Aussie Update on Red Flag 2015

02/14/2015

2015-02-14 From 27 January to 13 February 2015, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) will participate in Exercise RED FLAG 15-1 at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

Hosted by the United States Air Force (USAF), Exercise RED FLAG 15-1 will involve participants from the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia.

Utilizing the Nevada Test and Training Range, participants will be exposed to one of the world’s most advanced airborne training environments, and work together to overcome simulated threats in the air, from the ground, and in cyberspace.

A total of 150 RAAF personnel will participate in Exercise RED FLAG 15-1, along with two C-130J Hercules transport aircraft and an AP-3C Orion surveillance aircraft.

According to the Aussies, Red Flag 2015 is a “Fifth generation two scale airwar exercise.”

Australian Ministry of Defence

2/13/15

For our interviews with regard to Nellis AFB and its Warfare Center which hosts Red Flag see the following:

https://sldinfo.com/the-usaf-warfare-center-and-shaping-the-future-of-the-combat-air-force-a-discussion-with-major-general-silveria/

https://sldinfo.com/training-for-the-21st-century-battlespace-a-discussion-with-commander-of-the-nevada-test-and-training-range/

https://sldinfo.com/the-future-of-airpower-as-seen-from-the-422nd-test-and-evaluation-squadron/

https://sldinfo.com/welcoming-the-f-35-to-the-air-warfare-weapons-school-the-next-chapter/

https://sldinfo.com/the-next-chapter-in-renorming-airpower-the-f-35-arrives-at-the-usaf-weapons-school/

https://sldinfo.com/looking-back-and-looking-forward-with-regard-to-fifth-generation-aircraft-visiting-the-weapons-school-at-the-usaf-warfare-center/

 

 

 

 

 

 

Russia, Hybrid War and the Evolution of Europe

2015-02-14 By Stephen Blank

Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine and the forms that it has taken since February 2014 have caused commentators across the globe to label it as a manifestation of hybrid war.

Frank Hoffman of the National Defense University originated this concept in a series of publications going back several years.[i]

Alternatively Russian operations in Ukraine also resemble the Chinese concept of Unrestricted War.[ii]

But however we label these operations, it remains the case that NATO and the West still have a decidedly incomplete understanding of them and their implications. Moreover NATO, impaired by this lack of understanding and the visible absence of the will to resist, has failed to develop a coherent strategy to respond to this phenomenon.

Indeed, Western analysts and politicians find it difficult to get their arms (or heads) around the many dimensions this form of warfare takes today as it appears in Russian policy.

Clausewitz reminds us that war is a chameleon, and hybrid war fully justifies this appellation. Therefore we must grasp hybrid war in its totality, a totality that embraces multiple dimensions.

To use US military terminology, it is a form of war that utilizes all the instruments of power: diplomacy, information, military, and economic (US Army analysts call this the DIME). As discussed by Moscow in its new doctrine which accuses the US and NATO of practicing it and in statements by Chief of he General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov in 2013 we can see that the military instrument per se plays only a limited role in this concept.[iii]

A Russian Orthodox Army member stands guard near Donetsk airport. Credit: Financial Times

Instead all of the instruments of power subsumed in the DIME are employed and the purpose of using these instruments in this synchronized way is to effectuate regime change, i.e. destroying or at least permanently enfeebling regimes that oppose US (or in actuality Russian) interests.

Thus across Europe and Eurasia, and even in the US, not just Ukraine, Moscow employs the following instruments beyond the use of conventional military forces, irregular, and intelligence formations (GRU and Russian Special Forces [SSO–not Spetsnaz]) and regular nuclear threats to deter NATO involvement and intimidate the alliance.

Moscow’s non-military instruments are deployed every day in a constant, regular, and strategic if not systematic and synchronized effort to break up the processes of European or even regional integration, hollow out the EU and NATO, corrupt and subvert European political and economic institutions, and to try to ensure that Russia always has significant leverage upon European economic-political processes and states who will have to confront it bilaterally rather than in multilateral institutions, and ultimately detach the U.S. from active participation in European affairs and, from the Russian viewpoint, thereby leaving Russia as a dominant player in Europe.

These non-military instruments of this strategy comprise the following elements:

  • Investments in key sectors and not only in upstream or downstream aspects of the energy sectors of European economies;
  • The use of Russian investments, trade, and capital to bribe and influence key economic and political elites;
  • Buy up media, support anti-integration and pro-Russian political parties of all stripes (not just groups like the National Front in France);
  • Arms sales to gain influence over military decision-making and bribe key elites through kickbacks and the like;
  • Vastly enhanced spying and overall intelligence penetration of European organizations;
  • Large-scale use of intelligence penetration to subvert and manipulate businesses, political parties, and movements even when not subsidizing them;
  • Forging of links between Russian organized crime and local criminal elements and local political factions;
  • Establishment of ties among religious institutions, exploitation of unresolved ethnic tensions and campaigns for “minority rights” in countries like the Baltic States or Moldova or incitement of Hungary to do the same in Ukraine;
  • Large-scale supports for Russian information outlets abroad like Russia Today to promote an unrelenting pro-Moscow political message;
  • Emphasis is upon a diplomatic insistence that the U.S. is both an alien factor in Europe and a threat to European security by threatening Russia’s vital interests and right to be a great power i.e. have a sphere of influence in Europe;
  • And massive coordinated cyber strikes on selected targets.

Although the specific features of Crimea and the Donbass may not be replicable elsewhere what we must understand is that this repertoire of instruments allows Russian “music directors” enormous flexibility in orchestrating attacks on targets even though this activity goes on every day without ever abating.

Both in military and non-military terms Russia has learned how to “tailor” forces and non-military instruments to the requirements of the theater or target/s in question, e.g. targeting British finance in the City of London, French arms sales and German oil, gas, and electricity, as well as Balkan media, and other key sectors besides energy.[iv]

Finally we must grasp the origins of this strategy.

As befits a society and state ruled by KGB and FSB alumni it is a direct descendant of the Communist International and Soviet international strategy of the interwar period.[v] It represents what is called in the West political warfare although for the Soviets and presumably Putin and Co. politics represented and represents war by other means.

It is a doctrine utilizing all the instruments of power to compensate for military weakness by developing alternatives to and surrogates for military power to corrode Western societies.

Today’s strategy, like its predecessor derives from the Russian belief that the West is intrinsically and always hostile to Russia and aims to undermine its state and system of governance as outlined in the recent military doctrine.[vi] It starts from the point that Russia and its interlocutors are in a constant, unending state of siege (worse even than a cold peace) but not a cold war for today’s world order is different.

But it is a strategy of permanent conflict played out simultaneously in multiple dimensions and countries where military force plays only a limited role to deter, intimidate, and only if necessary conduct conventional war.

It is a direct descendant of the interwar strategy of the Soviet Union and takes its point of departure from the same perceptions that drove Soviet strategy minus the ideological scaffolding of class conflict.

Today it is states not classes who are in conflict but these states are corruptible and riven by various factions that Moscow can exploit through non-military means. It begins with the presupposition of unending conflict and wages that conflict in all the sectors where Moscow can gain leverage.

Therefore in each state and in European security institutions as a whole the elements of hybrid war as a whole must be countered by truly innovative strategic means.

This is not just a question of information warfare (IW which the Russians define essentially as mass political manipulation).

IW in this context is only part of the overall equation, albeit a critical and constant part.

But until and unless we realize that Russia regards itself in a permanent state of conflict with us and wages that conflict unremittingly, Ukraine will not be the resting point in a downturn in European security but merely the prelude to the next rounds.

[i] Frank G. Hoffman, “Future threats and Strategic Thinking,” Infinity Journal, No. 4, Fall, 2011, pp. 17-21; Frank G. Hoffman, “Complex Irregular Warfare: The Next Revolution in Military Affairs,” Orbis, L, No. 2, Summer, 2006, pp. 395-411; Frank G. Hoffman, “’Hybrid Threats’: Neither Omnipotent Nor Unbeatable,’ Orbis , LIV, No. 3, Summer, 2010, pp. 441-455; Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern Conflict Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare” Strategic Forum, No. 240, April 2009, www.ndu.edu/inss; Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly., No. 52, 2009, pp. 34-39

[ii] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999)

[iii] Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, December 26, 2014, www.kremlin.ru; General Valery Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ Nauki I Predvidenie (The Value of Science and Foresight),” Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’yer, (Military-Industrial Courier) February 27-March 5, 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/sites/default/files/pdf/VPK_08_476.pdf)

[iv] Fredrik Westerlund and Johan Norberg, Tailoring War-Russia’s Use of Armed Force in Ukraine, Paper Presented to the Annual Convention of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies, San Antonio, Texas, November 21, 2014

[v] Stephen Blank, “Class War on the Global Scale: The Culture of Leninist Political Conflict”, Stephen J. Blank et al, Conflict, Culture, and History: Regional Dimensions, Air University Press: Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1993, pp. 1-55.

[vi] Voyennaya Doktrina

Editor’s Note: For a NATO Review video on the Russians, Ukraine and Hybrid War see the following:

http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2014/russia-ukraine-nato-crisis/Russia-Ukraine-crisis-war/EN/index.htm

The photo shows a Russian Orthodox Army member stands guard near Donetsk airport. Credit: Financial Times

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RiWGbxZS

 

The US Navy CNO on Cyber Operations

02/13/2015

2015-02-13 Cyber is often confused with computer and information security.

But it is really about cyber operations and within the context of rapidly evolving concepts of operations, as digital systems become dominant players in the evolution of war fighting capabilities.

Our visit to CVN-78 highlighted the centrality of C2 and related systems to the operation of the next large deck carrier.

There are three software upgradeable aircraft flying today – the Wedgetail, the Advanced Hawkeye, and the F-35 – and two of these aircraft will fly off of the Ford and intersect with the software upgradeable radars and C2 systems onboard.

And working collaborative and integrate strike and defense capabilities with the rest of the Navy force, the joint force and coalition partners rests upon effective cyber operations.

This means that cyber is part of the evolving concepts of operations for the maritime, joint and coalition force. 

It is not an add on; it is not a stand alone; it is part of the integrated warfighting effort.

The video above provide the CNO’s perspective on cyber operations as published on October 28, 2014.

Shipmates,

Recently I visited Navy Cyber Forces Command in the Hampton Roads area. After holding a great All Hands Call with our cyber warriors and reenlisting some motivated Sailors, I sat down with two Shipmates to discuss what our cyber forces do and why their mission is important. In this episode of “Conversation with a Shipmate,” we discuss cyber security and warfighting.

Understanding Cyber

All of us, not just cyber warriors, need to understand the role that cyber security plays in our everyday operations.

Electromagnetic Spectrum

The Electromagnetic spectrum is also a hot issue for our Navy, and the exploration of that focus area goes hand in hand with what we’re doing on the cyber warfront.

Warfighting on the Sea and in Cyberspace

The Navy is has an inherent and unique need to combat cyber threats. Our resources, ships and bases around the world are connected by the very networks our cyber warriors defend.

Shaping a Strategic Triangle with Japan and India: Crafting a Way Ahead

2015-02-13 Ian Armstrong

Temple University Department of Political Science

Roughly five years since the Obama Administration initiated the U.S. “pivot” to Asia, the circumstances have aligned themselves to make for significant headway in the region.

In light of recent events, there is an opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relations of two of the United States’ most crucial Pacific allies — Japan and India — in an attempt to not only counter growing assertiveness from Beijing, but to enhance significant economic relationships as well.

A favorable climate has emerged for the cultivation of a dynamic security alliance between New Delhi and Tokyo.

At the helm of both nations are alliance-inclined conservative nationalists — PM Narendra Modi of India on one hand, Japan’s PM Shinzo Abe on the other – and recent elections in both nations now all but guarantee simultaneous leadership stability for the next several years.

Furthermore, both nations have numerous shared interests across both security and economics, most notable of all the mutual concern of China’s burgeoning power and its gradually intensifying claims to regional hegemony.

Neither Modi nor Abe are reserved in their recognition of the potential that an Japan-India partnership embodies, with both PMs taking several preliminary steps in strengthening bilateral relations over the past year, among which being the elevation of diplomatic ties to the status of “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.”

More recently, this broadening relationship has culminated in a joint pledge to “strengthen the trilateral alliance with the United States,” an announcement put forth by the Japanese and Indian foreign ministers less than three weeks into 2015.

This strategic opening could serve as a timely invitation for the United States to fully assume an innovative role in the development of Japan-India relations, the bilateral link of the relationship that is admittedly the least developed.

A trilateral relationship is only as strong as its weakest bilateral partnership, and so the United States needs to focus on supporting a strengthened Indian-Japanese relationship as a foundation for shaping an innovative strategic triangular relationship appropriate to 21st century opportunities and threats.

With this goal in mind, the United States should move forward in a two-phase strategy, the first of which focuses on assisting India develop economically, and the second of which involves assimilating India into the already highly-developed institutions surrounding the U.S.-Japan security alliance.Focusing first on the economic aspects of the relationship serves three purposes.

For one, a U.S. focus on enhancing the development of the Indian economy aligns itself with the foremost goal of the early Modi Administration: growing a stronger and more dynamic industrial base. Modi and his government are less likely to commit to matters of international security before stabilizing the relatively fragile domestic economy.

A deepening of economic interdependence between states is also generally associated with an increased propensity for military and security cooperation.

Second, honing in on India’s economic status in the context of Japan-India relations is a less alarming yet equally as important first-step towards a more robust trilateral partnership in the eyes of an already suspicious Beijing.

Finally, an economically viable India provides a counterbalance to China in pursuing world markets.

A major forum through which the United States can shape a strategic approach to an evolving triangular relationship is the now annual trilateral meeting held between the three nations. Being both supportive of enhanced Japanese-Indian economic relationships and having policies that can mutually benefit all three is a key foundation to shaping a strategic triangle.

Additionally, reinvigorating the slowly-developing talks between Japan and India on civil nuclear cooperation is a specific economic domain within which this can be achieved. Many U.S. nuclear energy companies have close and complex business relationships with Japanese firms — GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy, for instance — meaning that expansion into the Indian nuclear market would require civil nuclear agreements.

Accordingly, the United States must signal a desire for U.S.-Japanese nuclear firms to work together in the Indian market in an attempt to stimulate a Japan-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement.

Recent statements from both Tokyo and New Delhi suggesting “significant progress” are indicative of the increasing probability that an agreement is within reach, and the United States must seize the opportunity to accelerate this process. While stimulation of these discussions is a small step forward economically speaking, success in nuclear energy might result in the confidence needed for more substantial deepening of the Japan-India economic partnership, and thus a more stably developing Indian economy.

As the economic dynamics accelerate to shape a stronger tri-angular economic relationship, the question of an appropriate mix of security relationships can be considered in the evolving context.

The existing infrastructure provided by over a half-century of U.S.-Japan military partnership presents an excellent framework for strengthening Japan-India military ties and factoring India into more substantial trilateral relations.

As crucial powers in the Asia-Pacific, one of the most pressing security issues facing both Japan and India is a tense maritime climate with China. Thus, a reasonable starting point for the United States to begin strengthening Japan-India security relations can be found in the relatively low-cost measure of increasing maritime intelligence sharing.

For their part, the United States and Japan already have established an informal protocol of sharing maritime intelligence throughout their frequent military collaboration.

Factoring India into this informal intelligence sharing line is not only paramount in increasing U.S. capacity in Asia, but also in laying the foundation for a more effective, formalized system of intelligence sharing between the Washington, Tokyo, and New Delhi.

In doing so, the reckless behavior of North Korea as well as the strategic posturing of China can be better monitored. Furthermore, trilateral responses from the United States, Japan, and India can be better and more quickly formulated.

The establishment of such a system would also allow for more serious protocols to be established in the event of a maritime crisis, further encouraging more successful crisis management efforts.

Beyond maritime intelligence sharing, Japan and India exhibit a complementary nature in terms of defense procurement.

As Abe’s Japan gradually works its way out of a legacy of isolationism and the stigmas associated with the Second World War, a virtually unparalleled technological capability provides the emerging Japanese defense industry with great potential, and no market appears more fitting than an Indian nation keen on equating military clout with economic strength.

As one of India’s top three military suppliers and a dominant force in arms exports, the United States must not only accommodate the growth of the Japanese defense industry, but also leverage its position within the trilateral framework to stimulate the Japan-India defense trade.

By pursuing the continued development of U.S.-Japan-India trilateral meetings as well as joint military exercises, a block by block approach can be shaped moving ahead.

The future of the partnership is about channeling shared economic development and shared strategic interests to both deal with mutual threats and counter-balance the global assertiveness of powers like China.

It is not designed to be anti-Beijing, instead simply  reinforcing the international norms to which the U.S., Japan and India adhere while at the same time setting a standard for  China to follow and comply.

The increasingly amicable and frequent nature of U.S.-Japan-India consultation and collaboration has served as the ultimate means through which a more effective and efficient relationship has emerged.

It is then within the best interests of the United States to work with India on appropriate military exercises, which draw upon the Japanese-US working relationship as well.

Of course, these measures should be taken with respect to the desires of both India and Japan to maintain a general autonomy from U.S. influence, with Washington proceeding cautiously as it has in the past.

A too assertive United States might effectively stall the warming trajectory of U.S.-Japan-India relations, sending signals to New Delhi and Tokyo that they are best left to bilateral-level discussions.

However, there clearly is an unprecedented opportunity in forging a strategically invaluable alliance in the Asia-Pacific with long-term benefits to all three powers.

Such a relationship would lay a powerful foundation for a real Asian pivot strategy.

Editor’s Note: The intelligence sharing suggested by the author can be facilitated through a common platform acquisition program which can be leveraged to shape the kind of collaborative operative intelligence necessary to the three nation’s maritime and air forces.

The P-8 is a platform being flown already by the US Navy and the Indian Navy with the deployment of the P-8 Japan having begun early last year.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-indian-p-8-participates-in-the-search-for-malaysian-airlines-flight-370/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/indian-and-american-naval-cooperation-the-potential-role-of-the-p-8/

http://www.boeing.com/boeing/Features/2014/01/bds_p8a_01_14_14.page

The goal of the military and security side of the relationship could well captured in this concept of a way ahead for the USMC in the Pacific made last year in an interview with then MARFORPAC, Lt. General Robling:

These capabilities and others make perfect sense for Australia and the greater Asia Pacific’s collective security requirements.   In addition, other countries like Japan and Singapore can likewise contribute to this collective security because they too are buying the same types or similar military capabilities.

I like the term deterrence in depth because that’s exactly what it is. It’s not always about defense in depth.

It’s about deterring and influencing others behavior so they can contribute to the region’s stability, both economically and militarily, in an environment where everyone conforms to the rule of law and international norms.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-distributed-laydown-in-the-pacific-and-deterrence-in-depth-lt-general-robling-discusses-the-evolution-of-the-usn-usmc-team-in-the-pacific/

Upcoming Cy-Con Conference in Estonia: Architectures in Cyberspace

2015-02-13 CyCon is the annual NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence conference where topics vary from technical to legal, strategy and policy.

The pre-conference workshop day, 26 May, features a variety of talks and hands-on training.

The 7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon 2015) held on 27-29 May 2015 in Tallinn, Estonia, will focus on the construction of the Internet and its potential future development.

This year’s topic – “Architectures in Cyberspace” – asks what cyberspace is and will be in the coming years as well as what are its characteristics relevant for cyber security.

The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence is a research and training facility that aims to enhance capability, cooperation and information-sharing within NATO, its member nations and partners in Cyber defense through education, research and development, lessons learned, and consultation.

https://ccdcoe.org/

Last year’s conference focused on various aspects of cyber operations including:

  • Active Cyber Defense
  • Models of Active Cyber Defense
  • Cyber Situational Awareness
  • Detection and Deception
  • Cyber Operational Activities

TOC 2014 CyCon Conference

An especially interesting presentation for general considerations at the Conference was presented by Dr. Irving Lachow, the Mitre Corporation on the Subject of Policy and Strategy Aspects of Cyber Defense.

The work in cyber operations is a major part of the transformation of NATO.

An article by Peter Woudsma, Command and Control, Deployability and Sustainability, published on the NATO ACT website on March 29, 2012 highlighted the linkage:

NATO operates in a connected world, and uses an information technology infrastructure to communicate and collaborate with nations and organisations around the world.

The global network of these interdependent infrastructures is called “cyberspace”. The Alliance needs to defend its freedom of movement in cyberspace and the safety of its information against cyber threats, through a Cyber Defence programme.

As a highly-visible organisation, NATO has always been exposed to attacks on its Information Technology (IT) infrastructure.

Hacker groups have tried – and continue trying – to disrupt NATO’s political and military capabilities and mock our public image. Hacking incidents in the late 1990s, related to our operations in the Balkans, led to the start of NATO’s Cyber Defence Programme.

After the 2002 Prague Summit, initiatives were taken to establish the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), an organisation now under the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency) that monitors our infrastructure and responds to cyber threats and attacks. Since then, the Nations have re-confirmed NATO’s commitment to Cyber Defence, and implementation into the new Strategic Concept and the Cyber Defence Policy has begun.

A Plan for Cyber Defence

Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is involved in NATO’s Cyber Defence Programme in several ways.

The Cyber Defence Action Plan (CDAP) was introduced in 2011 with the release of the Cyber Defence Policy.

It reflects a number of short-term actions that are taken to mature NATO’s Cyber Defence capabilities and enhance the political and operational mechanism of the response capability of the Alliance.

ACT is leading in about one-third of these actions, and providing support to one-third more.

Several of this command’s activities focus on aspects that have a relationship with the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI).

Through the development of education, training, exercises and evaluation (ETEE) solutions we will sustain “expanded education and training”. Our development of a burden sharing concept strengthens a “better use of technology”.

Other aspects cover assessments of Cyber Defence measures and dependencies, the establishment of a standardised appropriate vocabulary and the development of a transformational agenda for future Cyber Defence solutions.

Furthermore, ACT is contributing to this topic through its leading role in Consultation, Command, and Control (C3) capability development.

Our investment proposals and project plans help to make sure that new solutions are implemented with state-of-theart monitoring and protection capabilities.

The specific requirements for these capabilities are captured in the C3 Classification Taxonomy.

Cyber: The Fifth Dimension

The current Cyber Defence activities in the Alliance – e.g. from the CDAP, at the NCIRC, with IT Modernisation and C3 capability development — are moving forward at a steady pace.

These activities have leaned heavily on the technical aspects of NATO’s own communications and information systems (CIS) in the past ten years.

Nevertheless, the scope of Cyber Defence is wider than the current work, as is highlighted by several trends.

For instance, in member nations there is a growing awareness of the operational implications of this activity. Some nations even consider cyberspace as the fifth dimension of warfare, right next to sea, land, air and space.

United States intelligence officials recently told that they believe that the United States faces a greater threat from cyber-attacks than from terrorism. Moreover, the “Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare” — a study written by an independent team of legal experts at the invitation of the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) — appreciates existing international law for cyberspace in the context of armed conflicts and the right to self-defence.

Amongst other things, it analyses the possibility to invoke NATO’s Article 5 in case of a cyber-attack on any NATO country.

The Human Dimension

ACT believes we need to consider Cyber Defence in a broader approach.

Our CIS infrastructure – and therefore cyberspace – should no longer be seen solely as a technical enabler for operational and administrative processes.

Cyber Defence is not an exclusively technical issue but rather a response to a threat to all aspects of the Alliance.

NATO can perform a role in coordinating the planning and implementation of national Cyber Defence capabilities as well as the integration of cyber responses between NATO and member nations.

It is important to put a greater emphasis on the human dimension. Cyber attackers often exploit human weaknesses through “social engineering”.

Studies show that users are the weakest link in Cyber Defence and we need tools and measures to offer them an easier capability to protect data, guarantee use of the IT infrastructure according to their legitimate needs, and prevent them from knowingly or unintentionally creating security violations.

We must raise awareness through information, training and exercises programs.

A Continuous Effort

With all the activities going on in ACT and beyond, and all the investments that are being made in C3 capabilities across the whole DOTMLPFI spectrum, it will not guarantee that NATO will be permanently and fully protected against cyber-attacks.

Cyberspace is becoming increasingly sophisticated. Cyber threats are constantly evolving and the Alliance needs to be vigilant and inventive to counter them.

That is a continuous effort, and through the update of our programs and our expertise, ACT is well-positioned and strongly committed to perform its transformational role in Cyber Defence.

Editor’s Note: It is no accident that the cyber center is located in Estonia. 

As the Honorable Ed Timperlake noted in an article published in 2009:

Cyberwar is now a fact of life in 21st Century wars.

Actual and potential enemies of America already know the dimensions of Cyberwar and have moved into full combat.

With a real world combat engagement in Georgia and Estonia, the Russians have shown skill…

And in 2011 Ed Timperlake was asked to testify in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee US House of Representatives on the emerging threat of cyber attacks, espionage and technology transfers to the People’s Republic of China and added some context to how cyber fits into the bigger picture

The Revolution in Military Affairs and Cyber War

While Congress was researching the issues mentioned above in the late 90s, Mr. Andrew Marshall Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, published his short and very direct paper heralding the advent of a “Revolution in Military Affairs.” The PLA and especially their spymasters were paying close attention.

Mr. Marshall’s vision was profoundly simple. He postulated that technology and war fighting would evolve toward two constantly improving military capabilities.

  • Precision-guided munitions with remote sensors;
  • Information war (the word “cyber” had not yet come into vogue).

In developing their “Information War” military doctrine, the PLA was awarding Doctorates in Information War to military officers as early as 1998.

Since that time PRC cyber espionage attempts have been growing and are unrelenting.

Traditionally the commonly accepted thoughts about PRC espionage is that they have different “spy craft” than the “cold war Russian” model of linear cells and cut outs. 

The evidence in the 1990s is that the PLA approached collecting information and technology much differentially than the Russian “cold war” model.

It has been my experience in investigating illegal money contributions that the PLA as needed will use their military along with their Intel community professionals, criminal elements (Triads), businessmen “hustlers,” academics both professors and students and even relatives of all those groups—what ever works.

So when the world become more digitized through the computer revolution, the PLA adapted, and became world class offensive cyber war fighters. 

However, this time there was a role reversal from Russian cyber activity. 

Russian cyber activity has been reported to be very wide open ranging from military and state sponsored activity, to numerous criminal enterprises for profit, to any of many other reasons. 

As mentioned above, PLA collection efforts in the field are very freewheeling and unstructured.

But in cyber activities the PRC has adopted a Russian paranoid “cold war mentality.”

They appear to be trying to keep their cyber war fighters in a rigid military chain of command.

In fact there are significant criminal penalties in China for violating cyber restrictions put in place to keep their citizens from freely playing on the web and also acquiring information.

The leadership of China is trying to constrain and contain the growing World Wide Web sharing of information. 

It will be interesting to see if overtime the PRC is capable of stopping their citizen’s nascent “Jasmine Revolution” which is currently originating in Africa and the Middle East and spreading.

The PRC essentially has two cyber targets, those external to China and also their own citizens.

Only totalitarian dictatorships and closed societies have this challenge. It is an Intel/cyber seam for a free and open society to exploit.

But currently today, regardless of internal PRC cyber issues their external attacks continue to be relentless. It is an ongoing struggle by the DOD CI community (NCIS, OSI, Army G-2), NSA, DNI, Law Enforcement (FBI and others) and Homeland Security to try and stay ahead of this dynamic and significant threat. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

An Evolving Multi-National Training Infrastructure: The Roll Out of the A400M

02/12/2015

2015-02-12 The A400M is being operated already by 4 air forces, with 4 more initial customers to come.

It is early days but the interactive process of multi-national training will be a crucial aspect of shaping an A400M enterprise.

A briefing provided in 2012 by the head of training for the 400M anticipated the process.

One of the more interesting presentations at the Airbus Military Trade Media Brief 2012 was by the head of training at Airbus Military.

Ian Burrett, Head of Training and Aircrew Operations, Customer Services, provided an overview of the approach and the standing up of the baseline training capability.

The multi-national training center opened up at Seville in late 2010 and Airbus Military will roll out capabilities through 2013 to make the training facility completely operational.

The A400M program like the F-35 program is built for multi-national training.

In the A400M case, there is a core or central training facility at Seville, which develops the core competencies and approaches and defines best practices.

The Seville center – like Eglin in the F-35 system – can operate as a hub for national training facilities, and national facilities can then replicate, link or incorporate via virtual links, systems and approaches with the capabilities of the multi-national training center.

The basic A400M includes three core personnel – a pilot, a co-pilot and a loadmaster.

The training is built to train a core team.  The loading system of the A400M is highly automated, and can be operated by a single person.  As an advanced system, it is important that the training be especially effective with the loadmasters…..

Although not discussed, not perhaps planned at this time, the A400M like the F-35, can shape a new learning approach to training upon which the program can evolve over time.

Over time, as the plane becomes operational, and the fleet gains experience operated by several national militaries, there will then be the opportunity to feed that experience into the training program.

There is the possibility of shaping a con-ops training or sharing capability built on the multi-national character of the program.

The photograph shows the A400M FFS at Wunstorf Air Base. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space
The photograph shows the A400M FFS at Wunstorf Air Base. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space

And the first Air Force deploying the A400M, the French Air Force (FAF), is leveraging the multi-national aspects of training and looking forward to operational convergence of the plane as well.

The French head of the Multinational Entry To Service Team in the FAF highlighted the importance of the multi-national aspects.

The MEST worked closely with the British as well as the Germans in preparing the ground for the future. Lt. Col. Creuset noted that the FAF has an agreement with the Royal Air Force’s Air Warfare Center and this relationship has been tapped into to shape a way ahead.

“We can profit from their experience and they can profit from ours.”

This theme is clearly a key part of the entire approach to standing up and looking forward to the operational use by a multinational fleet, from the French perspective.

Now the Germans are standing up their capabilities to do A400M training in Germany.

According to a press release dated February 9, 2015 by Airbus Defence and Military:

The German Air Force (GAF) has taken delivery of a Full Flight Simulator (FFS) for the A400M aircraft provided by Airbus Defence and Space.

 The training device entered service at Wunstorf Air Base, where the GAF A400M fleet will be based, on 8 January and will be used to train about 60 GAF crews in its first three years in operation.

Developed by Airbus Defence and Space and manufactured by Thales, it is a full replica of the A400M cockpit.

 As provider of a wide scope of training products and services to air forces, Airbus Defence and Space will deliver to the GAF additional training devices consisting of:

  • a Flat Panel – Flat Training Device (FP–FTD), which is a cockpit partial simulator to train pilots prior to the FFS training;
  • a Cargo Hold Trainer (CHT), which is a full 1:1 scale replica of the A400M cargo hold used to train loadmasters with real loading and unloading tasks as well as to train parachutists;
  • and a Cockpit Maintenance Operations Simulator (CMOS) which replicates the aircraft in 3D images and provides maintenance procedure simulations.

These training devices are due for delivery by mid-2015.

 Ian Burrett, HO Training & Aircrew Operations, Military Aircraft, said:

“The delivery of this FFS is an important step in creating the GAF´s own A400M training program and as part of the overall support infrastructure that will sustain the A400M in service for many years to come”.

 The GAF took delivery of its first A400M on 18th December 2014.

A presentation on the A400M training program presented at the Airbus Defence and Space Trade Media Brief in 2014 can be seen below:

The Japanese Government Shifts Policy to Deal with Overseas Threats to its Citizens

2015-02-12 We have written a great deal on the website as well as in our book on the evolution of Pacific strategy about the shifting approach to threats to Japan.

Japan is building out what it calls a “dynamic defense” strategy which is being crafted to deal with the regional and global threats to Japan.

With the beheading by ISIL members of Japanese citizens, the government of Japan has no intention of sitting on its hands.

The government has started by putting in motion modifications to its foreign aid policy to allow it to support foreign military forces in those areas where there are direct threats to Japanese citizens.

This is a sea change for Japan.

In a piece published on February 20, 2015, Masaaki Kameda, Staff Writer for The Japan Times discussed the policy change:

The Cabinet on Tuesday approved new guidelines for foreign aid, stipulating for the first time that Japan can fund foreign military forces, although the assistance must be for “nonmilitary purposes.”

Some analysts call that a contradiction, saying Japan won’t be able to ensure that its overseas development assistance remains exclusively nonmilitary.

It is the first revision of the basic policy on foreign aid in 11½ years. The new doctrine declares that Japan will use its development aid to contribute to the global society in line with its national interest.

“Based on the new framework, we will promote more strategic development assistance and further contribute to the peace, stability and prosperity of the international community,” Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida told reporters following the Cabinet meeting.

He said Japan will strive to eradicate poverty by supporting high-quality growth in developing countries, strengthening cooperation with the private sector and helping to spread universal values such as the rule of law.

The revision is in line with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s efforts to raise Japan’s international clout through a “proactive contribution to peace based on the principle of international cooperation.”

The Development Cooperation Charter, formally known as the Official Development Assistance Charter, retains the principle that aid can’t be used for military purposes or to fuel foreign conflicts, though the government can consider aiding foreign armed forces and their troops under certain conditions.

“Where military forces or personnel are involved in development assistance for civil or nonmilitary purposes such as disaster relief, each case is studied specifically with a focus on practical significance,” the charter says.

Independent analysts express concern about that clause. They said it is unclear how the government can prevent the aid from being diverted to military purposes.

“The sentence is quite vague. What does ‘practical significance’ point to? What is the criteria for studying each case?” said Eiichi Sadamatsu, director general of the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation.

He said the clause “can be interpreted in any way” as it fails to state the criteria that must be met.

Kishida played down such concerns, saying the aid will not be diverted to military use.

“The new charter retains the principle that (assistance) for military purposes, or which aggravates international conflicts, should be avoided. We will never offer aid for military purposes through development cooperation,” he said.

Sadamatsu called on the government to release more information about how Japan’s aid has been used and to improve monitoring.

By region, the newly adopted charter prioritizes Asian nations in light of their importance in national security and prosperity — especially Southeast Asia, a region where China’s influence is on the rise.

“(Japan) will support comprehensive and sustainable growth for ASEAN as a whole” by providing aid for infrastructure and reducing disparities across the region, it said.

The charter also calls for cooperation among private firms, municipal governments and NGOs, which increasingly play an important role in solving development challenges and contributing to sustainable growth in developing countries.

First UK A400M Named After the City of Bristol

02/11/2015

2015-02-11 The UK has added new tankers and is starting the process of adding a new airlifter to its lift fleet, the A400M.

The arrival of the A400M at its new base in the UK was announced by the UK government as follows in a November 27, 2014 press release:

The first of the UK’s A400M Atlas next-generation military transport aircraft has today been officially unveiled by the MOD at its new home at RAF Brize Norton…..

With a cargo capacity of 32 tons and a hold optimized for carriage of heavy vehicles, helicopters or cargo pallets, the aircraft is capable of supporting a wide range of operational scenarios.

The UK is the third country to operate the aircraft, after France and Turkey and the £2.8 billion program will see a total of 22 aircraft delivered to the RAF in the coming years.

According to a February 9, 2015 story on the UK MoD website, the new aircraft is named after the City of Bristol and the reason becomes clear.

The UK’s first A400M Atlas has been named “City of Bristol” by the Royal Air Force in a rare honor to highlight the important role industry in the city has played in the delivery of the aircraft.

The wings of the next-generation military transporter plane were designed and manufactured at the Airbus factory in Filton, Bristol, with a number of other businesses in the city, including Rolls-Royce, GKN Aerospace, and Atkins, demonstrating a range of high quality aerospace skills which support the A400M programme.

A total of 22 A400M Atlas aircraft have been ordered by the Ministry of Defence’s procurement arm, Defence, Equipment and Support (DE&S), which is also based in the city at Abbey Wood.

A400M ATLAS CITY OF BRISTOL

The naming of the aircraft is a special privilege for Bristol, since it is unusual for the RAF to name an individual aircraft in this way.

Speaking at a ceremony at the Airbus site to mark the event, Defence Minister Philip Dunne said:

The A400M program has created or secured work for around 900 people at companies based here in Bristol and is providing skilled jobs in manufacturing, engineering and supply chain roles.

Many of these jobs require training to acquire specialist new skills needed to help keep the UK aerospace sector at the forefront of this high technology industry.

The MOD is playing its part in contributing to our long-term economic plan and this A400M program will become an important contributor to the defence supply chain, here in Bristol, for years to come.

To mark the honor, the “City of Bristol” A400M Atlas recently completed a fly-past of the Clifton Suspension Bridge which also served as a reminder of the engineering history of the city.

Chief of Materiel Air, Air Marshal Simon Bollom said:

The naming of the Royal Air Force’s first A400M aircraft as City of Bristol reflects a continuation of historical ties between Bristol and the Royal Air Force.

Bristol is at the heart of the UK aerospace community which has progressed through time and industry from the Bristol built engines like Jupiter – the most successful aero engine of the 1920s – through to famous jets such as Concorde.

This tradition continues with state of the art work being carried out at Airbus’s Filton site on wings for the A400M, supported by complex work packages from GKN, Rolls-Royce and Atkins and this rare naming honour is recognition for the long and entrenched affiliation between the City of Bristol and British aviation.

Manufactured by Airbus Defence & Space the A400M Atlas will replace the existing fleet of C-130 Hercules and represents major advances on its predecessor, with it capable of flying considerably faster, twice as far and able to carry almost twice as much cargo.