The C-295 and Africa

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/29/2016

2016-06-29 By Guy Martin

This year Mali will receive a single C295 and Egypt will take delivery of the remaining three of 24 examples it has on order, according to Airbus officials, who believe Africa is a key market for the tactical airlifter.

Airbus announced in February that Mali would get a single winglet-equipped C-295W.

Fernando Ciria, Head of Marketing, Tactical Airlifters and ISR at Airbus Defence and Space (ADS), told journalists in Germany at the Trade Media Brief 2016 that Africa is a very promising region with many orders to come in the next few years.

According to Stephan Miegel, Head of Military Aircraft Services at Airbus Defence and Space, there are 148 C295s and 236 CN235s flying around the world today (168 C295s have been ordered) and these have accumulated 250 000 and 1.35 million flight hours respectively.

In Africa, there are 18 C212s, ten CN235s and 29 C295s in active service, primarily with air forces, although Republic of Congo’s Aero Service flies two C212s and South Africa’s Fortune Air flies a single CN235.

Most of these are built by Airbus but Burkina Faso and Senegal have aircraft produced by Indonesia’s PTDI.

Ciria said Africa has many fleets of transport aircraft made up of old types such as An-26s, Turbo Dakotas, Buffalos etc., meaning that these old fleets will have to be replaced, ideally by the C295, and augmented by intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.

Airbus is also hopeful of repeat orders from Africa, pointing out that half the company’s tactical transport customers took out repeat orders, something it describes as unique in this market segment.

Egypt is the world’s largest C295 operator and a repeat customer, having ordered its 24 aircraft in five different batches.

Ciria said that one of the notable features of Egypt’s fleet is that it has been used to take over missions previously carried out by the C-130H Hercules, as it is far cheaper to fly (one third that of a C-130).

In addition to personnel and cargo transport, Egyptian C295s are configured with removable VIP transport interiors.

Ghana has acquired three C295s which it flies on behalf of the United Nations. These have been deployed to Mali with the Minusma mission there.

Ciria said the Ghana Air Force supplies an aircraft that can fly 80-100 hours a month, including ten days of high intensity operations (eight hours a day) and 15 days of low intensity operations (five hours a day).

Three days of maintenance are required every month while a basic A-check inspection is done every 300 hours. Ghanaian C295s are used primarily to transport cargo and passengers, including wounded and sick. Ciria said flights are important as terrorists threaten the main land supply routes in Mali.

Ghanian C-295. Credit: Airbus Defence
Ghanian C-295. Credit: Airbus Defence

Ghana has taken the lead in acquiring and operating aircraft on behalf of the United Nations, but Ciria believes there are many other humanitarian missions that could make use of the C295/CN235, such as the Red Cross, European Union, Doctors Without Borders and World Food Programme. Many of these organisations are flying elderly aircraft like the An-24, HS-748 and DHC-5.

Airbus also highlighted C295/CN235 use by non-African operators on the continent.

For instance, the Spanish Air Force has used the C295 for humanitarian assistance missions in Africa as it is cheaper to fly than the C-130, while its CN235 MPAs are used to patrol for pirates, gather intelligence on land and sea and monitor sea lanes around Somalia and the Gulf of Aden as part of Spain’s contribution to the European Union’s anti-piracy Operation Atalanta.

The Spanish Air Force also flies P-3 Orions for Atalanta, based in Djibouti. Airbus said the Spanish CN235s have flown over 1 525 flight hours and 179 missions as part of Atalanta, which also sees the aircraft fly off the Kenyan and Seychelles coasts.

Although piracy is being contained off the Horn of Africa due largely to greater stability on land and multinational sea and air patrols, Ciria noted that there is a shortfall of maritime patrol capability in the Gulf of Guinea, where pirates and militant groups are hijacking tankers for their contents, destroying oil and gas facilities and kidnapping crew for ransom.

Ciria said only Nigeria, with its maritime patrol configured ATR aircraft, is able to patrol its maritime zone from the air and there is need for an aircraft like the C295 MPA in the region, not just to monitor for pirates but also to conduct environmental protection, fisheries protection, search and rescue and medical evacuation missions.

Other applications in Africa include border surveillance and maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean, where illegal migration and drug smuggling are major problems. Ciria said maritime patrol aircraft need to be active in North African countries where most trafficking vessels launch from.

Airbus is also promoting a C295 special mission aircraft for border surveillance, especially to monitor the illegal movement of people, drugs, weapons and terrorists.

For such a role, the C295 can be fitted with a synthetic aperture radar, ground moving target indicator (GMTI), video camera, infrared camera and communications and electronic intelligence systems.

Ciria said that Airbus is involved in a lot of commercial campaigns in Africa and sees a lot of opportunities in the coming years, especially as there are a number of countries that are replacing obsolete fleets.

Airbus has received two C295 contracts this year, one from Mali and one from Indonesia, which ordered two aircraft.

Indonesia already has nine in service. Ciria was confident that Airbus will have secured additional C295 orders by the end of this year.

Last year Airbus Defence and Space took the C295 on a South American sales tour and earlier this month began a sales tour of Latin America and Canada, with an eye on Canada’s requirement for a new maritime surveillance and search and rescue aircraft and is confident of being awarded a contract later this year.

Ciria said it is possible that Africa is one possible are for a C295 sales tour, if there is enough market potential on the continent. At the moment there are no short term orders or interest from Africa.

Fernando Alonso, Head of Military Aircraft at ADS, said that C295 sales have been very thin this year, but they have in the past fluctuated from five to 30 a year. However, he is encouraged by developments in India, as Airbus has been selected to supply the type to replace the Avro transport fleet, in partnership with Tata under the Make in India programme.

Alonso said the C295 is a winner that will keep the company going until it produces a replacement aircraft.

Jean Pierre Talamoni, Head of Sales and Marketing at Airbus Military Aircraft, said that the company is committed to Make in India but cautioned that one has to be ‘careful’ with trying to establish aircraft production from scratch without producing a supply chain.

“If there is no supply chain we will have to import and obviously the cost will be destroyed. A full system has to be put in place.”

Republished with permission of our partner defenceWeb

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44002:mali-and-egypt-to-receive-c295s-this-year&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

 

The Reshaping of the Global Order: Global Rules in Play

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-06-29 By Garth McLennan

Ever since its emergence as a global military, economic, and cultural superpower after the Second World War, the United States has sought to service its geopolitical imperatives by building an international order for the world that is structured around defined rules and norms.

Nowhere has this been symbolized more than on the world’s oceans, where the United States Navy (USN) effectively guarantees the principles of freedom-of-navigation for use of the global commons.

But maintaining such an order is never easy, and while examples like the natural openness of the world’s oceans certainly stand out, different geographic areas where the national interests of major powers diverge are in no short supply either.

From the creaking structures of the European Union (EU), which Great Britain recently frayed further with a momentous decision to leave the bloc, to finding balance with China in the South China Sea (SCS) to the future geopolitical battlegrounds of the Arctic and outer space, Washington’s preferred method for dealing with the world has come under strain.

The United States, facing populist-driven backlash at both ends of the political spectrum at home after grinding wars in the Middle East and a global financial crisis whose recovery has dragged on at an anaemic pace, will be less prepared and equipped to reinforce these institutions than it once was.

The precedents set by Washington and its allies today, and in the near future, in answering the challenges to the systems they have built will go far in determining how the world orients itself around the difficulties of tomorrow.

The pressures on the transnational union in Europe has complicated partner options for the United States in its efforts to uphold rules-based formats for the world’s hot spots. The integrationist ideals that have woven together the fabric of the EU have been strained to their breaking points by a long running sovereign debt crisis that has raised a litany of doubts regarding the viability of future financial cohesion across the continent and the equally devastating immigration crisis emanating from the wreckage of the Middle East.

Taken together, these interwoven and long running dynamics, which have converged in the public mindsets of much of Europe, have served not only to sharpen the rhetorical focuses of Eurosceptic political parties, but also to highlight the geopolitical stressors built into the structure of the union itself.

Great Britain, for instance, voted to leave the EU, despite Prime Minister David Cameron’s success in prying concessions out of Brussels designed to slow the pace of tighter continental integration. Despite the almost universal opinion of economists that London would suffer financially with a decision to depart, a sense that British sovereignty had been ceded to the EU permeated before the June 23 vote.

The concerns raised by the “leave” camp echoed many of those raised by other member states staring down the restive, anti-EU sentiment swirling throughout their own populations, namely that the sacrifice of even some autonomy to a supernatural body in Brussels is greatly compromised when the weaknesses of union are thrust to the forefront.These are issues of central importance to the future of the EU as it is presently constituted, but regardless of how they develop, they superimpose those geographic fault lines that divide the continent back onto the European map, and geopolitical cohesion with the United States is weakened. Should Europe continue to devolve into varying constituent parts, it will do so at different speeds, and for different reasons.

For Washington, this means the turmoil roiling the EU complicates the erection of a united front in the face of Russian aggression. A devolved or outright divided European bloc could reasonably see the continuation of an economic core built around Germany, France, and the nations of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands between them with other blocs organizing around trade, to the southeast, and solidarity toward Moscow, in Poland and eastward to the Baltics[1].

The future of open borders within the EU, a signature achievement of the bloc that is formalized as the Schengen Agreement, has been called repeatedly into question as well; reports surfacing out of the Netherlands late last year indicated Dutch officials were contemplating options for a so-called “mini-Schengen”, comprised only of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Germany, and Austria, which would limit immigration from the rest of Europe[2].

The uncertainty that came with the Brexit vote emphasized these fault lines across the continent, and threatens to widen them even further now as Britain negotiates its future realationship with the European Union. A precedent has now been set whereby concessions can be extracted from Brussels to allay fears of reduced national sovereignty.

London has traditionally played a stabilizing role in the EU between the bloc’s cores in Paris and Berlin. Existing tensions will only be exacerbated with British voters’ decision to leave the union, along both north-south and east-west lines, and Moscow will emerge as a strategic victor.

Sanctions on Russian products originating from Crimea or Sevastopol, along with EU investment in those areas, were extended for a full year on June 17[3], while the broader sanctions levied by the continental bloc against Moscow are expected to be renewed for an additional six months when EU officials meet on June 24[4].

Still, maintaining such penalties, designed to force Russian compliance with the Minsk ceasefire agreement in Ukraine, is more complex than it once was; the extension of sanctions, which requires unanimity among the EU’s 27-strong membership, faces pushback from elements in Italy, Greece, and Hungary, while Germany would like to find an eventual way back to normalization as well[5].

For Berlin in particular, the contradictions between wanting to stand strong with Washington against Russian aggression in Ukraine and the growing desire to mitigate the instability engendered by that very aggression, through initiatives like the Nord Stream II pipeline, are becoming harder to reconcile.

Nord Stream II would pipe Russian natural gas directly to Germany through the Baltic Sea and therefore bypass Ukrainian fields, which, in turn, is raising tensions with some states, like Italy[6], who will be bypassed by Nord Stream II and don’t prioritize Moscow’s adventurism highly. We see here a convergence of tensions here as the strategic stresses of a loosening union are overlain across the economic gulfs between northern Europe and the Mediterranean south.

Taken together, this teeming body of diplomatic and geopolitical complexity makes the machinery of America’s sought after international order far more difficult to run and operate smoothly. And raises questions about a significant need for re-orienting and reforming the US approach to the global situation and global order, more generally.

The far-reaching effects of the immigration crisis are a case in point; millions of fleeing refugees and migrants have rocked the European project and hastened the rise of populist, national-centric political parties in virtually every member of the EU that are calling the loudest for wholesale changes to the way the continental bloc functions, and for what purposes. Desperate European leaders facing upcoming national elections, including the powerhouses in France and Germany, have sought solutions wherever they can be found, including in more unsavoury quarters.

Russia forced its way into a leading role in the immigration crisis’ single biggest driver, the civil war in Syria, to the point where today it has become virtually impossible to see a resolution to that disaster arising without a substantial Russian role in the proceedings. As such Moscow will seek to leverage that sway into concessions on Ukraine and sanctions. Washington will undoubtedly attempt to head such attempts off, but the inability to fully delineate the two will present a challenge to a broader international system of checks and balances.

Likewise, Brussels has also sought to more widely engage Turkey in addressing the waves of refugee-seekers. The EU and Ankara several months ago came to terms on a tenuous deal that has seen Turkey limit the number of migrants reaching Europe in exchange for billions of dollars in compensation, promises of visa-free travel to Europe for Turkish citizens, and a relaxing of human rights standards that makes such a scenario possible.

If the difficulties threatening the cohesion of the western-led order in Europe are multifaceted and diffuse, those confronting Washington’s efforts to establish such a system in Southeast Asia are clear, but no less challenging.

Here the geopolitical forces are swirling their fastest.

China and its neighbors bitterly dispute one another’s territorial claims over the delineation of the South China Sea; Beijing’s famed “nine-dashed-line” that encompasses virtually the entirety of the SCS has been challenged by a raft of regional states, and will be officially adjudicated in the halls of The Hague in the Netherlands, under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), later this month.

The Philippines challenged China’s claims in international court back in January, 2013, and while Beijing has already stated unequivocally that it will not recognize any decision rendered by the forthcoming arbitration process, the lawsuit remains an important milestone that could serve as precedent around which future claims and disputes will be shaped and framed.

China’s refusal, despite being a signatory to the UNCLOS, to adhere to the court’s ruling, which is expected to favor Manila, puts into focus the inherent difficulty international structures like the U.N. face in enforcing their edicts when such resolutions stand at odds with a major power unwilling to abide by them.

Despite Beijing’s intransigence toward the tribunal, China has nonetheless fiercely contested the legal arguments put forth by the Philippines, which has resulted in much spirited debate surrounding the granular details of rocks, reefs, shoals and the exclusive economic zones that go along with them.

This indicates that while China will not recognize a ruling contradictory to their interests (or, indeed, of any kind), it does not plan to exit the treaty unilaterally either, which could leave China in a more difficult position should it need to shape the treaty’s governing mechanisms in the future.

A policy of such selective interpretation, however, could lead China to withdraw from the treaty at some point should Beijing come to see adherence to its parameters as more restrictive than pulling out of it entirely.

The SCS is believed to hold vast, untapped hydrocarbon and mineral resources beneath its waves, and the increasingly depleted stocks of fish that swim within it are an incredibly important food source for every nation that rims the SCS, especially China (indeed, Beijing has been involved in numerous skirmishes involving fishing rights; Chinese fishermen were recently engaged in a dispute with Indonesian officials)[7].

As such, China has undertaken ambitious efforts to create facts on the ground (or in the water) by artificially raising “islands” and militarizing them, a process that has frustrated the United States and called into question Washington’s longstanding commitment to free and unfettered access to any body of water in the world.

The USN has conducted several freedom-of-navigation patrols through the South China Sea in response, but Beijing’s dominance over the disputed Scarborough Shoal and Spratly Island chain is firmly in place, and will not be dislodged by a ruling from The Hague.

Beijing has shown clearly it does not envision a future for itself where questions of Chinese territory can be litigated in a far-away courtroom by an international body. In 2013 it issued surprise notification that the skies over the East China Sea would be covered by a Chinese air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and fear exists in some quarters that a ruling against Beijing in the Netherlands would lead to a similar situation occurring in the SCS.

Such a development would ratchet up U.S.-China tensions, and run the risk of future miscommunications and unwanted incidents. The United States is on the surface keen to not takes sides in the dispute, though this is largely perfunctory; Washington has already released its own analysis on the situation that runs contrary to the Chinese position and has called for universal respect of the U.N. ruling.

The United States prizes stability and predictability; it has consistently sought to get partner and allied nations in the region on the same page in presenting, as with Europe and Russia, a united front that can act as a counterweight to a rising China.

It has attempted to do so through bodies like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but that outfit has failed thus far to even produce a satisfactory statement admonishing Chinese land-reclamation in the SCS[8].

While reliable partners, like Japan, do exist, the fear of a much geographically closer China has hindered truly robust cooperation and coordination with many.

The Arctic, meanwhile, is witnessing the beginnings of its own legal structure coming into greater focus, and once more, the combination of Russian military and diplomatic pressure is already becoming a feature.

Washington’s ultimate goal for an orderly administration of the Arctic involves a greater institutional presence in the region built around a shared conceptual framework that serves as an interpretive mechanism for crisis resolution in a remote part of the world that nonetheless features a broad cross-section diverse national interests for states with a territorial link to it, and for some without one.

Currently, the Arctic Council comprised of the eight Arctic nations and several observer countries, acts as the primary intergovernmental body through which Arctic affairs are addressed. The Council is not principally concerned with military or geopolitical issues, however; its typical functions, especially since Washington assumed the organization’s rotating chairmanship for a two-year term last April, focus intensely on climate change, the betterment of regional living conditions and economic opportunity, and maritime safety[9].

Moscow, on the other hand, has shown signs that it will play a disruptive and confrontational role in the future of the Arctic, even as the estimated value of the region’s own massive oil and gas reserves has plummeted amid tanking oil markets. The cost of accessing and developing the region has risen dramatically as well with western sanctions thus far preventing Russian companies from pushing new projects[10].

The Kremlin nonetheless identified the Arctic as a major strategic interest last year with eyebrow raising revisions to its naval doctrine that, in the words of Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dimitri Rogozin, would lead to Moscow effectively militarizing the polar region[11]. Russian President Vladimir Putin had declared in no uncertain terms that the Arctic is under the undisputable sovereignty of Russia; the Kremlin even planted a Russian flag on the North Pole’s ocean floor in 2007.

Similar in a sense to the tangled web of territorial claims in the South China Sea, members of the Arctic club also find themselves waiting for a U.N.-led process to sort out who owns what at the top of the world. Until that happens however, the Arctic is likely to experience a gradually increasing presence of activity among a number of states, Russia foremost among them, looking to establish firm and defined positions. Moscow has already started building military bases on Kotelny and Alexandra Islands, though this has been largely preliminary so far[12].

Jurisdiction for Arctic territorial claims, the most contentious of which concern delineation of the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain range, falls under the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which is itself a component of the UNCLOS. Russia, Canada, and Denmark have all filed competing claims asserting what they believe to be their rights to the ridge, while Norway has considered its own as well.

Ottawa in particular has gone to lengths in answering aggressive Russian claims to Arctic sovereignty, with the competition to lay advanced spy infrastructure in tandem with the United States over the region before Moscow can emerging as one of the most interesting dynamics to watch in the Arctic[13].

With global warming slowly but surely opening up the Northern Sea Route and other Arctic passages to greater commercial and civilian shipping for longer and longer parts of the year, shaving the time needed for goods to reach the eastern seaboard of the U.S. for countries like China, these trends will only accelerate, and competition will grow. Russia has staked out claims to sizable portions of the Arctic, and the Kremlin’s rhetoric, along with its general disinterest in forums like the Arctic Council, raises questions as to how Russia would respond should it lose a U.N. directed arbitration process.

While low oil prices have put such questions on the backburner for now, they will not remain there. The United States may be too late to the party for itself, having not ratified the UNCLOS, but its leadership will be an important factor nonetheless as its Arctic allies assume prominent roles in adjudicating the region’s future.

Geography and interest will always ensure that America’s proclivity for building international institutions that provide forums for non-violent dispute resolution while simultaneously maximizing Washington’s inherent advantages with other countries will always be challenged. Just as the world will go through a trial-and-error process to sort out rules for the Arctic, so to will it when nations begin to more regularly break into space.

The legal architecture governing the conduct of nations in outer space is, for the most part, antiquated, a Cold War-era remnant that was conceptualized when few countries, even the most advanced, had much practical capacity to safely and successfully operate in space.

The Earth’s orbit is internationalized, but the United States (and other countries, to a lesser extent) maintains a vast satellite infrastructure that acts as the bedrock for its formidable command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network, the one that gives Washington global expeditionary and force projection capabilities.

The sheer scale of importance attached to this setup, which is largely unprotected from attack or disruption in both a physical and legal sense, ensures that outer space will in effect eventually become another area where nations will not just compete, but fight to construct the framework that will one day be used to hash what conduct is acceptable there. China has now conducted three anti-satellite missile tests that could theoretically target American systems, including two that reached a High Earth Orbit of at least 35,700 km[14].

As Washington is currently encountering problems in setting the parameters for a structure that works in the Arctic, it will also encounter issues as it begins to update and expand the laws of space. Despite the burgeoning space programs of China, Russia, Israel, and several other countries, the United States is at present without peer in terms of the size, capacity, and technological development of its C4ISR assets. While at first this would appear to grant Washington an advantage in leading the discussion for how space law will be framed, disadvantages are presented as well as less space-dependent actors have less incentive to follow the American line.[15]

The primary structure outlining the regulations for national action in space, the Outer Space Treaty, was negotiated in 1967 and as such bears signature imprints of the geopolitics of its time. The treaty for the most part addresses nuclear weapons and prohibits their staging or deployment in space or on the moon. It does not cover conventional weapons; it was not crafted in a time of exoatmospheric kill vehicles or anti-satellite weapons, nor does it address the possibility of resource extraction.

While these are not hot topics today, they very well may be one day. When these barriers are knocked down, and they will be, a more robust weaponization of space will begin in earnest. The bursting nature of the private sector, which is already on the cusp of breaking into space exploration, is another major consideration. The United States will do everything in its power to ensure that a secure, international framework is in place when these things become a reality.

Maintaining a structured, rules-based international order that emphasizes a shared political culture between competing states will only grow more difficult and complex for Washington in the years and decades to come.

Now is the time for the United States to prove definitively that such an order remains both viable and durable, and that institutional ideals like trust and transparency must be preserved.

Washington should take a significant step toward these objectives by making the ratification of the UNCLOS a priority of the next administration, and thereby acting to remove one of the chief hurdles in getting countries like China and Russia at least somewhat on board with a better defined institutional framework.

Without ratification, the U.S. has created a glaring policy contradiction by advocating for an order it does not officially belong to. This certainly would not solve every problem, ratification would in all likelihood come far too late for Washington to stake out claims for itself in the Arctic, but it would send a powerful signal all the same.

The precedents set today and in the years to come across a fragile Europe, on the South China Sea, in the Arctic, and one day into space will form the template for future dispute-resolution processes in the geopolitical landscapes to come.

Those processes will in turn shape the conduct of how the world works within them.

America has proven time and again that both it and the world are better off when a system exists to delineate the rules and order of the international community, to provide states with another path beyond zero-sum calculations of territory and national interest, no matter where that community happens to be.

Garth McLennan graduated from Arizona State University in 2015, with degrees in Political Science and Criminal Justice. He is based out of Vancouver, where his writing focuses primarily on American foreign policy.

[1] Mark Fleming-Williams, “Europe Without the Union”, March 1, 2016, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/europe-without-union

[2] Geopolitical Diary, “Considering a Northern European Alliance”, November 18, 2015, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/considering-northern-european-alliance

[3] Laurence Norman, “EU to Extend Crimea Sanctions by Year”, June 17, 2016, The Wall Street Journal, http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-to-extend-crimea-sanctions-by-year-1466169675

[4] Aaron Mehta, “Likely Sanctions Renewal on Russia Welcomed by US Allies”, June 20, 2016, Defense News, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/budget/2016/06/20/sanction-renewal-russia-welcomed-us-allies-minsk/85998850/

[5] Geopolitical Diary, “Negotiating an End to Russia’s Sanctions, Eventually”, May 27, 2016, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/negotiating-end-russias-sanctions-eventually

[6] Geopolitical Diary, “Why the EU Frustrates Italy So Much”, December 17, 2015, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/why-eu-frustrates-italy-so-much

[7] Analysis, “Fish: The Overlooked Destabilizer in the South China Sea”, February 12, 2016, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/fish-overlooked-destabilizer-south-china-sea?utm_source=paidlist-a&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=*|DATE:|*&utm_content=Daily+Intelligence+Brief%3A+Feb.+12%2C+2016

[8] Ankit Panda, “ASEAN Foreign Ministers Issue, Then Retract Communique Referencing South China Sea”, June 15, 2016, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/asean-foreign-ministers-issue-then-retract-communique-referencing-south-china-sea/

[9] Admiral Robert J. Papp Jr., “The halfway point of the U.S. Arctic Council chairmanship: Where do we go from here?”, April 25, 2016, The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2016/04/25-us-arctic-council-chairmanship

[10] Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Arctic illusions”, August 27, 2015, The Brookings Institution, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/08/27-russia-arctic-geopolitics-baev

[11] Matthew Bodner, “New Russian Naval Doctrine Enshrines Confrontation With NATO”, July 27, 2015, The Moscow Times, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/new-russian-naval-doctrine-enshrines-confrontation-with-nato/526277.html

[12] Analysis, “Supporting Russian Ambition in the Arctic”, November 18, 2015, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/supporting-russian-ambition-arctic

[13] James Bamford, “Frozen Assets: The Newest Front In Global Espionage Is One Of The least Habitable Locales On Earth—The Arctic”, May 11, 2015, Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/11/frozen-assets-arctic-espionage-spying-new-cold-war-russia-canada/

[14] Analysis, “The Battle to Militarize Space Has Begun”, November 11, 2015, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/battle-militarize-space-has-begun

[15] Omar Lamrani, “Avoiding a War in Space”, May 17, 2016, Stratfor Global Intelligence, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/avoiding-war-space

 

The A330 MRTT: The Flagship of a 21st Century Approach for Airbus Defence and Space

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/26/2016

2016-06-26 Second Line of Defense attended the Airbus Defence and Space Trade Media Brief held in Munich Germany on June 20 and 21st 2016.

We will be reporting on a number of the presentations and the launch discussion of the new H Force weapons system by Airbus Helicopters.

In this first piece, we will focus upon the presentation by Jerónimo Amador, the head of marketing for the A330 MRTT and other Airbus derivatives.

The first day started with the head of Airbus Defence and Space, Dirk Hoke, greeting the journalists attending the two event. The CEO told the gathering that the new strategy of the sector would be announced in the Fall and launched then. But clearly, the presentations, which followed, highlighted elements of that strategy and foreshadowed the way ahead.

Probably, no two presentations highlighted this more than the one on the tanker or from a group perspective the H force weapons presentations and demonstration on day two. They did so in a core way: these are very flexible, modular, and upgradeable systems, with software upgradeability playing a key role.

The tanker is in the hands of several operational air forces, and as such is becoming an established global fleet.

The user groups are key drivers for further change in the program, and the correlation with the A330 means that innovations driven from the commercial sector can be applied as well to the military derivative, the A330 tanker.

The global nature of the fleet and its operations means that shared experiences are being generated and shared by the users.

The certification leader – the Royal Australian Air Force – in facts has de facto certified a number of aircraft for other users.

The brief by Amador was different from past presentations to the media at the annual Trade Media Briefing (this was the 7th) in that is was really not a company business development presentation but an overview on the operational experience of the Air Forces using the aircraft and its implications for the further development of the aircraft.

In other words, rather than comparing the aircraft to others in the marketplace, it was an overview on the operational experience of the global fleet, which is a measure of the progress of the program itself.

Currently, there are 27 A330MRTT in services with more than 85,000 flight hours, which include 40,000 in the past year.

The Aussie experience was highlighted in which one RAAF tanker has been deployed to the Middle East since September 2014 with 631 sorties flown which is a monthly average of 30 plus and more than 5000 flight hours with a monthly average of 250.

Saudi Arabia has recently completed a flight test campaign to certify their AWACs as well as their legacy tanker, the KE-3.

Amador then focused on the further evolution of the tanker or what he called it as “more than a tanker.”

Progress is occurring on the automatic refueling system, the addition of wideband sitcom, avionics upgrades and enhance self-protection options.

He highlighted that the user groups were key shapers of the way ahead in terms of demand and shared experiences.

Aussie Experience

He then focused on how the evolution of the A330 itself was shaping new performance capabilities for the tanker variant, notably in terms of structural modifications, aerodynamic improvements with reduced fuel consumption and avionics computer evolutions.

In short, the Airbus tanker is part of the US and allied operational force and as the Marines told the Aussies in the Middle East, it is the tanker of choice.

In our interview with the KC-30A crew then at Edwards for certification tests earlier this year, they highlighted the evolution of the aircraft and its operational experiences.

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-the-kc-30a-from-edwards-afb-clearing-the-way-for-expanded-operations/

Question: With the situational awareness which you have on the plane, you operate the plane often to the fighter rather than forging a track to which the fighter goes.

 Could you describe that capability?

 Answer: We have a very good communications suite, including SATCOM, on the aircraft, as well as Link 16.

 So we can see the fighters in the battlespace and we can see their fuel loads and anticipate where the need for refueling might lie.

 It is about positioning yourself efficiently to refuel fighters to get them back in the fight as rapidly as possible; it is not just about being a tracked gas station in the sky.

And with our communications capabilities we can act as a relay between the fighters and other assets in the battlespace and link back to the home base as needed as well.

We can function as a communications relay for the fighter fleet as well.

Question: You are reshaping the tanker culture?

Where do your crews come from and how are they preparing for the boom part of your tanker’s future?

Answer: We have a mixture of people with fighter, tanker and airlift experience.

It is a mixed crew in terms of background.

And we have an exchange with the USAF with the KC-10 are building up our boom training and experience with them as well.

Question: How are the coalition partners responding to your tanker and your efforts?

Answer: We are the tanker of choice.

The amount of respect we are getting from being in the Middle East, I’ve never seen anywhere else. Especially from Marines and the U.S. Navy, we constantly hear: “We want you guys every time we’re going to do a strike package.”

So whenever there’s a strike package happening, they request us when possible: “We want the Aussie KC-30 tanker on board.“

Question: The KC-30A is being used by a number of other Air Forces, although you are the lead country is using the aircraft. What have been your interactions with them?

Answer: We have growing interaction with non-USAF’s which is also broadening our mutual experience.

For example, we have an exchange with the French, whereby the French are leveraging our work to shape their transition strategy with their own tanker.

All of the clearances we are doing for ourselves benefit all the other KC-30A air forces.

And we think we are driving the entire KC-30A enterprise forward as well evolve our experience and our capabilities.

During the tests here, we have an Airbus person with us as we certify the boom.

We have embedded him in our team and put an Australian flag on his back and made him feel like one of us.

And that breaks down the barriers necessary to have the kind of innovation, which we want to see.

 

The Airbus Defence and Space Approach to UAVs

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-06-26  By Guy Martin

Airbus Defence and Space believes the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) market is poised for massive growth, and it is seeking to become involved in this sector, through technology like its Zephyr pseudo-satellite.

Jean Pierre Talamoni, Head of Sales and Marketing at Airbus Military Aircraft, said UAVs represent a small portion of defence expenditure but will see the highest growth in the coming years.

Jana Rosenmann, Head of Unmanned Aerial Systems at Airbus Defence and Space, said there is great opportunity in the UAV space but there is also major uncertainty. For instance, different forecasts predict the value of the UAV market to be worth between $2.8 and $17 billion in 2020. One thing for certain is the commercial UAV market overtaking the military market in the near future.

Rosenmann predicts that the global UAV market will rise from around $10.5 billion in 2016 to nearly $18 billion in 2025, with two thirds of that coming from the United States. Medium altitude, long endurance (MALE) UAVs are predicted to make up the vast majority of market value.

She told media in Germany this week that Airbus is ‘crossing the Rubicon’ and moving into the commercial market and has spent a lot of time engaging with this market.

“Everybody is talking about the civil market, with a focus on small consumer drones, of which thousands are flying around.” She said Airbus is looking to see what strategy to take with regard to the commercial market.

One example of out of the box thinking with regard to UAVs is the Zephyr pseudo satellite, a solar powered aircraft operating in the stratosphere above weather and regular air traffic. Its main applications are surveillance, communications and Internet. So far it has flown 900 hours, including a single flight that lasted 14 days.

The Zephyr S (single tail) has a wingspan of 25 metres, payload of 5 kg and weight of 55 kg but Airbus is working on the larger Zephyr T (twin tail), with a 33 metre wingspan, weight of 140 kg and 20 kg payload. The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence has ordered two for a capability demonstration next year, and is in negotiations for a third.

Rosenmann said she saw enormous UAV potential from the commercial world, with Airbus in negotiations with information technology companies in this regard, with a focus on providing hubs for Internet connectivity, with military contracts following on from those.

At the moment Airbus Defence and Space is leasing Heron I UAVs to the Germany military, which uses them in Afghanistan, will supply the Heron TP to Germany and is working on a future European MALE UAV together with Dassault and Leonardo.

Launch of the development and production programme for the latter is expected in late 2018. Airbus will sign a definition study contract for the European MALE by mid-July, ahead of the commencement of development work on the project in September.

Also referred to as MALE2020, the European MALE RPAS project was launched in May 2014 with the goal of providing an unmanned capability to the armed forces of France, Germany, and Italy, reports IHS Jane’s.

Republished with permission of our partner defenceWeb.

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=44022:airbus-sees-big-growth-in-uav-market&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107

Editor’s Note: To unleash the potential of UAVs in the civil marketplace, it will be crucial to shape a modernized air traffic control system which can indeed handle the challenge.

We will publish a piece shortly on this challenge which is a key part of the roll out in the United States of the next generation system and in Europe with the introduction of SESAR.

https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/

http://www.sesarju.eu/discover-sesar

The Federal Aviation Administration is facing significant problems with integrating drones into US airspace.

The AP reports that plans for modernizing air traffic control can’t cover the unique challenges posed by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), given that they were made years before drones were used for more than military missions.

“It’s becoming painfully apparent that in order to get [drones] in there, there is going to have to be a fair amount of accommodation, at least in the beginning,” National Air Traffic Controllers Association representative Chris Stephenson is quoted as saying.

That’s going to add yet another set of goals for NextGen, an FAA program that promises to create a nationwide satellite-based location tracking system, provide better tools for sharing information, and update aging technology.

Launched in 2004, NextGen has made progress on these projects, but it’s also been consistently over budget and behind schedule. And large drones — which are currently mostly used for surveillance but could also carry commercial cargo or even wireless internet signals — throw a wrench in its current plans. “We didn’t understand the magnitude to which [drones] would be an oncoming tidal wave, something that must be dealt with, and quickly,” says NextGen administrator Ed Bolton.

Among other things, the AP says NextGen’s planned computer system can’t handle the complex flight plans of drones that stay in the air for days, weeks, or someday years (though super-long-range craft like the Facebook “internet drone” shown above would likely fly above normal airspace.)

Right now, they move slower than commercial planes, creating the risk of an aerial traffic jam. And that’s leaving aside the whole problem of creating a certification system comparable to the one for manned planes and their pilots.

The situation may be brighter for the drones people are actually worried about right now: small machines that fly under 400 feet, like existing aerial photography craft and Amazon’s proposed fleet of octocopters.

The FAA currently bans most commercial use of these drones, although many companies have flouted that rule with mixed results. But hobbyists can already fly them in unpopulated areas, and the FAA is supposed to have rules for businesses in place by 2015; it’s currently approved some limited use.

The agency, once again, appears behind schedule and potentially likely to miss the deadlinedue to problems figuring out drone certification procedures and making sure they’re able to sense and avoid other aircraft.

Earlier this month, NASA said it was working on an automated air traffic control system for drones that fly around 400 to 500 feet. Even with these problems unresolved, though, the FAA is much closer to putting small commercial UAVs in the air than larger, high-flying ones.

http://www.theverge.com/2014/9/25/6843303/faa-says-air-traffic-control-isnt-ready-for-drones

Airbus Defence and Space is a key player in SESAR and should be able to inform its UAV efforts of progress in the ATC domain.

Airbus is the third largest contributor to SESAR – bringing airborne operational and technical expertise to the programme, and focusing efforts on the definition and validation of concepts that require interaction between air and ground operators and systems.

http://www.airbus.com/newsevents/news-events-single/detail/airbus-supported-sesar-demonstration-activities-are-guiding-the-way-towards-improved-air-traffic-man/

 

The P-8 in Advance of the Weapons Revolution: A Core 21st Century Warfighting Capability

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/20/2016

2016-06-20 By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

We have argued that the 21st century warfighting enterprise is in need of a weapons revolution.  As the former Chief Scientist of the USAF, Dr. Mark Lewis put it: : “Why are we putting 3rd and 4th generation weapons on 5th generation aircraft?

https://sldinfo.com/building-21st-century-weapons-for-21st-century-operations-key-attributes-of-the-new-weapons-enterprise/

We have argued as well that the coming of a hypersonic cruise missile to the force will be a key game changer but that we saw that fitting into what we have called the S Cubed Revolution, namely Sensors, Speed and Stealth.

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-an-s-cubed-combat-revolution-preparing-for-the-coming-hypersonic-cruise-missile-threat/

When we visited Jax Navy, we discovered that the P-8 is a key plank holder in the S Cubed Revolution and a key candidate for new weapons, and is more than prepared to leverage a weapons revolution.

During the two days we spent at Jax Navy, virtually every member of the team mentioned that the P-8 was flying legacy weapons but was ready to do much more with new weapons.

This point was especially driven home by the Deputy Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing ELEVEN, Captain James Robinson (see bio below).

“Because the P-8 operates with the common 1760 Bus which is a common weapons standard for smart weapons, the only limit is your imagination with regard to what weapons might be put on the P-8 in the future.

It is forward compatible with future smart weapons.”

At some point in the future, the P-8 could be in the battlespace armed with hypersonic cruise missiles to go with its capability to see deep into the battlespace.  By building key capabilities for prevailing in the extended battlespace, the USN is building towards the future as it deploys in the present.

During a visit to RAF Lossiemouth earlier this year, there was chance to discuss the coming of the P-8 to the RAF.  The key RAF officer had met with a Navy Captain who had deployed with the P-8 to the Joint Warrior exercise.  During that meeting, the RAF officer highlighted that he was very impressed with the aircraft and very interested in the weapons hard points on the aircraft and their potential for operating in the North Atlantic.

It turns out that the USN Captain involved was none other than Captain Robinson who remembered the exchange well and in his train and equip role was talking with the Brits about future infrastructure for support to the P-8. RAF Lossiemouth is one of the candidate bases for operating UK P-8s as well.

Captain Robinson had worked earlier for Admiral Gortney who in our interview with him had highlighted the threats at the 10 and 2 O’Clock to North America, and when at Joint Warrior, Captain Robinson was operating in the 2’Oclock.

Norway is interested as well in the P-8 which then create a significant interlocking force. For Norway, because the P-8 is not a P-3, they would benefit from seeing much deeper into the maritime space to protect their interests.  It is not just about flying to an area of interest and patrolling it.  When you take off with the P-8 you link into the data network and are on station when you take off.

As Captain Robinson put it:

“With the P-3 we flew together and shaped a common operating picture largely by voice communication or the archaic link 11.

It was always a challenge.

With the P-8 we can share data electronically over hundreds of miles being able to link with other line of site contributors.

We will be able to have maritime domain awareness over huge square miles of ocean that can be covered by a single P8, even before we discuss what Triton brings to the effort.

You have a single sensor that from the time aircraft depart is operating miles and miles away, having domain awareness and feeding a common operational picture to the commander or a set of commanders.

That’s incredible.”

The P-3 experience is important in terms of working collaboratively and that aspect of the P-3 is being carried forward with the P-8/Triton dyad.

“I had extensive experience with the P-3s and worked closely throughout with foreign military’s Air Forces or Navy’s.

This collaborative foundation will be carried forward with the P-8/Triton community.”

We discussed the advantages and challenges of software upgradeability but this is now a baseline going forward for operating 21st century air combat systems.

“The clear advantage is that you can input operational experience into the software development cycle.

We are in a continuous development cycle.”

The challenge is “configuration control and getting everyone on the same page operationally.”

We discussed as well how the P-8/Triton community was interfacing with the surface fleet from the round up.

“We are sending Liaison Officers to the fleet to share knowledge about our capabilities and to learn from the surface fleet about their evolving needs and capabilities as well.

We are building this from the ground up.”

He highlighted the key role, which exercises are playing as well in shaping the way ahead.

He mentioned a recent exercise off of the Virginia Capes working with the Amphibious Fleet to shape a more effective operational capabilities as well.

It is notable as well that the P-8s although a recent addition to the fleet has flown a round the world trip (the Great White Fleet 21st century style) and has engaged in several multinational exercises or visits already, such as with Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Japan, Red Flag, etc.

Robinson noted that “although the “P-8s core competence is ASW; but it has been bought and developed as a multi-mission aircraft as well.”

We would add multinational as well.

Notably, the British Defense Minister recently visited Jax Navy and got an update on the aircraft coming to the RAF as well.

As an article in the Jax Air News published on May 18, 2016 noted about the Minister’s visit:

The Right Honorable Michael Fallon, MP, the British Secretary of Defense, visited NAS Jacksonville May 9 where he met with Royal Air Force (RAF) “Project Seedcorn” personnel who have been embedded within the VP-30 maritime patrol training program since 2012. He also announced the RAF’s intent to sign its initial order for nine Boeing P-8A aircraft this summer. They expect to accept their first P-8A in mid-2019.

RAF Squadron Leader Mark Faulds said the purpose of the visit was for Fallon to experience the Boeing P-8A Poseidon first hand, inside and out, in order to gain a better understanding of the multi-mission aircraft’s capabilities. VP-16 provided the P-8A static display.

The secretary was also briefed at the P-8A Integrated Training Center by VP-30 Commanding Officer Capt. Dave Whitehead, and Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 11 Capt. Anthony Corapi.

Faulds explained that Project Seedcorn consists of 11 RAF personnel (two pilots, four TACCOs and five EWOs) who have trained on U.S. Navy P-8A aircraft embedded with Fleet Replacement Squadron VP-30 personnel since 2012.

The program enables British servicemen to maintain skills that would otherwise have been lost due to the cancellation of the outdated British Nimrod program in 2010.

Project Seedcorn also counts nine personnel embedded with squadron VX-1 at NAS Patuxent River, Md. By 2013, all Seedcorn personnel were certified P-8A instructors.

The defense secretary said, “This new fleet of nine maritime patrol aircraft will help to protect our nuclear submarines and surface ships. We can make this investment because we are increasing defense spending every year of this decade. That enables us to meet the NATO two percent commitment and keep Britain safe.”

http://jaxairnews.jacksonville.com/military-jax-air-news/2016-05-18/story/uk-defense-secretary-checks-out-poseidon#.V0dhk1d5w7k

The Minister’s visit to Jax River is a visible reminder of the key working relationship between the US and the RAF and Royal Navy which is enabled by key Navy leaders such as Captain Robinson and the team which visited RAF Lossiemouth as part of Joint Warrior 2016.

CAPT Robinson Biography

CAPT Robinson is a native of Modesto, California and enlisted in the United States Navy in September 1983.  Following completion of the Nuclear Power program he served onboard the FLORIDA (SSBN 728 Gold) and Submarine NR-1, while earning Bachelor of Science degrees in Sociology and Nuclear Technologies.  In September 1991, CAPT Robinson was initiated as a Chief Petty Officer (EMC SS/DV) and accepted to Aviation Officer Candidate School; he was commissioned in March 1992 and designated a Naval Flight Officer in April 1993.

CAPT Robinson’s aviation assignments include:  VP-40 where he completed two Misawa, Japan deployments and one Diego Garcia deployment.  VP-30 where he served as an NFO instructor, IUT Instructor, Lead NFO Fleet NATOPS evaluator and Weapons Tactics Unit subject matter expert for the Stand-off Attack Missile (SLAM), participating in SLAM strikes during air campaign in Kosovo and designated as a P-3C Weapons Tactics Instructor (WTI).

VP-40 as the first Maritime Patrol Aviation “Super JO” where he served as the Tactics Department Head and deployed to Diego Garcia and Misawa, Japan flying over 400 hours overland Afghanistan in the opening months of Operation Enduring Freedom.

VP-46 where he served as Command Service Officer, Tactics Officer, Training Officer and Operations Officer and deployed to Misawa, Japan.

VP-10 as Executive Officer and the squadron’s 73rd Commanding Officer where the RED LANCERS completed a tri-site deployment to CENTCOM, AFRICOM and PACOM and awarded the 2009 COMNAVAIRLANT Battle E, Golden Wrench for maintenance excellence and the CFFC Retention Excellence Award.

CAPT Robinson’s shore assignments include:  The Joint Staff, J-6 directorate where he served as an Action Officer within the Spectrum Division.  NAVCENT HQ where he served as the Deputy Commander of Task Force FIVE SEVEN in support of combat operations for Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom and New Dawn. USCENTCOM HQ, J-5 directorate where he served as the Arabian Peninsula Branch Chief and Strategic Planner.

CAPT Robinson’s education includes Master degrees from the Naval War College and Air War College as well as JPME I and II.

CAPT Robinson transitioned to the P-8 and assumed the duties as Deputy Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing ELEVEN in July 2015.

His personal declarations include:  Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service (2), Meritorious Service (2), Air Medal (2nd strike), Navy Commendation (4), Navy Achievement (6) and the Good Conduct Medal.

The first slideshow of aircraft at Joint Warrior 2016 are credited to the RAF.

Global Defence Trade 2015

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/19/2016

2016-06-19  By defenceWeb

The global defense trade reached a record-breaking $65 billion in 2015 fueled by conflict in the Middle East and military spending in Southeast Asia.

This is according to the annual Global Defence Trade Report released on 13 June by IHS Inc.

The report found that the Middle East was the largest importing region, with $21.6 billion in deliveries of defense equipment.

Total defense spending accelerated in Asia-Pacific as states bordering the South China Sea boosted defense spending.

France has doubled its backlog of orders from $36 billion in 2014 to $55 billion, meaning that $55 billion worth of defense equipment has yet to be exported.

This increase means that France will overtake Russia as the second-largest global defense equipment exporter.

Egyptian Rafales. Credit: Dassault.
Egyptian Rafales. Credit: Dassault.

Germany moved from fifth- to third- largest exporter and the UK dropped from fourth to fifth. The largest global exporter, the United States, saw another 10 percent increase in exports over the past year, bringing the total to $23 billion (35 percent of the global total).

South Korea saw exports climb again to $871 million while there was significant change in the top five importing countries, with Taiwan, China and Indonesia all dropping out of the top five and Australia, Egypt and South Korea replacing them.

“The global defense trade market has never seen an increase as large as the one we saw between 2014 and 2015,” said Ben Moores, senior analyst at IHS. “2015 was a record-breaking year.” Markets rose $6.6 billion, bringing the value of the global defense market in 2015 to $65 billion. IHS forecasts that the market will increase further to $69 billion in 2016.

The largest Middle Eastern importers remain among the largest globally in 2015. Saudi Arabia and the UAE imported $11.4 billion (17.5 percent of the global total) worth of defense systems in 2015, up from $8.6 billion in 2014, according to the report.

“The combined value of Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s defense imports is more than all of Western Europe’s defense imports combined,” Moores said. Saudi Arabia’s imports grew from $6 billion to $9.3 billion; an increase that is three times that of the entire sub-Saharan Africa market.

“The US, Canada, France and the UK are the main exporters of defense equipment to the Middle East and beneficiaries of this spending boom,” Moores said.

The IHS report indicates that US trade flow to the Middle East has been driven by sales of military aircraft and associated mission systems.

Canada is the second-largest exporter of defense equipment to the Middle East with $2.7 billion in sales, moving the UK down the table to fourth place, just behind France. Germany and Russia each saw a 25 percent growth in exports to the region of $1.4 and $1.3 billion, respectively.

Russia is likely to increase its trade in the region as post-sanctions Iran begins to replace its exhausted aviation assets.

In 2018, France will move from the third to the second largest global exporter of defense equipment, pushing Russia down the table for the first time in decades.

“France has revived its defense industry and had spectacular back-to-back year of sales,” Moores said. “2014 and 2015 were France’s best-selling years in decades.”

France sold $26 billion of defense equipment, $8 billion in 2014 and $18 billion in 2015. In 2016, France secured the record-breaking $38.7 billion Australian submarine order.

This extended run has increased the French 10-year backlog for defense exports from $36.1 billion to $54 billion in 2016. These sales have included Rafale multi-role fighter aircraft, submarines and helicopters. The bulk of the sales went to India, Saudi Arabia, Australia, Qatar, Egypt and the UAE.

The value of military imports throughout Western Europe rose from $7.9 billion in 2013 to $9.6 billion in 2015. “This notable climb takes Western European imports back to 2010 levels but not their 2009 high point of $12 billion,” Moores said.

Nearly all of Western Europe’s military import gains in 2015 have come from Norway, pan-European programs and the UK.

UK imports nearly doubled as imports of MARS tanker ships from South Korea and CH-47 helicopters from the United States have commenced.

Total defense spending accelerated in Asia Pacific as states bordering the South China Sea boosted their defense spending.

Between 2009 and 2016, defense imports rose 71 percent in the region.

The United States continued to top the export table in 2015 having supplied $22.9 billion worth of goods and equipment compared with $20.7 billion worth 2014, $18.3 billion in 2013 and $12.9 billion in 2009.

This dramatic rate of growth cannot be tied to one particular factor but, going forwards, the total may exceed $30 billion as deliveries of the F-35 begin to ramp up, according to IHS.

This rise could be derailed by sustained low oil prices because, for the US, the Middle East is a key region for exports.

The United States delivered $8.8 billion worth of equipment to the Middle East in 2015.

The IHS report covers production, R&D, logistic support and service revenues where there is an export but does not cover munitions and small arms and anything under 57mm caliber was not included in the study.

The IHS report on global defense trades is in line with other figures. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), world military spending totaled almost $1.7 trillion in 2015, an increase of one percent in real terms from the previous year.

The 2015 increase is the first in military spending since 2011 and reflects continuing growth in Asia and Oceania, central and Eastern Europe and some Middle Eastern states.

The decline in spending in the West is also leveling off.

At the same time, spending decreased in Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus, the global military expenditure picture is mixed, according to SIPRI.

The United States remained by far the world’s biggest spender in 2015, despite its expenditure falling by 2.4% to $596 billion. Among the other top spenders, China’s expenditure rose by 7.4% to $215 billion, Saudi Arabia’s grew by 5.7 % to $87.2 billion – making it the world’s third-largest spender – and Russia’s increased by 7.5% to $66.4 billion.

A combination of high oil prices and new oil discoveries and exploitation has contributed to a surge in military spending in many countries around the world in the past decade, SIPRI said. However, the crash in oil prices that started in 2014 has begun to reverse this trend in many oil revenue-dependent countries and further cuts in spending are expected this year.

Despite declining oil revenues, several other oil-exporting countries continued to increase military spending in 2015. Many of these countries – notably Algeria, Azerbaijan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Vietnam – were involved in conflict or faced with heightening regional tensions.

However, Russia’s expenditure was lower than projected in its budget, and Saudi Arabia’s spending would have fallen but for the additional $5.3 billion cost of its military intervention in Yemen.

Russia and Saudi Arabia are planning cuts in 2016.

In Africa military spending fell by 5.3% following 11 years of continuously rising spending, SIPRI research found. This was mainly due to the large cut by Angola, the largest spender in sub-Saharan Africa in the wake of the sharp fall in oil prices.

Republished with permission of our partner defenceWeb

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=43915:global-defence-trade-reaches-a-record-breaking-65-billion-in-2015-report&catid=7:Industry&Itemid=116

Exercise Malabar 2016: US, Indian and Japanese Navies Collaborate on Maritime Security

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-06-19  The process of enhanced cooperation among the US, Japanese and Indian navies is proceeding apace.

The Chinese have already driven a deeper defense relationship between the two most important Pacific naval powers in the 20th century and now are putting the Indians in play as well.

Enhanced cooperation provides ways to shape joint operations and joint procurement as well.

The P-8 is a case in point

The Malabar 2016 exercise currently underway is doing just that, enhancing the joint interoperability capabilities of the three forces.

In a visit to Jax Navy, a USN Officer involved earlier in working with Indian P-8s described the experience this way:

The P-8I is different from the P-8A with a different sensor suite, one which provides more emphasis on coastal defense as well.

“We operated from their P-8I base at INS Rajali.

We found them to be very professional and we operated together from that base.

They are building the infrastructure there to support their P-8Is.

They see P-8I as critical to how they’re going to operate in the future.

They had a lot of questions about how we operated.

We had questions about how they operated.

And at the time they were the only other country operating P-8.”

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-most-experienced-p-8-squadron-and-shaping-the-way-ahead-an-interview-with-the-co-and-xo-of-vp-16/

According to an article by MC2 Ryan Batchelder from the Stennis Strike Group Public Affairs:

SASEBO, Japan – Ships from the Indian Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and U.S. Navy departed U.S. Fleet Activities Sasebo to conduct the at-sea phase of exercise Malabar 2016, June 14.

A trilateral maritime exercise, Malabar is designed to enhance dynamic cooperation between Indian Navy, JMSDF and U.S. Navy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.

The exercise allows for practical training, while exchanging skills and cultures, and helps to increase the understanding of multinational operations.

“At its core, originally, Exercise Malabar was started [in 1992] as a bilateral exercise between the Indian Navy and the U.S.,” said Capt. Jason Gilbert, U.S. Naval attaché to India. “The Japanese (JMSDF) became a permanent partner in 2015, and we are now starting to see the benefits of Malabar being a trilateral exercise.”

Ships will spend the at-sea phase of Malabar in the Philippine Sea to advance the participating nations’ military-to-military coordination and capacity to plan and execute tactical operations in a multinational environment.

“It’s great to see the details and planning from the harbor phase [of Malabar] come to fruition at sea,” said Lt. Cmdr. Brent Jackson, executive officer of the guided-missile cruiser USS Mobile Bay (CG 53) that is participating in Malabar. It’s amazing to see thousands of tons of steel come together on the water and operate as seamlessly as we had planned.”

Malabar 2016 builds on progress made during previous exercises, improving participating nations’ abilities to conduct joint operations, and improve trilateral coordination and capacity.

SASEBO, Japan (June 14, 2016) Senior naval commanders from the Indian Navy, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and U.S. Navy pose for a photo before getting underway for exercise Malabar 2016's at-sea phase. A trilateral maritime exercise, Malabar is designed to enhance dynamic cooperation between the Indian Navy, JMSDF and U.S. Navy Forces in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. (U.S. Navy photo by Ensign Davis Anderson/RELEASED)
SASEBO, Japan (June 14, 2016) Senior naval commanders from the Indian Navy, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and U.S. Navy pose for a photo before getting underway for exercise Malabar 2016’s at-sea phase. A trilateral maritime exercise, Malabar is designed to enhance dynamic cooperation between the Indian Navy, JMSDF and U.S. Navy Forces in the Indo-Asia-Pacific. (U.S. Navy photo by Ensign Davis Anderson/RELEASED)

“We have a variety of exercises planned for the at-sea phase of Malabar,” said Gilbert. “We are doing the full spectrum of things that you can possibly do at sea in a short period of time. The more we can understand how each nation works together translates into easier facilitation of operations in the future.”

Areas of proficiency that will be exercised include surface events; visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) exercises; subject matter and professional exchanges; maritime patrol and reconnaissance scenarios; and anti-submarine warfare operations.

“Mobile Bay is out here to be a strong partner in supporting our allies in the exercises’ upcoming operations,” said Jackson. “Both during the harbor phase, and now at sea, we are part of a much larger team and we look forward to executing our mission together as professionals.”

Jackson added that three nations coming together to conduct complex, multi-national operations and maintaining presence helps to preserve peace and stability in the region and further enhances maritime partnerships between allied nations.

“Interoperability is crucial, because if we ever have to work together in a real-world scenario, we will have had the necessary training and preparation to the point where our operations become second nature,” said Gilbert. “Working together is what Malabar is all about.”

And this article published by the Indian Navy provides further details as well.

In consonance with India’s ‘Act East Policy’ and growing relations among India, US and Japan, IN ships Satpura, Sahyadri, Shakti and Kirch are participating in the 20th edition of Ex MALABAR-16 with the USN and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF).

IN and USN have regularly conducted the annual bilateral exercise named ‘MALABAR’ since 1992. Since 2007, MALABAR has been held alternatively off India and in the Western Pacific.

The 19th edition of the exercise, Ex MALABAR-15, was conducted off Chennai and included participation by the JMSDF.
The 20th edition of the exercise, Ex MALABAR-16, is being conducted from 14 to 17 June 16 with the harbour phase at Sasebo from 10 to 13 June 16 and the sea phase in the Pacific Ocean from 14 to 17 June 16.

The primary aim of this exercise is to increase interoperability amongst the three navies and develop common understanding of procedures for Maritime Security Operations.

Malbar 2016 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

The scope of MALABAR-16 includes professional interactions in harbour and a diverse range of activities at sea, including complex surface, sub-surface and air operations.

The IN ships participating in the exercise are from the Eastern Fleet and include INS Sahyadri and INS Satpura, indigenously built guided missile stealth frigates, INS Shakti, a modern fleet tanker and support ship and INS Kirch, an indigenous guided missile corvette. The ships have embarked one Sea King 42B ASW helicopter and two Chetak utility helicopters.

The US Navy will be represented by ships from CTF 70 of the USN 7th fleet, which is based at Yokosuka, Japan. The CTF will include the aircraft carrier USS John C Stennis (CVN 74), Ticonderoga class Cruiser USS Mobile Bay and Arleigh Burke class destroyers USS Stockdale and USS Chung Hoon, all with embarked helicopters. In addition, one nuclear powered submarine, carrier wing aircraft and Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft will also participate in the exercise.

The JMSDF will be represented by JS Hyuga, a helicopter carrier with SH 60 K integral helicopters and Long Range Maritime Patrol aircraft, besides other advanced warships for specific parts of the exercise.

Additionally, the Special Forces (SF) of the three navies will also interact during the exercise.

MALABAR–16 will be another significant step in strengthening mutual confidence and inter-operability as well as sharing of best practices between the Indian, Japanese and US Navies.

The exercise will support maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region, and benefit the global maritime community.

The video above shows the John C. Stennis Strike Group, the Indian Navy, and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force taking part in exercise Malabar 2016.

Credit: US NAVY, 6/17/16

An Update on US-Indian Developments

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
06/16/2016

2016-06-16  By Gulshan Luthra

India Strategic

Ever since President Bill Clinton…. Washington has steadily made attempts to come closer to New Delhi.

President Clinton was impressed by India’s measured response in launching the limited Kargil War in 1999 to evict the Pakistani army from the Kashmir heights it had intruded into. In fact, when Islamabad made ‘foolish’ suggestions to use nuclear weapons against India, Mr. Clinton is reported to have drawn attention of the Pakistani leaders to an Indian response which would have simply deleted that country.

The events at that time apparently convinced the US administration of India’s growing maturity, and in 2005, the State Department decided to seek strategic relations with India, declare it a global player, and offered to sell a variety of sophisticated weapons to India.

In fact, a month before the State Department gave indications in this regard, US companies welcomed Indian journalists at the IDEX’05 defense show in February in Abu Dhabi. I happened to be there, and was surprised to learn that from Raytheon to Lockheed Martin and Sikorsky and Boeing that everyone was looking forward to sell arms to India.

The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting with the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Ashton Carter, in Washington DC, USA on June 07, 2016.
The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting with the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Ashton Carter, in Washington DC, USA on June 07, 2016.

It was there that Ambassador Thomas Pickering, a former US envoy to New Delhi and then a Board Member of Boeing, told me that the F/A-18 Super Hornet was on offer to the Indian Air Force (IAF). In fact, he had just reached the UAE capital after attending the Aero India show in Bangalore, where he had interacted with the Ministry of Defence and IAF.

I was surprised and wrote in a local newspaper that “looks like, Uncle Sam is ready to offer AMRAAM, SLAMRAAM AND DamnRAMM to India.” (The first two items are advanced missiles made by Raytheon).

In 2004, US sold Raytheon’s Weapon Locating Radars (WLRs) to the Indian Army under the first Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deal. Ever since, US companies have logged about $12 to $14 billion worth of sales to India, though mostly by Boeing.

Many items are still in the pipeline, and both Lockheed Martin and Boeing are also back in the fray to sell their respective F-16 Super Viper and F/A-18 Super Hornet aircraft which had lost to the French Rafale in the MMRCA competition.

Both these aircraft, BAE Systems’ M777 howitzers with Raytheon’s Excalibur munitions, Honeywell’s jet engines for Jaguar aircraft and Sikorsky’s helicopters should be on the agenda of Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics when he visits New Delhi in July to follow on the visit of the Indian Prime Minister.

IAF is loaded with old 1970s and 1980s generation aircraft, and has been pressing the Government for new generation manned and unmanned combat assets.

On top of India’s list is Predator C, or Avenger, the latest unmanned precision strike machine being rolled out by General Atomics.

The two countries have been in informal discussions for some time in this regard, but as it could be sold to India only after its entry into the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), New Delhi has formally mentioned this in a wish list during the just-concluded visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Washington.

It wouldn’t still be easy for the US to sell this most sophisticated technology to India, even after declaring it as a Major Defense Partner, given the history of uneasy relations between the two countries.

New technologies are difficult to part with or share, but then, Washington has shared the best of its airborne anti-submarine technologies on board its Navy’s Boeing P8 Poseidon with the Indian Navy in the form of P-8I.

Nonetheless, at best, President Barack Obama, who has been as friendly to India as his predecessor George Bush was, can ask the State and Defense Departments to consider the Indian request. A lot of decisions would be left to his successor who would take over in January 2017.

There would be riders; India could be asked to opt for at least one of the two aircraft. After all, IAF needs to replace most of its inventory and the deal with France for Rafales is going to be limited, given the cost issues that have erupted between New Delhi and Paris. India has asked for 36 aircraft, or two squadrons. IAF wants some more, but the bulk of the required numbers would have to come from elsewhere.

IAF needs both single and twin engine aircraft but of the MMRCA type. Both Rafale and Super Hornet have twin engines while the F-16 has a single engine. Notably, the single engine Swedish Gripen is also making a very aggressive attempt to capture the IAF requirement.

What is eventually selected depends upon the Indian Ministry of Defence.

What is significant is that besides the critical parameters of equipment, strategic equations with the country of manufacture are going to have a clear and decisive role in the selection process.

New Delhi and Washington have had a history of unease, given the military alliances that the US forged with Pakistan since the 1950s. But Pakistan looks for money and weapons, and despite generous help from the US, is now known as an NMTP (Nuclear, Missile and Terror Proliferator) state.

The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the President of United States of America (USA), Mr. Barack Obama in Oval Office, at White House, in Washington DC, USA on June 07, 2016.
The Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi meeting the President of United States of America (USA), Mr. Barack Obama in Oval Office, at White House, in Washington DC, USA on June 07, 2016.

In its frenzy of unneeded hatred against India, Pakistan has also leaned towards China and given Beijing access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean for the first time through a land route connecting with its Gwadar port. This has long term implications for the region, particularly as China has declared that it is going to preposition naval assets – like aircraft carriers and submarines apparently – in different oceans.

China has already shaken its littoral neighborhood by claiming most of the South China Sea.

There is combination of factors which will bring India and the US together, even though New Delhi is keeping a highly significant exit clause in its relations with Washington. There will be cooperation, but not in conflict!

But the relations are getting stronger.

Diplomatic Equations and Military Cooperation are set to grow, particularly in view of developments in the Indian Ocean and Pacific regions.

It is best to conclude here by what Mr. Modi himself said in his address to the US Congress:

“Mr. Speaker, My final thoughts and words would reiterate that our relationship is primed for a momentous future. The constraints of the past are behind us and foundations of the future are firmly in place.

In the lines of Walt Whitman, the Orchestra have sufficiently tuned their instruments, the baton has given the signal.

And to that, if I might add, there is a new symphony in play.”

http://www.indiastrategic.in/US-India_Strategic_Symphony.htm

For additional India Strategic stories looking at the evolving relationship, see the following:

http://www.indiastrategic.in/India_Joins_MTCR.htm

http://www.indiastrategic.in/India_Asks_US_for_Predator_C_Drones.htm