Plan Jericho: John Blackburn Explains the RAAF Approach at the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
05/11/2015

2015-04-29 John Blackburn retired as an Air Vice-Marshal in the Royal Australian Air Force in 2008 and has been involved in a number of strategic issues since then in Australia.

He is currently the Deputy Chairman of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, an Australian think tank focused on Air Power. In his Reservist capacity, he was tasked by the current Chief of Staff of the RAAF, Air Marshal Geoff Brown, to help standup what Brown calls Plan Jericho.

He has worked on this effort for the past 12 months, and the Plan has been launched and even more importantly the process to achieve a transformation.

As Blackburn explained at the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium on April 17, 2015, the idea behind the effort is pretty straightforward, namely, to leverage the coming of the F-35 as a trigger for transformation for the modernizing RAAF fleet.

Rather than just waiting for the coming of a fifth generation aircraft, the Aussies are looking to reshape the force to become a more integrated, lethal force enabled by vastly improved, shared, situational awareness and targeted decision making able to operate effectively in the challenging environments in which they operate. It is about a step change in the ability to operate as an integrated team across the Australian Defence Force and in Coalition operations.

The RAAF considers the F-35 in the terms, which Lt. Col. Berke has described, an entirely new type of aircraft, but its impact comes not simply from being a new type of aircraft but providing enhanced situational awareness, decision-making and spectrum dominance.

And the full value of the plane simply will not come by operating by itself as some sort of silver bullet, but operating in an effective manner with the other new platforms and with legacy systems which are themselves becoming shaped for 21st century operations.

In part, the challenge is to get past the replacement platform mentality.

The core air platforms have been or are being replaced but the task is not simply to learn the new platform and prepare for the next one in a narrowly defined functional area – fighter is a fighter, tanker is a tanker, a lifter is a lifter, an air battle manager is an air battle manger and so on down the 20th century species list – but to shape cross platform capabilities and to reshape how battle management, operations and warfare is conducted.

This is challenging for a small air force, which is already taxed in learning how to operate new platforms, and get them into operations.

The notion of preparing for the introduction of the F-35 and cross platform innovation will be evolved by testing new approaches to using other new platforms and leveraging them as well in new ways PRIOR to the F-35 becoming the dominant fighter in the RAAF.

For example, the RAAF Super Hornets operating in the Middle East have changed aspects of how they operate as they worked with F-22s in operations.

John Blackburn presenting at the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium, April 17, 2015. Credit: The Williams Foundation
John Blackburn presenting at the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium, April 17, 2015. Credit: The Williams Foundation

Or, the Wedgetail is an innovation battle management platform, but it is not about simply providing a 21st century upgrade on AWACS it is about managing the battlespace differently with various domains in operations, and testing ways to do battle management differently with the KC-30A tanker and the Hornets and Super Hornets.

They aim to find ways to shape distributed operational capabilities before the F-35 a trigger for a new model of 21st century distributed operations.

It is not about waiting for change to occur; it is about transforming with the coming of the trigger force, the F-35, and other key elements as well such as the Triton.

At the heart of the challenge is to shape a narrative, which gains wide acceptance in the Australian Defence Force and resonates with the public.

It is not about adding silver bullet capability for future fights.

Shaping a fifth generation warfare narrative and driving transformation are closely connected.

The narrative is not just an abstraction but describes a universe of innovation populated by cross-platform transformation.

The Chief of the RAAF starts with underscoring how the F-35 impacts on the pilots.

He has identified the following 5th Gen Implications for the pilot:

Sensors require little if any manual manipulation;

Fused picture is presented to the pilot on a single display;

Inter-flight comm is significantly reduced;

Pilot has more brain-space to be a tactician rather than a sensor operator and data fuser

Faster and more accurate decisions

Massive generational leap in Situational Awareness

Ability to forward plan and allocate resources pre-emptively.

He then moves from this and asks about its implications then for the force:

In particular, “the Chief has focused on the 5th Gen Implications for Air Battle Management and has concluded:

  • We need a generational change in the ISR, network and Comms systems and other capabilities that will support the F-35 is we are to get the most out of the aircraft’s capabilities …
  • We must continue to think about and analyze how we employ all of our air combat systems as a system of systems in our regional security setting and within the rapidly changing technological environment.”

For Air Marshal Brown, the task for Plan Jericho is about combat innovation and not just about a new airplane, but what that plane and the innovation in the RAAF associated with the plane might mean for the Australian Navy and Army as well?

The question he posed to launch Plan Jericho is simply: What is a 5th Gen / 5th Gen enabled Force?

For the Chief this is clearly a Force with: vastly improved shared situational awareness, the ability to operate as an integrated team and the term is a lever for joint integration in 21st century combat conditions and adapted to a 21st century strategic environment.”

The formal definition of Plan Jericho has been laid out in an official publication earlier this year and the way to understand it is as follows:

“Plan Jericho is Air Force’s plan to transform into a fully integrated force that is capable of fighting and winning in the information age.

Jericho Vision: To develop a future force that is agile and adaptive, fully immersed in the information age, and truly joint.

This is not the final plan, but rather the first step to meet our challenge of transformation for the future.

In many ways, the ecosystem which synergistically interacts with the coming and evolution of the F-35 global fleet (as Lt. Col. Berke put it) is what plan Jericho is all about: how do we create an effective 21st century combat ecosystem leveraging the F-35 but within which the other platforms find their proper place in a reset or transformed combat force?

The Dutch Air Force focuses on Air Force 3.0; the Marines on the F-35 reshaping the MAGTF, and the Aussies have launched Project Jericho.

It is not simply about buying a replacement aircraft.

It is about changing the mental furniture and reshaping the way the force operates.

This is easier said than done, something Blackburn is acutely aware of having been part of earlier RAAF processes of change.

The focus cannot be simply on top down directives or change, or simply having a transformation office handing out mandates for change.

It has to come from the 06 and O5 leaders and it needs to come from the operators and not just the self-styled strategic thinkers.

John Blackburn visiting the European Air Group prior to the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium. Credit: Second Line of Defense
John Blackburn visiting the European Air Group prior to the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium. Credit: Second Line of Defense 

It is about unblocking opportunities, which can be found throughout the force; it can come only from the rising generation committing themselves to change and shepherding change throughout the RAAF. It is about defining a vector rather than a detailed plan.

To do so, the Jericho team has been established with two 06s or Colonels who are working the relationships within the RAAF and across the Australian Defence Force to support the Chief’s approach.

They have been pulled from operational responsibilities for a period as co-chairs of the effort, and given time to talk to others in the RAAF and to think.

And to assist in the effort, a new Air Warfare Centre is being established to facilitate dialogue on practical opportunities for innovation and change, in part along the lines of the RAF Air Warfare Centre, which means its is about combat operations as much as it is about pure airpower innovation.

Not surprisingly, when the RAAF searched for innovative thinking from allies and industry, not a lot has been easily found.

So the effort itself will need to trigger that kind of change.

In part, that is why Blackburn and the Williams Foundation were in Copenhagen to drive the debate about the future of airpower, and to be able to present with the core partner whom they recognize as going through a very similar thought process, namely the USMC.

To shape a way ahead, Blackburn discussed a four-part process, which is highly overlapping and highly interactive.

The first step is to develop a fifth generation “narrative” to explain the opportunity that the JSF provides as a basis for a 5th generation enabled force concept.

The second step is develop a high level 5th generating enabled air operations architecture with concrete examples for fifth generation concepts of operations, for example a new approach to air battle management.

The third step is to develop individual capability roadmaps based on existing plans that will identify gaps and disconnects with a 5th generation concept of operations.

The fourth step is to identify critical joint integrators and enablers; to identify impact s of delays to integrators and enablers on fifth generational capability and to prioritize integrators and enablers based on capability impacts.

It is clear that the RAAF is providing an innovative challenge to allied air forces, and clearly will be a lever for change across the Pacific, in the United States, Europe and the Middle East.

And certainly the standing up of the global F-35 fleet will provide an important opportunity for proliferating the RAAF innovation effort.

Editor’s Note: John Blackburn visited the RAF and the European Air Group while in England prior to the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium.

 

 

Australian Minister of Defence Embraces Fifth Generation Warfare Concept

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2015-05-11  The Royal Australian Air Force has launched a transformation approach called Plan Jericho.

The Chief of Staff has underscored that for this to work, the entire defense approach needs to embrace change under the influence of fifth generation warfare capabilities.

Apparently, the Minister of Defence agrees with this approach.

In a speech delivered at the end of March 2015, he argued that with regard to the development of the Australian future surface fleet:

The 2015 Defence White Paper, to be released later this year, will provide a costed, affordable and enduring plan to achieve Australia’s defence and national security objectives.

The White Paper is being developed in a considered and methodical manner and will reflect the Government’s strategic, national security, fiscal and broader policy priorities.

It will outline a strategy for securing Australia’s strategic interests in the period to 2035 and beyond.

The White Paper will align defence policy with a clear military strategy and a credible, affordable and properly funded ADF structure designed to achieve that policy:

•     it will set out the strategic objectives that the Government expects Defence to be able to carry out

•     which will be underpinned by a fully-costed Force Structure Review

•     and the Government will ensure Defence is properly funded to meet these objectives.

Most importantly, it will propose options for the force structure that ensure the capabilities that enable modern joint operations, such as surveillance, communications and logistics infrastructure, are robust and resilient.

Succeeding in the future operating environment will depend on more than just high-end capabilities.

It’s the ability to integrate and share information between platforms and systems in a timely manner that will make the ADF a truly fifth generation force and one will give us a distinct edge over many other countries.

http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/2015/03/31/minister-for-defence-aspi-australias-future-surface-fleet-conference/

 

 

Integrating Innovative Airpower: A Report from the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

On April 17, 2015, two of our partners, the Williams Foundation (Australia) and the Centre for Military Studies (University of Copenhagen) hosted a seminar in Copenhagen on airpower innovation.

In this Special Report, an overview to the Symposium as well as the speaker’s presentations are highlighted and summarized.

Related material published on Second Line of Defense augments the focus on coalition operations is also included.

The conference launched a significant effort to think through the core problem of coalition airpower as seen from the standpoint of the smaller powers or air forces, or in the case of the United States, the role of the USMC in working through transformation correlated with evolving coalition approaches.

Operators from key Air Forces gave the core presentations that then drove the broader discussion.

It is no accident that one key element of USMC evolution is new approaches to C2 with allies, being developed by the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, and their approach is indicative of the way the Marines think about the role of embedded airpower.

The Marine Corps approach is widely appreciated by allies as they think through their own relations to coalition operations, notably given the impact of airpower modernization, including the broader use of fifth generation capabilities.

Although a small country, Denmark has optimized its military forces to be one of the most expeditionary in today’s Europe.

In fact, Denmark has a core coalition operational competence, one that is of growing significance as operations become increasingly coalition in character.

Airpower and intervention forces are increasingly modular and scalable.

Denmark has modular and scalable forces in its DNA.

The conference was clearly not about applying lessons learned by other powers being to Denmark; it was an honest quest to understand how to reshape forces to be more effective as modular and scalable building blocks for future coalitions, notably as capabilities are being reshaped under the influence of new technologies, such as the broad introduction of fifth generation aircraft.

The rethinking being done by the Royal Australian Air Force, the Royal Air Force, the Dutch Air Force and the Danish Air Force as well as the USMC were the major inputs that challenged the participants at the symposium to think through the rapidly evolving demands for, and reshaping of, approaches for successful coalition airpower.

Intelligence Failures Revisited

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
05/09/2015

2015-05-07 By Stephen Blank

It is long since time to reopen the vexed question of continuing large-scale US intelligence failure.

The scope of our continuing failures in this area is too large to ignore and too dangerous to brush aside. Intelligence failures – and there have been many large-scale intelligence failures during the past generation – are only part of the melancholy litany of strategic failures since 1991.

But they are a major part of this record of futility.

We have repeatedly committed numerous unjustified and egregious strategic errors, displayed an astonishingly high level of strategic incompetence, ignorance or even insouciance, and responded anemically to Russian and other threats.

Statements that we could not have foreseen Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea are utterly without basis as many specialists, including this author, have warned about this contingency for years.

While it is true that in the last decade we underwent bruising debates on intelligence reform; we did so because we were caught by surprise by the attacks of 9/11, lacked capability in regard to Islamic terrorism, corrupted the intelligence process in the run-up to the war in Iraq, and then failed to understand the nature of the crisis that we had generated.

But despite efforts to overcome these failings, e.g. the massive investment in intelligence capability pertaining to Islamic terrorism and successes like the operation to kill Osama Bin Laden, it is excruciatingly apparent that we are still consistently reproducing large-scale intelligence failures.

These intelligence failures may well be in some cases the result of prior policy failures. That was almost certainly the case in regard to the surprise that engulfed the Bush Administration when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. The Bush administration was clearly taken by surprise and as a result had no effective response to an invasion that could and should have been predicted.

In Iraq too the corruption of intelligence and the pre-determination of the assessment that war was necessary and could be won without taking Iraq’s basic socio-political reality into account manifested itself in both intelligence and policy failures too numerous to list here.

But since then the results have been, if anything worse. Both Secretaries of Defense Gates and Panetta, former heads of major intelligence agencies, conceded that we had failed to grasp the magnitude and scope of China’s ongoing defense buildup or more recently Russia’s military buildup. US intelligence’s ability to detect and assess Russian capabilities and intentions is clearly far below what it should be.[i]

To be sure, the Obama Administration is by no means alone in its failure to grasp the profound strategic changes occurring around it.

A recent report by the House of Lords delivered a scathing critique of the UK’s evisceration of its capabilities to monitor Russian developments in general, not just military trends.

And on April 27 John Vinocur reported that French President Francois Hollande reported that the Minsk II agreement signed by Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany were holding. Hollande made this statement in spite of the fact that earlier that week his office received from Washington “the mother lode of declassified information” documenting the heavy redeployment of Russian troops into the Donbass.

Indeed, there are now 14 Russian battalions, or about $14,000 Russian forces at the border, the most since last summer.

Yet neither France nor Germany responded to this intelligence, thereby demonstrating how policy failure could undermine even diligent intelligence reporting and analysis.[ii]

Thus it is hardly surprising that Administration warnings that Russia is planning to launch a new offensive in Ukraine shortly are not being taken seriously abroad.

But this is just the top of the proverbial iceberg.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 29, General Phillip Breedlove, USAF, SACEUR told Congress that the intelligence caps confronting him regarding Russia are critical. Some Russian military exercises caught his command by surprise, “our textured feel for Russia’s involvement on the ground in Ukraine has been quite limited,” and his command learned about a Russian exercise in the Arctic – increasingly a major defense priority for Russia – through social media technology.

Breedlove further cited an insufficiency of Russia experts since virtually all intelligence assets were shifted to Iraq and Afghanistan or future threats.”[iii] Ironically these asses examining future threats missed the threat in the imminent future, a telling commentary on our blindness.

While Breedlove urged more ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets and improved intelligence sharing with allies, all of which are desirable, those steps will only partially ameliorate the overall failure.

The shortage of experts, and not only in regard to Russia must be overcome by a substantial long-term investment in human intelligence, i.e. experts just as we did in the 1950s-1970s.

Whatever the wonders of military technology might be there is no substitute for procuring expertly trained human beings to conduct analysis and intelligence.

This author has talked to intelligence analysts who maintain that because they saw no document from Moscow, Putin’s Crimean operation, a meticulously rehearsed operation that was planned from 2005-06 if not earlier and whose ongoing modification and refinement can be found and which in the assiduous study of open, i.e. unclassified sources, was improvised.

Unfortunately this amazing conclusion is also shared by the White House no doubt because it could not admit to being surprised when other analysts both in and out of the government, including this author, were warning by late 2013 that if Ukraine moved towards the West, either by signing a major agreement with the EU or by revolution, that Putin would invade.

Incredibly this assessment of the high likelihood of a Russian invasion was also the Ukrainian government’s assessment.

Therefore it is incomprehensible that we were caught by surprise.

Thus it appears that US intelligence’s ability to detect and assess Russian capabilities and intentions is far below what it should be.[iv] Blaming Edward Snowden’s defection to Russia or our lack of Russia specialists may be partly correct but these are also self-serving and insufficient responses.[v]   It also appears that we had warning of the Crimean operation that began in late February 2014 but could not assess it properly, another sign of a massive intelligence and policy failure.[vi] But this failure is not merely in regard to Russia.

As we have noted the intelligence community repeatedly failed to gauge the scope and extent of China’s military buildup. Similarly in Afghanistan numerous military and Administration briefings reported on the progress we were making. On the basis of these assessments the Administration formulated its policy to withdraw US troops by the end of 2014.

Yet not only was that withdrawal curtailed we have put troops back into Afghanistan and they have been recently involved in heavy fighting there. Moreover, multiplying reports suggest that terrorist forces there have now broken into parts of Central Asia, potentially widening this war.

In plain English this is an unacceptable record.

Despite our enormous tactical proficiency and technological lead cognitive failures have materially contributed to the melancholy record of lost opportunities and failed military campaigns if not failed wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While accurate intelligence that is then acted upon in timely fashion is no guarantee of success, intelligence failure and linked policy failures in advance of or during and after assessments and reconnaissance all but ensure protracted wars if not defeat and failure.

If there is to be a genuine rethinking of our strategy and defense policy, reform of our intelligence and the investment in new cadres of experts is essential.

Pulling people off to study future war and then being surprised by a resurgent Russia or China suggests a continuing inability to grasp the present let alone the future. Neither is more technology the exclusive answer.

If the US cannot understand what is happening in real or potential theaters of military operations we will continue to pay an excessive price in men and resources for our enduring cognitive failures and refusal or failure to learn from them. As contemporary historians have shown, one major reason for allied victory in World War II was allied superiority in intelligence.

Could it be that we have irrevocably lost our ability to recover that capability or worse, as this Administration and Congress seems to feel that we do not have the means or need to invest in it?

[i] Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes, and Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. Scurries to Shore Up Spying on Russia,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2014, www.wsjonline.com

[ii] John Vincour, “Europe Follows the Un-Leader on Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2015

[iii] Joe Gould, “Breedlove: Russia Intel gaps ‘Critical’,www.defensenews.com, April 30, 2015

[iv] Adam Entous, Julian E. Barnes, and Siobhan Gorman, “U.S. Scurries to Shore Up Spying on Russia,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2014, www.wsjonline.com

[v] Ibid.; Jason Horowitz, “Russia Experts See Ranks Thin, And an Effect on U.S. Policy,” New York Times, March 7, 2014, p. A9, www.nytimes.com

[vi] Entous, Barnes, and Gorman

Dr. Stephen Blank is a Senior Fellow with the American Foreign Policy Council.

Editor’s Note: Dr. Blank has raised an important issue. 

But we suspect the challenge is even deeper, namely, the inability to have serious debates about events happening rapidly in a turbulent period of history and to determine what if any US interests are affected and what if any policy tools Washington really has available to deal with challenges.

It is far beyond just simply loading up on experts; it is about the quality of strategic debate in which expertise can inform but can neither determine outcomes nor strategic choices.

It is time to take a serious relook at the dulling of debate by politically correct expertise as well.

Outliers may be important to innovation but not to the hand holding “debates” so often held inside and outside of government Inside the Beltway.

 

 

 

Japan and Ospreys: An Update

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2015-05-09  The Japanese government has become the first foreign government to purchase the V-22.

As of early May, the Department of State has approved an FMS deal with Japan.  Japan’s initial buy is for 17 Block C Ospreys, together with spare parts, associated equipment and logistics support.

“Japan is modernizing its transport fleet to better support its defense and special mission needs,” the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency said in its required notification to Congress.

“The proposed sale of V-22B Block C Osprey aircraft will greatly enhance the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s humanitarian and disaster relief capabilities and support amphibious operations. This sale will promote burden sharing with our ally and interoperability with U.S. forces.”

In addition, the US government working with the Japanese government has determined where to deploy the USAF CV-22s within Japan.

According to a story in The Japan Times:

The U.S. government has decided to deploy the CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor transport aircraft at Yokota Air Base in western Tokyo from 2017, informed sources said Friday.

Washington has already notified the government about its plan to deploy 10 of the U.S. Air Force version of the hybrid aircraft, with three to arrive in the second half of 2017 and seven within a few years, the sources said. The plan is due to be announced soon, they said.

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/05/09/national/politics-diplomacy/u-s-to-deploy-ospreys-at-west-tokyos-yokota-air-base-from-2017/?utm_source=Daily+News+Updates&utm_campaign=3e47374381-Sunday_email_updates10_05_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c5a6080d40-3e47374381-332756961#.VU48AmDsdAc

05/04/2015:  The video above shows Gen. Nakatani, the Japanese Defense Minister, arrives outside the Pentagon and boards an MV-22 Osprey attached to Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1), Arlington, Virginia, April 29, 2015.

The flight was part of several events promoting a strong working relationship between Japan and the United States Marine Corps.

 

 

 

The Co-Hosts for the Copenhagen Airpower Symposium: The Williams Foundation and the Centre for Military Studies

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
05/04/2015

2015-05-04 The recent Airpower symposium held in Copenhagen, Denmark was co-hosted by the Williams Foundation and the Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen.

This outreach from Australia to Northern Europe parallels the Aussie engagement in the battle against ISIS and the evolving relationship between Europe and Asia, which has seen new agreements between Norway, the UK, France, and Japan.

Denmark is a major commercial maritime power with global reach, and operates one of Europe’s most expeditionary air forces, so it should be no surprise that there is interest in both Denmark and Australia to better understand expeditionary operations under the impact of evolving airpower.

John Blackburn, Deputy Chair of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, speaking at the Copenhagen Airppwer Conference. Credit Photo: SLD
John Blackburn, Deputy Chair of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, speaking at the Copenhagen Airpower Conference. Credit Photo: SLD 

The Sir Richard Williams Foundation is based in Canberra, Australia and is focused on airpower and its further development.

The Sir Richard Williams Foundation is an independent research organisation whose purpose is to promote the development and effective implementation of national security and defence policies as they impact on Australia’s ability to generate air power appropriate to its unique geopolitical environment and values.

The Foundation aims to strengthen Australia’s national security by advocating the need for forward-looking policies which take full advantage of the potential for air power to shape and influence regional security; and by promoting constructive debate regarding the implementation of such policies.

Last year, the Williams Foundation held a seminar which addressed the challenges of airpower modernization.

According to the Willliams Foundation website:

On Tuesday 11 March 2014, The Sir Richard Williams Foundation conducted its biannual seminar on “Air Combat Operations – 2025 and Beyond.”  The seminar explored the challenges and opportunities afforded by the introduction of 5th generation air combat capabilities. 

Themes explored included:

  • The future Asia / Pacific security environment.
  • Future technology advances and challenges.
  • How the US Marines are approaching the challenge of integration of 5th generation capabilities with the legacy force.
  • Consideration on how the RAAF will approach the transition to, and integration of, 5th generation airpower capabilities.

The major presentations were as follows:

Air Combat Operations Seminar Intent – AVM John Blackburn (Retd) 

Keynote Address – AIRMSHL Geoff Brown, Chief of Air Force 

Regional Security Environment 2025 – Prof Michael L’Estrange ANU

A Chinese Perspective – Dr John Lee University of Sydney 

Advances in Technology – Mr Peter Hunter

5th Generation Experience: My Story – LTCOL David Berke USMC

5th Generation Capability Integration – COL Mike Orr USMC

F-35 Update – LTGEN Christopher Bogdan USAF F-35 Program Executive Officer 

The presentations were delivered on the day and we thank the individual presenters for allowing us to share their insights and anecdotes.

For a summary of the Seminar see the following:

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/Resources/Documents/Air%20Combat%20Seminar%20summary-AndrewMcL_0.pdf

For an additional overview on the seminar, which provides an overview on Australian defense modernization, see the following:

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/Resources/Documents/LAIRD-Special%20Report-V2.pdf

The Centre for Military Studies is an academic research center which focuses more broadly on the defense and security issues affecting Denmark.

According to the Centre’s website:

The Centre for Military Studies is a university research centre focusing on policy-relevant research and research-based information and innovation that identify options for Denmark’s defence and security policy in a globalised world.

Research at the Centre is thus a means to identify policy options in a complex, interconnected security environment.

We work closely with the Danish Ministry of Defence, the Danish Armed Forces and the political level to investigate issues and develop ideas and options…..

The Centre seeks to bridge the inherently global nature of security issues and security actors and the national Danish foreign, security and defence policy discourse.

It does so by utilising Scandinavian traditions for a meaningful dialogue between industry, civil-society, parliament, officials and the armed forces.

The Centre is a go-to-place for dialogue and policy-options.

The Centre harnesses concepts, trends and evidence into tools for understanding and acting on Danish defence and security issues.

Dr. Gary Schaub, Jr of the Centre of Military Studies. Opening the Danish Airpower Conference. Credit: SLD
Dr. Gary Schaub, Jr of the Centre of Military Studies. Opening the Danish Airpower Conference. Credit: SLD

At the Airpower Symposium held on April 17, 2015, the latest piece of research conducted by the Centre, on the lessons to be learned from the F-16 experience for Denmark as the country looks to replace that aircraft with a next generation one, was released.

According to the Centre’s website:

When Denmark chose to acquire a fleet of 58 F-16 combat aircraft in 1975, it received substantial and disproportionate benefits given the way that investment was made and managed. 

Buying a common aircraft type together with allies deepened Denmark’s ties to its Alliance partners, including deploying in multinational formations with those partners.

It enabled multinational cooperation to modernize the aircraft at greatly reduced costs over its lifetime. 

Common aircraft also enabled improved training opportunities for Danish pilots and substantial assistance from the United States when pilot shortages threatened to idle 25 percent of Danish F-16s.

Common aircraft did not guarantee that Denmark would be as effective as others in coalition air campaigns, however.

This required substantial modernization of the aircraft, acquisition of advanced systems and munitions, reorganization of the Royal Danish Air Force, a change in its organizational culture, and sufficient numbers of pilots. Once these adaptations occurred, Danish performance in expeditionary air operations garnered Denmark praise from its coalition and Alliance partners. 

Danish leaders should cooperate with its allies in a similar way to replicate this experience when they choose a replacement aircraft in 2015.

Because international cooperation proved to be such an important part of the Danish F-16 experience, the Centre for Military Studies partnered with The Williams Foundation of Australia to host a symposium at Kastellet in April 2015. 

Together 10 airpower experts from Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States explored how medium and small air forces could cooperate with one another to generate innovative concepts of operation that increase joint combat power to address regional and global security issues in the coming years. 

That report can be found here:

http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/publications/learningfromthef-16/Learning_from_the_F-16._Layout_FINAL.pdf

For an overview on the Centre for Military Studies and its work, see the following briefing by Dr. Gary Schaub, Jr.:

Centre for Military Studies

And like the Williams Foundation, the Centre hosted an airpower conference last year, with their focus upon the transformation of the European air forces.

 

 

 

Japan Continues to Expand Aperture on Global Defense Cooperation

Posted on | by Robbin Laird
05/02/2015

2015-05-02  Earlier this year, Japan and the UK as well as Australia and Japan expanded their discussions on defense industrial cooperation.

In an agreement in March, the Japanese did this with France.

According to a Reuters story published on March 13, 2015:

Japan and France signed a deal on military equipment and technology transfers on Friday, in a move to drive cooperation and joint development of defense gear, as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe strengthens security ties with major powers.

Japan, at odds with China on territorial and other issues, has reached similar deals with Britain and Australia over the past two years, while ending a ban on its military fighting abroad and easing restrictions on weapons exports.

The agreement encourages bilateral defense cooperation by ensuring that transferred technology and equipment will not be provided to a third country without the consent of the country of origin…..

Potential items of cooperation include unmanned gear for mine removal, French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said.

“Both France and Japan have high-tech companies in this field. If we work together, we can find a win-win solution,” he said.

Japan and France also agreed to work toward concluding an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA), which provides a framework for logistic cooperation between armed forces. Japan already has ACSAs with the United States and Australia.

Japan, France hold 2-plus-2 security meeting in Tokyo (From L) French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe hold talks at the prime minister's office in Tokyo on March 13, 2015. The same day, Japan and France held a meeting of their defense and foreign ministers in Tokyo at which they were expected to affirm increased defense and antiterrorism cooperation. (Kyodo)
Japan, France hold 2-plus-2 security meeting in Tokyo
(From L) French Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian and Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe hold talks at the prime minister’s office in Tokyo on March 13, 2015. The same day, Japan and France held a meeting of their defense and foreign ministers in Tokyo at which they were expected to affirm increased defense and antiterrorism cooperation. (Kyodo)

And more recently, on his visit to the United States, the US and Japanese governments modified their defense agreement as well.

According to a Reuters story published on April 27, 2015:

The guidelines allow for global cooperation militarily, ranging from defense against ballistic missiles, cyber and space attacks as well as maritime security. They follow a cabinet resolution last year reinterpreting Japan’s post-World War Two pacifist constitution.

The resolution allows the exercise of the right to “collective self-defense.” This means, for example, that Japan could shoot down missiles heading toward the United States and come to the aid of third countries under attack….

The guidelines eliminate geographic restrictions that had largely limited joint work to the defense of Japan and the surrounding area, a senior U.S. official said.

“We will be able to do globally what we’ve been able to do in the defense of Japan and regionally,” the official said.

The changes allow greater coordination and information sharing and allow increased cooperation in cybersecurity and defense of assets in space…..

The constitutional reinterpretation still needs to be enabled by legislation later this year, but will also allow Japan to take action such as mine-sweeping during hostilities in the Hormuz Strait and provide logistical support for U.S. forces beyond Japan’s immediate neighborhood without a specific law for each operation, Japanese lawmakers and government sources say.

The new guidelines as adopted can be downloaded here:

US Japanese Defense Guidelines

 

Norway Takes Over Responsibility for the Baltic Air Patrol

Posted on | by Robbin Laird

2015-05-02  According to a story published on 4/9/15 on the Norwegian Ministry of Defense website, Norway will take over the role of policing Baltic airspace this month.

The Baltic nations Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have all been members of the NATO alliance since 2004, but because of limited own capacities the alliance handles the air policing in the Baltics.

This means that the other NATO partners alternate on maintaining the Quick Reaction Alert (QRA) in the Baltics.

On 1 May, Italy hands over the QRA responsibility at Šiauliai Air Base in Lithuania to Norway.

Even though Norway has the main responsibility, Italy will continue to support the allied operation.

Norwegian F-16. Credit: Norwegian MoD
Norwegian F-16. Credit: Norwegian MoD

In addition, United Kingdom will contribute from its established base, Ämari Air Base in Estonia.

The mission lasts through August and involves four F-16 fighter jets, of which two are constantly ready to act. Also, RNoAF is sending three liaison officers to the Control and Reporting Center in Karmelava, Lithuania.

“About 70 people are involved in the mission. However, due to personnel rotations, closer to 300 people will contribute in Lithuania during the course of the mission,” Stene explains.

Norway has previously contributed to air policing in the Baltics, both in 2005 and 2007.

132 Air Wing at Bodø Main Air Station has been given responsibility for planning and preparation, while the Norwegian Joint Headquarters will retain operational command.

Personnel from a wide range of professional fields are involved. Among others, personnel from Bodø and Ørland, the two air stations housing F-16, other air wings, in addition to the Norwegian Defense Logistics Organisation, Norwegian Cyber Force, and Norwegian Defense Medical Service.

Some conscripted soldiers will also be given the opportunity to serve part of their compulsory military service in Lithuania.

“We are proud to contribute to the Baltic Air Policing mission and the beneficial NATO collaboration, an ever-more important collaboration, given the current political situation in Europe. Both our fighter jets and control and reporting system are ready to perform,” says Major General Per Egil Rygg, Chief of Staff of the RNoAF.