Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence: Shaping a Way Ahead

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
02/21/2016

2016-02-12 By Robbin Laird

There is a long history and strategic culture associated with nuclear deterrence.

The only question is whether the history and the culture are more of hindrance than a help into thinking about second nuclear age deterrence and warfighting?

Paul Bracken in his book, The Second Nuclear Age, has argued persuasively that nuclear weapons have returned clearly as an agent of global influence.

What’s taking place isn’t disarmament; rather it’s nuclear modernization. These countries are building nuclear postures, which in their view will be suited to 21st century conditions.  They may be wrong about this, certainly. 

But the larger point is that the United States effort to design a world order that was free of nuclear weapons hasn’t worked out…. 

Put another way, nuclear weapons have returned as a source of influence and power in the international system.  

If we go back to the earlier years of establishing “rules” of deterrence, we might recover a sense of what a new round of nuclear modernization in a multi-polar world might entail.

We can begin by understanding the context within which the U.S. first used nuclear weapons.

Paul Bracken's book on the Second Nuclear Age has introduced a rethink of some fundamental questions.
Paul Bracken’s book on the Second Nuclear Age has introduced a rethink of some fundamental questions.

After bloody island campaigns, with mass suicides on Guam, and fight to the last man on Okinawa, and the defense of Okinawa in part by the widespread attacks on the US fleet by Kamikaze pilots, President Truman reached the conclusion that a nuclear attack made a great deal of sense.

The alternative was to face massive destruction and death on the Japanese mainland as the Japanese fought to the last man.

My father was one of those Army officers preparing for the invasion with a very clear expectation that he and his men would die on the assault on Japan.

He told me that “we cheered when we heard what had happened, for we knew that we now had a chance to see the war end, and possibly go home alive.”

He spent the next two years in Japan during the occupation and got to know the Japanese well.

He learned Japanese and gained a sense of great respect for Japan and a deep pain that the war had had to happen at all.

In other words, the U.S. used nuclear weapons to meet a strategic purpose not well met by conventional means.

This clearly can fit someone’s calculus today.

A second example was the French desperate struggle in Indochina where the French government asked President Eisenhower to use tactical nuclear weapons in helping defeat the Vietnamese Communists. Eisenhower refused, for perfectly good reasons, but clearly made the point that nuclear weapons are a sovereign national solution, not an allied one or international one for that matter.

It is only sovereign national decisions, which raises fundamental questions as Asian allies face a persistent Chinese and Russian nuclear modernization trajectory about whether or not they too need access to nuclear weapons to defend their interests or to trigger U.S. actions in the broader alliance defense.

A third example involved the Korean War and the request by Chou En Lai to Stalin of whether he was willing to use nuclear weapons in defense of Chinese troops in Korea if the US used tactical nuclear weapons against those troops?

The answer was a clear no and again this pointed out the limits of alliance solidarity when it came to tying war with the potential use of nuclear weapons below the strategic threshold.

(I learned of this request during a meeting with the chief of staff of Chou En Lai at Princeton during the 1980s.)

These were fundamental realities of the beginnings of the first nuclear age; and after a long transformation through the Cuban Missile Crisis and into the demise of the Soviet Union, the second nuclear age might look more like the beginning of the first.

There are recent developments as well, which are triggering significant rethinks about the nuclear threshold or at least the political utility of possessing nuclear weapons.

First, there is Odyssey Dawn, a military attack on Gadhafi, which would be unthinkable if he had not given up nuclear weapons.

As Ed Timperlake has argued:

What lessons are other countries that are not currently directly involved learning from observing the situation? 

It can also be noted that some countries without troops have the right to also kibitz from the side like Putin is currently doing, because of the Administration is using a UN Security Council imprimatur to justify the attack. 

But what do other thuggish countries think and what will they do? And this is literally a life and death question. 

The world now knows that when the U.S. decides the leader of a country is an “evil doer” about to stage a massacre  a forceful military attack can be justified and launched. This is the emerging “Obama Doctrine. ” Ironically, it is reinforced by the observed experience of the Bush Doctrine and the Clinton Doctrine. The goal is to stop a negative by pointing out the massacre that does not happen. 

Now visualize a meeting after the U.S. Military successfully attacked both the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussain Iraq. At that table of world class thuggish leaders sits Moammar Gadhafi, Kim il Jong, the Dear Leader of North Korea, and Mahmoud Ahmadmejad of Iran. They see a huge problem –what will the Americans do next? 

Gadhafi, knowing Saddam had WMD, specifically poison gas that he had used and a nuke R&D effort, decides his best course is to welcome the western nations into his country to deactivate his nuclear research and development program. 

The Dear Leader of North Korea leaves their meeting and shows the world that he has credible nuclear devices along with trying to build ICBMs. Mahmoud Ahmadejad had a choice when he left that table –he could follow the lead of the Libyan leader or play catch up to the Dear Leader. 

With the attack on Libya, the Obama Administration has just made Kim il Jong look like a strategic genius. It also totally confirmed a lesson learned to the Iranian Leadership. The lesson is the only thing that can stop the Obama Administration deciding, with no U.S. Congressional notification, to attack a sovereign nation, is credible WMD.  Iranian leaders must now quickly double down on their belief that they need credible deterrence against an attack. 

Second, there is the Russian seizure of Crimea, which is a direct violation of agreements signed by the United States and the United Kingdom.

What remains of the non-proliferation treaty and its value when a state gives up its nuclear weapons in return for a promise of the protection of its territorial integrity by so doing?

When one produces the academic reader for the Second Nuclear Age in about 15 years, this action by Russia will have its own chapter as a stepping stone to a new era.

With Russian actions in Crimea, the agreement seems to be going the way of Kellogg-Briand Pact signed in 1928 to abolish war.

In fact, the collapse of the agreement in the face of Russian seizure of Crimea is a key lesson learned for states regarding nuclear weapons: if you have go them keep them; if you don’t have them you might want to get them to prevent “aggression” against your interests.

The main security threat to Ukraine since independence has been that Russia will seek to incorporate all or some parts of its territory. Credit Image: Bigstock
The main security threat to Ukraine since independence has been that Russia will seek to incorporate all or some parts of its territory. Credit Image: Bigstock

In a clear example of reverse historical logic whereby the “banning” of war by states in in the Kellogg-Briand created the preconditions for a clear marker for the return of war, the Russian seizure of Crimea has ripped apart a key agreement which was designed to reduce the risks of nuclear proliferation.

And being denigrated, such an agreement not only appears worthless but makes clear that proliferation will be viewed in a desirable manner by aspiring nuclear states.

Clearly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was facilitated by Ukraine giving up its nuclear weapons.

The agreement crafted by the United States and the UK to guarantee the territorial integrity of Ukraine if it gave up its nuclear weapons was as worthless as the Munich agreement of 1938.

This will have lasting consequences for the Second Nuclear Age.

At an event celebrating the Non Proliferation Treaty hosted by Kazhkhstan, arms controller Rose Gottemoeller, the current Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security was asked about the impact of not honoring this agreement.

She sidestepped the issue and told the audience that we still have the START agreement and that we needed to work with the Russians.

Nicely avoiding the point is a rather brutal fact: if the Russians who signed the Ukraine agreement honored it as much as did the US and the UK — which is to say not at all — why does the START agreement matter?

Put bluntly, agreements and words do not matter a great deal when you can invade the country you have the agreement with and reset the agenda.

The question really is HOW you work with the Russians which matters.

It should also be noted that the Russian actions against Ukraine might have been motivated as well by another nuclear dimension, namely, the protection of Russian tactical nuclear assets with the fleet.

In 1995, The Belfer Center of Harvard published a well thought out research paper on “Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet in Russian- Ukrainian Relations,” this was one of their findings:

Russia tried to prove that the whole Black Sea Fleet was a part of “strategic forces” which should be under joint CIS (i.e., Russian) command.

The presence of tactical nuclear weapons on its ships and planes, and its important role in defending the CIS from a maritime sector were presented as arguments to emphasize the strategic nature of the Black Sea Fleet

Sevastopol has been viewed as the city of “Russian naval glory,” and the Russians are very sensitive to the idea of restricted access to the city

http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2934/crimea_and_the_black_sea_fleet_in_russian_ukrainian_relations.html

Were the tactical nuclear weapons still there, and did the Russians do their Crimean intervention in part to ensure the safety and security of their nuclear armed fleet?

It is beyond foolish to think Russia would use tactical nuclear weapons in the Ukraine engagement.

However, being worried about losing control is another matter completely.

Third, there is the Iranian stake in the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which may well be facilitated and abetted by the preoccupation of the West with regard to the ISIS crisis.

As Dr. Amatzia Baram put it in an interview last year:

Question: We have discussed Iran in passing with regard to the GCC states, but obviously Iran has a big stake in the crisis as well. 

Baram: They do. 

And one of the ironies of the current situation is that American policy against ISIL actually helps Iran. 

Baghdad is now mostly an Iranian issue, more so than an American one.

You have to be aware of what America is doing. 

America is getting Iran out of trouble by helping the government of Baghdad to push the ISIS back. 

You are serving Iranian interests, not just yours.  

So I’m not against it, as long as you understand what you are doing. 

Iran will allow you to save it from ISIS, and in return they want you to allow them to continue to develop nuclear weapons. 

Question: The ISIL crisis and its ongoing consequences will affect the great powers outside of the region as well; how do you see the stance of the major players? 

Baram: With regard to Russia, they have little concern about Iran having nuclear weapons. 

The Russians see this from the perspective of their conviction that they can unilaterally counter an Iranian nuclear threat effectively. 

But what they have not calculated well is what others are going to do.

After Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and very likely also Turkey will acquire nukes.

A multi-player nuclear crisis is extremely difficult to control. 

Even a nuclear war between Iran and Israel alone is dangerous for neighboring Russia, and one should bear in mind that unlike the Cuban missile crisis, there is no direct communication between Teheran and Jerusalem to provide key elements for negotiation as a crisis unfolds. 

What does deterrence mean to Tehran as opposed to an old nuclear power like the United States or Russia? 

How would a crisis management emerge that could manage these two very different poles?  

And if Iran were to have access to nuclear weapons, notably with the onslaught of ISIL,or another similar anti-Shi`i movement, the use of nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out, and all this in close proximity to Russia.

In other words, second nuclear age issues are part and parcel of regional conflicts even if they are not the dominant motif.

They are part of the changing calculus of key players with regard to the role which nuclear weapons can play with regard to protecting or projecting one’s interests.

In the case of Iran, clearly the possession of nuclear weapons is perceived as part of a regional power projection strategy as they would understand it.

By possessing nuclear weapons, the sanctity of Iranian territory is preserved from which actions within other countries in the region can be encouraged without fear of reprisals against Iranian territory through traditional conventional means.

A fourth example is clearly the evolution of North Korea and the question of what happens if war comes.

Unfortunately, for many strategists the North Korea of today is perceived as fighting the last war with a wave of conventional forces coming South.

This ignores not only the possession of nuclear weapons and missiles by the North, and the very isolated regime which will have its own calculus on war which will have to be affected by minutes and hours not days of actions by the UN, the South Koreans and the United States.

With a nuclear North Korea, it is clearly a "come as you are war." Credit: Bigstock
With a nuclear North Korea, it is clearly a “come as you are war.” Credit: Bigstock

One way to let the North know that the U.S. recognizes the new realities of the Second Nuclear Age is to change the command structure.

It makes no sense to have an Army officer in charge of U.S. forces in South Korea; it is time to have an Air Force officer in charge and directly focused on the capability of the U.S. and the allies to strike North rapidly and effectively in the very early moments of the coming of war.

It is not about the US Army defending South Korea in depth; it is about the South Koreans doing that and the U.S. and allied air, naval and army air defense systems integrated in a strike and defense enterprise than can defeat North Korea’s missile and strike force.

Ironically, the ghost of McArthur has returned: in the case of war, there is no substitute for victory, but this time it is against a Second Nuclear Age power.

A recent 7th USAF commander put the challenge this way:

Question: You are sitting in a theater which is characterized by what Paul Bracken has referred to as a second nuclear age power facing you directly. This is not 1954, and one cannot assume that if conflict unfolds that the “Dear Leader” will follow a ladder of escalation approach. How does this affect your thinking about and approach to the theater? 

Lt. General Jouas: We have a tough problem with North Korea, obviously. You have to understand that this is a different type of adversary with capabilities that concern us, and we need the best tools possible in order to contend with it. 

We should not mirror image when we consider the North Korean nuclear strategy.

North Korea has seen what happened in Libya, and with Kaddafi, and that’s reinforced their strategy. 

And while this may be a North Korean problem right now, there’s a strong possibility it won’t remain so. And that creates real danger to our allies and our homeland. We have to think about a world in which we have more than one North Korea, in which those capabilities are held by other nations whose interests and strategy are very different from ours.

A fifth example is clearly the conjunction of the Chinese nuclear buildup with their nuclear modernization.

Because of their nuclear modernization, the Chinese are clearly working to protect their territory against classic conventional strikes and by so doing, then providing bases from which to then project power in the region.

Yet amazingly this conjunction is blown by in analyses that simply assert that the U.S. needs a long range strike force to go after Chinese territory.

Such a strategy is based on an implied belief that the Chinese will accept a conventional phase before any nuclear response if an adversary strikes its territory.

This is an assumption, but precisely an assumption.

There is no wishing this away, but clearly many precisely do this.

Many of the problems the United States and Europe face at present arise from competing expectations and hopes for the future.

Basically, there are two “visions” of the future with regard to nuclear deterrence.

One is prevention of a second nuclear age, to include nuclear nonproliferation, 1970s style treaty-based arms control, TED talks, magical thinking, etc.

The other is managing a second nuclear age, to include counterforce at least against small forces, a new structure for arms control, sensitivity to arms races breaking out while not willing to fall dangerously far behind.

And certainly, political acceptability of different kinds and degrees of U.S. modernization is part of the response.

The two visions are in conflict, but the practical insight is that they are not completely in conflict.

There are a number of incremental changes that would constitute a reasonable package of strategic modernization, which might be acceptable under either approach.

First, the F-35 in its next block of software will carry nuclear weapons.

And modernization of the arsenal in ways that leverage fifth generation capabilities could well enhance the capability of the US and its allies to deter smaller nuclear powers.

Second, Trident submarines might shift from a full load of ballistic missiles to a mixed load whereby some variations of precision guided munitions are added to be part of the deterrent equation for the smaller nuclear powers emergent in the Second Nuclear Age.

Third, a nuclear cell could be established in Cybercom for targeting smaller nuclear forces and disrupting their capabilities.

Fourth, there is a clear need to relook at PACOM’s deterrent posturing options with regard to China.

How do you not just fight a nuclear war, but how do you credibly deter China with regard to its use of nuclear weapons?

Fifth, identify ways rapidly use the stockpile of SLCM nuclear warheads in storage for unanticipated scenarios.

Sixth, what kinds of nuclear guarantees make sense as weapons proliferate?

The NATO practice of expanding but not demonstrating credible military force to defend all areas of NATO, should not be repeated with regard to nuclear guarantees.

If Putin resorts to nuclear weapons in the current Middle East crisis, as he has threatened to do, what is more realistic, a U.S. nuclear guarantee or Israeli possession of nuclear weapons?

In short, the challenge of nuclear deterrence has returned.

There need to be ways to shape both a clear and coherent strategy and appropriate means including credible weapons and concepts of operations for American forces to deal with the challenge.

“Strong sanctions” against a state like North Korea is hardly a realistic response, in which credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and the safety and security of the United States are in play.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ninja Discusses His F-35 Flight Across the Atlantic: The Right Stuff Italian Style

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
02/18/2016

2016-02-08  On Feb. 5, the Italian Air Force’s first F-35, AL-1 with code “32-01” and markings of the 32 Stormo Wing landed at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, at the end of the JSF’s first ever transatlantic flight.

The aircraft was piloted by “Ninja,”an Italian Air Force test pilot, belonging to the Reparto Sperimentale Volo (Test Wing) from Pratica di Mare, and who had successfully completed his initial F-35 flight training at Luke AFB in November 2015.

To put this in perspective, the pilot had only 50 flight hours of F-35 flying experience.

And the Lightning II which Ninja flew across the North Atlantic in winter had only 15 flight hours on before he took off on his historic flight. 32-01was the first plane to came off of the Italian assembly line at Cameri Italy.

And this was done in the middle of winter, flying in and out of cloud layers over the turbulent North Atlantic against 120-knot headwinds. It was remarkable flying.

After his 7-hour flight he sat down with reporters to discuss the flight and what he sees as the way ahead for the F-35 program.

“We started from Cameri.

We had bad weather.

For the first day, we went from Cameri to Lajes AFB in the Azores via Palma de Mallorca.

This was the first time the F-35 had landed in Portugal.

We had to wait out the weather for a day and then flew the 2000 plus miles past St Johns to Halifax to the Boston area and then we arrived in Maryland.

For safety and security reasons, we had four air refueling during this second leg, and given how bad the weather was the fourth refueling was done close to Pax River again for safety and security reasons.

The flight lasted 7 hours.

We had to go through a Cold Front and heavy headwinds (120 knots).”

Question: You flew in formation and through heavy clouds, we understand?

Answer: We had four aircraft total; and kept tight formation; and refueled in the clouds as well.

We had two C-130s just in the case; the tanker, a Typhoon headed to Red Flag and the F-35.

Question: So you were in a new aircraft, single engine, flying in the middle of winter across the North Atlantic in heavy headwinds?

Answer: That characterizes it.

Question: Did you hand fly the plane to stay in formation?

Answer: The plane is very reliable, and I hand flew some times, but auto pilot handled a great deal of the flight.

Question: What about the air refueling events?

Answer: We had 100% success even in the clouds; the big thing here is that the plane is very stable and reliable with no problems.

We had no disconnections; the F-35 is a very stable airplane.

Question: This is the first F-35 built on a new assembly line.

Did that come into play in your calculations in flying the aircraft?

Answer: We did 15 flight hours with AL-1 prior to crossing the Atlantic and we had no issues, and I mean NO issues.

It is the first F-35 built outside the United States.

Our workers at the FACO worked as a team as a team to get this result.

We are building for our own air force and wings for other air forces.

We flew the jet 5 times back to back to back to back prior to coming. I don’t think that has ever been done before as well.

Question: How many flight hours do you have on the F-35?

Answer: About 50 real flight hours.

I was formerly a Tornado pilot in the reconnaissance role.

And then became a test pilot.

Question: After the testing here, what is next for the jet?

Answer: We will take the first two aircraft to Luke AFB.

Then in a few months will bring additional aircraft to Luke.

This summer we will ferry number 4 and 5 to give us a full complement of five at Luke.

All the student pilots at Luke fly the aircraft in the fleet whether US, Australian, Norwegian or Italian.

And the training allows us to learn common TTPs from the ground up.

We are building a fifth generation approach from the ground up.

Question: When you sit in the F-35 cockpit and flew across the Atlantic how did the various systems assist you in the flight?

Answer: The great thing about the F-35 is that the human-machine interface (HMI) is so good and so built around the pilot that you don’t have to learn how it works.

You just use it.

You can configure the screens to configure for the mission.

The aircraft is built to understand; you are building a strategy, not focusing on managing the sensors or really focused on the flying function.

I was able to see the aircraft surrounding me through the clouds, such as keeping distance with my tankers, by using my helmet and the Distributed Aperture System and see the C-130s below me below the clouds.

Question: Did you have any problems with your helmet?

Answer: No. I used the Gen II helmet and the Gen III has improved the helmet, but my helmet worked flawlessly during the flight. I was able to fulfill the mission and I am here.

Question: How different is flying the Tornado compared to the F-35?

Answer: How can answer and be polite? There is no comparison. Recently, I flew the Tornado after learning to fly the F-35. It was a real shock to go back in time.

I had to move my head and focus on the switches and sensors – you have to manage the aircraft to fly.

The F-35 is totally different.

Question: What is it like to cross the Atlantic with DAS?

Answer: It is IR so much of its functionality is used during the night not the day, although you do look through your legs and could see buildings, intersections, and various landmarks while flying.

Question: Many more people saw Lindbourgh land at Le Bourget in 1927 than are here today.

There are four reporters here to witness your arrival, and let make no mistake about it, this is an historic day in which an Italian flew the first F-35A with an Italian assembled aircraft, rather than the USAF having done so.

How does that feel from an Italian point of view?

Answer: It feels great. It is a different mindset. We are working at a different level than we have done in the past.

It must be weird from your point of view to have an Italian fly the first F-35 across the Atlantic. We are making history. We are building it; we are flying it; we are maintaining it.

We talk about facts. I am a pilot.

We have flown all these flight hours with no problems; we are living a new reality.

The aircraft is extremely reliable.

We are close to 50,000 flight hours with aircraft.

That is a fact.

We had a no gripe, no maintenance discrepancies during flight as well.

Question: When the Marines we barred from flying from Pax River to the Farnbourgh air show in 2014, how did this affect your preparation and thinking?

Answer: I certainly realized that I was going to be first and felt that pressure.

But with regard to the flight I talked with the Marines about their flight – they went from Yuma to Pax – and their flight plan to come over.

They were very helpful.

Semper Fidelis is what I have to say about that.

Question: How was the airplane ergonomically?

Answer: I did not think about it until you asked the question.

The seat is very comfortable.

You can stretch your legs in front of you.

The helmet was confortable, and the seat was very supportable and comfortable.

With this helmet I do not have to turn my head, which makes it easier as well for the pilot.

Question: When did you learn that you would do this flight?

Answer: We started working this about six months ago and worked various scenarios for the flight including divert requirements if needed.

But the aircraft holds so much fuel that there is an additional safety factor built in. After 30 minutes after take off from the Azores I could reach the coast of Canada flying high. If I needed to fly lower, I would need a refueling.

We also brought our tankers to Edwards last year to do refueling of the F-35 and worked through various procedures and operating conditions.

Question: This plane is designed to drop bombs and fire missiles.

What you can see going forward with regard to training with regard to weapons?

Answer: It is a lot easier than you think.

This is one of the first aircraft that you can take off and after about two flights dropping bombs, and firing weapons.

Your mission systems are so good that you can start operating weapons very early in your training and operations.

We have to air-to-air pilots working with air-to-ground pilots and merging the cultures.

You are not focusing on your sensors; you are focusing on the end objective of your mission.

The big difference with this aircraft is situational awareness.

You see everything, and I mean on the surface and on the ground and you command attack, defense and electronic warfare functions within the aircraft.

The HMI is processing this and allowing you to be more strategic in your role.

You have different screens and different set ups that we are using as we fly the aircraft, and over time we can help the pilots standardize ways to usual the two screens optimally.

During my flight, I mostly used the two screens in the following way:

Half a screen provided a long-range view to look further; the second half showed the formation.

And the second screen contained my targeting Pod in one half and DAS in the other.

I hand flew because I wanted to play with the screens and figure out how to make best use of the systems during flight.

Question: How is the F-35 a game changer for the Italian Air Force?

Answer: The F-35 gives us much greater global reach.

We have so much gas in the aircraft and it is so fuel efficient, it gives us options in the various scenarios we are likely to face in our area of operations.

Editor’s Note: The F-35 program is rapidly maturing in the hands of the pilots and maintainers.

By the end of 2015, the F-35 program has achieved the following:

  • More than 45,000 hours flown
  • More than 16,000 sorties
  • F-35 stationed at 10 bases
  • F-35 completed five deployments to sea
  • 6 nations are currently flying the F-35
  • More than 160 F-35s are in the field
  • 229 Jets on Contract
  • 150 More with LRIP 9 and 10
  • More than 300 pilots and 2700 maintainers.

Also see the following stories as a compliment to the interview with Ninja:

https://sldinfo.com/an-italian-first-the-f-35-crosses-the-atlantic-and-lands-at-pax-river-february-5-2016/

http://www.sldinfo.com/shaping-the-future-of-italian-airpower/

https://sldinfo.com/three-historic-firsts-for-italy-in-the-f-35-program-during-2015/

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-a-way-ahead-for-the-21st-century-air-combat-enterprise-an-australian-perspective-on-the-italian-first-flight/

https://sldinfo.com/italy-and-two-historic-first-flights-in-2015-shaping-the-f-35-global-enterprise/

https://sldinfo.com/the-second-italian-built-f-35-takes-to-the-skies/

And in 2013 interview, the head of the Italian Air Force discussed how the F-35 was going to be a game changer for Italy.

Lt. General Preziosa laid out his perspective during a Second Line of Defense October 2013 visit to Italy.

He started by underscoring the nature of global change. He saw the period through World War II to end of the first decade of the 21st century as having more in common than different. 

He saw this as a period, which saw significant disruption and then growth built around building up continental focused growth and development.  Global regions grew and financial systems largely supported those regions in their growth and development.

Airpower has been largely linear during this period, in which new planes have been added, but they have essentially replicated what we asked planes in World War II to do.  Bombers and fighters have over time gotten better, but essentially they work in a linear strike and defense pattern in shaping an approach towards longer-range operations.

With the information age, he sees a different type of development, globalization in which the focus is upon inter-continental growth and development.  In this phase, we have to meet the challenge of new growth and development models, shape new financial systems and deal with new defense and security challenges.

“Partnerships are changing; continents are working to get closer and to work more effectively with one another.  But there is a governability shortfall in managing the new challenges, and in such areas of shortfall the problems appear.  There are continuing conflicts within and among continents but there are also new patches of emerging challenges within the seams of the global system whereby terrorists, organized crime or forces of instability grow and disrupt.”

With the range and distance of erupting threats, and the need for global cooperation or coalitions to deal with them, airpower needs to be modified.

“We now need to have assets which operate in a distributed manner with coalitions engaged to deal rapidly with problems.  The advantage of airpower is its reach, speed and mobility.  The challenge is to coalesce capabilities to put resources rapidly up against threats and challenges early enough to deal with them.”

More by chance, than by design, the F-35 is entering the global scene at this moment in global history.

“This is an information warfare airplane which can share data across a fleet of global players.  The reach of the F-35 means that my planes operating in the Western Mediterranean can receive data from throughout the region. And it is a plane with coalition designed into the aircraft.”

The plane is an information warfare aircraft, or an aircraft built to operate very differently from legacy aircraft.

“We will start with the plane and operate in a more traditional manner.  But the new pilots will learn how different it is and will shape new approaches.  When I started with an F-104 and then we transitioned to the Tornado, we applied the F-104 tactics to the new Tornado.  We did not focus on the presence of the second man in the cockpit, the navigator, and needed to shape new approaches to use the new capabilities built into the Tornado.  It will be similar as we transition from legacy aircraft to the F-35.”

The difference is that the change will even be more disruptive and more radical.

“Command and control capabilities are built into every cockpit of the F-35; the challenge will be to leverage those capabilities and the distributed decision making capabilities inherent in a fleet of F-35s.”

He underscored that a strategic shift towards pockets of defense and security challenges around the European, African, Mediterranean and Middle East regions meant that Europe, the United States and others needed to shape collaborative approaches to insert airpower when appropriate rapidly.

And the F-35 as a key distributed force asset was the right match for meeting distributed challenges.

“The fusion system built into every cockpit will allow shared coalition decision making that is required for the kinds of multi-national operations which are becoming the norm.  We are not fighting in mass; we are applying tools rapidly and directly to discrete problems and challenges.”

He saw the approach at Cameri where it is part of a global production and sustainment system as symmetrical with the new strategic realities as well.

“Australia, Japan, Italy, the UK, the U.S. and others will share their production and sustainment capabilities for the F-35 and learn how to apply lessons learned from the use of a coalition aircraft in dealing with the evolving 21st century problems.  This is not yesterday’s aircraft being applied to the challenges of the next 30 years; it is about reshaping concepts of operations for coalitions meeting the evolving new challenges and operational requirements.”

He emphasized that the presence of Australia in Afghanistan demonstrated that a country far from a geographical area moved force into deal with a threat identified by a coalition with which it worked.  And airpower has been central to Afghan operations.

“We use airpower for virtually everything to support the guys on the ground.  They rely heavily upon airpower to deliver the ordinance to protect them and to engage the enemy.”

He argued that: “We will discover the new dimension of airpower using this type of aircraft.”

Reach of Italian F-35Bs

F-35B coverage from the allied fleet in the Mediterranean.

Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Need for Cultural Innovation: Lessons Learned from Dunkirk

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-02-14  By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

The F-35 working with robotic elements and with new weapons can empower a distributed operations approach.

This approach is being tested out at various centers of innovation within the U.S. military and will be synergistic with allied partners.

Traditional assets, such as the large deck amphibious ship or th large-deck carrier, will be rethought as the new approach and new capabilities are introduced into the force.

Continuing to invest in past approaches and capabilities makes little sense.

And ultimately, the fifth-generation aircraft and associated systems can drive significant cultural change.

But there is nothing inevitable here.

The United States is at a crucial turning point.

German Panzers punch through the Ardennes Forest then turn northward.
German Panzers punch through the Ardennes Forest then turn northward.

In a stringent budgetary environment and with a demand to shape a post-Afghan military, the crucial requirement is to invest in the future not the past.

But it is not just about airframes or stuffing as much as you can in legacy aircraft.

The new aircraft represent a sea change with significant savings in terms of fleet costs and overall capability at the same time.

The sustainability of the new aircraft is in a world significantly different from legacy aircraft.

Digital maintenance is part of the revolution in sustainability. The sustainability revolution enables a significant increase in the sortie generation rates for the new combat aircraft.

And in addition to this core capability, there is a significant transition in combat approaches facilitated by the new aircraft.

The aircraft can shape disruptive change by enabling distributed operations.

The shift is from linear to simultaneous operations; it is a shift from fighters needing reachback to large aircraft command and control and ISR platforms to 360-degree dominance by deployed decision makers operating not in a network but a honeycomb.

These lessons have been recently highlighted in the Trilateral Exercise held at Langley AFB in December 2015.

If this exercise was held 12 years ago, not only would the planes have been different but so would the AWACS role. The AWACS would have worked with the fighters to sort out combat space and lanes of operation in a hub spoke manner. 

With the F-22 and the coming F-35, horizontal communication among the air combat force is facilitated so that the planes at the point of attack can provide a much more dynamic targeting capability against the adversary with push back to AWACS as important as directed air operations from the AWACS. 

As General Hawk Carlisle put it: 

“The exercise was not about shaping a lowest common denominator coalition force but one able to fight more effectively at the higher end as a dominant air combat force. 

The pilots learning to work together to execute evolving capabilities are crucial to mission success in contested air space.” 

Modernization of assets, enhanced capabilities to work together and shaping innovative concepts of operations were seen as key tools for the U.S. and the allies to operate in the expanded battlespace in order to prevail….. 

And as the RAF highlighted: 

“Whoever can gather, process and exploit the most information in the quickest time will win the information war and ultimately the fight. 

With fifth generation aircraft being able to instantly share data with their fourth generation cousins, the Typhoon can become and an even more effective and capable jet fighter.” 

Fifth-generation aircraft both generate disruptive change and live off of disruptive change.

An F-22 flying with a Typhoon and a Rafael at the Trilateral Exercise at Langley AFB, December 2015. Credit Photo: USAF
An F-22 flying with a Typhoon and a Rafael at the Trilateral Exercise at Langley AFB, December 2015. Credit Photo: USAF

Taking a fleet approach, rather than simply focusing on the platforms themselves, highlights their potential for disruptive change.

Properly connected or interoperable with one another, the new aircraft can work together to operate like a marauding motorcycle gang in an adversary’s battlespace.

Rather than operating as a linear force, the marauding motorcycle gang creates chaos within the OODA loop of the adversary. In fact, the F-35 is really about shifting from the OODA loop with the machine-man interface doing much of the OO and focusing attention on the DA.

By having an onboard combat systems enterprise able to respond in real time to the impacts that the aircraft are creating in the battlespace, they can respond to the fractual consequences of the battle itself.

Rather than going in with a preset battle plan, the new aircraft can work together to disrupt, destroy, and defeat adversary forces within the battlespace. It is about on-the-fly (literally) combat system processing power that enables the pilots to act like members of a marauding motorcycle gang.

The fifth-generation aircraft enable the pilots to become key decision makers within the battlespace and, if properly interconnected, shape a distributed operations approach to battle management and execution.

They are key elements of C4ISR D, which is deployed decision making rather than data collection sent back to decision makers for less timely actions. C5ISR D is the core capability that 21st-century military forces need for strategic advantage.

F-22 Raptors from the 94th Fighter Squadron, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va., and F-35A Lightning IIs from the 58th Fighter Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., fly in formation after completing an integration training mission over the Eglin Training Range, Fla., Nov. 5, 2014. It was the first operational integration training mission for the Air Force’s fifth generation aircraft. The F-35s and F-22s flew offensive counter air, defensive counter air and interdiction missions together, employing tactics to maximize their fifth-generation capabilities. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo)
F-22 Raptors from the 94th Fighter Squadron, Joint Base Langley-Eustis, Va., and F-35A Lightning IIs from the 58th Fighter Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., fly in formation after completing an integration training mission over the Eglin Training Range, Fla., Nov. 5, 2014. It was the first operational integration training mission for the Air Force’s fifth generation aircraft. The F-35s and F-22s flew offensive counter air, defensive counter air and interdiction missions together, employing tactics to maximize their fifth-generation capabilities. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Shane A. Cuomo)

For the United States to have an effective military role in the new setting of regional networking, a key requirement will be effective and assured combined command, control, and communications, linked by advanced computing capabilities to global, regional, and local intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance assets (C5ISR).

The services will need to ensure that there is broad synergy among U.S. global forces fully exploiting new military technologies and the more modest capabilities of regional allies and partners.

Indeed, C5ISR is evolving to become C5ISR D, whereby the purpose of C5ISR is to shape effective combined and joint decision-making. The USMC clearly understands and embraces the disruptive capabilities of the fifth-generation aircraft. For the USMC, TAC Air does not simply play a close air support role in any traditional sense.

It is an enabler for distributed operations when such operations are essential to either conventional strike or counterinsurgency warfare.

USMC aviation has allowed the USMC ground forces to operate with greater confidence in deploying within the civilian population in Iraq. Aviation’s roles in both non-kinetic and kinetic operations have allowed the USMC to avoid operating within “green zones” so as to facilitate greater civilian-military relations.

Aviation has also provided an integrated asset working with the ground forces in joint counter-IED operations. And quite obviously, battlefields of the future will require the USMC to operate upon many axes of attack simultaneously. Such an operation is simply impossible without a USMC aviation element.

For the USMC thinks ground in the air and the forces on the ground can rely 24/ 7 on USMC aviation forces to be with them in the ground fight.

As Lt. Col. “Chip” Berke, the F-22, F-35, F-16 and F-18 Marine Corps former squadron commander, put it in a presentation on airpower at the Copenhagen Airpower conference last year:

As a JTAC the key requirement is that the airplane show up.

The A-10 pilots are amazing; the plane will not always able to show up in the environment in which we operate; the F-35 will.

That is the difference for a Marine on the ground.

The F-35 will be a “first-generation flying combat system” that will enable air-ground communication and ISR exchanges unprecedented in military history. The pilot will be a full member of the ground team; the ground commanders will have ears and eyes able to operate in a wide swath of three-dimensional space.

But if other airpower leaders simply mimic the operations of older aircraft with the fifth-generation aircraft, the promise of the new air operations will not be realized.

As Robert Evans, a specialist on C2, formerly a senior USAF officer and now with Northrop Grumman put it about the dynamics of change:

If warfighters were to apply the same C2 approach used for traditional airpower to the F-35 they would really be missing the point of what the F-35 fleet can bring to the future fight. 

In the future, they might task the F-35 fleet to operate in the battlespace and affect targets that they believe are important to support the commander’s strategy, but while those advanced fighters are out there, they can collaborate with other forces in the battlespace to support broader objectives. 

The F-35 pilot could be given much broader authorities and wields much greater capabilities, so the tasks could be less specific and more broadly defined by mission type orders, based on the commander’s intent. He will have the ability to influence the battlespace not just within his specific package, but working with others in the battlespace against broader objectives. 

Collaboration is greatly enhanced, and mutual support is driven to entirely new heights. 

The F-35 pilot in the future becomes in some ways, an air battle manager who is really participating in a much more advanced offense, if you will, than did the aircrews of the legacy generation. 

And going back to my comment about the convergence of planning and execution, and a warfighter’s ability to see and sense in the battlespace … that’s only relevant if you take advantage of it, and the F-35 certainly allows warfighters to take advantage of it.

You don’t want to have a fifth-generation Air Force, shackled by a third-generation system of command and control.

The result would be that the United states and its allies will repeat the failures of the French facing the Germans in World War II where they had superior tanks with outmoded tactics and command structures, and with the predictable results.

The new aircraft simply do not function in the way the old do.

Indeed, one lesson of Dunkirk needs to be remembered when shaping an innovative military strategy for the  decade ahead 21st century: new capabilities without new concepts of operations will lead to strategic failure.

A military force is truly blessed if the combat leaders at all levels in the chain of command have the proper weapons and also the wisdom to employ them against a reactive enemy. History of combat often shows that their not understanding or exploiting that advantage can offset one army’s engagement-winning weapons.

It is true that weaker forces through brilliant leadership can vanquish the more technology-capable and stronger army. Of course, as Napoleon said, he also wanted a general who was lucky, and all combat leaders know how the great unknown of luck can also determine the outcome.

And to add to the mix is another great thinker, Damon Runyon, who once quipped, “The race is not always to the swift nor the battle to the strong, but that’s the way to bet.”

Possibly the best tank of the 1940 campaign, the S-35 had a top speed of 25mph and boasted a 47mm gun with a muzzle velocity of 2,200 feet per second. These tanks along with the excellent Hotchkiss H39s equipped the three light mechanized divisions or DLMs. These divisions were only formed starting in 1939 and were poorly prepared for the German invasion, which succeeded with inferior tanks.
Possibly the best tank of the 1940 campaign, the S-35 had a top speed of 25mph and boasted a 47mm gun with a muzzle velocity of 2,200 feet per second. These tanks along with the excellent Hotchkiss H39s equipped the three light mechanized divisions or DLMs. These divisions were only formed starting in 1939 and were poorly prepared for the German invasion, which succeeded with inferior tanks.

By all static order-of-battle accounting, the Miracle at Dunkirk should have never been necessary, because the British and French had a number of key elements that could have allowed them to win, including superior tanks to the attacking Germans and rough parity in the air.

But the French and British were defeated; the British Expeditionary Force was evacuated and lived to fight another day on to the eventual V-E Day. So betting on the French and the British was the wrong chip to play on the table of the battlefield.

The Germans Blitzkrieg generals down to the lower ranks were all “making their own luck” by exploiting the French and British approaches with the weapons they had.

The fall of France may have some interesting lessons on CONOPS and decision making against a reactive enemy.

And those lessons argue for shaping a transition from legacy air CONOPS to new distributed air operations CONOPS leveraging the F-22 and F-35.

The Germans were a quicker and smarter force that defeated the French and the British. Words echoing from history tell us that story and also can now bring an interesting lesson learned to the current debate on what is becoming known as “distributed air operations.”

The shift from “legacy” air operations to distributed air operations is a significant operational and cultural shift. Characterizing the shift from fourth- to fifth-generation aircraft really does not capture the nature of the shift. The legacy aircraft operate in a strike formation, which is linear and runs from Wild Weasels back to the AWACS.

The F-22 and F-35 are part of distributed operational systems in which the decision makers are distributed and a honeycomb structure is created around which ISR, C2, strike, and decision-making can be distributed.

A new style of collaborative operations is shaped but takes away the ability of an adversary to simply eliminate assets like the AWACs and blind the fleet. Distributed operations is the cultural shift associated with the fifth-generation aircraft and investments in new weapons, remotely piloted aircraft, and the crafting of simultaneous rather than sequential operations.

Unfortunately, the debate about fifth-generation aircraft continues as if these are simply aircraft, not nodes driving significant cultural changes in operational capabilities.

In a fascinating book by Hugh Sebag-Montefiore on the courageous men in the British army who fought the Germans to allow the escape from Dunkirk, some of these lessons were highlighted. [ref] Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Dunkirk: Fight to the Last Man (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).[/ref]

In writing the book, the author provided significant insight into how the British and French lost to the Germans in the European forests and battlefields.

Comments taken from diaries of the survivors provide significant insight into lessons learned by not engaging in the cultural revolution that one’s new technology provides.

The British and French had new equipment, which, if properly used and embedded into appropriate concepts of operations, might well have led to a different outcome at the beginning of the war.

And the first lesson here is simply to develop advanced equipment is not even half the job.

First and foremost: “The campaign showed that politicians must never, even in peacetime, deprive their armed forces of the equipment they need. Complacently assuming that the equipment can be manufactured once war is declared is demonstrably unwise.” [ref]Ibid. xiv[/ref]

A second lesson learned is that if you do not adapt your command structure to the technology, you will lose.

A theme that the author developed was that although the French had tanks, World War I generals who simply were not able to adapt to the tactics of armored warfare commanded them.

These difficulties were aggravated a hundred times by the style of French leadership.

The soldier who should have had most influence on the way in which the first counterattack was mounted was X Corps’ commander General Grandsard, who had direct control over the divisions in the Sedan sector.

He was a Corps’ commander General Grandsard, who had direct control over the divisions in the Sedan sector.

He was a general of the old school, who had not understood that French strategy must change in line with Guderian’s (the German general in charge of the attack) new mobile tactics. [ref]Ibid, 100.[/ref]

General Heiz Guderian was a military theorist and innovative General of the German Army. Germany's panzer forces were raised and fought according to his writings.
General Heiz Guderian was a military theorist and innovative General of the German Army. Germany’s panzer forces were raised and fought according to his writings.

The author when discussing command style introduced a really key term very relevant to the shift from sequential to simultaneous air operations:

“The need to refer back to Guderian was, however, limited by the entrepreneurial culture he fostered:

German officers were expected to make up their own minds on how to achieve the objectives Guderian set and how to act in a crisis.” [ref]Ibid, 101.[/ref]

A third lesson was the importance of getting inside the enemy’s OODA loop.

The French command structure was too slow to use information and to act on that information on a timely manner.

The German commanders were allowed significantly greater freedom of action and could act in minutes, whereas the French operated in terms of hours:

“The rapid German response to the threat posed by the counter-attack only serves to underline the slowness of the French . . .

In other words, the Germans began their own counter-attack within 10 minutes of identifying their target, whereas it had taken the French more than 12 hours to launch their troops into the attack.” [ref]Ibid. 105.[/ref]

A clear advantage of the new aircraft is their technical capability to get inside the enemy’s OODA loop; but without change in how command structure works, no clear advantage can be realized.

A fourth lesson is the challenge of the enemy exploiting your weaknesses for which he has trained to exploit.

The German tankers confronting superior armor in the advanced French tanks were able to exploit weakness in those tanks because of intelligence about the weaknesses and training to exploit those weaknesses.

From the diary of a German survivor with regard to meeting the superior French tanks:

The tanks’ silhouettes were getting larger, and I was scared. Never before had I seen such huge tanks. . . .

My company commander gave clear instructions over the radio describing which targets to aim at, and the enemy tanks were just 200 meters away before he gave the order to fire.

As if they had been hit be lightening, three of the enemy tanks halted, their hatches opened and their crews jump out. But some of the other tanks continued towards us, while some turned. . . .

Presenting their broadsides to us. On the . . . side of the tank there was an oil radiator behind some armor.

At this spot, even our (smaller Panzer 2) tanks’ 20mm guns could penetrate the amour, and the French tanks went up in flames immediately after they were hit there. It was then that our good training made such a difference. [ref]Ibid. 101-102[/ref]

The Chinese study of the classic U.S. air battle and the perceived value of targeting USAF or USN large battle management systems such as AWACS reminds one of the need to get rid of the AWACS as a lead element in any offensive operations and sequential air battle and to move to distributed capabilities in simultaneous operations.

A fifth lesson is to develop logistical systems that allow one to exploit advantages of new technology.

The superior French tanks were refueled by trucks and dependent upon truck-provided fuel.

The Germans parked a “farm” of fuel containers to which the tanks came for refueling and could thus keep up the speed of the attack:

They (the key French tanks) could not even be expected in their first assembly area at Le Chesne, fifteen miles southwest of Sedan, until 6 am. It would then take around six hours to fill them with petrol, another two to move the five miles to their positions to the Mont Dieu forest, and two more hours to refuel them again. . . .

In contrast, the Germans overcame their refueling difficulties by transporting petrol to the front in cans. Once the cans were in the vicinity of the panzer divisions, all the tanks nearby could be refueled simultaneously on any terrain.

Blitzkrieg as made use of by Germany had significant psychological, or as some writers call, “terror” elements, such as the ‘Jericho Trompete’, a noise-making siren on the Junkers Ju-87 dive-bomber to influence the spirits of opponent forces.
Blitzkrieg as made use of by Germany had significant psychological, or as some writers call, “terror” elements, such as the ‘Jericho Trompete’, a noise-making siren on the Junkers Ju-87 dive-bomber to influence the spirits of opponent forces.

The French, on the other hand, had the petrol brought to the front in lorries, which, not being tracked, could not be used over rough ground. Even when the French armor was refueled on a road, the vehicles’ petrol tanks had to be filled up consecutively rather than simultaneously which took much longer than the German method. [ref]Ibid. 109-120[/ref]

Keeping the old tanker approach in place while you add the new aircraft undercuts the ability of those aircraft to operate in a distributed approach.

By moving the tanker line back significantly, one can refuel almost like the German “fuel farm” and not expect the tankers like the French trucks to come to them.

Even the difference between simultaneous versus sequential attacks was underscored as crucial to the success of the Germans and the negative impact on French morale.

As one French officer commented, “Simultaneous attacks would have been very difficult for us. But attacking in waves in this manner means they lose their courage after seeing their burning comrades.” [ref]Ibid.107[/ref]

In short, the core lesson to learn is to buy appropriate numbers of new equipment and to adapt the operational culture, including the logistics systems, to allow the blue team to exploit their advantages.

German tanks refuel in the field to enable rapid operations.
German tanks refuel in the field to enable rapid operations.

Unless one wants outcomes such as the French and British experienced in the forests of Europe against the Germans, it is crucial to accelerate the shift to a new culture and capability built around distributed operations.

The old system of sequential air operations built around legacy aircraft, AWACS, and multiple assets needs to be replaced in a timely manner by a well-resourced distributed operations enterprise.

The current Deputy Commandant of Aviation, Lt. General Davis, when CG of 2nd MAW underscored how important he saw the F-35 as a tool in the hands of what he called the I-Pad generation pilots of a USMC shaping a new C2 approach:

I think it is going to be a fantastic blending of not only perspectives but also attitudes. 

And what I really look forward to is not the old guys like me, but the very young guys who will fly this fantastic new capability. 

The older generation may have a harder time unleashing the power and potential of the new gear – the new capabilities.  We might say “why don’t you do it this way” when that approach might be exactly the wrong thing to do from a capabilities standpoint.

My sense is the young guys will blend. We’ve already picked the first Prowler pilot to go be an F35 guy. 

He’s going to do great and he’s going to add perspective and attitude to the tribe down at Eglin getting ready to fly the jet that’s going to make a big impact on the F35 community.

I think it’s going to be the new generation, the newbies that are in the training command right now that are getting ready to go fly the F35, who are going to unleash the capabilities of this jet. 

They will say, “Hey, this is what the system will give me.  Don’t cap me; don’t box me.   

This is what this thing can do, this is how we can best employ the machine, its agility its sensors to support the guy on the ground, our MEU Commanders and our Combatant Commanders and this is what we should do with it to make it effective.

Editor’s Note: Our recent visits to Pax River reminded us of how different the F-35 is from legacy aircraft, and that it really is NOT a replacement aircraft. In turn, we were reminded of an essay which we first published in 2010 and included it in The Renorming of Air Operations published later that year.

We included a revised version in our book on Pacific strategy.

Recently, we discussed fifth generation enabled warfare with a senior naval aviator and during that discussion a number of key points were emphasized with regard to the role of the F-35 in enabling a more effective approach to shaping the sea services capabilities to prevail in the extended battlespace.

  • The capabilities of fifth generation aircraft reduce the amount of time necessary to do the OO of the OODA loop with a focus on the decision making part of the loop and a general restructuring of how decisions can be taken from the edge of the battlespace;
  • A key focus is upon working new ways to distribute information throughout the battlespace;
  • It is about parsing of information as well.
  • The shift from COIN to higher tempo warfare is a key shift.
  • And the usual argument about the spectrum of warfare misses the point that it is about enhanced decision making in a more rapid operational environment regardless of the spectrum on which you are fighting.
  • The F-35 is both informing and informed by this shift towards warfighting in the extended battlespace.
  • The intersection of the coming of the F-35 with the overall evolution of new technologies and concepts of operation will enhance significantly both the role and capability of the sea base.
  • A key dynamic going forward will be upon the interaction of the systems operating within that extended battlespace with the software evolution of the F-35 combat systems themselves.
  • The shift in training is crucial: “We tend to be conservative in our TTPs and are still captured by the replacement platform mentality.  We do not want to do TTPs for the F-35B informed by the Harrier; we do not want to do TTPs for the F-35C informed largely by Super Hornet thinking.  We need a paradigm shift in the war fighting culture with regard to the F-35.”

Supporting the Distributed Fleet: Challenges for the Military Sealift Command

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-02-18 By Robbin Laird, Ed Timperlake and Murielle Delaporte

Logistics is the oft forgotten dimension of combat power. For the sea services, this means that the key role of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) can never be overlooked or forgotten. It is just a notable fact that the MSC can be too often overlooked for what it is – the enabler of the sea services shift towards distributed operations.

And they do not have a powerful seat at the table in the Pentagon to gain access to resources, because the MSC mariners spend their lives at sea, not Inside the Beltway.

The Navy has clearly underscored its shift towards a more distributed fleet with distributed lethality to extend the global reach of the carrier strike force.

As a harbinger of this, the USN-USMC team has already seen a shift in how its basic combat force is deployed.

Historically, the Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Force or the ARG-MEU has deployed in a three-ship formation over a 200 mile sea space. With the integration of the Osprey into the fleet, the ARG-MEU now operates on ships often deployed a thousand miles from one another.

It does not take a genius to understand that resupplying ships that are 1,000 miles from one another is not the same as 200 miles from one another, and enhances the demand function on the MSC fleet.

And with the shortfall of combat ships in the fleet, the Military Sealift Command is being pressed to do more. A case in point is the newest supply ship in the MSC fleet, the T-AKE ship. The 14 T-AKE ships are completed and the final two ships were funded at $825 million which would make per ship cost around 412 million.

The dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS William McLean (T-AKE 12), left, and the aircraft carriers USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), center, and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) steam through the Atlantic Ocean July 16, 2014. The ships were underway conducting an ammunition transfer. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Karl Anderson/Released)
The dry cargo and ammunition ship USNS William McLean (T-AKE 12), left, and the aircraft carriers USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75), center, and USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) steam through the Atlantic Ocean July 16, 2014. The ships were underway conducting an ammunition transfer. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Karl Anderson/Released)

The ship has been designed to provide flexible, blue water support in any Ocean of the world to the fleet. A well designed ship for any climate and sea state T-AKE ships have significant cargo space, including ammunition support, with efficient and well thought-out elevators to enable the crew to move cargo to the delivery to the point of support. Coupled with the use of modern logistical and inventory control IT systems the ships crew can find the cargo in its location quickly and efficiently.

Given the shortage of ships for the USCG and the US Navy, the T-AKE ship fleet has been tasked to do a diversity of missions far beyond simple fleet replenishment.

  • Given the high demand on the tanker fleet, T-AKE ships have also become an ocean going tanker.
  • The Marines are using it as mini-amphibious support ship in the Pacific.
  • Currently T-AKE con-ops can already support either military helicopters for fleet replenishment at sea or commercial helicopters for other mission sets
  • Its helo deck has landed Ospreys and there an important consideration of perhaps modifying the two-helo hanger arrangement into a space for 24/7 Osprey operations
  • As the surface Navy is discovering for the distributed operational fleet, it makes good sense to rely on the Osprey as a significant operational connector.

A blunt fundamental question in today’s resource battle for assets is; can the MSC actually support Navy plans to more widely distribute its fleet in the years ahead?  

The answer currently can only be a provisional yes, given the shortage of ships, and the proliferation of new high demand drivers such as the Littoral Combat Ship. In addition to a declining merchant fleet there is a growing shortage of trained and experienced civil mariners generated by the decline in the US merchant marine.

The key to an expanded role of the Military Sealift Command must be met by having a supply of experienced mariners and a robust number of US merchant ships to generate these qualified mariners.

With the continued and rapid decline of the US merchant fleet and the declining shipbuilding base in the United States, core military capabilities envisaged for the period ahead may not be realized.

Without the logistics base necessary for globally distributed operations, it will be necessary to cut back the tasks and operational reach of the sea services.

The expenditure on the land wars has clearly challenged the future of the sea services, notably with regard to its logistical support structure.

During a recent visit to the Military Sealift Command in Norfolk Virginia, we discussed a number of these issues with the head of MSC, Admiral Shannon. The Admiral is a Surface Warfare Officer who has a distinguished naval background.

He served in various parts of the USN surface fleet as a consumer of MSC support but in his words, “I always wanted to be on the other end of the probe taking oil.”

As a former carrier strike group commander, he certainly has brought to the job a deep knowledge of the needs of the customer, and notably those in time a global stretch for the USN-USMC team.

He expressed concern that the decline of the US merchant marine has clearly highlighted the challenge of being able to recruit the requisite numbers of civil mariners to the MSC fleet.

According to Admiral Shannon: “One thing I wake every morning thinking about is if the President declares the need for the country to go to war, how will the logistical side of the military meet the challenge?

This is a challenge for airlift, land transportation, and for us, of course, sealift, since around ninety percent of the world commerce moves by sea.”

The magnitude of the challenge generated by the decline of the Merchant Marine fleet was highlighted by Admiral Shannon.

“Three decades ago, when I came into the U.S. Navy, we had around 400 ships in the merchant marine. Today that number is down to 77 in the international trade. Just a few months ago, that number was around 80. That is a drop from the beginning of 2015.

We are getting close to that magic number where we clearly will not have enough U.S. flagged merchant ships to generate the mariners, which MSC will need to operate, notably when we mobilize. And it is not just a question of mariners; it is about the shipbuilding base and ship repair facilities being available in the United States.”

USS Kearsarge, left, and USS Ponce, right, are alongside USNS Kanawha during a replenishment at sea. Kearsarge is the command ship of Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group, supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Scott Pittman/Released)
USS Kearsarge, left, and USS Ponce, right, are alongside USNS Kanawha during a replenishment at sea. Kearsarge is the command ship of Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group, supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Scott Pittman/Released)

And along with the decline in the pool of US civil mariners, there is the question of the block retirement of the current generation of civil mariners.

In an interview with the Skipper of the fleet replenishment oiler USNS Kanawha (T-AO 196) during the same visit to MSC in mid-December, Master Mariner Jim Dolan, argued:

“As the American commercial fleet declines, there’s going to be a shortage in the pool of skilled mariners. No doubt about it. And we’re starting to see that in MSC.

And my peer group, of 35 years of experience, is retiring, so you will see new Captains onboard the fleet. Good captains but without our experience. You can not put a price on experience.”

Dolan has been in the service for 35 years with MSC by May 2016, the last 15 aboard tankers and has been a Master Mariner for around 25 years.

The decline of the merchant marine and the availability of civil mariners is a problem now in terms of peacetime, but clearly the problem of attrition in conflict would create a significant problem for MSC and its ability to support the Navy.

Admiral Shannon noted that for Iraqi Freedom there was no real threat to MSC transit “Let us take the case of our support to Iraqi Freedom.

For example, on a single day in 2003, 167 ships under the cognizance of Military Sealift Command were moving cargo to support the operation in the Middle East. Because the sea was uncontested, this was relatively a walk in the park.

Fast-forward to today’s Pacific, where there clearly are powers capable of contesting us at sea.

How then do we do the logistical support necessary for the operation of the sea services operating forward in a contested environment?”

How then to deal with this shortage and ensure that the sea services have the kind of logistical support they need in a conflict environment?

For Admiral Shannon, the answer must begin with strengthening the US merchant marine and enhance its ability to supply civil mariners to the MSC. According to Admiral Shannon “The Jones Act and the Maritime Security Program are important but not enough. We need things like more cargo preference to ensure that we have adequate U.S. merchant shipping.

I know some people consider cargo preference corporate welfare. I consider cargo preference an investment in our national security because if you put some cargo on the table, the U.S. flag will see an opportunity and they will acquire or build U.S. flag ships. They will flag them in the United States if there’s some cargo there for them to haul.”

In other words, from the MSC perspective, one could look at cargo preference as a proactive incentive, which supports the logistical side of sea service operations.

And the Admiral tied the need for civil mariners as well to the mobilization tasks, which the National Command Authority would generate when conflict becomes serious.

Admiral Shannon added “with such an approach, we can build capacity in the merchant marine and, in turn, expand the base of mariners available to us in time of need. Those mariners are critical to us because when you look at today’s MSC report, we have 61 ships in a reduced operating status.

Forty-six of those are over at the Maritime Administration and 15 of them are with Military Sealift Command. And they’re mostly large roll-on/roll-off vessels and dry cargo vessels; and they’re strategically dispersed around the country with 10 to12 mariners on each ship.

When the president rings the bell, we go to the union halls and we man the ships up to whatever their manning requirement is It’s typically about another 20 persons per vessel.

So, right there, 60 times 20, we need 1,200 mariners to fall in from somewhere, and where they’re going to fall in from is the U.S. flagged merchant fleet.

The capacity of a robust U.S. flag merchant marine and its manpower is the engine which enables us to carry our country to war when ordered.”

An edited version of this article was published on Breaking Defense on February 18, 2016.

Challenges for the Military Sealift Command

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Red Flag 16-1: Training to Total Force Integration

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-02-18 By Todd Miller

Three weeks of intensive Red Flag aerial warfighting culminated 2-12-16.

This first of four Red Flag exercises to be held in 2016 featured 39 units, 120 aircraft and 2400 personnel from three countries, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.

Group Captain Philip Gordon, Air Expeditionary Wing Vice Commander, Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) noted that a very real portion of the exercise for the RAAF was the deployment from Australia to Nellis AFB Las Vegas, NV.

The RAAF deployment of 400 personnel, 14 aircraft and all required support equipment took one week with stops in Guam and Hawaii.

The deployment was supported by the RAAF C-17 and KC-30A refueling tanker and the group was proud to have departed and arrived on time.

Such an effort by Australia represents a very successful force projection halfway around the world.

The exercise also gave the RAAF an opportunity to deploy the legacy F/A-18As and the F/A-18Fs side by side in a combat environment.

Exercise Red Flag 16-1 Concludes from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

Col. Kenny Smith, Commander of the 57th OG noted great value for participants to understand the unique capabilities of each unit (F-22A, F-16CJ, RAAF F/A-18F, E-3G B40/45, E-7A etc), and collaborate as a team.

Nationalities and specific unit identities quickly go by the wayside as participants gel into an integrated “Blue Force.”

From day one of the exercise, the learning curve is steep.

Red Air threats are fully integrated and the entire adversary force thinks and adapts. It is an intense and very unforgiving environment by design, and if Blue air is not fully integrated, they will take losses.

This is the entire purpose of Red Flag, the best lessons are learned from experience and this ensures they are learned before they are in theater in a real conflict.

New air combat capabilities are changing the face of the air battle, and the participating Air Forces are adapting their tactics to utilize their assets more effectively.

The RAAF F/A-18F Super Hornets AESA radar adds enhanced capabilities that make the aircraft and the Blue force more effective.

The wide variety of sensors combined with the stealth of the F-22A provide an unparalleled ability to gather and fuse information and create an effective picture of what is happening upfront in the battle space.

These capabilities enable Raptor pilots to function as battle managers, passing information to other platforms and as such becoming force multipliers.

The amount of information from Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, Drones, and Sensor laden aircraft (RC-135s, U-2, P-8, P-3C, E-7A, E-3G & others) is significant and must be assessed and directed effectively.

It is about the parsing of information to support an effective combat force; not just collecting vast amounts of information.

The opportunity to deploy these assets side by side “in theatre” and learn how best to utilize is unrivaled.

1st Lt. 1st Lt. Emily Lebeau, 965th Airborne Air Control Squadron air battle manager (Tinker AFB, OK) noted that her unit had deployed the vastly improved E-3G Block 40/45 aboard its AWACS (its second Red Flag appearance) to manage the airspace and provide the big picture in support of the F-22As and other assets.

The technology leap from 1970’s technology to current is significant and represents quite a steep learning curve as well.

Given Red air regenerates after being killed, there is a continuous and ongoing Red air threat for the 90-minute exercise window (Red Flag consists of two 90-minute exercise windows one at night, one at day each day during the 3-week exercise).

Group Captain Philip Gordon, AEW VC RAAF noted the need to manage the battle with available weapons resources.

While the F-22As may appear to be the obvious choice to eliminate the air threats, they only carry 6 AMRAAMS.

As a result, battle managers on the “networked” Blue Force determine the best asset to engage the threat. Real time information and target data is communicated to the designated asset to engage.

In many cases, AMRAAMS are “fired” (simulated) from an F/A-18 or F-15E on a strike mission (exiting the range after attacking their target) an F-16CJ on a SEAD mission or from another platform – preserving AMRAAMS on the F-22 for other uses.

There is no question that the advanced capabilities of the F-22A, the incoming F-35, the E-3G, E-7A, F/A-18F, EA-18G and other platforms are changing the face of aerial warfare.

Utilized effectively, the integrated team approach enhances the capability of the “Blue” combat force. Red Flag ensures all operators are well prepared to achieve greater effectiveness from day one of any conflict.

Editor’s Note: Todd Miller is an avid photographer and contributor to a number of Aviation media groups. Utilizing www.flyfastandlow.com as a personal “runway” it is Todd’s goal to reflect the rapidly evolving capability of the military aviation mission, as well as the character and commitment of the military aviation professional.

Todd Miller wishes to thank MSgt S. Allen, SrA T. Spangler and the entire 99th ABW Public Affairs team for support during his visit to Red Flag 16-1.

Updates on the C-295 in Global Air Forces: Mali and the Philippines

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
02/16/2016

2016-02-16  In 2013, Airbus Defence and Space announced the introduction of the C-295 W.

In a piece we published on 6/10/13, we highlighted the coming of the C-295W,

During the Airbus Military Trade Media Briefing 2013, held on May 29th and 30th 2013, Angel Barrio Cardaba Head of Engineering and Technology provided an overview on a number of technological developments at Airbus Military over the past year.

But the key system highlighted was the C295W.

According to Airbus Military:

Featuring winglets and uprated engines as standard, the new model will provide operators with enhanced performance in all flight phases but is particularly aimed at those operating at “hot and high“ airfields where payload increases in excess of 1,000kg are promised. 

In intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) roles such as airborne early warning (AEW) the enhancements will increase endurance by 30-60min and permit an operating altitude up to 2,000ft higher than now. 

The new features will also provide an overall reduction in fuel consumption of around 4% depending on configuration and conditions. 

The C295W, assembled in Seville, Spain, is being offered to the market from now on and will be the standard version of the aircraft in all versions from the fourth quarter of 2014. Certification is expected in 2Q14. 

Airbus Military is committing to the C295W following flight-trials with winglets fitted to its company development aircraft which showed positive results for a weight penalty of only around 90kg. 

The engines are the Pratt & Whitney Canada PW127 turboprops which power all versions of the C295. New procedures recently certified by Canada and Spain permit operation in the climb and cruise phases at higher power settings at the discretion of the operator. As well as improved hot and high performance, the procedure improves operation over very high terrain such as the Andes or Himalaya mountains with only a minor influence on maintenance cost.

Gulshan Luthra of India Strategic highlighted the importance of the C-295W for a market such as that of India.

Airbus Military has launched an uprated C295W medium transport aircraft with winglets and more powerful engines with an eye on the Indian military and civil aviation market.

In official briefings at the recent launch ceremony here, company officials mentioned India more that a dozen times in view of the impending replacement of 56 HS-748 transporters of the Indian Air Force (IAF) while Airbus Military Chairman and CEO Domingo Urena-Raso told India Strategic (www.indiastrategic.in) that he expected the number of selected aircraft in this category to be more than 100.

According to India Strategic’s own estimates though, the figure could touch or exceed 200, keeping in mind the growing requirements of the armed forces, paramilitary organizations like the Border Security Force (BSF) and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), civil operations in India’s mountainous Himalayan states and even the secretive Aviation Research Centre (ARC) of India’s external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).

Recently, Mali became the latest customer for the aircraft.

According to an Airbus Defence and Space press release dated 2/16/16:

Airbus Defence and Space has secured its first order in 2016 for the market-leading C295W transport and mission aircraft.

Mali becomes the 23rd nation to order the C295 with an order for one winglet-equipped C295W model, now the standard version, in transport configuration for the Mali Air Force. Delivery is due in the second half of this year.

Head of Marketing and Sales, Jean-Pierre Talamoni said: “This order from Mali reflects the C295W’s proven ability to handle the exceptionally harsh operating conditions encountered in sub-Saharan Africa.”

The company also announced that the Philippines Air Force took delivery of its third and final C-295 for its operational fleet,

The Philippines Air Force has taken delivery of the third and final Airbus C295 medium transport aircraft ordered from Airbus Defence and Space.

Philippines C295

The aircraft was ferried from the final assembly line at Seville, Spain to Clark Air Base, Philippines.

In Philippines Air Force service the C295 will play a key role in the modernization of the force´s transport fleet and will undertake a wide variety of military and humanitarian missions.

The photo shows the first of the three aircraft.

 

 

 

 

 

 

An Update on Eurofighter: Longer Range Missile Integration, An Historic Trans-Atlantic Flight and Going to Red Flag 2016

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
02/15/2016
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2016-02-12 The Eurofighter is being effectively modernized with a new radar and with the integration of longer-range missiles for both ground attack and air-to-air operations.

The Eurofighter as well is subsuming Tornado missions with the integration of key missiles such as Brimstone and Spear.

According to a press release from Eurofighter on February 11, 2016, progress with the integration of the Storm Shadow and Meteor onboard the Eurofighter is described.

Further trials of the Storm Shadow deep strike missile and Meteor Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air missile have been successfully completed as part of a programme of improvements which will further enhance the powerful swing-role capability of the Eurofighter Typhoon combat jet. 

It has been confirmed that a new operational release of the Storm Shadow missile was carried out in the UK Ministry of Defence’s Hebrides range in Scotland. 

The release – from the Italian Instrumented Production Aircraft (IPA) 2 – is part of work conducted to expand the safe weapon trajectory data envelope of the missile. The test, which was led by Finmeccanica – Aircraft Division, with the support of Eurofighter, BAE Systems, Airbus Defence and Space, and MBDA, follows the completion of ground trials on the weapon and a successful release of Storm Shadow in November 2015. 

It was followed by another firing of a Meteor Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air missile using UK Typhoon aircraft IPA6, also at the Hebrides range. Led by BAE Systems with support from MBDA, Selex, QinetiQ and UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) and the Eurofighter teams. 

The firing follows trials held in late 2015 which saw the Typhoon aircraft conduct guided Meteor firings against real air targets in pre-planned scenarios. 

The Storm Shadow and Meteor firings are part of the flight test campaign for the Phase 2 Enhancement (P2E) programme which will introduce a range of new and improved long range attack capabilities to Typhoon. 

Commenting on the Storm Shadow tests, Enrico Scarabotto, the Italian Chief Test pilot who flew the IPA2, said: “The integration of the weapon further enhances Typhoon’s potent multi-role and swing-role capabilities, adding new capability to strike in day or night, in all-weather conditions. 

Storm Shadow adds attack stand-off capability to Typhoon which now really accomplishes every possible role in the combat scenario. The aircraft retains excellent performance in an incredible low pilot workload cockpit environment, essential for a single seat multirole aircraft.”  

Steve Greenbank, Director of Aircraft Programmes for Military Air & Information, BAE Systems, said: “These latest Meteor firing trials are another step forward in the integration of the missile onto the Typhoon aircraft, demonstrating they can operate safely, accurately and effectively. 

“2015 was a hugely exciting 12 months for Typhoon, with contracts placed for new capabilities and enhancements. 

The integration of Meteor further enhance the aircraft’s abilities to ensure Typhoon maintains its position as the most capable, agile and enduring swing role fighter in the international market. 

These trials also form important maturity points for the UKs Project CENTURION plan, which will see Typhoon provide the continuous delivery of key combat air capabilities as Tornado moves towards its out-of-service date.” 

In addition to Meteor and Storm Shadow, the integration of MBDA’s Brimstone, part of the Phase 3 Enhancements (P3E) programme, is on contract for Eurofighter Typhoon. 

Brimstone is a precision attack missile with proven capabilities against both static and moving/manoeuvring targets.

Two Eurofighters recently crossed the Atlantic as escorts for the first Italian-built F-35 which flew across the Atlantic and landed at Pax River on February 5, 2016.

The planes landed on the East Coast and then have progressed to Nellis AFB to participate in Red Flag 2016.

Typhoons from 4th Stormo, Grosseto, Italy are participating in Red Flag 2016 and will engage in the escort role during the exercise.

When Ninja, the F-35 pilot who flew across the Atlantic, discussed the flight with reporters, he made the point that the flight package which crossed the Atlantic which was completely Italian – KC-767s, C-130s, Typhoons, and his F-35 – represented the future of the Italian Air Force as an integrated force.

With regard to last year’s initial Red Flag exercise, the RAF described the role of their Typhoon in the exercise as follows:

The world’s most intensive air combat training exercise has concluded at Nellis Air Force Base, USA. Over the course of the three-week Red Flag exercise RAF Typhoon and Sentinel aircraft flew twice daily sorties against complex air defences designed to mirror what they would expect to encounter on a real operation against a near-peer adversary. Whilst airborne they were given vital tactical information from radars and other sensors by aerospace battle managers from 1 Air Control Centre. 

For Group Captain Mark Chappell, Station Commander of RAF Lossiemouth Red Flag is essential training. He said: “This exercise continues to be the most challenging and rewarding training for all domains and so while it has been hard work for everyone involved it’s been well worth the effort. Everyone has received unparalleled levels of training and we are thus far better equipped for any future contingency which we may be asked to support.” 

During Red Flag Typhoon FGR4 multi-role fighters flew 150 sorties with each pilot deployed taking the opportunity to gain experience of dropping one of the 25 Paveway IV bombs precision guided bombs used by the RAF on the exercise.

One of the 1(Fighter) Squadron Typhoon pilots was Flight Lieutenant Alec Palfreyman who said: “Red Flag was everything I expected it to be and more. The way they pull all the elements together into one mission is something we can’t do at home. It’s of great value both to the Typhoon Force and personally. 

“With 70 plus aircraft in the air to be able to fight your way into a target, drop a bomb and then fight your way out and survive is a challenge. I definitely feel the sharpest I’ve been at the end of the flying having been exposed to the closest thing to doing it for real. It certainly gives you confidence for the future.” 

The training is only possible through the work of the engineers who keep the Typhoons serviceable. Flt Lt Darren Tremble is a Junior Engineering Officer on 1(F) Squadron. He said: “It’s been very hard work across all trades but it’s provided the opportunity to work in a different environment which they may encounter on operations. I’ve been particularly pleased with the serviceability of the Typhoons.” 

The exercise was similarly successful for V(AC) Squadron which deployed a pair of Sentinel R1 surveillance aircraft to Red Flag for the first time. The RAF Waddington based unit had a 100% mission success rate, flying a sortie on each of the two missions flown each day over the vast Nellis training ranges. 

The Sentinel aircraft have returned to the UK but the Typhoons will remain in the USA to participate in Exercise Western Zephyr. Led by RAF Lossiemouth based 6 Squadron, the exercise will see the RAF work closely with the F-22 Raptors of the US Air Force’s 1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. The exercise continues the interoperability and integration of RAF operations with the fifth-generation F-22 ahead of the introduction into service of the F-35 Lightning II to its combat air inventory.

And the recent Trilateral Exercise held in Langley AFB, highlighted the integration of the F-22 with the Typhoon, and for the first time, the French Air Force introduced the Rafale to the process as well.

A key element of the exercise was enhancing the capabilities of the air fleet to work among the pilots horizontally and not just directed hierarchically from an AWACS, which is a key aspect of a fifth generation enabled force.

The Typhoons from XI squadron had been to Langley in 2013 for training with F-22s, but this was the first time for the Rafales.

As all three aircraft pass the 10 year operational mark, there is enough combat experience under their collective combat belts to take the next step, and not simply be the best aircraft in each individual air force, but to come together to craft a much more powerful coalition capability.

https://sldinfo.com/a-special-report-on-eurofighter-modernization-shaping-a-way-ahead/

The first slideshow shows various photos of the typhoons.

The first photo shows the Typhoons in the formation along with the F-35 crossing the Atlantic and is credited to the Italian Ministry of Defence.

The second and third show RAF Typhoons involved in Red Flag 2015.

The fourth shows the Typhoon with the Storm Shadow.

The fifth shows the Typhoon with a Meteor missile.

And the final photo shows the Typhoon with both Storm Shadow and Meteor.

The second slideshow shows Typhoons during the Trilateral Exercise.

The video below shows Typhoons from RAF 3rd Squadron (based at Coningsby) participating in Red Flag 16-1.

Red Flag 16-1 Continues from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

02/14/2015: As the second week of Red Flag wraps up, over 130 aircraft are taking to the skies for 16-1.
Watch a variety of aircraft from multiple branches of the military and coalition partners focus on combat readiness as they head out the Nevada Test and Training Range.

Credit:99th Air Base Wing Public Affairs:2/9/16

And the video below shows the RAF coming to last year’s Red Flag with Typhoons crossing the Atlantic supported by their new A330MRTT tankers.

An Update on Red Flag 16-1: Air Combat Integration and the Role of the F-22, the Typhoon and Wedgetail.

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2016-02-15  Red Flag is evolving as the services and partners focus on the need and capability to operate in the extended battlespace.

In early 2015, we visited Nellis, and discussed the evolution of Red Flag with senior USAF officers.

Col. Jeffrey Weed, the Commander of the 414th Combat Training Squadron clearly laid out the strategic direction for the evolution of Red Flag exercises in the period ahead. 

With the need to train for a more difficult and more contested combat environments, training must adjust. Adjustments are necessary both to deal with evolving threats over great distances and to train for ways to more effectively integrate evolving blue systems as to operate in a contested environment.

As Col. Weed explained” “Although the airspace has not changed for the exercises — we still operate live fly on the NV Test and Training Range — we do use a MUCH larger geographic AOR for virtual and constructive participants.”

The challenge of synchronizing the various combat elements is increasingly complex; and the evolution of command and control to provide for synchronization in the expanded battlespace is a key requirement for enhancing the effectiveness of airpower.

A recent piece written by Steven Valinski and published by Aviation Photography Digest provided some useful insights into Red Flag 16-1 and the work of the USAF, the RAF and the RAAF with regard to training for air combat integration.

Along the way, the article  provided insights with regard to three aircraft which we will be visiting during the year, namely, the F-22, the Typhoon and the Wedgetail.

Red Flag 16-1 took place from January 25 to February 12, 2016.

The full piece can be read here but we are highlighting some of the key points with regard to the three aircraft mentioned above, and the photos are credited to Aviation Photo Digest as well.

Red Flag is About Problem Solving as Air Combat Evolves

Integration has always been the core objective with Exercise Red Flag.

Yes, the exercise was born out of the need to simulate a pilot’s first ten combat missions, but Red Flag has grown to be much more than combat mission simulation. Red Flag is integration, Red Flag is problem solving, Red Flag is learning how to deal with a multitude of sophisticated threats, Red Flag is learning how to execute under pressure…and much more.

Colonel Kenny Smith, 57th Operations Group Commander, explains what one of the key objectives is with Red Flag exercises: “What we are trying to set up here is, we have units that are at home station doing, basically, single role type of aircraft.

The F-16’s that are from Aviano that are here just here today. They don’t get a chance to train with other platforms very often.

And so, when they show up here, one of the things we really want to tease out of them is: how do you integrate with other platforms? I’m going to think about the problems of an F-16 pilot, from an F-16 perspective.

I want that F-16 pilot, the mission commander is going to leave that large-force package, to be able to understand what the capabilities of an F-22 is, what the capabilities of the E-3 is, what the capabilities of the Super Hornets from Australia are and be able to integrate those to be able to deliver an effect for a joint force commander.

Essentially, the big takeaway for the people that are flying in these exercises here is when they go home, they have a better understanding of what those things are.”

During the course of Red Flag 16-1, the U.S., UK and Australia worked together to overcome communication and terminology differences, a lack of understanding of each other’s capabilities, differences in strategies and tactics and more to successfully reach common objectives.

The F-22 in Red Flag 16-1

For Red Flag 16-1, standing out among the Gen 4 and Gen 4.5 fighters is the Gen 5 Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor air superiority fighter.

With its stealth capabilities and technology such as the BAE Systems EI&S AN/ALR-94 radar warning receiver (RWR), Lockheed Martin AN/AAR-56 infrared and ultraviolet Missile Launch Detector (MLD) and Northrop Grumman AN/APG-77 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, the F-22 is capable of air superiority in a matter of minutes.

Screen Shot 2016-02-15 at 7.22.15 PM

However, with payload limitations, the F-22’s are best utilized when working together with other assets to help manage the battlefield and take out the enemy. 1st Lt. Emily Lebeau, 965th Airborne Air Control Squadron air battle manager out of Tinker AFB in Oklahoma, discusses how the Boeing E-3 Sentry works together with the F-22s:

“The F-22 has a much better ability to command the air-to-air. We work with them just because they know their tactics so much better than we ever could. So, it’s a lot more of us picking up the things they’re not looking at. Because their radar is going to look somewhere, but we’re looking everywhere. So, it’s more of backing them up…’hey, the entire fight’s happening over here, but nobody is talking about this person’.

And, we can manage that, at the same time we are working with other C-2 agencies, other intelligence platforms, to get them more data, more information to make their decisions in the air-to-air fight.”

The 965 AACS brought the latest E-3G block 40/45 to Red Flag 16-1, which is only the second time this upgraded model participated in a Red Flag exercise.

The Typhoon in Red Flag 16-1 and Coming to Red Flag 16-2

The RAF brought Typhoons from 3rd Squadron to Red Flag and the Italians are bringing their Typhoons to Red Flag for the first time and will fly during Red Flag 2016-2.

In terms of aircraft, the RAF (United Kingdom) brought Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4s, a Raytheon Sentinel R1, a Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 Hercules C4 and a Boeing E-3D Sentry….

Lt. Col. Kevin “Flash” Gordon, 414th Combat Training Squadron deputy commander, gives us some insight into these missions, or “fights”: “So, the fights are 90 minutes and when the ‘Blue’ participants are flying, they are taking off usually anywhere from 45 minutes to 20 minutes before the VUL starts. They may go hit a tanker first to top-off with gas before the fights starts.

Screen Shot 2016-02-15 at 7.21.50 PM

And then, typically the first 10 minutes or so it’s solely air to air going on where you’d have the ‘Blue’ escort fighters, so your F-22’s, the British Typhoons, maybe the F-15C’s or whatnot, going across the airspace and trying to clean the aggressors out.

To provide that air supremacy for the rest of the fight.

And the next phase goes into the suppression of enemy air defenses, to now where you’ll have the Growlers or the F-16CJ’s come in and now try to suppress some of those surface-to-air threats, just like you would expect in the real-world. Again, we are trying to make Red Flag as realistic as possible.

So, all those aspects that you are going to see in a live, real-world, combat operation, you are going to see at Red Flag.

And then, kind of the final phase is now the air-to-ground strike aircraft, the B-1’s, F-15E’s, F-16’s, whatever…they’ll come in drop their bombs on the targets and they’ll all get out of ‘bad guy land’ successfully…go back home. And, all that takes place in about a 90 minute fight. ”

The point about the Typhoon it has become a regular participant and is assumed into the coalition air superiority mission and integrated with the F-22 along with the F-15 Cs.

A nice statement of its current capabilities, which will now evolve with the next round of upgrades in terms of radars, missiles and aerodynamic changes as well.

The RAAF and the Wedgetail

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) participated with one of its largest contingents ever for a Red Flag with 14 aircraft and over 400 personnel. The RAAF’s role was vital to the success of the overall mission of Red Flag 16-1. 

Group Captain Philip Gordon, Air Expeditionary Wing vice commander, RAAF, explains: “We are part of this big coalition here, this air expeditionary wing.

So we’re fully plugged into all the mission planning and it’s a great opportunity for each of the countries to learn a bit more about each other’s capabilities.

And, really building a good team that imparts the strengths of individual systems and mitigates any weaknesses.

Screen Shot 2016-02-15 at 7.23.20 PM

So, we have different scenarios each day which present different tactical problems.

So, we develop a solution, we brief it, we go fly it, we learn a bunch of lessons. But, we are fully integrated with the US and the UK in the missions and we’ll fly all the elements and the roles there be it, air control, strike, dynamic targeting…we’ll be involved in all of that with our aircraft…..”

Australia brought its unique Boeing E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft.

Based on the Boeing 737, the E-7 is designed to help control the battlefield from the sky by communicating with other aircraft while utilizing an advanced Multi-Role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar.

This sophisticated technology gathers information from a variety of sources and sensors, analyses it, then distributes pertinent information to the other assets in the battlefield. Australia also brought its uniquely configured AP-3C.

Conclusion

As Col. Weed put it in our 2015 interview with him:

Expanding the venue of Red Flag is seen as crucial to insert the realities of the expanded battlespace facing the combat air force.

According to Col. Weed, “if you have an uncomplicated air war, the operational C2 is relatively easy, and you have time.

But operating in a compressed time scale over a large battlespace is a very different matter.

The strike force is simultaneously working complex ISR tasks, missile defense task, protection against electronic and cyber attack and determining the targets to go after – this is the reality against which we need to train.

And that is where we are going with Red Flag.”