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Paris – The armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, is due to make an official visit to Vietnam to attend French and Vietnamese commemoration on May 6 and 7 of the bloody battle of Dien Bien Phu, which marked the defeat of French colonialism in the southeast Asian nation.
The memorial events mark the 70th anniversary of that military siege, and the ministerial visit to Hanoi points up the importance Paris sets on developing close ties in the strategic Indo-Pacific region, ministry officials said.
A letter of intent is due to be signed, setting out a structure for defense cooperation between the two nations, a ministry official said.
Vietnam is seen as looking to strengthen ties with France, and although military cooperation is at a modest level, there is a perception there is a good base to work on.
The pursuit of closer links with Paris include Vietnamese interest in renewing its stock of arms, which depend largely on Russia.
There will be three major events this year for armaments, namely the Eurosatory trade show for land weapons in June, the Euronaval show in November, with the first two in France, and the Vietnam International Defense show in Hanoi in December, and there is also Forum for Franco-Vietnamese defense industry in November, also in the Vietnamese capital.
France will listen closely to what Vietnam seeks, an official said.
There are French navy ships making calls at Vietnamese ports, and there is a shared view of the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The latter is in the face of Chinese claims of sovereignty over disputed waters close to Vietnam.
There has also been French cooperation in providing humanitarian aid in natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific region.
Foreign Interest in Vietnam
That western interest in strengthening ties with the southeast Asian nation could be seen in the visit by president Joe Biden last September to Hanoi, with the U.S. head of state signing agreements with Vietnam on semiconductors and minerals in a bid to cut America’s dependence on China.
The Vietnamese foreign minister, Bui Thanh Son, visited U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken in Washington in March, and the two senior diplomats discussed expanding cooperation on semiconductors and widening the supply chain, Reuters reported.
That military interest in Vietnam extends to Moscow.
The Reuters news agency reported Sept. 10 it had seen documents setting out talks between Vietnam and Russia, with Moscow offering an $8 billion credit facility to allow Hanoi to order anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, and anti-aircraft systems and fighter jets.
France supplies those types of weapons, and recently upgraded its anti-submarine aircraft. There is also a French project for a new generation anti-submarine aircraft.
Meanwhile, China also has reached out to Vietnam, with the Chinese defense minister, Dong Jun, telling his Vietnamese counterpart that Beijing was ready to raise the “strategic mutual trust” between the two militaries to a new level, the British news agency reported April 12.
There should be higher cooperation at sea, the Chinese minister told Vietnamese defense minister Phan Van Giang.
In that geopolitical arena, Lecornu is due to meet on the morning of May 6 the Vietnamese prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, the defense minister, and the president of the foreign relations committee of the Vietnamese Communist party, Le Hoai Trung.
In the afternoon, the French minister is due to fly to Dien Bien Phu, in the remote hills in northwest Vietnam, for memorial visits of key sites of the battle.
Thousands of Vietnamese troops fell in the assault before the French army surrendered on May 7, 1954. Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history teacher, led the siege, which included the unforeseen deployment and use of artillery in hills looking down on the French base.
That eight week siege by the Vietnamese forces saw the loss of 3,000 French and African soldiers, 4,000 wounded, and some 20,000 prisoners of war.
That Vietnamese defeat of a western power was later seen as a precursor to the struggle with the U.S., which led to the victory of North Vietnam over the then Saigon government in 1975.
Commemoration Of A Battle
The French minister is due to visit an exhibition of the French veterans association, Office National des Combattants et des Victimes de Guerre on the site of the battle.
Lecornu is also expected to visit the command post of brigadier general Christian de Castres, who led the paratroopers, foreign legionnaires, and other French-led forces at the camp.
A French commemoration ceremony is planned in the evening, with veterans due to attend.
Lecornu is due to attend in the morning of May 7 the Vietnamese national ceremony marking the victory. That will be the first time a French defense minister has been invited to the military parade.
A rehearsal of the 12,000-strong parade was held on May 3 in the stadium of Dien Bien Phu, Le Courrier du Vietnam magazine reported.
Public interest in past Vietnam conflicts appears strong, with a television adaptation of a novel, The Sympathizer, by Vietnamese-American author Viet Thanh Nguyen. That is a thriller tale with dark humor of a Vietnamese double agent, in the wake of the U.S. war with Vietnam.
U.S. Air Force Airmen assigned to the 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, prepare to depart Luleå-Kallax Air Base, Sweden, Feb. 29, 2024, during Bomber Task Force 24-2.
The Air Force routinely operates across the globe and remains flexible and agile to respond to the changes in the operational environment. BTF operations provide U.S. leaders with strategic options to assure Allies and partners, while deterring potential adversary aggression across the globe.
LULEA, SWEDEN
02.29.2024
Video by Staff Sgt. Jake Jacobsen
28th Bomb Wing Public Affairs
After returning to the United States from Australia on April 25, 2024, I buckled up again for a flight to Yuma, Arizona to have the privilege of witnessing the MAWTS-1 change of command ceremony.
In the process of finishing up our forthcoming book on MAWTS-1, this seemed a good way to close out our effort.
One of the architects of the MAWTS-1/WTI concept and the first MAWTS-1 Commanding Officer, LtCol Howard DeCastro, had written to me suggesting the idea, and the CO of MAWTS-1, Col Purcell kindly agreed to invite me.
This would give me the chance to meet with several of the earlier Commanding Officers of MAWTS-1, meet the three 3 Star USMC Generals attending the ceremony and meet the new CO of MAWTS-1 as well.
On the day before the ceremony, I had the chance to sit down and interview two of the first commanding officers, LtCol DeCastro and LtGen Barry Knutson. In the afternoon, I was able to interview the outgoing CO, Col Purcell, and the incoming CO Col Joshua Smith.
Col Smith on the left and Col Purcell on the right at the change of command ceremony, May 3, 2024. Credit Photo: Robbin Laird
What was amazing about the two sets of interviews is how connected in time they were.
The first and eighth CO of MAWTS focused on the approach they built towards combat innovation, namely, inserting technology into con-ops rather than having technology existing outside of the organizational changes needed to use relevant technologies.
It was the warfighters driving innovation in terms of real warfighting improvements, rather than some contractor or acquisition official pushing technology down their throats.
Then two hours later, I had the same conversation with Purcell and Smith.
It was about technology that did not exist at the time when DeCastro and Knutson were in charge, but it was the same mentality and same drive for combat excellence which we discussed.
And I would conclude with just one thought – don’t change the course.
The drive for warfighting excellence in the operating force is not nice to have, it is what we need if our country continues to field a warfighting force respected by the world, both allies and adversaries.
Well I am not a Marine, but it is hard to not listen to the USMC hymn at the ceremony and not say Semper Fidelis.
Featured photo: Purcell returns from his last flight as CO of MAWTS-1. Credit Photo: Robbin Laird
An aspect of modern Western strategic thinking has been a focus on gray zone conflict.
This is an area I have always found confusing.
In a world which I would characterize as one of the rise of multi-polar authoritarian movements and states, their constant conflict efforts have indeed been in the gray zone punctuated with direct periods of violence against the West and its legacy of a “rules-based order.”
But as this is going on, it would be difficult not to factor in the domestic conflicts in both the UK and the United States which affects the AUKUS partners of Australia. So how well is Australia doing in the gray zone or information or cognitive warfare areas?
The is a major aspect affecting any credible strategy involving a “ whole of government” strategy or a whole of society effort to deal with threats in the region.
The West over the past few years has done considerably better in the cyber-war domain, but given the penetration of authoritarian movements and states within our social networks, and the extensive disruption in the West with regard to migration, I do not think we can make the same judgement with regard to information or cognitive war.
At the Williams Foundation Seminar on April 11, 2024, the subject of information war was addressed by Major General Anna Duncan, Commander Cyber Command. Her talk highlighted the importance of gaining information advantage in conflict.
Major General Anna Duncan, Commander Cyber Command, presents at the Williams Foundation Seminar, April 11, 2024.
She started with this definition: “What is information advantage? From a military perspective, information advantage, ideally occurs through the integration and through the use of the moral and information informational elements of fighting power. We would seek to gain an information advantage over an opponent by targeting their understanding and thus degrade their will to fight.”
She cautioned that was not new in warfare but clearly what is new is the nature of information networks in liberal democracies and how conflict has escalated within these societies by the emergence of tribal clubs which operate within social media which has challenged the ability of democracies to shape consensus.
When I attended a UNESCO event in Barcelona in 1996 which focused on the new information society, I highlighted this danger associated with an internet society. But the extent to which the tribes have grown to disaggregate democracies was certainly not my thought at the time. The point is important – precisely in the 1990s when many were trumping the global ascendency of democracies, we were building tools which would in fact undercut that ascendency.
Gray zone conflict in my view goes hand in hand with information warfare. Western militaries are building more flexible militaries which can operate as a more distributed force but we have not seen the adaptation of the political class to how in fact confront adversaries in the gray zone effectively nor how to use penetration of authoritarian societies or movements to our advantage.
Duncan provided a professional treatment of how the ADF is working through how in conflict to gain an information advantage over adversarial forces. A military officer dealing with cyber and information warfare scopes the focus on information advantage over adversarial forces in a conflict.
This is obviously crucial, but the actual conduct of information war occurs every time an authoritarian government or movement defines the perceived geopolitical reality inside Western societies.
A murderous organization like Hamas defines the ideas for a protest at my former school, Columbia University, due to their information war capabilities.
I would close by including an article I published in December 2021 which underscored gray zone conflict which I also thinks expand the notion of what is entailed in the kind of information war which the West is not very good at engaging in.
Western analysts have coined phrases like hybrid war and gray zones as a way to describe peer conflict below the level of general armed conflict.
But such language creates a cottage industry of think tank analysts, rather than accurately portraying the international security environment.
Peer conflict notably between the liberal democracies and the 21st century authoritarian powers is conflict over global dominance and management. It is not about managing the global commons; it is about whose rules dominate and apply.
Rather than being hybrid or gray, these conflicts, like most grand strategy since Napoleon, are much more about “non war” than they are about war. They shape the rules of the game to give one side usable advantage. They exploit the risk of moving to a higher intensity of confrontation.
Russia is doing this right now in Ukraine. China, likewise, is doing it in the South China Sea and in the Sea of Japan. It’s critical to understand this point, and terms like gray zone operations and hybrid war don’t capture the challenge of escalation control.
There are two games being played. One game is over the immediate contentions of the major powers. Ukraine and Taiwan must be protected from attack.
But the second game is just as important, it asks what limits should be crossed to manipulate the risk of going to a higher intensity of competition?
In the Cold War these limits defined the “system dynamics” of the competition. Shaping them was important, because they were the foundation for winning a war that might erupt, or toward stabilizing a competition in a way that gave advantage to one side or the other.
Seen this way Korea, Vietnam, Berlin, etc. were about winning those local wars. But they were more importantly about shaping the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Quite elaborate rules were worked out for this. It took substantial time during the evolution of the Cold War (to make sure that it was indeed was a cold war from a global conflagration point of view) for this learning curve to develop. Limited wars, like Korea, produced know how about escalation control and dominance.
The problem today is that we are only at the earliest parts of this learning curve for our age. We’re in a long term competition with authoritarian powers, but it’s like it was 1949 in terms of our know how for managing this rivalry to our advantage. The problem isn’t simply to defend Ukraine and Taiwan; it’s to do it in such a way that doesn’t lead to crazy escalations or that doesn’t scare the daylights at of our allies.
Taiwan and Ukraine are not sideshows to global conflict; they are the early test cases of competition in a second nuclear age.
Recently, I discussed the question of how best to describe the terminology to describe peer conflict with my colleague Dr. Paul Bracken the author of The Second Nuclear Age.
According to Bracken, it is preferable to use the term “limited war” to describe the nature of conflict between the authoritarian powers and the liberal democracies. “A term was invented in the Cold War which is also quite useful to analyze the contemporary situation, namely, limited war. This term referred to conflict at lower levels and sub-crisis maneuvering. And that is what is going or today in cyber and outer space, to use two examples. But it also applied to higher levels of conflict like limited nuclear war.”
“The notion of limited war focuses escalation as a strategy. What is the difference between limited and controlled war?
“That’s a really important question with enormous implications for command and control. Today, for example, limits are determined in a decision making process whereby the Pentagon goes to the White House and says we’d like to do this operation. The White says yes or no.
“Left out of this is any discussion of building a command and control system for controlled war. This means keeping war controlled even if things go wrong — as they always do. Without an emphasis on controlled war, and not just limited war, I would estimate that the United States will be highly risk averse, that is, the fear of an escalation spiral will drive the United States toward inaction.
“Look at the Ukraine. The first U.S. reaction to the Russian buildup was to immediately take military options off the table. The White House refocused its strategy on financial sanctions instead. It looked as if the United States was desperately searching for ways not to use force. Soft power, gray zone operations, the weaponization of finance — these are clearly important and I think we should use them.
“But they look like a frantic attempt to any use of force, like British foreign policy in the 1930s.
“Our language shapes our strategy. An image of war that blows up, that’s unlimited, or that you’ve declined to fight because of your fear that it would become so is where we are. In academic studies and think tanks the focus is overwhelmingly on “1914” spirals, accidental war, entanglement, and inadvertent escalation.
“If it’s going to be controlled or limited, how are you defining that it is limited? Is it limited by geography? Is it limited by the intensity of operations? Is it limited by the additional political issues that you will bring into the dispute?
“These are never specified in discussions that I see of hybrid or gray zone warfare. To use a very sensitive example. In a Taiwan scenario, will the United States Navy and Air Force be allowed to strike targets in China? I see a real danger that this isn’t being thought through. If we think it through only in a crisis we’re likely to find a lot of surprises in how the White House and Joint Chiefs of Staff see things differently.
These expressions – hybrid war and gray zone conflict – are treated as if they self evident in term of their meaning. Yet they are part of a larger chain of activities and events.
We use the term peer competitor but that is a bit confusing as well as these authoritarian regimes do not have the same ethical constraints or objectives as do liberal democratic regimes. This core cultural, political and ideological conflict who might well escalate a conflict beyond the terms of what we might wish to fight actually.
And that really is the point – escalate and the liberal democracies withdraw and redefine to their disadvantage what the authoritarian powers wish to do.
Bracken noted: “That’s a good distinction too, because it brings in the fact that for 20 years we’ve been fighting an enemy in the Middle East who really can’t strike back at the United States or Europe other than with low-level terrorist actions. That will not be the case with Russia, China, and others.
“The challenge is to define limited war, and I would add, controlled war. Is it geographic or Is it the intensity of the operations? How big of a war is it before people start unlocking the nuclear weapons?
“Every war game I’ve played has seen China declare that its “no first use” policy is terminated. The China player does this to deter the United States from making precision strikes and cyber attacks on China. This seriously needs consideration before we get into a real crisis.
“Russia and China’ are trying to come in with a level of intensity in escalation which is low enough so that it doesn’t trigger a big Pearl Harbor response. And that could go on for a long time and is a very interesting future to explore.”
Limited war requires learning about escalation control i.e. about controlled war, which when one uses that term, rather than hybrid war or gray zone conflict, connects limited war to the wider set of questions relating political objectives of the authoritarian powers.
Bracken concluded: “I believe using those terms adds to the intellectual chaos in Washington. It prevents us from having a clear policy discussion of what the alternatives for escalation control and management are in any particular crisis. This is a lot more dangerous than mishandling the Afghan exit, or the COVID pandemic.”
Although the Australian Defence Strategic Review and the recent Surface Fleet Review indicated that the threat environment was deteriorating in the here and now, the major investments are being made for a force that will not arrive for a decade.
How then to enhance the ADF in the next three to five years?
Or in the words of Keirin Joyce: “The Defence Strategic Review (DSR) did not address how to give us a focused force to deal with today’s threats. And the Fleet Review did not deal with how we can deal with the real threats of today with new capabilities we might affordably incorporate into today’s maritime force.”
Currently, WGCDR Keirin Joyce is a visiting senior fellow at ASPI. According to his bio on the Australian Strategic Policy Institute website:
WGCDR Joyce is an Australian Defence Force Academy graduate with an Honours Bachelor of Aeronautical Engineering. WGCDR Joyce has spent the last 18 years in support of the ADF Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) capability including deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan.
WGCDR Joyce is a Chartered Professional Engineer, holds a Masters in Aviation Management (specialising in Human Factors), a Masters of Aerospace Engineering, a Masters in Military and Defence Studies, a Graduate Diploma in Secondary Education (Mathematics) and has researched part time as a Doctorate of Philosophy student through ADFA.
He is currently the Chief Engineer for RAAF RPAS MQ-4C Triton. Before that, WGCDR Joyce was the Australian Army UAS Sub-Program Manager responsible for all Australian Army UAS activities, including Army Drone Racing, and then the Royal Australian Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) Sub-Program Manager.
We started by focusing on maritime autonomous systems.
He pointed out that this technology is now a decade old, Australia has extensively experimented with this technology, and the technology can be used now. He also cautioned that obviously not only the West is working this technology and with competitors and adversaries working with this technology, there is a clear need to know how to deal with adversary threats in this area as well, which will come only with extensive use and experience with remotely operated and autonomous system technologies.
Not only is the technology here, but much of it is also Australian and which the government can directly leverage. “With the exception of batteries and silicon, almost all of the technology necessary for an autonomous systems industry already exists in Australia.”
In other words, not only does technology exist to enhance ADF capabilities in the near to midterm, but it also be part of a resilient defence structure. Joyce argued: “That gives us a clear opportunity to enhance the current force and carve out the future.”
We then discussed air systems, and in particular the opportunity to leverage the coming of Triton.
He noted that “we are the only QUAD member that does not have armed persistent UAV strike. We will have the Triton which can provide the ISR and targeting data to a persistent airborne strike node, but we simply do not have armed persistent strike capability. This is clearly something which can be done to add to the kind of capability which the Air Force can provide to the Navy for maritime strike.”
We discussed the absence of discussion as well in Australia and elsewhere for that matter of the unique quality of what NATO now has at the Sigonella base in Italy. NATO flies the Global Hawk, the U.S. now operates Triton, and the Reaper armed UAV is operating there as well. This creates the kind of combat cluster which a remotely piloted can deliver to the combat force complementary to manned air assets.
A key aspect of the impact which introducing and accelerating autonomous systems into the ADF is the workforce issue.
The ADF like virtually all Western militaries face recruitment and retention challenges. The autonomous systems are significant generators of data both ISR and C2 systems. A civilian workforce or military cadre with enhanced flexibility on work hours and location can support such efforts. In effect, a data and an AI eco system is being generated and crafted which can be managed by innovative new ways for recruiting, developing and retaining workforce.
The final issue we discussed was acquisition.
I interviewed a U.S. Navy three-star Admiral last year, and he focused on his need to identify gaps which needed to be met and he and his staff could identify the bits and pieces which were needed which would fill the gaps.
But the organizational structure is not there for him to do that. And he emphasized that autonomous systems continuous redesign would be one way to fill gaps rather than going through the traditional lengthy and in the case of software and AI defined systems simply irrelevant acquisition process.
As Joyce underscored: “We have demonstrated we can do this. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan we got very good at rapid acquisition to fill the gaps. Autonomous systems are almost by operational reality rapid acquisition systems, whereby the warrior works with the industrial code writer on changes he sees as possible or deems necessary. It is a different kind of demand driven operational development cycle: not a traditional acquisition, requirements driven approach.”
My conclusion from my book on the coming of maritime autonomous systems is brutal and straightforward: the technology has arrived, but our organizational culture and structures are not changing to be able to use it. It is a form of structural disarmament.
Featured Photo: A MQ-4C Triton taxis at Andersen Air Force Base. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Michael S. Murphy)
When I met with LtGen Heckl earlier this year, we discussed the way ahead for the USMC in operating a distributed force, and he underscored it all starts with logistics.
“The pacing factor for everything we are doing in shaping the distributed force is logistics and to do so in a contested environment. We are focused on our ability to move ourselves organically.
“The CH-53K, the KC-130J and the Osprey can provide basic timely lift with support by surface connectors crucial as well. We need to be resilient. If one component of our ecosystem of moving and supporting a distributed force is not available or will not work with the current situation, then we need to have another component available.”
The significance have having the right kind of organic lift support defines the reach and range of what a maneuver force can do.
The featured picture certainly highlights the reality of what the CH-53 K can do. Not only is it carrying an F-35C airframe, it is doing so while being refueled.
This is what the Pax River folks said in their caption to the photo: “U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
“A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.”
I was clearly reminded of that when looking at the limits the Australian Army has when working to address their new core mission, namely littoral maneuver from the north of Australia out to their first island chain. They only have a Chinook with its limited range and lack of refueling capability.
Contrast that with the USMC and its CH-53K which not only can carry a wide range of capability in support of the deploying and deployed Marines but can be refueled extending their range of operation.
Your lift and support define what you can do as an insertion force: and define what a distributed force can deliver in terms of sustainable impact.
Having just returned from Australia where the government is arguing that their new strategy will deliver “impactful projection” which revolves around buying longer range strike weapons, a perceptive Aussie analyst questions the concept.
Stephen Kuper argued: “In order to avoid repeating history, it is clear that Australia and the ADF must begin to view expeditionary capability and the underlying doctrine, force structure, and platforms as a fundamental component of the nation’s new strategic paradigm.
“Only our capacity to deploy to defend and support our regional partners and in defence of our interests through “impactful presence” will ensure that Australia’s critical sea lines of communication remain unmolested in the era of great power competition.”
“Impactful presence” requires sustainable support at range for the ADF. They should consider the CH-53K as even more important than acquiring TLAMS.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24. A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
Paris – The French and German defense ministers signed April 26 a memorandum of understanding, with a target of signing contracts by the end of the year to launch phase 1A of designing and building a new tank, dubbed main ground combat system (MGCS).
The French armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, and his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, gave a news conference on the planned weapon system, which will include manned and unmanned vehicles armed with conventional and laser weapons, and working in a combat cloud network of advanced communications.
Phase 1A will set out the architecture of the project and decide the companies’ leadership, including how the eight industrial pillars will be shared, an official of the French armed forces ministry said after the news conference.
The two defense ministers were speaking just a day after the French president, Emmanuel Macron, gave a keynote speech, calling on the European Union to pursue European military capability, backed by heavy financial and political investment in the arms industry.
“We must produce more, we must produce faster, and we must produce as Europeans,” he said at the élite Sorbonne university.
The head of state also called for reform of European central bank policy to support spending to tackle climate change, and investment in new technology, including artificial intelligence. There was no guarantee Europe would live on.
“We have to be lucid that our Europe today is mortal — it can die — and it depends on the choices that we make now,” he said.
The German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, promptly welcomed Macron’s speech.
“France and Germany want Europe to be strong,” the leader of the German coalition said on social media. “Your speech contains good ideas on how we can achieve this.”
That warm response from Scholz was reported as a break from a previous chill in relations between the two political leaders. Strained ties at the highest level were seen as hampering cooperation on major arms projects, namely the future combat air system (FCAS), and the MGCS, due to replace the German Leopard 2 and French Leclerc in 2040.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House are seen as key factors in Macron’s call for a stronger European military and industrial capability, with the EU working with Nato.
It remains to be seen if the 27 EU member states will take up the measures to boost European sovereignty outlined by Macron, who has led the charge for strategic autonomy.
Fresh Dynamism
The joint press conference with the French and German defense ministers appeared to show restored political ties between Berlin and Paris, key members in the EU.
Pistorius made his opening remarks in fluent French before speaking in German in the elegant room, mostly filled by German journalists.
France and Germany were close, the German minister said, and there was a “new dynamic” between the two nation states.
There would be difficult, complex negotiations in drafting contracts on the MGCS – the negotiating teams have a great deal to do – but the deal would be sealed by the end of the year, he said. Asked if the Bundestag would endorse the agreement, he was confident the German parliament would back the deal.
French and German parliamentarians sat on the front row, which had been reserved for them by French officials.
Lecornu pointed up how work on the MGCS showed a European lead over the U.S. and Russia, as neither had started work on replacing the Abram and Russian army tanks.
There had been a difference of approach on the MGCS compared to the FCAS, he said, with the priority given to French and German army officers agreeing on common military requirements on the former. That was in contrast to the time consumed by French and German industry in competing claims to win project leadership on the latter.
Germany will be the lead nation on MGCS, and German authorities will sign contracts with the companies working on the project.
Work on MGCS will be shared 50/50 between the partner nations, and Italy has signed up as observer nation. There is interest from other countries, including those in Eastern Europe, on work on the new tank, the ministry official said.
There has been French concern on whether there would be equal share of work, as Rheinmetall, a German builder of weapons and shells, had won a place on the work plan. That might have reduced the French share of work.
Work had previously been reserved for the French and German units of the KNDS joint venture, until Rheinmetall lobbied successfully for its share.
Rheinmetall, Thales, and other companies will work on MGCS, Lecornu said, with the French electronics company due to work on the connectivity.
The MGCS contracts relate to studies on eight industrial pillars:
platform: German leadership. This will include the chassis and navigation system;
conventional firepower: Franco-German shared leadership. This includes the cannon, turret, and ammunition, with national development of systems, trials, and a selection after test firing;
innovative firepower: French leadership on secondary weapons, including guided missiles;
active protection: German leadership, includes anti-drone measures
infrastructure: Franco-German leadership, includes logistics, service, and infrastructure.
The work will be shared out on a 50/50 basis. Phase 1A will be followed by phase 1B, which will build a prototype.
The French 2024-2030 military budget law pledges some €500 million to support the MGCS project, the French minister said.
There had been plans for MGCS to enter service in 2035, but that was pushed back to 2040.
The core of the future combat air system is a new fighter jet, to replace respectively the Eurofighter Typhoon for Germany and Dassault Aviation Rafale for France, in 2040.
At the April 11, 2024 Williams Foundation seminar, the former head of the Air Warfare Center and now Director General for Air Combat Capability, Air Commodore Ross Bender, addressed the way ahead for the RAAF in dovetailing with the new strategic focus of the Australian government.
Bender noted that the RAAF although closely partnered with other allies is focused on “conducting campaigns directed to the operational and strategic goals supporting national defense.”
It is focused in this sense, and increasingly on the region.
The speed and range of airpower is an essential contribution to the defense of Australia’s maritime interests.
As Bender put it: “The ADF must be able to operate across great distances to assure the security of our economic interests and be able to support our allies and partners. Air capability is vital to the maritime domain by providing the speed and responsiveness which it can deliver.”
He provided a slide which reminded the audience of an aspect of the range and focus challenge.
He commented on this slide as follows: “And though we’ll discuss northern approaches, we should not forget the south with the Antarctic Treaty in mind, which from 2048, any of the parties can call for review. I also flag our contributions to some long standing and some relatively new maritime surveillance operations throughout our region, supporting the Australian Government and importantly, our regional partners.
“You might be aware of the Australian P-8 that recently visited La Réunion. Australia is a maritime nation and the ADF must be able to operate across great distances to assure the security of economic interests and be able to support our allies and partners.”
I would note that the ADF is truly dependent on what the RAAF can do as it provides both the air capability associated with the USAF in the United States as well as what the U.S. Navy provides for the U.S. military. It delivers strike, reconnaissance, maritime ISR and targeting data to the ADF. If the RAAF is not capable of performing its air delivered 360 degree capabilities, then the entire maritime domain defense enterprise for Australia is severely weakened.
In his talk, he discussed the need for the RAAF to develop its own version of agile employment which largely will evolve over ways to operate from the Northern areas of Australia where there are significant infrastructure and work force limitations. The challenge of fuel and logistical support to a distributed force is a major one to be met.
I would note that it has been announced that there is to be acquisition of AGM-158C LRASM anti-ship missiles to be carried on F/A-18Fs, P-8As and eventually F-35As, as well as AGM-158B JASSM-ER air-to-ground missiles. Another item is integration of the Kongsberg Joint Strike Missile on the F-35A. E/A-18G Growlers will receive 63 AGM-88E AARGM-ER missiles for attacking radars.
And as McInnes noted in his presentation, the range of these missiles in terms of effective attack is expanded by the operation of the air platform themselves.
Bender then discussed the coming of Triton to the ADF.
“Triton will operate from RAAF base Tyndall in the Northern Territory and be controlled from RAAF base Edinburgh in South Australia, a clear example of the new paradigm for the ADF and the Air Force. The platform is high cost, requires a highly skilled workforce to operate and maintain, but its capability is ideally suited for constant observation of our northern approaches.”
But the plan is to expand over time autonomous capabilities augmenting the manned and remotely piloted combat force.
Air Commodore Bender underscored: “Advanced autonomous concepts and capabilities, such as collaborative combat aircraft, can expand the projected envelope of high value, air or maritime assets, while extending their effective reach.”
Air Commodore Bender presenting at the Williams Foundation Seminar April 11, 2024.
A challenging and I personally believe costly effort that is not fully recognized in realistic budget discussions is simply adapting the RAAF to new operational conditions and contexts.
This is how Air Commodore Bender put It: “There must be important efforts to address a challenge in operating force in Australia. We can’t consider our bases as sanctuaries anymore, disconnected from the support base in Australia. How do we continue to operate and demonstrate resilience and maintain the initiative to support deterrence?
“The Air Force is adopting an agile operations concept of a maneuver across a dispersed and hardened network of bases. Of course, this approach must include the measures we can take through the development of integrated air and missile defense capabilities. This protection also requires an understanding of own force signatures, and the automated threat environment, including to supporting and enabling elements.
“An agile posture increases deterrence by being strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable. Strategic predictability comes from ensuring potential adversaries are left under no doubt about our resolve to ensure survivable, resilient, and enduring airpower operations. Agility at the level we think necessary requires new approaches to combat support, logistics and command and control.
“At its heart, an agile operations concept provides a network of air domain access points to enable aircraft to move rapidly to enable us to aggregate effects, and then disaggregate and reconstitute to complicate advisory targeting. Agile operations enable the resilience of our airpower.”
But what is the challenge in moving ahead with such a vision?
What follow are my own thoughts and not those of any speaker during the day of the Williams Foundation seminar from the ADF.
The reality is that the government is cutting airpower in favor of its investments in the future maritime force, notably SSNs and the future surface fleet. This leaves clear gaps with regard to the enhancing of ADF capability in the crucial three-to-five year period facing the ADF.
Government documents and officials have embraced the notion that Australia’s warning time is significantly reduced but the reality is that the government is cutting current capability to pay for a force 10 years away.
One needs to be clear.
The decision to cut funding for the fourth squadron of F-35s is a significant reduction in capability. Notably, when one considers the range at which F-35s operating as an allied fleet can move data for targeting, eliminating the numbers of aircraft have an impact.
And the RAAF F-35s are capable of integration with those of the USAF and in fact now operate in such a manner. This is not interoperability but integratability which is a very unique contribution delivered by the F-35 across the ADF and U.S. militaries fleet of F-35s, USMC, US Navy and USAF.
This is simply not true of a legacy aircraft like the Super Hornet, for in fact that is why the ADF was buying the F-35 in the first place.
And air autonomous systems are not a solution for the three-to-five-year period in and of themselves but might become useful adjuncts as ISR or C2 nodes in a kill web especially as Triton comes on board. There could be accelerated capability to move data from Triton to loyal wingman operations if there is an operational and budgetary space for the USE of autonomous systems prioritized by the government in the three-to-five-year period.
And the work on the Australian approach to agile combat employment is a priority but will be costly up front and require new working relationships between Army and the RAAF as well.
In an interview I did last year with John Blackburn with Air Vice-Marshal Darren Goldie, then the Air Commander of the RAAF, we discussed the challenge of re-focusing the force:
“We don’t have the level of knowledge and normative experience we need to generate regarding infrastructure across Western and Northern Australia for the Australian version of agile combat employment.”
He contrasted the Australian to the PACAF approach to agility. The USAF in his view was working on how to trim down support staff for air operations and learning how to use multiple bases in the Pacific, some of which they owned and some of which they did not own.
The Australian concept he was highlighting was focused on Australian geography and how the joint force and the infrastructure which could be built — much of it mobile – could allow for dispersed air combat operations.
This meant in his view that “we need to have a clear understanding of the fail and no-fail enablers” for the kind of dispersed operations necessary to enhance the ADF’s deterrent capability.
A key element of this is C2. Rather than looking to traditional CAOC battle management, the focus needs as well to focus on C2 in a dispersed or disaggregate way, where the commander knows what is available to them in an area of operations and aggregate those forces into an integrated combat element operating as a distributed entity.
Goldie commented: “We are developing concepts about how we will do command and control on a more geographic basis. This builds on our history with Darwin and Tindal to a certain extent, although technology has widened that scale to be a truly continental distributed control concept.
“We already a familiar with how an air asset like the Wedgetail can take over the C2 of an air battle when communications are cut to the CAOC, but we don’t have a great understanding of how that works from a geographic basing perspective. What authorities to move aircraft, people and other assets are vested in local area Commanders that would be resilient to degradation in communications from the theatre commander – or JFACC?
“We need to focus on how we can design our force to manoeuvre effectively using our own territory as the chessboard.”
Air Vice-Marshal Goldie underscored that the ability to work with limited resources to generate air combat capability is exercised regularly by the normal activity of 75 Squadron, flying F-35s in Australia’s Air Combat Group. This squadron operates from RAAF Base Tindal in the Northern Territory and as Goldie put it: “they have to operate with what they have in a very austere area.”
He highlighted a recent exercise which 75 squadron did with their Malaysian partners. The squadron operated their F-35s, and each day practiced operations using a different support structure. One day the operated with a C-27J which carried secure communication, along with HF communications systems and dealing with bandwidth challenges each bearer posed.
Another day they would operate with a ground vehicle packed with support equipment and on another day they would operate without either support capability. The point being the need is to learn to operate in austere support environments and to shape the skill sets to do so.
By learning how to use Australian territory to support agile air operations, and to take those capabilities to partner or allied operational areas, Australia will significantly enhance its deterrent capabilities going forward. This is a key challenge being squarely addressed by the RAAF.
So what can be achieved in the near to midterm along these lines?
In my view, this is a key measure of the credibility of Australian deterrence by denial or whatever other term you might use.
