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The South China Sea “Sea Grab” is no less an egregious violation of international law than a “Land Grab” by Russia in the Ukraine.
Both cases are virtually identical in that a treaty defined international boundary or limitation was violated. Though in the SCS case, it was, a priori, violated by multiple overlapping claimants.
Both cases upended the post-war norm that international boundaries should not be altered by force.
Yet the international community’s response has been tepid and limpid in SCS when it involves China’s island creation on features and formal military occupation. The result is hardly any different from Russia’s “green men” seizing control of the Crimea, running a “referendum” and then annexing the territory.
Negotiations with Beijing and the competing claimants, Creating Codes of conduct, Lawfare, Strengthening regional allies Brokered settlements, FONOPs by the US have all been tried to moderate the behavior of the competing parties and none of these have worked for any length of time or to any degree.
There are substantial differences in Chinese behavior in the SCS compared to other territorial disputes with India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Russia.
In theory, the “unequal treaty” and “century of humiliation” propaganda narrative of the CCP would suggest that the claim over 1 million km2 of resource rich land lost to Russia would be highest on their “recovery” priority after Taiwan.
But in practice, there is little or no correlation between Beijing’s priority from any number of rational actor calculations and how and what particular issues are pursued.
ADIZs are imposed over East China Sea and not followed in SCS. Island hopping and land reclamation is not pursued in disputes with Japan and Korea. No action is taken against Russia. That speaks to the importance of local factors and interests.
That begs the question of what are the local interests driving PRC behavior in the SCS beside Beijing?
While certain issues are clearly local, such as the rapid depletion of fishing stocks concomitant with explosive growth of highly subsidized fishing fleets or the existence of oil and gas resources. Other issues revolve around securing the approaches to the Hainan Island naval base have strategic dimensions.
The formal “take over” of the Republic of China narrative and claim only happened in the 1990s after the PRC signed and acceded to the UNCLOS, which should have in theory, extinguished the ROC claims and also provided a framework for negotiated settlements with other claimants. Yet that is not to be.
Today, the PRC is at once, the largest beneficiary of rights of freedom of navigation around the world granted under UNCLOS, and the largest single beneficiary of protection given to Chinese shipping by the US and Allies around the world.
China, in that respect, is the largest and most egregious free rider in the world. China benefits immensely from UNCLOS worldwide, but when it comes to Chinese obligations under UNCLOS in the South China Sea, their failure to deliver on treaty obligations is obvious.
Whereas Russia was immediately and in no uncertain terms condemned and sanctioned for their behavior in the Crimea and Ukraine, China, to date have suffered no consequences whatsoever for the same behavior beyond an unfavorable ruling from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, and a few minor diplomatic slights.
The question then is how can such Chinese behavior be sanctioned, and done so in a way that do not just aimed at Beijing, which has proven ineffective. But sanctions targeted at the Southern Chinese, or coastal interests that are the largest beneficiaries from the rights and privileges granted by UNCLOS.
FONOPs challenges by US warships and aircraft have been infrequent and fraught with risks of accidents or mistakes that can quickly escalate to a major international incident. Moreover, to date, close allies of the US have been reluctant to participate. It also play to the CCP narrative of “century of humiliation” that can result in a propaganda victory and strengthen the Beijing CCP regime domestically.
Militarily, passages of US warships and aircraft give the PLA/PLN the opportunity to practice detection, intercepts, drill, and ready for the day when conflict will break out in an area where Chinese A2/AD capabilities are the strongest and the US the weakest. A different approach is needed.
Rather than a military challenge to the Chinese claims, a civilian based challenge may be far more effective. Most ocean going vessels on international voyages are fitted with vessel based Automatic identification system (AIS). This is in turn supplemented by satellite based AIS that together, enable most major vessels to be tracked around the world. Vessel position and voyage data is routinely collected and archived by governments.
The US and allies can effectively transform every civilian vessel equipped with AIS into a FONOPs operation by unilaterally enacting a new regime to discourage unlawful claims under UNCLOS.
For example, in the case of particularly troubling Chinese claims like the Spratly Islands close to busy shipping lanes that have been found to be invalid by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the US can unilaterally declare that shipping that transit through unlawfully claimed seas (even though they are allowed passage by the), will be barred from entry into US territorial waters.
Enactment of such a policy and its enforcement will lead to neutral shipping giving the unlawful Chinese claims a wide berth. Chinese flagged shipping that transit run the risk of being refused entry if they are chartered to US ports.
Should the claims expand, the “no go” area expands.
These moves will induce a real, quantifiable cost to the Chinese maritime and trade dependent coastal Chinese community that is likely to alter the calculations and behavior of southern Chinese provinces.
Danny Lam is an independent analyst based in Calgary.
Editor’s Note: Danny Lam is one of the VERY few foreigners who called the Trump election months before it happened.
Indeed, three weeks before the election, he sent a forecast to us with regard to the electorcal colleage vote for Trump, which was, it would turn out to be, exactly right.
2016-11-22 According to a news item on the RAF website published on November 8, 2016, between 4 and 10 November 2016, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Air Force hosted “Invincible Shield,” the first ever combined air exercise with the US and the UK.
Four Eurofighter Typhoons from Royal Air Force (RAF) No. 2 Squadron deployed to Osan Air Base in Korea after conducting exercises in Malaysia and Japan. C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft, Voyager tanker aircraft, and around 200 RAF personnel will also participate.
This exercise marks the ROK’s first domestic air combat maneuvering exercise with a foreign nation other than the United States. The plan for the exercise was first initiated with the purpose of enhancing the interoperability among the Air Forces from ROK, US, and UK and increase the ROK-UK defense and security cooperation.
In particular, the UK emphasized that their participation demonstrates their continued commitment to the maintenance of the international rules-based system as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (of which the UK has been a member since its inception) and has no relation to the current security environment in the region.
RAF Typhoons engage in a US-ROK exercise in South Korea. Credit Photo: RAF
ROKAF F-15K and KF-16 fighters, and USAF F-16 fighters have joined the RAF Typhoons in the exercise. Beginning with the familiarization flight in the mission airspace on Monday, November 7th, each component of the exercise is being conducted over a three-day period from Tuesday, November 8th, until Thursday, November 10th.
The RAF Typhoons’ principal role will be Defensive Counter-Air, which involves the targeting of hostile aircraft in the air, whilst ROK and US aircraft will be involved in a range of missions, including Air Interdiction, which is directed at hostile ground targets.
This large exercise provides the opportunity to develop interoperability between different types of aircraft and weapon systems, and try out various tactics and techniques, thereby greatly contributing to improving the operational capabilities of each air force.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Hillier, Chief of the Air Staff and professional head of the RAF, said, “This exercise is helping to deepen further the relationship between the Republic of Korea Air Force and the RAF, and I have taken enormous pride from witnessing our Air Forces join together to enhance even further the spirit of friendship and cooperation between our countries.”
Lieutenant General Won, In-Choul, Commander, ROK Air Force Operations Command, who hosted the exercise, said, “I expect Invincible Shield, our first ROK-US-UK combined air exercise, to not only enhance the air operations capability to protect peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, but also great contribute to the improvement of military cooperation with the Royal Air Force,” said Won. “ROKAF will continue to put utmost effort in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and stability of the region with ROK-US alliance and coordination from friendly nations.”
Lieutenant General Thomas Bergeson, US 7th Air Force Commander who participated in the exercise, remarked, “It is a great honor to be able to work so closely with the proud and capable ROK and UK militaries in the defense of the Korean Peninsula,” he said. “The RAF has a proud history of excellence and the lessons learned in working with them will be invaluable for everybody involved.”
The United Kingdom and the Republic of Korea, both of which are democratic, constitutional states, continue to develop opportunities for cultural and economic exchanges. The UK’s participation in “Invincible Shield” not only demonstrates the UK’s ability to project air power to East Asia, but also marks a milestone in the ROK’s and UK’s journey towards greater defense cooperation and a stronger partnership between the two countries in the future.
For an interview with No. II (AC) Squadron conducted at RAF Lossiemouth, see the following:
The Russian speakers at Valdai differed on the impact of the Western sanctions applied against Russia’s energy, defense and banking sectors in response to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and its support for the separatist insurgency in eastern Ukraine.
Since 2014, the United States and the European Union (EU) have renewed and expanded these economic sanctions several times.
Western governments believe such sanctions punish Russia by imposing costs for its past behavior, deterring further Russian aggression, underscoring Western solidarity in the face of common threats, and compelling Russia to make concessions regarding Ukraine and other issues.
The Western sanctions have been directed against individual Russian leaders and companies as well as limited sectors of the Russian economy.
The most stringent of the EU and U.S. sanctions limit Western economic engagement with Crimea, apply travel and asset freezes to prominent Russians and Ukrainians responsible for Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, and constrain the transfer of military items and sophisticated energy technologies to Russia.
Valdai Conference Panel. Credit Valdai Discussion Club
Experts debate the extent the sanctions have harmed the Russian economy by amplifying the adverse impact of the Russian ruble’s fall in international value, the flight of assets from the Russian economy, and the decrease in global prices for Russian oil and gas.
In 2015 the Russian economy did decrease by about 3.8 percent. Nearly half of Russia’s federal budget is derived from its oil and gas export revenue, so the fall in prices for these commodities since 2014 has forced major cutbacks in non-military spending.
This loss of revenue combined with limits on high-tech energy sales to Russia have degraded the modernization of Russia’s energy sector.
The sanctions and downgrading of Russian government bonds has restricted Russian access to Western financing and required the central bank and government to draw from the country’s previously large national reserve funds.
Despite their economic costs, the sanctions have not changed Moscow’s policies towards Crimea or any other critical national security issue. The sanctions have not stopped Crimea’s integration into the Russian Federation nor have they reduced Russia’s political-military support for the war in the Donbass region of Ukraine.
The Obama administration expressed hope that Moscow might alter its course if Russian President Vladimir Putin’s popular support began to seriously erode due to the economic costs of the sanctions.
However, polls show a surge in President Putin’s popularity following Crimea’s annexation, despite the resulting Western sanctions, collapse of the Russian ruble, and general economic downturn.
Russian policy makers may have thought that the Western sanctions regarding Ukraine would weaken over time, given the rapid reversal of their earlier sanctions imposed after the 2008 Russia-Georgia War. This experience likely dissuaded Russian leaders from making major concessions to end the sanctions.
Russian policymakers may also have hoped that Western businesses, certain Russian-friendly political figures, and other interest groups that favor good economic or energy ties with Russia would dilute or circumvent the sanctions. European political movements opposed to sanctions have been especially prominent in Austria, Greece, Hungary and Slovakia.
Russian strategic communications and counter sanctions on EU imports have sought to feed European resentment at being forced to “pay the bill” for U.S. policy in Ukraine.
(The main Russian sanctions on the United States have been entry visa bans on current and former U.S. officials such as ex-U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul).
Russian policymakers may also have expected that bellicose nuclear rhetoric and assertive military maneuvers might have aroused Western peace groups alarmed by the recent war threats in Europe, which have reached Cold War levels.
In Asia, Russian policymakers may have anticipated that Japan and South Korea would avoid harsh sanctions that could threaten diplomatic ties with Russia.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has strived to reach a deal with Moscow over their islands dispute (what Russians call the Kuril Islands, and the Japanese their Northern Territories), while South Korean officials want Moscow to press Pyongyang to curtail its aggressive actions and join Russian-sponsored economic integration plans between the Koreas.
Yet, until now the Western governments have shown surprising solidarity behind the sanctions on Russia.
In particular, European governments have renewed them on several occasions despite suffering much greater economic losses than the United States from the foregone trade and investment.
Donald Trump’s election as the next U.S. president has increased Moscow’s prospects for sanctions relief.
Many expect Russian-U.S. relations to improve under Trump, leading to a repeal of at least some U.S. sanctions, along with those of Asia and, despite deeper misgivings about Russia’s intentions, some European countries.
At a minimum, the change of power in Washington has made it unlikely that the United States, NATO, and the EU will adopt more comprehensive (Iran-style) sanctions on the Russian economy and society, deny Russia access to U.S. and EU financial systems like the SWIFT global electronic payments system, or curtail additional science and technology projects, including in the civilian space and energy sectors.
At Valdai, most of the Russian officials downplayed the negative effects of Western sanctions, describing them as strengthening the Russian economy by promoting diversification as well as self-sufficiency.
They also highlighted the costs to European countries in maintaining them.
They agreed that Russia needed further integration with the world economy to spur innovation and efficiency, but insisted that they would never compromise Russian national security imperatives to do so.
One senior Russian official who spoke at the conference said that the sanctions had made it harder for Russia to secure foreign investment and loans to pursue large infrastructure projects and other undertakings, citing the first quarter of 2015 as being particularly difficult.
However, he still claimed that through “internal administrative mobilization” and “active economic policies,” Russians have been able to mobilize their internal reserves while government policies, including privatization of major state corporations, have encouraged domestic entrepreneurship. In the assessment of one official, “the combined effect, at the present time, is more positive than negative.”
Another official, taking a long-term perspective, noted that the recent setbacks had not erased the large growth in Russia’s GDP that had occurred during the past two decades: “despite all the turbulence in the economy and the international scene. In 15 years we moved from low-income country to a medium income country.”
In a public session, Putin argued the adverse impact of the sanctions had been overstated, and that they cost Russia well below 0.5 percent of its GDP.
He also said that European countries “have lost almost 60 billion dollars or euros – I don’t remember exactly” in foregone exports to Russia.
Putin stated that the fall in oil and gas prices began a cascade that pulled down the value of Russia’s exports of related products like petrochemicals and fertilizers. Putin also acknowledged that the sanctions had discouraged investment in Russia due to the uncertainty.
Putin said that Russia “will work to get rid of them but this should be a two-way street.”
In contrast, former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin estimated the sanctions annually cost Russia one percent of its GDP growth.
He told the media on the sidelines of the Valdai conference that, “whoever says that these sanctions are insignificant” does not understand that they “seriously affect our economy, growth, and standard of living.”
Given this burden, he argued, “we should take measures to reduce the sanctions for the sake of our people.”
2016-11-20 Earlier this month, the UK and France announced a new agreement involving MBDA, the missile company, which provided a venue to expand their cross-channel collaboration.
According to Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon:
Sir Michael made the announcement, which further deepens the UK-France defence relationship, at the Franco-British Council meeting today in Paris.
The revolutionary Cross-Channel Centres of Excellence Strategy will allow Franco-British defence company MBDA to develop cutting-edge technology in the UK and France while increasing efficiency.
The creation of specialised Centres of Excellence for missile technology will support 400 skilled jobs at MBDA’s UK sites in Stevenage and Bolton.
Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon said:
To keep Britain strong, it’s vital we develop mutual security through innovation and co-operation. By securing a rising defence budget, working with allies and investing in Centres of Excellence, we can keep Britain at the cutting-edge of technology.
This Franco-British defence co-operation ensures high-skilled jobs through innovation and will help keep Britain safer and more secure.
Defence Secretary Sir Michael Fallon speaks at the opening of the Franco-British Council in Paris. Credit: UK MoD
Building on recent Franco-British commitments to work more closely, the strategy seeks to extend the boundaries of traditional interstate co-operation, to the advantage of both countries, including by increasing UK and French military capability and promoting competitiveness in exports.
Minister for Defence Procurement Harriett Baldwin added:
The UK and France are the biggest European investors in equipment, and defence projects such as these Centres of Excellence will ensure we work effectively and innovatively with industry to secure the very best deal for the tax payer.
The UK is investing £178 billion so that our Armed Forces have the equipment they need to keep Britain safe.
During his visit the Defence Secretary also praised the UK and France’s deep and enduring partnership on operations against Daesh. The British and French militaries work closely together on a daily basis. RAF Voyager tankers often refuel French Rafales, as well as RAF jets.
The RAF and French air force also team up to jointly strike more difficult targets, most recently in western Iraq, where RAF Tornados carrying Stormshadow missiles, and French aircraft successfully destroyed a large group of Saddam Hussein era bunkers used by Daesh for weapons manufacture.
And only last week, near Mosul, an RAF Reaper crew was able to guide French Rafale jets onto a Daesh mortar team, striking the terrorists and eliminating the threat they were posing to Iraqi troops.
In a further boost to innovation the visit comes shortly after the launch of the next phase of a £117 million joint Franco-British Maritime Mine Counter Measures (MMCM) programme.
The MMCM programme will develop cutting edge maritime mine warfare capability, which will keep the UK and France at the forefront of autonomous systems technology. The development and deployment of unmanned mine clearance vehicle will help keep our personnel safe in challenging maritime environments.
The announcement on Centres of Excellence came at the annual meeting of the Franco-British Council, an organisation set up in the 1970s to foster closer UK-French ties. 2016’s conference underlined the continuing strength and progress of the Lancaster House agreement, which is a fundament part of Britain and France’s defence relationship.
And last month, Germany and France took a step forward with regard to joint operational cooperation with regard to their lift fleet, namely that France and Germany agreed to share military facilities as well as aircraft.
Paris (AFP) – Germany and France announced plans Tuesday to share an air base and transport planes as part of a military shake-up in the wake of Britain’s vote to quit the European Union.
The two countries signed an agreement with a view to sharing C-130J Super Hercules military transport planes, French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said in Paris.
His German counterpart Ursula von der Leyen, in Paris to sign the deal, told reporters both countries wanted to have the new arrangement in place by 2021.
France ordered four C-130Js from US company Lockheed in January.
France ordered four C-130Js Super Hercules military transport planes from US company Lockheed in January (AFP Photo/Senior Airman Christine Griffith)
Germany was looking to acquire between four and six of the same aircraft and to base them in France, said Von der Leyen. The two countries were looking at using an air base in Orleans, central France, she added.
A member of Le Drian’s team said the idea was to make the planes operational for both French and German crew in a first for the two air forces.
In July, just weeks after Britain’s referendum vote to quit the European Union, Von der Leyen said London had “paralysed” European efforts for a more closely integrated policy.
The EU should seize the opportunity to change that, she argued.
French officials told AFP last month that Paris and Berlin were drawing up plans for a more “active and useful” defence policy.
In short, the first agreement highlights the French focus on deepening cooperation with Britain inspite of the impeding Brexit;
and the second shows the very practical approach which France wishes to take with Germany to provide for force enhancements outside of the joint procurement of European built systems.
2016-11-20 A new Special Report highlights perspectives from the operators at RAF Lossiemouth.
The Royal Air Force is in transition as the Tornado is retired, the Typhoon is modernized and the P-8 and F-35 are introduced.
Infrastructure of key bases is being modernized as well.
This transition as seen by officers involved in the operation and support of combat aircraft at RAF Lossiemouth is presented in this report.
In effect, Lossie will train to support the formation and evolution of a 21st century combat force in which a multi-mission combat fleet of Typhoons will work with the maritime-focused but land-based capable maritime combat system which is the P-8 (which will be based at RAF Lossiemouth), and which, in turn, will work with the multi-tasking flying combat system which is the F-35 which will be based at RAF Marham.
It is clear that the base is well positioned to support the evolving dynamics of defense, not only for the UK homeland, but to provide a solid anchor within the defense system for the North Atlantic.
We start with the first interview with Group Captain Paul Godfrey, the base commander with regard to his perspective concerning the evolution of the base in preparing for the RAF airpower transition.
We will then present interviews, which look at the coming retirement of the Tornado, its legacy and its contribution to the transition as well.
We will then look at the Typhoon and its key role for the RAF, in Quick Reaction Alerts, Operation Shader and in the Baltic Air Patrol.
Insights are provided by interviews with the 1 (F) Squadron, 2 (AC) Squadron, and those charged with the responsibility of maintaining and supporting the Typhoon fleet at Lossie and in its expeditionary operations, which include deployments to the Falklands as well.
Next is an interview with an officer involved in keeping the skill sets alive while waiting for the P-8, which highlights how the RAF is handling a very difficult transition, namely, the retirement of the Nimrod PRIOR to receiving a replacement aircraft.
The final RAF Lossiemouth interview is one a second interview with Group Captain Paul Godfrey, who highlighted the challenges and opportunities of shaping RAF transformation as seen from a key operating base for the RAF.
In a return visit in June, I was able to get updates on the RAF preparation for P-8s, an update on the Typhoon and operations in the Middle East, a discussion of the ground support system for Typhoon, a look at the Tornado weapons training approach and leveraging the approach moving forward into the Tyhpoon/F-35 era, and a look at the nature of the Quick Reaction Force at QRA North.
We will publish materials on these various aspects of the visit in coming weeks.
But during the visit, I had a chance to continue my earlier conversation with the RAF base commander and to get his perspectives, notably after his return from Estonia where he was able to look at the performance of RAF Lossiemouth Typhoons on deployment to the Baltic Air Policing effort.
Question: You recently returned from Estonia.
How is the effort going?
Group Captain Godfrey: It is very similar in mission to QRA in the UK; as you know we have QRA NORTH which is here at Lossie, and QRA SOUTH at RAF Coningsby.
The facilities in Estonia are of the same level and quality we have here in the UK.
A British Typhoon jet, bottom, is seen intercepted one of two Russian ‘Bear’ aircraft that were spotted flying in international airspace September 2014. Credit Daily Mail
You will have seen in the media, that our aircraft are busy intercepting Russian aircraft, including those launched from Kaliningrad although I do think the dynamic has changed slightly since we’ve been operating in the same AOR as the Russians in Syria.
We know more about each other given the deconfliction that we’re going through in Syria and Iraq AORs.
Question: Are there differences between QRA in the UK and in the Baltics?
Group Captain Godfrey: The template is the same but the mission is slightly different.
From the UK, we are largely dealing with Russian Long-Range Aviation with crews that are ‘used’ to being intercepted by European Fighters
In the Baltics, we are often intercepting Russian fighters, and there the adherence to a common template is a work in progress. For several Russian pilots, this may be the first time they seen or dealt with a Typhoon and they are learning the process of how to work safely in such situations.
We are dealing with a different generation of pilots.
Question: How is Typhoon doing in performing the mission?
Group Captain Godfrey: We are building on the experience of the other Typhoon nations, earlier German and Spanish deployments as well as our own, in creating a solid understanding of the infrastructure support.
It is great to have an aircraft able to deal with any of our likely eventualities in performing the mission.
Question: The P-8 is coming to the RAF and during a recent visit to Jax Navy we were able to see some of the capabilities which you mentioned last time, certainly in terms of its ability to do more than simply do classic maritime patrol.
What is your sense of its potential impact?
Group Captain Godfrey: If we open our intellectual aperture, and do not stymie it by doctrine, the P-8 becomes a key part of overall evolving combat force, and not simply as you say a classic maritime patrol aircraft, doing a specialized mission.
It’s all about on board sensor fusion.
Group Captain Paul Godfrey addressing the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium, April 17, 2015. Credit: SLD
With F-35 and P-8 out in the battlespace, we have the potential to shape collective sensor fusion to give absolutely everybody, either airborne, on the sea, on the land the same situation awareness to allow for enhanced timely decision-making.
And that will affect how we operate Typhoon here as well, as we work greater integration across the combat fleet.
P-8 can be the wingman for F-35; F-35 can be the wingman for P-8; and Typhoon can operate as the weapons force multiplier of the evolving force, and a key force protection element as well.
It will be important for our air doctrine to be reworked as our force finds ways to cross-transform rather than trying to fit these multi-mission and multi-tasking assets into classic doctrinal boxes such as strike, mobility, lift, etc.
We are at the beginning of a long road.
I am not sure of the direction in which the road is going which is probably a good thing for if we set the direction to narrowly we will limit the innovation, which is possible.
For the new Special Report which includes all of the Second Line of Defense interviews from RAF Lossiemouth, see the following:
On November 2, 2016, we had a chance to visit the Spanish Air Force at their Albacete Airbase and to talk with a Eurofighter pilot as well as senior maintenance officer.
They both had worked with Eurofighter in the latest Baltic Air Patrol earlier this year.
Albacete flies a regular Quick Reaction Alert force to provide for Spanish security in the Mediterranean.
The engagement in the Baltics is in effect a QRA mission further north.
In an article published on January 11, 2016 by the Spanish Air Force, the deployment earlier this year to the Baltics, which involved our hosts, was described.
On January 4, four Eurofighter planes took off from Albacete Air Base with Siauliai in Lithuania as their destination.
Their aim was to join the VILKAS detachment and therefore carry out surveillance missions of the air space of the Baltic Republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
In this way, NATOs commitment to the carrying out of air policing in the Baltic has been continued.
After four hours of flight and the re-fuelling of an Italian KC-767 in German airspace, the aircraft arrived without stopovers and without event at Siauliai.
Following the relief of the previous nation Hungary, the first alert service was in place within days.
Ahead, there are four months of air policing in the Baltic, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Head of Force Juan Antonio Ballesta Miñarro.
Captain Antonio Duque Polo. Credit Photo: Chloe Laird
The 14th Wing will act as the lead nation of the assets deployed in the Baltic; specifically, of the Belgian F-16s stationed at Amari, Estonia.
Deployment of VILKAS Detachment Personnel
On January 3, the act of bidding farewell to the first relief of the Air Force personnel that will form part of the VILKAS detachment, within the framework of Operation Baltic Air Policing, took place at Albacete Air Base.
The contingent is made up of 105 military personnel, as well as one other staff member, and it belongs mainly to the 14th Wing.
It will unite with those that left from Spain with Siauliai Air Base, Lithuania, as their destination on December 27.
The objective was to reach full operative capacity on January 8.
This is the third time that the Air Force has participated in this mission. From August 1 to November 30 2006, it did so from Lithuania and as the lead nation, with four C.14 Mirage F-1s from the 14th Wing.
Later, from January 1 to May 4 2015, and with four C.16 Eurofighters from the 11th Wing, they carried out operations from Amari Air Base, Estonia. The Eurofighters from the 14th Wing will lead the missions during the first quarter of 2016: this time from Lithuania.
In total, approximately 230 personnel will form part of the detachment in the four months that the mission will last. Half way through it, a relief of crews, controllers, health workers and maintenance staff will take place.
The event was presided over by the Chief of Staff of Air Combat Command, Division General César Miguel Simón López, on behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Air General Francisco Javier García Arnaiz. General Simón, who was accompanied by the Head of the 14th Wing and Albacete Air Base, Colonel Julio Nieto Sampayo, offered Christmas greetings to the members of the contingent and their families in the name of the Chief of Staff.
He also expressed the wish that the detachment´s tasks will pass without event.
Echoing the recent words of the President of the government, the general also reminded the attendant personnel that they are the “best ambassadors for Spain” outside of our borders.
Baltic Air Policing
“Baltic Air Policing” is a NATO mission framed within the principle of collective defence. It has as its aim the protection of the air space of the Baltic countries that lack their own resources to carry out air policing tasks.
We had a chance to discuss this mission with Captains Antonio Duque Polo and Sergio Martinez Pėrez during our time at the base.
The 2015 mission was conducted in Estonia; the 2016 mission was done in Lithuania.
This year, the winter was especially cold and provided challenges for operations.
But another challenge was provided by the difference between the two bases.
“In Lithuania, we had two shelters from which to operate aircraft.
Obviously, given the extreme cold, we could not work on the aircraft outside, but needed to prepare them inside; the situation is different from Estonia where there are more facilities to operate our aircraft.”
Captain Duque noted that the first six weeks of the mission involved the set up by the support crews of their structure to support the Eurofighter as well as working with the back up flight crew for the mission, which was provided by the Hungarian Air Force flying Gripen fighters.
It was noted that the Spanish Air Force operated with their normal uniforms, rather than special winter gear, which added to the challenges as well.
But the Eurofighters performed well and according to Pėrez the support structure also worked well.
Eurofighter landing at Albacete Air Base During Second Line of Defense Visit. Credit Photo: Chloe Laird
“We had a baseline established from earlier engagements to determine what we needed on the supply side for our Eurofighters.
These forecasts worked well. And with our Spanish digital logistic system we were able to order parts directly from Lithuania back to Spain to support the mission as well.”
Obvious, difficult conditions challenge any air combat asset.
A key challenge which they faced was the need to have well salted runways to operate the aircraft.
And the combat jets would kick up material from the runway into the landing gear areas and pose a challenge of diffusion of Foreign Object Debris or FOD within the aircraft.
“We worked hard on this challenge and found ways to deal with it during the mission,” commented Pėrez.
When asked about cross-talk among those Eurofighter squadrons had operated in the Baltics before them, both officers indicated that the experience of the Spanish squadron at Moron Airbase was a key baseline for them.
They also talked with German and British Eurofighter squadrons to shape their baseline for operational and support expectations.
Pėrez underscored the point that for Spain, the deployment to the Baltics was expeditionary and the support structure for Eurofighter performed well in this Baltic mission set.
After we discussed the Baltic mission, we toured the base starting with the maintenance facilities for Eurofighter at the base.
A simulation system is in place for training purposes.
The simulator is an excellent tool for refreshing training as well but a challenge as Eurofighter gets upgraded is to ensure that the software is upgraded in the simulator as well.
This simulator was described in a press release from Cassidian (now Airbus Defence and Space) in 2013 as follows:
A new Eurofighter flight simulator to be used by the aircrew of the 14th Wing of the Albacete Air Base has been delivered by Cassidian, adding to the two already installed at the Morón de la Frontera Air Base in Seville.
The simulator delivered is part of the ASTA advanced training system. Cassidian has been responsible for all tasks related to the installation and commissioning of this Cockpit Trainer/Interactive Pilot Station (CT/IPS-E) which, together with the Full Mission Simulator (FMS), form the ASTA.
The 19 ASTA systems in service in five of the nations operating the Eurofighter Typhoon combat aircraft – Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – are intended for crew training.
This ranges from familiarisation with the aircraft to actual missions in highly complex tactical environments, using aircraft software code tailored to the simulator to reflect the behaviour of the aircraft and its embedded systems with a high degree of fidelity.
The simulators currently in service at the Morón de la Frontera Air Base have to date clocked up 6,500 hours of simulation including 4,800 training missions.
With Spain having just received the latest version of Eurofighter, and with the simulator not having been upgraded, training is being done on a two seat Eurofighter which we visited as well on the base.
This version of software is what the British call their Operation Shader ready aircraft, namely the version where ground attack missions are now included in the combat envelope of the aircraft.
A good statement of the shift in capability was provided in an interview with an RAF 1 (F) squadron pilot based at RAF Lossiemouth:
“With Tranche 2, the pilot could type in the targeting information and the plane will then provide the data to execute the strike mission. This capability has been demonstrated in Operation Shader. And the targeting capability was so effective that JTACS actually were calling for the Typhoon/Paveway IV capability on a regular basis.
We had combat mass and significant strike capability which could be delivered rapidly and coalition partners quickly began to pick up on this capability.”
As he described the change in performance and its impact: “We could operate a four ship formation and strike 16 targets in one pass. We never could do that with Tranche 1.
And we provided close air support to our ground forces, and provide information to the ground forces to support their operations, with targeting information provided from the ground maneuver forces, or from our onboard sensors.”
This capability is now coming to the Spanish Air Force as earlier this year the Spanish Eurofighters have been testing their Paveway capabilities as well.
One change which would make the simulator a more powerful weapon system for the Spanish Air Force would be to link the Eurofighter simulator in Albacete with the more powerful one at Morón Air Base.
“This would expand our capability to train for more complex scenarios as well enhance the quality of our training.”
We visited two maintenance buildings.
The first was a building where engine maintenance was going on.
The engine for the Eurofighter is as they put it: “a good news story. It is very reliable and very maintainable and a significant upgrade over the engine we had on our earlier combat aircraft, the Mirage F-1.
It is a next generation engine.”
The engine is maintained in a vertical position and the crew can replace modules on the engine for engine repair.
But the bench tests need to be done at Morón Air Base near Seville.
The 14th Wing is hoping to be able to have their own bench test capabilities so that they do not need to send repaired engines forward to Morón Air Base for final verification.
We then visited an aircraft hanger where multiple repairs were underway.
One aircraft involved was a two seat Eurofighter in for its initial major repairs; and other aircraft where going through regular maintenance inside the facility.
A key asset for the Spanish Air Force is the logistics base which is paired with the combat base at Albacete.
Here the personnel are trained to work on the range of aircraft which the Spanish Air Force flies.
“They are a key asset in keeping the force operational.
But a challenge is the aging of the workforce and to renew the workforce.”
Currently, the other key combat aircraft flown by the Spanish Air Force (the Navy flies Harriers) is the F-18. Until the arrival of the Eurofighter, the F-18 was the key combat asset.
But as the Eurofighter has matured, the F-18 role has shifted from an air superiority mission to a ground attack mission. The Spanish Air Force does not fly Tornado, so that the F-18 is moving into this role.
This year, the Spanish F-18s went to Red Flag.
“We have done a great deal of modernization on the F-18 and find a very capable compliment to the Eurofighter. And as we gain experience with Eurofighter, its role is being expanded as well.
The Baltic Air Patrol has been an important mission in this regard,” according to Captain Antonio Duque.
In short, it is clear that the Baltic Air Patrol is an important mission for expanding the capability of European air forces to shape common approaches and capabilities.
For the Eurofighter there is an opportunity as well to shape a support structure, say in Estonia, so that Eurofighter could fly to the crisis and have prepositioned support equipment.
Such a possibility could flow from a key activity, which is ongoing at Albacete, namely the Eurofighter integration effort lead by the European Air Group.
As two senior officers at the European Air Group put it in an interview earlier this year:
Lt Col. Schiattioni underscored that “We managed to get the key people for each air force responsible for the standards for their national aircraft to shape a more global approach to standards.
And also important was bringing the maintainers together to share lessons learned and to shape more common maintenance procedures.”
Lt. Col. Lecube emphasized that the program has been very industry driven which meant that the operational commonality was not the center of attention.
“But at the squadron level there has been a growing interest ways to shape more operational commonality.
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The Baltic patrolling was a key driver for this approach as well.
With the Spanish and the British e.g. operating together in the Baltic Air Patrol, it is crucial to operate a common SOP in such operations.”
A key achievement clearly is to shape a more common SOP for operations and maintenance which, of course, will become even more important as the Tranche 3 standard comes into play for the Eurofighter nations.
Underlying the new approach is a broad agreement reached many years ago where the seven Eurofighter nations agreed to broad ways to work together but the EAG as in other areas is focused on driving practical solutions.
Lt Col. Schiattioni added: “The sharing of information can provide a better way to underscore how each nation can pursue modernization but sort out which among the Eurofighter nations is interested in a solution generated by a particular nation.
This will allow national, bi-national approaches which can drive innovation for the larger Eurofighter enterprise.”
It is clear that the Spanish Air Force is operating under fiscal constraints, but it is also clear that the squadron leadership is working innovative ways to ensure that the optimal combat capability can be generated within those constraints.
In the slideshow above, the latest Eurofighter is seen at Albacete and is used as well for training to the new level of capabilities in the aircraft.
Editor’s Note: In this piece published by the El Pais about last year’s Baltic Air Patrol, a number of points are made about the mission.
Defense Minister: “We’re not here to create problems, we’re here to avoid them”
About 3,200 kilometers separate the Morón de la Frontera base outside Seville and the Ämari Air Base in Estonia, not to mention around 30 degrees in temperature.
Nevertheless, the Baltic republic’s brutal -15ºC weather has not hampered Spanish Eurofighter Typhoons from their duties protecting the region’s airspace. Planes from Group 11 of the Spanish Air Force have been in control of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission (BAPM), based in Ämari, since January 1 and will continue there until May 4.
So far, the Eurofighters have conducted 108 patrols, clocking up nearly 200 hours of flight time. Only one flight had to be canceled because of technical problems.
“It has been better than we thought,” said Lt. Col. Enrique Fernández Ambel, who is heading the team of 115 Spanish officers of the Ambar detachment.
But the fears are real and the tension exists. NATO is concerned that the conflict may spill over from Ukraine, where the Kiev government has been fighting pro-Russian separatists.
Along the icy waters of the Baltic, two old Cold War adversaries can look directly into each others’ eyes at distances sometimes as close as 300 meters – that is how near Spanish Eurofighters have come to Russian aircraft during the interceptions that have taken place.
These testy encounters have occurred about half-a-dozen times when Russian Ilyushin and Antonov transport planes – modified for spying or electronic warfare – fly from St Petersburg to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad Oblast, which is sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland.
Although the Russian jets have not violated Baltic airspace, they ignore international air navigation rules by not filing a flight plan, turning off their transponders so they can’t be identified, or refusing to communicate with civil aviation authorities.
The Spanish Eurofighters usually intercept and escort them under the orders of NATO’s Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), based in Uedem, Germany.
Commander Eladio Daniel Leal said the tensest moments usually occur when the alarm goes off and “you just don’t know who you are going to encounter, or how they are going to react.”
NATO has been helping the Baltic nations patrol their airspace since 2004 as none of them has an air force of their own. Member countries take turns leading the mission.
But since the Ukraine crisis, NATO has beefed up its patrols. Besides the Spanish EF-2000s, fighter jets have also been dispatched from Italy, Poland and Belgium.
In a tense war of nerves, any wrong move can turn into a catastrophe. According to NATO figures, more than 400 interceptions of Russian planes by the Alliance’s jets occurred last year – more than double the number in 2013.
Although the Russian jets have not violated Baltic airspace, they ignore international air navigation rules
And each day the Kremlin is getting bolder. Last month, two Russian Tupolev Tu-95 bombers ventured as far as the English Channel, setting off an emergency dispatch of British and French jets.
The Norwegian government released a video that showed how an F-16 fighter nearly collided with one of the Russian bombers. But the biggest risk is that of a commercial jet getting entangled in these dangerous standoffs.
“We’re not here to create problems, but instead we’re here to avoid them,” said Spanish Defense Minister Pedro Morenés, who visited the detachment in Ämari on Wednesday.
The Spanish government is spending €9 million on having its four Eurofighters take part in the BAPM and hopes to repeat the mission next year.
And last year, Spanish F-18s participated in Red Flag at Nellis.
According to a story published by the US Air Force on September 2, 2016:
Since its inception in 1975, Red Flag has served as the pinnacle of air-to-air combat training for the Air Force and its allies.
For the Spanish Air Force, Red Flag 16-4 has been the perfect avenue to receive the best training for their aircrews and support personnel, as well as an avenue for overcoming unique challenges that aren’t always experienced in European exercises.
“With most of our experience coming from European exercises, we have mostly a European outlook,” said Spanish Air Force Capt. Dario Perez, an EF-18M pilot. “Working with the United States Air Force aircraft and its allies serves as a great chance to train in a non-European venue, and broaden our views.”
In order to expand their views, communication between allies can be a challenge for Spanish Air Forces, but at Red Flag this has not turned out to be a roadblock.
“As we are standardized with NATO everyone speaks the same language while we train,” said Spanish Air Force Capt. Esteve Ferran, a pilot. “With the NATO documents we use, everyone is on the same page and on the same sheet of music at all times. Like last time we were here in 2008 the exercise proved to be difficult at first, but once we got rolling it was excellent.”
Once settled in, Red Flag 16-4 offered unique trials for Spanish Air Force pilots and crews to overcome.
“While the Red Flag exercise here is similar to the exercises that we encounter in Europe, the surface-to-air threats that are part of Red Flag are top notch and always serve as a challenge,” Perez said.
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While the surface-to-air threats that pilots face here at Red Flag 16-4 serve as a valuable aspect of training, they aren’t the only facet of Red Flag valuable for aircrews.
“Tactically speaking, the surface-to-air threats are top notch,” Ferran said. “Also, the ability to use live ordnance in training is something that we don’t always get access to when we participate in European exercises.”
With all of these benefits of Red Flag’s training there are also multiple challenges that aircrews have had to face.
“One of the most difficult things about this exercise has been the act of deploying all of our assets here,” Ferran said. “It has been difficult, and staging out of Nellis was the first challenge we faced. Then, the night operations of Red Flag have also been a challenge. There is a nine-hour difference between the time zones and so when we finish operations we then have briefings at 3 a.m. It gets tiring and becomes a challenge and is something that we don’t see in European exercises.”
While these challenges, coupled with the tests of the monsoon weather that Las Vegas has brought to Red Flag 16-4, have presented Spanish air force with obstacles, they haven’t stopped pilots and aircrews from overcoming them.
Taking these obstacles in stride, the Spanish Air Force has used one of the premier air-to-air exercises that the Air Force offers to gain excellent training experience for aircrews.
All photos are credited to Second Line of Defense (Chloe Laird) except the F-18 photos which are credited to the USAF.
The slideshow showing Typhoons during the EAG Typhoon interoperability exercise in Spain and the photos are credited to the Spanish Air Force and the European Air Group.
The fact that crisis serve as a catalyst for needed and awaited reforms is a well-known proposition.
The triple effect of an increasing threat environment, of Brexit and now of what is widely perceived in Europe as the unpredictability of a new Trump Administration is having a clear impact on a new sense of urgency in favor of an increased European ” strategic autonomy”[1].
It is a bit too early to know if the new American administration will follow the paths of Reagan, Roosevelt or Wilson as far as his course of action towards Europe will go, but let us try to take a constructive approach based on the only concrete hints we have at this point, i.e. the few foreign policy speeches Donald Trump delivered during the campaign[2].
Two Parallel Plays In Need of Synchronization
Both America and Europe aspire to modernize post-War institutions in order to better deal with the current threats and challenges, while going back to the Founding fathers’ initial spirit.
Former SACT, General Palomeros, recently stated that this is something one owes to the upcoming generations, who need to be more involved in a debate that directly concerns them[3].
Both the old and the new continents want to optimize their expenditures to invest in better capabilities and a resilient defense industrial base via renewed R&D funding.
Both want to assess how to be more efficient and reactive if/when a crisis occurs.
Both want to avoid redundancies.
Both want to re-focus on far too long-neglected homeland security needs, including border security and cyber defense.
There is therefore clear room for leading NATO and EU modernization processes in a coordinated and non-antagonistic manner – with the help of XXIth century innovative processes and technologies -, so a true European pillar emerges at last.
If one fails in this process and decoupling and division prevail, our enemies will have won.
However, and no matter how rational this is, we all know that the devil is in the details.
So how does one restructure without “de-structuring” and reducing the mutualized pool to the lowest common denominator?
Restructuring Without “De-structuring”
One can identify many challenges in this very delicate process, but two jump out when one tries to start from scratch:
How to avoid redundancies while preserving national sovereignty and, in the case of Europe, increase “strategic autonomy”?
Washington under President Trump could decide to condition its traditional support to the Alliance to a narrower definition of its national interest and to the level of reciprocity and contribution of each individual ally.
At the same time, the EU wants to increase its capabilities while avoiding redundancies with SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe).
If that is the case, the task is first to identify where most or all national interests intersect as the common minimum baseline and secondly see how to keep building complementary and interoperable forces.
Given the evolution of the threat which requires action as much outside one’s borders as within and given current technological breakthroughs in C2, strategic lift, platform and weapons’ range or accuracy, the question of burden-sharing is rather different than it may have been till now.
Indeed, should Allies focus resources based on priority missions based on geographic proximity, capabilities, whether the operation is territorial or overseas, or, the way it is more or less now, on an ad hoc basis?
Which metrics should one use to optimize one’s defense and security investments?
If the 2% of the GDP goal set by NATO has the merit of measuring each nation’s commitment and is a simple indicator and political threshold, it does not reflect how these 2% are spent and how they actually contribute to readiness[4], since each nation has its peculiar acquisition policy and operational experience.
A business-oriented mind like Donald Trump will probably be interested in what is actually useful, efficient and cost effective.
Lessons learned might be the best way to assess NATO performance, as it is commonly done.
The same goes for the EU who seems to have decided to favor quickly-implemented solutions (via the PESCO[5] process in particular) and to start with the institutionalization of concrete success stories, such as the European Air Transport Command (EATC[6]).
A Kissinger-like “small steps” policy of modernization, if well synchronized, could actually be welcome on both sides of the Atlantic, while fitting the upcoming era of American “Realpolitik” in the world affairs.
[1] See the conclusions of the EU Council, November 14th, 2016, Implementations Plan on Security and Defence (link to pdf)
[2] See the following abstract from Donald Trump’s April speech, in which he highlights five major flaws in the past decades’ US defense and foreign policies:
« America First will be the major and overriding theme of my administration. But to chart our path forward, we must first briefly take a look back. We have a lot to be proud of.
In the 1940s we saved the world. The greatest generation beat back the Nazis and Japanese imperialists. Then we saved the world again. This time, from totalitarianism and communism. The Cold War lasted for decades but, guess what, we won and we won big. Democrats and Republicans working together got Mr. Gorbachev to heed the words of President Reagan, our great president, when he said, tear down this wall.
History will not forget what he did. A very special man and president. Unfortunately, after the Cold War our foreign policy veered badly off course. We failed to develop a new vision for a new time. In fact, as time went on, our foreign policy began to make less and less sense. Logic was replaced with foolishness and arrogance, which led to one foreign policy disaster after another.
They just kept coming and coming. We went from mistakes in Iraq to Egypt to Libya, to President Obama’s line in the sand in Syria. Each of these actions have helped to throw the region into chaos and gave ISIS the space it needs to grow and prosper. (…)
Our foreign policy is a complete and total disaster. No vision. No purpose. No direction. No strategy. Today I want to identify five main weaknesses in our foreign policy.
First, our resources are totally over extended. (…)
Secondly, our allies are not paying their fair share, and I’ve been talking about this recently a lot. Our allies must contribute toward their financial, political, and human costs, have to do it, of our tremendous security burden. (…)
Thirdly, our friends are beginning to think they can’t depend on us.(…)
Fourth, our rivals no longer respect us. In fact, they’re just as confused as our allies, but in an even bigger problem is they don’t take us seriously anymore.(…)
Finally, America no longer has a clear understanding of our foreign policy goals. Since the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, we’ve lacked a coherent foreign policy. One day, we’re bombing Libya and getting rid of a dictator to foster democracy for civilians. The next day, we’re watching the same civilians suffer while that country falls and absolutely falls apart. Lives lost, massive moneys lost. The world is a different place.
We’re a humanitarian nation, but the legacy of the Obama-Clinton interventions will be weakness, confusion and disarray, a mess. We’ve made the Middle East more unstable and chaotic than ever before. We left Christians subject to intense persecution and even genocide. (…) »
[5] See on this subject: http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/protocols-annexed-to-the-treaties/673-protocol-on-permanent-structured-cooperation-established-by-article-42-of-the-treaty-on-european.html
