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2016-02-29 The venerable CH-53 has been a staple for Marines in providing heavy lift since the Vietnam War.
The origins of the heavy lift helo is described by Wikipedia as follows:
In 1960, the United States Marine Corps began to seek a replacement for their HR2S piston-powered helicopters. On 27 January 1961, the Marine Corps began working with the other three U.S. armed services on the “Tri-Service VTOL transport”, which would eventually emerge as the Vought-Hiller-Ryan XC-142A tiltwing.
The design became more elaborate and the program stretched out, causing the Marines to drop out when they decided they would not receive a working machine in a satisfactory timeframe. In the end, the XC-142A, although a very innovative and capable machine, never entered production.
In March 1962, the United States Navy’s Bureau of Naval Weapons, acting on behalf of the Marines, issued a request for a “Heavy Helicopter Experimental / HH(X)”. The specifications dictated a load capability of 8,000 pounds (3,600 kg) with an operational radius of 100 nautical miles (190 km; 120 mi) at a speed of 150 knots (280 km/h; 170 mph). The HH(X) was to be used in the assault transport, aircraft recovery, personnel transport, and medical evacuation roles. In the assault transport role, it was to be mostly used to haul heavy equipment instead of troops.
Sikorsky YCH-53A. Credit: Sikorsky
In response, Boeing Vertol offered a modified version of the CH-47 Chinook; Kaman Aircraft offered a development of the British Fairey Rotodyne compound helicopter; and Sikorsky offered what amounted to a scaled-up version of the S-61R, with twin General Electric T64 turboshafts and the dynamic system of the S-64, to be designated the “S-65”.
Kaman’s proposal quickly died when the British government dropped its backing of the Rotodyne program. Competition between Boeing Vertol and Sikorsky was intense, with the Chinook having an advantage because it was being acquired by the United States Army. Sikorsky threw everything into the contest and was awarded the contract in July 1962.
The YCH-53A prototype in 1964
The Marines originally wanted to buy four prototypes but ran into funding problems. Sikorsky, determined to keep the deal, cut their estimate for development costs and said that the program could be done with two prototypes. The military bought off on the proposal, and in September 1962 Sikorsky was awarded a contract for a little under US$10 million for two “YCH-53A” prototypes, as well as a mockup and a ground-test airframe.
The development program did not go entirely smoothly, due to a shortage of engineering resources plus various failures of subcontractors and the government, but these problems were gradually overcome. There was also the problem that U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was pushing to maintain “commonality” between the armed services by using the Chinook, but the Marines managed to convince McNamara’s staff that the Chinook could not meet their requirements without numerous expensive changes.
All these obstacles overcome, the first YCH-53A performed its initial flight at the Sikorsky plant in Stratford, Connecticut, on 14 October 1964, about four months behind schedule. The Marines had already placed an initial production contract for 16 helicopters in September. Flight trials went more smoothly than expected, helping make up for the lost time in development. It received the military designation and name “CH-53A Sea Stallion”. Delivery of production CH-53s began in 1966.
The CH-53A arrived in Vietnam in January 1967 and proved useful, eventually recovering even more downed aircraft than the CH-54. A total of 141 CH-53As were built, including the two prototypes. The U.S. Navy acquired 15 CH-53As from the USMC in 1971 for airborne mine countermeasures (AMCM) activities. The helicopters had more powerful T64-GE-413 turboshafts installed and received the designation “RH-53A”.
There have been changes over the years as the CH-53 migrated from an A to an E model.
But it has been a voyage of a Type/Series/Model not unlike other programs, changes have been made, upgrades have been built in, but the basic helicopter has been recognizable throughout its evolution.
A comprehensive look at the evolution of the helicopter from the A through to the E has been provided in the Sikorsky archives and can be found here:
The original helicopter was later modified to the CH‑53D, which had more powerful engines and added engine air particle separators to prevent ingestion of dust.
Ch-53E operating in Afghanistan. Credit: USMC
The growth version of the CH‑53D added a third engine and a seventh main rotor blade, drastically increasing maximum gross weight by 75%.
It became the largest and most powerful helicopter outside of Russia.
Although a CH-53, the CH-53K is not easily understood as an evolution of earlier models.
The predicate for the CH-53 series really is founded in the context of 1960s technologies and concepts of operations.
The predicate for the CH-53K is 21st century military aviation, approaches, materials and technologies and is entering the force when a very different concept of operations is being shaped than the one forged in the 1960s and which evolved forward from the Vietnam War.
And as a 21st century platform which is designed to be embedded into a transformed USMC insertion force, enabled by Ospreys, F-35Bs, and digital interoperability among other new technologies, the K is both enabled by and enables the shift to distributed operations.
The K has come on line more slowly than intended, in part because putting together the pieces of a new 21st century capability into an integrated platform is not easy. And because the new platform is quite different from its predecessor, in terms of design, construction, testing, and capabilities, it is not as easy to describe as if it was a completely new type of aircraft.
Nonetheless, it is a 21st century aircraft for a 21st century USMC and its approach to operations.
It simply cannot be understood simply in terms of step grade evolution.
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Credit Images: USN and USMC
We are starting a new series of the CH-53K which will provide an update on the program as the program matures and gets ready for Initial Operating Capability or IOC.
We last visited the K in 2013 after an earlier interview with a Marine involved with the program in 2011.
During the 2013 interview the shortfall in the heavy lift fleet and the need for the K was highlighted.
A key asset being added to the 21st century amphibious fleet is a new version of the CH-53…. During this year’s visit to New River, we had a chance to talk with a key Marine involved in the upcoming testing of the CH-53K and who is moving to the test facility in West Palm Beach, Florida at the Sikorsky Test Development center this fall.
Major Foster T. Carlile is the CH-53K Operational Test Director.
SLD: Could you describe the current situation with the CH-53E fleet?
Major Carlile: We are approaching a serious situation with respect the CH-53E fleet of aircraft. The airframes reaching their 10,000 hour limit, combined with the treacheries of flying in combat for over a decade has taken its toll.
Additionally, the new technology available to the CH-53K is a giant-giant leap relative to the CH-53E.
In this series we will describe the “giant-giant leap” from the E to the K and how this will impact USMC operational approaches as well as how it reflects shifts in those approaches.
We will start by looking at the design for sustainability element inherent to 21st century air systems, and seen in programs like the F-35 or the A400M. The key role for software and digital systems is built in from the ground up and is a key element for shifting the approach to sustainability.
For the Marines, this shift started with the Osprey and lessons learned there are being applied to the K program as well. And given the key role of VMX-22 in the Osprey, F-35B and K programs, the squadron will shape lessons learned helpful across 21st century innovation for the air element for the USMC.
We will next look at the interaction between the platform and the operational context and examine how the one impacts on the other , and vice versa.
And then a visit to West Palm where tests are underway will provide a comprehensive update on the program, testing and shaping the way ahead.
Also important will be to understand how the K fits into a dynamically changing force which is shaping an integrated approach to operate in the 21st century battlespace.
In an earlier article, we highlighted some of the key criteria to examine with regard to a new platform coming into a 21st century integrated force:
Thus, when one approaches the acquisition of new platforms, a key consideration needs to be what does a new platform bring to the battlespace?
How can its organic capabilities enhance the capability of the force to provide for an integrated effect?
How can the platform contribute to the multiplier effect of its operation within the battlespace?
How can the force best survive and prevail and how do new platforms contribute to that effort?
How upgradeable is the platform with regard to the other key capabilities operating in the battlespace?
How can the central role of software upgradeability best be recognized and supported in building out an information secure, decision dominant force?
How to measure cost effectiveness in an integrated battlespace world?
How do new approaches to sustainability built into 21st century systems get recognized as cutting edge ways to have a more effective and sustainable force, rather than being audited to death by 20th century practices and thinking?
The most expensive acquisition could well be one that is the cheapest up front in terms of initial price tag, but is not an effective member of an integrated battlespace.
Such platforms might only contribute to a narrow function without any real capability to evolve with the forces shaping a way ahead to reshape capabilities to achieve key effects in the evolving battlespace and within that battlespace shaping an open ended force integration process.
According to the USMC, the CH-53K is described and understood as follows:
The CH-53K “King Stallion” is critical to sea-based expeditionary maneuver warfare for our Corps. As MAGTF equipment gets heavier, demand for vertical heavy lift assets increase. Heavier equipment, such as up-armored HMMWVs, the future JLTV, and the LAV eliminate medium-lift assets as lift platforms and increase demand for the heavy lift CH-53K.
The CH-53K provides our Corps with the ability to transport 36,000 lbs of external cargo and is specifically designed to lift 27,000 lbs of cargo up to 110 nautical miles in support of future warfighting concepts.
The CH-53K generates nearly three times the external lift capability of the CH-53E under the same environmental conditions, while fitting within the same shipboard footprint. Performance improvements enable vertical insertion of dual-slung up-armored HMMWVs, the JLTV, LAV, or three individually tailored resupply loads, which are delivered to three different operating bases using the independent triple-hook external load system.
The CH-53K provides unparalleled lift and range capability under high-temperature and high altitude austere conditions, similar to those found in Afghanistan, thereby greatly expanding the commander’s operational reach. It is the only fully “marinized” helicopter that can lift 100 percent of air transportable equipment from amphibious shipping to inland objectives.
The CH-53K, has more lift capacity than present day heavy lift assets, and is the aircraft of choice to minimize the MAGTF footprint while maximizing operational efficiency.
Major system improvements include:
more powerful engines
increased lift capability
enhanced drive train
advanced composite rotor blades
modernized digital cockpit
improved external and internal cargo handling systems
increased survivability and force-protection measures.
The CH-53K designed to greatly improve heavy lift performance and survivability while reducing shipboard logistical requirements, operating costs, and direct maintenance man hours-per-flight hour compared to the CH-53E.
Operational Impact:
The CH-53K maintainability and reliability enhancements decrease recurring operating costs significantly, while improving aircraft efficiency and operational effectiveness compared to the CH-53E. Its Fly-by-Wire flight controls provide unprecedented stability and flight safety.
Survivability and force protection enhancements significantly increase protection for aircrew and passengers. The CH-53K will transport three independent external loads tailored to individual unit requirements and provide the critical logistics air bridge to facilitate sea-based and distributed operations.
The CH-53K is the only Marine Corps helicopter capable of carrying 463L Air Force pallets internally, which greatly shortens logistics delivery timelines from fixed wing transport aircraft.
Foreign militaries are clearly interested in the aircraft as well with Germany and Israel heading the list. For these militaries, the capabilities of the K significantly redefine lift capabilities for an insertion force, the kind of force we have argued is becoming central to 21st century operations and threat reductions.
For the United States, the land wars of the past decade led to a significant redirection of its military forces and highlighting key role for the US Army and the USMC playing its ground operations role and to the support of those forces by the US Air Force and the US Navy. A large logistics operation via land, sea, and ground along with significant expenditures to civilian contractors such as Maersk to support the effort was entailed as well.
It has led to a significant bulging of the Department of Defense toward the US Army and its leadership with the other forces largely in a support role.
A major centerpiece of this effort has been Counter Insurgency Operations and the training of local forces to support local governance or a significant role highlighted for national building.
Stability operations were highlighted over traditional conventional operations, and the nuclear dimension of the force structure reduced and largely de-emphasized.
This bulging makes no sense going forward.
he U.S. has insertion forces able to engage and withdraw, and several core allies are shaping similar forces, rather than setting up long-term facilities and providing advisers as targets.
The ability to establish air dominance to empower multi-mission USMC insertion force able to operate effectively, rapidly and withdraw is a core effort that now exists in US way of war for emerging 21st century conflicts.
The classic dichotomy of boots on the ground versus airpower really does not capture the evolving capabilities of either airpower or the evolving capabilities of ground forces capitalizing on those evolving capabilities to provide for more effective and more lethal insertion forces.
Clearly, the K is part of this evolving transition. And as such, deserves a close examination which we will provide in this series.
During a recent visit to Pax River, we had the chance to discuss the F-35 test approach and way ahead with Andrew Maack. F-35 Integrated Test Force (ITF) chief test engineer.
Although we were at Pax River, the F-35 ITF is rooted in an integrated team at Edwards AFB as well, and the two teams, although in different physical locations, are part of the same team.
In 2014, Maack received a Department Navy award (2013 Test & Evaluation (T&E) Lead Tester Award) for his performance and accomplishments.
Maack would be the first to tell you, that the team deserves the credit but the words released by the Navy about the award tell a different story than so often grabs the headlines about the F-35 program.
“This award recognizes a member of the T&E workforce who has excelled at the planning, management and oversight of T&E activities as the Lead Tester for the largest programs,” Capt. Erik “Rock” Etz, the former director, Test & Evaluation (T&E) F-35 Naval Variants, explained. “Andrew’s leadership of the ITF and contributions to the F-35 program have been exceptional, particularly during the dynamic flight test tempo that we all experienced last year.”
Etz underscored Maack’s skillful leadership of the more than 920-member ITF team during the execution of safe and efficient execution of F-35 critical flight test events and his direct contributions to Fleet operations as he wrote the nomination for the award.
“Andrew’s exceptional efforts, incredible depth of technical knowledge, and meticulous attention to detail resulted in the safe completion of pivotal test milestones of the F-35 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase,” Etz added. “
In August 2013, he led the highly successful F-35B Developmental Test (DT) II sea trials aboard the USS WASP, providing clear direction for a 220-member Pax River ITF team that worked in concert with the more than 900-member crew of the USS WASP to verify F-35B capabilities at sea.
With safety of test as his primary focus area of effort, Andrew ensured that a high-paced tempo of flight test operations was executed in a safe manner that guaranteed the well-being of all embarked personnel and preservation of each of the participating uniquely-configured test aircraft (BF-01 and BF-05).
Each aircraft and team provided complementary execution paths to ensure that the aggregate body of collected data would provide the most robust data package for certification of Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) aircraft for the U.S. Marine Corps Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and fleet at-sea operations.
Testing was executed in areas of performance (including minimum performance Short Takeoffs), flying qualities (including high crosswind short take-offs (STOs) and vertical landings), loads, alternative approaches, first at-sea night operations, mission systems instrument carrier landing system (ICLS) approaches, in-motion alignments, propulsion (first at-sea tests for In-Service Release F-135), among other flight test disciplines.
The DT-II achieved the highest rate of execution yet displayed on the program (more than 90 sorties generated in just over two weeks, with approximately 220 test points for score).”[1]
Maack has many years of experience not just on the F-35 program but on other test programs, and it was from his total comprehensive experience at testing that he discussed with us the F-35 program.
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He made several points, which we will focus on below.
First, developmental testing goes on throughout the life cycle of a combat air program. He noted that developmental testing with the F/A-18 was ongoing and, with a software upgradeable airplane such as the F-35, developmental testing would not end until the program did.
Second, the F-35 program is more complex than programs before it, and they had to craft a test approach that fit the complexity of the aircraft and program itself. The integration of both Edwards and Pax to conduct ongoing synergistic testing was a key point in that direction.
Third, the program is one of “spiral development” in which combat F-35 Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) airplanes emerge throughout the process to operate as effective combat assets, even while the developmental testing for all three types of F-35s continue. Put bluntly, the F-35B in the hands of the Marines is a fully combat-capable asset that will evolve over time.
Fourth, the airplane is the most integrated combat jet ever built, in terms of systems, fusion, and software. And, even though integrated, it is a very robust system in which cascading issues from any particular component or system really has limited effect on the overall F-35 air combat system. This robustness is found in the integrated systems’ ability to continue functioning in the presence of component failures. Thus, it is a safe combat aircraft.
Fifth, to put the team together required a different cultural approach, whereby specialists must act as integrators across the airframe and avionic components of the airplane. This is clearly different from legacy programs.
Sixth, the decade of putting together the unique and innovative approach to shaping the F-35 fleet is laying down the foundation for the decade ahead in which the services and partners generate the combat experience — which will then lead to further innovations and developmental testing.
Put bluntly, if you waiting for the end of developmental testing come back in 30-40 years.
Meanwhile, the F-35 fleet will have reshaped air combat operations.
Question: How integrated is the test force here and at Edwards?
Answer: Very. We talk and work together every day. A lot of times, people want to draw a distinction between Pax and Edwards, and that is really not applicable to this program. What is unique about the F-35 program really is the scope and scale of what we are doing.
It is not only different from what we have done before, but frankly there are some very real-world throughput issues. By having both Pax and Edwards integrated, we can expand the test space.
Let me give you an example. The data generated and communicated by the F-35 is unprecedented. This means that from a testing point of view we run up against telemetry limits. What we can use in DoD-related telemetry from the planes in flight is really pushed into a very tight box. We are limited to four or five airplanes at a time as the max that we can operate for the kind of bandwidth we are pulling off of F-35s at any given time.
The test data from what we call the orange instrumentation on the plane — specialized flight test instrumentation like pressure transducers and load strain gauges and things like that — are part of the significant bandwidth we transmit. And, when combined with bus data, it is indeed a very large bandwidth compared to our legacy programs.
Question: Developmental testing is not a one-off to get the planes out the door until the next model series arrives. What is the role of developmental testing in the life cycle of a combat airplane?
Answer: Put simply, developmental testing is for the life cycle of the airplane. People would be surprised, if they do not follow the business, at how much developmental flight-testing goes on today on the F/A-18. There are continuous needs generated by new weapons, or communication requirements, especially with the F-35 coming to the fleet.
With the F-35, clearly this type of developmental testing is for the life cycle. There is no reason to expect otherwise.
Question: It is clear that you are having to adjust the test culture to deal with the F-35.
How would you describe the change?
Answer: One aspect is clearly with regard to testers themselves. With legacy aircraft, you tended to have various specialists — a hydraulics expert, or flight controls expert, or a radar expert.
On the F-35, unlike anything that I’ve dealt with before — and I’ve been in test and evaluation for 30 years now — you find you certainly still have specialists in those areas. However, it’s not satisfactory to only know that system because it is so interactive across the airframe from a software standpoint, from a controls standpoint, that it really requires everyone on the team to be an integrator. You need to be an integrator across all the different disciplines on the airplane, and that’s been a challenge.
Question: In this past decade, you have established your basic test approach, which really is built around spiral development.
And this decade is laying down the foundation for the next where the combat experiences of the service and partner fleet become folded into the next round of development of the aircraft.
How would describe the process that you have established?
Answer: We have been developing three different variants of the F-35. It was clear that the services would need the aircraft prior to some notional finished aircraft.
And so the program was intentionally put into a spiral development type of mode in which there were going to be defined blocks. And each block represents a combat-ready variant of the aircraft, or of a particular model of the aircraft.
We defined all the different capabilities of the airplane that were going to be shaped over time. The end point, so to speak.
And then we divided them up into blocks in which there were going to be useful war fighting capabilities. Those were provided at incremental blocks to the airplane.
At the same, there was a flight envelope established as an expectation for each of those block developments.
All of our test planning was scoped around being able to clear — for flight sciences — a given envelope to meet a milestone promise date for the particular block in question. And, from the mission system side, developing those missions systems and weapons that were promised for each of those blocks.
For example, when the F-35B Block 2B became cleared for IOC, there were many stories about what it cannot do; that really is not the point. The plane will evolve its capabilities over time based on spiral development. The point is that it is a very capable combat jet at the block it has achieved already.
And the impact is immediate.
Stealth from the sea is brand new for the Marine Corps and Navy.
Question: How do you manage risk in the program?
Answer: Everything has to be evaluated, and our team does an excellent job of evaluating the risk at hand versus the need for the test. A high-risk test, which has a high value, is the flight that you should be flying more so than the flight that is next to nothing for risk but is questionable as to whether it even has to be flown from a value perspective.
The very first level of risk reduction, of what we do in a program like this, is to scope out what is really necessary to do and what is not necessary to do.
Your best safety net is creating a culture that is not risk averse but is positive, proactive, and dedicated to moving forward, yet at the same time does not compromise safety.
You need sound reasons for doing your testing; not just testing for testing’s sake.
Question: In your testing, how robust have you found the F-35 as baseline aircraft to be?
In test, the concern about cascading failure states is always very high when you start to operate the airplane. This concern is based on the general fact that once you integrate everything, a small problem all of a sudden can cascade into an enormous problem.
What I will say has been absolutely outstanding in the F-35 design has been the robustness of failure accommodations on the airplane. When systems fail, it is difficult for me to come up with examples of things that have not generally displayed tremendous — tremendously good — robustness. And, by robustness, I mean being able to isolate the problem while being able to continue operating the aircraft.
Editor’s Note: Below is a helpful overview with regard to the Pax River test facilities.
Editor’s Note: A press release from the Joint Program Office dated February 10, 2016 highlighted passing 50,000 flight hours for the F-35 fleet.
F-35 Lightning II aircraft operating at 12 different locations worldwide surpassed the 50,000 flight hour mark this month.
The first flight hour was achieved by an F-35B aircraft, BF-1, June 1, 2008. The 25,000 flight hour milestone occurred in December 2014, six years and six months later. As a sign of program growth and maturity, the second 25,000 flight hours were reached only one year and two months later.
“The F-35 program continues to grow and accelerate as we complete additional flight testing and increase deliveries to our U.S. and partner warfighters,” said Lt. Gen. Christopher Bogdan, F-35 Joint Program Executive Officer. “The next 50,000 hours will be achieved much quicker as we double the size of the F-35 fleet worldwide in the next three years alone.”
Flight hours are divided into two main categories: Operational flying hours, flown by 155 jets delivered to six different nations, and System Development and Demonstration (SDD) flight test hours, flown by 18 aircraft assigned to the Integrated Test Forces at Edwards AFB, and NAS Pax River. Of the 50,000 hours, operational jets flew approximately 37,950 hours while SDD aircraft flew 12,050 hours. More than one third of the program’s flight hours were flown in 2015 alone. Among the three variants, approximately 26,000 hours were flown by the F-35A, 18,000 hours by the F-35B and 6,000 by the F-35C.
F-35s are flying at eight operating locations: Edwards Air Force Base, California, Eglin AFB, Florida, Hill AFB, Utah, Luke AFB, Arizona, Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina, MCAS Yuma, Arizona, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, and Nellis AFB, Nevada. Jets are also flown at two F-35 depot locations at MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina, and the Ogden Air Logistics Complex at Hill AFB, Utah. Flight hours were also recorded at the two F-35 production facilities at Cameri, Italy, and Fort Worth, Texas.
To date, more than 250 F-35 pilots and 2,400 aircraft maintainers from six nations are trained and more than 110 jets are jointly under construction at both production facilities.
Three distinct variants of the F-35 will replace the F-16 Fighting Falcon and A/OA-10 Thunderbolt II for the U.S. Air Force, the F/A-18 Hornet for the U.S. Navy, the F/A-18 and AV-8B Harrier for the U.S. Marine Corps, and a variety of fighters for at least ten other countries. Following the U.S. Marine Corps’ July 2015 combat-ready Initial Operational Capability (IOC) declaration, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy intend to attain service IOC this summer and in 2018, respectively.
[1] Maack Honored with the Department of the Navy’s 2014 Test and Evaluation (T&E) Lead Tester Award, Pax River Press release, 2014 0501.
2016-03-02 Our colleague Air Vice Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn has focused attention on the energy security shortfall for Australia for some time.
As an island continent at the bottom of the Asia Pacific region, Australia is heavily dependent upon liquid energy imports and with a rapidly disappearing domestic refinery production capacity, these imports necessarily are with regard to refined end products as well.
In reports produced in 2013 and 2014, Air Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn has highlighted the challenges for Australia and the importance for Australia to reshape its energy approach to avoid an inevitable crisis flowing from its situation of energy dependence. The rest of this article is drawn from Blackburn’s reports.
The combination of diminishing refinery capacity along with over-reliance on a stable flow of imports from Asia, the Middle East and North America, has led to a situation where no country would wish to be: Australia currently possess the equivalent of only 23 days of actual consumption of liquid fuels in country at any one time.
This means that the country is subject to significant disruption. Beyond the question of the disruption of supply from an unstable Middle East, there is the direct impact of any disruptions in Asia itself.
As of 2011, Singapore provided 51% of Australia imports of petroleum products.
In the wake of the new Defence White Paper, there is growing focus of attention on the energy security challenge.
In a piece by Malcom Sutton published by ABC News (Australia) regarding the White Paper and the challenge:
With the Government expected to release its latest Defence White Paper on Thursday, an adviser to the country’s largest motorist association has said he hopes tensions in the South China Sea have forced a re-think of where Australia gets its fuel.
Retired Air Vice Marshall John Blackburn said Australia’s food, water and medicine distribution was entirely reliant on transport fuel and the supply operated on a “just in time” philosophy for the sake of logistical efficiency.
Mr Blackburn, who is commissioned by the National Roads and Motorists’ Association (NRMA) to provide consultancy and strategic advice on Australia’s fuel security, said this unerring drive for market efficiency had led to four of the country’s seven oil refineries closing down in three years.
“We’re heading towards 100 per cent import dependency,” Ret. Air Vice Marshall Blackburn said.
“But when the British were passing 40 per cent import dependency, they said they had a national security concern.”
University of New South Wales Professor of International Security Alan Dupont agreed that Australia’s growing dependency on imported fuel was “obviously a vulnerability”.
“We don’t have much in the way of refinery capacity in Australia right now and we don’t have much in the way of strategic stock piles,” he said.
“I think that dependency is only going to increase.”
The South China Sea is a shipping route through which a large proportion of Australia’s refined fuel is imported, including diesel, unleaded and jet fuel.
It is also emerging as a hot zone for potential conflict as China, the United States, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines become increasingly invested in territorial disputes over islands in international waters.
Mr Blackburn said a scenario of conflict in the region and how it would affect Australia’s fuel security was not considered in the Government’s National Security assessment, “upon which the Energy White Paper (EWP) bases its assessment,” Mr Blackburn said.
“The fundamental assumption they’ve made is because we haven’t had a problem in 30 years, we’re not going to have a problem.”
With last year’s EWP offering only brief discussion of the reliability of fuel imports, Mr Blackburn said he expected the Defence White Paper to look more “closely” at the issue…..
It prompted warnings from the NRMA and the likes of Senator John Madigan, all of who have been critical of the steady decline in Australia’s oil refining capacity.
The Australian Automobile Association told the Senate inquiry a major disruption to transport fuel supplies would be felt “across society and in every sector of the economy”.
The NRMA and Fusion Australia suggested that even a 20 to 40 per cent cut in the fuel supply, “brought about by factors such as conflict, would quickly lead to a situation whereby the country would start running out of food and medicines, while the economy would start to shut down”.
The Senate inquiry concluded there was no capacity for emergency reserves in the form of government-held or compulsory industry stocks of Australian fuel because its storage capacity was held within the supply chain.
It reported there was no mandate for industry to report fuel stock holding levels because their focus was entirely on a “just-in-time” security of supply to keep costs down.
It recommended a “whole-of-government risk assessment”, which would consider vulnerabilities due to military actions, acts of terrorism, natural disasters and industrial accidents.
And during Senate debate in Australia on February 25, 2016, the question of energy security was discussed by the Minister of Defence directly.
Senator MADIGAN (Victoria) (14:26): My question is to the Minister for Defence. Before the government commits to $30 billion of expenditure: a well-equipped defence force could become a museum exhibit if it cannot be supported by adequate logistics in a time of conflict. There are serious concerns about the ability of our defence forces to have a guaranteed supply of fuel in a conflict scenario, given the fact that Australia has no government owned fuel stocks and does not mandate minimum stock levels for industry to hold. Fuel security is the job of government.
How would the government respond to a direct attack on our fuel supply lines?
Senator PAYNE (New South Wales—Minister for Defence) (14:27): I thank senator Madigan for his question.
There have been a number of discussions recently, and most recently I saw former Air Vice Marshal John Blackburn making some observations in relation to this.
Significantly, while Defence is indeed able to meet its fuel requirements through its own stockholdings, it is important to note that we do in fact a have a number of other supply options.
Amongst those I would indicate that we have arrangements with our closest allies, who can be relied on should there be an interruption to the general supply of fuel.
I understand also in response to Senator Madigan’s question, particularly in relation to logistics support, that this is an aspect of the white paper, to which I would draw senator Madigan’s attention.
It is an area of enabling capability within Defence that has been significantly underfunded in recent years, and it is one which this white paper most importantly seeks to address and in fact readdress.
2016-03-02 Recently, our colleague Col. “Jeep” Willi from the Joint Airpower Competence Center (JAPCC) brought to our attention a new journal which in part will be dealing with the information warfare being practiced and refined by the global competitors of the US and its allies.
‘Defence Strategic Communications’ is a peer reviewed journal published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia.
The aim of establishing this journal was to bring together military, academic, business and governmental knowledge. The journal’s publication is the culmination of a busy first year for the Centre.
Our team have already undertaken significant studies in Russian Information Warfare; Daesh propaganda, the growing use and importance of Social Media, a review of ISAF Strategic Communication in Afghanistan, and an audit of NATO member nation’s Strategic Communication preparedness.
We have delivered capacity building trainings in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia and assisted our respective sponsor governments in their own awareness of the complex communication issues that now confront us all.
NATO StratCom COE has come at a critical time; our Strategic Communication (StratCom) efforts in Afghanistan were mixed, we face a new generation hybrid warfare from the east, and in the Middle East Daesh/ISIL use propaganda and communication to deadly effect.
No one in NATO can afford to ignore the importance and latent power of communication.
This inaugural edition of the journal has cast its net deliberately wide. We cover academic theory, social media, Russian information warfare, Daesh/ISIL propaganda, NATO public diplomacy and narratives. All have relevance to the subject and help us collectively build our knowledge and understanding of the complexity of StratCom and its need.
The Editorial Board of “Defence Strategic Communications“ is headed by Dr Steve Tatham. We encourage you to contribute to the next issue of “Defence Startegic Communications”, more information about the process is available here.
We hope that this journal will enhance your understanding of the subject matter and prove useful in your future academic endeavours.
The JAPCC itself is conducting a number of interesting studies and those studies along with past publications can be found on their website.
One interesting study is looking at a very neglected issue, namely how adversaries attempt to undercut the use of airpower by the Alliance and to attenuate its effectiveness by the most non-kinetic of means, information warfare.
There is far more attention paid in NATO to the challenges of cyberwar, than to the pressing issue of how to best conduct information war against adversaries like ISIS which are both at once branding and terrorist organizations.
The study is described as follows on the JAPCC website:
By James S. Corum PhD, Dr Conrad Crane (USA), Dr Philpp Fraund (DEU), Dr Eugenio Cusumano (ITA), Dr Mathieu Chillaud (FRA), Dr James Pugh (UK)
Introduction
This study will examine one of the most serious threats against Western airpower that we now face – the disinformation campaigns carried out against NATO and coalition forces in campaigns in Afghanistan and Libya that specifically characterize airpower as an inhumane and indiscriminate weapon of war.
In fighting irregular non-state forces (and even forces in state on state war) groups and nations routinely and deliberately exaggerate the civilian casualties of aerial bombing, or even make false claims, to claim the propaganda advantage of victimhood (discussed in the book Airpower and Small Wars). Indeed such campaigns often conflate and exploit legitimate debate or genuine errors to serve their means.
In recent air campaigns airpower has been routinely portrayed as indiscriminate, enormously lethal, and causing massive collateral damage and civilian casualties.
Disinformation and misinformation published in the Western media have a powerful effect of winning sympathy for enemy forces and for undermining Western public support for military operations.
In short, groups such as al Qaeda, Taliban and affiliated groups make the NATO use of airpower a major theme in very effective information operations.
These information campaigns are some of the best weapons employed by NATO’s enemies. Besides their influence on the public, they also steer the political debate, e.g. the discussion about weaponized Unmanned Air Systems (UAS).
It is important that the nature of information campaigns that target Western airpower, including weaponized UASs, and specifically weaponized UAVs, be examined in depth so that we can better understand the opposition and its information strategy.
We need to understand the concerns and perceptions with regard to airpower and how these are dealt with by the Alliance and are exploited by its adversaries.
We need to look at the recent NATO and Western air campaigns, in Afghanistan and Libya in particular (but not excluding Iraq and Kosovo) and the degree to which disinformation and misinformation about air strikes was portrayed in the European media and the degree to which the portrayal of airpower worked to win sympathy for the enemy groups and movements and to win support for restricting or avoiding the use of airpower altogether.
With the rise of weaponized UASs we can anticipate that al Qaeda affiliates and related terror organizations (or any organisation without capable air power of its own) will use disinformation and misinformation to undermine the will of NATO nations to engage in military operations, and to specifically disallow the use of airpower in the strike role.
Aim
The aim of the study is in line with NATO’s work to identify problems and solutions to ensure that airpower continues to be a key enabler to the security of NATO.
The study will identify and analyse the information campaigns that have been mounted against NATO and Western airpower over the last fifteen years which had the intent of discrediting NATO airpower.
This study will provide doctrinal, policy and training recommendations to meet the threat of disinformation and to improve NATO’s Strategic Communications (StratCom) in employing airpower in the future.
The finalized study will support “NATO Forces 2020” by providing realistic concepts and doctrines to meet the expected challenge of disinformation in an ever changing security environment.
The study will also form the basis of a flexible module of training to be developed for NATO personnel to deal with the challenge of disinformation aimed against NATO airpower.
Scope
An in depth study will examine the role of airpower and information campaigns, particularly related to disinformation in recent air campaigns. The study will develop several case studies to examine NATO and national policies and reaction to the use of air power.
These studies will determine which themes and information strategies have worked best in countering the portrayal of airpower as being inhumane and, by these portrayals, have won international support for the enemy cause.
The case studies will determine where NATO and Western StratCom have succeeded in shaping the information environment with regard to the use of air power as well as countering the disinformation claims, and where NATO and NATO nations have not been effective and have allowed the enemy to have the information advantage.
In addition to the case studies of disinformation and airpower the study will include national case studies of the major European nations that have employed airpower and UASs in recent conflicts to answer several questions.
By examining a representative national media (major newspapers, magazines, news agencies) in each country we will determine:
How is airpower portrayed in the media?
How are UAVs portrayed in the media?
What is the public understanding of aerial strike operations?
What does the public understand of the targeting process?
To what extent do the media repeat the disinformation themes of NATO opponents?
What is the effect of the media reporting on the public view of airpower and UAVs?
In addition the study will examine how is the application of airpower considered by commanders and planners in the development of operation plans and their information strategies to communicate and counter disinformation? What systems are in place to rebut or counter disinformation? How is this trained?
The countries for special case studies will be: Germany, France, UK, Italy, and the US.
For earlier pieces on information war, see the following:
TRITON lives within Greek mythology as a fish-tailed sea god, the son and herald of Poseidon, king of the seas. Triton both calmed the seas and frightened enemies with the blow of a conch-shell trumpet, and when the Argonauts were stranded in the desert Triton helped them find passage back to the sea.
The Northrop Grumman built MQ-4C Tritons “trumpet” is a feed of unparalleled information simultaneously directed to the Main Operating Base (MOB), the National Intelligence Center, Carrier Strike Groups, the P-8A Poseidon, and others.
By generating situational awareness and facilitating the mobilization of Naval assets the Triton will bring calm to the seas, and the retreat or defeat to any number of bad actors.
Effective military forces of the future will be information enabled.
USAF drones, the F-35 or any other number of assets make it clear that future war fighting will be driven by information, and the ability to share information. The MQ-4C plays a critical role feeding real time information to both strategic and tactical Naval forces.
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The Triton is a force multiplier, making networked assets more effective, efficient and lethal.
Born out of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) program, the MQ-4C Triton is a derivative of the RQ-4 Global Hawk featuring significant modifications to the airframe, systems and sensors. It is an extremely capable platform, so capable that many debates have arisen about the possibilities of the Global Hawk replacing the venerable U-2 altogether.
Given the MQ-4C is more capable than the Global Hawk in a number of areas – flight parameters, sensors, and communication, it surely provides exceptional capability.
The US Navy’s duo of P-8A Poseidon & MQ-4C Triton are replacing the P-3C Orion’s and are integral to the Navy’s Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force (MPRF) and broader Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) strategy.
The Triton will provide a superior picture of what is happening above the surface, enabling the Poseidon to focus on what is below the surface.
While the Triton itself may be referenced as an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the program is more accurately referenced as an unmanned aerial system (UAS), a combination of UAV, Flight control and payload operators stationed at a MOB.
The Triton will support a broad mission set including maritime ISR patrol, signals intelligence, search and rescue and communications relay.
Look no further than the MH370 incident and the decade of “unceasing” pirate activity off the coast of Somalia to reflect on the challenge of addressing maritime situations. It would seem to the casual observer that someone should have the capability to quickly address such issues.
Such is the vastness of the ocean that despite all the technology, one can still easily be lost by accident or intention. The Triton’s 360 degree sensor capability, perched at high altitude with 24/7 persistent presence (with rotation) will provide the kind of over watch or search and rescue that would be invaluable in these scenarios
Program Status
Three Tritons have been delivered to NAS Patuxent River in Maryland where they are undergoing operationally oriented sorties to verify the mission systems meet the Navy’s specifications.
The Triton flies about twice per week out of Pax River, with flights lasting up to a maximum of 10-12 hours (they are not yet operating at maximum fuel load).
In total, the MQ-4C is coming up on about 60 total flights with nothing more than straightforward integration issues to date.
With the first flight of the Triton taking place in May 2013, the development plan included 3 primary stages, each built around three designated software builds referred to as Integrated Functional Capabilities (IFCs).
Triton Program Manager Sean Burke of NAS Pax River explained the MQ-4C’s test and validation plan and progress to date as follows:
IFC 1.0 – Implementation of line of site communications and build out of the flight envelope.
IFC 2.0 – Introduction and validation of the wide band and satellite communication capability and initial sensor capability. Tritons ferried from Northrop Grumman’s Palmdale facility utilized IFC 2.0
IFC 3.0 – Introduction & validation of the Anti-Ice & De-Icing systems, active Center of Gravity control and additional airframe systems to maximize fuel load and fuel efficiency, as well as additional radar modes for coastal environments.
Like all complex and critical software roll outs, functionality is thoroughly tested in lab environments, and then rolled out for field testing and resolution of any integration issues prior to going operational.
It is the field-testing, integration and performance validation that currently rests with the team at NAS Pax River.
IFC 1.0 and initial flight envelope expansion was validated out of the Northrop Grumman facility in Palmdale. Arriving from Palmdale in Sept 2014 and utilizing IFC 2.0, the team spent the summer and early fall of 2015 building stability in the systems such as the flight control computer, mission control computer, engine operation, payload sensors, communication, and power and cooling systems.
The team realized system stability in the fall, at which point they handed the UAS over to the OA team to perform a number of flights (approx. 6 flights totaling 60 hours of flight time) through December 2015 / January 2016 to verify the UAS was performing to US Navy specifications.
The platform to date has exceeded threshold requirements with regard to its systems and sensors.
Though at the time of our discussion in early February there was a significant amount of data analysis pending, Program Manager Burke is confident the OA teams final report will be positive. A positive outcome of this OA will support the U.S. Navy’s Milestone C review, and lead to entry into low-rate initial production (LRIP) contract for four aircraft.
Given a successful outcome of the IFC 2.0 OA, the Pax River team will begin to implement and validate IFC 3.0, the final build that will be utilized for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) anticipated 2018.
The US Navy currently intends to buy 68 aircraft to ensure adequate global coverage capability.
The US Navy has just recently started the formal scoring (summer 2015) to determine the reliability/readiness of the UAS. The system considers metrics for both “operational availability” and “effective time on station” in simple terms, “is it able to go fly, and is it usable for the duration required on station?”
There is a reliability growth curve built into the plan as they move through IFC 2.0 and 3.0 to IOC.
The Platform Itself
The sheer size of the Triton is hard to appreciate until you actually see it. The bulbous nose strikes me as “beluga like,” yet the long slender wings and flight characteristics imply the grace of a high altitude glider.
The Tritons wingspan is some 13 ft. greater than the new Boeing 737 MAX 8, yet operates at a gross weight of almost one sixth the 737 – it is a high altitude fuel sipping sensor platform.
Built on the same production line as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, and outwardly looking quite similar, the MQ-4C Triton has a number of critical design features that optimize it for performance in the demanding maritime environment.
The Triton features thicker wing skins, a heated engine inlet, anti-icing and deicing systems on wings and tail. This ensures the Triton will be more than capable to fly in the kind of stormy weather (including high wind gusts, lightning, hail) more typically seen over the oceans, as well as descend through ugly turbulent conditions when required to put its optical camera (EO/IR) on a situation, and then climb back to altitude afterwards.
The MQ-4C features a unique sensor package and communications suite, and the ground stations utilize a specific philosophy that facilitates improved communication and teamwork among the operators.
This maritime optimized feature set requires different internal routing of systems, power, de-icing, communications etc. and results in a UAV that is slightly heavier than the Global Hawk. However, one additional benefit to operators, the Triton makes autonomous adjustments to ensure optimum fuel burn given weights and winds.
According to Northrop Grumman Northrop Grumman the aircraft can fly over 24 hours at a time, at altitudes higher than 10 miles, with an operational range of 8,200 nautical miles.
According to Northrop Grumman and NAVAIR fact sheets, the platform has the following attributes and capabilities:
Electro-optical / infrared (EO/IR) sensor – Capturing Still Imagery and full motion video
Automatic identification system (AIS) receiver – Identification and Tracking of Surface Vessels
Electronic support measures (ESM) – Identifying threat signals
The payload also includes communications relay equipment and Link-16 communications capability.
The Triton’s radar includes both Inverse Synthetic Aperture (ISAR) and Synthetic Aperture (SAR) modes. The AIS receiver will read transmitting vessels transponders.
Given those on the seas up to nefarious activity often turn their transponders off, the capability to descend below clouds and capture imagery or stream live video via the EO/IR will ensure no vessel goes unwatched.
Given the UAS altitude, endurance and sensors, Program Manager Burke sums up the capability as “persistent, real time coverage across the designated maritime environment. All assets (MOB, Carriers, P8A Poseidon’s, National Intelligence Center etc.) tied into the feed can see what is in that space, and where it is going in real time.”
UAS Deployment
The US Navy has carefully considered the deployment of the UAS. Throughout the services the use of UAVs has often resulted in air vehicle operators (AVO) or pilots in one location, with payload operators and Intel personnel in another location.
Very focused on the tactical utility of the system with direct feed to Carriers, Expeditionary Strike Groups, P8A, the Watch Centers etc. the US Navy determined to pull all personnel into a single control station, where they would function as if they were on an aircraft themselves.
Within that context Program Manager Burke identified the 3 components of the UAS.
Aircraft with sensors (UAV)
Main Operating Base (MOB)
Forward Operating Base (FOB).
MQ-4C Triton Squadrons are based around 5 circles of global orbit and will be based at NAS Jacksonville and NAS Whidbey Island with the following structure:
Each MOB contains 2 Main Control Stations (MCS) that function independently and simultaneously. The MCS is configured as if the crew were on an aircraft, with Tactical/Mission coordinators, AVOs (3 stations so inbound, outbound and on station UAVs can be operated) and payload operators clustered together.
At any given time, only one of the potentially 3 airborne UAVs is feeding the payload operators and streaming to associated assets. The two main control stations are situated side by side separated by a glass wall, with instructors in the midst. While one MCS is operational with 3 UAVs, the other one can be training or offering support to the primary.
Payload (sensor) data is feed directly back to the MCS where the tactical & sensor operators monitor the feed real time. The feed also goes to a teleport which feeds to National Intelligence centers with everything manned 24/7. The quality of the sensor data is such that decisions can be made based on hard data, rather than judgment. With sensors streaming data on a common data link the data can be fed simultaneously to the carriers, P8s, and even forward forces even while the intel services as performing deeper analysis.
UAV C2 is enabled from both the FOB and MOB via satellite communication, or when enabled, via line of site. UAVs stationed at the forward operating bases (FOB) in Guam, Sigonella or the Gulf will be serviced by local maintainers, and launched with a local AVO. Once airborne C2 of the UAV will be passed over to the appropriate MCS at the designated MOB in either NAS Jacksonville or NAS Whidbey Island.
From an AVOs perspective, the Triton operates under what is essentially instrument flight rules (there is no forward facing camera on the Triton to provide a viewing capability for the AVO). Emulators have been developed so that the AVO can be fully qualified with virtually no flight hours required on the actual UAV.
As both the Triton and Poseidon are being introduced as replacements for the P3C the Navy has planned for a high degree of operational integration between the two platforms.
It is anticipated that Triton Squadrons will rotate personnel in who have qualified on the Poseidon as payload operators, aerial vehicle operators (AVOs/pilots) and maintainers. In any case a high degree of interoperability between the two is planned.
Program Manager Sean Burke summarizes the MQ-4C Triton UAS as a system that “provides the US Navy the ultimate persistent over watch, high altitude broad area surveillance with real time feed of the operational picture to the watch and operational centers and to forward deployed forces.”
Conclusion
The exceptional capability of the Triton has not gone unnoticed by allies, and in particular Australia has shown interest in procuring a number of Tritons.
With a coastline some 22,000 miles (36,000km) and tensions are increasing in the area (South China Sea) the Triton seems a valuable asset to Australia’s services.
The Triton would be not only cost effective, but invaluable in ISR, search and rescue and communications roles. It would also be an exceptional fit in the “information transformation” of Australia’s military that already includes the E-7A Wedgetail, and the F-35A Lightning II.
Work on a planning case is underway to support the necessary flight clearances, air worthiness qualifications and technology transfers in the context of an Australian procurement.
We are witnessing before our eyes the transformation of the military ISR and C2 systems. Given information is considered the greatest asset for the future warfighter, the Triton UAS must be considered as a critical asset in the inventory.
With advanced capability and relatively low operating costs the Triton is a force multiplier and rightfully earns the moniker “game changer.”
True to its name, in the ocean and coastal environment the Triton will enable the US Navy to use each asset more effectively, it will deter nefarious activity of any type, gather intelligence and aid in search and rescue. A rightful family member of the “king of the seas.”
Special thanks on the part of Todd Miller to NAVAIR PAO Unmanned Aviation and Strike Weapons Jamie Cosgrove & US Navy Triton Program Manager Sean Burke.
Editor’s Note: Todd Miller is an avid photographer and contributor to a number of Aviation media groups. Utilizing www.flyfastandlow.com as a personal “runway” it is Todd’s goal to reflect the rapidly evolving capability of the military aviation mission, as well as the character and commitment of the military aviation professional.
The pictures in the slideshow are credited to Navair and to Todd Miller. The Triton on the ground were shot by Todd Miller and the Triton in the air is credited to Navair.
Editor’s Note: The combination of P-8 with Triton is the P-3 replacement so to speak with the P-8 having great speed to the target than the P-3 and with Triton providing the enduring and slower sweep which the P-3 has provided.
In an interview we did in San Diego in 2011, this combination was discussed by Commander Jake Johansson, a P-3 operator as follows:
SLD: One advantage of a manned versus unmanned platform is the ability of the crews to communicate with ground forces. Could you comment on your judgments in this area?
Johansson: Some of our most rewarding missions have been when a General from a ground force calls you directly on the radio and tells you what he needs. You provide him with the surveillance or reconnaissance he required and a short time later you see Marines or soldiers taking care of the issue.
BAMS is designed as a tactical adjunct to the P-8. As long as BAMS remains in that role, the combined capability of the P-8/BAMS aircraft actually offers ground forces far more capacity and capability.
However, if BAMS becomes more of a strategic asset, it may be more difficult for a war fighter on the ground to get it in a position where it will do him some good tactically. The operators are not within line of sight of the ground forces so the command and control to move UAVs around gets a little tricky, especially if they are being employed strategically but are required tactically.
I think the P-8 will continue to be used tactically and provide a little more flexibility for the ground forces to utilize tactically.
Persistence may not be as good as the BAMS with its long dwell time but there is some merit to having a man in the cockpit with eyes on overhead. I point out that you concentrated on ground forces. I would like to mention again that our interest is getting back to the maritime environment where we would be able to provide maritime domain awareness for the Fleet with the persistence of BAMS and the capabilities of the P-8 Poseidon.
SLD: And these are really not unmanned, except airborne?
Johansson: I’m not a big fan of calling them unmanned anymore. I call them remotely-piloted, because it takes a lot of people to operate these systems. We moved to the family of systems (BAMS and P-8) because we felt that we could move some of the persistent ISR capabilities to a more capable platform, BAMS.
BAMS long dwell time can provide the persistence necessary more efficiently than a rotation of P-8 24/7/365. Also, if we used P-8 to do that we would have to increase squadron manpower to give them the necessary crews to fly 24/7 MDA in addition to the ASW/ASUW missions. We hope to have 5 orbits flying 24/7/365 to cover the maritime picture were required.
The great thing about BAMS and P-8 is that they can work together to meet the COCOMS requirements.
BAMS can provide the persistence and the P-8 can be used to conduct the specialized skill-sets that the BAMS cannot.
BAMS can provide you the maritime picture while the P-8 either responds to BAMS intelligence or conducts ASW/ASUW.
This Family of Systems concept can become quite a lethal combination if we employ it correctly.
And for Australia, the Triton will be part of an integrated approach combining what the U.S. would consider Air Force with Navy systems under the control of the RAAF’s Surveillance and Response Group.
As such, their mix and matching of land, with air and sea assets is designed to provide for the kind of integration, which can support longer- range persistent defense forces for Australia.
As Group Captain Champion put it: “The P-3 has served us well but we are transitioning to the P-8 which has a much greater set of sensor capabilities which we will become part of our overall enhanced capabilities to see and defend the approaches around Australia.”
With the F-35, the P-8 and the Triton operating in the waters surrounding Australia, in addition to the ground based assets providing core data, the challenge will be to integrate data in a timely manner and ensure it is delivered to the appropriate actors in the broad defense belt surrounding Australia.
And doing so will require an ability to work closely with allies shaping their own common operating pictures.
SRG clearly faces challenges, but is at a critical vortex of the Plan Jericho effort.
Shaping capabilities to inform the joint force in an effective manner to enhance their lethality and survivability will be the challenge; but Australia is investing in new systems to provide for new tool sets; and with Plan Jericho, the mindset is being reshaped to look to draw the best from what each platform can provide, to shape a more effective joint force effort.
The Australians are concerned that when they add a new platform like the Triton, that they can position themselves for maximum effective use of the asset for an integrated force in the battlespace.
This means that one priority is to shape a workforce which can handle data, and to support the deployed forces.
In the Defence Integrated Investment Program recently published by the Australian Ministry of Defence, they underscore this point as follows:
Workforce reshaping and growth in this capability stream will support: collecting and analysing intelligence, with a particular focus on strengthening intelligence capabilities in support of deployed forces (for example to support increased use of unmanned systems)
Improving support to counter-terrorism operations
Enhancing geospatial systems analysis and support, including information and communications technology systems, and strengthened collection and assessment capabilities
Processing, exploiting and disseminating the large volumes of data that will be generated by sophisticated platforms – such as the P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and response aircraft, unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems (including Triton), F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, E/A-18G Growler, Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer, future frigates and future submarines
Generating intelligence and mission data for pre-programming advanced platforms
Enhancing cyber capabilities
Developing further space command, control, communications, computer and intelligence systems and space surveillance sensors, including ground support functions
Improving electronic warfare planning and coordination, and spectrum management
Enhancing our ability to develop electronic warfare countermeasures to protect ADF systems
Enhancing situational awareness across all domains and environments (page 30).
The need to operate at greater distance and to deal with a growing diversity of threats has highlighted the importance of ensuring an ongoing modernization effort to enhance that the industrial democracies have the capabilities to fight as a an integrated team in that battlespace.
This requires capable platforms, which can perform their core missions but to do so with greater effect by being more capable through the connectors or enablers for a more integrated force.
The recent Australian Defence White Paper and associated materials provide a useful look at how to do this.
The analysis recognizes the importance of key platforms, such as how the Royal Australian Air Force has been rebuilt with a number of core assets, such as Wedgetail, the KC-30A and the coming of the F-35.
Each of these platforms has a set of core functions, yet their impact is enhanced by inter-connectivity and determining how best to operate those platforms in ways which enhance the overall capabilities of the force.
Building on existing capabilities, the ADF of the future will feature decision-making superiority, and enabled, mobile and sustainable forces with potent and agile offensive response capabilities
The breadth, complexity and interrelated nature of all Defence capabilities and enablers led to the development, in the Force Structure Review, of a new framework to adequately explain the link between strategy and capability.
The six capability streams in the framework are used in the Integrated Investment Program to better represent the key force elements – how they are typically employed and their planned enhancements.
This was a deliberate move away from describing our capability investment plans in a stovepiped structure.
These six capability streams also support building a clearer picture of the link between capabilities, systems and their supporting enablers in creating key Defence outputs: Intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, space and cyber
Key enablers:
Air and sea lift
Maritime and anti-submarine warfare
Strike and air combat
Land combat and amphibious warfare.
The relationship between the key attributes of the future force and planned enhancements across the six capability streams is outlined in the Table below (page 13, Defence Integrated Investment Program).
To get to where the ADF wishes to go with regard with an integrated force, key decision making superiority is a crucial capability delivered throughout the integrated battlespace.
In other words, all attributes are not equal.
To do so means appropriate information needs to be generated and delivered to the appropriate decision maker at the point of need.
It is about effective C2 in the battlespace operating at the various points of attack or defense;
It is about generating and distributing information appropriate to those decisions;
It is about information parsimony not simply doing an NSA approach to collecting as much as one can;
It is about focusing on where the decision makers are in the battlespace, allowing them to make decisions at key points of attack or defense and to shape a realistic and effective secure information approach within that battlespace.
Clearly, cyber needs to be built in as well as learning how to fight cyber war within the integrated battlespace.
To ensure our forces can operate effectively and safely in our region and globally, they need a comprehensive picture of what is happening around them.
They also need to be able to operate effectively in a contested electronic environment.This requires analysis, fusion and dissemination of information to support decision makers at all levels (page 14, Defence Integrated Investment Program).
And the Defence White Paper highlighted the kind of force which Australia needs to build as well:
To ensure our forces can operate effectively and safely in our region and globally, they need a comprehensive picture of what is happening around them.
They also need to be able to operate effectively in a contested electronic environment.This requires analysis, fusion and dissemination of information to support decision makers at all levels (Defence Integrated Investment Program, p. 14).
This analysis then is really about the interaction among platforms, enablers, C2 modernization, and secure information tools to deliver the effects appropriate to the mission.
It is not that platforms are not important; they are; but they now must be placed in the context of their contribution to the effects desired by the integrated force.
In making future platform selections, a key decision point is how they contribute to the ultimate desired effect, and how they contribute to decision making superiority and enhanced information security and dominance.
In other words, the shift from a platform centric world is not about platforms not mattering; they do; but what is crucial is now evaluating how a new platform contributes in a multi-mission, or multi-tasking and specialized effect for the evolving force.
There will be more emphasis placed on the joint force – bringing together different land, air, sea, intelligence, electronic warfare, cyber and space capabilities so the ADF can apply more force more rapidly and more effectively when called on to do so.
A new permanent future force design function in Defence will strengthen Defence’s capacity to deliver joint and integrated capabilities.
As well as investing in high-end warfighting equipment, the Government will increase investment in the vital enabling capabilities that bind military capabilities together to maximise Defence’s operational effectiveness.
Key enablers include ADF bases, logistics systems (including fuel and explosive ordnance facilities), upgraded training and testing facilities, health services and information, communications and technology equipment.
The Government will recognise the fundamental input to defence capability provided by Australian defence industry to ensure it delivers the support Defence needs (page 84, Defence White Paper).
For this to work, the purchase of platforms requires a new working relationship between industry and government as well as the services working more effectively to shape how their particular new platform contributes to both the service’s core missions as well as the effects desired for the extended battlespace.
For example, the Wedgetail clearly provides for air battle management, and will change as the F-35 is added to the fleet, and air dominance is the core mission, but how best to provide for the decision making superiority through other parts of the force structure, and to ensure the kind of combat effects the integrate force could deliver?
This requires shaping information sharing approaches that make sense in the contested and permissive battlespace, and shape information parsiomony to deliver information to the decision maker at the point of attack or defense in the air, on the sea or on the ground.
Another example is how the Aussies might address Tanker 2.0.
KC-30A MRTT and E-7A Wedgetail conduct Air to Air refuelling testing in the airspace near RAAF Williamtown. Credit: Australian Ministry of Defence
They have already acquired the advanced A330MRTT and are using it in the battlespace and bringing the tanker to the point where it can support the entire fleet.
The Aussies have already modified their concepts of operations of how to use the tanker, having shifted the tanker from the classic tanker track approach, to one where the crew is connected to the battlespace and determines how best to support the air fleet.
And in shaping the way ahead for what might be called Tanker 2.0 the question is how to get full value out of the operational capabilities of the tanker.
Lifters and tankers are not simply functioning as transportation and fuel off loaders, but are operating in the battlespace and their role can expand as the concept of operations is shifted via additions of appropriate technology to allow them to shape greater capability within the integrated battlespace.
There is a lot of real estate inside and outside of the KC-30A.
How we use that real estate needs to be determined by evolving concept of operations, not simply applying a technology solution set offered by a prime contractor.
From a support perspective, software-enabled systems of the sort prevalent in today’s C2 and ISR systems, are almost throw away systems within five years.
We need to build in cost effective systems, which do not go on forever and are not expected to be repaired beyond a certain period but simply replaced by new, better and cost effective technologies.
Rethinking the Role of Air Mobility in the Transformation of Jointness.
Graphic credited to Second Line of Defense
Here the basic shift is one where Air Mobility Group functions largely as a garage storing tanking and lift assets which transport and fuel assets to its engagement in a much broader role in the battlespace and with it its ability to engage with and support ground, air and naval forces.
Thus, when one approaches the acquisition of new platforms, a key consideration needs to be what does a new platform bring to the battlespace?
How can its organic capabilities enhance the capability of the force to provide for an integrated effect?
How can the platform contribute to the multiplier effect of its operation within the battlespace?
How can the force best survive and prevail and how do new platforms contribute to that effort?
How upgradeable is the platform with regard to the other key capabilities operating in the battlespace?
How can the central role of software upgradeability best be recognized and supported in building out an information secure, decision dominant force?
How to measure cost effectiveness in an integrated battlespace world?
How do new approaches to sustainability built into 21st century systems get recognized as cutting edge ways to have a more effective and sustainable force, rather than being audited to death by 20th century practices and thinking?
The most expensive acquisition could well be one that is the cheapest up front in terms of initial price tag, but is not an effective member of an integrated battlespace.
Such platforms might only contribute to a narrow function without any real capability to evolve with the forces shaping a way ahead to reshape capabilities to achieve key effects in the evolving battlespace and within that battlespace shaping an open ended force integration process.
Leveraging the Aussie rethink can help shape a new approach to platform acquisition which can get out of the platform centric ghetto that is so often the only lane in which they are discussed, considered and bought.
It has been seen recently over the skies of Edward Air Force base.
It did not just go away after being sidelined by the Boeing protest via the GAO route several years ago, it has become a staple of several allied air forces.
And as the lead Air Force for the KC-30A, the Royal Australian Air Force is preparing its new boom capabilities for a key role in shaping an ability to refuel its entire fleet of aircraft, and those of its allies, many of whom also are operating the KC-30A.
According to a story published by the Australian Ministry of Defence recently:
The first air-to-air refuelling from an RAAF KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) to a United States Air Force (USAF) C-17A Globemaster III occurred on February 10 over Edwards Air Force Base in the United States.
The five-hour sortie saw 39 contacts between the KC-30A and C-17A aircraft. During these contacts approximately 6,800 kilograms of fuel was transferred to the C-17A via the KC-30A’s Advanced Refuelling Boom System (ARBS).
Air-to-air refueling of a C-17A significantly increases the aircraft’s range, making it capable of carrying heavy payloads further. Group Captain Adam Williams, the Officer Commanding of Number 86 Wing said this is a major achievement for the KC-30A MRTT.
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“The KC-30A is an outstanding platform and we are seeing it work towards full maturity as we expand the list of receiver aircraft types,” Group Captain Williams said.
“The ARBS is a key enabler for the Air Force with most of the RAAF’s future fleet requiring boom type refuelling rather than hose and drogue.”
“The successful refueling with a USAF C-17A paves the way for trials with our own C-17A’s from No 36 Squadron in the near future.”
RAAF C-17A crews will soon begin refuelling trials with the KC-30A, having trained in the role in late 2015 with a Republic of Singapore Air Force KC-135 tanker.
One KC-30A from Number 33 Squadron, RAAF Base Amberley, is currently deployed to the United States to conduct these trials. More trials between a KC-30A and a USAF C-17A aircraft are scheduled to occur over the coming days, along with refuelling trials with USAF F-15 and F-16 fighters.
The RAAF operates five KC-30A MRTTs, with two more joining the fleet from 2018. The KC-30A has a fuel capacity of more than 100 tons, allowing it to fly up to 1800 kilometres from its home base and offload up to 50 tons of fuel for four hours.
The RAAF also operates a fleet of eight C-17A transport aircraft, the latest two examples of which were delivered in 2015.
These aircraft are extensively employed in support of Defence operations abroad, and are currently conducting missions to Antarctica for the Australian Antarctic Division.
The KC-30A’s ARBS is also compatible with refueling the F-35A Lightning II, as well as the E-7A Wedgetail, P-8A Poseidon, and other KC-30As.
Each KC-30A is also equipped with two hose-and-drogue refuelling pods that are compatible with the RAAF’s own Hornet and Super Hornet strike fighters, and the Growler electronic attack aircraft.
When one looks through the recent Australian Defence White Paper and its accompanying documents, it is very clear how important the KC-30A is as an enabler of extended Australian defense.
For example on pages 95-96 of the White Paper, this point is highlighted:
The Government will acquire advanced air defence and high-speed, long-range strike weapons for the air combat fleet capable of attacking land and maritime targets.
Two additional KC-30A air-to-air refuellers will be introduced into service before the end of this decade, for a total of seven, to extend the range and endurance of our combat aircraft and surveillance platforms.
Consideration will be given to a follow-on acquisition of further air-to-air refuellers, to take the refueller fleet to nine aircraft, to support new aircraft types such as the P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft.
And elsewhere, namely in the Defence Integrated Investment Program document, the following is underscored:
The current air-to-air refuellers are larger, heavier and capable of carrying more fuel than their predecessors
The air-to-air refuelling fleet will undergo systems software and hardware upgrades (including to the aircraft’s self-protection systems) throughout its life to ensure its safe and effective operation (page 70).
In short, the KC-30A is a key part of the Australian Defence Force and the evolving Australian defense strategy.
For a look at the KC-30A and its role in the Australian Defence Force, see the following:
As the United States faces a new Administration and with the resurgent Russians reshaping their place in the world, it will be crucial to shape a real policy towards deterrence of Russia.
We have gone way beyond the reset button; and face a significant deterioration not only in our relationship with the Russians, but in dealing with the Russian redesign of Middle Eastern and European security.
Put bluntly, coming to terms with Putin, and putting him in his place is a key requirement going forward.
When President Reagan came to office after the Carter Administration, the President felt that a significant shift in how to deal with Russia was required.
He started by being very clear that is was about rebuilding American power, engaging effectively in information war with the Russians and reworking relationships with key allies to ensure that Russian interests would not split the NATO Alliance and expand Russian power at the expense of the democracies.
President Reagan at Berlin Wall calling for its removal. June 12, 1987.
He also set in motion what would become the eventual reunification of Germany by challenging the values of the Russian reform government, and challenged Gorbachev to “tear down this wall.”
There was no assumption of moral equivalence between Russian Communism and Western democracy.
He also did not have a vast National Security Council bureaucracy to confuse policy making. Senior policy makers – certainly after the shake out of the first two years – were in place who had the clear support of the President.
Over the course of his Administration a strategy was put in place to reshape the Western relationship with Russia and to create precisely the environment against which Putin has shaped his revenge.
In a piece which I wrote for the French team which addressed the question of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Empire, I was asked to write a piece on the military factor in that collapse. In that piece, I highlighted that the Russians were faced with a resurgent U.S. military under Reagan but one which was shaping a new approach to concepts of operations, air-land battle, and that the shift being shaped and populated with new technology, simply made their plans for threatening Western Europe with a World War II style of invasion, simply not credible.
When the Soviet military leadership looked at ways to respond, the response was not one, which the Russians could afford, nor execute easily. [ref]”Le Facteur Militaire dans l’effondrement de l’Union Sovietique: Les Limites du Systeme Adaptation, in Anne de Tinguy, editor, L’Effondrement de L’Empire Sovietique, Bruxelles: Etablissements Emile Bruylant, 1998. [/ref]
But the strategy, which emerged under Reagan, was complex combination of military modernization and a much broader political strategy.
Internet image of photograph of Ronald Reagan on a trip to russia. 1st left (stripe top) is believed to be Vladimir Putin. Source: pete souza / radio free europe
Contemporary analysts rarely recognize this combination, but such a combination is needed now as well to shape a way ahead to deal with Putin. And while the cry has gone out to find Russian scholars to understand Putin and his challenge, a little history is in order, especially because this is EXACTLY the history to which Putin, who has shaped by that history, is responding.
There were several elements to the effort.
First, the Administration sought to highlight a weapons program cancelled under the previous Administration to refund to make a strategic point – the U.S. was going to strengthen the military.
The weapon chosen was the B-1 bomber, and in the first term, the program was brought back and served as a symbol of a new way ahead.
Second, the Soviet military buildup was highlighted as a direct threat against the United States and its allies and information war was initiated to focus directly on the Soviet threat.
Third, new systems were funded and brought into existence along with shaping a new deterrent strategy in Europe.
Fourth, the Euro-Missile crisis was joined, in which the Russians clearly sought to split the NATO Alliance along the lines of nuclear deterrence by introducing new missiles explicitly targeting Europe but not the United States.
I spent much time in the early 1980s visiting Western Europe and engaging in debates in the West about the Euro-missile crisis and the importance of a clear response in terms of weapons and doctrine to the Russian challenge. And I wrote several books on the same as well.
Fifth, there was reconciliation between Reagan and President Mitterrand of France, an odd couple of there ever was one.
But the pair worked together to shape a coherent response to the Russians. We published an essay in French and English, which addressed how the Russians would attack France in case of war.
We leveraged some key Russian General Staff work which made it very clear to the President of the Republic, that the Russians were going to go after the French nuclear deterrent at the outset of any war. Rather than providing a sanctuary, French nuclear weapons made France a key priority target of any military campaign against Europe.
President Mitterrand personally responded to our work with a clear recognition of what this meant for France and was an input to his rethink and in 1983 made a famous speech in the German parliament in which he called for support to the Reagan missile deployment plan in Europe.
Less known was the Reagan-Mitterrand efforts in what would become known later as the Farwell Affair. Here Mitterrand informed Reagan of the extensive Russian technological espionage program in the West, whereby the Russians were able to steal technology in the United States with the collusion of a number of U.S. political, intelligence and industrial officials.
Mitterrand decided to share with President Reagan unique intelligence information, which the French had gathered which should how the Soviets were stealing the US and the West blind on defense industrial information.
The information showed significant Soviet penetrations into the US intelligence and other communities. The CIA leadership was less than enthusiastic about working with a “socialist” President with “communists” in his government.
Fortunately, Mitterrand provided the leadership to engage Reagan, and Reagan remembered that as President it was his responsibility to provide for US national security, not the intelligence community.
For the past few months, France had had a mole, code name “Farewell,” operating at the heart of one of the most sensitive divisions of the KGB. During a face-to-face meeting, Mitterrand shared this secret with Ronald Reagan and revealed to him the scope of global Soviet industrial pillage. At the time, the American president did not fully understand the impact of the dossier, but he was a fast learner. Soon after, he would refer to it as “the greatest spy story of the twentieth century.”[ref] Kostin, Sergei; Raynaud, Eric (2011-08-02). Farewell: The Greatest Spy Story of the Twentieth Century . AmazonEncore. Kindle Edition. Sergei Kostin and Eric Raynaud, The Greatest Spy Story of the Twentieth Century.[/ref]
Eventually, the Russian espionage network was broken and Reagan launched the Star Wars program in part because he sensed that the Russians could not technologically respond, and the impact upon the thinking of the Russian leadership about their inability to respond would have strategic consequences. It did and was part of the military factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Another strategic dynamic was the Spanish debate about the entrance into NATO.
Here the new Spanish Administration in the 1980s, faced a significant debate about whether the US involvement with Franco meant that Spain needed to attenuate its relationship with the United States and go its own way, and to NOT join NATO.
The Russians were well aware that if the new Spain joined NATO and shaped a modern democratic military, this meant that they faced a two flank defense in depth Alliance. This meant as well that the priority on the North Atlantic would be compromised as the United States and the NATO allies could counter North Atlantic military pressures with counter pressures from the South.
President Ronald Reagan shakes hands with Mikhail Gorbachev after the two leaders signed a treaty during a ceremony in the White House East Room in Washington, D.C., in this Tuesday, Dec. 8, 1987 file photo.
With my colleague Professor Kenneth Maxwell, I engaged in debate in Spain about the importance of democratic Spain in NATO. We held a conference in Toledo Spain in 1984 which was part of the public debate, and Susan Clark and I produced a counterpart paper on the Soviet approach to Spain in military terms which made it clear whatever Spain thought about its neutrality, in case of war, the Russians had no intention of honoring it.[ref] Kenneth Maxwell (ed) Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy (Westview Press, Boulder/San Fransico/Oxford, 1991)[/ref]
Eventually, the Reagan challenge to tear down the wall would be met by the reunification efforts to create the new Germany. While at the Institute of Defense analysis in the mid 1980s, I set up a working group with members of the government to address how one might prepare for the opportunity for German reunification. But it was clear that without the overall Reagan strategy, such an option for the West was simply not on the table.
In short, after Obama, the next President will need a comprehensive strategy built on military strength but combined with an active and practical allied working agenda.
Putin lived through the Reagan strategy and it is against this which he working in the absence of a Reagan.
What might such a strategy look like in the period ahead?
I will return to this question in a later article.
