The Deputy Commandant of Aviation Down Under: Plan Jericho Marine Corps Style

03/18/2016
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2016-03-19 By Robbin Laird

The Williams Foundation hosted a seminar on new approaches to air-land integration.

The terms of reference for the conference were as follows:

Air forces need to be capable of delivering air and space power effects to support conventional and special operations in the land domain.

Air-Land integration is one of the most important capabilities for successful joint operations.

The last decade has seen a significant shift in how airpower has supported ground operations. 

With the introduction of systems like Rover, the ability of airpower to provide precision strike to the ground forces saw a significant change in fire support from a wide variety of air platforms. 

Precision air dropping in support of outposts or moving forces introduced new capabilities of support.

The DCA was in Australia to learn from Aussie transformation and not simply to transmit a message.
The DCA was in Australia to learn from Aussie transformation and not simply to transmit a message.

Yet this template of air ground is really focused on air support to the ground whereas with the shift in the global situation, a much wider set of situations are emerging whereby the air-ground integration approach will become much wider in character, and the ability to insert force rapidly, as a precision strike capability, and to be withdrawn will be a key tool in the toolbox for decision makers.

Fifth generation enabled operations will see a shift to a distributed C2 approach which will clearly change the nature of the ground-to air command system, and the with the ability of fifth generation systems to generate horizontal communications among air assets outside the boundaries of a classic AWACs directed system, the change in C2 will be very wide ranging.

The seminar will explore how the ADF can take advantage of Army’s Plan Beersheba and Air Force’s Plan Jericho to enhance Air-Land integration.

Quite obviously, the evolving capabilities of the USMC are clearly convergent with the approach, which Williams wished to foster for the future of the ADF.

Lt. General Davis highlighted at the beginning of his presentation that when he attended the Avalon Air Show and then head of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) introduced Plan Jericho, it was clear that the Marines and the RAAF were on the same page.

“I went back to the Commandant and said that we need to work more closely with the RAAF because with Plan Jericho they are onto something big with regard to innovation.”

Equipping the Marine

The presentation was hard hitting, comprehensive and clearly on target for the Australian audience.

As Air Commodore Steve Roberton, Commander Air Combat Group and a former exchange officer with the USMC, commented, “If you think this was hard hitting, it was mild compared to some Marines.

The Marines are gung ho about the future and shaping new combat capabilities.

They do no like to lose.”

This theme was central to Davis’s presentation – the entire point about combat innovation was to be the best force, which America could deliver to any global crises at any time.

“We want to be the best partner to our friends; and the most feared enemy of our foes.”

Technology is important to this effort, and he highlighted that the Osprey being brought into the force was a generator of “disruptive change,” but the kind crucial to real combat innovation.

“But change is difficult; and the critics prevalent.”

He noted that if we held this conference 12 years ago, and the room was filled with Marines we would hear about all the things the Osprey could not do and why we should not go ahead. “If we brought those same Marines into the conference room now, they would have amnesia about what they thought then and press me to get more Ospreys and leverage it even more.”

But it is not just about technology – it is about “equipping Marines, not manning the equipment.”

His point was that you needed to get the new equipment into the hands of the Marines at the earliest possible moment, because the young Marines innovate in ways not anticipated when the senior leadership gets that equipment to them.

The Marines like at risk differently from the cubical commandos.

I recall a conversation I had with a well-known and oft quoted aviation analyst who told me that the Marines should have waited few years before using the F-35B because doing so now was “risky.”

I pointed out that it was inherently risky flying legacy aircraft into ever more challenging conditions than getting new equipment into the hands of Marines who would innovate rapidly in ways that could not be imagined in the chat corridors Inside the Beltway.

Future Tiltrotar

Davis provided several examples of innovation, but one was about the F-35.

He argued that there was no doubt that the F-35 is the right plane for the USMC.

Now that it is in the hands of Marines, they are innovating in ways which the leadership really did not anticipate and much more rapidly than might be imagined.

He described an event where the Commandant was going witness a Yuma to Nellis scenario in which F-35s would be used to support Marines in the maneuver space.

He went to the Marines working the exercise and asked: “Was everything ready for the Commandant?”

The answer was: “Sir we are not going to do exactly what you asked for and are not ready to do it that way?”

Davis commented: “The Commandant is just about here, what are you talking about?”

The Marine answered: “Frankly, the scenario you suggested was not tough enough for we wanted to take our F-35s into a more advanced SAM belt to get through and then support the Marines on the ground.”

Davis was a bit taken aback, but the innovation already evident by the squadron pilots was rewarded with a demonstrated success on the Nellis ranges.

The Commandant was impressed, and although a ground combat Marine, he argued “we need to get that plane into the hands of Marines as fast as we can.”

The DCA noted throughout his presentation that the RAAF focus on bottom up innovation with the Plan Jericho processes was what the Marines felt was central to real combat innovation.

And shaping the way ahead was really about leveraging the new platforms, shaping key enablers and then ensures that whatever follow-on platforms are bought that they build upon but push the innovation envelope.

Every Sensor a Shooter

He saw the tiltrotar experience as a crucial baseline and saw the future of Marine Corps rotor wing as tiltrotar.

He saw the Cobras, Hueys, and Yankees replaced over time by a new generation tiltrotar aircraft.

He favored developing one, which would be two seaters, and able to be either manned or unmanned to provide for the kind of flexibility which the Marines would want to reshape the capabilities and approach of the assault force.

His version of the Plan Jericho approach to building a more integrated assault force was as follows:

Every platform a SENSOR, every platform a SHOOTER, every platform a SHARE/CONNECTOR, and every platform an EW NODE.

 And throughout he highlighted that the Marines were preparing for the high end fight and enhanced capabilities to operate throughout an expanded maneuver space, and able to operate from land, and sea sequentially, concurrently or jointly as the mission demanded.

With regard to equipping that force, he saw the need to build on fifth generation capabilities, multi-mission everything, spiral develop everything and leverage bottom up combat innovation.

He concluded that he saw a great opportunity to work with an ADF in transformation as the Marines went down a similar path.

Shaping New Approaches to Air-Land Integration: The Perspective from Down Under

03/17/2016

2016-03-18 By Robbin Laird

On March 17, 2016, in Canberra, Australia, the Williams Foundation held a seminar looking at the evolution of fifth generation enabled combat transformation which focused on new approaches to air-land integration.

And the seminar followed the two-day RAAF Airpower Conference, which addressed a broad range of airpower issues, and during the second day explicitly looked at the RAAF’s transformation approach, Plan Jericho.

Lt General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Army, addresses the question of innovation and modernization for the ADF,
Lt General Angus Campbell, Chief of the Army, addresses the question of innovation and modernization for the ADF,

Over the next few weeks, I will publish several pieces on the discussions over the three days, as well as a report for the Williams Foundation on their conference.

Next up is a look at new approaches to air-sea integration as well, and one of the major participants at the air-land integration seminar would certainly be relevant to the air-sea integration seminar, namely the USMC which is working at the seams of air-sea-land integration.

In addition, we will be publishing several interviews with the RAAF and the Royal Australian Army to provide further perspectives on the evolving transformation approach.

Lt. General Davis addressing the USMC approach to modernization and air-sea-land integration.
Lt. General Davis addressing the USMC approach to modernization and air-sea-land integration.

The former Chief of Staff of the Royal Australian Air Force, Geoff Brown, was the organizer for the event, and provided navigation throughout the day through the diverse presentations, as well as providing significant input to the final event of the day, the panel with senior leaders.

The current Chief of Staff of the RAAF, Air Marshal Leo Davies, provided an overview on the RAAF’s approach to transformation and his priority on shaping new approaches to operating with the ground forces.  It is not just about having a new fleet; it is about shaping new capabilities for the joint force, but one which is to be understood as multi-dimensional and not simply about who is supporting whom in a particular operation.

Several themes stood out from the Seminar.

The first was how significant the rethink on Army’s part really is.

The Chief of Staff clearly underscored that the land wars of the past decade are not the template for moving forward and saw the need and opportunity to shape new ways to integrate airpower with ground maneuver forces in providing for more effective capabilities in the contested battlespace.

The second was the reshaping of Army modernization to achieve the force envisaged by the Army Chief of Staff.

Brigadier General Mills, the head of Army Modernization, provided a hard hitting look at the Army and how the evolving force could shape a more distributed operational and decision making force, one which he saw as providing for 21st century ground maneuver forces.

Brigadier General Mills, Australian Army, addressing the question of Army modernization under the influence of evolving air capabilities.
Brigadier General Mills, Australian Army, addressing the question of Army modernization under the influence of evolving air capabilities.

The third was the clear synergy between the USMC and Plan Jericho.

Lt. General Davis, Deputy Commandant of Aviation, provided a comprehensive and hard hitting presentation on how the Marine Corps was evolving under the influence of the new technologies, the Osprey and the F-35, and how the focus of the Corps was upon “equipping the 21st century Marine,” rather than “manning the equipment.”

Davis highlighted that the Corps was working at the seams of air-land-sea integration, and described how he thought the tiltrotar revolution started with the Osprey would continue. He also provided an update on how the F-35 was fitting into the USMC’s overall approach to transformation.

He noted that the young pilots for the F-35 were already pushing the envelope on Close Air Support, and flying the F-35 into Nellis ranges through complicated red threats and being able to come out the other side and provide the maneuver force with various types of support, fires, ISR and C2.

The fourth was a clear response to industry to the Plan Jericho challenge to evolve differently in relationship to the evolution of the Australian Defense Force.

Major General Stephen Goldein, USAF Retired, from Northrop Grumman, addressing the C2 challenges.
Major General Stephen Goldein, USAF Retired, from Northrop Grumman, addressing the C2 challenges.

The Northrop Grumman presentation provided a clear look at the evolution of C2 capabilities in line with a transformed force; the Rockwell Collins presentation looked at how the JTAC role will change with new technologies; the L3 presentation provided a look at how commercial technologies could be leveraged to provide for the kind of cost effective and dynamic technological innovation which could support the connectivity needs for the RAAF.

And in an interview with the “Jericho Twins,” Group Captains Jake Campbell and Pete Mitchell, they underscored that indeed C2 transformation was emerging as a key thread for transformation in shaping a way ahead.

There were other threads to the discussion which we will highlight in the days to come, including, the evolution of training to build a 21st century force, the evolution of the remotely piloted aircraft to work in an evolving battlespace, the challenge of ensuring that we get the right information to the right people at the right time, the evolution of Army force projection with the new RAAF airlift capabilities, and the future of providing for forward air control from the air in the contested battlespace.

What is clear is that the Aussies are at the cutting edge of the rethink of how to reshape an integrated 21st century force.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Exercise Red Flag 16-2 – NATO Airpower Integration with Turkey and Italy Participating

03/15/2016

2016-03-16 By Todd Miller

The second Red Flag of 2016 featured an international coalition of NATO partners training against a dynamic and integrated “Red Adversary” Force.

The exercise running from February 29 to March 11 included some 23 units representing the US Air Force, Army, Navy, Marines and contingents from NATO partners the Aeronautica Militare (AM – Italian Air Force) and the Turkish Air Force (TAF).

Participating units launched from Nellis AFB in Las Vegas, and trained over the 2.9 million acres of land, and 12,000 sq miles of airspace afforded by the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR).

All told some 75 aircraft and 1700 personnel participated in the exercise.

This was the first Red Flag to feature the Italian Eurofighter Typhoon or F-2000 as it is called in Italy.

Italy participated with 8 F-2000s.

Some of those Typhoons accompanied the F-35 in its first trans-atlantic flight which landed at Pax River.

The Turkish Air Force AF participated with 6 F-16s and 2 KC-135R tankers, and  US aircraft included the F-16CM, F-15E, F-15C, E-3G a variety of helicopters, drones (MQ-9), tankers (KC-135R) specialized aircraft and 2 of the 3 Global Strike Command bombers, the B-52H and B-1B.

This was the first time Turkey had come to Red Flag after the shutdown incident with the Russian Air Force.

The wide variety of aircraft are typical of a coalition force should it be thrust into battle.

The Red Air units included dedicated F-16C Aggressor units supplemented by AT-38Cs from the 435th FTS of Randolph AFB and the 88th FTS of Sheppard AFB, participant in the Euro-NATO Joint Pilot Training Program. Fast and exhibiting a very small radar cross section the AT-38C is representative of the aircraft that many potential adversaries utilize today.

Often overlooked by commentators but not pilots, the Red Adversary Force includes ground assets that are very real threats.

Colonel A. Bernard AEW Commander for Red Flag 16-2 indicated that “the Red Adversary is an advanced, agile and integrated force that includes both air and surface threats, acts like a country, and the combined assets create the finest adversary that we could ever face.”

Air superiority efforts are not just fought against airborne assets, but encompass air, sea and land assets which can lead to denial of an air force’s ability to control air space. 

While never long on details, suffice it to say there are radar emitters, SAM (Surface to Air Missile) sites, and a number of other challenging weapon systems (the participation of a virtual Patriot battery implies involvement in neutralizing surface to surface missiles fired by the Red Adversary) that the Blue Force must either avoid, or neutralize during each of the approx.

10 night and day sorties of the exercise. Mission sets flown by Blue Force include Close Air Support (CAS), Air to Ground (A2G), Air to Air (A2A), Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), Dynamic Targeting, Personnel recovery and more.

One of three command and control (C2) groups, a Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS-1) coordinated aircraft movement and tasking within their designated area.

C2 functions were also performed by the 726th Air Control Squadron and in the air by the 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron flying the E-3B/C/G. The US Navy was represented by the HCS-21 “BlackJacks” flying the MH-60 in primarily a personnel recovery mission.

The Turkish Air Force utilized the multi-role F-16 to its full spectrum in the exercise, while the Italian AM primarily used the F-2000 in an Air to Air role, though a couple F-2000s were utilized in a swing role, carrying Litening targeting pods and dropping inert GBU-16 Paveway IIs on designated range targets.

Colonel M. Bertoli the Italian AM detachment commander indicated that this is not the primary role the AM plans for the F-2000, however they are validating the capability for select operations and to support the ongoing export initiatives of the Eurofighter Typhoon.

Col. Bertoli indicated that “we consider it [Red Flag] the best training, so we brought our young pilots so they can train our Typhoon force for years come.

The AM thinks that this [Red Flag] is by far one of the best combat training environments our pilots can find all over the world.  

So we committed ourselves and the Typhoons to train our pilots and to integrate them with our NATO partners to give them the possibility to have a great training and be ready of course for future operations with our NATO partners.”

Over the NTTR aircraft were observed integrating as one force in carefully planned missions.

Nationalities were of no issue.

Platform and unit capabilities defined each participants place within the integrated force, with all working together as a single unit to defeat the adversary and achieve mission goals.

EF-2000s primarily took on the battle for air supremacy from the advantage of high altitude, working with F-16s on Combat Air Patrol.

F-16CMs moved in from medium altitudes to perform SEAD, followed by F-15Es from medium altitudes combined with additional F-15Es and F-2000s from low altitudes attacking designated targets.

The B-1B appeared from medium or low altitude to attack their targets, while B-52Hs made target runs, turned, loitered and then attacked again and again.

Red Air threats had multiple lives and regenerated when killed ensuring a constant adversarial threat. Attack, counter attack, identify targets and vector assets to kill or be killed.

Captain R. Kearns, B-1B pilot from the 34th Bomb Squadron noted that while the missions were not typically different from what they normally train (medium and low altitude attack), it was unique to have so many diverse aircraft in the operating area and to look out on B-1Bs wing and note F-16 and F-15 escorts.

The exercise itself is only the beginning of learning.

After the mission, a lengthy debriefing takes place. The briefing is aided by the enhanced capability on the Nellis Range and by the recently launched E-3G that features the ability to clearly reconstruct the C2 activity.

Major C. Bulla of 414th Combat Training Squadron summarized succinctly, “better data, better learning, that’s why we are here.”

Col. Bernard defined the exercise well, “it is in fact putting together the team you have and use each strength to make 1+1 = 3.”

Mathematically impossible, but attainable within the context of synergistic teamwork.

Australian Defence Minister at the Air Power Conference 2016: Highlighting Priorities

2016-03-16 By Robbin Laird

The first of a two day conference on Air Power hosted by the Royal Australian Air Force featured a keynote presentation by the Minister of Defence.

This represented her first major policy statement after the release of the White Paper and associated documents.

For an American attending the conference what was clear was that the Minister has followed defense issues for a long time and has a demonstrated mastery of the issues.

This was no walking through a speech written by others, but a clear statement of how she saw the issues as part of the current government.

I have read through the White Paper documents and have written pieces providing some initial analyses.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/australia-re-sets-its-defense-policy-the-defence-white-paper-2016-looks-beyond-the-platform-shopping-list/

Listening to the Minister certainly brought both context and emphasis to the White Paper.

FD8A0594

One issue which jumped out was a clear statement of how the strategic environment had changed and the importance of Australia focusing its attention on modernizing defense and enhancing its capabilities to work with core allies, including its regional partners.

There was no free ride issue which one often sees with too many NATO partners.

A second issue was underscoring the importance of shaping an integrated force that was capable of flexible and agile operations, and with a high demand humanitarian work load for the Australian Defence Force, this means across the spectrum of operations.

A third issue – after emphasizing IT and networks – was a clear understanding that a modernized force may be great but without the proper infrastructure, including logistics, the modernization effort would not really have its intended effects.

It is of course not just improved ICT networks and systems and capability that will underpin our future Air Force over the next two decades.

One of the defining features of the 2016 Defence White Paper and Integrated Investment Program is the renewed focus on enabling capabilities.

In fact, 25 per cent of the Integrated Investment Program is allocated to the enabling projects, which help to bind our capabilities – whether it’s our airfields, our bases, our wharves, our ordnance facilities or our logistics systems, just to name several.

I have always felt that understanding the central role of logistics is a key discriminator between those who actually understand defense operations and those who do not.

Clearly, the Minister put herself on the side of defense professionals in her emphasis on funding the enabling factors.

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2016/03/15/minister-for-defence-2016-royal-australian-air-force-air-power-conference-national-convention-centre-act/

2016 Royal Australian Air Force Air Power Conference – National Convention Centre, ACT

Tuesday, 15 March 2016

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Let me begin by acknowledging the traditional owners of the land on which we meet this morning and pay my respects to their elders, past, present and future.

Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Davies, I thank you very much for the invitation to address this important event and for your kind words of introduction. I echo your welcome to all delegates to this conference. In particular, I extend a very warm welcome to the many visiting Chiefs of Air Forces and international delegations, particularly also to my Ministerial colleague, the Minister for Defence Materiel, Dan Tehan, to our important partners from industry and to our many other distinguished guests and invited speakers.

As the Chief of Air Force said, the fact that more than 1,000 delegates are gathered here today, including a significant number of international Air Force Chiefs, a contingent of United States Commanders in the Pacific, and senior Air Power representatives from around the world, does attest to the very high regard in which this conference is held. I welcome you all to our Nation’s capital.

I say in advance, before the morning unfolds too much further, that for me and for Minister Tehan, this is a Parliamentary sitting day. Not all of you have Ministers who are parts of your Parliament; some of you have Cabinets which sit separately from your Parliaments – or elected representatives. But for us, it is a case of be there in person to vote or else, as required by one’s leaders. So we will both be departing relatively soon after our speech this morning. Please don’t take that as a lack of interest, if I was choosing I promise you I would be spending a lot more time here than I would in my Parliamentary chamber today.

Ladies and gentlemen, this is a very important time for the Australian Department of Defence and also the Royal Australian Air Force. Three weeks ago, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and I released the 2016 Defence White Paper. This document is supported by a fully costed Integrated Investment Program and a Defence Industry Policy Statement. The White Paper sets out the Turnbull Government’s comprehensive and responsible long term plan to ensure Australia’s national security and to create a more capable, agile and potent ADF – the RAAF is at the heart of this plan.

Australia has long seen itself as the ‘lucky country’. Our richness in natural resources, geographic location, our historical and contemporary relationships, and a well educated, innovative and productive population have allowed us to benefit from the shift in global economic power to the Indo-Pacific region. However, as the White Paper makes clear, the parallel shift in strategic power makes for a more complex and demanding strategic environment. This may, in turn, give rise to a broader range of security challenges.

With our international partners, Australia works therefore to foster a rules-based global order. If Australia is to grasp the opportunities available to us and manage the risks, the Turnbull Government recognises that the ADF, including our Air Force, must become more capable, agile and potent. Furthermore we recognise that Australia’s strong network of regional and global Defence relationships will be even more important to us in the future.

So, in the White Paper for the first time we have prioritised and funded Defence’s international engagement as a core Defence function. The RAAF already has – and it will grow – a core role in our international engagement. Through the capability plans in the White Paper, the RAAF’s alibility to project its air power further across the globe will be strengthened.

The importance, for example, of our role in our region and, in this instance, in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief has been underscored by the devastating effects of Cyclone Winston in Fiji. Our RAAF C-17s carrying supplies and Army MRH-90 helicopters were among the earliest international responders to reach the devastated islands. The ADF continues to provide invaluable support to Fiji through operation FIJI ASSIST, with HMAS Canberra currently providing essential support on deployment, while the Army’s 2nd Combat Engineer Regiment is assisting in helping the nation to rebuild its critical infrastructure.

Over the next two decades Air Force will also be equipped with new and more capable platforms to patrol and respond on Australia’s vast maritime approaches. As foreshadowed in the White Paper, I can indicate today that the Government has approved the acquisition of four additional P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and response aircraft, bringing the total number of P-8As on order to 12. The Government is also considering the acquisition of seven MQ-4C Triton unmanned aircraft systems. These two platforms will replace the ageing AP-3C Orion aircraft, giving Australia a greater maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and response capacity.

The first of the Poseidons is expected to be delivered late this year and 12 aircraft will be in service by 2022. Pending government approval a further three aircraft are planned to enter service late in the 2020s and the Triton is planned to be introduced into service in 2023. While the Orion fleet has performed exceptionally on operations throughout its distinguished service, the last of these aircraft will be almost 40 years old when they retire from service.

Ladies and gentlemen, Air Force is already operating some of the sophisticated platforms that will contribute to the networked joint force the White Paper will deliver. I had the opportunity to fly aboard and see first-hand the impressive capabilities of the Wedgetail Airborne Early Warning and Control aircraft and crew, which is currently part of our contribution to the campaign against Daesh in Iraq and Syria.

Australia’s Air Task Group forms the combat element of the Turnbull Government’s contribution to the Coalition efforts targeting Daesh. This Task Group, with its Super Hornets, Hornets, Wedgetail and KC-30 tanker aircraft, is a strong combat capability. In particular, it’s the interoperability of our aircraft, including our KC-30 tanker aircraft and Wedgetail, with our coalition partners that is bringing unique capabilities to the air campaign.

The Chief of the Defence Force, Mark Binskin, has previously remarked on the positive feedback he has received regarding the impressive capability of our Wedgetail aircraft. Our KC-30s and our C-17s are at the centre of our ability for our Air Force to deploy across the globe and to work with our international partners to promote our interests. That capability will be further increased with the acquisition of a further two KC-30s, bringing the total number to seven, further increasing our ability to project our air power and sustain humanitarian, combat, and search and rescue operations.

Over the next decade, the Australian Air Force’s capability will be further strengthened with the introduction into service of the Joint Strike Fighter, the Growler Electronic Attack aircraft and armed unmanned air systems. As the development of the Joint Strike Fighter continues, the pace of testing and evaluation is increasing and I am pleased that another two Australian pilots have recently been relocated to the United States to begin their training. Australia’s JSF aircraft remain on track to arrive in Australia in 2018 with Initial Operational Capability scheduled for 2021.

To maximise the capabilities of our current and future Air Force our systems must be networked and integrated to a degree not previously achieved. Air, land and maritime forces need to exploit the high level of connectivity made possible by use of systems uniting them through the space and cyber domains. Much work has already begun in this regard under Plan Jericho, to which the Chief of Air Force referred, to ensure we have a fully networked joint future force across air, space, electromagnetic and cyber.

With its modernised inventory, Air Force will introduce and develop capabilities that will enhance its ability to work jointly with its sister Forces, in many cases before the systems they will network with enter service with Army and Navy. The work being undertaken by Air Force now in exploring the “art of the possible” and reducing risk through experimentation and trials means that the benefits of a joint force will be more rapidly realised once the networked systems committed to in the White Paper enter Army and Navy service.

As the White Paper details, Defence’s ICT systems have not necessarily kept pace with the rapid advances in technology. To address this, we are making a significant commitment to modernising and transforming Defence’s communications and information systems so that we can take advantage of the changes and improvements in technology.

The Government also acknowledges that the greater our reliance on information systems, the greater the potential risks from cyberattacks. As a result we have also provided for significant investment in cyber capabilities to safeguard government agencies and critical infrastructure against cyberattack.

It is of course not just improved ICT networks and systems and capability that will underpin our future Air Force over the next two decades. One of the defining features of the 2016 Defence White Paper and Integrated Investment Program is the renewed focus on enabling capabilities. In fact, 25 per cent of the Integrated Investment Program is allocated to the enabling projects, which help to bind our capabilities – whether it’s our airfields, our bases, our wharves, our ordnance facilities or our logistics systems, just to name several.

We have upgrades underway at a number of airfields to accommodate some of our new capabilities including RAAF Base Tindal, Williamtown and Darwin. Over the next twenty years in fact, we will spend up to $3 billion in upgrading our airfields across Australia to ensure that our next generation capabilities are properly supported. Without the attention and commitment to deliver these enabling systems, the force multiplying effect of a joint force will not be realised. I know that air forces love their technology, but without the right people, technology can’t, doesn’t become capability.

In Australia, which is a multi-cultural society with a relatively modest population and a vast territory – that vast territory is landmass alone, close in size to that of all of Europe – but with a population less than one third of that of Germany’s. So, to deliver the capabilities of the technologically advanced Future Force outlined in the White Paper, the Government has also committed to grow the uniformed Defence Force to around 62,400 people over the next decade, which will be its largest size in two decades. To attract and sustain this expanded military work force, Defence must recruit and retain its workforce from across that very diverse society; a society in which more than a quarter of all people were born overseas, and over half of which are female.

In relation to women in the Air Force, they currently make up more than 18.5 per cent of Air Force personnel, with Air Force on track to reach its target of 25 per cent female representation by 2023. A number of initiatives are in place to embrace a more inclusive culture within Defence and significant work has been done to remove barriers to the career progression and employment of women, but there are still challenges, still barriers.

Australia has never had a female fighter pilot, although I am pleased to hear that may change very soon, with one female pilot in training right now to become a fast jet pilot. The challenge, though, is to ensure that she’s not the only one, and that there is a steady stream of young women entering these programs of which they’ve not traditionally been part.

We are also addressing the under representation of Indigenous Australians and culturally diverse sections of our society in the ADF. Yesterday I was at ‘the home of the soldier’ – Kapooka, our Army recruiting base – to launch Defence Force Recruiting’s new Indigenous recruitment campaign, which was another important step towards creating an ADF that reflects the community from which it is recruited and which it is entrusted to protect. So that recruiting program – #seeyourself – displays commitment of three of four young Indigenous Australians who’ve been in the ADF for 25 – 8 – 10 years themselves across the three services and asks the viewer to ‘see yourself’ in their jobs, in their roles, and it does it in their own words. It’s a very impactful, very powerful message to young Indigenous Australians that the Australian Defence Force is a great place to be and to come and work.

Ladies and gentlemen, as I’ve mentioned already today, the resources that this workforce will have at its disposal – the aircraft, the vessels, the vehicles, the technology and the information systems will be increasingly sophisticated. The Turnbull Government recognises that a strong, innovative and competitive Australian Defence Force industry is essential.

The Defence Industry Policy Statement, released alongside the White Paper, hasn’t been far from my side over the past three weeks. This document is designed to reset the relationship between industry and Defence; to maximise industry’s innovation potential and to ensure Defence can benefit from, frankly, some amazing capabilities being developed right here in Australia.

One of the key initiatives of the Industry Policy Statement is the Centre for Defence Industry Capability, which the Prime Minister and the Minister for Industry and I announced last week, will be centred in Adelaide. It will have national reach and it will ensure that the defence industry knows what Defence’s capability priorities are and importantly, it will help Defence identify what industry can offer because the Defence-Industry relationship for us is very much a two-way street.

The Joint Strike Fighter program is one area in which we have seen Australian industry compete and access export markets already worth $500 million, which is expected to rise to more than $2 billion by 2022-23. Over the last few months I’ve been lucky enough to visit a number of impressive small-to-medium enterprises that have developed – or are in the process of developing – cutting edge technologies that provide our Australian Defence Force with unique capabilities. The Centre for Defence Industry Capability will help foster the relationship with industry to build its capacity to drive innovation and to open export markets, so that we can find and help develop the next great Australian innovators and I know there are very many of them around this country.

Capability, agility, potency; these are the attributes the Government has invested in enhancing through its balanced approach to the future development of the Australian Defence Force as outlined in the 2016 White Paper. Cutting edge, networked, and integrated technology; an expanded and empowered workforce; and an engaged industrial base are the means of its delivery. And our Air Force is very much at the centre of our high-technology, Future Force.

Air Marshal Davies, I thank you very much for inviting me to address the Air Force’s Air Power Conference. I wish you and all of the participants, presenters and delegates a very productive conference and thank you for the opportunity to be here this morning.

 

 

 

The Service Chiefs Address the Australian Airpower Conference: Shaping a Convergent Way Ahead

2016-03-16 By Robbin Laird

The three Australian Service Chiefs – Air Marshal Davis (RAAF), Vice Admiral Tim Barrett (Royal Australian Navy) and Lieutenant General Angus J. Campbell, (Army) – provided a perspective on their services and the dovetailing of their efforts.

http://www.airforce.gov.au/Our_People/Our_Leaders/Chief_of_Air_Force/?RAAF-cIPygzYc/Fwxxi5dCKVD3g8SFEpfUGXS

http://www.navy.gov.au/biography/vice-admiral-tim-barrett

http://www.army.gov.au/Our-people/Leaders/Chief-of-Army

What was clear from the three presentations was the clear shared understanding each had of the central significance of the other services in achieving the outcomes desired by the ADF over all and in terms of strategic outcomes desired by the Government.

The RAAF Plan Jericho was dovetailing with similar plans of the other two services.

Chief of Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Leo Davis AO, CSC Addresses the Conference. *** Local Caption *** The biennial Air Power Conference on 15 and 16 March 2016, explores the idea of seamless joint effects. The theme of Multi-Domain Integration - Enabling Future Joint Success explores the integration of air, sea, land, space and cyber operations to evolve to a truly joint force. Day one focuses on strategic multi-domain integration, While day two focuses on the implementation of operations through Plan Jericho. The conference will also announce the 2016 RAAF Heritage Awards.
Chief of Air Force, Air Vice Marshal Leo Davis AO, CSC Addresses the Conference.

But there was a clear understanding that shaping convergence of networks and sharing of data to get the right information to the right person at the right time was clearly a challenge, but one central to the transformation of Australian forces.

In a discussion later in the day with Deputy Chief of the RAAF, Air Vice-Marshal Warren McDonald which will be published later, the Air Force leader underscored how farsighted Army leadership was in pushing the ADF towards more convergence on data sharing and joint operations.

He argued that the three services which focused on a core platform as a center point for shaping the convergence or in effect establishing a triangle of cross-cutting platforms/systems which could provide for a focus on the effort, namely Wedgetail or E-7 for the RAAF, the Hobart class frigate and its combat systems for the Navy, and the Army’s Battle Management Systems, including the Land Network Integration Center or LNIC for bringing together significant joint efforts.

In effect, because the RAAF was in the throes of a significant modernization and with the coming of the F-35, Plan Jericho was a lead element.

According to the RAAF chief, “Plan Jericho is designed to transform the RAAF into a fifth generation enabled force. This is not a singular airpower effort.” It is multi-domain and cross-cutting with the other services.

The Navy chief underscored that the new shipbuilding approach which was highlighted in the White Paper was about having continuous production and shaping technological refreshes throughout the life cycle of the fleet.

FD8A0602

And doing so meant, that his fleet needed to effective connect with the other elements of the ADF force structure.

The P-8s and Wedgetails flown by air force obviously needed to be integrated into fleet operations and vice versa.

The Army Chief has an impressive and wide- ranging background and that background interacts nicely with the broad approach which he is bringing to his role as a leader for Army modernization understood in a much broader sense of providing for land operations within the multi-domain agile force which Australia is building.

Not only is shaping the right kind of C2 and ISR approach crucial, but shaping a new approach to Army Aviation is crucial as well.  The Army is indeed undertaking a major rethink about Army Aviation and its look at its place within 21st century three-dimensional warfare.

FD8A0605

Former Chief of the Defence Force, ACM Angus Houston, has been tasked to look at the reshaping of Army Aviation within a multi-dimensional 21st century force.

Army aviation lies at the seams of air and ground power and the Chief is clearly concerned that its role evolve effectively in terms of how airpower is overall transforming.

He underscored the need to shape ways for the various ISR systems to work effectively together going forward as the Army added new unmanned systems, and modified manned systems and to work with Wedgetail, JSF, P-8 and other Air Force systems coming online.

He argued that we can not assume the air dominance we have had in the past decade of land wars.

He argued for the formation of small, agile units, which could depend on, or not air support, and to ensure that they could be hard to find on the battlefield when necessary.

“We need to draw upon the past, but move forward towards a very different environment in shaping the Army of the future.”

Air Marshal Davis Meeting with the Australian Press

During the first day of the conference, Air Marshal Davis sat down with the Australian press and discussed additional issues with them which also provided insights in to his thinking about the way ahead.

He started by going back to an announcement made by the Minister that the RAAF would receive additional P-8s.

He was pleased, of course, but noted that the focus would clearly have to be on how to connect the P-8 to the overall force, both Navy and Air Force, and Army as well.

It was not just about adding a platform; but ensuring that it was a multi-dimensional capability as well.

He also discussed simulation, including Live Virtual Constructive Training, and argued that the expanded ranges over which an agile force needed to operate was a challenge for Australia and its allies.

Foreign Chiefs of Air Force with Australian Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Leo Davis, AO, CSC. *** Local Caption *** The biennial Air Power Conference on 15 and 16 March 2016, explores the idea of seamless joint effects. The theme of Multi-Domain Integration - Enabling Future Joint Success explores the integration of air, sea, land, space and cyber operations to evolve to a truly joint force. Day one focuses on strategic multi-domain integration, While day two focuses on the implementation of operations through Plan Jericho. The conference will also announce the 2016 RAAF Heritage Awards.
Foreign Chiefs of Air Force with Australian Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Leo Davis, AO, CSC.

And he saw simulation as part of getting live exercises more advanced in terms of operational training by ensuring that systems worked with one another much earlier in the training process so that more effort can be placed on achieving desired outcomes from an operation.

When asked about Middle East operations, he noted that on occasion the RAAF has gone into Syria but has largely operated outside of Syria.

He noted that they had no incidences with Russian aircraft, but obviously took account of their operations, and given the reach of the Wedgetail system, the RAAF was able to operate more effectively even in Syrian airspace.

Two policy questions were raised.

The first was about statements made by PACAF that suggested there was a US interest in basing aircraft, including bombers, in Australia.

The RAAF chief dismissed these concerns as he argued that US aircraft were cycling through Australia regularly, but there were no plans to forward base US aircraft in Australia.

In should be noted that the previous PACAF, now the ACC Commander, General “Hawk” Carlisle focused on places not bases as the USAF approach in the Pacific.

While the US was clearly interested in shaping mobile and flexible deployment packages, such as Rapid Raptor with 4 F-22s and a C-17 for support, which could rotate through places like Australia, this was clearly not about permanent basing.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-pacaf-commander-and-reworking-pacific-defense-the-aor-will-become-a-caoc/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/c-17-loaded-for-rapid-raptor-exercise/

The second was about the regional response to Chinese actions in the South China Sea.

Interestingly, the Air Marshal highlighted that the presence of the regional air bosses at the Airpower conference provided an opportunity to discuss mutual concerns and responses.

Clearly, there was an interest on Australia’s part to understand the perceptions of the various regional players and how they might respond.

But the Australian response was clear both at the government level and from the Air Marshal.

FD8A0599

The Australian government underscores the importance of rule based behavior in the area, obviously having in mind the Chinese trying to make up their own rules.

And the Air Marshal said that the focus was ensuring that we could do for the next fifty years what we have done for the last in terms of transit and “gateway continuity.”

Editor’s Note: The biennial Air Power Conference on 15 and 16 March 2016, explores the idea of seamless joint effects.

The theme of Multi-Domain Integration – Enabling Future Joint Success explores the integration of air, sea, land, space and cyber operations to evolve to a truly joint force.

Day one focused on strategic multi-domain integration, while day two focuses on the implementation of operations through Plan Jericho.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Norway, the High North and Security: Shaping a Template for the Way Ahead

03/14/2016

2016-03-15 By Robbin Laird

Norway is in a unique position with regard to the future of the Arctic.

The Norwegian High North is a key part of Norwegian territory and with decades of development of energy supplies on the Norwegian continental shelf has established approaches and procedures for the future development of energy supplies in the High North/Arctic region.

The High North is an elastic concept in Norwegian policy which covers its bundle of interests in the Arctic region, and will evolve over time as the template for dealing with the challenges, including those posed by Russia are engaged and dealt with.

As Odd Gunnar Skagestad noted in his paper on the High North published in 2010:

“What can be expected is not the disappearance of the High North as a high-profiled topic in Norwegian public discourse ad politics, but occasional and gradual shifts of emphasis in its contents and directions (Fridtjdf Nansen Institute, 2010).”

They directly face Russia and have needed to shape a working relationship with Russia for regional development and security, which means that cooperative safety, development and security are part of the Norwegian profile.

Yet the Norwegians are clearly concerned with Russian policies in Europe and beyond, and view defense as part of the overall development and security mix.

Norway's Air Force F-16 fighters (R) and Italy's Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon fighters participated in Arctic Challenge Exercise 2015. (/ Ints Kalnins) / Reuters).
Norway’s Air Force F-16 fighters (R) and Italy’s Air Force Eurofighter Typhoon fighters participated in Arctic Challenge Exercise 2015. (/ Ints Kalnins) / Reuters).

The challenge of course is to cooperate with, compete and protect one’s sovereignty against a very large neighbor with an assertive global agenda.

As it was put in the December 2006, Norwegian Government’s High North Strategy:

“It is a question of our ability to continue our tradition of responsible management of resources, predictable exercise of sovereignty and close coopeation with our neighbors, partners, and allies.

But it is also a question of a broad, long term mobilization of our own strengths and resources….”

Norway’s High North Strategy

Norway faces a complicated balancing act, and because their leadership in forging a way ahead in dealing with a competitive Russia is in advance of the opening up of much of the Arctic, they are shaping a template for the other Arctic powers as well.

The energy side of the equation is pretty straightforward from the Norwegian point of view – Europe needs energy diversity in order to have a secure future.

There is clear concern with how the Germans have over-relied on Russian natural gas supplies, and the latest Nordstream proposals, known as Nordstream 2, would only enhance Germany’s dependence on Russia, something which concerns Norway.

The pipeline would solve a problem for Russia and Germany, namely this gas pipeline would avoid the troubled Ukrainian region.

Nord Stream 2 is a second pipeline that is being built by Russian energy giant Gazprom and Germany’s BASF and E.ON energy companies.

It will run in parallel to the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was completed in 2011 and sends gas under the Baltic Sea directly from Russia to Germany. In doing so, the pipeline weakens Ukraine’s role as the major transit country for Russian gas exports to Europe.

In a presentation to the Atlantic Council in Washington DC on February 25, 2016, Tord Lien, Norway’s Minister of Petroleum and Energy,  provided his perspective on Norway, the High North and European Energy Security.

Having grown up in the Norwegian High North, the Minister emphasized that Norway unlike other members of the Arctic Council were working their resources in the region virtually year round.

Known as the Blue Arctic, Norway is able to extend its production techniques shaped in the Norwegian Continental Shelf to the Arctic region.

He focused on the importance of shaping a global natural gas market, and upon the contributions which natural gas can provide as Europe gets off of the use of coal, such as the current UK government has stated as a strategic objective.

Energy security in the broad sense for Europe, for the Minister, was having a diversity of supplies. Norway and Russia are the top natural gas suppliers to the European market, and by having the Norwegian channel as well as LNG imports from the United States, and growing supplies from Africa, Europe would not need to be dependent upon Russia, which would, thereby, enhance Norway’s security.

The Norwegians have made it clear that they seek cooperation with the Russians in shaping rules of effective development, safety and security in the development of the Arctic region.

But the defense of Norwegian sovereignty is not to be based on Russian good will.

The Norwegians are reshaping their defense forces to become more integrated with safety and security forces and to provide for the kind of capability which could provide for on the spot defense of sovereignty.

The approach was laid down in the 2006 strategy document:

“Norway will maintain its presence, and exercise its sovereignty and authority in part through “the presence of the armed forces is vital for meeting national security needs and maintaining our crisis management capacity in the High North.”

The relationship with Norway’s NATO partners is seen as a key part of the effort, and the hosting of Cold Response exercises is an example of Norway’s focus upon evolving real capabilities for defense of the region.

In this year’s version of Cold Response more than 15,000 military personnel from 14 nations participated.

As the Norwegian Ministry of Defense put the purpose of the exercise:

“Norwegian winter can be extreme, and the cold and changing conditions might be unfamiliar and surprising to many. In case of an emergency situation, military personnel need experiece with combat operations in cold weather.

Norway is ideally suited​ for this kind of winter training, and exercises like Cold Response give us the opportunity to test and confirm our plans and tactics. Cold Response also strengthens cooperation between military and civilian organizations, and military cooperation ​between the participating countries.​​”

The Norwegian Minister of Defense visited U.S. Marines during Exercise Cold Response 16 at a training location near Steinkjer, Norway, March 2, 2016.

The increased spending of Norway upon army, naval and air systems to contribute more effectively to the dynamic protection of Norway’s sovereignty is also part of the mix.

The 2006 strategy document highlighted that a primary task of its military is “to provide background information for national decision-making through up-to-date surveillance and intelligence….(and that) such information is crucial both as regards natural resources and the environment and as regards civilian and military developments.”

This is certainly why the Norwegians is adding the F-35 to its force and looking to integrate it with its overall ISR, C2 and defensive capabilities, such as their P-3s and Aegis ships.

The goal is to shape an interactive dynamic among development, safety, security and defense to provide for the kind of engagement which Norway wishes to have with Russia. Norway clearly seeks cooperation but also to find ways to best protect Norwegian sovereign interests,

Norway's Minister of Defence, Ine Eriksen Søreide, in front of the country's first F-35 combat aircraft. (Photo: Torgeir Haugaard/Forsvaret)
Norway’s Minister of Defence, Ine Eriksen Søreide, in front of the country’s first F-35 combat aircraft. (Photo: Torgeir Haugaard/Forsvaret)

This topic was discussed recently in Canada by the Norwegian Ambassador to Canada at the Conference on Security held in Ottowa, Canada on February 19, 2016.

At that event the Ambassador highlighted the importance of the Arctic and the challenge of dealing with Russia.

According to the Ambassador, to understand the rationale behind Norway’s approach it is often instructive to look at the world from a circumpolar perspective and Norway’s position geographically and strategically.

The Ambassador added that 80% of our maritime areas are north of the Arctic Circle and almost 90% of the export revenues come from the sea-based economic activities and resources. In other words, Norway has important economic interests to safeguard in the north.

According to the Ambassador, located on NATO’s northern flank, Norway puts special emphasis on the need for predictability and stability in our relations with Russia.

This is an area where NATO and Russian interests meet. Norway has a common interest in keeping the High North a region of peaceful cooperation and sustainable development. This is the situation today and we want to keep it that way.

The challenge is to shape a template which can allow for development, cooperation, and the protection of national sovereignty without having that template shaped by the Russians and their definition of Arctic interests.

Clearly, Norway has a key role in shaping the way ahead.

PAX River and the F-35 Integrated Test Force Looks Back on 2015

03/13/2016

2016-03-07 Developmental testing is a fact of life for operational fleets.

As one test engineer commented during our visit to Pax River, “we continue to do developmental testing on the Super Hornet here at Pax.”

And with more than 50,000 flight hours on the F-35 fleet and an operational squadron with the Marines, to be joined by the USAF this year and the Navy next year, the F-35 fleet has already taken off.

There are currently more than 250 F-35 pilots and 2,400 aircraft maintainers from six nations already trained and more than 110 jets are jointly under construction at the Fort Worth and Cameri production facilities.

The F-35 has become tactically operational in the USMC while the aircraft is undergoing developmental testing by the Pax River and Edwards AFB with an F-35 Integrated Test Force (ITF) for the USAF and USN . What is not widely understood is that the ITF is managing the ongoing developmental testing for the life of the program.

With the scope, complexity and concurrent global reach of the F-35 program, a new approach to testing was set in motion.

PAX RIVER F-35 ITF Year in Review from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

The program is one of “spiral development” in which combat F-35 Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) airplanes emerge throughout the process to operate as effective combat assets, even while the developmental testing for all three types of F-35s continue.

Put bluntly, the F-35B in the hands of the Marines is a fully “up” combat aircraft (both airframe, sensors and weapon systems) addition to the USMC Air/Ground team.

All Squadron Pilots in Marines, USAF and Navy, will be backed up by the best test community in the world at Edwards and Pax. This partnership forged for decades will continue a dynamic synergistic combat way for the entire life of the F-35 Global Enterprise.

For the Lightning II, the past decade of putting together a unique, and innovative approach to shaping the F-35 fleet has paid off and has built a solid foundation for the decade ahead.

As US fighter pilots and their partners generate fleet and ultimately combat experience that will lead to never ending innovations and developmental testing.

Put bluntly, if you waiting for the end of developmental testing come back in 30-40 years. Meanwhile, the F-35 fleet will have reshaped air combat operations.

As Andrew Mack, F-35 Integrated Test Force chief test engineer put it:

“When the F-35B Block 2B became cleared for IOC, there were many stories about what it cannot do; that really is not the point. The plane will evolve its capabilities over time based on spiral development.

The point is that it is a very capable combat jet at the block it has achieved already.

And the impact is immediate.

Stealth from the sea is brand new for the Marine Corps and Navy.”

Iran and Saudi Arabia: Scenarios for Future Developments in Middle East

03/11/2016

2016-03-11 By Risk Intelligence

Risk Intelligence

Background

The two countries are already fighting proxy wars in Syria and Yemen.

In Syria, the Saudis are backing several of the rebel groups fighting Bashar al-Assad, who is receiving substantial support from Iran. This also, to some extent, applies to Iraq where Iran is supporting the Shia-dominated Iraqi government against the Islamic State (IS).

In Yemen, the Saudis have since early 2015 directly intervened in the ongoing conflict with ground forces, airpower and naval blockades on behalf of Yemeni president Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi (internationally recognized as the legitimate political leader of Yemen) against the Iranian supported Houthi rebellion that began in February 2015.

Saudi Arabia is under pressure nationally to deflect attention from its economic situation – mainly a result of low oil prices – and to maintain its current standing within the region.

Iranian Naval Activity

Therefore, Saudi Arabia is trying to appease hardliners within its borders to prevent attacks on its own territory and to curb the number of its citizens, who might otherwise seek to join IS. The recent executions can therefore to be viewed through this prism and although Iran continuously demanded the release of al-Nimr, the execution was still carried out. AL-Nimr was not a particularly well-known Imam in Iran (mainly because he was not Iranian), but he was known for campaigning against Saudi Arabia’s treatment of the Shia population in Ahsa, the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.

A broadly accepted consensus, amongst many Iranians, is that the execution has more to do with the internal issues of Saudi Arabia, rather than explicitly targeting Iran.

That said, it must be stressed that the execution, whether deliberately or not, has affected their relationship for the worse, at a time when a better relationship is required most urgently in relation to the Syrian and Yemeni peace talks. Additionally, Iran fears that the broader effects of both the execution and the following attacks could detriment the fragile nuclear deal, the terms of which were only agreed late last year.

The agreement is key for Iran, as it includes the easing of international sanctions. The nuclear deal, which many Iranians, view as a success – and the direct result of Iranian president, Mr. Rouhani’s negotiations – because the easing of sanctions will help improve daily life. The execution of al-Nimr, has, therefore, created a diplomatic crisis, providing fuel for the hardliners but problems for Mr. Rouhani – a champion of peaceful methods compared to the hardliners.

In addition, the deal has generated fear in Riyadh that a major economic boost for Iran from increased trade will give them an edge on not only the previously mentioned proxy battlefields but also on Iran’s influence in the Middle East in general, thus creating a perceived need by Saudi Arabia to counter this new situation.

Current Situation

The outburst of anger between the two countries started on 2 January, following the execution of al-Nimr. Iran, having continuously demanded the release of al-Nimr, condemned the execution.

During the afternoon of 2 January, Iranian protesters and students from Tehran’s religious centers had gathered outside the Saudi embassy in Tehran, eventually attacking and ransacking the building entirely during the evening and night. The Iranian authorities universally condemned the ransacking of the embassy along with another attack on the Saudi Arabian consulate in Mashhad by protesters. Saudi Arabia’s response was to sever all diplomatic ties to Iran on the following day (3 January), giving the Iranian diplomatic delegation in Riyadh 48 hours to vacate the embassy.

On 4 January Saudi Arabia called on its allies in the region, Bahrain, Sudan and United Arab Emirates to follow suit on breaking ties to Iran, with Bahrain and Sudan cutting relations entirely, while the UAE downsized its diplomatic representation in Tehran by recalling its ambassador. Egypt and Kuwait, though both allies of Saudi Arabia, chose only to condemn the attack on the Saudi embassy. Djibouti and Qatar both recalled their ambassadors from Tehran on the evening of Wednesday 6 January.

Furthermore, Saudi Arabia threatened to impose travel and trade bans against Iranian citizens, which was answered by Iran banning all Saudi Arabian trade products. Turkey, major Sunni country, and otherwise in competition with Iran for power in the Middle East, offered diplomatic assistance, saying the crisis should be kept at a diplomatic level. On 7 January, Iran accused the Saudis of intentionally targeting the Iranian embassy in Sana’a, Yemen in an air raid amidst coalition strikes against Houthi targets in the city.

This has been denied by the Saudi led coalition, and unverified reports from witnesses and residents say that the embassy was not damaged in the 7 January strikes. These developments have led to concerns that the deterioration in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran could result in a deteriorating security environment in the region or even outright conflict. The following sets out three possible future scenarios for the short term.

The probability of each of these scenarios is assessed on the following scale: unlikely (10-33% probability); about as likely as not (33-66%); likely (66-90%).

Future Scenarios

Continuation of Current Developments (likely)

From an Iranian point of view, the main concern is to seem sensible and non-aggressive, in order to keep the process of lifting sanctions against Iranian oil on track, as they prepare to double the production and sale of crude.

In that sense, Iran has a clear incentive; at least outwardly, to keep the situation from escalating, something Iranian political leaders seem to understand.

The current path could lead to increased tensions in the Ahsa province, which has been a flashpoint for religious division and violence for many years.

This is due to the perceived suppression of the Shiite majority by the Sunni authorities. Because the recent crisis is rooted in the execution of al-Nimr, the current narrative is laden with religion and sectarianism.

Moreover, Iranians could try to induce Shiites into escalating actions towards the Sunni-authorities, by playing on the sectarian tensions already present.

This escalation could also happen in Ahsa without any significant Iranian support, as the Shiite majority in the province are already agitated because of the mentioned perceived suppression. Activism, low-level attacks and unrest aimed at the Sunni authorities might increase because of this.

The most likely response, by the Saudis, would be to clamp down by various means.

However, no matter the Saudi response, there will be no notable regional consequences. In relation to maritime operations, the above scenario carries no direct increased risk.

The escalation described in this scenario focuses on activities that do not directly affect the sector.

In the event that the Iranian nuclear deal is implemented, the resultant easing of sanctions will in turn increase shipping activity. This will not only increase the trade and transport of oil, but commodities in general, especially into Iran.

The increase in imports and exports will further underline the importance for Iranian maintaining a stable maritime environment in the Persian Gulf.

However, worsening relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia will likely mean increased difficulties in negotiated resolutions to the conflicts in Syria and Yemen.

Escalation (About as Likely as Not)

The Iranians and Saudis could amplify their current bids in the different conflicts in which they are engaged. Iran could increase support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen, for example by stepping up arms supplies.

Because of this, the prospects of the peace talks on Yemen, expected to resume shortly, might suffer significantly because of the recent tensions. The Saudis can take similar actions in Syria, where the conflict pits Iranian proxies and IRGC members against Saudi Arabian-supported rebel groups. The Iranians might also consider activating their Hezbollah allies in Lebanon, encouraging them to escalate reprisals against Sunni sites and persons.

The recent events could potentially have dire consequences for the peace process in Syria where Saudi Arabia in October 2015 had agreed to let Iran to be a part of the UN-led peace process. Saudi Arabia may now use its influence in the UN-led peace talks on Syria, and freeze out Iran and Iranian-supported groups such as Hezbollah from participating in the negotiations.

This would be a severe blow to the peace process that had otherwise started to move forward, and had raised hopes of a negotiated peace in the not too distant future.

Without Iran included in the negotiations, any real progress would be hard to achieve, as Iran is a major player in the Syrian civil war, being a firm supporter of the Assad regime.

Increased political instability between the Saudis and Iranians and their associates in the region will most likely put any negotiation son hold as no solid peace deal can be brokered without these actors present.

Jihadi opportunism as a result of the tensions is another possibility. Groups such as al-Qaeda or IS could attack Shiites, soft targets and security forces in order to further destabilise the situation in Ahsa.

Attacks on Shiite communities, sites and mosques, has happened severalties in recent years, with the claimed IS bombing of a Shiite mosque on 22 May 2015 standing out as one of the most serious incidents.

Any attacks on the extensive Ahsa oil infrastructure is not likely in this scenario, as all installations are considered high priority sites and, as such, will be heavily guarded by Saudi security forces.

Therefore, any sabotage or attacks against the facilities are not a concern currently. In regards to maritime business, this scenario would not have a major direct impact.

Increasing Iranian or Saudi involvement in Syria or Yemen will probably primarily have direct effect on ground based operations and therefore only possibly indirectly impact port cities in Yemen, Syria and Saudi Arabia.

This is also true if the Saudis halt the Syrian peace process, as this will only affect the prospects for a solution, and will not change the dynamics of the battlespace. Jihadi opportunism may have an impact if it materializes.

Sites in port cities such as Dammam or Jubail could be targeted, influencing the overall terror threat level and attacks against Shiites could cause unrest or maybe even reprisals against Sunnis in general or the authorities specifically, increasing the risks of strikes, violence and activism.

Direct Confrontation (Unlikely)

This scenario envisages potential Iranian naval activity directed against Saudi shipping, as well as disrupting traffic to the Saudi Arabian eastern ports servicing the oil industry.

In case of any confrontation, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) would be the main Iranian combatant rather than the regular Iranian Navy, as the Persian Gulf is designated as the IRGCN’s area of operations.

Any approaches or disruption would probably be conducted by fast attack craft, such as missile or torpedo boats and the threat of laying out mines in the Hormuz Strait – both tactics similar to the Iraq-Iran War Direct confrontations in the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz would have an impact on international maritime shipping.

Harassment from the IRGCN and IRIN would in all probability be directed towards Saudi-flagged vessels although other vessels conducting trade with Saudi Arabia could be harassed or hit by mistake or as collateral damage.

However, this might still increase the overall insecurity in the area due to the Iranian military, and the Saudis would surely deploy their own naval assets to counter the Iranian presence, increasing the risk of escalation into a wider conflict.

This scenario is assessed as being unlikely as any provocation of this sort would be a clear escalation by Iran, which is not in its interests due to the upcoming lifting of sanctions.

Iran does not at present have sufficient interest in a potential escalation in its relations with Saudi Arabia to a possible naval confrontation in the Persian Gulf, even at a low level.

Conclusion

The likely scenario that the souring in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue at the diplomatic and commercial relations level at least in the short term.

This will have minimal impact on the regional maritime security environment, although broader security processes in Syria and Yemen will be affected. Indeed, some escalation in these areas is about as likely as not, perpetuating armed conflict (particularly in Yemen), which does have broader regional implications.

Internal security in Saudi Arabia might also be affected, increasing the likelihood of sectarian violence.

Direct naval conflict or even low-level harassment of commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf cannot be ruled out, but is assessed as unlikely. Iran has limited if any interests in escalating the conflict in this area and has a broader agenda that involves a re-setting of relations with the US and Europe (and the lifting of sanctions) and pursuing its strategic interests in, particularly, Iraq and Syria.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia does not have an interest in escalating the conflict any further or, if it where to happen, the capability of managing two armed conflict sat the same time.

This article was republished with permission of Risk Intelligence and is part of their latest issue of Strategic Insights, March 2016, Issue 62.

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