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The second Red Flag of 2016 featured an international coalition of NATO partners training against a dynamic and integrated “Red Adversary” Force.
The exercise running from February 29 to March 11 included some 23 units representing the US Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines and contingents from NATO partners the Aeronautica Militare (AM – Italian Air Force) and the Turkish Air Force (TAF).
Participating units launched from Nellis AFB in Las Vegas, and trained over the 2.9 million acres of land, and 12,000 sq miles of airspace afforded by the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR).
All told some 75 aircraft and 1700 personnel participated in the exercise.
This was the first Red Flag to feature the Italian Eurofighter Typhoon or F-2000 as it is called in Italy.
Italy participated with 8 F-2000s.
Some of those Typhoons accompanied the F-35 in its first trans-atlantic flight which landed at Pax River.
The Turkish Air Force AF participated with 6 F-16s and 2 KC-135R tankers, and US aircraft included the F-16CM, F-15E, F-15C, E-3G a variety of helicopters, drones (MQ-9), tankers (KC-135R) specialized aircraft and 2 of the 3 Global Strike Command bombers, the B-52H and B-1B.
This was the first time Turkey had come to Red Flag after the shutdown incident with the Russian Air Force.
The wide variety of aircraft are typical of a coalition force should it be thrust into battle.
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The Red Air units included dedicated F-16C Aggressor units supplemented by AT-38Cs from the 435th FTS of Randolph AFB and the 88th FTS of Sheppard AFB, participant in the Euro-NATO Joint Pilot Training Program. Fast and exhibiting a very small radar cross section the AT-38C is representative of the aircraft that many potential adversaries utilize today.
Often overlooked by commentators but not pilots, the Red Adversary Force includes ground assets that are very real threats.
Colonel A. Bernard AEW Commander for Red Flag 16-2 indicated that “the Red Adversary is an advanced, agile and integrated force that includes both air and surface threats, acts like a country, and the combined assets create the finest adversary that we could ever face.”
Air superiority efforts are not just fought against airborne assets, but encompass air, sea and land assets which can lead to denial of an air force’s ability to control air space.
While never long on details, suffice it to say there are radar emitters, SAM (Surface to Air Missile) sites, and a number of other challenging weapon systems (the participation of a virtual Patriot battery implies involvement in neutralizing surface to surface missiles fired by the Red Adversary) that the Blue Force must either avoid, or neutralize during each of the approx.
10 night and day sorties of the exercise. Mission sets flown by Blue Force include Close Air Support (CAS), Air to Ground (A2G), Air to Air (A2A), Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), Dynamic Targeting, Personnel recovery and more.
One of three command and control (C2) groups, a Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS-1) coordinated aircraft movement and tasking within their designated area.
C2 functions were also performed by the 726th Air Control Squadron and in the air by the 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron flying the E-3B/C/G. The US Navy was represented by the HCS-21 “BlackJacks” flying the MH-60 in primarily a personnel recovery mission.
The Turkish Air Force utilized the multi-role F-16 to its full spectrum in the exercise, while the Italian AM primarily used the F-2000 in an Air to Air role, though a couple F-2000s were utilized in a swing role, carrying Litening targeting pods and dropping inert GBU-16 Paveway IIs on designated range targets.
Colonel M. Bertoli the Italian AM detachment commander indicated that this is not the primary role the AM plans for the F-2000, however they are validating the capability for select operations and to support the ongoing export initiatives of the Eurofighter Typhoon.
Col. Bertoli indicated that “we consider it [Red Flag] the best training, so we brought our young pilots so they can train our Typhoon force for years come.
The AM thinks that this [Red Flag] is by far one of the best combat training environments our pilots can find all over the world.
So we committed ourselves and the Typhoons to train our pilots and to integrate them with our NATO partners to give them the possibility to have a great training and be ready of course for future operations with our NATO partners.”
Over the NTTR aircraft were observed integrating as one force in carefully planned missions.
Nationalities were of no issue.
Platform and unit capabilities defined each participants place within the integrated force, with all working together as a single unit to defeat the adversary and achieve mission goals.
EF-2000s primarily took on the battle for air supremacy from the advantage of high altitude, working with F-16s on Combat Air Patrol.
F-16CMs moved in from medium altitudes to perform SEAD, followed by F-15Es from medium altitudes combined with additional F-15Es and F-2000s from low altitudes attacking designated targets.
The B-1B appeared from medium or low altitude to attack their targets, while B-52Hs made target runs, turned, loitered and then attacked again and again.
Red Air threats had multiple lives and regenerated when killed ensuring a constant adversarial threat. Attack, counter attack, identify targets and vector assets to kill or be killed.
Captain R. Kearns, B-1B pilot from the 34th Bomb Squadron noted that while the missions were not typically different from what they normally train (medium and low altitude attack), it was unique to have so many diverse aircraft in the operating area and to look out on B-1Bs wing and note F-16 and F-15 escorts.
The exercise itself is only the beginning of learning.
After the mission, a lengthy debriefing takes place. The briefing is aided by the enhanced capability on the Nellis Range and by the recently launched E-3G that features the ability to clearly reconstruct the C2 activity.
Major C. Bulla of 414th Combat Training Squadron summarized succinctly, “better data, better learning, that’s why we are here.”
Col. Bernard defined the exercise well, “it is in fact putting together the team you have and use each strength to make 1+1 = 3.”
Mathematically impossible, but attainable within the context of synergistic teamwork.
The first of a two day conference on Air Power hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force featured a keynote presentation by the Minister of Defence.
This represented her first major policy statement after the release of the White Paper and associated documents.
For an American attending the conference what was clear was that the Minister has followed defense issues for a long time and has a demonstrated mastery of the issues.
This was no walking through a speech written by others, but a clear statement of how she saw the issues as part of the current government.
I have read through the White Paper documents and have written pieces providing some initial analyses.
Listening to the Minister certainly brought both context and emphasis to the White Paper.
One issue which jumped out was a clear statement of how the strategic environment had changed and the importance of Australia focusing its attention on modernizing defense and enhancing its capabilities to work with core allies, including its regional partners.
There was no free ride issue which one often sees with too many NATO partners.
A second issue was underscoring the importance of shaping an integrated force that was capable of flexible and agile operations, and with a high demand humanitarian work load for the Australian Defence Force, this means across the spectrum of operations.
A third issue – after emphasizing IT and networks – was a clear understanding that a modernized force may be great but without the proper infrastructure, including logistics, the modernization effort would not really have its intended effects.
It is of course not just improved ICT networks and systems and capability that will underpin our future Air Force over the next two decades.
One of the defining features of the 2016 Defence White Paper and Integrated Investment Program is the renewed focus on enabling capabilities.
In fact, 25 per cent of the Integrated Investment Program is allocated to the enabling projects, which help to bind our capabilities – whether it’s our airfields, our bases, our wharves, our ordnance facilities or our logistics systems, just to name several.
I have always felt that understanding the central role of logistics is a key discriminator between those who actually understand defense operations and those who do not.
Clearly, the Minister put herself on the side of defense professionals in her emphasis on funding the enabling factors.
2016 Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Conference – National Convention Centre, ACT
Tuesday, 15 March 2016
Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Let me begin by acknowledging the traditional owners of the land on which we meet this morning and pay my respects to their elders, past, present and future.
Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Davies, I thank you very much for the invitation to address this important event and for your kind words of introduction. I echo your welcome to all delegates to this conference. In particular, I extend a very warm welcome to the many visiting Chiefs of Air Forces and international delegations, particularly also to my Ministerial colleague, the Minister for Defence Materiel, Dan Tehan, to our important partners from industry and to our many other distinguished guests and invited speakers.
As the Chief of Air Force said, the fact that more than 1,000 delegates are gathered here today, including a significant number of international Air Force Chiefs, a contingent of United States Commanders in the Pacific, and senior Air Power representatives from around the world, does attest to the very high regard in which this conference is held. I welcome you all to our Nation’s capital.
I say in advance, before the morning unfolds too much further, that for me and for Minister Tehan, this is a Parliamentary sitting day. Not all of you have Ministers who are parts of your Parliament; some of you have Cabinets which sit separately from your Parliaments – or elected representatives. But for us, it is a case of be there in person to vote or else, as required by one’s leaders. So we will both be departing relatively soon after our speech this morning. Please don’t take that as a lack of interest, if I was choosing I promise you I would be spending a lot more time here than I would in my Parliamentary chamber today.
Ladies and gentlemen, this is a very important time for the Australian Department of Defence and also the Royal Australian Air Force. Three weeks ago, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and I released the 2016 Defence White Paper. This document is supported by a fully costed Integrated Investment Program and a Defence Industry Policy Statement. The White Paper sets out the Turnbull Government’s comprehensive and responsible long term plan to ensure Australia’s national security and to create a more capable, agile and potent ADF – the RAAF is at the heart of this plan.
Australia has long seen itself as the ‘lucky country’. Our richness in natural resources, geographic location, our historical and contemporary relationships, and a well educated, innovative and productive population have allowed us to benefit from the shift in global economic power to the Indo-Pacific region. However, as the White Paper makes clear, the parallel shift in strategic power makes for a more complex and demanding strategic environment. This may, in turn, give rise to a broader range of security challenges.
With our international partners, Australia works therefore to foster a rules-based global order. If Australia is to grasp the opportunities available to us and manage the risks, the Turnbull Government recognises that the ADF, including our Air Force, must become more capable, agile and potent. Furthermore we recognise that Australia’s strong network of regional and global Defence relationships will be even more important to us in the future.
So, in the White Paper for the first time we have prioritised and funded Defence’s international engagement as a core Defence function. The RAAF already has – and it will grow – a core role in our international engagement. Through the capability plans in the White Paper, the RAAF’s alibility to project its air power further across the globe will be strengthened.
The importance, for example, of our role in our region and, in this instance, in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief has been underscored by the devastating effects of Cyclone Winston in Fiji. Our RAAF C-17s carrying supplies and Army MRH-90 helicopters were among the earliest international responders to reach the devastated islands. The ADF continues to provide invaluable support to Fiji through operation FIJI ASSIST, with HMAS Canberra currently providing essential support on deployment, while the Army’s 2nd Combat Engineer Regiment is assisting in helping the nation to rebuild its critical infrastructure.
Over the next two decades Air Force will also be equipped with new and more capable platforms to patrol and respond on Australia’s vast maritime approaches. As foreshadowed in the White Paper, I can indicate today that the Government has approved the acquisition of four additional P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and response aircraft, bringing the total number of P-8As on order to 12. The Government is also considering the acquisition of seven MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft systems. These two platforms will replace the ageing AP-3C Orion aircraft, giving Australia a greater maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and response capacity.
The first of the Poseidons is expected to be delivered late this year and 12 aircraft will be in service by 2022. Pending government approval a further three aircraft are planned to enter service late in the 2020s and the Triton is planned to be introduced into service in 2023. While the Orion fleet has performed exceptionally on operations throughout its distinguished service, the last of these aircraft will be almost 40 years old when they retire from service.
Ladies and gentlemen, Air Force is already operating some of the sophisticated platforms that will contribute to the networked joint force the White Paper will deliver. I had the opportunity to fly aboard and see first-hand the impressive capabilities of the Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft and crew, which is currently part of our contribution to the campaign against Daesh in Iraq and Syria.
Australia’s Air Task Group forms the combat element of the Turnbull Government’s contribution to the Coalition efforts targeting Daesh. This Task Group, with its Super Hornets, Hornets, Wedgetail and KC-30 tanker aircraft, is a strong combat capability. In particular, it’s the interoperability of our aircraft, including our KC-30 tanker aircraft and Wedgetail, with our coalition partners that is bringing unique capabilities to the air campaign.
The Chief of the Defence Force, Mark Binskin, has previously remarked on the positive feedback he has received regarding the impressive capability of our Wedgetail aircraft. Our KC-30s and our C-17s are at the centre of our ability for our Air Force to deploy across the globe and to work with our international partners to promote our interests. That capability will be further increased with the acquisition of a further two KC-30s, bringing the total number to seven, further increasing our ability to project our air power and sustain humanitarian, combat, and search and rescue operations.
Over the next decade, the Australian Air Force’s capability will be further strengthened with the introduction into service of the Joint Strike Fighter, the Growler Electronic Attack aircraft and armed unmanned air systems. As the development of the Joint Strike Fighter continues, the pace of testing and evaluation is increasing and I am pleased that another two Australian pilots have recently been relocated to the United States to begin their training. Australia’s JSF aircraft remain on track to arrive in Australia in 2018 with Initial Operational Capability scheduled for 2021.
To maximise the capabilities of our current and future Air Force our systems must be networked and integrated to a degree not previously achieved. Air, land and maritime forces need to exploit the high level of connectivity made possible by use of systems uniting them through the space and cyber domains. Much work has already begun in this regard under Plan Jericho, to which the Chief of Air Force referred, to ensure we have a fully networked joint future force across air, space, electromagnetic and cyber.
With its modernised inventory, Air Force will introduce and develop capabilities that will enhance its ability to work jointly with its sister Forces, in many cases before the systems they will network with enter service with Army and Navy. The work being undertaken by Air Force now in exploring the “art of the possible” and reducing risk through experimentation and trials means that the benefits of a joint force will be more rapidly realised once the networked systems committed to in the White Paper enter Army and Navy service.
As the White Paper details, Defence’s ICT systems have not necessarily kept pace with the rapid advances in technology. To address this, we are making a significant commitment to modernising and transforming Defence’s communications and information systems so that we can take advantage of the changes and improvements in technology.
The Government also acknowledges that the greater our reliance on information systems, the greater the potential risks from cyberattacks. As a result we have also provided for significant investment in cyber capabilities to safeguard government agencies and critical infrastructure against cyberattack.
It is of course not just improved ICT networks and systems and capability that will underpin our future Air Force over the next two decades. One of the defining features of the 2016 Defence White Paper and Integrated Investment Program is the renewed focus on enabling capabilities. In fact, 25 per cent of the Integrated Investment Program is allocated to the enabling projects, which help to bind our capabilities – whether it’s our airfields, our bases, our wharves, our ordnance facilities or our logistics systems, just to name several.
We have upgrades underway at a number of airfields to accommodate some of our new capabilities including RAAF Base Tindal, Williamtown and Darwin. Over the next twenty years in fact, we will spend up to $3 billion in upgrading our airfields across Australia to ensure that our next generation capabilities are properly supported. Without the attention and commitment to deliver these enabling systems, the force multiplying effect of a joint force will not be realised. I know that air forces love their technology, but without the right people, technology can’t, doesn’t become capability.
In Australia, which is a multi-cultural society with a relatively modest population and a vast territory – that vast territory is landmass alone, close in size to that of all of Europe – but with a population less than one third of that of Germany’s. So, to deliver the capabilities of the technologically advanced Future Force outlined in the White Paper, the Government has also committed to grow the uniformed Defence Force to around 62,400 people over the next decade, which will be its largest size in two decades. To attract and sustain this expanded military work force, Defence must recruit and retain its workforce from across that very diverse society; a society in which more than a quarter of all people were born overseas, and over half of which are female.
In relation to women in the Air Force, they currently make up more than 18.5 per cent of Air Force personnel, with Air Force on track to reach its target of 25 per cent female representation by 2023. A number of initiatives are in place to embrace a more inclusive culture within Defence and significant work has been done to remove barriers to the career progression and employment of women, but there are still challenges, still barriers.
Australia has never had a female fighter pilot, although I am pleased to hear that may change very soon, with one female pilot in training right now to become a fast jet pilot. The challenge, though, is to ensure that she’s not the only one, and that there is a steady stream of young women entering these programs of which they’ve not traditionally been part.
We are also addressing the under representation of Indigenous Australians and culturally diverse sections of our society in the ADF. Yesterday I was at ‘the home of the soldier’ – Kapooka, our Army recruiting base – to launch Defence Force Recruiting’s new Indigenous recruitment campaign, which was another important step towards creating an ADF that reflects the community from which it is recruited and which it is entrusted to protect. So that recruiting program – #seeyourself – displays commitment of three of four young Indigenous Australians who’ve been in the ADF for 25 – 8 – 10 years themselves across the three services and asks the viewer to ‘see yourself’ in their jobs, in their roles, and it does it in their own words. It’s a very impactful, very powerful message to young Indigenous Australians that the Australian Defence Force is a great place to be and to come and work.
Ladies and gentlemen, as I’ve mentioned already today, the resources that this workforce will have at its disposal – the aircraft, the vessels, the vehicles, the technology and the information systems will be increasingly sophisticated. The Turnbull Government recognises that a strong, innovative and competitive Australian Defence Force industry is essential.
The Defence Industry Policy Statement, released alongside the White Paper, hasn’t been far from my side over the past three weeks. This document is designed to reset the relationship between industry and Defence; to maximise industry’s innovation potential and to ensure Defence can benefit from, frankly, some amazing capabilities being developed right here in Australia.
One of the key initiatives of the Industry Policy Statement is the Centre for Defence Industry Capability, which the Prime Minister and the Minister for Industry and I announced last week, will be centred in Adelaide. It will have national reach and it will ensure that the defence industry knows what Defence’s capability priorities are and importantly, it will help Defence identify what industry can offer because the Defence-Industry relationship for us is very much a two-way street.
The Joint Strike Fighter program is one area in which we have seen Australian industry compete and access export markets already worth $500 million, which is expected to rise to more than $2 billion by 2022-23. Over the last few months I’ve been lucky enough to visit a number of impressive small-to-medium enterprises that have developed – or are in the process of developing – cutting edge technologies that provide our Australian Defence Force with unique capabilities. The Centre for Defence Industry Capability will help foster the relationship with industry to build its capacity to drive innovation and to open export markets, so that we can find and help develop the next great Australian innovators and I know there are very many of them around this country.
Capability, agility, potency; these are the attributes the Government has invested in enhancing through its balanced approach to the future development of the Australian Defence Force as outlined in the 2016 White Paper. Cutting edge, networked, and integrated technology; an expanded and empowered workforce; and an engaged industrial base are the means of its delivery. And our Air Force is very much at the centre of our high-technology, Future Force.
Air Marshal Davies, I thank you very much for inviting me to address the Air Force’s Air Power Conference. I wish you and all of the participants, presenters and delegates a very productive conference and thank you for the opportunity to be here this morning.
The three Australian Service Chiefs – Air Marshal Davis (RAAF), Vice Admiral Tim Barrett (Royal Australian Navy) and Lieutenant General Angus J. Campbell, (Army) – provided a perspective on their services and the dovetailing of their efforts.
What was clear from the three presentations was the clear shared understanding each had of the central significance of the other services in achieving the outcomes desired by the ADF over all and in terms of strategic outcomes desired by the Government.
The RAAF Plan Jericho was dovetailing with similar plans of the other two services.
Chief of Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Leo Davis AO, CSC Addresses the Conference.
But there was a clear understanding that shaping convergence of networks and sharing of data to get the right information to the right person at the right time was clearly a challenge, but one central to the transformation of Australian forces.
In a discussion later in the day with Deputy Chief of the RAAF, Air Vice-Marshal Warren McDonald which will be published later, the Air Force leader underscored how farsighted Army leadership was in pushing the ADF towards more convergence on data sharing and joint operations.
He argued that the three services which focused on a core platform as a center point for shaping the convergence or in effect establishing a triangle of cross-cutting platforms/systems which could provide for a focus on the effort, namely Wedgetail or E-7 for the RAAF, the Hobart class frigate and its combat systems for the Navy, and the Army’s Battle Management Systems, including the Land Network Integration Center or LNIC for bringing together significant joint efforts.
In effect, because the RAAF was in the throes of a significant modernization and with the coming of the F-35, Plan Jericho was a lead element.
According to the RAAF chief, “Plan Jericho is designed to transform the RAAF into a fifth generation enabled force. This is not a singular airpower effort.” It is multi-domain and cross-cutting with the other services.
The Navy chief underscored that the new shipbuilding approach which was highlighted in the White Paper was about having continuous production and shaping technological refreshes throughout the life cycle of the fleet.
And doing so meant, that his fleet needed to effective connect with the other elements of the ADF force structure.
The P-8s and Wedgetails flown by air force obviously needed to be integrated into fleet operations and vice versa.
The Army Chief has an impressive and wide- ranging background and that background interacts nicely with the broad approach which he is bringing to his role as a leader for Army modernization understood in a much broader sense of providing for land operations within the multi-domain agile force which Australia is building.
Not only is shaping the right kind of C2 and ISR approach crucial, but shaping a new approach to Army Aviation is crucial as well. The Army is indeed undertaking a major rethink about Army Aviation and its look at its place within 21st century three-dimensional warfare.
Former Chief of the Defence Force, ACM Angus Houston, has been tasked to look at the reshaping of Army Aviation within a multi-dimensional 21st century force.
Army aviation lies at the seams of air and ground power and the Chief is clearly concerned that its role evolve effectively in terms of how airpower is overall transforming.
He underscored the need to shape ways for the various ISR systems to work effectively together going forward as the Army added new unmanned systems, and modified manned systems and to work with Wedgetail, JSF, P-8 and other Air Force systems coming online.
He argued that we can not assume the air dominance we have had in the past decade of land wars.
He argued for the formation of small, agile units, which could depend on, or not air support, and to ensure that they could be hard to find on the battlefield when necessary.
“We need to draw upon the past, but move forward towards a very different environment in shaping the Army of the future.”
Air Marshal Davis Meeting with the Australian Press
During the first day of the conference, Air Marshal Davis sat down with the Australian press and discussed additional issues with them which also provided insights in to his thinking about the way ahead.
He started by going back to an announcement made by the Minister that the RAAF would receive additional P-8s.
He was pleased, of course, but noted that the focus would clearly have to be on how to connect the P-8 to the overall force, both Navy and Air Force, and Army as well.
It was not just about adding a platform; but ensuring that it was a multi-dimensional capability as well.
He also discussed simulation, including Live Virtual Constructive Training, and argued that the expanded ranges over which an agile force needed to operate was a challenge for Australia and its allies.
Foreign Chiefs of Air Force with Australian Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Leo Davis, AO, CSC.
And he saw simulation as part of getting live exercises more advanced in terms of operational training by ensuring that systems worked with one another much earlier in the training process so that more effort can be placed on achieving desired outcomes from an operation.
When asked about Middle East operations, he noted that on occasion the RAAF has gone into Syria but has largely operated outside of Syria.
He noted that they had no incidences with Russian aircraft, but obviously took account of their operations, and given the reach of the Wedgetail system, the RAAF was able to operate more effectively even in Syrian airspace.
Two policy questions were raised.
The first was about statements made by PACAF that suggested there was a US interest in basing aircraft, including bombers, in Australia.
The RAAF chief dismissed these concerns as he argued that US aircraft were cycling through Australia regularly, but there were no plans to forward base US aircraft in Australia.
In should be noted that the previous PACAF, now the ACC Commander, General “Hawk” Carlisle focused on places not bases as the USAF approach in the Pacific.
While the US was clearly interested in shaping mobile and flexible deployment packages, such as Rapid Raptor with 4 F-22s and a C-17 for support, which could rotate through places like Australia, this was clearly not about permanent basing.
The second was about the regional response to Chinese actions in the South China Sea.
Interestingly, the Air Marshal highlighted that the presence of the regional air bosses at the Airpower conference provided an opportunity to discuss mutual concerns and responses.
Clearly, there was an interest on Australia’s part to understand the perceptions of the various regional players and how they might respond.
But the Australian response was clear both at the government level and from the Air Marshal.
The Australian government underscores the importance of rule based behavior in the area, obviously having in mind the Chinese trying to make up their own rules.
And the Air Marshal said that the focus was ensuring that we could do for the next fifty years what we have done for the last in terms of transit and “gateway continuity.”
Editor’s Note: The biennial Air Power Conference on 15 and 16 March 2016, explores the idea of seamless joint effects.
The theme of Multi-Domain Integration – Enabling Future Joint Success explores the integration of air, sea, land, space and cyber operations to evolve to a truly joint force.
Day one focused on strategic multi-domain integration, while day two focuses on the implementation of operations through Plan Jericho.
Norway is in a unique position with regard to the future of the Arctic.
The Norwegian High North is a key part of Norwegian territory and with decades of development of energy supplies on the Norwegian continental shelf has established approaches and procedures for the future development of energy supplies in the High North/Arctic region.
The High North is an elastic concept in Norwegian policy which covers its bundle of interests in the Arctic region, and will evolve over time as the template for dealing with the challenges, including those posed by Russia are engaged and dealt with.
“What can be expected is not the disappearance of the High North as a high-profiled topic in Norwegian public discourse ad politics, but occasional and gradual shifts of emphasis in its contents and directions (Fridtjdf Nansen Institute, 2010).”
They directly face Russia and have needed to shape a working relationship with Russia for regional development and security, which means that cooperative safety, development and security are part of the Norwegian profile.
Yet the Norwegians are clearly concerned with Russian policies in Europe and beyond, and view defense as part of the overall development and security mix.
Norway’s Air Force F-16 fighters (R) and Italy’s Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon fighters participated in Arctic Challenge Exercise 2015. (/ Ints Kalnins) / Reuters).
The challenge of course is to cooperate with, compete and protect one’s sovereignty against a very large neighbor with an assertive global agenda.
As it was put in the December 2006, Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy:
“It is a question of our ability to continue our tradition of responsible management of resources, predictable exercise of sovereignty and close coopeation with our neighbors, partners, and allies.
But it is also a question of a broad, long term mobilization of our own strengths and resources….”
Norway faces a complicated balancing act, and because their leadership in forging a way ahead in dealing with a competitive Russia is in advance of the opening up of much of the Arctic, they are shaping a template for the other Arctic powers as well.
The energy side of the equation is pretty straightforward from the Norwegian point of view – Europe needs energy diversity in order to have a secure future.
There is clear concern with how the Germans have over-relied on Russian natural gas supplies, and the latest Nordstream proposals, known as Nordstream 2, would only enhance Germany’s dependence on Russia, something which concerns Norway.
The pipeline would solve a problem for Russia and Germany, namely this gas pipeline would avoid the troubled Ukrainian region.
Nord Stream 2 is a second pipeline that is being built by Russian energy giant Gazprom and Germany’s BASF and E.ON energy companies.
It will run in parallel to the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was completed in 2011 and sends gas under the Baltic Sea directly from Russia to Germany. In doing so, the pipeline weakens Ukraine’s role as the major transit country for Russian gas exports to Europe.
In a presentation to the Atlantic Council in Washington DC on February 25, 2016, Tord Lien, Norway’s Minister of Petroleum and Energy, provided his perspective on Norway, the High North and European Energy Security.
Having grown up in the Norwegian High North, the Minister emphasized that Norway unlike other members of the Arctic Council were working their resources in the region virtually year round.
Known as the Blue Arctic, Norway is able to extend its production techniques shaped in the Norwegian Continental Shelf to the Arctic region.
He focused on the importance of shaping a global natural gas market, and upon the contributions which natural gas can provide as Europe gets off of the use of coal, such as the current UK government has stated as a strategic objective.
Energy security in the broad sense for Europe, for the Minister, was having a diversity of supplies. Norway and Russia are the top natural gas suppliers to the European market, and by having the Norwegian channel as well as LNG imports from the United States, and growing supplies from Africa, Europe would not need to be dependent upon Russia, which would, thereby, enhance Norway’s security.
The Norwegians have made it clear that they seek cooperation with the Russians in shaping rules of effective development, safety and security in the development of the Arctic region.
But the defense of Norwegian sovereignty is not to be based on Russian good will.
The Norwegians are reshaping their defense forces to become more integrated with safety and security forces and to provide for the kind of capability which could provide for on the spot defense of sovereignty.
The approach was laid down in the 2006 strategy document:
“Norway will maintain its presence, and exercise its sovereignty and authority in part through “the presence of the armed forces is vital for meeting national security needs and maintaining our crisis management capacity in the High North.”
The relationship with Norway’s NATO partners is seen as a key part of the effort, and the hosting of Cold Response exercises is an example of Norway’s focus upon evolving real capabilities for defense of the region.
In this year’s version of Cold Response more than 15,000 military personnel from 14 nations participated.
As the Norwegian Ministry of Defense put the purpose of the exercise:
“Norwegian winter can be extreme, and the cold and changing conditions might be unfamiliar and surprising to many. In case of an emergency situation, military personnel need experiece with combat operations in cold weather.
Norway is ideally suited for this kind of winter training, and exercises like Cold Response give us the opportunity to test and confirm our plans and tactics. Cold Response also strengthens cooperation between military and civilian organizations, and military cooperation between the participating countries.”
The Norwegian Minister of Defense visited U.S. Marines during Exercise Cold Response 16 at a training location near Steinkjer, Norway, March 2, 2016.
The increased spending of Norway upon army, naval and air systems to contribute more effectively to the dynamic protection of Norway’s sovereignty is also part of the mix.
The 2006 strategy document highlighted that a primary task of its military is “to provide background information for national decision-making through up-to-date surveillance and intelligence….(and that) such information is crucial both as regards natural resources and the environment and as regards civilian and military developments.”
This is certainly why the Norwegians is adding the F-35 to its force and looking to integrate it with its overall ISR, C2 and defensive capabilities, such as their P-3s and Aegis ships.
The goal is to shape an interactive dynamic among development, safety, security and defense to provide for the kind of engagement which Norway wishes to have with Russia. Norway clearly seeks cooperation but also to find ways to best protect Norwegian sovereign interests,
Norway’s Minister of Defence, Ine Eriksen Søreide, in front of the country’s first F-35 combat aircraft. (Photo: Torgeir Haugaard/Forsvaret)
This topic was discussed recently in Canada by the Norwegian Ambassador to Canada at the Conference on Security held in Ottowa, Canada on February 19, 2016.
At that event the Ambassador highlighted the importance of the Arctic and the challenge of dealing with Russia.
According to the Ambassador, to understand the rationale behind Norway’s approach it is often instructive to look at the world from a circumpolar perspective and Norway’s position geographically and strategically.
The Ambassador added that 80% of our maritime areas are north of the Arctic Circle and almost 90% of the export revenues come from the sea-based economic activities and resources. In other words, Norway has important economic interests to safeguard in the north.
According to the Ambassador, located on NATO’s northern flank, Norway puts special emphasis on the need for predictability and stability in our relations with Russia.
This is an area where NATO and Russian interests meet. Norway has a common interest in keeping the High North a region of peaceful cooperation and sustainable development. This is the situation today and we want to keep it that way.
The challenge is to shape a template which can allow for development, cooperation, and the protection of national sovereignty without having that template shaped by the Russians and their definition of Arctic interests.
Clearly, Norway has a key role in shaping the way ahead.
2016-03-07 Developmental testing is a fact of life for operational fleets.
As one test engineer commented during our visit to Pax River, “we continue to do developmental testing on the Super Hornet here at Pax.”
And with more than 50,000 flight hours on the F-35 fleet and an operational squadron with the Marines, to be joined by the USAF this year and the Navy next year, the F-35 fleet has already taken off.
There are currently more than 250 F-35 pilots and 2,400 aircraft maintainers from six nations already trained and more than 110 jets are jointly under construction at the Fort Worth and Cameri production facilities.
The F-35 has become tactically operational in the USMC while the aircraft is undergoing developmental testing by the Pax River and Edwards AFB with an F-35 Integrated Test Force (ITF) for the USAF and USN . What is not widely understood is that the ITF is managing the ongoing developmental testing for the life of the program.
With the scope, complexity and concurrent global reach of the F-35 program, a new approach to testing was set in motion.
The program is one of “spiral development” in which combat F-35 Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) airplanes emerge throughout the process to operate as effective combat assets, even while the developmental testing for all three types of F-35s continue.
Put bluntly, the F-35B in the hands of the Marines is a fully “up” combat aircraft (both airframe, sensors and weapon systems) addition to the USMC Air/Ground team.
All Squadron Pilots in Marines, USAF and Navy, will be backed up by the best test community in the world at Edwards and Pax. This partnership forged for decades will continue a dynamic synergistic combat way for the entire life of the F-35 Global Enterprise.
For the Lightning II, the past decade of putting together a unique, and innovative approach to shaping the F-35 fleet has paid off and has built a solid foundation for the decade ahead.
As US fighter pilots and their partners generate fleet and ultimately combat experience that will lead to never ending innovations and developmental testing.
Put bluntly, if you waiting for the end of developmental testing come back in 30-40 years. Meanwhile, the F-35 fleet will have reshaped air combat operations.
As Andrew Mack, F-35 Integrated Test Force chief test engineer put it:
“When the F-35B Block 2B became cleared for IOC, there were many stories about what it cannot do; that really is not the point. The plane will evolve its capabilities over time based on spiral development.
The point is that it is a very capable combat jet at the block it has achieved already.
And the impact is immediate.
Stealth from the sea is brand new for the Marine Corps and Navy.”
The two countries are already fighting proxy wars in Syria and Yemen.
In Syria, the Saudis are backing several of the rebel groups fighting Bashar al-Assad, who is receiving substantial support from Iran. This also, to some extent, applies to Iraq where Iran is supporting the Shia-dominated Iraqi government against the Islamic State (IS).
In Yemen, the Saudis have since early 2015 directly intervened in the ongoing conflict with ground forces, airpower and naval blockades on behalf of Yemeni president Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (internationally recognized as the legitimate political leader of Yemen) against the Iranian supported Houthi rebellion that began in February 2015.
Saudi Arabia is under pressure nationally to deflect attention from its economic situation – mainly a result of low oil prices – and to maintain its current standing within the region.
Therefore, Saudi Arabia is trying to appease hardliners within its borders to prevent attacks on its own territory and to curb the number of its citizens, who might otherwise seek to join IS. The recent executions can therefore to be viewed through this prism and although Iran continuously demanded the release of al-Nimr, the execution was still carried out. AL-Nimr was not a particularly well-known Imam in Iran (mainly because he was not Iranian), but he was known for campaigning against Saudi Arabia’s treatment of the Shia population in Ahsa, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.
A broadly accepted consensus, amongst many Iranians, is that the execution has more to do with the internal issues of Saudi Arabia, rather than explicitly targeting Iran.
That said, it must be stressed that the execution, whether deliberately or not, has affected their relationship for the worse, at a time when a better relationship is required most urgently in relation to the Syrian and Yemeni peace talks. Additionally, Iran fears that the broader effects of both the execution and the following attacks could detriment the fragile nuclear deal, the terms of which were only agreed late last year.
The agreement is key for Iran, as it includes the easing of international sanctions. The nuclear deal, which many Iranians, view as a success – and the direct result of Iranian president, Mr. Rouhani’s negotiations – because the easing of sanctions will help improve daily life. The execution of al-Nimr, has, therefore, created a diplomatic crisis, providing fuel for the hardliners but problems for Mr. Rouhani – a champion of peaceful methods compared to the hardliners.
In addition, the deal has generated fear in Riyadh that a major economic boost for Iran from increased trade will give them an edge on not only the previously mentioned proxy battlefields but also on Iran’s influence in the Middle East in general, thus creating a perceived need by Saudi Arabia to counter this new situation.
Current Situation
The outburst of anger between the two countries started on 2 January, following the execution of al-Nimr. Iran, having continuously demanded the release of al-Nimr, condemned the execution.
During the afternoon of 2 January, Iranian protesters and students from Tehran’s religious centers had gathered outside the Saudi embassy in Tehran, eventually attacking and ransacking the building entirely during the evening and night. The Iranian authorities universally condemned the ransacking of the embassy along with another attack on the Saudi Arabian consulate in Mashhad by protesters. Saudi Arabia’s response was to sever all diplomatic ties to Iran on the following day (3 January), giving the Iranian diplomatic delegation in Riyadh 48 hours to vacate the embassy.
On 4 January Saudi Arabia called on its allies in the region, Bahrain, Sudan and United Arab Emirates to follow suit on breaking ties to Iran, with Bahrain and Sudan cutting relations entirely, while the UAE downsized its diplomatic representation in Tehran by recalling its ambassador. Egypt and Kuwait, though both allies of Saudi Arabia, chose only to condemn the attack on the Saudi embassy. Djibouti and Qatar both recalled their ambassadors from Tehran on the evening of Wednesday 6 January.
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia threatened to impose travel and trade bans against Iranian citizens, which was answered by Iran banning all Saudi Arabian trade products. Turkey, major Sunni country, and otherwise in competition with Iran for power in the Middle East, offered diplomatic assistance, saying the crisis should be kept at a diplomatic level. On 7 January, Iran accused the Saudis of intentionally targeting the Iranian embassy in Sana’a, Yemen in an air raid amidst coalition strikes against Houthi targets in the city.
This has been denied by the Saudi led coalition, and unverified reports from witnesses and residents say that the embassy was not damaged in the 7 January strikes. These developments have led to concerns that the deterioration in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran could result in a deteriorating security environment in the region or even outright conflict. The following sets out three possible future scenarios for the short term.
The probability of each of these scenarios is assessed on the following scale: unlikely (10-33% probability); about as likely as not (33-66%); likely (66-90%).
Future Scenarios
Continuation of Current Developments (likely)
From an Iranian point of view, the main concern is to seem sensible and non-aggressive, in order to keep the process of lifting sanctions against Iranian oil on track, as they prepare to double the production and sale of crude.
In that sense, Iran has a clear incentive; at least outwardly, to keep the situation from escalating, something Iranian political leaders seem to understand.
The current path could lead to increased tensions in the Ahsa province, which has been a flashpoint for religious division and violence for many years.
This is due to the perceived suppression of the Shiite majority by the Sunni authorities. Because the recent crisis is rooted in the execution of al-Nimr, the current narrative is laden with religion and sectarianism.
Moreover, Iranians could try to induce Shiites into escalating actions towards the Sunni-authorities, by playing on the sectarian tensions already present.
This escalation could also happen in Ahsa without any significant Iranian support, as the Shiite majority in the province are already agitated because of the mentioned perceived suppression. Activism, low-level attacks and unrest aimed at the Sunni authorities might increase because of this.
The most likely response, by the Saudis, would be to clamp down by various means.
However, no matter the Saudi response, there will be no notable regional consequences. In relation to maritime operations, the above scenario carries no direct increased risk.
The escalation described in this scenario focuses on activities that do not directly affect the sector.
In the event that the Iranian nuclear deal is implemented, the resultant easing of sanctions will in turn increase shipping activity. This will not only increase the trade and transport of oil, but commodities in general, especially into Iran.
The increase in imports and exports will further underline the importance for Iranian maintaining a stable maritime environment in the Persian Gulf.
However, worsening relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia will likely mean increased difficulties in negotiated resolutions to the conflicts in Syria and Yemen.
Escalation (About as Likely as Not)
The Iranians and Saudis could amplify their current bids in the different conflicts in which they are engaged. Iran could increase support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen, for example by stepping up arms supplies.
Because of this, the prospects of the peace talks on Yemen, expected to resume shortly, might suffer significantly because of the recent tensions. The Saudis can take similar actions in Syria, where the conflict pits Iranian proxies and IRGC members against Saudi Arabian-supported rebel groups. The Iranians might also consider activating their Hezbollah allies in Lebanon, encouraging them to escalate reprisals against Sunni sites and persons.
The recent events could potentially have dire consequences for the peace process in Syria where Saudi Arabia in October 2015 had agreed to let Iran to be a part of the UN-led peace process. Saudi Arabia may now use its influence in the UN-led peace talks on Syria, and freeze out Iran and Iranian-supported groups such as Hezbollah from participating in the negotiations.
This would be a severe blow to the peace process that had otherwise started to move forward, and had raised hopes of a negotiated peace in the not too distant future.
Without Iran included in the negotiations, any real progress would be hard to achieve, as Iran is a major player in the Syrian civil war, being a firm supporter of the Assad regime.
Increased political instability between the Saudis and Iranians and their associates in the region will most likely put any negotiation son hold as no solid peace deal can be brokered without these actors present.
Jihadi opportunism as a result of the tensions is another possibility. Groups such as al-Qaeda or IS could attack Shiites, soft targets and security forces in order to further destabilise the situation in Ahsa.
Attacks on Shiite communities, sites and mosques, has happened severalties in recent years, with the claimed IS bombing of a Shiite mosque on 22 May 2015 standing out as one of the most serious incidents.
Any attacks on the extensive Ahsa oil infrastructure is not likely in this scenario, as all installations are considered high priority sites and, as such, will be heavily guarded by Saudi security forces.
Therefore, any sabotage or attacks against the facilities are not a concern currently. In regards to maritime business, this scenario would not have a major direct impact.
Increasing Iranian or Saudi involvement in Syria or Yemen will probably primarily have direct effect on ground based operations and therefore only possibly indirectly impact port cities in Yemen, Syria and Saudi Arabia.
This is also true if the Saudis halt the Syrian peace process, as this will only affect the prospects for a solution, and will not change the dynamics of the battlespace. Jihadi opportunism may have an impact if it materializes.
Sites in port cities such as Dammam or Jubail could be targeted, influencing the overall terror threat level and attacks against Shiites could cause unrest or maybe even reprisals against Sunnis in general or the authorities specifically, increasing the risks of strikes, violence and activism.
Direct Confrontation (Unlikely)
This scenario envisages potential Iranian naval activity directed against Saudi shipping, as well as disrupting traffic to the Saudi Arabian eastern ports servicing the oil industry.
In case of any confrontation, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) would be the main Iranian combatant rather than the regular Iranian Navy, as the Persian Gulf is designated as the IRGCN’s area of operations.
Any approaches or disruption would probably be conducted by fast attack craft, such as missile or torpedo boats and the threat of laying out mines in the Hormuz Strait – both tactics similar to the Iraq-Iran War Direct confrontations in the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz would have an impact on international maritime shipping.
Harassment from the IRGCN and IRIN would in all probability be directed towards Saudi-flagged vessels although other vessels conducting trade with Saudi Arabia could be harassed or hit by mistake or as collateral damage.
However, this might still increase the overall insecurity in the area due to the Iranian military, and the Saudis would surely deploy their own naval assets to counter the Iranian presence, increasing the risk of escalation into a wider conflict.
This scenario is assessed as being unlikely as any provocation of this sort would be a clear escalation by Iran, which is not in its interests due to the upcoming lifting of sanctions.
Iran does not at present have sufficient interest in a potential escalation in its relations with Saudi Arabia to a possible naval confrontation in the Persian Gulf, even at a low level.
Conclusion
The likely scenario that the souring in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue at the diplomatic and commercial relations level at least in the short term.
This will have minimal impact on the regional maritime security environment, although broader security processes in Syria and Yemen will be affected. Indeed, some escalation in these areas is about as likely as not, perpetuating armed conflict (particularly in Yemen), which does have broader regional implications.
Internal security in Saudi Arabia might also be affected, increasing the likelihood of sectarian violence.
Direct naval conflict or even low-level harassment of commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf cannot be ruled out, but is assessed as unlikely. Iran has limited if any interests in escalating the conflict in this area and has a broader agenda that involves a re-setting of relations with the US and Europe (and the lifting of sanctions) and pursuing its strategic interests in, particularly, Iraq and Syria.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia does not have an interest in escalating the conflict any further or, if it where to happen, the capability of managing two armed conflict sat the same time.
This article was republished with permission of Risk Intelligence and is part of their latest issue of Strategic Insights, March 2016, Issue 62.
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The MAGTF and the USN-USMC team are working on shaping a 21st century approach to joint operations from the sea.
There is a broader transformation of jointness being shaped by the evolution of the amphibious forces has escaped attention as precisely what it is – the transformation of joint capabilities.
In broad terms, amphibious operations has shifted from primarily providing a transport capability to providing a base of operations for the air-land-sea domains, and the flexibility of the evolving amphibious task force allows it to focus on the primary domain necessary for the mission: ground, air or sea.
It is a flexible Swiss army knife for joint operations. The V-22 Osprey has been a key agent of change whereby ground forces can be inserted at greater distance, resupply can be managed from land to the sea base, or force packages built around the Osprey can execute missions previously only possible with the “large deck” amphibious ships.
There is little question that there is a significant shortage of L-class ships and the enablers for what the evolving amphibious task force needs, but it is also clear that allies are looking at Navy-Marine Corps innovation and seeing the future of a key joint capability.
USS America on its way to San Diego is seen stopping in Uruguay. The USS America represents the new standard by which an air combat element can support the insertion and support of Marines ashore and Ks aboard a USS America will be key enablers.
Whether it be South Korea, Japan or Australia, in the Pacific the core U.S. allies see the amphibious force as part of their joint force transformation as well.
The Osprey and the F-35B are clearly shaping such a transformation.
The Osprey with its range and speed has changed the operational approach of the amphibious ready group. With the coming of the F-35B to the amphibious fleet an organic C2, ISR, EW and strike asset will integrate with the fleet and provide for a wider range of effects from the sea-based force.
In an interview last year with the head of the 2nd Expeditionary Strike Group (Admiral Cindy Thebaud) and with Capt. Michael M. McMillan, Commander of Amphibious Squadron Eight who had just returned from command of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group off of the waters of Yemen, the evolving flexibility of the amphibious group was highlighted and discussed in detail.
With the impact of the Osprey and now the coming of the F-35B, the amphibious task force is much more than a transportation asset, and as such, joint operation capabilities need to be forged, shaped and transformed going forward.
Marines and Sailors assigned to Maritime Raid Force, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embark from the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), at sea, on MV-22B Ospreys assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 266 (Reinforced), for a simulated night raid, Feb. 09, 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Kyle N. Runnels/Released)
With the refocusing efforts in tandem with platforms like the Osprey and F-35B, the Navy is shifting from a strictly transport force from point A to B to becoming an expeditionary tactical strike and power projection asset as part of the national security equation.
When I asked her about that, Thebaud acknowledged that she sees such an evolution as having an impact on the evolution of the Navy overall.
“We already have 80% of the ships and other major equipment we’ll have 20 years from now. The key is to evolve its capability and to draw upon the new systems to shape a more effective combat force,” she said.
The evolution of amphibious capabilities will allow the rest of the surface fleet, and the aircraft carriers to evolve as well.
An important aspect of the joint capability, which a dynamically evolving and integrated Navy-Marine Corps capability brings to the fight, is to support what we have called force insertion….
Capt McMillan’s recent operational experience provided many examples of the evolving capabilities of the Amphibious Ready Group and challenges to be met in enhancing its capability to deliver joint effect. As McMillan put it, “We felt that what we did during the operation was unique, but I think that over time, our ‘unique and unusual’ will become the norm.”
He added, “Put another way, our unique joint capabilities as a Navy-Marine Corps force can be mixed or matched to deal with a variety of tasks in the battlespace, and that flexibility is probably becoming the norm as a requirement, and we are looking to enhance that flexibility going forward.”
The CH-53K as a 21st century air system will add significant capability to the evolution of the amphibious fleet as well, given its capacity for much more efficient heavy lift, which can be delivered to multiple points in the battlespace, faster, and with significantly enhanced integration with the other combat assets.
The aircraft will be able to externally carry nearly three times the current load of the E and offload with much greater flexibility, safety and security.
Given its significantly improved readiness and reliability, greater sortie rates will be generated, coupled with independent triple hook capability, managing logistical throughput will significantly reduce ship to the shore transit time.
Just how the capabilities of the new aircraft intersected with the evolving operational approaches was discussed with three key Marines involved in the program we started by focusing upon the maintainability and sustainability aspects of the new air system.
The three Marines were as follows: Col. Paul Fortunato, Branch Head, Weapons Requirements (APW-1); Col. Hank Vanderborght, Program Manager, PMA-261/H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopters; and Major Thomas Trimble, Heavy Lift Requirements (APW-51), Department of Aviation, USMC.
Question: Let us start with the materials technologies which make this very different from an E. Composites are now a norm for new air systems, as opposed to when the E was conceived of and built. How do the material technologies affect the K?
Answer: By leveraging modern engineering practices and materials, we have enhanced performance. The structural strength of the aircraft provides for extra performance, and is clearly a key reason why the K can lift nearly three times more than the E externally in the same ambient conditions.
It is obvious but important to underscore that a heavy lift mission is just that; and leads to stresses and strains on the aircraft, and the airframe. The plane has been designed to take the stress of a three time enhanced lift capability and we are testing the aircraft rigorously and robustly to ensure that the performance is being met.
Question: The avionics and the fly by wire system are a major shift as well from the E to the K. How will the new technology have an operational impact from your perspective?
Answer: We land in hostile and in degraded visual environments.
The new systems will have a number of increased capability impacts, one of the most significant is stable hover.
Because of the ability of the aircraft to hover assisted by technologies onboard, we can land the aircraft much more safely and in difficult degraded visual environments.
Automation will assist is in managing the flight and let us focus much more on the mission.
There are two different flight control modes on the aircraft, PFCS and AFCS.
During different missions, one can select different flight control modes that are optimized for those missions.
The different fly by wire systems actually assist the pilot in optimizing those systems for the assigned mission.
Loading a standard 463L Pallet directly onto the CH-53K, something which can not be done with the CH-53E which requires the standard Air Force pallet to be repacked prior to loading onto the CH-53E.
Question: What about the cockpit and the situational awareness of the pilot and the flight crew?
Answer: The cockpit is a glass cockpit with five Multi-Functional Displays.
They dramatically increase air crew situational awareness.
The fly-by-wire flight control system makes the aircraft a lot easier to fly and allows the crew to focus on what the MFDs can provide to shape mission effectiveness.
Safety and security are significantly enhanced.
We have had mishaps with the E because of low visibility and brownouts.
If I could compare, the 53K comes in to pick up an external load, there is a flight director in the aircraft, almost like an airliner.
And when you fly at the initial point, which is the last checkpoint on your route before the landing zone to pick up the external, the 53K pilot can push a button and the aircraft will fly itself to the load and basically come into a steady hover at a preselected altitude right over the load.
For example, if the pilot wanted that aircraft to go to 20 feet over the load, he would put those parameters in the system and hit the button and the plane will do that.
With regard to what we call “divided attention,” where you need to multi-task, the systems help you manage that as well.
For example, say you were inbound to a landing zone and you are about to come pick up an external load. And all of a sudden you get a call on the radio that says, hey, change your mission. You now need to pick up the external and go to a different location and drop it off.
Because the aircraft is so augmented and is able to do pretty much the pilots’ job, the crew can start re-planning that mission while one pilot can monitor the aircraft and the other pilot can actually re-plan the mission to go to the new landing zone.
Whereas in the Echo, it took the entire attention of the entire crew just to stay safe to pick up that external load in a difficult environment.
The power of the fly-by-wire system combined with the displays inside the aircraft makes the K much safer than other military helicopters.
Question: Clearly, the K is core logistical asset.
How is it a next generation aircraft from the logistical point of view, beyond its significantly improved maintainability?
Answer: The K has two key features, which make it a next generation aircraft.
The first is the widening of the cabin to allow it to load Air Force 463L pallets.
Currently, when the Air Force arrives with a C-17 or C-5, we have to crack open the 463L pallets and re-palletize them into 48 x 48 wooden pallets and then put them into the CH-53E.
With the K we will be able to take them directly off of the C-5 or C-17 and roll the pallets right onto the Kilo and go to whatever FOB we need to deliver the cargo to. This optimized intra-theather lift and logistical throughout will be much greater.
The second is the triple hook system which no other helicopter has. Whereas the E can only do a single and dual point, the Kilo can do a single, dual and triple point.
The beauty of this capability is that we can be on an L-Class ship and pick up three independent loads. And then in one sortie, drop off those loads at three independent locations which from a logistical point of view give you much greater flexibility than we have ever had before.
The Echo was built in a former era when you brought supplies as part of a support wave; the K is being built in the age of force insertion across a distributed battlefield.
You can support three different company landing teams across the battlefield that could be supported by one ship, with three loads taken from the ship and then going to zone one, zone two and zone three without ever having to back to the ship to reload.
This saves not only transit time but exposure to threats while flying the aircraft among multiple loadings rather than loading a triple package and taking off for the area of interest. You save sortie numbers simply by being able to use the triple hook system.
Put in simple terms, the K will contribute to optimizing your capabilities for maneuver warfare.
The triple hook system for the CH-53K allows for the delivery of three payloads each to a different landing area if requires. Credit Photo: USN-USMC
Question: The K is a marinized helicopter as well. While we are at it, could we discuss the differences between an Army helicopter landing on a ship and a marinized helicopter landing on a ship, before the strategic community gets carried away with the notion that the Army can transfer its air assets to ships?
Answer: That is a good point. There are significant differences here.
The first is simply the point about electronic systems; the ship has to turn off many of its systems to allow Army helos to land on ships.
Electromagnetic hardening of the aircraft is crucial so that the electronic components in the aircraft can be protected from radars and other ship-board electronic systems, when it operates aboard naval shipping.
This is especially critical if you are operating a fly-by-wire system.
Comment: I guess you want to keep your fly-by-wire system and not turn it into a fry-by-wire system!
Answer: The second is simply ability to operate with large wind envelopes at sea because extensive testing is done.
If you take an Army helicopter to a ship you can only land on a ship if you basically have five knots of wind using a generic helicopter wind envelope.
The ship has to adjust its heading to accommodate the tight wind envelope that it may or may not be able to get allowing the helo to land.
With a marinized aircraft, we can land with large wind speed and direction envelopes.
The ship will minimize maneuvering in order to get the winds within those envelopes for the aircraft to land.
Testing is conducted to maximize those wind envelopes within safe operating conditions.
The other issue of course is corrosion.
At sea you always have salty sea spray and mist.
If your helo is not marinized against corrosion, material condition and operational reliability will suffer.
Our aircraft is designed, built, and tested with this in mind.
Question: What ships will the K be able to land on?
Answer: The same ships that the E can land on.
The CH-53K’s maximum weight on wheels is only 5,000 pounds more than the Echo but it is able fold down to a smaller shipboard footprint.
Question: Let us go back to the question of lift and beyond the question of new materials technologies, how is the K able to lift nearly three times more than an E externally?
The video above shows the first flight of the CH-53K seen at the West Palm test facility on September 28, 2015.
Answer: While expanding capability, engineers were challenged not to exceed the current logistics footprint of the current CH-53E.
There are three technologies which come together to create this capability.
The new engines (T-408-GE-400) provides the lifting power.
The split torque gearbox generates the power to the blades from the engine.
The new rotor blades with anhedral tips.
The K’s rotor blades are much more efficient than those of the Echo.
They are all composite and the new materials allowing for developing and building a more efficient blade.
Question: I know that Germany among other allies is considering the K as an addition to their force. And currently, the competition seems to be between the Chinook and the K. How would you compare them?
Answer: It is basically 1960s technology versus 21st century technology with the implications for capabilities, maintainability and flexibility being weighed heavily favor of the K.
The mission is one of lift; and there is no comparison between the two helos.
The max gross weight on the K is 88,000 pounds; the Chinook is 50,000 pounds, they are not even in the same rotorcraft weight classification.
You get to the area of interest faster, safer and with the flexibility of deploying in support of multiple FOBs given the three hook system.
The first article in the series:
The Coming of the CH-53K to the Amphibious Force: How to Describe a New 21st Century Air Platform and Its Impact?
03/03/2016 Although a CH-53, the CH-53K is not easily understood as an evolution of earlier models.
2016-03-04 The HMAS Canberra is part of the Australian aid effort to Fiji to help in the wake of Cyclone Winston.
According to the Australian Ministry of Defence:
On Tuesday March 01, HMAS Canberra steamed towards cyclone devastated Koro Island to assist with the Fiji Government’s disaster relief effort.
Australian Defence Force (ADF) elements together with personnel from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) flew ahead from the ship via MRH-90 helicopter to meet with Koro Island local authorities in preparation for Canberra’s arrival.
A Royal Australian Navy Landing Craft approaches HMAS Canberra off the coast of Koro Island, Fiji.
Commanding Officer, 2nd Combat Engineer Regiment (2CER) toured the island with DFAT and local Fijian authorities to meet and discuss needs with village leaders.
Concurrently, reconnaissance sections from 2nd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (2RAR) conducted a survey of the island to assess the condition of roads, houses, schools and other infrastructure.
Information gathered will be used to set the priorities for HAMS Canberra’s capability, including amphibious and engineering assets as well as specialist engineer personnel to help carry out repair work.
Contractor sea trials commenced in February 2014 and were completed in September 2014. The Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) accepted NUSHIP Canberra from BAE Systems in October 2014 and she sailed to her home port at Fleet Base East, Garden Island, Sydney later that month…..
Canberra carries the pennant number L02 and not L01, even though it was the first of its class to be built. Adelaide will carry pennant number L01. This is so the two ships’ pennant numbers will conform to the convention adopted with their namesakes in the Adelaide class.
HMAS Canberra was commissioned and joined the Royal Australian Navy fleet in an official ceremony at Fleet Base East, Sydney on 28 November 2014. In March 2015, HMAS Canberra was formally designated the flagship of the Royal Australian Navy.
At 27,000 tonnes, the LHDs are the largest ships ever constructed for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and are being built by contractors BAE Systems Australia and Navantia. The ships will provide the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with one of the most capable and sophisticated air-land-sea amphibious deployment systems in the world.
The ships will contribute directly to the defence of Australia and its national interests, and also allow the ADF to provide large-scale humanitarian assistance, at home or in our region.
A conventional steel mono hull design is employed with the superstructure located on the starboard side of the flight deck. They are designed with the shallowest possible draft to operate in secondary ports and harbours as well as manoeuvre in the shallow waters common in the littoral regions.
There are four main decks; heavy vehicle, accommodation, hangar and light vehicles and flight decks.
The construction of the hull to the level of the flight deck and the majority of fit-out is being undertaken at Navantia’s shipyard in Ferrol, Spain. The hull was then transported by Heavy Lift Ship MV Blue Marlin to BAE Systems’s shipyard in Williamstown, Victoria for final construction and fit-out such as the consolidation of the superstructure and installation of the Combat and Communication Systems.
The first LHD was named Canberra in an official naval ceremony on 15 February 2013. Canberrais the third ship to bear the name after the Kent class heavy cruiser and Adelaide class guided missile frigate.
Contractor sea trials commenced in February 2014 and were completed in September 2014. The Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO) accepted NUSHIP Canberra from BAE Systems in October 2014 and she sailed to her home port at Fleet Base East, Garden Island, Sydney later that month.
Canberra will be able to conduct amphibious operations and land a force of over 1,000 embarked personnel along with all their weapons, ammunition, vehicles and stores by LCM-1E landing craft, helicopters or a combination of both.
Canberra is capable of conducting large-scale humanitarian and disaster relief missions. The medical facility is of a size and scope of which would rival some regional hospitals equipped with two operating theatres, an eight bed Critical Care Unit, and a variety of low and medium dependency beds. In addition, the medical facility has dedicated areas to accommodate pathology and radiology services, x-ray, pharmacy and dental facilities.
According to an article in The Diplomat, the HMAS Canberra’s role in aid relief was described as follows:
Canberra is headed to Fiji in the wake of Cyclone Winston, which has reportedly killed dozens, done tremendous property and infrastructure damage, and left up to 30,000 homeless.
The United Nations has suggested that Winston is the most devastating cyclone ever to hit the island.
Canberra is reportedly carrying 800 relief personnel, along with sixty tons of relief equipment.
The Royal Australian Air Force has already begun relief operations, and elements of the Royal New Zealand Navy have joined Canberra in the assistance mission.
The 27,500-ton amphibious assault ship, constructed in Spain and Australia, entered service in late 2014. She and her sister can, in expeditionary combat configuration, carry over a hundred vehicles. In air support configuration, they can carry eighteen helicopters (8 is standard capacity).
The well deck allows the rapid deployment of vehicles and personnel from ship to shore, especially in areas where docking structures have been damaged or destroyed.
Canberra can remain on station for an extended period, especially when acting in conjunction with air and other sea assets.
Relief of Fiji is precisely the kind of operation that Australia envisioned for Canberra and her sister…..
Maritime Southeast Asia (not to mention Oceania) is characterized by wide spaces, meager-to-non-existent infrastructure, low state capacity, and irregular severe weather. Because of this, humanitarian and disaster relief needs are generally underserved.
The Canberra-class (and other, similar ships in other navies) fills this gap by offering platforms for air and sea relief, as well as medical care and infrastructure repair.
On March 3, 2016, the Fijian Minister for Immigration, National Security and Defense, Mr. Timoci Natuva visited the HMAS Canberra and his visit can be seen below in a video provided by the Australian Ministry of Defence.
Mr Natuva was given a first hand look at the capabilities offered by the ship, which has been deployed to Fiji as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) led Australian Whole of Government response to Fiji’s request for Humanitarian Aide Disaster Relief support in response to Tropical Cyclone Winston.
Mr Natuva was flown onto Canberra before being met by the Commander Joint Task Force 635, Captain Brett Sonter, Commanding Officer HMAS Canberra, Captain Chris Smith and Commander Landing Force, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Bassingthwaighte.
Mr Natuva was given a tour of the vessel, which arrived into Fijian waters on the 1st of March to begin the second phase of Australia’s relief effort, joining Royal Australian Air Force C-130 Hercules and C-17 Globemasters delivering aid and assistance.
Mr Natuva was briefed on the operation, which is currently focussing on Koro Island, one of the worst islands to be struck by Tropical Cyclone Winston, before returning back to Suva by Helicopter.
