Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

Abandoning a Treaty: Russia Makes a Statement

Posted on March 18, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

03/18/2015

2015-03-18 by Richard Weitz

On March 10, Russia ended its participation in the Joint Consultative Group of the Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Moscow’s decision effectively formalizes Russia’s lack of interest in working within the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and deepens concerns that the Kremlin will ignore arms control until Moscow makes further progress in pursuing and applying its conventional and nuclear armaments program.

On November 19, 1990, the then 16 NATO members (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States) and the 6 members of the now disbanded Warsaw Pact (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union) signed the original CFE Treaty in Paris.

The Treaty established equal ceilings of five categories of “heavy” conventional weapons for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the geographic zone extending from the Atlantic to the Urals, each group agreed to possess no more than 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 620,000 artillery pieces, 800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters.

The accord also created several sub-regions where both blocs could deploy equal numbers of specified weapons systems. The most important zonal (“flank”) limits were located along Russia’s northeast and southwest borders (near Norway and Turkey). Yet, the Warsaw Pact’s subsequent dissolution and NATO’s ensuing expansion soon disrupted these carefully crafted force balances, based on a bloc-to-bloc structure that no longer existed.

To address the changing European security environment, on November 19, 1999, the thirty countries then party to the treaty met at a heads of state summit in Istanbul and adopted two important agreements.

First, NATO governments agreed to modify the CFE Treaty that replaced the obsolete bloc ceilings and zones with a system of national limits for each treaty party. The adopted treaty draft also reduced the size of the flank zones.

Currently, Russia is running large scale exercises which includ putting the northern fleet on alert, including with nuclear weapons, for arctic defense,Putin has stressed the importance of a strong Russian presence in the resource-rich Arctic region, where it shares a border with NATO member Norway.

In addition, Russian President Boris Yeltsin indicated Russia would withdraw its forces from the former Soviet military bases in Moldova and negotiate with Georgia on an appropriate Russian military presence (if any) in the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Unfortunately, the new Russian government under Vladimir Putin retained a military presence in Moldova and Georgia, citing security and other considerations.

As a result, only four of the signatories—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine (partly)—ratified the 1999 Adaptation Agreement.

The Russian decision to withdraw from the Joint Consultative Group has little practical effect since in 2007, the Russian government “suspended” its participation in the CFE Treaty due to “exceptional circumstances” that jeopardized Russia’s “national interests in the sphere of military security.” The suspension has resulted in Russia’s not providing information about the size, location, and activities of its military forces west of the Ural Mountains, the Russian territory covered by the treaty, for more than seven years.

At the time, the other three dozen governments effectively ignored the Russian decision, calling on Russia to resume participation but continuing to share data and otherwise adhere to the treaty. The Russian military was large but weak, seen as unlikely to present a major threat to its neighbors or most anyone else. Russian defense spending was limited and the command was churning reforms and projects with little practical effect.

But then Russia and Georgia went to war in August 2008.

The Russian military performance was mediocre but good enough to seize Georgia’s breakaway provinces as well as undermine the CFE treaty restrictions.

During the conflict, the Russian forces in the CFE’s North Caucasus flank region exceeded their permissible limits; they eventually occupied all the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Russia subsequently recognized these two regions as independent countries, whose governments then allowed the Russia to establish large bases on their territories.

More importantly, the troubled military campaign spurred the Russian leadership to make the reforms needed to produce a more powerful military machine.

Anatoly Antonov Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation — Anatoly Antonov
Deputy Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation

Following a delay due to the Georgia War, the treaty parties held intermittent but fruitless negotiations.

For a while, Russian officials proposed that NATO governments ratify the Adopted Treaty and then Russia and the other parties would try to improve it.

However, in an April 2013 speech at a Geneva disarmament conference, Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov said that the

CFE Treaty and associated arrangements based on the principles of the Cold War are absolutely outdated.

At least Russia will never return to them.

We need a new approach to address the issues of conventional arms control.

In November of last year, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov declared the treaty “dead,” adding that “there will be no return.”

Meanwhile, Russian officials threaten to challenge other critical pillars of European arms control.

According to the U.S. government, Moscow has violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty by testing a prohibited missile.

In addition, Moscow violated the Budapest Memorandum whereby Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom offered Ukraine security assurances in return for giving up its nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, the Russians insist that any new European security architecture must limit the further growth in the size of NATO’s membership and the alliance’s ability to deploy forces near Russian territory. Some Russian analysts interpret the recent CFE withdrawal decision as a riposte to the recent U.S. military deployments in the Baltics.

The Russian government is annexing the two separatist regions of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, making the bases their part of Russian territory despite OSCE norms against using military force to change borders.

In recent years, moreover, Russia has conducted large-scale military exercises with little or no advance notice to NATO members or other countries, including one now in Crimea, with nuclear bombers.

These “snap” drills are designed to test the Russian military’s day-to-day readiness without advanced warning to the troops, but also were used to conceal the Russian military operation in Crimea and then to prevent Ukrainian forces from concentrating their attacks against the pro-Russian rebels in eastern Ukraine.

Furthermore, the Russian air force is flying an unprecedented number air patrols in European air space, with Russian military aircraft turning off their transponders to conceal their position from Western air controls. Russians argue that the growing length and precision of long-range strike forces make having regional numerical limitations such as the CFE’s flank zones obsolete. But they also insist that any new conventional arms control treaty to limit carrier-based or remotely piloted airplanes.

Russian calls on the parties to set the CFE aside and negotiate a new legally binding conventional arms treaty will prove exceptionally difficult given the differences between the parties.

Above all, now that the Russian military has shown in Ukraine its improved tactical and operational effectiveness, Moscow is unlikely to agree to serious limits on the growth or application of its military power, at least at present when the Eurasian security order is both threatening and (for Kremlin revisionists) enticing.

Editor’s Note: Arms control is effective when the parties agree that limits make strategic sense; when the underlying order shifts and powers seek to “break out” of older constraints, arms control is not only a dead letter but only constrains those who hope the past constraints hold without any realistic look at the new hard power situation.

We have seen this before with treaties such as the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.

Shaping a New Way to Manage the Supply and Logistical Chains: Forging a Smart Network

Posted on March 17, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

03/17/2015

2015-03-17 By Robbin Laird

The introduction of new sensors into the supply chain has provided a solid basis for starting to think differently about how to manage the supply chain and the entire logistics custodial system.

As Secretary Wynne underscored in his interview on the start of an industry, the introduction of unique identifiers and RFID tags allowed the beginning of real transparency in the movement of goods for the defense enterprise.

And as Rob Leibrandt from OSD Acquisition, Technology and Logistic underscored, the new sensors then allowed a rethink in how to operate the supply and logistics chains.

As it became possible to match up items with inventories through a scanning device and because of the volumes involved (whether bricks or wheels), “people started to translate this into force management, which was not intended at first. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in particular realized that, if done properly, the right combination of UIDs could make an RFID, allowing you to read up a full pallet load.”

“(…) People started to translate this into force management, which was not intended at first.”

https://sldinfo.com/starting-an-industry-from-uid-to-rfid/

But new standards and new sensors are not enough.

An entire rethink of the workflow and how to then use the operational intelligence generated by the new sensors is required. It is not a question of simply building new file cabinets filed with digital data generated by sensors; it is not simply replacing paper with electronically generated data.

What is facilitated by the introduction of new sensors into the supply and logistics chains is the possibility of a whole new way of working and managing those efforts.

But to turn possibility into reality can not be generated simply by attaching sensors to objects; a new way of thinking and managing data, as well as working with the data generated, including reshaping the relationship between local and central actors is required.

That effort is at the heart of the entire effort of GlobeRanger and the approaches put into practice by the head of GlobeRanger, George Brody and his team. In this series of articles, we will look at the initial approach of Brody, then translated into GlobeRanger’s proprietary software, iMotion, and the diversity of applications to which the software has been applied which in turn lead to the retooling of the software.

This entire effort is unleashing new ways to manage the supply and logistics chains and providing new ways to use automation and work process tools to deliver more accuracy and innovation in supply chain management.

In this article, we will start by looking at the original concept and the origins of that concept by George Brody, which then translated itself into a new start-up company, GlobeRanger.

In the next article, we will look at the software tools and engines developed to implement the approach, iMotion and GR-AWARE.

We will then look at some of the defense related domains to which these tools have been applied and to their potential for a new defense program such as the F-35 global enterprise.

At the heart of the approach has been the application of a telecoms concept and technologies for locating people to forging an approach to shape an Internet of Things. By so doing, an enterprise can locate and monitor goods and supplies in an analogous manner to that of the mobile telecoms approach.

Graph 1

Question: How did your telecoms background affect your initial approach to the world of logistics and shaping what you refer to as the Internet of Things?

Brody: I came at this from my experience in the telecoms world and the shift from landlines to mobile networks. Look at the old landline network. In the global telephone network there was no concept of tracking a person as the person moved around. Calls were directed to some location and jacks in the wall associated with phone numbers assigned to them. The numbers were not associated with a person, but with a place where that person might be found at a particular moment. But the system was not able to find a person in motion.

When people move around they don’t specifically go to a location. They move around. The network had no knowledge of where the person was. So to track a person, the caller had to do a lot of work, the caller had to call you at the office or home. It’s a really dumb network when it comes to tracking of people.

Question: In other words, there was a physical infrastructure to which you were attached rather than the infrastructure supporting the mobile individual?

Brody: Yes. People had to realistically guess where you are, and then start trying to reach you. As a result, call completions were not that good as people were not at the places where they are expected to be.

Voicemail came along so that callers could still get a message to the person he/she was calling. Obviously, this was a stop-gap and transitional means of contact with people on the go.

Question: To be clear, this voicemail system really was based on a series of inboxes. One can put a voicemail into the inbox, but you had no idea where the individual was. So the system was not even focused on people in motion?

Brody: Exactly. I know also the frustration on the part of the caller if you want to get somebody immediately; it was impossible unless you got lucky enough to catch the person in one of the places he/she was likely to be. More than likely, that person was in the car and you could not reach them.

The creation of the mobile network solved this problem.

But to do so, there needed to be a new infrastructure with a different approach tied to a person who is moving around, and the concept of a personal number that is always associated with the person rather than a location.

When that person moves around, the network is going to keep track of where that person is. Interestingly, a network knows where you are. The caller in this case doesn’t have to know anything. They just call your personal number. Then, the network does the rest of the work.

By virtue of this, there is an intelligent network operating where the network adapts itself to the location of the person. Put in other terms, this intelligent mobile network was able to move the process of connecting people away from the fixed wireline network to the edge, namely where the person is in motion.

People can be connected quickly without going back to the old telephone network. That’s what the mobile networks are best at. It’s a very intelligent, smart network at the edge. That’s where I’ve spent most of my telecom career – building intelligent wireless networks. My experience was in the creation of products for those mobile systems which could operate as an intelligent smart, edge network.

Question: Obviously at some point, you began to ask yourself the question, “This is great. This is transformational. It’s revolutionary. What about tracking things?”

How did that happen?

Brody: Just before I started the company, I was on my way to visit my brother’s family in Toledo, Ohio in the middle of winter. Weather was a problem in Chicago and the airline changed connections to get me to Detroit instead. As expected I arrived in Detroit but my bags were nowhere to be found. The airline could track me, but not my bags. The airline software system knew exactly where I was because it was scanning my boarding pass at every gate. Yet my bag was completely disconnected from that system, because the location of the “item in motion” was not (wirelessly) synchronized to the enterprise system.

So I thought to myself: “Here is a problem that is going to be very commonplace.” There are enterprise systems which need to be augmented by an intelligent network to track items that are in motion like baggage or any other things in the supply chain.

So to confirm, I went to warehouses to find out how they kept track of things in the warehouse. Sure enough, it’s a very tedious process. They went from using a clipboard to using a small, little barcode scanner. People were spending a lot of time to keep up with the movement of their items and making sure they end up in the right information system controlling their warehouse or business operations.

The systems were highly manual. They had to make sure a particular item was actually in the warehouse and then sending all the data back into the enterprise system. It’s very cumbersome.

So, the light went on. The enterprise system as expensive as it is, is almost in the same state as what the landline telecom network was prior to the advent of the intelligent mobile network. The items are moving all over the place, closer to the edge. That’s really the edge of the enterprise. The movement is happening at the edge and there needs to be a software layer just like the software layer in the mobile network that can keep track of items in motion.

And that has been my focus of attention from that point on and we built the GlobeRanger approach to be able to keep track of items in motion.

Question: So the IT systems that were operational were virtually clones of paper systems. They were basically digitalized filing cabinets with data pushed back to a central processing center. In other words, they were not attached to the movement of the things themselves?

Brody: People were spending a lot of time trying to keep up with the movement. So that’s why I said “information” about things in motion and items in motion were not synchronized. Having accurate information about things in motion is crucial to any effective management effort.

Question: Your experience in the mobile network gave you the experience of a culture change and a mindset change enabled by the technology. You were looking at how could you map that same capability into the workflow process of the movement of things.

And of course at the same time you’re thinking about this, we have this electronics revolution, which is starting to put in place miniaturization of tags and other sensors that could be tied to your vision.

Is that a fair way to put it?

Brody: It is. Since we are talking in concepts here, you and I are tagged objects by virtue of the mobile phone we carry with us becoming the “tag”. When the phone is with us, when we move the tracking of the location of the phone can be easily associated with our movement. The reason why the “tag” that you and I carry today is big is because it is a full-fledged communication device. If we needed just tracking, the tag could have been much simpler.

In the mobile network there’s only one process that moved from the core to the edge which is the process of making calls or communicating with others.

In managing the movement of things, we are focused on many processes and the key question of which processes are better handled at the edge and what needs to go back to a central processing center.

By focusing on the workflows, one can determine what data does not need to go back to the core anymore. We can do workflows at the edge. Once the edge network is in place, you can move some of those processes and workflows to the edge.

Graph 2

Question: In effect what you’re saying is a parallel transformation to what happened to phone communications. You’re putting yourself in a situation where everything doesn’t have to go back to the hub.

In effect, you are discussing the confluence of several processes, which need to be mastered to deliver the kind of transformation of management of supply, and logistic systems, which you have in mind.

In looking through your background material, which I read through for this interview, there is one slide which highlights the confluence of processes, and seems central to your approach.

What this graphic illustrates is that decision-making and the flows appropriate to the level of decision making is a key challenge and requirement for effective logistical operations.

And your system is technologically agnostic in the sense that the sensors can change, now RFID is crucial but this could change, and your focus is on managing information on the edge and helping informing decision about decision making and work flows.

Could you talk to this graphic and explain the thinking behind it?

Brody: The part that you picked out of the text represented the confluence part is very fundamental to our thinking and to our approach.

The confluence of Edge Computing, Wireless Sensors and Context-Aware technologies is causing reality awareness, events and decentralized decision making at their respective intersections as shown.

Let’s look at it together. I have with me a tag or sensor attached to an item. I want to know what is actually happening in reality. What is really happening?

In order to do that I need to have this little sensor out there and then I need to have some kind of edge computing that needs to be done closer to where the sensor is. At the intersection, that operational reality is yielded by the intersection of edge computing, and the sensor device.

We also need to have events. There are certain things that are happening which require correlation of sensor data to create an event.

For example, I now have a situation where the temperature of an item has exceeded beyond the allowed limit. There is a temperature reading, and then there is threshold beyond which we have an alarm situation.

That is context awareness. So that will create an event saying that there is an exception situation and the temperature of the perishable item has exceeded for five minutes and it is no longer usable. The intersection between the context-aware technology and the sensor data gives me that valuable event.

When I take the intersection of edge computing and the context awareness together with the events and the reality, I can now establish business rules and make a decentralized decision based on correlating the proper information with the proper business rule.

A key part of the approach is helping determine which events should be handled locally, which events should be driven to some other management level, so you’re actually building a kind of a hierarchy, a network of decision-making. You’re trying to understand what is better handled locally, rather than choking the system and being sent back to the core.

In this new approach, decisions can be made locally. Previous architectures didn’t allow us to determine the correlation between reality information, business rules and events to enable decentralized decision making.

We are building a smart network that has a picture of how the data goes from edge to the core.

Previous systems would have sent data back without any filtering to the enterprise system and what is this going to do.

There has to be a certain level of filtering and aggregation built into the physical level of the edge network. But then once you got the data all filtered at the physical level, then correlation of multiple sensor data, in manufacturing an event using the context information, business rules can be applied and decisions can be made.

Question: Correlation is the key to this approach and thereby putting appropriate decisions to the edge, and enabling more effective decisions at the core?

Brody: Exactly, correlation allows us to create something meaningful. The fact that things are moving is given but what does it mean in the context of the supply or logistics chain?

Question: Essentially you’re creating operational intelligence and shaping an understanding of a work process that actually could allow you to master the supply chain

In effect, your approach is about generating meaningful operational intelligence about the movement of things in a supply or logistics chain?

Brody: That is clearly an outcome of the approach. To move from simply having data about the movement of things, we are providing ways to manage the supply chain more effectively.

And the edge computing approach is designed to ensure that data is handled appropriately at the local area and not sent flooding the core, putting major bandwidth and noise distortions into the management system.

Question: Let me ask you a final question.

Obviously, RFID technology is a key enabler for your software systems and approaches, but hardware will change, and it appears you are hardware agnostic.

So when new sensor technologies arrive, your sensor agnostic approach can kick in effectively?

Brody: This Venn diagram we have been discussing assumes that the world is going to be changing so rapidly and hardware is going to change significantly over time. I don’t want to be tied to it specific piece of hardware, so we built this in a way that the top two circles are independent of that bottom circle which is the hardware being used currently by the logistics system.

It has to be one of the fundamental principles of building this edge platform. There can be all kinds of sensors, all kinds of things wired, wireless, it doesn’t matter to the approach which we have built and are applying in a diversity of industrial supply chains.

For the first piece in this series see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/managing-defense-supply-chains-shaping-a-21st-century-way-ahead/

And for a GlobeRanger white paper on smart networks:

https://sldinfo.com/whitepapers/supply-chain-management-innovation-building-smart-networks/

The Greeks Buy Time While Germany Repositions Within Europe

Posted on March 17, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-03-06 By Harald Malmgren

An historic February confrontation between the newly elected Syriza-led Greek government and the EU Commission, ECB, and IMF was averted by an ambiguous agreement to sort out differences over the period March to June.

Initially, it appeared that Eurozone governments, led by German Finance Minister Schauble, had yielded nothing significant to the new Greek leadership except to permit delay in the Greek decision whether its government would confirm continuity of the terms of the previous Eurozone bailout package, or refuse, and face a potential exit from the Eurozone.

Considering all possible options, the Greeks even prepared for exit by printing adequate Greek currency for distribution as might be needed.

Press and media have thus far concluded that Syriza won nothing except time.

However, while the media were distracted by the Greek tragedy, the political future of Continental Europe was shifting.

Chancellor Merkel’s aides are recently leaking to press and media the development of a new, more intimate and collaborative relationship of Merkel with French President Hollande. The public relations spin is that Merkel and Hollande became closer in their lengthy, arduous negotiations with Putin over the Minsk agreement to suspend armed conflict in the Ukraine.

This unlikely new show of mutual respect and affection between the two masked more fundamental worries in Paris and Berlin about the uncertain fate of Europe.

In Germany, Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel, who is also leader of the SDP coalition partner, broke with the hard stance of the CDU/CSU on treatment of Greece. In parallel, Merkel’s party suffered losses in regional elections, and the anti-EU and anti-EMU Alliance for Deutschland (AfD) secured seats in Hamburg’s parliament.

In Late February under Gabriel’s guidance the SDP began rethinking the faltering architecture of European security, potential breakup of the EU or the Eurozone, and Germany’s wavering foreign relations.

In Spain, the anti-EU political sentiment grew louder as Popodemus Party seemed to be gathering broad popular support, and movement to force a referendum on Catalonian secession from Spain seemed to gain momentum. In Italy, always stressed by intra-party conflicts, coherent political leadership seemed to be waning.

In the UK, anti-European sentiment remained strong and threatened to tip the Conservative Party into a more UK-Exit stance.

In France, Marine Le Pen’s popularity continued to grow, and with it her anti-EU followership.

Across many EU countries localism and rising anti-austerity sentiment seemed to be bringing into question Germany’s dominant role in Eurozone economic policy.

All of this internal political turbulence was taking place at the same time that European leaders, in particular Merkel and Hollande, were confronted with an increasingly aggressive Russia, both politically and militarily.

It became evident that Putin had raised his ambitions from rendering Ukraine economically and politically dysfunctional to a bigger objective of resumption of Russian assertion of influence and even power over the entire former Soviet Bloc neighborhood.

With the exception of the UK, France and Estonia, most of the European members of NATO had allowed defense spending to fall below agreed targets of defense spending in support of common security. Germany had not only permitted its military to fall into unreadiness, but had dramatically shrunk military personnel.

German leadership made a strong shift in foreign policy with its pivot East under Chancellors Schroeder and Merkel.

That pivot was geoeconomic in design, aimed at prioritizing future German economic growth towards Russia, China, and Eurasia more broadly.

Putin’s recent challenges to NATO, to the US, and now to France and Germany put that entire pivot in jeopardy.

Germany is again threatened by dependence on energy from the East.

At this moment, European confidence in Washington has diminished greatly, as the present US Administration is perceived as more concerned with Asia, Iran, and most important, US domestic issues.

The US President is viewed as indifferent and disrespectful of Europe, and US willingness to assure security stability for Western Europe is seen as weak.

For the moment, Merkel and Hollande are talking about a potential European military-strategic alternative, but Western Europe is simply not able to put together and fund a meaningful military response to Russia.

In this context, it appears that Merkel is being forced by her coalition, particularly the SPD side, to rethink the future of Western Europe, and Germany’s position in it.

Most likely this will require Merkel to reinvite UK involvement in a future of Europe discussion, as only the UK and France have meaningful military capabilities among the larger European economies. Moreover, the Finns, Norwegians, Swedes and Danes are all independently adopting a harder stance on Russia which Berlin cannot ignore.

In other words, while Greece is pivoting, Europe itself is changing and evolving.

The financial battle between Greece and its European and IMF creditors is taking place at a time when the entire political and security shape of Europe is in flux.

The critical geographic and strategic position of Greece in the bigger European picture is likely to come into play in the next few months as the bigger question is posed whether either the EU or the Eurozone of today may be the Europe of tomorrow.

Greece may soon find the EU/ECB/IMF Troika, dominated by Germany’s Finance Minister and German Constitutional law, may no longer be its wrestling partner, as Europe metamorphoses politically into something fundamentally different.

In this context of rethinking Europe’s future, and Germany’s role in Europe, the postponement time achieved by Greece may result in a different, more geosecurity and geopolitical response of Germany to Greece’s debt predicament.

Also see the following:

http://archive.defensenews.com/print/article/20120902/DEFFEAT05/309020004/The-New-European-Map

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/greek-elections-challenge-and-the-future-of-europe/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/shaping-a-way-ahead-for-the-defense-of-europe-a-french-senate-report-considers-a-new-approach/

http://breakingdefense.com/tag/harald-malmgren/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-european-union-and-the-east-the-friedrich-ebert-stiftung-looks-to-the-future/

Not Just in Darwin: The Aussies and the USMC Cooperate at Sea

Posted on March 15, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

03/15/2015

2015-03-15 According to a piece published on the Australian Ministry of Defence website on March 10, 2015, the USMC and the Royal Australian Navy have been collaborating at sea.

HMAS Success’ ship’s company in the Middle East recently witnessed the awesome display of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit’s amphibious vessel USS Iwo Jima.

Deployed on Operation MANITOU, Success was in company with the Iwo Jima on transit through the Gulf of Aden.

Iwo Jima carries MH-60S Seahawk, MH-53E Super Sea Stallion, Bell AH-1W Super Cobra and Bell UH-1N Twin Huey helicopters, as well as Bell MV-22 Osprey (tilt rotor) aircraft and AV-8B Harrier Jets.

Boatswains Mate Able Seaman Thomas Darcy said it was incredible seeing Iwo Jima’s operations up close.

“The Harrier Jets sliced the air leaving a stream line from their wing tips which produced great action photos. This was definitely the highlight of our deployment so far.”

Success recently conducted a Replenishment at Sea (RAS) evolution with Iwo Jima, transferring 685 cubic meters (CZ) of F76 marine diesel fuel, and 405 CZ of F44 aviation fuel to the carrier, the latter a record amount for the RAN’s Battle Tanker.

HMAS Success with USS Iwo Jima. Credit. Australian MoD

Iwo Jima dwarfs Success, a tanker that usually makes other warships look small.

It was a stunning sight for Success’ crew, which is used to looking down on frigates or corvettes from the flag deck.

Success’ own embarked dependable S-70B-2 Seahawk spent much of the RAS evolution in the air, capturing images of this spectacular scene.

Pilot Lieutenant Jordan Taylor was impressed by Iwo Jima’s aviation capability.

“I can see why these ships are so versatile,” he said.

“The flight decks on these types of carriers would be among the most dangerous workplaces in the world.

“There is so much happening, with such little margin for error.”

Success is in the Middle East on Operation MANITOU, the ADF’s contribution to maritime security, stability and prosperity in the area.

Working occasionally as part of Combined Task Force 53, Success provides logistical support to Combined Maritime Fleet coalition naval ships in the Middle East, enabling them to remain on patrol for longer periods.

Success is due to return home to Fleet Base East in June.

Norway Hosts NATO Response Force in September 2015

Posted on March 15, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-03-15 According to a story on the Norwegian Ministry of Defence website published on January 30, 2015, Norway will host the NATO Response Force this Fall.

Noble Ledger is a defence exercise conducted by NATO Response Force (NRF) starting mid-September. The exercise will mainly be executed in the southeast part of Norway.

The first to react in case of emergency

Noble Ledger prepares troops for their responsibilities as NATO Reponse Force. As of the beginning of 2015, this force will be the first to react in case of emergency, such as a humanitarian crisis or an armed conflict.

High-readiness NATO Response Force is a joint force of around 13,000 high-readiness troops, and is made up of land, air, maritime and special operations forces components from the members of NATO.

The response force demonstrates cohesion within NATO as well as a mutual commitment to the treaty. German, Dutch, Danish and Norwegian troops are contributors to exercise Noble Ledger.

Preparing the Norwegian Armed Forces

International cooperation and exercises prepare the Norwegian Armed Forces to solve similar missions together with allies.

Experience from exercises such as Noble Ledger contribute to the Norwegian Armed Forces ability to defend Norwegian values and interests, on a national scale as well as internationally.

Troops visible to the public

NATO troops are visible to the public where the exercise takes place. Ships loaded with equipment will arrive at Brevik and Fredrikstad between 2 September and 14 September^..

The equipment is then transported mainly by train from Brevik and Fredrikstad to Rena and Elverum.

Train transportation reduces road traffic and noise. Withdrawal will happen between 27 September and 2 October.

All troop movements and transportation will be executed with least possible burden to the infrastructure in Norway.

In case the presence leads to any delay, we kindly ask for the understanding of the public.

Below is a video which explains the 2014 version of this exercise which was held in Germany.

Cope North 2015: The Japanese Perspective

Posted on March 15, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-03-15 The Cope North exercises tests allied capacity to cooperate in providing Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Pacfic.

According to a recent piece published on the Japanese Ministry of Defense website, the role of Japan was highlighted in the exercise:

The ASDF took part in the trilateral combat training as well as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) exercise together with the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) from January 27th to March 12th at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

The exercise Cope North Guam seeks to enhance tactical combat skills of the ASDF units and the joint response capabilities of U.S. and Japan forces.

It also provides opportunities for the ASDF to improve interoperability with the USAF and RAAF in the HA/DR activities.

This trilateral exercise involved 460 personnel from the ASDF Air Defense Command and ASDF Air Support Command as well as aircraft such as the F-2A, F-15J/DJ, U-125A, E-2C, C-130H and KC-767.

For the HA/DR component, 64 ASDF personnel and two C-130H aircraft participated in the training involving airlift, airdrop of supplies, takeoff and landings on uneven surfaces, searching operations, and the aeromedical evacuations.

The ASDF units have taken part in Cope North Guam since 1999, with this year marking the 15th time.

The RAAF started participating in the exercise since 2011, making it the fourth time the Japan-U.S.-Australia trilateral training of its kind was held.

The Libyan Challenge to Europe: A Conversation with Marco di Liddo

Posted on March 15, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

2015-03-05 By Robbin Laird

Recently, the Centro Studi Internazionali based in Rome published a report by Marco di Liddo and Gabriele Iacovino on Libya and the fluid situation in the country.

Obviously, the general situation involving ISIL in the region, Egyptian reactions and the general dynamics of the region feed into the Libyan situation, which, in turn, has its more general impact on the region.

I had a chance to discuss the report and the Libyan situation and Italian options during a phone interview on February 27, 2015.

The turbulence in Libya has a direct impact on Europe, notably upon Italy.

The outflow of refugees, the intersection of radicalism in the Middle East within Europe itself, and the dynamics within the region, all drive attention from the Italian state.

The report from Ce.S.I. highlighted the very difficult situation within Libya and its spill over consequences.

The full report can be read in Italian on the Ce.S.I. website or in the English translation provided by the Center which can be downloaded below.

Italian Report on Libyan Situation February 2015

According to the authors the situation in Libya calls for international intervention.

In recent weeks, with the Libyan civil war as a backdrop, we have witnessed the Caliphate of Bayda’s overpowering entrance into the scene, a jihadist organisation based in Derna and officially affiliated to the Islamic State of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Indeed, taking advantage of the serious instability that has characterised Libya since 2011 and in the context of the confrontation between the Operation Dignity secular militia and the Operation Dawn Islamist militia, the jihadist forces launched an unexpected attack aiming to conquer the country, starting from the city of Sirte and with the objective of reaching Tripoli. ….

For Libya, 2014 was the year of the segmentation of the civil war into two fronts: the secular Nasserite front of General Haftar and the Tobruk Government; and the Islamist one of the Tripoli government, flanked by a collection of local militias, some dangerously close to the jihadist movement.

However, this division appears to be a political ploy to differentiate between the warring parties and does not reflect the political and military realities of the battlefield, with variable alliances and a web of magmatic and flexible agreements.

One of the more troubling statistics is that neither side seems to have the strength required to prevail over the other and, above all, the Tobruk and Tripoli governments are still far from any form of dialogue or confrontation.

It appears unlikely that, in the future, this situation will improve without incisive intervention from the international community….

The authors provide insights into the domestic situation in Libya but have written from the point of view of what outside powers can do, both with regard to the limits and the opportunities.

The birth of the Caliphate undoubtedly forces European countries to reconsider their foreign policy and defence strategy.

The Italian diplomats, in line with the trend that emerged in 2014, should continue the process of creating a united front for stabilising Libya.

In the last months of 2014, during the NATO and G8 summits, the government had opened an important channel of negotiations with the United Kingdom, and then continued intensive talks with Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, two leading Arab players engaged in the fight against the Islamic Libyan radical militia.

Libya is, in fact, a theatre where many Middle Eastern actors are developing a role.

The search for stability also involves a close dialogue with these realities.

The Italian government has shown that it fully understands these dynamics thanks to its diplomatic position.

Relations between Rome and Abu Dhabi, for example, have grown in intensity in recent years and today the UAE is one of the most important Italian partners in the region.

Furthermore, the Italian government’s attitude to the new path taken in Egypt, with Prime Minister Renzi being one of the first European leaders to give support to President Sisi, creates improved dialogue with Cairo, increasingly pronounced in its influence in Libya.

All this in light of the fact that, thanks to its role in international diplomacy, Italy could have the strength to also engage Qatar in a diplomatic process.

Qatar is currently firmly supporting the Libyan Islamists, as opposed to the secular forces, which receive aid from the Emirates and Egypt.

The involvement of Doha in the search for a compromise to stabilise Libya seems inevitable at this time because of the role played by the Qatari authorities and the need to find a compromise, or at least some common points among all the actors in Libya.

In this context, the role of Italy as a negotiator could be crucial with possible positive effects for the future.

The interview with Marco di Liddo built on this foundation and he discussed ways in which Italy might broker an opening into the Libyan situation.

The basic idea was to sponsor a conference in Rome, which would invite major Libyan factions to in effect sort out, with which the West could work to move ahead. The challenge from the ISIL-identifiers is clear; but the West did not have a clear ally who could control the situation.

The challenge is to help foster the emergence of a center of power in Libya with whom the West could work and who would be able to provide enough stability to roll back the jihadist forces.

A pure military solution was not going to help for the jihadists would like nothing better than to use a Western intervention to mobilize local opposition and to provide hostages for you tube and other more lethal activities.

The challenge is to bring together Western organizing efforts with appropriate military instruments, and not to fall back onto military instruments as the first entry point.

The EU was obviously important, but the challenge was to launch an effective process to deal with Libya. Here a lead role for Italy along with France could generate a process for change.

In short, to deal with an explosive security situation on the borders of Europe requires more than a military solution or a repeat of Odyssey Dawn.

Military means are part of the solution, but only to work with a coalition able to roll back the jihadist radicals.

This requires political initiatives as well as aid approaches.

The challenge is to shape an approach, one, which can combine the various aspects of power, and to make hard choices on who to work with and who to not.

The report clearly provides an American audience with a better understanding of the situation in Libya and the challenges which need to be met.

Marco Di Liddo is the Analyst in charge of the Africa Desk at Ce.S.I. – Centre for International Studies. Moreover, he is also responsible for the Desk covering the former USSR. He holds a degree in International Relations at University of Trieste and a Master in “Peacekeeping and Security studies” at the University of Roma Tre (Rome).

In 2011, he was teaching assistant in Contemporary History at University of Trieste. As an expert on Africa as well as the former USSR, Di Liddo has been frequently interviewed as commentator on national TV and Radio programmes aired by public broadcaster RAI, Radio Vaticana and TV2000.

Background

Several recent actions by Italy highlight their concerns with developments in Libya.

In a recent article in The Guardian the challenge of refugees was highlighted.

More than 1000 refugees have been saved in the Mediterranean north of Libya in the past two days but 10 people died at sea, Italian officials have said.

A flotilla of rescue vessels, including from Italy’s coastguard and navy, and three cargo ships saved 941 people in seven separate operations on Tuesday. On Wednesday, the coastguard and two cargo ships rescued 94 migrants whose motorised dinghy was in distress 40 miles (65 km) north of Libya.

Survivors were ferried to southern Italian ports. The migrants rescued on Tuesday had been aboard five motorised dinghies and two larger vessels. One of the larger boats capsized and 10 people were later found dead.

For months now, hundreds – sometimes thousands – of migrants fleeing conflicts or poverty have been reaching Italy every week on smugglers’ boats from Libya.

Italy’s interior ministry said 7,882 migrants arrived in the first two months of this year, compared to 5,506 over the same time in 2014. A total of 170,000 migrants and asylum seekers were rescued at sea by Italy’s coast guard, navy and other vessels including cargo ships last year. It is believed the tally will be higher this year.

And concern over the direct security threat from the turbulent situation in Italy has lead to deployments off of Libya by the Italian navy.

According to a March 1, 2015, Reuters story Italy began their annual naval exercises focused on Libya.

Admiral Pierpaolo Ribuffo, the officer in command of exercises, said the operation was not directly connected with the crisis in Libya, where Italian energy group Eni has significant offshore oil platforms and other assets.

But he said the presence of naval vessels in the area could help improve security.

“We’re training our ships and our men, that’s all. Our activity has nothing to do with other scenarios,” he told Italian news agency ANSA in comments that were subsequently released by the navy.

“Obviously the presence of ships at sea also means security, deterrence and dissuasion,” he said. “But that’s normal, it’s like police patrolling the streets.”

Italy, whose southern islands are only around 300 kilometers from the Libyan coast, has led calls for a global diplomatic push to stabilize Libya, where two rival governments are fighting for control and where Islamist militants have gained a growing foothold.

It has also offered help in training a regular Libyan army but has ruled out any peacekeeping mission for the moment.

Concern over attacks on targets in Italy has been heightened by video messages from groups associating themselves with the Islamic State movement, stating that Rome was a target and by press reports that militants could reach Italy on migrant boats.

In effect, what is happening under the pressure of the ISIL movement and other dynamics in the region, the Euro-Med region is becoming a highly interconnected zone within which security is increasingly important.

The EU has been good at giving aid; not so good at providing security imported from turbulent regions in the neighborhood.

And that is increasingly true for the Euro-Med region. The dynamics of change in the region intersect with internal dynamics in Europe to create a fluid situation.

This has led in part to the European Union trying to revitalize its so-called Neighborhood Policy (ENP) to deal with its neighbors in the East and the South.

According to an article by Eric Maurice published in the EU Observer on March 5, 2015:

EU foreign affairs chief Federica Mogherini and neighborhood commissioner Johannes Hahn launched Wednesday (4 March) an ideas paper on the EU strategy towards its neighbors in the east and south.

The EU member states, the 16 ENP partner countries and civil society in the East and South of Europe will be involved in the assessment of the actions undertaken so far.

A first consultation with the southern neighborhood will take place in Barcelona in April. The Eastern Parternship will be reviewed at a summit in Riga in May.

A full proposal for a renewed strategy to spend will be presented next autumn. Over €15 billion have already been budgeted for the period 2014-2020.

Whereas the Neighborhood Policy has until now mainly been about projecting EU soft power to help develop democratic standards and free trade, the focus now is set to be more on protecting Europe from the consequences of its neighborhood instability.

In future, the EU should put “a new emphasis on energy security and organized crime”, as well as terrorism and the management of migration flows, said Hahn.

The EU is also considering co-operating with “the neighbors of the neighbors”.

In a clear reference to energy issues, the consultation paper mentions “Russia and partners in Central Asia”.

The paper also suggests that the ENP could conduct “post-conflict actions as well as related state-and institution-building activities”.

In a neighborhood which is “less stable than ten years ago”, the EU will shift from generic policies to differentiated approaches with its Eastern and Southern neighborhoods as well as between countries in these two regions.

“In a number of areas, the reform agenda has stalled, in part due to competing interests, in part because not all partners seem equally interested in a special partnership with the EU under the model of pluralism and integration”, says the paper.

The EU “needs to move from an approach very much based on the evaluation of progress to a more political approach”, said Mogherini.

But it is difficult to have a neighborhood policy, if the neighborhood is in flames.

This is in effect the challenge with regard to Libya.

Spain Takes Over Air Policing Mission in Baltic States

Posted on March 12, 2015 | by Robbin Laird

03/12/2015

2015-03-12 Spain took over the rotating command of NATO’s air policing mission in January 2015.

The Spanish Air Force is flying its Eurofighters in this role.

According to an El Pais article published on February 19, 2015:

Planes from Group 11 of the Spanish Air Force have been in control of NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission (BAPM), based in Ämari, since January 1 and will continue there until May 4.

So far, the Eurofighters have conducted 108 patrols, clocking up nearly 200 hours of flight time.

Only one flight had to be canceled because of technical problems.

A Spanish pilot in one of the Eurofighters dispatched to patrol the Baltic. / JUANJO MARTIN (EFE)

Eurofighters have conducted 108 patrols, clocking up nearly 200 hours of flight time

“It has been better than we thought,” said Lt. Col. Enrique Fernández Ambel, who is heading the team of 115 Spanish officers of the Ambar detachment.

But the fears are real and the tension exists. NATO is concerned that the conflict may spill over from Ukraine, where the Kiev government has been fighting pro-Russian separatists.

Along the icy waters of the Baltic, two old Cold War adversaries can look directly into each others’ eyes at distances sometimes as close as 300 meters – that is how near Spanish Eurofighters have come to Russian aircraft during the interceptions that have taken place.

These testy encounters have occurred about half-a-dozen times when Russian Ilyushin and Antonov transport planes – modified for spying or electronic warfare – fly from St Petersburg to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad Oblast, which is sandwiched between Lithuania and Poland.

Although the Russian jets have not violated Baltic airspace, they ignore international air navigation rules by not filing a flight plan, turning off their transponders so they can’t be identified, or refusing to communicate with civil aviation authorities.

The Spanish Eurofighters usually intercept and escort them under the orders of NATO’s Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), based in Uedem, Germany.

Commander Eladio Daniel Leal said the tensest moments usually occur when the alarm goes off and “you just don’t know who you are going to encounter, or how they are going to react.”

NATO has been helping the Baltic nations patrol their airspace since 2004 as none of them has an air force of their own. Member countries take turns leading the mission.

And in a story published on January 30, 2015 on the NATO Allied Command Operations website:

Fighter aircraft from Italy, Poland, Spain and Belgium took over NATO’s Baltic Air Policing Mission on January 1, 2015 and will continue to patrol the skies over Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia with a total of sixteen aircraft over the next several months.

NATO has quadrupled the number of NATO fighter jets monitoring the airspace over the Baltic states since early 2014.

This is one of several prudent and defensive measures taken by NATO in response to the security challenges posed by Russia’s recent destabilising actions and use of hybrid warfare in Eastern Europe.

Spanish Typhoon in winter conditions during their Baltic Air Policing mission. Photo courtesy of: Spanish Air Force.

The Alliance has observed a steady increase in Russian military air activity near its borders and the overall nature of Russian air activity has changed.

It is now more assertive and frequent compared to previous years. Allies have voiced concerns about the timing, locations and composition of Russian flights, particularly in the context of a dramatically changed security environment.

Last year, NATO aircraft assigned to the Baltic Air Policing Mission conducted over 150 interceptions of Russian military aircraft, which is about four times as many as in 2013.

“We are concerned about these numbers because it represents a higher than normal amount of Russian air activity close to our borders,” said Lieutenant Colonel Riivo Valge, Chief of Staff of the Estonian Air Force.

“Specifically the amount of transport and fighter air activity has been increased,” he said.

Preserving the integrity of NATO airspace is a collective task.

For member nations not having the full range of Air Defence assets in their own militaries (Albania, Luxembourg, Iceland, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia), agreements exist to ensure a single standard of security within NATO’s Area of Responsibility.

The air policing mission above the Baltic States illustrates the ability of the Alliance to share and pool existing capabilities.

It started in April 2004 and has been executed continuously ever since. So far, 14 NATO nations have participated in this mission.

This is an important confidence building measure to demonstrate the Alliance solidarity and resolve not only to current members, but also to our partners and future potential members.

Air Policing has been, and remains, the cornerstone of Alliance solidarity and cohesion.

The video below shows Spanish air force planes in operation.

And the video was released by the Spanish Ministry of Defense on February 20, 2015.