The Future is Right There Staring You in the Face: Reconsidering the North Korean Threat

02/14/2016

2016-02-10 By Paul Bracken

Seeing North Korea again test an atomic bomb and long range missile is like watching a movie you’ve seen before.

The UN Security Council will meet. New sanctions will be put on North Korea. China will condemn the events.

And nothing, really, will happen.

The White House will do a review of its policy toward North Korea by asking staffers for new ideas.

There won’t be any, at least within the box of the “no escalation” premise that has confined US policy for years.

Yet it would be a mistake to think that this “same old, same old” policy is playing out again.

In my book on The Second Nuclear Age (Times Books, 2012) I emphasized the importance of looking at strategic problems both from a short term point of view, and from a longer term multi-year perspective.

Some security challenges are best thought of as what can be termed “important, but not necessarily urgent.”

They can go on for a long time and nothing dire happens.

But they contain the seeds of larger issues that strengthen — and ultimately make the problem impossible to ignore in a much more deadly way.

The likelihood of a North Korean attack on South Korea or Japan does not appear any greater today than it did one year ago, or five years ago. We could be wrong about this. But it seems reasonable to believe that while North Korea’s nuclear missile build up isn’t a good thing, it also isn’t urgent. It can be passed on to the next Administration, or kicked down the road beyond that.

This is the common view in Washington decision making circles.

Urgent problems in the Middle East push North Korea off the agenda.

I want to argue that this is one way that North Korea’s recent nuclear and missile tests matter.

They expose a large failure in policy imagination: an inability to distinguish between urgent issues like ISIS, and issues that are important — but not necessarily urgent.

One danger of being the sole superpower is over extension.

But another is of overwhelm by immediate, urgent issues.

This focus means that important issues are repeatedly kicked down the road.

Policy is a mixture of the immediate tastes and intuitions of the moment when the urgent issue arrives.

Short term drives out the long term — every time.

This is what’s happened with North Korea.

Pyongyang has a nuclear ICBM program that either is capable of hitting South Korea, Japan, and the United States, or that soon will be. It has done this with safety and reliability features that would never be acceptable in the United States.

If North Korea ever launched this force, it might not work.

But then again, it might.

Talk about deterrence.

This is a very different kind of deterrent than anything seen before in nuclear diplomacy.

Here is another feature of the second nuclear age.

Strategy innovation that goes beyond the limits of our imagination and cultural appreciation.

Most of what is thought about nuclear strategy in the West still derives from a long term game between two industrial powers maneuvering for control of Europe and the developing war.

This was the cold war.

It has little to do with strategy innovations of the second nuclear age.

Can anyone seriously maintain the North Korea seeks security by possession of a secure second strike force?

Everything we know about this force points to a very different strategic concept than this.

The tendency in the United States is to see problems with a strong bias toward the urgent even in the way we break them down.

In game theory there’s something called the Colonel Blotto game. Two opponents allocate forces to several battlefields. They do this to build advantage so they can win the overall war, e.g. take two out of three battlefields.

Or they maneuver forces across battlefields to increase tensions to increase their opponent’s caution.

North Korea is a “battlefield,” a front, in the larger strategic competition between the United States and China.

Taiwan’s security, the new man-made islands in the South China Sea, and North Korea are the three fronts in this rivalry.

Think of these as three as a Colonel Blotto game.

The US tries to negotiate over them individually, in isolation from one another.

For example, the man made Chinese islands are handled with a B-52 flyover, a freedom of navigation (FONOP) operation naval patrol, and some unsuccessful maneuvering in ASEAN to get the problem on the agenda.

I could describe in similar manner how Taiwan’s security and North Korea’s nuclear missiles are treated, entirely in their own terms.

What the US approach overlooks is game theory’s central insight that connecting individual strategies across the fronts creates an altogether more effective approach.

Increasing tensions in the South China Sea keeps the United States from pressing too hard against North Korea. If the US could get China to play this game as if it were three independent issues this would clearly be to Washington’s gain.

But China sees that negotiating this three way shell game gives it a lot more than dealing with only one shell at a time. Should the US escalate — it can counter not only in the immediate front of contention, but in the others as well.

As long as the United States attends to each challenge in terms of its immediate urgency it will get whipsawed by such strategies.

If Washington, for example, continues its naval guerilla war in the South China Sea, Beijing will tolerate even more outrageous North Korean behavior.

It will build even more missiles against Taiwan — conventional and nuclear — to keep the United States off balance.

The biggest danger of focusing on the urgent is that it misses the bigger picture.

Understanding this picture was the reason the cold war didn’t turn hot.

The United States won because it understood the rules of the game.

New rules for a second nuclear age are forming now, right before our eyes.

It’s time to see that these are the important lessons of North Korea’s recent launch and tests.

Maintainers at Red Flag 16-1: Providing the Infrastructure for Combat Effectiveness

02/12/2016

2016-02-12 by Senior Airman Alex Fox Echols III

It is a given that no aircraft leaves the ground unless it is working properly.  But that challenge is multiplied here during the three-week Red Flag 16-1 exercise. Hundreds of aircraft maintainers assigned to flying squadrons from around the world work long hours to ensure all training sorties are executed safely and efficiently.

Maintainers are the lifeblood of the flightline, and with almost 80 planes taking off twice daily during Red Flag, they have their work cut out for them. It is their primary duty to keep everything running safely and ensure every mission essential aircraft leaves the ground and returns safely.

“Anytime we take aircraft on the road we face challenges because we’re away from our facilities and our normal lanes for parts and supplies,” said Capt. Matthew Goldey, 95th Aircraft Maintenance Unit officer in charge, Tyndall AFB, Florida. “This exercise is pretty accurate to what you would see downrange. This is about as real as it gets and this is how we fight.”

Red Flag 16-1’s training is centered on readiness through completing combat-realistic missions in a contested, degraded, operationally-limited environment. Despite these challenges, the participating maintainers are managing to come together as a team to take care of daily maintenance operations and each other.

A Tyndall F-22 Raptor is ready to taxi and take off during Red Flag 16-1, Jan. 26 at Nellis AFB, Nev. Tyndall’s F-22 Raptors bring a lot to the exercise as the jet’s stealth capabilities, advanced avionics, communication and sensory capabilities help augment the capabilities of the other aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Alex Fox Echols III/Released)
A Tyndall F-22 Raptor is ready to taxi and take off during Red Flag 16-1, Jan. 26 at Nellis AFB, Nev. Tyndall’s F-22 Raptors bring a lot to the exercise as the jet’s stealth capabilities, advanced avionics, communication and sensory capabilities help augment the capabilities of the other aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Alex Fox Echols III/Released)

“There is no one out here saying, ‘that’s not my job.’ Instead it’s, ‘What do you need? Okay, let’s get it done. This is broke? Okay, let’s fix it.'” said Master Sgt. Marc Neubert, 325th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron first sergeant from Tyndall. “That is one of the coolest things that I have seen so far.”

Red Flag brings diverse units and countries together from all over the world and across the services. One thing they all have in common is the need for experienced maintainers to take care of their fleets.

“It’s a satisfying feeling to know that I’m part of a bigger picture and that I am making a difference,” said U.S. Navy Petty Officer 3rd Class Christian Gonzalez, VAQ-138 plane captain, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Washington. “I’m really enjoying learning the way the different branches do their maintenance and it’s very interesting to see the different aircraft.”

Total Force Integration is a key component of training during Red Flag 16-1. Capt. Goldey is a U.S. Air Force reserve officer from the 44th Fighter Group, Tyndall AFB, but during the exercise, he is imbedded in the 95th AMU as the officer in charge.

“We are one unit, and we are totally integrated,” Goldey said. “There is no us and them anymore. We’re all one team. We all wear the same uniform and we’re all out here to accomplish the same mission.”

There is a loss of knowledge and continuity when active duty Airmen rotate from a base and new ones come in. The U.S. Air Force alleviates that problem through Total Force Integration with the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard.

“A TFI unit brings continuity to the active duty force,” Goldey said. “Being in the reserve you have the opportunity to hang around in a particular location longer than most active duty members so we bring some continuity and experience to the fight.”

While most maintainers are not working directly with the other units outside their organization, the augmentee Airmen fueling the aircraft for the exercise are the exception. They work with most of the units on the flightline.

“We have really good comradery with everyone,” said Airman 1st Class Alexis Aragon, 7th Logistics Readiness Squadron fuels specialist, Dyess AFB, Texas. “Fuels is the lifeline of every aircraft, and without fuel these aircraft can’t go anywhere. I love it because I know we’re helping get the mission done, and I’m glad we augmentees could come out here from different bases to help do that.”

During exercises like Red Flag, the maintainers are able to shed any weight they may carry during normal operations at their home base, like special duties and office work, and just concentrate on their main objectives.

“Our Airmen are ‘killing it’ right now,” Goldey said. “Out here on the flightline it’s total mission focus. Out here it’s just about putting planes in the air. Anytime you get an opportunity to do that, it is great.”

With the collaboration between military branches and multiple units from around the world along with the Total Force Integration, the maintainers of Red Flag 16-1 know they have an entire flightline backing them up.

“I have learned here that you have to support one another,” said Staff Sgt. Matthew Brown, 44th Fighter Group weapons loader form Tyndall. “You have to consistently do what you can to make sure everyone gets what they need to accomplish the mission.”

http://www.nellis.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123468320

Ship Survivability: A Key Fleet Consideration for the Evolving Amphibious Task Force

2016-02-12 By Scott Truver

In the early morning of Feb. 18, 1991, the U.S. amphibious warship USS Tripoli (LPH-10) struck an Iraqi contact mine in the northern Persian Gulf, ripping a 25-foot by 23-foot hole in her starboard side below the waterline.

The quick reaction of her commanding officer and his crew managed to keep the ship on an even keel. That allowed Tripoli—which, ironically, was serving as a mine countermeasures (MCM) support ship with embarked airborne MCM helicopters—to continue mine-clearance operations for another six days before heading to port for repairs.

Officials survey the damage of USS Tripoli while the ship was in drydock in Bahrain following a mine attack. US Navy Photo
Officials survey the damage of USS Tripoli while the ship was in drydock in Bahrain following a mine attack. US Navy Photo

Compare that experience to that of the Sri Lankan navy’s logistics ship M/V Invincible which was attacked by the Tamil Sea Tigers on 9 May 2008. Built as a commercial vessel but transferred to the navy, the 210-foot Invincible was loaded with ammunition and explosives intended for government troops.

A simple limpet mine planted by a Sea Tiger diver sank the ship. A cheap kill if ever there was one.

One blindingly obvious lesson from real-world combat events is that surface ships built to military standards are more likely to survive attacks than are vessels designed to commercial standards.

Indeed, numerous critical factors in the Navy’s Survivability Instruction 9070.1A are taken into account in designing U.S. Navy surface ships to three survivability standards:

Level 1 (low);

Level 2 (moderate);

and Level 3 (high).

Aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers are designed to Level 3.

Amphibious warships and some underway replenishment ships are designed to Level 2.

Both versions of the littoral combat ship (LCS), other replenishment ships, mine warfare ships, patrol craft, and support ships are designed to Level 1.

Then there are Navy vessels that are built to commercial standards.

The damage, injuries and deaths resulting from the 17 October 2002 terrorist attack on the Aegis guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG-67) could have been much worse had the ship not been designed to Level 3 standards and without the excellent damage-control capabilities of her well-trained crew.

Tripoli was rated at Level 2, while the Sri Lanken Invincible, despite her name, was built to commercial “Level 0” survivability, with damage control little more than a prayer.

Why dredge up this history?

Lessons learned in combat must remain in focus as the Navy and the Marine Corps are challenged to carry out today’s operations with reduced forces while simultaneously planning and programming for an uncertain but still-dangerous future.

Nowhere is this more challenging than assuring the sea services’ expeditionary-from-the-sea capabilities.

During the past decade or so, as defense budgets were squeezed and amphibious force structure was stretched thin to meet combatant commanders’ near-insatiable demands for more ships, the Navy and Marine Corps reached for innovative alternative platforms to enable more littoral operations, particularly in lower-threat regions of the world.

Marines and Sailors assigned to Maritime Raid Force, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embark from the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), at sea, on MV-22B Ospreys assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 266 (Reinforced), for a simulated night raid, Feb. 09, 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Kyle N. Runnels/Released)
Marines and Sailors assigned to Maritime Raid Force, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embark from the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), at sea, on MV-22B Ospreys assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 266 (Reinforced), for a simulated night raid, Feb. 09, 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Kyle N. Runnels/Released)

That was largely due to the fiscal reality that the long-established requirement for 38 amphibious ships––an “alphabet soup” of LHDs, LHAs, LPDs and LSDs––would likely never be achieved, and at most a force of 33 Gators would be sustained.

“There is a requirement for over 50 [amphibious] ships on a day-to-day basis, that’s what . . . the combatant commanders are asking for,” Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., then-Marine Corps Commandant, noted at the January 2015 WEST conference in San Diego.

“We’ve got an objective of 38—that’s the requirement within the Department of the Navy. We’ve got a fiscally constrained objective of about 33. We’ve got an inventory right now of 31 . . . which equates to significant readiness challenges.”

A 33-ship force would include 15 amphibious ships for each MEB [Marine Expeditionary Brigade], with another three ships in overhaul at any given time.”

Since then, the Navy’s shipbuilding plan has been bumped up by one amphib, but numerous Cassandras are less optimistic and point to a more likely, budget-constrained 28-ship future amphibious force.

Go below even 34 and important factors––e.g., material readiness––start to reduce force effectiveness.

During a hearing before the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Feb. 23, 2015, Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Kenneth J. Glueck Jr., deputy commandant for Combat Development and Integration and the commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, stated that the number needed to satisfy COCOM demands for forward-deployed amphibious ships is “close to 54.”

This situation has stimulated new thinking about traditional as well as novel approaches to sustain the nation’s ability to project expeditionary power from the sea.

But these are always predicated upon the sustained core capabilities and minimum essential numbers of the nation’s ’Gators.

As Daniel Goure of the Lexington Institute concluded in October 2015, “The unraveling of the post-World War II international order fairly cries out for a larger and modern U.S. amphibious warfare capability.”

An over-reliance on designed-to-commercial-standards vessels to compensate for a severely numbers-constrained amphibious force runs the risk of easy mission-kills if not catastrophic losses of ships and crews.

That’s not to say these “ancillaries,” as former Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert described them, would be of no value.

To the contrary, they offer critical services and capabilities during peacetime and crisis, providing persistent presence in many areas of the world, thereby allowing gray-hulled amphibs to be deployed to regions of greater danger.

As Maj. Gen. Richard Simcock, commanding general, 3d Marine Division, remarked in a January 2016 USNI News interview, “what we’re finding out now is, we have to use these resources outside their original design. We cannot afford to just let them sit and not be used. We are finding ways of using these ships to support the engagement that we’re doing throughout the region.”

In that regard, three ship types have been highlighted as a means to assuage the risk in the arrival of combat support and combat service support elements of a MEB:

(1) the joint high-speed vessel (JHSV), in September 2015 reclassified EPF for expeditionary fast transport;

(2) the mobile landing platform (MLP) reclassified as expeditionary transfer dock (ESD); and

(3) the afloat forward staging base (AFSB) is now EBM, for expeditionary base mobile.

The Navy’s USNS Spearhead (EPF-1) program – formerly the Joint High Speed Vessel — is providing innovative capabilities for high-speed intra-theater movement of troops and equipment.

Feb. 16, 2013 The Military Sealift Command joint high-speed vessel USNS Spearhead (JHSV-1) pulls into Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story. Spearhead is the first of nine Navy joint high-speed vessels and is designed for rapid intra-theater transport of troops and military equipment. (U.S. Navy photo by William Cook/Released)
Feb. 16, 2013 The Military Sealift Command joint high-speed vessel USNS Spearhead (JHSV-1) pulls into Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story. Spearhead is the first of nine Navy joint high-speed vessels and is designed for rapid intra-theater transport of troops and military equipment. (U.S. Navy photo by William Cook/Released)

The EFPs are being built by Austal USA, five of which were delivered to the Navy by the end 2015. They are designed to commercial standards specified in the “American Bureau of Shipping High-Speed Naval Craft Guide.”

The naval vessel rules for building and certifying U.S. Navy ships did not apply to any part of the EFP design––nor did Instruction 9070.1A. Although they are fitted with four weapon positions for light machine guns, they have no other active or passive self-defense capabilities.

Another platform that has received increased notice is the USNS Montford Point (ESD-1)-class vessel.

The ESD’s mission is to serve as a transfer point between large auxiliary cargo and ammunition ships and smaller landing craft, a floating base in non-anchorage depths, to deliver people, equipment and cargo when no friendly ports are available.

USNS Montford Point (MLP-1) undocking at General Dynamics NASSO. November 2012.
USNS Montford Point (MLP-1) undocking at General Dynamics NASSO. November 2012.

The Navy’s program of record calls for two ESDs (both Montford Point and John Glenn have been delivered) and two modified ESBs configured as EBM vessels having the same hull/machinery/electrical features as the ESD, but are configured to support MCM and special-forces operations.

A third ESB is in the offing. USNS Lewis B. Puller (ESB-1) delivered in June 2015. General Dynamics/National Steel and Shipbuilding is the ESD/ESB yard.

Some visionaries have conceived distributed-lethality “mini-ARGs” comprising a surface-warfare-configured LCS (or some future lethal, frigate-like small surface combatant), EPF, combat logistics vessel (T-AKE), and an “up-gunned” ESB for low-end but still-in-harms-way missions, including littoral combat ops.

If funded in 2017, the third ESB could serve as the test platform for (if not the first to deploy with) the Navy’s electro-magnetic railgun, while others see the ESD as the baseline for new-design hospital ships, repair/tender vessels, intelligence-collectors, helicopter/tilt-rotor/UAV aviation support ships to replace MSC’s aging aviation support force and other vessels as active naval imaginations might divine.

Military Sealift Command ship USNS Lewis B. Puller seen in Norfolk on December 14, 2015. Credit: Second Line of Defense
Military Sealift Command ship USNS Lewis B. Puller seen in Norfolk on December 14, 2015. Credit: Second Line of Defense

These are not L-class amphibs, so we’re not doing forcible entry, we’re not doing the Iwo Jima kinds of things with these ships,” Maj. Gen. Simcock told USNI News. “However, there’s a lot of applicability to the warfighting spectrum towards the lower end that we can use these ships for. . . . Now, the piece that I’m looking at right now is, how far can we push that envelope?

How far can we take these ships—again, not L-class warships—how far can we get toward that higher end?

Meaning, if they were second-, third-, fourth-echelon level ships, could we still use them in conjunction with a higher-end operation like forcible entry?”

“And that’s kind of what I’m looking at right now,” he continued, “how far can I push these ships with the capabilities they provide towards the higher end of the spectrum.

Now there’s a line there I think, and I don’t know where that is, but it would be not prudent of me, the risk would be too high to push these things too fast, too close to the high end. I just don’t know where that line is right now.”

But, just don’t call them warships.

The Marine Corps concurs.

“I want to be clear,” Marine Lt. Gen. Ronald Bailey, deputy commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, underscored in an October 2015 Navy Times interview, “these alternative platforms are not substitutes or replacements for amphibious combat ships.”

The 30 amphibious ships in the Navy’s inventory in early 2016 are, without a doubt, survivable warships in name and reality.

In a May 28, 2014 commentary in The Washington Times, Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.) wrote, “Amphibious ships have been called the ‘Swiss Army Knives’ of the sea and America’s ‘911 force.’

They are versatile and responsive, making them one of the most valuable assets of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

That is why we turn to them time and again––from major combat missions to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”

The LHD-1 Wasp class (built by the former Litton Ingalls) comprises eight multi-mission amphibious-assault warships. The ship’s primary role is to provide embarked commanders with command and control capabilities for sea-based maneuver/assault operations employing elements of a landing force comprising helicopters, tilt-rotor aircraft and amphibious vehicles.

Other roles include power projection and sea control, as well as crisis response and combat operations. At survivability Level 2, all are fitted with passive and active self-defense features, including two 20mm Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems (CIWS), Sea Sparrow surface-to-air missiles and Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM), and several electronic-warfare (EW) “soft-kill” systems.

USS America seen pierside in Valparaiso, Chile, 8/26/14. Credit Photo: USS America
USS America seen pierside in Valparaiso, Chile, 8/26/14. Credit Photo: USS America

The America (LHA-6/-7)-class amphibious assault ships built by Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) are the newest components of the Navy’s expeditionary forces and are also at survivability Level 2 with passive and active self-defense capabilities, including two CIWS, Sea Sparrow missiles and RAM “hard-kill” systems, and several EW “soft-kill” systems.

The eight Whidbey Island (LSD-41) and four Harpers Ferry (LSD-49) dock landing ships carry, launch and recover amphibious assault vehicles, landing craft and operate helicopters and MV-22 aircraft. Built by Avondale Industries and Lockheed Shipbuilding, both classes were designed to survivability Level 2 with passive and active self-defense capabilities including two CIWS and RAM “hard-kill” systems, and several EW systems.

The San Antonio (LPD-17)-class landing platform dock ships being built by HII can launch and recov­er traditional surface-assault craft as well as two LCACs to transport cargo, personnel, tracked and wheeled vehicles, and tanks. Aviation facilities include a hangar and flight deck to operate and maintain tilt-rotor and rotary-wing aircraft and UAVs.

Designed to survivability Level 2+, because the design includes several selected Level 3 features, LPD-17s are fitted with passive and active self-defense capabilities, including two Mk 46 Mod 1 30mm cannon and RAM “hard-kill” systems, and several EW systems.

The Navy and Marine Corps recognized the need to move out quickly on an 11-ship LX(R) follow-on class to the LPD-17 program to replace the 12 Whidbey Island and Harpers Ferry dock landing ships that are fast approaching end of service life.

In the meantime, to ensure expeditionary-amphibious requirements will continue to be met, numerous observers called for keeping the “hot” LPD-17 line open by building a 12th San Antonio-class warship­­––it has been approved––as a bridge to the next-generation ’Gator.

The design of the next amphibious warship––whether to start from a clean sheet of paper or use an existing ship for modification to an LX(R) configuration––was resolved on Oct. 14, 2014, when Navy Secretary Ray Mabus approved a ship using the LPD-17 hull form.

“Through a focused and disciplined process that analysed required capabilities and capacities, as well as cost parameters,” Allison Stiller, then-deputy assistant secretary of the Navy (Ships) noted in an email exchange with the author, “the Navy determined that a derivative of the LPD-17 hull form is the preferred alternative to meet the LX(R) operational requirements.

SUEZ CANAL (March 13, 2014) The amphibious transport dock ship USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) transits the Suez Canal. Mesa Verde is part of the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and, with the embarked 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (22nd MEU), is deployed in support of maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility.
SUEZ CANAL (March 13, 2014) The amphibious transport dock ship USS Mesa Verde (LPD 19) transits the Suez Canal. Mesa Verde is part of the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and, with the embarked 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (22nd MEU), is deployed in support of maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility.

By selectively reducing LPD-17 requirements and de-scoping specific spaces and equipment, we can deliver sufficient capability and capacity to meet the LX(R) mission sets using an LPD-17 derivative design with costs that are well understood.”

The need for LX(R) survivability is well understood, too. According to the Navy’s Team Ships, the LPD-17 variant will be acquired using a revised survivability requirements-generation process.

Rather than working to a specified list of recommended survivability features, the revised instruction requires that the survivability features of a new ship design will be derived using the ship’s concept of operations––where, when, and how the ship will be used in combat––and a specified minimum capability after threat weapon damage.

That allows for an optimized set of threat weapon-based survivability features that accounts for threat attrition as part of the normal preparations for an amphibious assault as well as the protection provided by escorting naval forces.

The Navy’s ’Gators do not come cheap. According to the Government Accountability Office,America (LHA-6) cost about $3.36 billion.

50522-N-BQ308-110 ATLANTIC OCEAN (May 22, 2015) As fast as its name, an F-35B Lightning II screams past a flight deck handler as it takes off during flight operations aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1). Wasp, with VMFA-121 and VMFAT-501 embarked, is underway conducting the first phase of operational testing for the F-35B Lightning II aircraft, which will evaluate the full spectrum of F-35B measures of suitability and effectiveness in an at-sea environment. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist William Tonacchio/Released)
ATLANTIC OCEAN (May 22, 2015) As fast as its name, an F-35B Lightning II screams past a flight deck handler as it takes off during flight operations aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1). U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist William Tonacchio/Released)

But the nation’s return on the Navy’s investment is full-spectrum, expeditionary presence, power projection and warfighting capabilities in the multi mission, survivable amphibious warship fleet.

And, while some analysts might argue it is better to have less expensive and less survivable ships to help bolster force levels, emphasizing quantity over quality to reach and sustain the 54 amphibious warship force, that calculus ignores important intangible costs––loss of life and mission failure––beyond the tangible cost of the ship, itself.

The EPFs, ESDs and ESBs will fill important “ancillary” niches in benign and low-threat scenarios, including roles and tasks not contemplated when these ships were designed.

“They’ll never replace what I call the Cadillac, they’ll never replace an L-class ship,” Maj. Gen. Simcock said. “But there’s so many ways that we can use them to reinforce the missions we’re doing.”

All good.

However, if the Navy buys lower-cost, low-survivability vessels and puts them into harm’s way without adequate passive and active protection against burgeoning undersea, surface and air/space-borne threats, it runs the unacceptable risk of cheap kills––missions, ships and people.

As the Navy and Marine Corps look to assure their continued ability to project expeditionary military power from the sea, it would be good to remember the (so-called) Invincible.

This piece first appeared on USNI News and is republished with the permission of the author.

http://news.usni.org/2016/02/04/essay-when-in-comes-to-ship-survivability-prayer-isnt-enough

Amphibious Ship Build

Four Times A Charm? Moving Beyond “Strong Sanctions” To Deal with North Korea

2016-02-10 By Richard Weitz

U.S., Japanese, and South Korean diplomats are pushing Russia and China to adopt a hardline in response to the recent DPRK nuclear and missile tests.

This pursuit is likely to be in vain, though fortunately Seoul and Washington have more direct options that they can pursue.

North Korea has carried out four nuclear tests in the past.

Experts believe that Pyongyang could increase its stockpile to anywhere between 20 and roughly 100 nuclear weapons by 2020.

The U.S. government has repeatedly called on North Korea to commit to denuclearization as a condition of any future negotiations, but Pyongyang has steadily dismissed such an idea, demanding to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state.

People watch TV reporting North Korea's short-range missile test at Seoul Railway Station earlier this month Photo: AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon
People watch TV reporting North Korea’s short-range missile test at Seoul Railway Station earlier this month Photo: AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon

The growing nuclear arsenal poses a serious strategic challenge for the United States, which will find itself under threat of a DPRK nuclear attack through a long-range missile launch unless the DPRK program is halted in its tracks.

Among other challenges, East Asian allies will come to doubt U.S. commitments to come to their defense if exercising these extended deterrence threats could expose CONUS to a DPRK nuclear strike.

Following the latest Security Council consultations, Japanese Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa called the test an “outrage” and a clear violation of the past Security Council resolutions. Yoshikawa claimed that, “There was… unity on the members of the Security Council that, in response to the DPRK, business as usual will no longer apply.”

South Korean Ambassador Oh Joon observed that, “North Korea’s recent provocations have clearly demonstrated two points: first, the efforts to achieve denuclearization through dialogue so far have only resulted in allowing North Korea to buy time to advance these nuclear capabilities.

Second, given that North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons under previous UN sanctions, it has become clear by now that the current level of sanctions cannot put a break on North Korea’s nuclear weapons development.”

He reached the persuasive conclusion that: “Therefore, the lesson is clear: the only way to stop North Korea from going further down the nuclear path is to make it crystal clear to the regime that it has no option but to change.

It is therefore an urgent task before the Security Council to adopt a significant and robust Security Council resolution that exceeds all North Korea’s expectations and sends a firm message that the international community will never tolerate its nuclear weapons development.

U.S. Ambassador Samantha Power confirmed that the nuclear and missile tests “undermines regional stability and violates the DPRK’s obligations under four separate Security Council resolutions, demonstrating yet again that the DPRK will continue to escalate tensions in the absence of a strong and forceful response from the international community.”

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un praised the test as a "miraculous achievement," according to KCNA.5/9/15
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un praised the test as a “miraculous achievement,” according to KCNA.5/9/15

She added that, “The accelerated development of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program poses a serious threat to international peace and security – to the peace and security not just of North Korea’s neighbors, but the peace and security of the entire world.”

She explained that, “With each one of these actions, the DPRK moves one step closer to its declared goal of developing nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, and we cannot and will not allow this to happen. the Security Council must take decisive action, and to do so with urgency.”

In particular, Ambassador Power saw “robust sanctions [as] a tool to alter a government’s dangerous nuclear ambitions [since they] can affect a cost-benefit calculus that a government acting in defiance of international norms may be making.

However, while China and Russia have both opposed North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, they have resisted international initiatives that they believe could create chaos on the Korean peninsula.

They remain more concerned about the potential immediate collapse of the DPRK than about its government’s intransigence regarding its nuclear or missile development programs.

Chinese and Russian representatives profess to believe that the DPRK’s disintegration could induce widespread economic disruptions in East Asia, generate large refugee flows across their borders, weaken their influence in the Koreas by reducing their bargaining leverage, and potentially remove a buffer zone separating their territories from U.S. ground forces based in South Korea.

At worst, they claim to fear that North Korea’s demise could precipitate a military conflict on the peninsula, which could spill across into Chinese and Russian territory.

China and Russia may call for denuclearization, but they are adamant about regime preservation.

If Kim Jong-un were to be more flexible about negotiations with the ostensible goal of denuclearization, he could count on Chinese and Russian support for other goals. But if he stubbornly rejects diplomacy, neither Moscow nor Beijing is willing to confront him in any comprehensive manner.

South Korea, Sunday, Feb. 7, 2016. (Ahn Young-joon/Associated Press)
South Korea, Sunday, Feb. 7, 2016. (Ahn Young-joon/Associated Press)

Following North Korea’s January 6, 2016, in which the DPRK claimed that it had tested a miniaturized hydrogen bomb, Russia, China and the U.S. government representatives called on Pyongyang to cease such tests and fulfill its nuclear disarmament obligations.

The three countries joined others in unanimously agreeing in the UN Security Council to denounce North Korea’s violations of earlier UN resolutions.

However, Russia and China are again resisting adopting significantly more effective sanctions on North Korea.

Fortunately, the U.S. and ROK governments have launched formal negotiations to enhance U.S. missile defenses in northeast Asia.

The ROK’s acquisition of F-35s will also enhance the allies’ ability to detect and destroy DPRK missiles, whether in retaliation or preemptively.

Their new “4D Operational Concept” envisages how the allies would “detect, defend, disrupt and destroy” the DPRK’s nuclear systems.

The intended capacity is to be able to detect a DPRK missile launch within a minute, identify a target and appropriate counter-weapon within 1-3 minutes, and then strike and destroy the target.

Also see, the following:

North Korea Re-Enters the World Stage: Japan Prepares a Response

The Mistral is Coming to Egypt: Adding a Sea Base to Its Combat Capability

2016-02-12 According to an article published by our partner defenceWeb, Egypt is to receive both Mistral class ships later this year.

The Egyptian Navy will take delivery of its two Mistral class landing helicopter dock (LHD) vessels in June and September this year from French shipyard DCNS.

According to AFP, citing an unnamed source, the two Mistral class LHDs will be delivered to the Egyptian Navy in June and September respectively. Contacted by Navy Recognition a DCNS representative would not comment on the delivery dates but explained Egyptian sailors will be in France by the end of March to achieve their formation.

The French presidency just announced that Egypt will acquire the two Mistral LHDs originally intended for Russia. “President of the French Republic met with the President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi. They agreed on the principles and terms of the purchase by Egypt of two Mistral class amphibious vessels” according to an official statement by the French presidency.

Mistral_class_400

In early August 2015, France and Russia reached an agreement for the non-delivery of the two Mistral class LHDs originally ordered in June 2011. It was officially announced in September 2015 that Egypt would acquire the two Mistral LHDs originally intended for Russia.

The Egyptian Navy took delivery a FREMM Frigate from French shipyard DCNS last year. Moreover, a year ago, DCNS won a contract to supply the Egyptian Navy with four Gowind corvettes. Slated in 2017, the delivery of the first corvette, which is developed and realized at the DCNS Shipyard in Lorient, will occur less than four years after the signature of the contract. DCNS started cutting metal for the very first unit on April 16th 2015.

Mistral class vessels are capable of carrying 16 helicopters, four landing craft, 70 armoured vehicles and 450 soldiers.

Although there apparently are still some technical details to work out, the resale contract and adapting old projection and command of Russian to Egypt is on track. For this it was necessary for Cairo to ensure payment of the order, which is “ruby set on the nail,” the French defence minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian said in January.

While the adaptation work of former PCB Vladivostok and Sevastopol are in progress, the second is in dry dock in Saint-Nazaire for a refit prior to her return to sea.

A hundred and eight Egyptian sailors will come to Saint-Nazaire to take over the vessels with the assistance of DCNS and STX France and DCI Navfco for tactical training. The first Egyptians should already be in the Loire estuary. They will form the implementation crews for four CTM type landing craft and two fast catamarans NG type L-CAT.

Delivery of the first Egyptian PCB is planned for early summer, before joining her sister ship to Alexandria three months later.

 

The F-35 Learning Curve: The View from Pax River

02/10/2016

2016-02-04  By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

Pax River is the home of a key F-35 Integrated Test Force (ITF), which is focused on various aspects of the sea services F-35Bs and F-35Cs.

The ITF test regime is on the airframe, and flying characteristics in modes both symmetric and asymmetric, of the Lightning II.

Another F-35 test center is at Edwards AFB and is focused on expanding the flight envelope for the F-35A variant and verifying the capabilities of the mission systems and the fusion of information in the cockpit for the Lightning II force.

Pax River ITF

One of the most underappreciated aspects about the test program is how the concurrent learning among the various test centers provides enhanced confidence and accelerates testing with all T/M/S of this new aircraft.

The cross learning from the USMC F-35B, the service’s first T/M/S to achieve IOC, to the USAF F-35A to the USN F-35C model — with the preparation of the first RAF F-35B squadron — has meant that the USN can operate its Cs more rapidly and with more confidence and capability than in a traditional single-model aircraft test program.

The developmental testing across the board at Pax is converging on the emergence of an airplane that features excellent, handling qualities.

Every F-35 pilot interviewed by the Second Line of Defense team over the past few years has commented on the stable flight characteristics of the Lighting II. This was especially being proven in the most demanding and unforgiving combat flight requirements — carrier operations in all weather and sea sates.

It was noted that just like the USMC experience with F-35B, flight stability and control for safety and ease of a vertical landing, the same man-machine interface albeit different for Carrier arrested landings, is built into the F-35C.

Consequently, the prospects for reducing initial pilot training and requalification time for experienced Naval Aviators on the basics of safe landings and take-offs —with regard to both vertical and angled deck carrier flight ops —is a noteworthy accomplishment of the F-35 design.

This eventual reduction in required training for deck and carrier qualification means more flights can be used for tactical training.

An especially important impact maybe experienced with new pilots or “nuggets,” first tour aviators, who may have a safer basic training focus on landing and take-off requirements, requiring fewer hops because the aircraft is essentially easy to fly. If this is the case, then more expanded tactical training and operational time can be built into the Training & Readiness (T&R) syllabus within the same amount of resources required by an AV-8 or an F/A-18 just to learn and also stay current.

During our visit to Pax, we had a chance to discuss the test approach, test results and thinking about the way ahead with two key members of the ITF.

The first was with Tom Briggs, F-35 Pax River ITF Air Vehicle Engineering Department Head, who has more than 25 years of naval aviation test experience and has tested aircraft during 25 different at-sea detachments.

Thomas Briggs

The second is CDR J. Ryan Murphy, the USN Director of Test and Evaluation, F-35 Naval Variants.

CDR Murphy is an F/A-18 pilot with significant operational experience — including command of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 143 — and highlights the Navy approach for test pilots to come in and out of the operational community.

CDR Ryan Murphy

F-35C Arrested Landings Tests: November 2014 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

Question: From your perspective, how have you built synergy across the broader test community?

Briggs: An underappreciated reality is that the commonality of the aircraft allows the USAF and USN test communities to work closely together in shaping the way we test. Aircraft characteristics or anomalies, which the Air Force may see first at Edwards, we can leverage and vice versa.

We do a lot of information sharing with Edwards down at the individual team level. Our propulsion testers talk with their propulsion testers. Our weapons testers coordinate with their weapons testers. Our flying qualities folks talk with their flying qualities folks. So we understand what they have seen before we go into a similar line of testing and we share flight reports.

If there’s a problem that they see, we take a look at our data to see if we have something similar. If we start to see a problem, we let them know so that they can take a look as well.

Together we leverage our testing and ensure the other capitalizes on what we’ve found.

There’s a lot of that sharing that goes on, which frankly, for me, on a Navy test site to hear regularly from an Air Force test site is a little bit remarkable. 

Together we make that work and we do our best to keep each other moving forward with our test programs.

And, that’s allowed us to take some very quick steps and very large steps during our testing.

If you take a look at the density of test points across the entire envelope versus a legacy flight test program, the F-35B and C testing is much thinner.

And, by the time the F-35A has done something, the F-35B test approach is less dense. And, by the time we do it on the C, it’s even less dense.

So the amount of data we need to gather for specification verification­ is markedly reduced by the time we’re doing it with the third variant.

The significant commonality built into the program allows for convergent ways to work the way ahead.

The electro-hydro static actuators, which work well on the A at 9Gs, work pretty well on the B and C at 7Gs.

In effect, instead of having three test programs, you have in effect something like a one and a half or twofold spread over the three variants.

And, when you look at Edwards, where the mission effectiveness testing is occurring, they fly different mixes and matches of aircraft, F-35Bs with F-35Cs and with F-35As. In a lot of cases, it’s two F-35As and an F-35B and F-35C in the mix.

So, the sensors, the communications back and forth between the aircraft, and the maturing of the software happens across multiple variants at the same time.

We are shaping joint operations from the ground up if the service cultures can embrace this change.

Question: Let us focus on the at-sea Developmental Testing done to date on the F-35C. 

CDR Murphy, you came to Pax five months ago after your most recent operational deployment. 

How would you characterize what we have seen and will see in the F-35C DT process?

CDR Murphy: For the C, when you look at DT-I, DT-II, DT-III, by and large, they are very similar to each other. What changes is aircraft, how we have the aircraft loaded.

DT-I was just the basic aircraft with no ordnance. For DT-II, we added internal stores. For DT-III, we’re going to have internal and external stores on the aircraft.

The testing you saw on DT-I and DT-II focused on the handling qualities behind the ship, landings with and without crosswind, launches with and without crosswinds, and minimum end speed catapult launches.

Those kinds of tests are going to be the same kind of tests we do on DT-III.

The difference will be that we are going to do them with a heavier aircraft with external stores.

Also, we’re not going to have a whole lot of fuel to play with because we’re carrying so much weight in ordnance.

Question: The handling qualities of the aircraft have been clearly noted by the pilots. What will be the impact of the performance gains by the aircraft in the hands of the operators?

Briggs: The flight control capabilities of the F-35 have already made it clear that the F-35B training burden should be much less than the Harrier, particularly in preparing pilots for recovery aboard ships; and with the approach handling qualities in the F-35C, there should also be less preparation required for shipboard landing with the F-35C versus the current F/A-18 platforms.

Carrier landings are demanding and require a great deal of training, with the pilot controlling the proper glide slope, line up and angle of attack.

With the F-35 control laws, the aircraft is dramatically assisting the pilot, and the pilot is now setting and monitoring the aircraft rather than controlling everything on the approach to the ship.

And, we will see how the new pilots versus more experienced pilots can benefit from these flight control capabilities built into the aircraft. 

F-35C Night Ops from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

CDR Murphy: We will see the real impacts as the airplane comes to the carrier deck.

The aircraft performs so well behind the boat, we could well see a reduction in training time with regard to flying the aircraft, especially around the carrier.

The key benefit is that as the amount of necessary training time to fly the aircraft goes down, the amount of available tactical training time goes up, which will be a significant gain for the fleet.

Question: The Navy is the last service to acquire the F-35 and has been widely perceived as dragging its feet and providing significant opposition to acquiring the aircraft. 

Does this mean that the roll out of the culture changes (of the sort you are talking about) will see a slow cycle as well?

CDR Murphy: I do not think so.

There has been a barrage of literature out there, which has not always painted the aircraft in a favorable light, and our carrier pilots read that literature.

But, as the cadre of pilots grows and the aircraft makes its way to decks of carriers, you will see significant change rapidly.

We operate air wings; meaning that when a new air system comes to an air wing, the entire air wing is affected and its culture changed.

And, since the air wing trains together and deploys together, the F-35 will become ingrained as part of that air wing very rapidly.

Other Navy air wings will look at this experience and competitively seek to be as good or better than the last air wing that operated the F-35.

Peer pressure is a powerful learning tool.

Question: Although the F-35 represents a very new capability, it stands on the back of what has been done in the past, and harvests the results of significant work from before and operational achievements of earlier air systems. 

How do you view this aspect of the learning curve?

Briggs: You have hit upon an important point.

The handling characteristics of the aircraft are unprecedented.

Its flight controls scheme and the amount of automation are re-shaping the pilot’s role, allowing them to focus on the tactical and strategic aspects of their mission, rather than on how they control the aircraft to be in the right part of the sky at the right time, or how they will recover aboard a pitching carrier at night.

We are where we are because the F-35 program has leveraged the development work of programs like the A-12 and the Navy’s MAGIC CARPET initiative, as well as the significant investments in risk reduction that were made early in the F-35 program.

The investments in risk reduction during the concept demonstration phase of the program and the final aircraft, which are now being built, has been significant.

And these investments are paying off in the robustness of the F-35B lift fan and propulsion system, in the precision of the flight control system, and other key elements that make this a very effective aircraft from a flying characteristic point of view.

Question: The Navy seems to rotate the test pilots here from operational squadrons into the test program.

How important is that?

CDR Murphy: Very important.

From a test perspective, having recent operational experience allows a test pilot to tie any aircraft deficiencies directly to the impact that deficiency might have on the mission.

When test pilots rotate back to the fleet, they take with them the knowledge and experience they have gained working on their particular program, in this case the F-35.

This provides a basis of knowledge in the fleet and assists in the introduction of the aircraft.

It’s amazing the difference between a Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander test pilot traveling from Pax River to an operational air station and talking to people about the F-35 as opposed to even that same Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander who is now a part of an operational squadron talking about flying the F-35.

To many young pilots who have not reached the end of their first operational tour, that operational Lieutenant or Lieutenant Commander has a lot more credibility as a squadron pilot than he did six months earlier when he came down from Pax River, even though it is the same person.

For the first piece published from our 2016 visit to Pax River, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/the-emergence-of-the-f-35c-and-its-impact-the-view-from-pax-river/

Interviews done during our 2011 visit to Pax River:

https://sldinfo.com/fly-testing-the-f-35-a-building-block-approach/

https://sldinfo.com/the-f-35-mission-systems-a-game-changer-viewed-from-pax-river/

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-the-f-35-maintenance-approach/

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-f-35b-and-f35-c-testing/

https://sldinfo.com/the-f-35-pilot/

The slideshow highlights F-35B ship integration testing in May 2015.

The first video shows F-35C arrested landings aboard the USS Nimitz during DT-1 and is credited to the US Navy.

The second video shows U.S. Navy sailors conduct night flight operations with the F-35C Lightning II carrier variant joint strike fighter aboard USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69).

The aircraft, assigned to the Salty Dogs of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX 23), are aboard the aircraft carrier for the second phase of at-sea Developmental Testing (DT-II).

Credit: Navy Media Content Services:10/8/15

The UK at Pax River: Integrated, Innovative and Creating 21st Century Airpower

2016-02-04 By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

Our visit to the Pax River Integrated Test Force (ITF) concluded with an interview with two members of the British contingent of the ITF, along with a senior U.S. test engineer — which, in itself, was a demonstration of how the ITF works as the UK is an equal partner in an integrated team effort.

UK Pilots and engineers contribute to the overall roll out of capability for the F-35 program, as well as the U.S. contributing to a number of aspects of the UK F-35B roll out as well.

In addition to the obvious leveraging of cost efficient synergy, all F-35 pilots and test engineers being present at the source of engineering and flight test challenges avoids miscommunication and any lag time of important two-way information. It is a partnership wisely forged to deliver the best and safest aircraft for combat.

And, it is a harbinger of continued success for the concurrent development of the global F-35 combat enterprise.

What was striking about the day was the significant gap between the working reality of the dedicated professionals in the F-35 program, including test pilots putting their life on the line every flight, and the world only a few miles away inside the Beltway. At Pax, the F-35 is moving rapidly to becoming a 21st century combat reality.

Many cubical commandoes have made a career using second order interlocking google searches that are essentially hypothetical opinion pieces with no actual research to comment on the F-35. The vast amount of ‘literature” discussing the plane has little or nothing to do with the reality at Pax and all the actual tactical flying going on at many military airfields where the F-35 fleet can be found.

It should be noted that the F-35 program is reaching the 50,000 flight hours threshold worldwide.

And in 2015, the Pax River ITF flew 628 flights, 994.4 flight hours, and performed 4,744 test points.

What has been missed is the success of this new approach and a revolutionary tactical aircraft with the best cockpit information fusion system in the world shaping the way ahead.

Key elements, now being realized, that were built into the program to drive effective capability evolution going forward have been simply ignored or disdainfully and ignorantly mocked in print.

The ITF at Pax is a case in point whereby the cross learning is significant; and the cross learning with Edwards — as well as squadrons elsewhere — a key driver in innovation.

Pax River ITF

The F-35 as it evolves its software, and its ability to shape a more integrated combat capability in the extended battlespace is about a 21st century “no platform fights alone” capability; it is not about getting ever more proficient in yesterday’s tactics, and systems; it is about a generational leap.

The ITF at Pax understands this and is a key driver for such change.

The future is in good hands if the quality of the three members of the ITF interviewed about UK developments is any measure of the way ahead.

The first member of the discussion about UK engagement was with Gordon Stewart, UK MoD engineer, with significant Harrier experience and a key participant in recent ski jump testing.

The second member was Squadron Leader Andy “Gary” Edgell, RAF Test Pilot, who is an experienced Harrier pilot and extensively involved in the F-35B and F-35C testing process.

Sqdrn Ldr Andy Edgell

The third member was Tom Briggs, who was part of an earlier group of interviews, and is the F-35 Pax River ITF Air Vehicle Chief Test Engineer, who works closely with the Brits in shaping the capability that will fly to the UK in the form of the first IOC UK squadron in 2018.

Thomas Briggs

As we have noted earlier, the UK is shaping its first operational squadron in the US, which will then fly to the UK in 2018 in time for the Queen Elizabeth sea trials. At the same time, the UK is building out its UK infrastructure to move forward as a key element of what will eventually become a European F-35 air enterprise.

In blunt terms, this means that the UK will have its aircraft at least three years earlier than if relied simply on building its own infrastructure and then generating an operational squadron from that infrastructure. This is a factor, which is largely ignored by the critics of the program.

Question: How does the ITF work from a UK point of view?

Gordon Stewart: “Let me speak to my case.

I am employed by QinetiQ, but I am working here on behalf of the UK Ministry of Defence.

At the ITF, there around 900 people working here with the vast majority being U.S. Around 2/3s of the work force are contractors, and a third is government, and within that mix there are a number of UK nationals.

The UK is the only level one partner in the F-35 program, which means that we are more closely involved in the test phase of the program than other partners.

And, in my case, I work as a Flying Qualities (FQ) engineer on the 30-40 person FQ team as an integrated member.

As FQ engineers, we look at things like flight control laws and how the pilot interacts with those controls and what the aircraft feels like to fly in a wide range of conditions.

Where we do identify issues as we expand into new areas of the flight envelope, we work closely with the control law designers in Fort Worth to have those issues resolved.

We deal with the software that relates to flight controls, and those systems feeding data into the flight controls from the mission systems. Things like how the aircraft is going to get information from the ship as to where it is, what direction it is going, or how fast it is going.

There are pieces of that which feed into the flight controls to help with recovering the aircraft to the ship and making that whole process safer, and more effective.”

Question: The UK is making a joint investment in development and your role is to have a foot in both camps so to speak. 

You deal directly with the UK airworthiness certification process as well from the standpoint of being dual hatted within the ITF?

Gordon Stewart: “Part of my job is operating in the same role as the US personnel. This gives me the benefit of direct involvement in the program at a working level, and allows the ITF team here to benefit from my UK STOVL test experience.

At the same time, my engagement here helps the UK process, for when the UK-based airworthiness team has a question back in the UK, we are often able to provide answers based on our unique position here within the ITF.

I was involved with the DT-II Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing (STOVL) testing aboard USS Wasp and in the preparations for STOVL DT-III this fall. This type of UK involvement in US ship trials allows us to feed our experience into the planning for UK First of Class Flight Trials on HMS Queen Elizabeth.”

Question: The integrated part of the F-35 effort is often ignored. 

How would you describe the approach to integration in the test team at Pax River?

Gordon Stewart: “This is the most integrated test team I have ever worked on.

As we work the way ahead, it might be a UK person, a Lockheed person, or a US government person who provides the best solution. It is a very well integrated team at the working level.

It is a very different test process than in the past, although what is happening in the F-35 program is the way we are approaching the future as well. In the past, there was much more serial testing.

Twenty years ago when I first started, the contractor would do something and then throw it over the fence to the government, which would look at it, approve it and then pass it on to the operator.

Now with the pace of technology, and the role of software, we have a much more integrated process. We are shaping the evolution of the aircraft as it goes out the door as well.

At Pax, we are testing a software version ahead or a couple ahead of what the fleet is getting at the moment. In effect, we are testing the next iteration of the aircraft.

And the Edwards and Beaufort efforts provide important pieces to the evolution as well. We have an integrated RAF and Royal Navy team at Edwards. 17 (R) squadron at Edwards is a mix of RAF and RN.

At Beaufort, we have a UK team and one of our aircraft, and we are working closely with the USMC. That is another key element of the joint integrated effort, from our point of view.”

Question: You are part of the F-35B process as well as the coming of the new UK carrier. 

What changes involved with the ship affect the F-35B and how does the F-35B handling process affect the ship? 

This question was discussed by both Gordon Stewart and Squadron Leader Edgell and they focused on four key elements.

First, the handling qualities of the aircraft are so dramatically different from the Harrier that they could approach ship operations very differently.

Rather than being heavily focused on flying the airplane, they could focus upon the mission.

Squadron Leader Edgell: “I can still remember vividly a Harrier flight from HMS Illustrious in really rough sea conditions where I launched to conduct 1v1 training with the Typhoon.

As I was fighting the Typhoon, the whole time, in the back of my mind, I was thinking of the difficulties that awaited me when recovering to the carrier.

My mind was not fully on the task of fighting the Typhoon because I was concerned with the challenges that lay ahead.

With the F-35B, this problem is significantly ameliorated. The whole confidence factor of getting home safely is just another step in the generational jump provided by this aircraft.”

Second, the U.S. was building the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) as the ship-air integration pairing system; the Brits were building in a new system, the Bedford Array Landing System, onboard the carriers, to work with the F-35 man-machine system, to enhance the safety and effectiveness of landing at sea.  

Squadron Leader Edgell: “The Bedford Array Landing System is a formation of lights embedded within the deck.

When the ship is pitching, then the system compensates by changing which lights are illuminated so that from the pilot’s perspective he has a fixed aim point for landing.

But, in reality, the aim point is actually moving up and down the deck.”

Third, the UK carrier and its ski jump provided a way to better use deck space.

Gordon Stewart: “The ski jump offers improved take off performance compared to a flat deck take off.

For a heavily loaded jet, this translates into a shorter deck run or lower wind over deck requirements, which offers the ship flexibility in how the deck is used.”

Fourth, based on all of the above, the UK was very successfully pioneering SRVL or Shipboard Rolling Vertical Landings.

Squadron Leader Edgell: “Normally, RVL (a slow speed, fixed glidepath approach in the semi-jetborne flight regime) is a land-based recovery option. Historically, when we took Harriers back to a ship, we recovered via a vertical landing, which is purely jetborne flight.

Given the culmination of various qualities of the F-35B, we can now conduct semi-jetborne rolling vertical landings onto the carrier, known as Shipborne RVLs. Using the additional airflow over the wing, and the subsequent gain in lift, this approach provides flexibility in operations due to the extra ‘bring back’ – a term given to payload returning to the carrier vice jettisoning prior to recovery.”

We then returned to the earlier discussion of the ITF approach and its future.

But, prior to that we asked Tom Briggs to clarify what has become almost the holy writ for some analysts, namely, that the F-35B engine is a showstopper for the decks of the ships on which it will land, because of the impact of engine heat on the deck.

Briggs: “We have focused on this from the beginning and it is clearly not a show stopper — and, at this point, not even a serious issue.

When we were on the first sea trials aboard the Wasp there was deck degradation from a hot engine, but that engine belonged to the Osprey. The landing was not perfect, so there was some deck scorching from the Osprey engine.

It’s not that the F-35B engine is not putting out a lot of heat; it is.

But, in part, the flight control system and the propulsion system are controlling that output and reducing the amount of time you’re exposing heat onto the flight deck.”

The next DT test will focus in part on the F-35B and its flying qualities in terms of operations in higher sea states and difficult sea operating conditions.

Gordon Stewart: From a purely handling point of view, we expect this aircraft to operate much better than the Harrier in returning to the ship in difficult sea states.

We expect to have better systems to guide you back to the ship and to get you on there more safely and effectively.”

The F-35 integrated test approach is both a glimpse of the future as well as a foundation for that future.

The fusion cockpit of the aircraft, as well as the integration of the fleet and its impact and its ability to extend the reach of the carrier as part of integrated operations, provides a challenge to reshape the testing approach going forward.

 

According to Briggs: “So we’re getting at F-35 now.

But, if you take a look at some of the initiatives that are going on with the integrated warfare capabilities, and how you are going to marry up its sensors, its fusion engine, how you stimulate it, how it responds, and how you integrate them into a network architecture — that is where we are going.

It is not an in and of itself aircraft.

It is a significant network enabler.

In the test community, and for the F-35 this is mostly at Edwards, we are taking a look at how the aircraft, the ship, the satellites are responding, communicating, talking, displaying. There is a lot of effort going on in that. The Navy’s spent a fair amount in their network integrated warfare capability.”

And, it should be noted that the next partner to benefit from Pax River for its F-35 program will be Italy.

Recently, Italy flew its second Italian built F-35, known as AL-2.

February 4, its mate AL-1 will fly across the Atlantic fueled by an Italian KC-767A tanker to Pax River for further testing.

This is just another example of the collaborative approach built into the F-35 program.

Editor’s Note: What the Pax River testers are doing is concurrent testing, not serial testing. As the testers made clear throughout the visit, this is the way ahead, not going back to serial testing.

Secretary Wynne made this point during a visit to Eglin AFB in the fall of 2013.

After his presentation to the leadership of the 33rd Fighter Wing, Secretary Wynne was asked to discuss the challenge of what is called concurrency. The answer by Wynne provided one of the best understandings of the reality of the approach taken in the modern aerospace industry.

There would have to be concurrency no matter when you started the process. 

Because we tend, in industry, to hire to a very tight line; enough to get the job done; but not enough to be accused of introducing an overrun. As a result, we do not see the funding to the full up line that industry would like to maximize efficiencies. 

And industry will not put people on until they get slightly behind schedule. This is because we’re so worried about people cutting the program back, as the start is usually contentious, and up the line customers threaten to leave us high and dry and having to lay off a bunch of recently hired people.  

And the other thing is one does not discover many problems until we get later in the program. The top-level design is roughly perfect; with the devil in the details. This is called integration. 

Concurrency tends to sway like a pendulum of a clock from we want to involve the users early because we want the user feedback, and we want the engineers to get beat up and understand that they screwed up in the design. This is called direct feedback.

But you can’t get that if you wait, wait, wait, wait, and then have the tests and all your engineers have gone onto other projects, and they never actually meet the user because we waited so long. 

And then the other side of it is, if you waited, would you really have solved that problem?  

I don’t know.  

It is a question of balance. Every program manager is going to be subject to demands to meet the IOC as quickly as possible versus counter demands that they should’ve waited and fed in changes to airplanes number one through twenty before going operational. Only when top leadership takes overt possession of the Program Manager’s (PM’s) dilemma is it called concurrency. 

We will always want to feed in the air changes to airplanes one through twenty.  

But doing development without deployment guarantees you will not have a new asset out there reshaping capability. 

It also guarantees that the impact on operations will be shaped by testers, and not by operators.  

https://sldinfo.com/understanding-concurrency-secretary-wynne-discusses-with-the-33rd-fighter-wing/

We have focused on the coming of the Queen Elizabeth and the F-35B as well as UK and USMC stand up of capabilities.

For some earlier pieces see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/the-royal-navy-and-the-royal-air-force-prepare-for-cross-domain-transformation-the-f-35-and-the-queen-elizabeth-carrier/

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-a-new-combat-capability-for-21st-century-operations-the-coming-of-the-f-35b-to-the-new-british-carrier/

https://sldinfo.com/new-british-carriers-working-with-the-usn-usmc-team-to-redefine-the-air-enabled-insertion-force/

https://sldinfo.com/preparing-the-f-35b-for-hms-queen-elizabeth-ski-jump-testing/

https://sldinfo.com/a-tale-of-three-carriers/

https://sldinfo.com/visiting-the-hms-queen-elizabeth-the-transformation-of-british-projection-forces/

https://sldinfo.com/royal-air-force-operations-and-evolving-concepts-of-operations-shaping-a-triple-transition/

https://sldinfo.com/the-f35-global-enterprise-and-sustainability-the-perspective-of-the-raaf-and-the-raf/

Editor’s Note: A special thanks goes to Ed Timperlake in this and many other interviews for bringing his squadron experience and flight experience as a Naval Aviator who is both carrier qualified and also his Phase 1, SATS LSO (short airfield for tactical support landing signals officer) experience into the interviews, and creating a ready room experience, which highlights the significant impact which the squadron pilots play in airpower innovation.

For the first two pieces published from our 2016 visit to Pax River, see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/the-emergence-of-the-f-35c-and-its-impact-the-view-from-pax-river/

https://sldinfo.com/the-f-35-learning-curve-the-view-from-pax-river/

Interviews done during our 2011 visit to Pax River:

https://sldinfo.com/fly-testing-the-f-35-a-building-block-approach/

https://sldinfo.com/the-f-35-mission-systems-a-game-changer-viewed-from-pax-river/

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-the-f-35-maintenance-approach/

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-f-35b-and-f35-c-testing/

https://sldinfo.com/the-f-35-pilot/

The ski jump is a feature on UK warships which have operated the Harrier and will operate the F-35B. The joint UK-US test team at Pax River has completed the first test of the ski jump for the F-35B.

In the slideshow, there are three glimpses of the ski jump as used by the British.

The first shows it in use during USMC harrier certifications in 2007 aboard the HMS Illustrious, which also saw the first landing on a foreign warship of the Osprey.

The second shows the ski jump aboard the HMS Queen Elizabeth.

The third, fourth and fifth shows the first launch of the F-35B off of a ski jump at the Pax River test facility.

The sixth photo shows the F-35B taking off from the USS Wasp without a ski jump.

The ski jump provides an advantage for launching with more weight and with less-end speed.

The final photo shows an RAF F-35B at MCAS Beaufort with Squadron Leader Hugh Nichols.

Special thanks goes to Sylvia Pierson, the F-35 Pax River ITF PAO for setting up the interviews and working the review process.

 

 

The Emergence of the F-35C and Its Impact: The View from Pax River

02/07/2016

2016-02-04 By Ed Timperlake and Robbin Laird

In a visit to Pax River on January 8, 2015, we had a chance to talk with members of the Integrated Test Team at Pax River, which includes Marines, Navy, Brits and civilians as well as contractors.

This team is wringing out the F-35C from the standpoint of its ability to operate on the carrier. The team looks at flying characteristics not the mission systems, which are tested at Edwards AFB.

Because the Navy pilots involved in the testing rotate from operational combat squadrons, discussions with them highlight the coming impact of the F-35C on the air wing as well.

They can discuss with expert authority the culture gap between the F-35C and the Hornet, the 4th Gen fighter/strike aircraft currently operational in all USN Carrier Air Wings.

As test pilots, having gone through very vigorous school and fleet operational experiences, they are uniquely qualified to understand the dynamics of change associated with the coming of the USN F-35 Lighting II into the fleet.

On this visit, we engaged with USN Test Pilots.

Our last visit was to engage with the USMC Test Pilots flying the F-35B. It should be noted that both Navy and Marine aviators wear the same Navy Wings of gold, and Marines —in addition to flying the F-35B — will also have USMC squadrons of F-35Cs on board Navy carriers.

Pax River ITF

In this interview, we had a chance to discuss the results to date and the way ahead with LCDR Daniel “Tonto” Kitts, a VX-23 Test Pilot who is working on F-35C carrier suitability.

“Tonto” is now working as a test pilot focusing on carrier suitability, but he also has significant operational experience with the “Rhino,” otherwise known as the Super Hornet.

He was the det officer-in-charge (OIC) for the second phase of carrier landing testing in CVN DT-II and is preparing for CVN DT-III later this year.

LCDR Daniel Kitts

Also participating in the interview was CDR Theodore “Dutch” Dyckman, a fleet combat pilot and now a VX-23 Test Pilot and the Pax River ITF Operations Officer.

CDR Dyckman flew in both DT-I and DT-II and is preparing for DT-III later this year.

CDR Ted Dutch Dyckman

We discussed a wide range of issues, which demonstrated the breadth of knowledge and experience of these two pilots, but the interview presented here focused on the demonstrated flying qualities of the F-35C and the perceived impact of those capabilities on carrier qualifications and operations.

We also touched on the significant gap between their experience and the broad perception that the Navy is reluctant to become an F-35 force, which is most definitely not true for these experienced combat pilots.

Question: Carrier landings are challenging. 

They are dangerous and require a lot of training to get them right and to enhance the safety of the pilot, the crews, and the ship. 

In fact, during the Vietnam War, there were tests done of carrier pilots’ heart rates which we actually higher when landing on a carrier than when being shot at over Hanoi. 

How does the F-35 affect the landing challenges associated with trap and cat operations?

Answer: The plane flies very well.

The flying qualities are excellent and the machine systems built into the plane significantly enhance the ease of landing and taking off from the carrier.

Basically with the F-35 you get your mission cross-check time back.

Normally once you start the approach your scan is solely meatball, line up, and angle of attack. Your mission cross-check time behind the ship is zero because you’re just doing that scan.

With the F-35 and its enhanced flight controls and superb handling, the aircraft doesn’t deviate much from the desired flight path, which greatly eases the workload on the ball and frees up your scan.

It almost makes flying the ball a relaxing task.

Question: Ease of flying can clearly translate not just into safety but training time. 

What do you see as the impact? 

Answer: Before you go to the boat, everything stops in the squadron.

All training stops two to three weeks where all you’re doing is banging left-hand turns.

No one is doing any tactical training.

Everyone’s bandwidth is concerned with how they are landing at the ship.

Once you’ve been out on the ship for a few days and the landings are looking better, then finally you can start working on what we want to work on again tactically.

Where you’ve just taken a pause from all your tactical performance for the past nearly month, that’s going to go away with the F-35, which will allow you to be dedicated to your tactical performance.

Question: Clearly, the Super Hornet is an excellent airplane, but the F-35 is a very different aircraft with a different approach to air system operations. 

How do you see the F-35 affecting tactical training? 

Answer: With the current air wing (i.e, with the Super Hornet and Hornet as the tip of the spear), we are wringing out our tactics for a tactical advantage, which is also, at the same time, at the edge of the envelope for survival.

We are spending a lot of time making sure that we have the right tactics and the mastery of those tactics by pilots to survive and succeed.

It is about keeping a level of competence and capability where you’re not going to die.

There are points where you have a twenty second window.

You miss that window and you might be blown up.

When you’re traveling at those speeds, we are talking really only a couple of seconds that you have.

And, if you’re not performing tactics exactly as they’re prescribed, you put yourself in a kill zone.

With the F-35, we are jumping a generation in tactics and now looking at the expanded battlespace where we can expand our impact and effect.

You need to take a generational leap so we are the ones not playing catch up with our adversaries.

Question: Admiral Manazir talks about shaping greater reach for the carrier and your point is that with the coming of the F-35 your tactics will change? 

Answer: That is correct and the air wings will rapidly recognize the impact as they get their squadrons of F-35s.

They will put in the rear view mirror all of the uninformed comments made by many people who do not know the aircraft and what it can do.

And what we see as testers will proliferate rapidly in the fleet as squadron pilots see the impact on their lethality and survivability.

https://sldinfo.com/the-sea-services-prepare-to-prevail-in-the-extended-battlespace-an-interview-with-rear-admiral-manazir/

http://www.sldinfo.com/the-sea-services-transform-their-reach-punch-and-impact-in-the-extended-battlespace/

Question: There clearly is a cultural challenge in the Navy in making the transition. 

How do you view this transition as working out?

Answer: Navy leadership is clearly leading the charge, people like Admiral Manazir and other leaders.

Naval Aviation is clearly focused on integrated warfighting in the expanded battlespace.

The F-35 is a key part of that focus.

The air wings are not yet a key part of that transition, but when the planes get to the squadron, change will happen more rapidly than many people think.

Already, the first training squadron of F-35s came to Fallon for an exercise and that was an eye opener for Fallon.

The knowledge is there inside the Navy.

And, equally important, is getting it down to the user to understand what the airplane is going to do and to accept what’s already been designed to do.

That is the challenge.

Editor’s Note: There is another aspect of the impact of fifth generation systems on pilots, notably the new pilots who come directly into fifth generation systems.

A key point was made about an Aussie F-22 exchange pilot who is an experienced F/A-18 operator.

For RAAF Fighter Pilot Matthew Harper, the systems in the fifth generation aircraft, which take a giant leap forward with the F-35, provide the pilot with a decision making role, not an overburdened “look at your screens” and sort out what to do role. 

He summarized the impact that he saw with three key examples: 

First, within the first 30 minutes of sitting down in the simulator, he grasped that his ability to dominate the air space with the F-22 was clear. 

Second, the abilities of the pilots are significantly augmented with fifth generation capabilities.  He cited a recent example where a USAF pilot with only 350 total flight hours flew in Red Flag and dominated his airspace. For Harper, this would be virtually impossible to imagine in any other plane. 

Third, he cited the experience of a USAF F-15C pilot who told him: 

“I have more SA with only 20 hours on the F-22A than I ever had with over 1500 hours on the F-15C.” 

The overarching point of the presentation was that the fifth generation experience was about disruptive change, not evolution.  You needed to get into the fifth generation platform to experience the change and learn how to shape tactics and concepts of operations relevant to 21st century operations, rather than perfecting your 20th century piloting skills. 

He went out of his way to compare the Super Hornet to the F-22A with a core focus on how the former was NO WAY the later. Whereas the F-22A was an SA and information dominance machine, the Super Hornet was a classic aircraft which had the limitations of any airplane not built from the ground up to be an information dominance aircraft for the 21st century battlespace. 

While the Super Hornet is a significant upgrade from the Hornet, it is not and never will be able to deliver what a fifth generation aircraft can deliver: integrated data fusion and re-shaping the pilot and squadron roles in prosecuting air dominance and support to the joint force in the battlespace. 

In short, the leap ahead is crucial; and reworking the culture of the RAAF will be necessary to leverage the disruptive technology built into fifth generation aircraft.

https://sldinfo.com/an-raaf-f-22-pilot-explains-the-dramatic-shift-to-fifth-generation/

Interviews done during our 2011 visit to Pax River:

https://sldinfo.com/fly-testing-the-f-35-a-building-block-approach/

https://sldinfo.com/the-f-35-mission-systems-a-game-changer-viewed-from-pax-river/

https://sldinfo.com/shaping-the-f-35-maintenance-approach/

https://sldinfo.com/an-update-on-f-35b-and-f35-c-testing/

https://sldinfo.com/the-f-35-pilot/

The slideshow highlights activities during DT-1 aboard the Nimitz and planes flown by CDR Dyckman are seen in operation. 

The video shows activities during DT-2 last fall aboard the Eisenhower.