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Fueling a fighter jet mid-mission isn’t as easy as exiting a highway to top off your tank. It’s really quite a sight to see, as these amazing shots below, captured during recent flight operations at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, prove.
“The main reason military aircraft use aerial refueling is to extend the mission radius of the jet,” explains retired U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 pilot Rolf “Bugsy” Siegel. “For long-range missions, a fighter will take off from their operating base, meet a tanker en-route to top-off, enter enemy territory to perform their mission, and then return back to the tanker to refuel again prior to flying back to land at their operating base.”
Without aerial refueling, many of the long-range missions performed by the fighter jets of today, and those of tomorrow like the F-35, wouldn’t be possible. The same can be said for cross-country, or even trans-ocean flights, for cargo or personnel transit – using a tanker aircraft, you can essentially get a squadron of fighters from where you are to anywhere you need to go. Air refueling is also used for long range missions to deploy combat aircraft from the continental U.S. to overseas locations.
But how do they do it? How does an F-35, shooting through the sky at 240 knots (275 MPH), fly up beside a KC-130J or another tanker and plug in to a 93-foot fuel hose via a circular “basket” only about a foot-and-a-half in diameter? The precision of the task itself seems daunting. So here’s the breakdown of how aerial refueling works.
Rendezvous and Pre-Contact
The first step to aerial refueling is finding a rendezvous point.
“In some cases, this may be somewhere over the ocean if a squadron were transferring to an oversea base,” explains Bugsy, “or it could be a rendezvous point or tanker track normally published in the Air Tasking Order if the aircraft was performing air refueling as part of their mission.”
In the case of the F-35, it’s usually either a point somewhere over the middle of the U.S., when the aircraft are flying cross-country for a base transfer, or somewhere near one of the many training bases. Once the F-35 pilot locates the tanker, they make contact with the pilot and initiate intercept. The flight lead will join closest to the tanker while the wingmen line up in an echelon formation. Next, while the planes are in what is called “pre-contact,” the fighter pilot will adjust mission systems to ensure their radar isn’t interfering with the tanker. In legacy fighters, this involves pushing a few buttons and turning a few knobs. But in the F-35, explains F-35 Contract Instructor Pilot Oscar “Speedy” Alvarez, “it’s simply a matter of selecting the “pre-contact” option selection button (OSB) on the cockpit’s touchscreen, which puts the radar into standby mode.”
Refueling
Once in position, and still in communication with the tanker pilot, the F-35 pilot selects the “Refuel” OSB from his flight control display. On the F-35B and F-35C variants, which use a probe-and-drogue system, this will deploy the refueling probe so that it can connect to the basket on the end of the hose. Once contact is made, the fighter pilot will move the basket up about 10 feet or so and the refueling begins.
For the F-35A variant, which uses a flying boom aerial refueling, the pilot flies in a tight formation with the tanker. An operator at the back of the tanker and the F-35 pilot work together to ensure the boom aligns with the aircraft and is inserted directly into the fuel tank opening.
From there, it’s just a simple matter of starting the fuel flow.
Training
Aerial refueling is “part of the basic training pilots go through,” Speedy says. Before going on a refueling mission, the pilots have already been through most of the learning syllabus at the Pilot Training Center, and have already flown the jets to get some experience. After a lecture explaining the basics of aerial refueling mission planning, aircraft limitations, tanker rendezvous and departure procedures and tanker-specific capabilities, the pilots are sent back to their squadrons to give it a try.
“One of the hardest parts of aerial refueling is learning to fly the probe into the basket smoothly. At times when there is turbulence it’s not as easy as it looks as the basket is relatively light and moves around,” explains Bugsy. “It takes some practice to learn to fly the probe into the basket without too much closure [how fast you are approaching the basket] or angular rates (up/down, left/right) which could damage the basket or the probe on the aircraft.”
Pilots have to complete six “plugs” to achieve their initial “qual” – or qualification – for aerial refueling.
2015-06-13 The first new CN-235 has arrived at la Réunion.
According to the French Air Force (FAF), the second CN-235 will arrive next month, and the start of the replacement process for the Transalls in the region will begin.
“The CN-235 300 will replace the Transall C-160 in the southern area of the Indian Ocean.
The second will arrive in mid-July when the first Transall will then be withdrawn.
The second Translall with then leave Réunion at the beginning of August.”
The FAF is rebuilding its transport fleet with A400Ms, CN-235s and upgraded C-130s.
2015-06-17 The DCI Group is a French-based training and services organization which supports the French military and global partners worldwide.
Their focus on training is highlighted in their interview of Murielle Delaporte, co-founder of Second Line of Defense and editor of OPERATIONNELS, a French defense magazine which focuses on operations, inclusive of support.
She has worked with both US and French forces and has unique bi-lingual capabilities and is able to operate in both the US and French military cultures and languages, a major challenge given how different those cultures have been.
As the Marines and the French military converge on a number of operational approaches her work with both Marine Corps and French operations provides important insights into evolving coalition operations for 21st century operations.
She has been embedded with French forces in Mali, Afghanistan and in Djibouti.
And she has visited the Marines in North Carolina, Quantico, San Diego, and at the SP-MAGTF operating out of Europe as well.
In this interview, the DCI official focuses on key training capabilities necessary for 21st century forces as well as inquiring about US reactions to the acquisition of the Rafale by the Indian Air Force.
In the interview – done in English as well as French – she focuses on the challenges facing insertion forces, both in terms of operations and dealing with reactive enemies.
She emphasized that American reaction has been largely positive with regard to the Rafale sale to India, both for reasons that it will put in the hands of the Indian Air Force a battle-proven performer for allied operations, as well as creating a clear alternative to the acquisition of Russian aircraft.
The English version of the interview:
The French version of the interview:
The latest issue of her magazine features two major dossiers, one on how the French Air Force supports the Mirage 2000 in world wide operations (in French) and one on NATO’s evolving approach to mine warfare (written largely in English).
The issue highlights her ability to navigate the two cultures and languages and broadening English-language and French understanding of the practical approaches being taken by French and allied forces in 21st century operations.
2015-06-18 According to a story in The Daily Mail, Russian air activity around the Baltic area has been stepped up.
RAF Typhoons which are part of NATO’s Baltic air patrol mission intercepted the aircraft.
British warplanes scrambled to intercept nine Russian aircraft within hours after they flew menacingly close to the Baltic States in what was described as the biggest act of provocation since the Cold War.
Moscow sent the world’s fastest supersonic fighter jet, along with spy planes and bombers to ‘snoop’ on Nato war games designed to send a ‘warning to Vladimir Putin’.
A senior RAF source last night told the Daily Mail: ‘We’ve never had a period like this in living memory.’
An article posted on the RAF’s website on June 18, 2015 provided further details.
The Secretary of State for Defence, the Right Honourable Michael Fallon MP learnt at first-hand what policing the Baltic airspace means during yesterday’s visit to Amari airbase in Estonia.
The day had seen two scrambles (17th), one the previous night (16th) and one this morning (18th) bringing the total to four scrambles in barely over 24 hours from the Royal Air Force Typhoons based at Amari.
Two Quick Reaction Alert Typhoons landed just an hour before the Minister touched down. In just over 24 hours the tally of RAF intercepts has included four MiG-31BM Foxhound fighters, two Tu-22M3 Backfire C bombers, two An-26 Curl surveillance aircraft and an A-50 Mainstay airborne early warning and control aircraft.
The week was expected to be busy, because the multinational summer Baltic exercises always attract overflights.
Typhoon pilot, Flt Lt Oli Fleming, speaking of Tuesday night, said : “With a no notice scramble I made a Mach 1.5 transit to identify aircraft that had not filed a flight plan and were not ‘squawking’ (communicating). We got alongside to see a pair of MiG 31s. It’s the first time I’ve seen this type of MiG. They were in international airspace flying into Kaliningrad.”
On Wednesday morning it was the turn of 6 Squadron colleague, Major Ryan Franzen, on exchange from the US Marine Corps who spoke of his first mission of the day: “The Typhoon gets high, gets fast and gets there quick. We made a visual ID of Tu-22s. There was no real reaction. A little wave of the wings. It’s a safe procedure. They know what we’re doing.”
It didn’t end there. Maj Franzen and his wingman were re-tasked twice more on the same mission to intercept two pairs of Foxhounds. He added: “It was exciting – especially scrambling for one task and then having to do two more. This is great for the ground engineers. They make it possible.”
Just three hours later they were scrambled again – this time locating surveillance aircraft – an An-26 and an An-50. His wingman said: “ It’s what we are here to do. It is a lot to see in one day, but this activity is routine for us. When we hear the scramble it’s very automatic – but there’s a big surge of energy and a big adrenaline rush.”
Estonian Minister of Defence Sven Mikser greeted Michael Fallon and referred to the danger posed to commercial aviation by aircraft in the Baltic region without flight plans. He said: “Estonia is grateful for the British contribution to our security. We have had close co-operation and we hope it will continue.”
Wg Cdr Stu Smiley commands the RAF detachment, 121 Expeditionary Air Wing: “We have been here nearly two months and flown about 120 sorties. Twenty-one of these have been scrambles and the rest for training. We have identified just over a dozen aircraft with unidentified or uncertain flight plans. This level of activity is a little higher than normal – but that’s to be expected given the major exercises taking place.” He added: “Being in a position to be able to achieve this mission so effectively is a credit to every single person here. EAWs enable the RAF to deploy rapidly, set-up and execute the required mission. And we do it worldwide where the UK needs us.”
After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1986, Commander Peter A.J. Bergen Henegouwen served for six years mainly on minesweepers and minehunters.
This included a deployment for clearing sea mines in the Persian Gulf in 1991 as executive officer on HNLMS Haarlem.
In 1996 Commander Bergen Henegouwen received his first command on board of the minesweeper HNLMS Naarden.
He was then in command of the minehunters HNLMS Delfzijl and HNLMS Hellevoetsluis, which was assigned to the MCM flotilla “MCMFORNORTH” (now SNMCMG1).
In March 2011, his previous assignment was at the Netherlands Maritime Forces (NLMARFOR), Maritime Battle Staff, where Commander Bergen Henegouwen assumed responsibilities on the deployments with other international task groups.
Commander Bergen Henegouwen is the Commanding Officer of the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG 1) since January 22nd, 2015, a Group currently composed of German, British, Belgian, Dutch, Polish and Norwegian Mine countermeasures vessels, as well as a German Command and Supply ship.
One of the particularity of this Group is the fact that its Commander sails on a ship from another nationality than his, which happens from time to time, but is rather uncommon.
In the interview below done after the first week of sailing as a Group of four ships – the Flagship FGS Donau, the BNS Lobelia, the FGS Auerbach and the HMS Pembroke -, he describes the challenges, but also the excitement, of commanding an international staff on the German Tender Donau.
He also explains his roadmap for the Group leading towards Trident Juncture 2015, the largest NATO exercise organized in decades to take place in the Fall in Southern Europe, which envisions a better integration and synergy of MCM tasks within the overall fleets.
It seems Joint Warrior 2015, which took place in April, off the Scottish shores, already started to fulfil such a wish…
Commander, what are the missions of the SNMCMG1 for the months to come?
We have quite a busy program planned for this upcoming six months period: in addition to doing historic ordnance clearance, HOD for “Historic Ordnance Disposal” as we call it, off the coasts of Estonia, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as France, we are participating to five different exercises.
When we first started to sail together in January, I was very pleased to see that all the ships got out at the same time without incident, as, in my experience commanding similar ABNL deployments over the past three years, breakdowns often occur given the age of most mine-countermeasure vessels.
We always manage to keep them going, but delays for repair as you leave harbor frequently happen.[ref] ABNL stands for « Admiral BENELUX », which is the Common Operational Headquarters for the Netherlands and Belgium Navies. These headquarters are located in Den Helder in the Netherlands.[/ref]
This shows that units and ships were individually well prepared to work in this group.
The initial focus of the first three weeks on board is mostly about “getting used to work together”, because although the ships are individually well trained, they might lack some experience in working together.
It is all about different cultures, different procedures; some nations may allow certain things other nations do not, so we have to get used to each other and see how to manoeuver and do our exercises as safely as possible.
That is basically what we do at the beginning of a deployment: we start with communication exercises, maneuvering exercises, such as replenishment at sea (RAS), which is especially important.
As you come into close quarters, you want to see how the other ships behave in different types of weather.
These are the basics to ensure safety as we do our drills and exercises.
The next focus is to test our operational capabilities, i.e. mine countermeasures (MCM) and be prepared for joint exercises, the two main ones being Joint Warrior in March and Baltops in June.
We also organize our own sets of exercises, such as a two week-training period in the North Sea and an exercise off the Dutch coast.
We also join forces with exercises organized by other navies in the area, such as the Lithuanian Navy.
The command and support staff of the Group are from different nationalities than the ship hosting them: a German ship with a German crew hosting a Command staff composed of Dutch, Belgian and Spanish officers and headed by a Dutch CO.
What are the challenges of operating on such an international ship and commanding a group of ships from Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK?[ref] A Dutch, a Polish and a Norwegian ships joined the group after the interview was concluded.[/ref]
How different is it for you compared with your previous commanding experiences?
The nations provide the ships to the Group and it is their national responsibility to be operationally ready.
In the workup phase, the only thing I am doing is getting the ships to learn how to work together, how to communicate, how to maneuver at the same time, and, of course, keep up their operational readiness to be able to act if “something real world” happens.
StandingNATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 at Anchor Off of Kiel. Credit Photo: Murielle Delaporte
Ever since we have been at sea, you might not see it, but I am walking around with a smile on my face twenty-four hours a day.
I am enjoying it as, I believe, do the crews of all these ships, because being in this group means meeting colleagues from other nations and learning from each other.
As for me, personally, the only change is whom I am reporting to. In my previous assignment, I organized deployments for ABNL ships, as well as other ships.
I cooperated for instance with Danish or Norwegian staff, who would augment my staff and vice versa.
I worked with the Danish, German and Belgian MCM fleet and navies.
Because of my own deployments for the ABNL HQ, I hence do have some international experience.
The only change now is, of course, that I am working for NATO and reporting to the UK-based Maritime Command (MARCOM), in addition to my national authorities.
It is indeed a different process of reporting, but I am doing the same kind of work.
The main role of my staff is to act as a tasking authority, and, whether we do that nationally or within NATO, we all use NATO procedures.
You cannot obviously use the latter outside of NATO, as was the case for my staff and me in a recent international exercise last October in the Arabian Gulf, to which participated more than 20 countries.
It then becomes very challenging: you have to find out how to do your procedures, without using confidential procedures, nor NATO ones, which you are used to, and how to talk to each other in technical language.
However, these kinds of new challenges show that we are quite capable of doing this.
Sailors at sea all know what starboard or forward mean.
The language of the sea is universal.
We all know what sailing at sea means, we all go through the same environment, and we all speak English, somehow!…
So we find ways to communicate and, as long as you can communicate, you can work together.
There is always something to do for the staff: whether preparing for the next port visit or planning our exercises.
The SNMCMG1 participating in Open Spirit 2015. Credit: NATO
We are basically using the Donau as a supply ship, so we are trying to get everything for the group such as food or fuel.
This ship could almost go around the world with its fuel supply, but most of the mine-hunters have a two-week fuel autonomy.
Some of them, like the Norwegian mine hunters have an hover-craft capability, which consumes quite a lot of fuel, so they need to refuel every other day.
The need for a supply ship capable of providing fuel, like this German ship, is even more important for these kinds of mine-hunters, as you cannot hunt mines, while having to go back to port every other day.
All NATO ships use the same fuel (F76) and can handle the same naval diesel oil for helicopters.
Such standardization and the ability to take fuel from every supply ship, wherever it is, is one of the good things in NATO.
The billing is done by each nation and it is a very good system.
Two-week autonomy is also a good length as far as the crews are concerned, as they are rather small and need to sustain a high level of concentration in their work.
Our port visits are therefore as much intended to show the NATO flag as to provide the crews with R&R [Rest and Recreation], but if we had to extent our deployments at sea beyond two weeks, we would of course do our job.
The downside of that, as I stated, most of our MCMVs [Mine Counter-Measures Vessels] are getting older and during a period of two weeks of operations, they will have some defects in some way.
If the crews are not capable of repairing their own equipment, we are depending on shore assistance.
Each nation has indeed various levels of readiness, but in this Group, the equipment onboard each ship seems comparable.
Is there an “ideal Group” from your standpoint as far as its composition is concerned and how do you adjust to potential interoperability issues?
Logistically, it would be very nice to have all the same ships, so we could always have a 100% operational readiness.
However – and that is a big “however,” MCM is a very difficult type of warfare, since we are searching for small objects on the sea bottom, while conditions are not always that favorable.
If you have a clear sandy bottom and you put a soda can on top of it, most of our mine hunters will find it.
In 90% of the cases unfortunately, it is not that easy.
There are rocks on the bottom, or, if there is indeed a sandy bottom, it is in constant motion like dunes. In the coastal area, you face a lot of mud in which objects tend to sink.
So finding sea mines is not always easy.
The only way to go around these difficulties is to use different types of equipment, different sonars with different frequencies.
And, in the case of “unhuntable” mines, those who lie between rocks or are buried and are not detectable by sonar, a mine sweeper is required. MCMs of minesweepers consist in triggering a mine by mimicking a ship.
Mine-sweeping and mine-hunting are complementary techniques, since the mines you cannot hunt might possibly be swept and the other way around in the case of sophisticated mines, which can differentiate between sweeping gear or an actual ship.
There are approximately four or five different influences a ship might have in the water and it is all about frequencies: acoustic, i.e. noise coming through the water ; magnetic, i.e. a steel ship influences the earth magnetic field; minor influences, such as the electric current coming from a ship’s propeller ; high and low frequency sounds coming from the water; etc.
A modern mine with enough sensors combining all these influences would be unsweepable.
But right now, by mixing and matching different sonars and frequencies, our means complement each other increasing our chance to find or destroy mines.
So, to answer your question about the ideal composition of a mine-countermeasure group, operationally, having different mine hunters and mine sweepers together in one group is ideal, because you can use different MCM techniques and reduce the risks.
The German Minesweeper Auerbach. Credit Photo: Murielle Delaporte
It is a difficult type of warfare, because it is under water and the weather is always influencing us.
It is always a challenge, so nations tend to find the best equipment possible to operate under water.
It used to be the French PAP (Poisson auto-propulsé) developed in the 1960’s.
The German SeaFox, smaller and therefore easier to maœuver, is now used by many nations, because it is an almost autonomous vehicle and one of the best systems available at this time to counter mines.
You can do identification with it, and you can also destroy mines if needed. Each nation however has its own acquisition process and, as an operational commander, I am just very happy to have different options whether in sonars, drones, or else, although logistically speaking, it may not be wise.
The logistic responsibility remains in fact nation-centric.
In case of a breakdown, we will of course check within the Group to see if there are spare parts available, but if something has to be flown in, it is done so under the responsibility of each nation.[ref] The FGS Donau belongs to the Type 404 Elbe class replenishment ships of the German Navy. They were built to support its squadrons of Fast Attack Craft, submarines and minesweeper/hunters and as such are usually referred to as Tenders. They have a deck where Sea Kings or larger helicopter can land, but no hangar.[/ref]
I see our role as supply ship, as a “travel agency,” i.e. organizing the trips and coordinating, so we keep our operational capabilities at the highest level possible.
Every day I find out how much replenishment is needed and we organize what needs to be done.
If something has to be brought in, or if the Commanding Officer of one of the ships needs to go out of the group to port to get some things, we, as a command logistic platform, coordinate all that.
We can also arrange for the MCM mission to continue, while the support platform goes into port to get the spare parts.
We will be eight ships during the course of our deployment, which means more work in coordinating the parts and tasking of the ships.
But it makes the work easier, because the more ships, the more units you have available, the easier the task will be. MCM operations are indeed always about “we don’t have enough time,”
because everybody is always eager to transit somewhere without being stopped by sea mines.
With all the challenges we have with MCM, it takes time to get rid of mines.
So, the more ships we have, the easier the tasking becomes.
Our Netherlands’ MCMVs– which are the same for the Dutch, Belgian and French Navies – were designed jointly by these three nations in the late 70’s and commissioned in the early 80’s.
So they are almost thirty years old.
Our youngest Tripartite-class ship was commissioned in 2000.
When we first build our ships, we are always aiming for twenty- to thirty-year life-cycle, including a mid-life upgrade.
But there is always a part of unpredictability which goes with new equipment.
When the first GRP ships [Glass reinforced polyester] were built in the early 80’s, we did not know whether GRP ships would survive thirty years in salt water.
We are finding out right now that the hulls are still very good.
However, we need to regularly address engineering issues (pipes leaking for instance), as well as system obsolescence, which have sometimes to be fully replaced, as communication and computers for instance become outdated.
These are the challenges we are facing right now, since if something breaks down on the ship, there is no backup and the small ships need to go to port.
We need to ensure that this unit can be safely replaced as we look towards the future.
In that sense, the only recommendation I would have is that all nations try to keep up their level in MCM capacities, whatever it might be, to be prepared to counter mine threats and master such a difficult type of warfare.
What is the current evolution in mines threats precisely as well as in MCMs?
How do you assess innovations regarding the use of unmanned underwater systems?
Our ships are designed to do mine countermeasures, which is not the same as clearing historic ordinance.
Historic ordinance are explosives, which have been lying on the bottom of the sea for a long time.
As long as you do not touch or move them, they are not directly harmful, but the moment you drop your anchor on one of them or try to build a windmill on top of them, then, of course, that is a problem.
To dispose of historic ordinance, however, is not too difficult: you just blow it up and that is what we do on a regular basis: seventy years after WWII, we are still clearing the bottom of the sea with explosives from both WWI and WWII…
Real sea mines on the other hand pose a direct danger to the mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs), which must therefore be well protected from external signatures like acoustics or magnetic sensors.
They used to be made of wood, but now they are made of Glass reinforced polyester (GRP), which does not influence the magnetic field of the earth.
Our engines are also put on mountings, so they do not transfer the noise into the water.
MCMVs are therefore quite safe.
Modern mines can cause real problems, if they target a specific ship or are intended to deny access to a port, stop traffic or alter a strategy.
A mine-layer should however have quite generic mines (as was the case during the first Gulf war when an American ship was hit).
These are cheap weapons, which can be deployed from any kind of ships.
That is why they are so dangerous, but we can handle them.
Regular sea mines are not difficult weapons to acquire, as they are like IEDs on shore.
The more modern and sophisticated mines are harder to find, as they can be hidden taking for instance the appearance of a rock.
That is also the purpose of the NATO MCM groups: we are, of course, ready to counter any real threat, terrorist or else.
For budgetary priorities, some nations, such as the Netherlands, stopped their minesweepers program a few years ago, but are maintaining their research capability in order to be able to build the right gear if need be.
Keeping a minesweeping capability is very expensive given the complexity of modern mines, and the fact that simulation does not apply easily.
Simulating an actual ship is indeed very hard (vessels filled with ping-pong balls, or filled with foam, have been tried without much success).
These are the reasons why most nations in the past decade or so have been tending to focus essentially on minehunters.
The same goes with the ability to lay mines: only a few nations have kept this capability, but investment in research has been maintained within NATO.
In case of conflict, sea mines have indeed their value, as they allow to deny the enemy access to ports or specific areas.
As far as drones are concerned, one should remember that the environment at sea with its waves, currents, wind, as well as the underwater environment, are constantly changing.
That renders steering and communicating with any systems which you try to use remotely very difficult.
Using such systems from non-protected vessels as some Navies envision it is not totally feasible at this time.
Of course, everybody is researching for fully autonomous robots going into the water and clearing all the mines, but you will always need dedicated MCMV’s and personnel to oversee the mission.
Another solution, which is the Marine mammal program is a good way and is very impressive.[ref] Mostly undergone by the US Navy ever since the Vietnam war, some sources mention a few other nations, such as Russia, using dolphins for MCMs.[/ref]
It is however very expensive and you need people to make sure the job has been done properly.
Going against explosives in the water is a dangerous type of warfare and you need dedicated personnel to do so.
Compared to your past deployments – you mentioned the Arabian Gulf — how would you describe your current area of responsibility in the Northern and Baltic Seas?
There is of course a political dimension to the Baltic region given current events: it is about reassurance and showing that we are here.
We are a Readiness force demonstrating NATO’s resolve.
In terms of HOD, an immense amount of sea mines has been thrown in the Baltic Sea, especially during the Second World War.
So the moment we start the Open Spirit exercise off the coast of Estonia and the moment we will turn on our sonars, we will find explosives.[ref] Open Spirit is an annual HOD multinational exercise conducted since 1996 and led by one of the three Baltic states on a rotational basis.[/ref]
There is a big difference between the North Sea, which I am more used to, and the Baltic Sea.
In the North Sea, we have been using trawlers for fishery for decades, which have found quite a lot of explosives laying on the bottom of the sea.
In the Baltic Sea, there is hardly any trawl fishery and many mines are still there with their explosives intact.
I am therefore just very keen in contributing to the safety of the area we are deploying in.
How are you positioning the SNMCMG1 for the upcoming largest NATO exercise in decades, i.e. Trident Junction 2015 due to start in the Fall in southern Europe?
Is having a Dutch Commander related to the fact that TJ15 will be under a Dutch Joint Command?
Trident Juncture of course is a very large exercise.
I am currently focusing on the first six months of deployments, because most of my units, most of the ships participating in this Group right now will only be here for three to six months.
In July, both my staff and my ships will be changed and the only ones remaining will be the steward and me.
The Belgian minehunter Lobelia launches a Seafox during Open Spirit. Credit: NATO
In the second half, we shall probably go around the same procedures again to get used to each other and do basic exercises.
Then we shall indeed work up towards Trident Juncture.
In 2016, the Netherlands Navy will be in command of the Immediate Reaction Force (IRF) and the NMR [Allied Command Operations’ National Military representatives] staff is preparing for it.
Trident Juncture will be a big exercise, during which we will be able to test our capabilities in that respect.
My regular function is being part of the NMR-4 staff working on MCM, a function I have not been relieved from.
Through exercises like Joint Warrior, I can keep my interactions with the NMR-4 staff.
It will also be the case during TJ15, for which an amphibious scenario is planned, so I will try to use the NATO group to fit into this scenario of amphibious warfare.
An amphibious scenario means that you have bigger ships with a lot of troops going through shallow waters which could be mined.
Mine countermeasures is therefore always part of advanced forces operations.
However, because most exercises are limited to one to three weeks, MCM are in practice done in a separate area.
I would like in this case to see a bit more of an operational flow, where you first have MCMs and then continue on with the amphibious landing.
That is something that I would like to train and focus on especially this year.
All this depends on the whole scenario done by the exercise controller.
My staff is called the tasking authority: we order the ships to go to a specific area and do a specific MCM task.
It is our responsibility to organize where the MCM teams are going, and what they are doing in coordination with higher authorities.
That also means doing the calculations about MCM, reporting the percentage clearance or remaining risks for other ships, and then, of course, reporting if we find any mines or not.
What everybody always tends to forget is that MCM is not always to clear the sea mines.
It is also to show whether there are mines or not. Demonstrating the absence of mines is in actual fact perhaps even more important than showing that there are mines.
Being part of advanced forces means that you need to have some intelligence with special forces probably going in.
Mine explosion during Open Spirit 2015, a combined and joint Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) clearance operation hosted on a rotational basis by one of the three Baltic States. Credit: NATO
They are of course well trained to do things unseen.
On the other hand, our ships which go into advanced forces operations are big grey ships which can easily be seen.
These ships are not well equipped for generic warfare: they do not have air warning radars; they do not have heavy weaponry, and are only capable of defending themselves against small attacks (pirates; terrorists…).
We can protect ourselves against individuals coming towards us, not against an air raid or major surface combatants.
We use MCM Protecting Units (MCMPUs), but we would need a frigate or other capable ships to defend the group.
Then we run into the following challenge: how do you get a frigate into a possible minefield?
This is all about strategy and how we are we going to handle these types of scenarios.
That is why I say that it is probably more important to prove the absence of mines than the actual existence of mines.
We have seen it in the early 90’s in the Persian Gulf, where Iraq had laid sea mines.
The initial plan of the Coalition was to conduct a large amphibious operation off the coast of Iraq, but two American ships were hit by sea mines and we knew there were more mines present.
The whole strategy to reach Iraq changed, as we went around the minefield by crossing Kuwait.
This example illustrates how big an influence a sea mine can have on military warfare.
Just one or two sea mines completely altered the strategy underlying that operation.
I believe therefore that, again, showing a way onto the beach, where the mines are absent, is precisely something we have to train more.
Even though we have been discussing this for decades, the short duration of exercises tends to have us focus on the best separate training for MCMVs on the one hand, the frigates on the other hand.
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician 3rd Class Iain Omera, assigned to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Six, performs a tactical water entry during mine countermeasure training while participating in Bold Alligator 2014. Bold Alligator is intended to improve Navy and Marine Corps amphibious core competencies. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nicholas S. Tenorio/Released)
An amphibious operation is about getting all that different types of warfare together and raising many questions.
What are we going to report?
How are we going to talk to each other?
How are we going to defend each other?
How do you get a frigate in a possible minefield?
All these challenges do come up when you put together an amphibious operation.
Amphibious warfare is indeed the most extensive, the most difficult operation you can do.
Trident Juncture will be in that sense a first-rate opportunity for the SNMCMG1 to train and rehearse in this kind of complex context.
Editor’s Note: Murielle Delaporte went to sea with the NATO counter-mine task force and was onboard the German Marine Tender Donau earlier this year.
She is the co-founder of Second Line of Defense and the editor of Operationnels where a complete dossier on the NATO approach to mine warfare is discussed from the standpoint of her time in the Baltic sea operation.
For an article which deals with the possible use of unmanned systems in counter-mine operations see the following:
President Vladimir Putin’s boasting today that Russia will deploy 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles this year is another reminder of why it would be dangerous to de-alert more of the US nuclear force.
It is not because the Russian nuclear arsenal is poised to pounce on the United States.
As far as we can tell, Moscow remains deterred from attacking the United States or any other nuclear power.
Rather, the problem is that the current Russian leadership is prone to worst-case nuclear thinking and rhetoric.
“Over 40 new intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of penetrating any, even the most technologically advanced missile defense systems, will join the nuclear forces in the current year,” Putin told an arms show at Alabino, west of Moscow.
Last year, Russia obtained 38 new ICBMs, in what is planned to be a multi-year effort to upgrade Russia’s nuclear and conventional forces.
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg rightly denounced Russia’s continued “nuclear saber-rattling.” During his visit to the United States in May, Stoltenberg warned that Russia’s strategic buildup, nuclear saber rattling, and more aggressive bomber patrols throughout the transatlantic region have compounded alarm about Moscow’s violation of the INF Treaty as well as Russia’s continuing aggression against Ukraine.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, speaks at the opening of the International Military-Technical Forum ARMY-2015 in the military-patriotic recreation park Patriot in Kubinka, Moscow Region. (RIA Novosti/Alexander Vilf)
Responding to Putin’s message today, Stoltenberg said that, “They are developing new nuclear capabilities and they are also using nuclear rhetoric more in the way they are messaging their defense strategy and defense posture.”
Stoltenberg called Russia’s “nuclear saber-rattling … unjustified.
It’s destabilizing and it’s dangerous.”
Endorsing US plans to return advanced ground forces to the European Continent, Stoltenberg affirmed that, “We are responding by making sure that NATO also in the future is an alliance which provides deterrence and protection for all allies against any threat.”
US administrations have extensively reviewed and rejected proposals to de-alert more US nuclear forces in peacetime—an idea that President Obama and some of his advisers initially favored.
Obama has since participated in many exercises and top-level evaluations and concluded that de-alerting would weaken deterrence, reduce crisis stability, and deny the US important nuclear employment options.
US officials do not see the value of increasing strategic stability slight through de-alerting in peacetime, when the prospects of a Russia-US nuclear war are practically nonexistent and neither side has the capacity to conduct a disarming first strike, in exchange for reducing stability by having to rapidly re-alert more forces in a crisis, when the risks of nuclear use are much higher.
For example, US officials worry that having to bring more of the US nuclear force on higher alert in a crisis could be destabilizing and invite preemptive thinking by Russia and the United States since both sides would have incentives to strike the other sides’ forces before they complete their preparations to launch.
US policy makers fear that Russia and the United States could find themselves in a race to mobilize similar to that which prevailed in Europe before World War I, when national governments felt they had to mobilize their reserves to meet the dictates of the railroad timetables.
When German leaders found themselves at war with Imperial Russia, they felt that they had no choice but to attack France as dictated by their Shlieffen war plan.
The U.S. nuclear weapons command system is designed so that only the US President can authorize the use of nuclear weapons and has many safeguards against unauthorized or accidental launch.
For example, multiple people and networks would need to transmit and confirm a presidential launch order, and the launch code that must be fed into the missile only exists in hard-copy form.
In addition, the United States has an Open-Ocean Targeting policy in peacetime in which US nuclear missiles are aimed at the oceans just in case an accidental launch occurs.
According to those in charge of the US nuclear arsenal, US forces are not on “hair-trigger” alert status in peacetime.
At present, only the ICBMs and several of the strategic submarines on patrol are on full-alert status; the strategic bombers do not normally have their bombs loaded on their planes.
In a crisis, the rest of the force can be regenerated—with the bombers able to be more rapidly loaded and launched than the rest of the submarine force.
Any decision to raise the US nuclear alert status or actually employ the forces would follow only from an “attack assessment” based on U.S. early warning radars and satellites and the evaluation of their data by US command centers.
The focus of US attention is naturally Russia—the only country that for the next decade will be able to launch a counterforce attack against US nuclear systems based in the United States.
The United States does not have a “launch on warning” posture, according to which US forces would attack Russia before Russia actually launched some of its nuclear forces.
The United States does have “launch under attack” (LOA) options, but the United States does not need to use them, since a sufficiently large number of US nuclear forces on alert would survive a preemptive Russian attack whether in peacetime or in a crisis, but only provided US forces are regenerated rapidly enough to match Russian launch preparations.
The assumption is that any US forces not on alert can and would be destroyed in a preemptive Russian counterforce attack.
However, US policy makers believe that having LOA options, which de-alerting would reduce or eliminate, can enhance deterrence.
Notwithstanding Moscow’s nuclear rhetoric, the present Russian government does not seem to care about the de-alerting issue, meaning that Moscow is unlikely to reciprocate any unilateral US concessions.
The last time there were any official Russia-US talks on the issue was during the Yeltsin-Clinton years, when the two governments agreed to their Open-Oceans targeting agreement—aiming their missiles at the sea rather than each other in peacetime.
Despite earlier complaints by Russian arms controllers, Russian government officials no longer make an issue of the so-called alleged US “upload potential”–the ability of the United States to return nuclear warheads to strategic delivery systems from where they had been removed under earlier arms control agreements placed in storage pending dismantlement.
US experts believe that their Russian counterparts understand that the United States would require months to return these warheads to US strategic submarines and ICBMs since the United States has only a limited number of skilled technicians and specialized equipment for loading warheads on delivery vehicles.
US officials would like to renew official strategic stability talks with Moscow, but Russian officials insist that their US counterparts cannot pick or choose—they must re-launch the entire two dozen Russian-US presidential commission working groups rather than resume the few ones, such as regarding strategic stability, that the United States considers most important.
In addition, President Obama, like his predecessors, has participated in many exercises and reviewed many studies and decided that he wants to have a range of nuclear employment options, which requires having some of the US nuclear arsenal on full-time alert—and more than required simply to deter a Russian attack against the United States..
Instead, the Obama administration has decided that a better way to strengthen strategic stability that through further de-alerting is to improve the US command and control system to counter the challenges of having aging hardware and to thwart efforts at cyber manipulation of US nuclear forces.
Note: The Topol-M system is shown in the video above.
The TOPOL-M missile was designed to penetrate an American anti-ballistic missile shield by leveraging high-speed, a relatively small infrared signature during its boost phase, advanced decoys (as many as ten carried on a single missile), maneuvering mid-course capability, and maneuvering independently targeted reentry vehicles, of which it can carry up to six, although they are said to carry just one operationally.
The missile’s high speed shortens the time anyone can react to it, and every second matters when it comes to ballistic missile defense. The rocket motors were designed for a short, very powerful boost stage so that American space-based infrared detection satellites (SBIRS, DSP) have less time to detect and track it. Its decoys make it hard for radar to adequately track the correct target, and its countermeasures are said to have been upgraded to fool infrared tracking systems, which are use for mid-course interception. The missile and reentry vehicles’ ability to dynamically maneuver outside of their ballistic track makes producing an effective kill solution, or even predicting the TOPOL-M’s target, problematic. All these features come together to make a missile that is probably outside of America’s missile defense capabilities today, and the sheer number of them that exists makes the idea of defending against anything but a limited barrage totally invalid.
Editor’s Note: The Russian re-emphasis upon nuclear weapons across the tactical and strategic spectrum, along with their assertive global policies, come at a time when the rules established in the past are not simply that — rules of the past being redefined by new nuclear states forging a second nuclear age.
The Russian actions against US and NATO pilots seen in the Baltic, are either provocations or a new generation of pilots who have not learned that moving within 1o feet of a non-fighter combat aircraft is not safe and not acceptable.
This is a microcosm of a bigger problem — what are the rules of deterrence going forward?
For a broader look at the dynamics of the second nuclear age see the discussion on the Second Line of Defense Forum:
Spirits ran high aboard the Karel Doorman, a warship with the Royal Netherlands Navy, as U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 made the first MV-22 Osprey landing aboard a Dutch ship during an interoperability test conducted near Marine Corps Air Station New River, North Carolina, June 12.
“What we normally do is support the forces ashore,” said Capt. Peter van den Berg, the commanding officer of the warship.
To better support ground forces, the amphibious unit recognizes it needs aircraft support, said van den Berg.
“That’s why the Netherlands Navy is very interested in cooperating and integrating with the U.S. Marine Corps and operating the Osprey from our decks,” said van den Berg.
“The Osprey is capable of doing large airlifts at a time, instead of a smaller helicopter – an Osprey can take much more personnel back to shore.”
The landing was the first of its kind and tested the interoperability of the two military entities, as well as the Dutch’s ability to host the American aircraft aboard their ships through carrier landings.
“The majority of people live within 300 nautical miles of the ocean,” said Capt. Matthew Thompson, a Marine with VMM-261 and the pilot and operations officer for the exercise.
“With that in mind, the true Marine aspect of ‘from the sea, to the shore,” is increasingly important. Being able to land on a ship, or sea base from a ship, and move people, things, to the shore is increasingly important.”
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The test included five landings aboard the warship along with a refuel check to test the Osprey’s ability to receive fuel from the Dutch warship.
“[This test] supports the mission of the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing because when units from 2nd MAW move forward, they sometimes work in concert with coalition partners and that may include the Dutch one day,” said Thompson.
Thompson said building a stronger relationship and testing the units’ ability to integrate was the central focus of the carrier landings.
“The MV-22 Osprey provides commanders with unprecedented agility and operational reach,” said Thompson.
The U.S military has a long-standing history working with their Dutch counterparts, a partnership both units expressed an interest in deepening.
“Having the knowledge that we learned today can help us when we move forward, if we ever work with the Dutch, which I think is a very real possibility … especially when we saw the amount of compatibility that we have from a simple exercise like today,” said Thompson.
2015-06-12 By Gulshan Luthra and Cmde Ranjit Rai (Retd)
Singapore. The sea is a dangerous place, getting miniaturized due to the ever-growing number of naval and merchant vessels, factors that mandate internationally cooperative efforts to maintain the peace and stability of the established Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC) as well as neutrality of the waters.
This was an important observation made at seminars on the sidelines of naval exhibition IMDEX in May, particularly by Prof Geoffrey Till, a respected naval historian based here with the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). He observed, quite emphatically, that China’s interest in the Indian Ocean along with the rapid expansion of its naval capabilities cannot be taken lightly.
Notably, there are strong military ties between Beijing and Islamabad, and China has provided and paid for the development of Gwadar port, next to the strategic Strait of Hormuz, and not far away from Indian shores.
China’s intent to claim much of the South China Sea by establishing artificial islands is already troubling this part of the Pacific. Further movement of its nuclear and non-nuclear vessels, including submarines, westwards into the Indian Ocean should be worrying not only for India but other countries as well.
Prof Till wasn’t the only one to express this concern. Everyone except the Chinese in fact said so. The Americans were emphatic, and top to bottom, officers simply said they didn’t care about China’s synthetic claims, echoing what Admiral Harry Harris Jr, Commander of the US Pacific Command, has often said (and declared repeatedly by successive US Secretaries of Defense, including the newly-appointed Ashton Carter).
Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Akitaka Saika has observed that China had violated Japanese waters more than 130 times, and Japan has warned them off “in Chinese” without trying to provoke hostilities.
Beijing’s apparent aim is to control virtually the entire South China Sea, a position not acceptable to any one.
Why does China create ripples with nearly all its neighbors?
Admiral Michelle Howard, US Navy’s first four-star distinguished lady officer, serving as Vice Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO), categorically demanded: I think it is now time for China to talk about what the reclamation of land means. There is a purpose to it and I think in terms of helping everybody, who lives in this part of the world to understand the Why, it would be helpful for China to explain it.”
She discounted any chances of any conflict with Chinese forces though, saying there was an established mechanism to prevent a clash.
China has steadily warned US ships and aircraft to keep off its newly created-and-claimed areas while the US Navy continues to go where it wishes to “in the international waters.” In fact, soon after the Singapore show, the US Navy sent a P8-A Poseidon maritime surveillance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft over the area being reclaimed by China.
This “string of pearls” strategy of bases and diplomatic ties includes the Gwadar port in Pakistan, naval bases in Burma, electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal, funding construction of a canal across the Kra Isthmus in Thailand, a military agreement with Cambodia and building up of forces in the South China Sea, Credit: Japan Focus
Nonetheless, China has declared that it would continue to build the islands as well as defensive and offensive air, naval and land capabilities.
It will also build lighthouses and defenses in the disputed Spratly islands, which are claimed also by Vietnam and the Philippines.
Singapore is a beautiful city, a good host, and many countries from the Pacific and elsewhere were invited to IMDEX, the region’s International Maritime Defence Exhibition. There were delegations from India, China, Vietnam, Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Germany, France, Sweden, US, Italy, Bahrain, Oman, Spain, Israel and Pakistan. Many countries displayed their ships at the Changi Naval Base with India showcasing INS Satpura, a multirole stealth ship, and INS Kamorta, an anti-submarine corvette.
Rear Admiral Ajendra Bahadur Singh, Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet (FOCEF), was there to congratulate his hosts on the 50th Anniversary of Indo-Singapore diplomatic relations, and to coordinate the annual naval exercise with the Singapore Navy (Simbex – 15, or Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise).
Additional Director General and Indian Coast Guard Commander (West) Surinder Pal Singh Basra was also invited by the Singapore Navy.
To recall, operational interaction between the Indian Navy and Royal Singapore Navy commenced with ASW training exercises in 1994, and formalized as an annual bilateral exercise in 1999.
Over 20 years, SIMBEX has grown in tactical and operational complexity, transcending from the traditional emphasis on ASW to more complex maritime exercises involving various facets of Naval operations such as Air Defence, Air and Surface Practice Firing, Maritime Security and Search and Rescue.
In 2014, Simbex-14 was conducted May 22-28 off Port Blair in which RSN ships Valour and Independence participated, while the Indian Navy was represented by Guided Missile Corvettes Karmuk, Kuthar and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Dornier.
This year, RSN ship Supreme and submarine Archer along with MPA and fighter aircraft took part, and the Indian Navy brought in its Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti Submarine (LRMR-ASW) aircraft P 8I, which is now well integrated into its force structure.
The US displayed its latest Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Fort Worth with one manned and one unmanned helicopters , and significantly, for the first time in aviation history, the same pilot can fly either of the two aircraft, up in the air or from the control station on the ship. Appropriately, the squadron of these pilots is called Magicians. The machines on board were Sikorsky-Lockheed Martin MH 60R Seahawks and Northrop Grumman’s MQ 8 Fire Scout, both of which are on offer to India.
All the countries including Singapore, India, Malaysia, Australia, US and others allowed the media to visit their ships, some 20 of them all.
There was one exception, the Chinese ship, Jiangkai class frigate Yulin (569) with C 803 Missile and Harbin Z-9 helicopter (copy of French Dauphin) was kept away from the prying eyes of newsmen.
The event was apparently a show of capabilities, and as far as intent was concerned, China insisted the growth of its naval power was just for peace and stability.
Rear Admiral Shen Jinlong, who exchanged courtesy visits onboard some of the participating ships, including INS Satpura, told India Strategic that China wanted good relations with everyone. He warned the US to keep out, and in reply to a question, said India had no locus standi in the region.
Addressing a seminar, he had claimed that China’s policy is “defensive in nature, actively developing friendly relations with the rest of the world.”
Admiral Jinlong, who is commander of the Chinese navy’s South China Fleet – that operates in the area where China is reclaiming 2000 acres of sea by artificially building islands – also said: A new security concept should be unfolded; keep yourself safe while making others safe and jointly build a harmonious and stable environment…. We should adhere to solve maritime disputes in a peaceful way, reduce suspicions, understand each other, control risks, avoid conflict and strive for win-win situations.”
He said that any dispute in the region should be left to the countries in the region to resolve, an argument not accepted by others as China is not talking about its established waters but outside them to claim what it shares with most of its neighbors, Japan, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam etc.
Prof Till said that China has to understand that the South China Sea does not belong to China just as the Indian Ocean does not belong to India. The established maritime boundaries must not be disturbed, and the freedom of navigation should continue to be there for all nations as has been historically so.
All the countries, from Australia to the US, are members of the international community, and should be free to operate in South China Sea or the Indian Ocean or the Pacific.
That should include both India and China.
But does China accept this?
Apparently NO.
It is the observation of these writers that China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean should be a big worry for India, particularly the creation of a Chinese naval base at Gwadar.
China and Pakistan are military allies, and Pakistan continues to needle India in every way, fair or foul, military or terrorism notwithstanding its own dissipation due to internal troubles.
It may be recalled that while India sought Soviet technical support in building the Visakhapatnam naval base, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was firm in not accepting Soviet funds, for that would have made it difficult for her to say a NO to Moscow in permitting a Soviet naval base there.
Soviet technicians were allowed only to help maintain the submarines and vessels that India bought, and their mess deck – staying place at the base – was named Kremlin. That was all.
The Kremlin is still there, and interestingly, Mr. Carter, who is the first US Secretary of Defense to visit an Indian naval base on June 2, would have passed by it. It is not known if anybody drew his attention to this building, located very near the entry gate of the Eastern Naval Command.
Mr. Carter is continuing with US efforts to draw India into a rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific region, and cooperation against China is one of the items on his agenda. India may or may not get drawn into it, but a lot will depend upon what China does in the Indian Ocean.
In the case of Pakistan, China has paid for the development of the Gwadar port, and much more. It is logical that it will begin with commercial vessels and then gradually station and service its warship and submarines there. China is also giving Pakistan eight submarines, and Chinese maintenance personnel, engineers, and apparently others, will come there as part of the initial package. Islamabad will not hesitate in helping Beijing, particularly as China has now become the source of a substantial largesse – US$ 46 billion in addition to whatever is already given.
Pakistan has always depended on doles from the US, and even used terrorism to demand more. Post the 9/11 terror attacks on the US; equations between Washington and Islamabad are bound to wither over time. The entry of China as a one-way generous friend in terms of money, is a welcome opportunity for Pakistan.
With nearly 70 submarines, a few aircraft carriers in the making, large amphibious aircraft and other seaborne capabilities, the Chinese navy seems ready to venture out.
China will not explain to the Americans the Why of their build-up in the South China Sea, or their increasing naval forays into the Indian Ocean. But China is there in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir, it has systematically been creating surface links from there to Gwadar.
China has also been challenging India on its Himalayan border.
Or for that matter, challenging all its neighbors as well.
Watch out, Dear World, there is trouble ahead.
China has the will, money, capability, and intent to throw new challenges on the horizon.
Gwadar, built by it, paid for by it, and maintained by it, will be the pivot of its naval strategy in the Indian Ocean and beyond.
Reprinted with permission of our strategic partner, India Strategic:
Editor’s Note: China and Russia both wish to make conflict in their key regions about conflict with the United States.
The reality is very different.
It is about conflict with its neighbors within which the U.S. is an ally of those neighbors.
It is about self-defense coupled with what ever allies can bring to the defense of the country being pressured by either China or Russia.
For a Japanese and French joint perspective on the Chinese actions in the South China Sea. see the following:
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and French President Francois Hollande shared concern Sunday over China’s reclamation projects in disputed areas of the South China Sea also claimed by other countries, a Japanese official said.
On the fighting in Ukraine, Abe and Hollande agreed it is important for all countries concerned, including Russia, to implement a cease-fire agreement to halt fighting between government forces and pro-Russia rebels, according to the official.
The Japanese and French leaders met on the sidelines of the Group of Seven summit in Schloss Elmau, south of Munich.
The other G-7 members are Britain, Canada, Germany, Italy and the United States.
Abe told Hollande that China has been pushing ahead with reclamation “at a rapid pace” in the area, the official said.
China has built artificial islands and facilities on them in disputed parts of the sea, provoking other claimants including the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations.
