2016-08-28 By Garth McLennan

The United States Congress is contemplating changes to the standards it uses to define its defense architecture against ballistic missile threats. Any such changes are likely to be more symbolic than substantive in the short term, but over time will create more political space for the development of new ballistic missile defense systems (BMDS).

At the same time, any moves to strengthen Washington’s ballistic defense posture will be met with opposition from Russia and China.

More immediately, real revisions to the way Washington defends against potential missile threats will develop as facts on the ground outpace existing structures more so than through congressional mandate.

Regardless of any rhetorical changes made or considered to America’s ballistic defence architecture today, the future of missile defense more generally is in for significant change.

This dynamic will be driven by technological advancement, particularly in the domain of hypersonic missiles capable of traveling as fast as Mach-10.

The United States and China have been successfully conducting experimental hypersonic tests for several years, and both are aiming to test a fully field-ready prototype by 2020, and Russia is not far behind[1]. The introduction of such weapons, which follow different, far less predictable flight patterns that exceed the capacity of existing missile defence systems designed to counter incoming ballistic targets, will change how countries organize, structure, and resource their defence strategies.

Politically, these manifestations are already becoming apparent; with Beijing testing its DF-ZF hypersonic platform a full seven times in the last two years, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) included amendments to the 2017 NDAA tasking the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with building the doctrinal frameworks needed to guide and regulate America’s approach to defending against such hypersonic attacks, as well as to bolster US space-based interception capabilities[2].

Financial changes have and will continue to come as well with significant investment in the development of directed energy weapons; the House’s NDAA bill passed on May 18 included $15 million for the stalled directed energy low-power laser demonstrator, and another $25 million for joint research work with Israel[3].

The imperative of organizing and maintaining a layered dense in depth against a multitude of threats will nonetheless ensure the continued prominence of ballistic defense systems (sky-high development and acquisition costs will leave hypersonic missiles beyond the reach of many American adversaries for years to come), but the unique threat of hypersonic weapons equipped with nuclear warheads could lead to new doctrines built around ideas of pre-emptive military action before an enemy can use, or possibly even acquire, them. The likelihood of such a scenario will only increase if effective tools in countering hypersonic missiles are slow to develop.

The proliferation of precision-guided, medium-range ballistic missiles, particularly to state and non-state actors across the Middle East, is a viable rationale for stronger BMDS networks[4]. The spread of precision-enhancing terminal guidance technology has lowered the previously prohibitive cost of obtaining such weapons.

As these and other technologies proliferate, US and allied defense frameworks must keep pace; existing structures like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) may find their bandwidth taxed. The spread of medium-range ballistic missile capability could result in more countries armed with smaller quantities of such missiles, resulting in a lowered threshold for conventional combat.

For core US allies like Israel, this is a principal national security threat (something that should be factored in as well when determining the scope of American missile defense in Washington). Ten years ago, when the Jewish state went to war with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, the inaccurate nature of Hezbollah rockets prevented them from posing a major strategic threat.

Today, however, with a battle-hardened Hezbollah now possessed of offensive organizational experience in support of the al Assad regime in Syria[5] and in control of an increasing stockpile of Iranian-provided missiles, the threat of precision-guided rockets raining down on cities and critical infrastructure like power plants anywhere in Israel is both terrifying and very real.

Likewise, the evolution of direct-ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite missiles capable of threatening Washington’s C4ISR infrastructure will mean new priorities, with the attendant funding that comes with them.

With China having conducted extensive testing in this domain, showcasing an ability to reach targets into the High Earth Orbit (35,700 km and up) in the process[6], and with Russia, North Korea, and Iran all aggressively working to augment their own space-based launch capabilities, proposed countermeasures have included calls for the development of a space-based interceptor (SBI) platform that can destroy targets in their ascent and boost phases over enemy territory[7].

In opposition to threats emanating from countries like Iran, which attempts to thinly cloak its efforts at ballistic missile development under the guise of testing for its national space program, an SBI system can be viewed as a particularly attractive solution.

Guidance from documents like the 1999 Missile Defense Act, which calls for defense against limited ballistic missile attack, also serves as an acknowledgement of the fact that no system capable of offering a perfect defense against long-range ballistic missile threats exists, but that reality does not diminish the potency, depth, and absolute strategic necessity of America’s BMDS.

Comprised of formidable Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) platforms, Aegis SM-3 missile interceptor systems like the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) deployment to eastern Europe, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in conjunction with the road-mobile PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) interceptor recently sent to South Korea, the depth of America’s ballistic defense shield should not be in dispute.

If anything, the requirement of a “limited” ballistic missile defense capacity affords Washington a greater degree of political and diplomatic flexibility. The Obama administration found this beneficial when it felt the need for room to maneuver on the EPAA deployment and a Bush administration-led initiative for a GBI site in Poland.

That said, at a time of great uncertainty amid unprecedented military aggression by Moscow in multiple theaters, few signs would be stronger in response than strengthening American missile defense networks.

The removal of “limited” and the adoption of “robust layered” from US missile defense doctrine would provide the conceptual underpinning that allows for the political space needed to accelerate SBI development, but shaping an effective way ahead requires investments in key technologies, deployment decisions and commitments by the next Administration.

Garth McLennan is a strategic affairs analyst who has written previously for Second Line of Defense and 38 North. He graduated from Arizona State University in 2015, and currently resides in Vancouver, British Columbia.

[1] Omar Lamrani, What the Next Arms Race Will Look Like”, March 21, 2016, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/what-next-arms-race-will-look

[2] Press Release, “National Defense Authorization Act Amendment Victories for EMP Protections, Missile Defense, and the Fight Against ISIS”, May 5, 2016, United States Congressman Trent Franks Representing Arizona’s 8th District, https://franks.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/national-defense-authorization-act-amendment-victories-emp-protections

[3] Thomas Karako, Missile Defense Project Newsletter – May 2016, May 31, 2016, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/missile-defense-project-newsletter-may-2016

[4] Max Singer, “The New Threat of Very Accurate Missiles”, August 9, 2016, The Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/research/12727-the-new-threat-of-very-accurate-missiles

[5] Lee Smith, Reuven Azar, Michael Doran, & Tony Badrin, “Israel and Hezbollah: The Prospect of Renewed Hostilities Ten Years after War”, July 26, 2016, The Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/events/1359-israel-and-hezbollah-the-prospect-of-renewed-hostilities-ten-years-after-war72016

[6] Analysis, A Test of China’s True Intentions in Space”, July 6, 2016, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/test-chinas-true-intentions-space

[7] Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, “Space and the Right to Self Defense”, June 27, 2016, The Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/research/12593-space-and-the-right-to-self-defense

2016-08-20 By Richard Weitz

In another of the bold moves that has marked Putin’s Syria campaign since it began last September, the Russian Air Force began using bases in Iran on August 16 to support its bombing campaign in Syria.

For several days now, Tupolev-22M3 Backfire long-range supersonic bombers and the shorter-range Sukhoi-34 tactical bombers have conducted strikes from Iranian air bases.

The immediate reason for the cooperation may be tactical—to strengthen the strikes and reverse recent rebel successes in Aleppo, but strategic drivers are at work—Russia and Iran remain alienated from the West and share common goals regarding Syria; yet, some Russians may also have seen a need to reassure Tehran about Moscow’s commitment despite talk of Russian-U.S. military collaboration regarding Syria.

Russia and Iran have already been cooperating militarily in Syria, with Moscow providing air power and Tehran ground advisers for both Syrian government forces and for Hezbollah’s paramilitary units, which have provided auxiliary manpower to reinforce Syria’s depleted army.

Yet, until now the Tu-22s have mostly launched from the Mozdok Air Base in North Ossetia in the north Caucasus as well as short-range ground attacks from Su-34 strike planes using Russia’s newly built Hmeimim airbase, located outside the Syrian coastal city of Latakia as well as missiles launched from ships in the Caspian Sea and submarines in the Mediterranean.

Russian commanders want to use Iranian territory to support air strikes in Syria for the same reason the U.S. Air Force seeks access to Turkey’s facilities.

Using Iranian bases means Russian bombers can fly shorter distances, carry larger payloads, fly more sorties, expend less fuel to reach Syria, spend more time searching for targets, attack from new directions that may make them less vulnerable to ground defenses, and perhaps provide more rapid long-range heavy bomber support in an emergency (in the way U.S. commanders in Vietnam would call for B-52 air support whenever they needed overwhelming sky-based firepower).

Moreover, the modest-sized Hmeymim airbase from which the 30SM and Su-35S support planes have escorted the TU-22s cannot host such large aircraft themselves.

Some Russians said the move would also cut Russia’s war costs, though this seems unlikely unless the Russians stay in Iran long enough to compensate for the expenses of moving the bombers’ support infrastructure to Iran, and do not have to pay much rent.

Moscow has probably sent transportation planes, munitions, specialized equipment, and many ground personnel to Iran.

Iranian officials explained that the cooperation was “of a strategic character” to “unite our potential and capabilities” against terrorism.

Iran has never allowed a foreign military to deploy on its territory, and officials in Tehran have since strenuously denied that Moscow has established a permanent base in their country.

Still, the Russian decision may help assuage some Iranian complaints about Moscow’s insufficient operational coordination with Tehran in Syria.

In January, Russia and Iran signed a defense cooperation agreement, and some sources claim that the Russian bombers’ use of Iranian bases was discussed even before then.

But evidence suggests that the decision to conduct the deployment was more recent.

The Russian planes arrived in Iran on August 15, only a day before they began bombing.

Though the State Department spokesperson said that Moscow’s move was not unexpected, the Russian military did not warn the United States in advance about the redeployment.

Russian operators only provided short-term tactical warning to coalition air forces that the Russian planes were entering Iraqi airspace to secure their safe passage.

One reason for the escalation may have been that the Syrian government offensive against Aleppo had recently bogged down.

The Iranians had their own setback on May 7, when insurgents killed more than a dozen Iranian officers at Khan Tuman near Aleppo, the single largest known Iranian loss in the Syrian War. Syrian officials attributed some setbacks to inadequate military coordination between the pro-regime forces in Syria. The Iranian government then established a new position of senior coordinator for political, military and security affairs with Syria and Russia.

Iran also sent reinforcements into Syria. On June 10, the three countries’ defense ministers conferred in Tehran on the Syrian War.

Moscow may also be seeking to dispel Iranian suspicions over the Russian-U.S. negotiations regarding possible military cooperation in Syria.

Washington wants Moscow to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power, or at least limit Russian-Syrian attacks against the Western-backed fighters in Syria, which Iran opposes. Persian Gulf and U.S. representatives were also pressing Russia to limit Iran’s influence in Syria.

By deepening their military partnership, Moscow also decreases Iranian interest, and ability, to reconcile with the West.

Russia’s move may have also aimed to force U.S. concessions in their discussions over bilateral military cooperation in Syria. Russian officials have complained that U.S. negotiators in the military talks were regularly changing their terms and failing to fulfill agreements.

Despite insisting that it is not committed to Assad’s rule, the Russian government has shown little interest in deposing him to reach a deal with the United States.

By highlighting its expanded cooperation with Iran, Moscow has increased its leverage and options.

Finally, Russia may be trying to expand its arms sales to Iran.

In April 2016, Iran received the first elements of the five S-300PMU-1/SA-20 Gargoyle surface-to-air missile (40 launchers) defense systems. Tehran immediately highlighted them at its annual National Army Day parade later that month. Russia had suspended implementation of this $800-million contract, signed in 2007, to deliver five S-300 in mid-2010, but reinstated the contract after last year’s nuclear deal, which took effect in January with the repeal of all nuclear-related sanctions on Iran.

After Russia finishes delivering the five systems by the end of this year, Russian officials expect Tehran to withdraw its lawsuit against Russia for failing to implement the deal.

Though the JCPOA prohibits Russia and other countries from selling Iran ballistic missiles for eight years, Russia and Iran are discussing a sale worth $8 billion of Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters, Su-30SM multi-role fighter, Yak-30 training aircraft, K-300 Bastion coastal defense systems, diesel submarines and surface warships such as frigates, and other goods with more orders in the future.

Like the S-300 sale, Russia has a reason to sell anti-access area-denial systems to Iran as part of an effort to try to limit U.S. military options in the Gulf.

United Nation Security Council Resolution 2231 does allow the United States or other permanent members of the Council to veto the sale until 2021, but Russia and Iran could circumvent this impediment by delaying the execution of the deal by five years.