2015-04-23 By Robbin Laird

Copenhagen is a lovely city.

The Danes are hearty and friendly folks.

They just don’t seem the kind of folks who need to open their mail and a get a greeting from the Russian Ambassador, who after all is a guest in their country, that reads something like this:

I do not think that the Danes fully understand the consequences of what happens if Denmark joins the US-led missile defense.

If this happens, Danish warships become targets for Russian nuclear missiles.

http://www.dw.de/denmark-could-become-target-of-russian-nuclear-weapons-ambassador-warns/a-18332777

So let us reverse the logic – the Danes tell the Russians that they are imperialists who are interfering in European affairs and seizing the territory of free states, reach agreements with states like China to operate on that territory, or that they should act like a civilized state.

Not likely to happen in a small country of a group of islands against a giant land mass with multiple time zones and led by Putin the Great.

To be blunt this is a policy of intimidation which we have seen from Russians before, but this time with the Ukrainian occupation coupled with an assertive Arctic policy and a clear design on the Baltics, it is not just about Denmark.

It is about a significant redesign of the map and putting Russia in the middle of it.

And to add a point to all of this, the Russians decided to paratroop into the Arctic and show their ability to paratroop to support their claims and protect their interests.

Only one small problem: they parachuted into the Danish zone of responsibility for search and rescue in the Arctic without bothering to tell any one. Of course, when one is asserting imperial presence, one need not tell the little guys anything of note.

And as the Nordic states look at this unchecked Russian ballet for regional influence, perhaps dominance, they are working together to sort out ways to better protect themselves.

This is hardly a dramatic and unwarranted reaction, notably in a world of uncertain American policies.

Earlier this month, the Nordic states issued a declaration of intent to work more closely together to protect their interests, which of course does not include invading Russia or seizing St. Petersburg, named for Peter the Great, but perhaps will become Putinburg over time.

According to an April 9, 2015 Reuters story:

Writing in a joint declaration, the defense ministers of Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark and Iceland said Northern Europe must prepare for possible crises or incidents because of Russia.

“Russia’s leaders have shown that they are prepared to make practical and effective use of military means in order to reach their political goals, even when this involves violating principles of international law,” the ministers wrote in a joint statement in daily Aftenposten.

“There is increasing military and intelligence activity in the Baltics and in our northern areas,” the ministers said. “The Russian military is challenging us along our borders and there have been several border infringements in the Baltics.”

The statement comes amid heightened tensions in Europe since Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine a year ago. With large Russian minorities living in the Baltics, concerns have grown in the region about the risk of Russian intervention.

Finland, which borders Russia, and Sweden are not members of NATO but have increased cooperation with the trans-Atlantic alliance, and the joint declaration has been among their strongest responses to Russia’s aggression.

“Russia’s actions are the biggest challenge to the European security,” the ministers said. “Russia’s propaganda and political maneuvering are contributing to sowing discord between nations, and inside organizations like NATO and the EU.”

The ministers said that closer cooperation in the Nordics and solidarity with the Baltic would improve security through deterrence as it would lift the threshold for military events

This includes two neutral states, Sweden and Finland, and a clear target for the Russians is making sure that neutrality is interpreted very narrowly and that these two states stay in a clearly defined national territorial defense box, rather than contributing to Baltic and/or Arctic security.

The Russian government completely rejects the legitimacy of such an approach, notably as if the Nordics banded together they have enough capability to make the Russian agenda very difficult to succeed, and even more so as the West modernizes its forces.

Reflective of the Russian stance is the position laid out by Artem Kureev in Russia Direct in a piece published on April 15, 2015.

Kureev is identified as an expert from the Moscow-based think tank “Helsinki+” that deals with protecting interests of Russians living in the Baltic countries. Kureev graduated from Saint Petersburg State University’s School of International Relations.

So what needs protecting?

A detailed analysis of the document raises questions as to which parts are declarative in nature and which will actually be implemented. The four areas highlighted pertain to increasing the number of joint exercises, intelligence sharing, military industry, and combating cyber threats.

The mechanisms needed to implement the initiatives in the declaration are lacking at present. Moreover, most of them require permanent cooperation and the establishment of coordination centers in the field of intelligence gathering and cyber security.

Put another way, it is, in fact, a bid to set up a separate entity with its own staff, divisions and, it seems, head office. However, all this requires significant additional outlays and the signing of specific multilateral agreements. Yet such structures already exist within the NATO framework; for instance, Estonia’s cherished Cyber ​​Defense Center.

It is more than likely that within the framework of enhanced cooperation all five Nordic countries will start taking an active part in the operations of these structures. However, it is clear that neither Stockholm nor Helsinki wants to play second fiddle to the Baltic countries and both are intent on creating their own agencies in the field of security in conjunction with the rest of Scandinavia. Hence, another cyber center could crop up on Russia’s borders within a few years.

It is also quite possible that large-scale military exercises simulating a joint response to an attack from the East could be carried out with the Nordic countries.

Next up, time to assert one’s interests against the aggressive Norwegians, for they might launch long boats and end up in Kiev.

So in a story published by ABC news on April 20, 2015, Russia drops in on disputed territory as if it was their own.

Russia on Monday dismissed Norway’s protests over a weekend visit to a Norwegian archipelago by a delegation that included Russia’s deputy prime minister Dmitry Rogozin.

During a visit to the Arctic on Sunday to inaugurate Russia’s new floating research station, the delegation stopped by Norway’s Svalbard islands.

Rogozin, who oversees defense in the government among other things and is known for his nationalist views, has been slapped with sanctions barring him entry to the European Union and non-EU Norway over his position on Russia’s annexation of Crimea.

Norway demanded that Moscow explain why he visited the islands given the sanctions imposed on him.

In response, Russia’s foreign ministry dismissed the accusations as “absurd” and said that the delegation made the stop for “logistical reasons”. The ministry also cited a 1920 treaty granting access to the islands to nationals of all signatory nations including Russia.

The Norwegian response: Norway will now consider reinforced measures regarding entry to Svalbard.

“From the Norwegian side we will consider reinforced measures concerning entry, also including Svalbard,” Frode Andersen says to BarentsObserver.

First Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Leonid Kalashnikov questioned Norway’s right to have Svalbard.

The islands are “not fully under Norwegian sovereignty,” he said.

Last year Rogozin become the person who is responsible for Arctic matters. He has been in charge of plans to reopen Russian military bases in the area.

Russia’s new focus on the Arctic can be compared with the annexation of Crimea, says Rogozin in a video that was published April 20^th.”

And Americans out there, Rogozin thinks the loss of Alaska is not acceptable either.

According to this piece in the Alaska Dispatch News published on March 27, 2015:

Lurking in the Russian plan for its Far East is a sinister figure who believes that Alaska is a legitimate part of Russian manifest destiny – Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin.  

It was betrayal, Rogozin believes, that led to the sale of what is rightfully Russia’s to the United States. In the forward to Ivan Mironov’s book, “Alaska Betrayed and Sold,” Rogozin equates the sale of Alaska to another betrayal: Mikhail Gorbochev’s and Boris Yeltsin’s breaking up the former Soviet Union. 

Rogozin is not a crackpot. He’s the equivalent of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, and one of President Putin’s right-hand men.

He’s on the U.S. State Department list of individuals responsible for destabilizing the Ukraine among other nefarious accomplishments intended to reunite the former Soviet Union into the Russian Federation.

And, he’s the newly appointed head of Arctic policy for Russia, likely forming a new government entity designed to carry out Putin’s militarization and development policy in the Arctic.  

If I lived in the Baltics, I would be a bit more than nervous, for as Secretary Kerry has warned us these guys live in the 19^th century, and we remember what that century eventually delivered to the world in the 20^th.

“You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pre-text,” Kerry told the CBS program “Face the Nation.”

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-kerry-idUSBREA210DG20140302

Well unless you do.

In a follow up piece, I am going to address a way ahead in Baltic defense, which will lay possible ways to make any repeat of Ukraine in the Baltics a deadly one for the Russians.

In this story published on April 15, 2015, published by Business Insider, the Russian paratrooping event was highlighted:

More than 50 Russian soldiers parachuted onto drifting Arctic ice near the North Pole last week in a first-ever training exercise, Russia Beyond The Headlines reports.

The Russian paratroopers parachuted along with airdropped supplies from an Ilyushin-76 military transport aircraft at 89 degrees North latitude Tuesday, April 8. In collaboration with the Expedition Center of the Russian Geographic Society, the paratroopers will build a camp and train in the rescue of polar expeditions.

Airborne Forces spokesman Lt. Col. Yevgney Meshkov said the drop proceeded without accidents and that soldiers are equipped with knives and hunting guns to guard against wild animals.

And earlier, the Russians made history by partrooping onto a floating iceberg.

2015-04-27 By Risk Intelligence

The Maghreb region has long been a rich breeding ground for Islamic extremism and this is true of the security problems in Egypt, Mali and Libya.

These problems, coupled with a growing social divide within the populace, rising food and fuel prices, and an increase in youth unemployment in many countries, have made social unrest a major problem for regional governments.

The recent emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in both Iraq and Syria and its sudden growth in popularity among Muslim youth has surprised many in the Western world, although within the Maghreb countries signs of discontent and re-assertions of sub-group rather than nationalist identities were already being seen (including the Arab spring movements). For North African youth, there are social factors fuelling their discontent, but also pull factors that make joining Islamic extremist and terrorist organizations such as Ansar al-Sharia, al-Qaeda and IS as an attractive option.

This article identifies the strength of support for IS in North Africa and provides an assessment on the potential risks for maritime interests and terrorist activity related to potential IS operations.

The Rise of IS

The growth of IS in North Africa has been rapid, and IS has already established strong links with other militant jihadist groups across North Africa. These groups have embraced the ideologies of IS and some have pledged allegiance or support. There is not widespread public support for IS at present, and most in regional countries are as shocked and upset by the violent scenes that the media portrays of the group’s activities as are international audiences. De- spite this, there has been a steady stream of volunteers who have now travelled to Iraq and Syria to fight on the behalf of IS, with Algeria and Tunisia reportedly providing the largest number of regional volunteers and fighters for the group.

IS, under various names, emerged in Iraq and Syria as part of the Tawhid Wa al-Jihad in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the US-led coalition invasion of Afghanistan and was established under the leadership of the Jordanian Islamist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Initially, Zarqawi pledged his allegiance to Osama bin Laden and established the group al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI became a major force in the insurgency movement after the coalition forces invaded Iraq in 2003.

After Zarqawi’s death in 2006, AQI created an umbrella organization, the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). However, ISI’s activities were gradually being weakened by the US military surge operation and also by the creation of the ‘Sah- wa councils’ led by Sunni Arab tribesmen, who did not embrace the brutal tactics practiced by ISI. By 2010, Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samrrai (commonly known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) had become the leader of ISI and he began to rebuild the military capability of the group. At its core is the aim to establish a ‘caliphate’, a state ruled by a single political and religious leader according to Islamic law. ISI promised to destroy the borders of Lebanon and Jordan and to “free Palestine” in its rather broad manifesto. Baghdadi’s calls found support from Muslims around the world, a claim backed up by the number of foreign fighters who have joined the group, certainly during the past 12 months.

ISI was responsible for carrying out many attacks in Iraq and Baghdadi was also instrumental in the establishment of the al-Nusra Front, an ISI-focused group fighting President Bashar al-Assad in Syria. In April 2013, Baghdadi announced a merger of IS forces in Iraq and Syria and created the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/the Levant (ISIS). This was a move not supported by all factions, and led to some violent infighting between the groups. How- ever, following some brutal and violent actions, ISI became the predominant military rebel force fighting President Assad’s forces in Syria, and it also experienced significant military success in Iraq. Its capture of significant territory in Iraq led to Baghdadi’s ‘official’ announcement of a caliphate and an ostensible name change to the Islamic State.

Reaching out to North Africa
IS has grown in popularity among militant Islamic groups in North Africa. While widespread popular support is limited, IS has become a banner to rally to for disaffected and/or militant groups. By some estimates, 25,000 fighters from the region (the Middle East and North Africa) have been recruited to fight in Syria and Iraq. There are some groups that have pledged their allegiance, support or both to IS and in particular to Baghdadi as their de facto leader. Within North Africa, and in particular Libya, Tunisia and Algeria, there appears to be a growing level of support within domestic Islamic groups, with some groups and individuals now conducting operations under the IS franchise and flag.

The growth in popularity of IS internationally has been remarkable, but many analysts believe that the group’s growing support has been in the main part due to its dynamic use of the internet and social media for recruiting and propaganda purposes, to a greater extent than any other group before. It has been become quite proficient at releasing its own video evidence of IS achievements and support. As well, the Western-led intervention in Syria and Iraq has been a useful recruiting tool, just as AQI used the US-led invasion of Iraq to rally jihadists to join the insurgency.

Within North Africa, of the groups that have expressed support for IS, there is no specific intelligence to suggest that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has done so, although small individual groups that had been operating under the AQIM franchise may have pledged allegiance to IS. Al-Qaeda affiliated groups are under some pressure, however, as IS appears to offer a dynamic – and militarily successful – franchise as al-Qaeda’s ‘brand’ declines.

In a recent development in March 2015, Boko Haram, the Nigerian-based Islamic group, went public with its pledge of allegiance to IS. Although this group is principally involved in its own attempt to establish an Islamic state in northern Nigeria, its violent methods are similar to that of IS. There is intelligence reporting to suggest that fighters from Boko Haram were involved in the conflict in Mali. Uncorroborated reporting also suggests that they have joined Islamic groups in Libya, Algeria and Tunisia. Boko Haram is the largest Islamic terrorist group that has pledged its support and allegiance to IS at this time, but is focus is primarily in Nigeria and there is little evidence to suggest that its allegiance is much more than rhetorical at this time.

Mauritania

The strongest Islamic group in the country remains AQIM, which has recently been active and it has always found a strong recruiting ground within the country. In October 2014, there were some arrests in the mining town of Zouerate after reports that active recruiting for IS was taking place. There has been little to corroborate this media report, but judging by regional influences, it has some credence and should not be discounted.

There has been some cross-border movement of Islamic groups from Mali, and although these groups have not been identified as being franchised to IS, they could well be part of the growing trend in following IS. The Mauritanian military has increased surveillance along the country’s eastern borders in recent months and cross-border insurgency is no longer a common occurrence.

With some rampant poverty and a high incidence of political corruption, support for IS’s ideals could grow in Mauritania, but any direct insurgency threat to the government is unlikely in the short term. Overall, the expected support for IS from the general public in Mauritania is low but may trend upwards. Among Islamist groups, expected support for IS is medium and may trend upwards.

Morocco

There have been reports that individuals are being recruited from Morocco through social media outlets. Indeed, arrests of recruiters have been reported frequently and Morocco appears to be one of the key recruiting grounds for IS. In August of 2014, Moroccan ministry sources identified that over a thousand Moroccan nationals were fighting on behalf of IS in Syria and Iraq. During 2014, the police reportedly dismantled a large cell of IS recruiters. In support of this operation, Spanish authorities in Ceuta and Melilla were also active in the interdiction of recruiters and would-be fighters in transit.

Recruitment into the ranks of IS has been made a criminal act in the country, with the security services and police making significant arrests. They have also linked into joint operations with the Spanish authorities, in particular within the Spanish enclaves. Moroccan officials are also preparing for the prospect of returning fighters establishing themselves into insurgency groups within the country, with an emphasis on maintaining the IS goal – that is, the establishment of the Muslim caliphate.

Overall, the expected support for IS from the general public in Morocco is low. The expected support for IS in Islamist groups in Morocco is low, but has the potential to trend upwards in some areas, especially in Western Sahara.

Algeria

Algeria has been synonymous with terrorism since the

1990s. The North African wing of al-Qaeda has its origins in the bitter Algerian civil war in the 1990s. Since then, terrorism within the country has taken on a more international jihadist agenda. AQIM remains the main terrorist group in the country, although there has been some growing support for IS. On 30 September 2014, a previously unknown group ‘The Soldiers of the Caliph- ate in Algeria’ or Jund al-Khilafa, who were responsible for the execution of a French tourist in 2014, pledged their allegiance to IS. Additionally, the al-Huda Battalion of Islam in Maghreb has also pledged allegiance to IS. The strength and organizational structure of either group remains unknown, but the Algerian security services are conscious of such groups establishing themselves with- in the national territory and they have stepped up intelligence-gathering operations.

Media and intelligence reports have highlighted the in- creasing numbers of Algerians who have gone to Iraq and Syria to fight alongside IS. This could create a similar problem for the Algerian government when and if these individuals return, as was experienced after the Afghan/ Soviet war in the 1980s. Like Morocco, Algeria is taking measures to ensure that the interdiction of returning jihadists is a priority for the security agencies.

Overall, the expected support for IS from the general public in Algeria is low but has the potential to trend upwards. The expected support for IS among Islamist groups in Algeria is medium with the likelihood of trending upwards.

Tunisia

Tunisia is very much in the spotlight following the attack on the Bardo museum in Tunis on 18 March 2015. During the attack, 17 tourists were killed by several gunmen. In the aftermath of the shooting, IS quickly claimed responsibility for the atrocity, although this is speculative and there is no public evidence that the group or individuals responsible were connected to the organization.

Within the country, the Islamist group Okba ibn Nafaa Battalion has pledged allegiance to IS. It is also likely that there are many individuals who have expressed support for IS. There is a large Salafist following in the country, which has tried to push for a stronger Islamist code and the removal of a secular government. Intelligence reporting has identified that Tunisians, by a significant margin, make up the largest numbers of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.

Following the attack in Tunis, many Tunisians marched in a show of unity against Islamist terrorist activity. There appears to be strong opposition to jihadist groups in the country, with increased support for the new secularist government elected in November 2014. But high unemployment and poor prospects for the youth of the country could test this support and become push factors for IS recruitment.

The expected support for IS from the general public in Tunisia is low, and is unlikely to increase. The expected support for IS in the more militant Islamist groups in Tunisia is high and is trending upwards, which is likely to keep the number of Tunisians fighting in Iraq and Syria high.

Libya

With the country facing variety of competing factions vying for political control, there are significant opportunities for militant groups to flourish. Ansar al-Sharia, the Muslim Brotherhood and AQIM are all emerging with various degrees of effectiveness. Many of the militias that grew out of the civil war that toppled Qaddafi have tried to hold on to the power that was achieved in the first year after the revolution. However, some of these groups have either sided with the old government, or the new and un-elected government, or have shifted allegiance to militant groups. Within the country, at least three groups have pledged allegiance to IS, although there are likely also to be hitherto unknown organizations and militia who have similar goals and ideals to IS.

Groups in Libya have some freedom to move and train, making it easier to send fighters to neighboring countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria, as well as south into Niger and towards Mali. The murder of a number of Egyptian Coptic Christians in Libya was a catalyst that triggered military interdiction by Egypt, but it has not brought further military intervention from EU or US forces. Italy has deployed naval units to monitor the coast of Libya, but this is principally to prevent irregular migration and to provide protection and support for Italian oil exploration companies operating in Libya.

Islamic State of Libya, Lions of Libya, and Shura Council of Shabab al-Islam are three of the main groups that have expressed support and or allegiance to IS. These groups were probably part of Ansar al-Sharia but have since changed their allegiance. In the east of the country in Derna, militias claiming allegiance to IS claimed part of the city as their stronghold. But other militant groups, such as Ansar al-Sharia and the Abu Salim Martyrs Brigade are active in the area, all with their own agendas (such as to secure control of oil fields and port facilities). Derna has been a high-profile ‘success’ for IS but the city has been under attack by Libya military units for some months, including air support from Egypt. At the time of publication a major offensive was being launched.

Most of the more egregious atrocities carried out in Libya recently, including the attack on the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli and the execution of Egyptian Coptic Christians, have been committed under the IS franchise. As well, IS-affiliated militias have been active in Sirte, where they are fighting Misratan militias that are nominally part of the Libya Dawn alliance, the more Islamist of the competing governments in Libya. The Misratans have accused the IS militias of being aligned with old Qaddafi factions (a charge usually leveled at the Misratan’s opponents in Libya’s army) and containing foreign fighters.

Overall, with the militias in Libya preoccupied with their own political and tribal allegiances, there is not wide- spread support for IS. However, the conflict is creating space for IS to gain more and more of a foothold by recruiting local groups to its cause. While the civil war continues, these groups will continue to be active and per- haps present the most sizable threat posed by IS within North Africa itself.

Mali

Although not part of the Maghreb, Mali borders Mauritania, Algeria and Niger. As such, it has a demonstrable effect on the North African countries, with a variety of Islamist groups with similar goals to IS. Groups such as Ansar Dine, the Islamic Movement for Azawad, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), as well as AQIM are all operating within the country. There is no evidence that these groups have formed any allegiance with or support for IS.

Mali has been under intense pressure from Islamist groups, which have been fighting both international and Malian military forces for nearly two years in the north of the country. The largest Tuareg group in Mali is Ansar Dine, with other groups such as MUJAO, the Signed in Blood Battalion and the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA) all being active.

Overall, the expected support for IS from the general public in Mali is low, but higher in the north of the country with the potential to further trend upwards. The potential support for IS among militant Islamist groups in Mali is high could solidify into practical linkages. At the present time, however, these groups are more focused on their immediate local goals and allegiances.

Potential Impacts on Maritime Operations

With the exception of Libya and Tunisia, maritime operations have not yet been affected by the influence of IS. In Tunisia, the attack at the Bardo museum in Tunis led to the cancellation of numerous cruise ships visiting the port; other than this, other commercial maritime operations in Tunis have not been disrupted.

In Libya there has been some significant disruption to port operations, especially those concerning the export of oil products, and in the main ports of Tripoli and Benghazi where random indirect artillery fire has been report- ed. As well, vessels have been accused on aiding different factions in the civil war; the tanker ARAEVO was hit by airstrikes in the port of Derna by the Libyan air force. There is some concern regarding the safety of ships’ crews, although no specific attacks have been leveled at, or reported by, vessels calling into Libyan ports. There is, however, a high level of risk to foreigners in Libya and ship operators and crew should be aware of this. However, most of the risks in Libya are related to the insecurity from the civil war, rather than the threat of IS – other than in key areas where IS-aligned militias are active. This said, there are growing terrorism concerns and the US Coast Guard in April imposed ISPS Level 2 and other measures on vessels calling US ports that previously called in Libya.

Irregular migration from the North African coast across the Mediterranean has a significant effect on maritime operations. Large numbers of migrants are taking advantage of the increased patrolling by European naval and coastguard units to make the crossing to Italy and Malta. They do this as there is now a better chance of interdiction and rescue from these naval assets. Ships operating in the general area should be mindful of the risks of migrant vessels and their obligations to render assistance when required.

There have been no incidents or any significant increase in stowaways from North African ports since the emergence of IS within the confines of North Africa. There is some anecdotal evidence that some stowaway incidents are under-reported, with ships opting to avoid the bureaucracy that comes with the detection of stowaways. IMO reporting for the first quarter of 2015 is not available for analysis, but ship operators and masters should make sure that appropriate measures are taken while in ports.

Further Expected Developments

Currently, IS forces may number around 30,000 fighters in Iraq and/or Syria, of which about half are ideologically supportive of the group, with the rest believed to be either coerced through fear/forced recruitment. There is further support among other Islamist groups throughout North Africa, especially in Libya. IS has become a formidable adversary, and although it has not met strong military opposition in Iraq or Syria, it has withstood a concerted coalition offensive for several months and is still gaining support. In recent months, IS has lost a lot of the military gains made during 2014, and intelligence suggests that much of its military effectiveness has been damaged.

However, IS’s brutality is likely place limits on its appeal. It has shocked most Muslims throughout the region. Militarily, coalition forces are likely to further increase military action against IS targets. The governments in the Maghreb are also likely to increase their crackdown on IS supporters, recruiters and potential fighters. Support for the group will be seen as a criminal act in most North African countries.

In the Maghreb, the political conditions in Libya and Mali are confused and volatile: a situation that IS could exploit to give them a strong base from which to expand their ideology. This could allow IS to expand its presence on the ground in the region, rather than just being a force for recruiting fighters for operations in Syria and Iraq. Attacks by IS in Libya and Mali, if they increase in frequency and severity, would attract the interest of European powers that have vital interests to protect in these countries and the neighboring areas.

Conclusion
The IS group has become the standard bearer for Islamic extremism in North Africa. Its origins in Iraq, and the speed of its influence across neighboring countries to jihadist groups that see it, as the answer to Western oppression, has been nothing short of phenomenal.

2015 will be a key year for all countries in the Maghreb, as well as neighboring Egypt. Government forces are engaging Islamic groups as well as supporters and recruiters. The biggest problem that regional governments will face is that if IS fails in Iraq and Syria then it is possible that large numbers of jihadists will return to their own countries and fuel the prospect of increased terrorist activity in that region. The dispersal of large numbers of fighters from Iraq and Syria could also be a problem for European governments and security services as returning fighters and those seeking asylum to avoid retribution in their own countries could sow the seeds of potential terrorist activity.

Within North Africa, further attacks as seen in Libya and Tunisia could spread to Morocco, where there is a large tourist infrastructure, and an attack against Western tourists anywhere in the region is now considered highly likely. Algeria is already experiencing an increase in Islamist activity and although the country is not a popular tourist destination there are visitors from the EU and beyond who have been put off visiting the country.

IS, and any Islamic extremist group in North Africa, could well be in a strong position to challenge governments in the region through attacks on government, diplomatic, commercial, religious or tourist centers. The security services in all these countries are reportedly mindful of the potential problems that could, and in some places already do, exist and they are taking radical steps to counter the threats. 2015 will be a difficult year for these governments, as extremists attempt to capitalize on perceived Western anti-Islamic policies. As such, IS related activities will be a major security factor in the year ahead.

This piece first appeared in Strategic Insights, No. 57 (April 2015) and is republished with permission of our strategic partner, Risk Intelligence.

The publication Strategic Insights can be obtained via subscription at the following linkL

http://www.riskintelligence.eu/maritime/strategic_insights/