
To manage the increased SA we are training the Loadmasters to use the Link 16 picture and pass important information to the pilot.
In the past, the Loadmasters have maintained a visual scan to the side and rear of the aircraft. They notify the pilots of any threat that they see.
The Link 16 picture, which they view on a hand held tablet expands their horizon beyond the visual and cues their scan in the direction known threats are coming from.
The crew is also able to feed information back to air battle managers with text messages.
This is an enormous step in integrating combat air mobility aircraft into a larger force package.
It is a significant step towards realizing the Jericho vision by harnessing the combat potential of a fully integrated force.
In this slideshow, C-130Js from No. 37 Squadron are seen during the Pitch Black 2016 Exercise.
Exercise Pitch Black is being conducted from RAAF Base Darwin and RAAF Base Tindal from 29 July until 19 August.
This year’s exercise featured up to 2500 personnel and 115 aircraft from participating nations including Australia, Canada, French (New Caledonia), Germany, Indonesia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand and the United States.
Exercise Pitch Black aims to further develop offensive counter air; air-land integration; and intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance, as well as foster international co-operation with partner forces.
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In an interview that Nigel Pittaway conducted with one of C-130 leadership, the new role was highlighted.
As exercise Pitch Black enters its third and final week this week, the C-130J will be operating low-level tactical missions in a high-threat environment, supporting Australian and US Special Forces within the remote Bradshaw and Delamere training ranges in the Northern Territory. What is different, however, is that it will be connected to the networked battlespace for the first time in its operational career.
Australia is installing an Engility Corp. Joint Range Extension (JRE) TDL system into all 12 of its Hercules, and the installation is unique in that there are five display terminals: for the pilot, co-pilot, the two loadmasters in the cargo bay and the auxiliary crew station in the rear of the flight deck.
“This specific fit-out is unique to Australian Defence Force (ADF) airborne assets and what we have now is both a Beyond Line Of Sight (BLOS) and Line Of Sight (LOS) capability,” explained Flight Lieutenant Shaun Wilkinson, a C-130J pilot with No. 37 Squadron and a member of the Link 16 integration project team.
“There is also no other C-130 worldwide that has this system, no other Hercules has integrated Link 16 with a loadmaster station before.”
FLTLT Wilkinson said that the first operational sortie using Link 16 was only flown at the end of last week, after two weeks of testing.
“The RAAF’s Command and Control unit here in Darwin (114 Mobile Control & Reporting Unit) is using parts of Link 16 that they’ve never used before with fighter aircraft, even when they go to Red Flag,” he said.
“What is important is that in the cockpit we are able to take in the entire picture in a quick glance, where normally we would have to listen to our voice radios to try and build a complex mental picture of what’s happening…..”
There was the opportunity to insert air mobility and ground forces into the exercise, in terms of SOF as well as airlift dropping maneuver equipment to support SOF and then to use SOF to achieve objectives important to the blue force effort to degrade red air capabilities.
2016-08-19 During the Pitch Black 2016 exercise, a KC-30A refueled US F-16s coming from Japan to the exercise in Australia.
On July 19, a RAAF KC-30A flew non-stop with six F-16Cs from Kadena Air Base, Japan to RAAF Base Darwin in just over six hours.
RAAF Group Captain (GPCAPT) Adam Williams, Officer Commanding of No. 86 Wing, said it was the first time that a RAAF air-to-air refuelling tanker deployed in support of U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft to Australia.
“The KC-30A conducted 35 contacts with the six F-16Cs, transferring a total of 55.8 tonnes of fuel to the F-16Cs, or nearly 70,000 litres,” GPCAPT Williams said. “The air-to-air refuelling boom on the KC-30A performed well, with no significant issues.”
Now that demonstrated capability has been provided in Middle Eastern operations.
The F-16 is the first aircraft to be refueled in theater with the KC-30A boom.
According to the Australian Ministry of Defence:
An Air Task Group KC-30A has, for the first time, successfully refuelled two F-16C aircraft extending support to the US-led multi-national coalition in the fight against Daesh.
The Air Task Group (ATG) of Operation OKRA is operating at the request of the Iraqi Government within a US-led international coalition assembled to disrupt and degrade Daesh operations in the Middle East Region (MER).
The ATG comprises six RAAF F/A-18A Hornet fighter aircraft, an E-7A Wedgetail airborne command and control aircraft, and a KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport air-to-air refuelling aircraft.
Additionally, the ATG has personnel working in the Combined Air and Space Operations Centre, and embedded with the ‘Kingpin’ US tactical Command and Control Unit.
The ATG is directly supported by elements of Operation ACCORDION including the Theatre Communications Group, Air Mobility Task Group, and the Combat Support Unit, whose mission is to provide airbase and aviation operational support to sustain air operations in the MER.
There are up to 350 personnel deployed, at any one time, as part of, or in direct support of the ATG.
Credit: Australian Ministry of Defence
August 19, 2016
As Group Captain Williams has put it with regard to the impact of the C-17 and KC-30A dyad for the Australian Defence Forces:
“As a dyad, it’s an incredible enabler.
“For example, with regard to a ground force you can put the heavy equipment and heavy spares in the C-17, which specializes in outsized, overweight cargo.
“The KC-30, which can put most of the maintainers and ground combat force upstairs, most of their tooling downstairs and grab a couple of the jets on each wing. It gives you a much better way to hit the ground running.”
The dyad in other words provides flexible support to various ways to mix and match an insertion force.
A Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) KC-30A Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) during air-to-air refuelling trials with a United States Air Force (USAF) F-16 fighter. December 2015. Credit: Australian Ministry of Defence
And this kind of task force projection capability is central to the way the ADF is being transformed overall.
“There’s not many missions that we envisage for the land force that don’t involve them having organic mobility when they hit the ground, so definitely C-17’s a must for any trip Army will take on the KC-30.”
And the Group Captain described an example of how the dyad can support change with regard to the case of Australian Antarctic missions.
“The Australian Antarctic Division currently spend nearly a month in the scientific season leapfrogging helicopters towards the Pole to set up forward stores of fuel and food so that the over-land mission can get its way to the Pole to go and do the science.
“With a KC-30 and C-17 dyad, we could airdrop the science team’s support caches in one mission and provide them an extra month of time to do the science mission.
“That sort of enabler is the creative ways that these two aircraft can offer to government.
“We’re thinking about how that pairing can contribute to the ADF and any of the missions we might be doing, as well as any of the missions that government wants as options.”
In another of the bold moves that has marked Putin’s Syria campaign since it began last September, the Russian Air Force began using bases in Iran on August 16 to support its bombing campaign in Syria.
For several days now, Tupolev-22M3 Backfire long-range supersonic bombers and the shorter-range Sukhoi-34 tactical bombers have conducted strikes from Iranian air bases.
The immediate reason for the cooperation may be tactical—to strengthen the strikes and reverse recent rebel successes in Aleppo, but strategic drivers are at work—Russia and Iran remain alienated from the West and share common goals regarding Syria; yet, some Russians may also have seen a need to reassure Tehran about Moscow’s commitment despite talk of Russian-U.S. military collaboration regarding Syria.
Russia and Iran have already been cooperating militarily in Syria, with Moscow providing air power and Tehran ground advisers for both Syrian government forces and for Hezbollah’s paramilitary units, which have provided auxiliary manpower to reinforce Syria’s depleted army.
Yet, until now the Tu-22s have mostly launched from the Mozdok Air Base in North Ossetia in the north Caucasus as well as short-range ground attacks from Su-34 strike planes using Russia’s newly built Hmeimim airbase, located outside the Syrian coastal city of Latakia as well as missiles launched from ships in the Caspian Sea and submarines in the Mediterranean.
Russian commanders want to use Iranian territory to support air strikes in Syria for the same reason the U.S. Air Force seeks access to Turkey’s facilities.
Using Iranian bases means Russian bombers can fly shorter distances, carry larger payloads, fly more sorties, expend less fuel to reach Syria, spend more time searching for targets, attack from new directions that may make them less vulnerable to ground defenses, and perhaps provide more rapid long-range heavy bomber support in an emergency (in the way U.S. commanders in Vietnam would call for B-52 air support whenever they needed overwhelming sky-based firepower).
A Russian defence ministry video showed a Tupolev Tu-22M3 dropping bombs over Syria. AP
Moreover, the modest-sized Hmeymim airbase from which the 30SM and Su-35S support planes have escorted the TU-22s cannot host such large aircraft themselves.
Some Russians said the move would also cut Russia’s war costs, though this seems unlikely unless the Russians stay in Iran long enough to compensate for the expenses of moving the bombers’ support infrastructure to Iran, and do not have to pay much rent.
Moscow has probably sent transportation planes, munitions, specialized equipment, and many ground personnel to Iran.
Iranian officials explained that the cooperation was “of a strategic character” to “unite our potential and capabilities” against terrorism.
Iran has never allowed a foreign military to deploy on its territory, and officials in Tehran have since strenuously denied that Moscow has established a permanent base in their country.
Still, the Russian decision may help assuage some Iranian complaints about Moscow’s insufficient operational coordination with Tehran in Syria.
In January, Russia and Iran signed a defense cooperation agreement, and some sources claim that the Russian bombers’ use of Iranian bases was discussed even before then.
But evidence suggests that the decision to conduct the deployment was more recent.
The Russian planes arrived in Iran on August 15, only a day before they began bombing.
Though the State Department spokesperson said that Moscow’s move was not unexpected, the Russian military did not warn the United States in advance about the redeployment.
Russian operators only provided short-term tactical warning to coalition air forces that the Russian planes were entering Iraqi airspace to secure their safe passage.
One reason for the escalation may have been that the Syrian government offensive against Aleppo had recently bogged down.
The Iranians had their own setback on May 7, when insurgents killed more than a dozen Iranian officers at Khan Tuman near Aleppo, the single largest known Iranian loss in the Syrian War. Syrian officials attributed some setbacks to inadequate military coordination between the pro-regime forces in Syria. The Iranian government then established a new position of senior coordinator for political, military and security affairs with Syria and Russia.
Iran also sent reinforcements into Syria. On June 10, the three countries’ defense ministers conferred in Tehran on the Syrian War.
Moscow may also be seeking to dispel Iranian suspicions over the Russian-U.S. negotiations regarding possible military cooperation in Syria.
Washington wants Moscow to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power, or at least limit Russian-Syrian attacks against the Western-backed fighters in Syria, which Iran opposes. Persian Gulf and U.S. representatives were also pressing Russia to limit Iran’s influence in Syria.
By deepening their military partnership, Moscow also decreases Iranian interest, and ability, to reconcile with the West.
Russia’s move may have also aimed to force U.S. concessions in their discussions over bilateral military cooperation in Syria. Russian officials have complained that U.S. negotiators in the military talks were regularly changing their terms and failing to fulfill agreements.
Despite insisting that it is not committed to Assad’s rule, the Russian government has shown little interest in deposing him to reach a deal with the United States.
By highlighting its expanded cooperation with Iran, Moscow has increased its leverage and options.
Finally, Russia may be trying to expand its arms sales to Iran.
In April 2016, Iran received the first elements of the five S-300PMU-1/SA-20 Gargoyle surface-to-air missile (40 launchers) defense systems. Tehran immediately highlighted them at its annual National Army Day parade later that month. Russia had suspended implementation of this $800-million contract, signed in 2007, to deliver five S-300 in mid-2010, but reinstated the contract after last year’s nuclear deal, which took effect in January with the repeal of all nuclear-related sanctions on Iran.
After Russia finishes delivering the five systems by the end of this year, Russian officials expect Tehran to withdraw its lawsuit against Russia for failing to implement the deal.
Though the JCPOA prohibits Russia and other countries from selling Iran ballistic missiles for eight years, Russia and Iran are discussing a sale worth $8 billion of Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters, Su-30SM multi-role fighter, Yak-30 training aircraft, K-300 Bastion coastal defense systems, diesel submarines and surface warships such as frigates, and other goods with more orders in the future.
Like the S-300 sale, Russia has a reason to sell anti-access area-denial systems to Iran as part of an effort to try to limit U.S. military options in the Gulf.
United Nation Security Council Resolution 2231 does allow the United States or other permanent members of the Council to veto the sale until 2021, but Russia and Iran could circumvent this impediment by delaying the execution of the deal by five years.
Media probed for human-interest stories from the cadre of pilots on board, “What was it like, after all the simulator hours and practice landings at the airfield to actually land on the ship?
From pilots who had 50 traps with the F-35C to those who had just realized their first – they struggled to provide any other answer; “no drama, no surprise, performed as expected, very vanilla, pretty straightforward.”
No news.
“Any issues moving 7 F-35Cs around the deck at once, or reliability issues?”
Beginning in March 2014, the Williams Foundation began a series of seminars and workshops to examine both conceptually and practically ways to build a 21st century combat force, which can prevail in the extended battlespace.
This can be looked at as a force operating in what the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations as kill webs or what an Australian Army General called building an Australian anti-access anti-denial strategy.
In our book on Pacific strategy, we referred to the evolving force structure as shaping a honeycomb force capable of presence, reachback and targeted dominance. Alternatively, we have referred to the shaping of a force capable of operating in an integrated offensive-defensive enterprise.
What is unique about what Williams has done is to shape a public discussion of the opportunities and challenges to shaping such a force.
And through the seminars, the conversation has evolved and generated more joint force involvement as well.
The first seminars were largely Air Force driven, as the Air Force shaped its Plan Jericho approach to leveraging 5th generation capabilities. Plan Jericho is about transformation as the RAAF adds new platforms, and rather than adding them like Lego blocks it is about interactive platform modernization and overall force transformation.
This theme was taken to Denmark and the Williams Foundation co-hosted a seminar with the Centre for Military Studies in Copenhagen and discussed the way ahead prior to the Danish decision to buy the F-35 and to become a fifth generation enabled force.
This Danish decision combined with Norway’s and the Dutch acquisition of F-35s combined with the joint UK and USAF operation of F-35s in the UK means that the fifth generation force can enable the shaping of new collaborative approach in a key region of the world.
When I visited RAF Lakenheath in June, I had a chance to talk with the 48th Wing Commander, Col. Novotny about the strategic opportunities inherent in the joint standup.
He underscored that unlike setting up an F-35 base in the United States, standing one up at RAF Lakenheath was about putting the F-35 into play with the UK, the Norwegians, the Danes and the Dutch.
“We are not flying alone; but joined at the hip.
“We will be flying exactly in the area of interest for which the plane was designed and can fly together, maintain together, and operate together leveraging the air and sea base for which the F-35 B will fly from as well.
“It is a unique and strategic opportunity for the USAF and for the nations.
“I’m glad that we are the first base overseas, but I see there is great potential for two countries to develop in concert, side-by-side, and to set, set the model for joint operations.
“As we get this right, we can bring in the Danes, the Norwegians and Dutch who are close in geography and the Israelis and Italians as well to shape the evolving joint operational culture and approach.
“Before you know it, you’ve got eight countries flying this airplane seamlessly integrated because of the work that Lakenheath and Marham are doing in the 20 nautical miles radius of the two bases.”
Clearly, the RAAF has something similar in mind as they work with the U.S. and the Asian allies in the region or to operate in Europe or the Middle East.
The Williams Foundation then extended the discussion to the dynamics of change between air and land forces.
Brigadier General Mills, Australian Army, addressing the question of Army modernization under the influence of evolving air capabilities.
Senior Army and Air Force officers presented their thinking to the seminar on air-land integration earlier this year. The terms of reference for the seminar highlighted the way ahead.
“Air forces need to be capable of delivering air and space power effects to support conventional and special operations in the land domain. Air-Land integration is one of the most important capabilities for successful joint operations.
The last decade has seen a significant shift in how airpower has supported ground operations.
With the introduction of systems like Rover, the ability of airpower to provide precision strike to the ground forces saw a significant change in fire support from a wide variety of air platforms. Precision air dropping in support of outposts or moving forces introduced new capabilities of support.
Yet this template of air ground is really focused on air support to the ground whereas with the shift in the global situation, a much wider set of situations are emerging whereby the air-ground integration approach will become much wider in character, and the ability to insert force rapidly, as a precision strike capability, and to be withdrawn will be a key tool in the toolbox for decision makers.
Fifth generation enabled operations will see a shift to a distributed C2 approach which will clearly change the nature of the ground-to air command system, and the with the ability of fifth generation systems to generate horizontal communications among air assets outside the boundaries of a classic AWACs directed system, the change in C2 will be very wide ranging.”
A number of practical ideas as well as conceptual thinking was provided at the seminar which the foundation followed up in additional sets of meetings.
What was clear in discussing with Army officers during my current stay in Australia is that practical steps have indeed been taken since that seminar which reflects the approach outlined at the seminar.
Two key examples of this are the Army looking clearly to ways to leverage Wedgetail in supporting ground maneuver forces, including having Army officers onboard the aircraft and gaining practical knowledge about the aircraft and becoming stakeholders in the further evolution of the capabilities of the E-7 itself.
Another example is how the new LHDs are being looked at as “magnet” ships drawing together air-sea and land integration.
At Williamtown Air base, the home of the E-7, the virtual Wedgetail system is being used to work with the Army and Navy to prepare exercises this Fall to shape practical ways to work Wedgetail with the LHDs and vice versa. This can then shape a co-modernization strategy for the two platforms, which reflects real joint needs as opposed to an abstract requirements process setting those requirements.
It is also the case according to Brigadier General Chris Mills (in a comment made during an interview conducted during this visit and to be published later) that the Army is working with Navy to shape a common digital communications system to ensure greater integration between the ship and the ashore force. Again, it is a case of the interactive modernization of capabilities, which is crucial to shaping effective force integration.
With the latest seminar, the Williams Foundation addressed air-sea integration.
What was different about this seminar is that it was Navy-led rather than being primarily air force led. Indeed, there was only one RAAF presentation.
It was clear that the senior Navy officers who presented were looking at the evolution of their capabilities from the broader perspective of how to build more lethal and effective forces in the extended battlespace.
And this perspective was built around cross-modernization of platforms delivering joint effects in the battlespace.
Obviously, exercises and training a key elements of shaping a new way ahead, a key point underscored by Rear Admiral Mayer, Commander of the Australian Fleet.
The three closest allies in shaping new maritime capabilities were represented at the seminar – Australia, the U.S. and the United Kingdom.
The lead speaker was Rear Admiral Manazir, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (OPNAV N9) who provided an overview of the key dynamics of change in the maritime warfare global situation and discussing the US Navy’s kill web concept.
It should be noted that the first allied force, which actually discussed the kill web concept, was the RAAF. Two days after Rear Admiral Manazir had introduced the concept at a Mitchell Institute audience in Arlington Virginia earlier this year, the Air Combat Commander in the RAAF was taking it onboard.
In that interview Air Commodore Roberton argued that there is a three-phase process underway and “we are only at the first step.
“We need to be in the position where our maritime surface combatants are able to receive the information that we’ve got airborne in the RAAF assets. Once they’ve got that, they’re going to actually be trying to be able to do something with it.
That is the second level, namely where they can integrate with the C2 and ISR flowing from our air fleet.
But we need to get to the third level, where they too can provide information and weapons for us in the air domain.
That is how you will turn a kill chain into a kill web. That’s something that we want in our fifth generation-integrated force.
And in a fifth generation world, it’s less about who is the trigger shooter but actually making sure that everybody’s contributing effectively to the right decisions made as soon as possible at the lowest possible level.
And that is why I see the F-35 as an information age aircraft.
I’m less concerned about the load outs on the F-35. You can give it another ten weapon stations and you would miss the core point.
What’s actually important is how the F-35 makes other weapon providers or effect providers out there far better and shape faster reaction times.
A lot of people seem stuck in the old mindset of how many weapons we are going to stack on each aircraft.
That’s almost two generations ago.
In some ways, we are going back to the concept of military aviation early in World War I where we are the eyes and ears for the combat force forward operating.”
After the opening by Rear Admiral Manazir, there were a number of key presentations by Royal Australian Navy, RAAF and Australian Army officers as well as by the Royal Navy, providing an update on the Queen Elizabeth carrier capability.
Presentations by industry complimented those by the senior officers, as well as closing and opening remarks by senior Williams Foundation officials.
In addition, the final formal presentation of the seminar by John Blackburn of the Williams Foundation who announced the next seminar which will focus on how best to shape a way ahead for more effective integration of the joint force.
A full report about the seminar will be published in the near future and will include as well a number of interviews with Army, Air Force and Navy done at Amberly, Williamtown, Canberra and Sydney.
It is clear that the Royal Australian Navy is leveraging the LHD coming into the fleet to shape new ways to integrate air, sea and ground power.
It also clear that the coming of the Air Warfare destroyer is seen as an opportunity to expand the sensor shooter relationship as well as shaping ways to task force differently.
Indeed, Rear Admiral Stuart Mayer, Commander of the Australian Fleet, made it very clear both in his presentation and his interview, that a key way to understand the way ahead is shaping variable task force concepts and capabilities.
He was clearly looking at a range of ways to operate the force with mix and match capabilities to provide for the kind of maritime power, which was crucial to 21st century operations.
Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Tim Barrett, made it very clear that he was taking the long view on the development of Australian maritime power and saw the goal as shaping not a joint force but an integrated force.
And in the interview with him, we discussed how he saw the development of the new Australian submarine in the context of shaping an effective way ahead, in terms of an ability to not just to build hulls, but integrated support and effective software upgrades to keep the fleet effective and modern on an ongoing basis.
Indeed, the “one ship” concept is crucial to Barrett whereby 21st century infrastructure was being built to shape the fleet in a way in which sustainment, ongoing modernization and operations would be more effectively conjoined in shaping a 21st century fleet.
Even though this was a Navy led discussion, the Air Force and Army were key elements in discussing the evolution of maritime operations.
Major General McLachlan, head of Australian Army Modernization, discussed and analyzed the evolving role of the Aussie Army in the defense of Australia through what the U.S. Army would call Air Defense Artillery (ADA) or shaping the lower tier to a missile defense system engaged with the power projection forces.
From his perspective, the more effective the territory of Australia could be used to shape effective defenses, the more the Air Force and Navy could focus on extended operations. He characterized this as shaping an Australian anti-access and area denial force.
The key air force presentation was by Group Captain Hombsch, Chief of Staff of the Headquarters of the Surveillance and Response Group. The SRG provides a number of key assets for the joint force to operate in an integrated maritime domain space, such as the Wedgetail and the P-8/Triton dyad coming to the force.
The SRG includes a number of capabilities that in the US forces would be owned variously by the US Army, Navy or Air Force. But with the co-ownership of a diversity of assets, the SRG is well positioned to be a key element for the force transformation underway in Australia.
It is clear that significant integration is underway, largely driven by service approaches reaching out to the other services.
A key example of this is Wedgetail.
The Wedgetail is often referred to as an Aussie AWACS, but clearly is not. The AWACs is an AIR battle managements system with the customers being largely the fighter community.
The Wedgetail is evolving towards a ground and naval engagement capability with naval and army officers onboard and with virtual Wedgetail becoming part of the officer training for the Army and Navy this process will deepen in the years ahead.
In many ways, what is being experienced with Wedgetail is what the ADF hopes to bring to the process of overall force design and greater operational integration.
John Blackburn in the final formal presentation, indeed, announced that the Williams Foundation was next looking at how to best shape a way ahead to achieve this outcome.
What was clear with the UK and US participation is that the three key powers are thinking along similar lines.
Indeed, in the presentation by Captain Nick Walker on the Queen Elizabeth, he highlighted that the introduction of the Queen Elizabeth carrier was part of a rethink in the UK along the lines of what the ADF is working on as well.
When the seminar was completed, I had a chance to talk with Rear Admiral Manazir about his reactions to his visit and participation in the seminar. That interview will be published in the near future. But I think he captured what the general consensus of the seminar was quite well.
“The Williams Foundation is coalescing around a lot of the issues that we’re trying to solve.
Most often the public discussions are mostly about resources.
That conversation is important but the discussion, which Williams set in motion, is about how to develop a different kind of navy.
The conversation has got to be along the lines of what we had today if we are going to get it right. For this, I thank the Williams Foundation.”
The terms of reference for the conference were as follows:
“The Royal Australian Navy has had the ability to network and share situational awareness amongst the fleet for many years and the P-3s has been the only RAAF platform capable of being part of that network.
The RAAF’s journey of networking its capability journey started more recently with the Hornet Upgrade Program and has accelerated with the introduction of capabilities like Wedgetail and Vigilaire. All of the RAAF’s fleet is now capable of linking into and contributing to an Air Layer of the Joint Battle management system.
With the advent of 5th Generation capabilities like the JSF and the new combat systems on the AWD as well as the design and development of the new combat systems for the Australia’s future frigates, Offshore Patrol Vessels and Submarines, the ADF has a unique opportunity to influence and design in an unprecedented level of integration into the RAN’s and RAAF’s new platforms. That unprecedented level of integration should drive new thinking on the integration of air and sea power effects. The seminar is about examining the challenges and possibilities of the combat power in that future integrated force.
Air Force and Navy need to not only remediate existing deficiencies but take advantage of the transformative nature of fifth generation technology. The seminar aims to explore the art of the possible in future Air-Sea operations.”
See our earlier discussions of Williams Foundation seminars:
