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As the US shapes its next phase of 21st century military and security policy, it is crucial to assess the capability of the national security system to set goals and objectives appropriate the tools available.
In a world of high demand, and scarce resources, this means that there are always limits, and options, but choice is not without its constraints.
There has been a growing literature based in part on the land wars of the past decade, which focus on the role of the military as part of a process whereby hard power transmutes into soft power and then into something called stability operations.
The notion here is that military engagement is about filling power vacuums, and then rebuilding capabilities in regions or nations to fill those vacuums, and the role of the military in the first is somewhat clear but in the second is not.
In this second area, so-called soft power is seen as the key element as the hard power of deploying force to fill the power vacuum is transformed into the creation of the “new” political, economic, cultural and military force to fill the vacuum.
A hard look at the past decade needs to be made, to determine what makes sense and what does not going forward.
What are the limits of the possible revealed by the past decade?
How effectively can an outside power remake power vacuums within foreign cultures?
What are the limits to foreign intervention, not simply military intervention, but intervention per se of outside powers?
It is not so much about hard to soft power, it is a question about the inherent limits of what a foreign power can do when invading, occupying and “remaking” a power substitute in a situation where there is a dangerous power vacuum for that outside power.
Looking back at the lessons learned of the past decade, should not simply or even primarily be about the US and allied militaries; it is about the capabilities of national security systems to deploy force and to define objectives for the use of force appropriate to the tasks and then withdrawing force effectively.
Maj. Mark Binggeli, staff advisor for the METF, Alaska Army National Guard, speaks with a Mongolian Mobile Training Team member about the employment of 82 mm mortars after a weapons live-fire demonstration with Afghan National Army Soldiers on Sept.2 at the Camp Scenic weapons range near the Darulaman Infantry School in Kabul, Afghanistan. The MTT specialize in 88 mm mortars and SPG-9 recoilless rifle systems and train ANA Soldiers at the infantry school. Credit: 196th Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 9/2/10
There is much literature on the problem of the military fighting the “last war,” but the military has innovated far more than the civilian systems whose main role with regard to the military is not simply deciding to send them, but to set realistic and evolving objectives towards their withdrawal.
It is not about simply sending the military to a crisis area and then hoping the situation resolves itself intuitively; it is about constantly shaping realistic policies which force can be used for, and then withdrawing those forces to preserve their warfighting capabilities, and not dissipating them in policy wind downs with no real strategic or tactical objectives in mind.
In other words, it is about using hard power for insertion to achieve objectives up to a certain point and then withdrawing those forces to preserve their combat capability.
It is about defining objectives, deploying force (and not micro managing the force when deployed) and withdrawing those forces when (almost by definition) those limited objectives are achieved.
It is about determining what are the success criteria short of totally remaking the crisis area to which force is deployed.
One problem has been that the dominance of the US Army and occupation thinking has migrated to what supporters call stability operations and nation building.
Despite the decidedly mixed (at best)results and the impossibility of squandering the national treasure as has been done in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is a strong Army-led predisposition to try to transform the last decade into a next decade version of filling power vacuums with so-called ground forces.
I say so-called ground forces, because the U.S .has air-enabled ground forces, not ground forces.
And one clear force for change in the decade ahead is that the USAF will have more important tasks in the decade ahead than being the Fed Ex and United Airlines for the US Army.
A recent RAND report published for the US Army addresses some of these questions.
And as such provides a useful launch point to discuss ways to think about the decade ahead.
The report is entitled Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War and was done by the RAND Arroyo Center, the Army equivalent to CNA for the US Navy.
Iraqi Air Force Squadron 3 assaults a target with an AGM-114 Hellfire missile
Not surprisingly, the report is pitched to looking at the future of the US Army but from the perspective of what the report considers to be a key failing, namely strategic competence gaps, so to speak.
According to the report’s abstract, the report is described as follows:
This report contributes to the ongoing debate about the lessons from the past 13 years of war and the requirements for addressing future conflicts.
It addresses a particular disconnect in the current debate on the future of national security strategy and the role of landpower caused by an inadequate examination of the national level of strategy made by the U.S. government.
The disconnect exists because there has been no systematic effort to collect and analyze insights from those who have been actively engaged in making policy and strategy from 2001 to 2014.
A RAND Arroyo Center workshop provided a mechanism for eliciting insights from policymakers and academic experts involved in the formation of national-level strategy and its implementation over the past 13 years.
This study analyzes and develops those insights in the context of the debate on future national security strategy.
It applies those insights to the future operating environment, which will include irregular and hybrid threats, and identifies critical requirements for land forces and special operations forces to operate successfully in conjunction with other joint, interagency, and multinational partners
This is a classic statement in Think Tank speak.
But a clearer statement was provided in an article published by Sandra Erwin in National Defense.
The United States does not have a credible strategy to combat enemies like Islamic extremist groups and needs to rethink its entire national security decision-making process, a new military-funded study suggests.
“I don’t think we understand completely the fight we are in,” said Lt. Gen. Charles Cleveland, commanding general of U.S. Army Special Operations Command.
Despite 13 years of grueling wars, he noted, the national security apparatus has not adapted to changing threats and has not learned to cope with complex challenges.
“We are in a competition where it looks like football to us, but it’s really a game of soccer with elements of rugby and lacrosse,” he said Dec. 12 during a gathering of think tank experts and military officials hosted by RAND Corp. senior analyst Linda Robinson. She is one of the authors of a new study sponsored by Army Special Operations Command, titled, “Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War.”
RAND analysts wade into the debate about the lessons from the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, and whether the United States is applying those lessons to address future conflicts.
Cleveland said the study exposes uncomfortable truths that not everyone in official Washington will want to hear, but need to be recognized. One of those realities is that the military continues to fight the last war even though enemies such as the Islamic State present entirely new challenges. “We have to be honest about how much legacy we are bringing into a fight that is not suited for the legacy we bring forward,” he said. “This is unlike anything we’ve confronted, I think, in our past.”
The counterterrorism machine the United States stood up after the 9/11 attacks has become a bureaucratic juggernaut that struggles to adapt, Cleveland said. “We built a great apparatus for terrorism. It has huge advocacy. If someone questions it, you run the risk of taking on an entrenched infrastructure.”
The United States needs fresh ideas on how to make the nation safe, he said, and they can’t just involve military actions. “We keep adapting the existing tools the best we can but at some point we have to develop new tools, new ways to look at this problem.”
In the case of the Islamic State, the Obama administration was caught unprepared to deal with a terrorist group that turned into a “no-kidding insurgency” that conducts maneuver warfare, information campaigns and is taking on the characteristics of a nation state. It is still not clear how to respond,
This all sounds promising, so with the Erwin piece in mind, I dove into the study.
But what I found was less fulfilling than I hoped to find for what quickly became evident was that the report more or less updated the last decade for the next.
And we learned such insights as the importance of “whole of government” approaches rather than relying on the traditional military.
At the heart of the problem is the failure of political authorities and crisis managers to define clear objectives within the limits of the possible and withdrawing force when those limits are reached.
It is about defining success; not decisive victory.
Interestingly, the report is built around a core contradiction on this point.
U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 161 transport Marines on MV-22B Ospreys during Exercise Iron Fist 2014 to San Clemente Island, Calif., Feb. 14, 2014. Iron Fist is an amphibious exercise that brings together Marines and Sailors from the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, other I Marine Expeditionary Force units, and soldiers from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, to promote military interoperability and hone individual and small-unit skills through challenging, complex and realistic training.
On the one hand, the report argues for victory as the definer for intervention; and on the other, for a more nuanced success indicator.
Military campaigns take place in the social, cultural, and political contexts of the states in which they are fought, and any successful operation will be cognizant of those contexts and have a plan for how to operate within, exploit, influence, and achieve victory in them.
The lack of a political strategy, the failure to recognize its centrality, and its inadequate integration and sustained application may be the most important insights to arise from this inquiry. (pp.52-53).
Yet later the report comes closer to the reality of political use of combat forces, namely the need to declare what is success rather than a final notion of victory.
The theory is based on a broader conception of war to include the political dimension.
That broader conception in turn necessitates a theory of success that addresses the full dimensions of war.
The ways of achieving success encompass a much wider range of actions.
The desired political outcome may be obtained via containment or mitigation, formally negotiated settlements, informal power sharing, or elections and constitutional charters that establish the basis for a new political order.
These outcomes may be sought, of course, without waging war; but the point is that the goals of war must also encompass some such outcomes.
Otherwise the United States runs the risk of winning battles but failing to achieve strategic (or even operational) success.
This broader view does not make attaining success necessarily more difficult, but rather opens up a broader definition of what success may look like and a wider range of ways to attain it (p.99).
The report focuses on shortfalls of the military and its thinking about success; and the need for a broader concept of achieving objectives than simply using force.
Shaping a New Sensor-Shooter Relationship in Japan with Aegis, Patriot and THAAD will significantly expand the capabilities of all (Credit Photo: Raytheon and its PAC-3)
The report makes a clear argument that the skill sets developed over the past decade need to be maintained going forward as the “political” context of military engagement requires them.
This study suggests that recognizing the likely continuities between the recent past and the possible future will provide a hedge against unwise abandonment of hard-won innovations in practice and thought.
While budget decisions necessarily force reductions in capacity, many of the capabilities developed over the past 13 years merit retention at smaller scale.
Some of those capabilities warrant further investment of time or resources to ensure they are refined to perform better in the future.
And some ongoing gaps, if not addressed, represent a risk to future mission success. (p.123).
Even if one accepts that some skill sets of the sort advocated by the report are important, and I certainly would agree with that, the question is within which budgetary and force structure context?
Having visited the Pacific earlier this year, while the Army was making their bid for a Pacific Pathways strategy, whereby the USAF would essentially take the Army around the region, the reality is that the other services plus the allies valued the US Army contribution in missile defense more than human terrain mapping.
Yet in the report, the only mention of missile defense is scarce references to the Manpads threat!
The most fundamental problem facing the US Army as an occupation force can be put simply:
When an outside power intervenes and stays as an occupying power it is always a “them to the us” of the local culture or state.
This “them-us” dichotomy is built into occupation.
It is inherent in the use of force itself, for the state is using force for specific punishment purposes, not to set up a new nation or welfare state.
An outside power intervening ALWAYS upsets the local power structure, and locals leverage the presence of the outside power to augment their own power within their society, either by working with or suberverting the occupation power ‘s agenda.
Since the RAND authors want to talk about political context, let us talk about the political context of occupation and its impacts.
The Osprey flight line as the MEU prepares to deploy from New River. Credit Photo: SLD, 2012
This takes the discussion then out of the lingo of think-tankese.
The report spends a great deal of time focusing on the transformation of the military to enable it to do political interventions and, in effect, occupations without grasping the single most important question – where and why?
And who is writing the check for all of this?
A colleague commenting on an earlier version of this article added this insight into the challenges of moving forward to deal with the threats of the next decade and not being trapped by the “stability occupations” argument.
At the heart of the traditional land power argument is a concept that goes something like this:
“In the end, land forces will secure the objective to allow Phase IV follow on operations.
No other force can achieve what a present, persistent land force can do.
All other forces in their respective mediums should support the land force
in their efforts to secure this objective.”
The Petraeus corollary to this idea is that to do so will take 25 years and in the end the locals must own the problem.
I would argue the locals already owned the problem from the start and all a great power can do is set conditions to allow one side of the local power equation to rule.
General Gaviard With President Jacques Chirac After the Air Operations in Kosovo in 1999
My models are Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya not Iraq or Afghanistan.
The problem is the lingering notion that a massive, armored land army will be required to deal with a peer competitor.
Problem: if A2/AD is a problem for air and sea forces then it’s a complete bar to land power employment in the same theater at least the current US Army formations of armored BCTs.
In my mind a tank is the 21st century equivalent of a battleship of the 1920s. If your opponent has access to his airspace and possesses late 20th century precision attack (ISR plus sensing weapons), tanks will be defeated like Saddam’s were in 1991.
This is the lesson PRC and DPRK as well as others except the US Army have noted.
My Army friends also acknowledge the value of airpower but only as a prelude to their operations.
I am not personally interested in a strategy that repeats pastglories (note today is the 70th Anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge).
Our adversaries have seized on nukes as an answer to our way of war.
So precision attack from long range on a very specific set of targets that limit causalities on both sides, allow the power elites of the adversary to live to see their mistake and choose a path to peace is what we should figure out how to do.
The military has over adapted to land occupation and nation-building.
The challenge is not to modernization the approach but to jettison it.
And with it, the core obligation of civilians to manage crises needs to be highlighted.
A French Air Force Dassault Rafale F1 fighter jet receives fuel from a Royal Australian Air Force KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport in Iraq.
It is about using the military instrument to intervene to a level where success is attained and then to withdraw.
One reads in vain in the report for a real treatment of the fundamental gap in the national security system, namely civilian crisis managers who can put in place reasonable exit strategies when forces inserted have achieved the limits of success appropriate and possible to a situation.
In effect, the report blurs the lines between what a coherent military operation can accomplish and what the national leadership might wish to accomplish in a particular state, region or crisis.
We learn such things as “technology cannot substitute for expertise in history, culture and languages because of the inherently human and uncertain nature of war” or that “interventions should not be conducted without a plan to conduct stability operations, capacity building, transition and, if necessary counterinsurgency.”
Why?
If we look back at Afghanistan we accomplished the most that we really needed to achieve with the initial destruction of the Taliban government in the early Afghan war period.
The insertion was well organized and well designed; and we did not need to go down the path of nation builder and occupier of Afghanistan.
No amount of language training is going to make the US Army Afghani. Full stop.
What we need from RAND and from the Washington think tanks is a serious look at the missing capabilities of the civilian side of the equation – what are the objectives of an intervention and as we intervene how do we plan for withdrawal?
And with that what are the limited but important objectives we can achieve by using the military?
This is what missing; not turning the US military into the Red Cross.
There is no doubt that the US military needs to progress in terms of its ability to work within coalitions, to better understand how to operate in various global settings, but clearly this is ongoing for the US military.
In fact, one could argue that the US military as a whole understands the broader world considerably better than its political masters.
As Dr. Kenneth Maxwell, the noted American and English historian of Brazil has observed: “One problem for the U.S. has clearly been that the US military is engaged globally in way that neither the Congress nor Administration officials have been. This means that foreign leaders often look to the US military for advice in ways that the domestic bound politicians can simply not provide.”
And it is hard to argue that AID or the State Department are stunning performers or the CIA or NSA for that matter with regard to working global foreign policy challenges, problems or anticipating threats.
So it is not clear that pushing the U.S. military further into the swamp of “interagency and intergovernmental coordination” will make for more effective interventions; it could give us endless Iraq’s or Afghanistan’s, something that surely will end with the US military bankrupt and ineffectual.
There is little question that the ISIL induced crisis is a major one. And it is one with cascading regional implications.
With several years of dynamic change in the region, and the failure to create a stable Iraq during the period after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, ISIL is like throwing a match into a gas can.
And the tensions in the divisions within the Middle East itself come into play and are augmented and aggravated by both responses to ISIL and the impact of success or failure in containing the impact of the ISIL movement.
In a recent interview with Dr. Amatzia Baram, a leading Israeli expert on the Middle East and notably with regard to Iraq, the regional implications of dealing with ISIL were underscored:
I see essentially two main very negative developments.
One is that Iraq will never be Iraq again, and I cannot see Syria becoming Syria again.
If you have this terrible instability, it’s very, very hard on the other Middle East states.
They see this huge problem, and this is a spoiler of any hope for any stability.
I would still think the American administration has the right approach to see what they can do to try and put Humpty Dumpty back, when it comes to Iraq.
So my main concern would be how to bring stability back to this area by keeping Iraq as Iraq, and Syria as Syria, and saying that, which may be the case we should know within a few months.
The idea is to try and help a new architecture emerge that will enhance stability rather chaos. That’s number one issue.
Number two, not less importantly, is that ISIS cannot be allowed more success.
They already had great success, but they have to at least be stopped.
I can see already all over the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Africa, the intellectual pull from ISIS as a radicalization virus spreading around much of the Islamic world. In other words, if they are more successful, even though it may not create a total chaos where they are already, just the fact that they are so successful means that others will follow their example in the broader region.
So what kind of architecture is possible in view of the dynamics in Iraq and beyond, and the need to have realistic engagement by the US and its allies, rather than an open-ended set of commitments?
ISIS militants lined up 30 Sunni men in a town west of Baghdad and shot them dead October 29, 2014. Credit: Mail Online
Or put another way, we tried occupation and unification via support of an Iraqi Army controlled by the Sunnis in Baghdad. That did not work, but what is a realistic alternatives which can be pursued with realistic means and appropriate to the evolving situation?
It is about ends and means; it is not about replaying the past decade.
There is little doubt that a transitional opportunity was missed by the Obama Administration, but with a new Republican Congress we clearly do not need to hear simply that Obama was wrong or that he had no choice and that we need to repeat the past decade.
We need for Congress to consider realistic policy options and to debate those options in an open manner to gain the trust of the American public, who has every right not to be handed an ultimatum from the Administration or be simply dictated to by events.
The President can build on two important realities providing him opportunities in Iraq.
First, Iraq in 2014 is not the Iraq of 2003. Not the least of the differences is the embrace of allies in the effort.
Second, secular forces in Iraq are fighting for their very lives, one which provides the force on the ground and which can anchor sanity in the region, namely the Kurds.
Even more significantly, the first trend intersects with the second.
But Iraq 2014 is not Iraq 2003 in another key dimension: directly dealing with the failure of the Baghdad government to govern Iraq but rather to use its assets to try to dominate Iraq in the interests of the Shia.
This means that the Iraq Army, a central focus of attention for the US Army in “stability operations,” and “nation building” is an inherently flawed instrument of power.
An alternative path needs to be highlighted and supported.
The US and its allies can commit to the territorial integrity of Iraq but to one which is federal in character, rather than one dominated by a Sh’i-Baghdad.
In the current environment, there are three key players, each of whom is playing a key role and which can anchor a federal Iraq.
The Kurds are clearly focused on fighting and protecting their region and can be counted upon to play a key role in any future Iraq federation.
The US and its allies have clearly seen the value of working with the Kurds, and both training and operating from Kurdish territory.
But there is a limit on what the Kurds will do with regard to the integrity of Iraq.
The Turkish President is playing a deadly game of leveraging the ISIL crisis to augment his internal power and to seek to play a role in shaping the future of Syria but doing precious little to help deal in a concrete manner with ISIL.
And to be clear, this is more about domestic politics and the efforts of the current President to reverse course in the classic Ataturk solution set for Turkish identity.
In the interview, Baram provided some guidance on what the US could do to deal with Turkey, which is clearly at a crossroads of either supporting NATO or befriending ISIL, notably pushed by the question of the Syrian Kurds.
The Turks have no intention of sending ground troops, for the current Turkish Administration is an ally of ISIL.
The Turks are brokering ISIL oil and selling it into the global market among other ways in which they are working with ISIL…..
But what to do about support for the Syrian Kurds?
Here Turkey comes into play; the support of the current Turkish Administration of ISIL is making the US Administration absolutely furious but not furious enough to provide weapons and other supplies to the Syrian Kurds.
And as far as the Turkish reluctance to allow the use of their airbase, it may come to choosing sides between ISIL and NATO.
This crisis is that serious.
The US could begin to build a new airbase in north-eastern Jordan (or expand the existing one there) to prepare to remove its reliance on the Turkish base, a position which might well prove necessary in the evolving politics in the region.
A recent report published in The Wall Street Journal suggests that the Turkish Administration is finally adjusting its position, and by so doing will open up its airbases to the campaign. But if the Turkish Administration fails to do so, it is time to move on.
U.S. and Turkish officials have narrowed their differences over a joint military mission in Syria that would give the U.S. and its coalition partners permission to use Turkish air bases to launch strike operations against Islamic State targets across northern Syria, according to officials in both countries.
As part of the deal, U.S. and Turkish officials are discussing the creation of a protected zone along a portion of the Syrian border that would be off-limits to Assad regime aircraft and would provide sanctuary to Western-backed opposition forces and refugees.
U.S. and coalition aircraft would use Incirlik and other Turkish air bases to patrol the zone, ensuring that rebels crossing the border from Turkey don’t come under attack there, officials said.
Turkey had proposed a far more extensive no-fly zone across one-third of northern Syria, according to officials. That idea was, however, a nonstarter for the Obama administration, which told Ankara that something so invasive would constitute an act of war against the Assad regime.
In contrast to a formal no-fly zone, the narrower safe zone along the border under discussion wouldn’t require any strikes to take out Syrian air defenses. Instead, the U.S. and its coalition partners could send a quiet warning to the Assad regime to stay away from the zone or risk retaliation.
The second key player are the Shia.
The Shia will fight to defend Baghdad, although some US help in terms of airpower is being offered and clearly of use.
The target of the ISIL leadership is clearly Baghdad and the fight between Sunnis and Shia could revolve around the current capital city.
Yet it is very likely that the militia and the fighting remnants of the Iraqi Army can certainly when aided by US and allied air strikes and the Iranian Quds Force defend Baghdad.
This leaves the crucial Sunni factor.
Here the US and its allies have no easy choices.
Kurdish mourners flash the V-sign as they chant slogans during the funeral of Kurdish fighters Hanim Dabaan, 20, Idris Ahmad, 30, and Mohammed Mustafa, 25, killed in the fighting with the militants of the Islamic State group in Kobani, Syria, at a cemetery in Suruc, on the Turkey-Syria border, Tuesday, Oct. 21, 2014. Lefteris Pitarakis / CP
The Sunnis simply do not trust their experience since 2003 with regard to Baghdad and the Shia role in dominating Iraq through the use of the military, and other power instruments.
To broker a federal Iraq, Mosul needs to be captured and managed by an honest broker, not the Shia Iraqi Army.
The Sunnis are crucial to a federal Iraq, and need to be enlisted to support a new effort away from the Shia dominated approach of the Baghdad government and the training of its Army for control as much as security purposes.
Again Baram provides targeted insight which can be leveraged for a way ahead.
The Kurds have a clear agenda, but so do the Sunnis.
They do not want to be dominated by a Baghdad Shia government.
A way to turn them against ISIL is to provide for their ability to defend themselves against other forces within Iraq and outside of it.
Which means that first and foremost, they want a defense force that will protect them against anybody and everybody: of course, ISIL, but also the Iraqi National Army.
In view of some revanchist Sunni groups, though, this force must be defensive, not sufficiently powerful to overcome either the Kurdish peshmergas or the national Army and, say, conquer Baghdad.
But you see, right now they are in a bind because if they join you, and you don’t give them any guarantees for the future, why not just leverage the ISIL destabilization?
And if the Iraq Army occupies Mosul it will be viewed precisely as that by the Sunnis with the Shia seen to be occupying Mosul. And the U.S. and allied role as an honest broker would simply not be possible.
A way to achieve this is to return the 101st Airborne to Mosul and the recover their key role in providing stability.
The performance of the 101st the last time in Mosul was outstanding and it is crucial to return the same unit to make the same point – we are here to manage in the interests of the citizens of Mosul, not the rulers of Baghdad.
As an airmobile force, there is no group of “boots on the ground” better suited to return to Mosul, help throw back the ISIL and to broker peace than the 101st.
And if one were to return to Veteran’s Day in 2003 and look back at the 101st in Mosul one can capture a sense of the way ahead:
Three suspected terrorists were captured in raids conducted by the 101st Airborne Division in Mosul Saturday and Sunday.
Based on intelligence gathered from local Iraqi citizens, the division’s second Brigade Combat Team sent joint security forces to three different locations in Mosul and detained the suspects for questioning.
One person suspected of planning attacks on coalition forces was found at a hospital in Mosul Saturday. Another thought responsible for several bombings was found Sunday morning in a Mosul home.
The home of a third suspect was targeted, but the suspect was not there.
The suspect’s driver was detained, however, and terrorist paraphernalia, including photos of Osama Bin Laden, were confiscated.
Despite recent attacks by former regime loyalists and foreign terrorists, civilians increasingly cooperate with coalition and Iraqi security forces. Joint patrols, checkpoints and raids by these forces daily target threats to peace and stability in northern Iraq.
In a separate mission, two weapons caches and 13 people were grabbed during routine patrols conducted by 101st and Iraqi security forces Saturday in northern Iraq.
The new Sinjar Police arrested eight people conducting an illegal checkpoint this weekend, and turned them over to coalition forces as the detainees claimed affiliation with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
About the same time, a U.S. patrol discovered a cache of 30 60-mm mortar rounds south of Mosul. In a separate incident, the Coalition for Iraqi National Unity turned in 42 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, two RPG boosters, six RPG rounds and four heavy machine guns to U.S. forces northwest of Mosul. Saturday night, three people were detained at a checkpoint in Mosul for illegal weapons possession and were taken to a Mosul police station.
In addition, the Iraqi Border Patrol apprehended two smugglers on the Iraq-Syria border for attempting to move 15 barrels of benzene across the border on nine donkeys.
The Iraqi border guards and the Mosul and Sinjar police forces, trained by the 101st Airborne Division, continue to demonstrate the ability to conduct security operations.
The 101st would be part of a new approach whereby the Kurds, the Shia in Iraq and the Sunnis would have autonomy within a federated Iraq.
Guard units to provide security in each of the federated territories would be funded from a national account and able to ensure that each of these territories could be defended against security threats of the sort constituted by the ISIL.
And one could toss into the mix the notion of moving the capital from Baghdad.
Battery, 2nd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, fire rounds from their M119A2 Howitzer at enemy targets during Operation Fulton Harvest in the Al-Jazeera Desert, Jan. 13. Alpha Battery fired over 1,100 rounds in 48 hours while in direct support of 2nd Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment during the operation, which was a combined arms counterinsurgency operation aimed at destroy and neutralizing an al-Qaida training camp southwest of Samarra. (U.S. Army Photo/1st Lt. Jonathan J. Springer)
The US could not agree on a capital so a swamp was picked and the origins of Washington DC as the new national capital in a territory no one wanted allowed the new federation to arise and be built. Perhaps something equally drastic is necessary to break the stranglehold of Baghdad, as a center of Shia power might be necessary.
The 101st would broker the Sunni transition and leave; the Kurdish effort would be supported with training and engagements to a level, which makes tactical and strategic sense; and continued working relationships with the government in Baghdad largely Shia in character would be fostered as well.
The new airbase in Jordan would in part support the military side of this, sea based capabilities, which can insert force as necessary, and perhaps an airstrip in Kurdistan to support operations would be relied upon to support any necessary military operations in support of the Federation.
Only a light footprint would remain to support military operations with political support to the Federation of Iraq as the core political objective.
What is clear is that air strikes with no clear strategic objectives other than destroying what can be reached of ISIL is not enough.
In view of a recent report by the chief of the Kurdish military staff that ISIS can field around 200,000 rather than mere 30,000 fighters this is certainly the case.
And “boots on the ground” to do the past ten years all over again is not on offer and makes no sense.
There is a way ahead, which can build around a federated Iraq, assisted with targeted military aid and assistance, but not a repeat of an Iraqi occupation.
Iraq 2014 is not Iraq 2003.
And Congress can play a very positive role in shaping a way ahead with legitimacy and credibility.
It makes no sense to have an Administration red marking the “correct” number of troops to employ with no strategic objective in sight.
For the Vietnam generation we have seen this before and do not want to see it again.
As former Lcpl. Bill Jayne who was wounded during the siege of Khe Sanh warns:
We have an announcement of 1500 “advisors” going to Iraq.
War has always been a racket, to some degree, but I would argue that what is really relevant today is that war has become a bureaucratic program of perpetual focus….
War, since the Korean War three generations ago, has become in the United States simply another government program like building sewage treatment plants.
Legislators should withhold appropriations and authorization for perpetual war that does nothing but aggrandize the power of the executive branch.
If it’s really in the national interest to defeat the latest bunch of Islamic thugs and lunatics, then let Congress declare war and mobilize the entire nation in the cause of victory.
Otherwise, get the hell out.
The entire Middle East and all its oil are not worth the bones of one tattooed lance corporal.
For an earlier version of this article published by Breaking Defense see the following:
2014-12-12 Eurofighter is continuing to progress with its weapons modernization program.
Recent test firings of Storm Shadow by the Typhoon are a crucial step in the subsuming of some of the missions of the soon to be retired Tornado aircraft.
The Italian aerospace and defense company Alenia Aermacchi, working closely with its Eurofighter partners, has successfully conducted the first release of a Storm Shadow missile from a Eurofighter Typhoon aircraftas part of its missile integration program.
The trials took place in November and saw the missile being released from the aircraft and tracked by radar up to impact.
Storm Shadow provides a significant leap in the Eurofighter Typhoon’s operational capabilities, enabling the platform to deploy multiple weapons at a very long range well clear of danger from air defenses.
Alberto Gutierrez, Chief Executive Officer of Eurofighter GmbH said: “The trials represents an important step forward in the development and integration of the Storm Shadow weapon system onto the Eurofighter Typhoon. The results help pave the way for full integration of the missile onto the aircraft for operational use.”
In parallel to the flight trials led by Alenia Aermacchi, another Eurofighter partner, BAE Systems, has completed the first trial installation of a Storm Shadow missile onto a RAF Typhoon with support from weapons provider MBDA. The confirmation of this procedure is an essential part of the integration contract.
Storm Shadow, already in service with the Italian Air Force and Royal Air Force Tornados, is a conventionally armed, stealthy, long-range stand-off precision weapon designed to neutralise high value targets.
The new weapons system will add the capability to strike in day or night in all-weather conditions, well-defended infrastructure targets such as port facilities, control centers, bunkers, missile sites, airfields and bridges that would otherwise require several aircraft and missions…..
Another element of the Tornado to Typhoon transition is equipping the Typhoon with the Brimstone missile.
We have completed the first full trial installation of MBDA’s Brimstone missile onto a Typhoon aircraft.
The trial fit is an important milestone in demonstrating the integration of the missile with the aircraft and follows the successful completion of an initial £5M study contract awarded to us by the UK’s Ministry of Defence earlier this year. The trials are helping to pave the way for Brimstone 2 integration for the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) by 2018.
Eurofighter with Brimstone missiles. Credit: BAE Systems
Six Brimstone missiles were fitted to the aircraft, each wing carrying a launcher with three missiles. Training missiles were used for the purposes of the trial and demonstrated that the weapon can be fitted to the aircraft. The aircraft was also fitted with two Paveway IV precision guided bombs, showing the baseline Phase 3 Enhancements Air-to-Surface configuration which will provide RAF Typhoon operators with a multi-role platform capable of addressing a wide range of target sets and delivering a variety of proportional precision weapon effects.
Andy Blythe, Test Pilot said “Brimstone is an extremely flexible combat low collateral damage missile which was proven on the Tornado GR4. Brimstone 2 is the next iteration of the weapon and building on its previous successes, will undoubtedly provide the RAF with a potent capability. When the system is paired with Typhoon and Paveway IV, the aircraft will be able to engage a huge cross section of potential targets.”
The current Dual Mode Seeker Brimstone which Brimstone 2 replaces is effective against the most challenging, high speed and manoeuvring targets over land and sea. As a low collateral, close air support weapon it is already combat proven by the RAF in Afghanistan, Libya and most recently in Iraq on the Tornado GR4.
And test firings of the Meteor missile continue as well.
Following contract signature in 2013 for the full integration of Meteor onto Typhoon, the trials continue to demonstrate that the weapon operates effectively with the aircraft.
Led by ourselves with support from MBDA, Selex, Qinetiq and MOD, the trials were conducted in November 2014 at the MOD’s Hebrides firing range in the UK and further developed and tested the integration of the missile with the weapon system as well as expanding the jettison envelope by conducting firings at different altitudes and speeds. The trials also tested the interface of the missile with the weapon system for both pre-launch priming and post launch datalink functions between the missile and radar.
Test pilot Nat Makepeace flew the sortie and said: “The aircraft and the weapon performed exactly as expected. It’s very easy and intuitive to operate, and the trials demonstrated that we can operate in an expanded envelope safely and accurately. This is a significant step forward for the full integration of the Meteor missile onto the Typhoon aircraft.”
Produced by MBDA, Meteor is an active radar guided missile designed to provide a multi-shot capability against long-range maneuvering targets, such as fast jets, small unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles in a heavy electronic countermeasures environment.
Capable of engaging air targets during day and night, and in all-weather conditions, the Meteor will complement Typhoon’s existing missile systems, providing pilots with a greater choice of weapons during combat.
Further firing trials are scheduled to be carried out as part of the Meteor Integration contract to fully expand the launch envelope and weapon system integration which will culminate in the integration being complete in 2017.
Expanding the Effects of Eurofighter
Group Captain Paul Godfrey, OBE has extensive experience of a range of combat aircraft through Harrier, F-16 and Typhoon. A Harrier weapons instructor, he was the first non-US national to fly the F-16 CJ operationally in the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) role whilst on exchange with the USAF and has spent the last 10 years in the Typhoon program with two flying tours including 4th/5th generation fighter training with the F-22.
After his current tour working on the Initial Operating Capability of the UK F-35B, he will become Station Commander RAF Lossiemouth, where two Typhoon squadrons are now located and a third will stand up in 2015.
According to Group Captain Godrey, a key impact of missile modernization on Typhoon will be to expand the effects of Typhoon operations.
“There is a clear need to expand the effects of Typhoon operations and here the enhancement of its weapons package will be an important improvement.”
The retirement of the Tornado as well is driving weapons modernization for the Typhoon. To take up some of this role the Eurofighter is being reconfigured to provide an enhanced capability for the ground attack role, over and above the austere level of Enhanced Paveway II integration that was used by the RAF during the Libya campaign.
Paveway 4 is being integrated in P1E and then further weapon capability, primarily from MBDA, is being integrated, some of which are currently carried by Tornado.
The Tornado carries both Storm Shadow and Brimstone and both are being shaped for integration onboard the Eurofighter.
The integration of the Storm Shadow on Typhoon is being driven in part by funding from the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia which wants its Typhoons to have a cruise missile carrying capability, and when married with its new air tanking capability can enhance the strike range of its Typhoon force.
Brimstone 2 is designed to operate against maneuvering surface targets on land or sea. It is a low collateral, close air support weapon and has been combat proven by the RAF in both Afghanistan and Libya. It will greatly enhance the effect of the Eurofighter as well.
And Typhoon will carry the new Meteor missile as well which allows for a broader range of defensive operations for the combat aircraft. he Meteor is a software upgradeable air-to-air missile with significant range and capabilities. And it is being integrated on several 4th generation aircraft – Eurofighter, Rafale and Gripen – as well as the F-35.
A White Paper on the Meteor Missile
The new Meteor missile developed by MBDA is a representative of a new generation of air combat missiles for a wide gamut of new air systems.
It can be fitted on the F-35, the Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale, Gripen and other 21st century aircraft.
The Background Environment
Increasing proliferation of state-of–the-art air-to-air threats is a critical challenge for modern Air Forces answered by METEOR;
Typhoon Carrying Meteor Missile. Credit: BAE Systems
METEOR is being developed to meet the requirements of six European nations (UK, Italy, Spain, Germany, Sweden and France) for a superior Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile system with the operational capability to excel in all current and future combat scenarios;
This collaboration of six European nations provides access to technology and expertise from across Europe.
The range and performance of the Meteor and its ability to enable both old and new air systems moves air-to-air weapons into the next generation.
What is METEOR and what are its benefits?
A fast and highly maneuverable Beyond Visual Range air-to-air weapon
Largest No Escape Zone of any air-to-air weapon resulting in a long stand-off range and high kill probability to ensure air superiority and pilot survivability;
Guidance is provided by an active radar seeker benefiting from enhanced technologies drawn from MBDA’s advanced seeker programs;
Capable of engaging air targets autonomously by night or day, in all weather and in severe electronic warfare environments;
Equipped with both a proximity and impact fuse to ensure total target destruction in all circumstances.
METEOR will be integrated onto several major platforms:
Eurofighter Typhoon;
Saab Gripen; and
Dassault Rafale
Potential to add to the air-to-air capability of other combat platforms including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
According to a Daily Mail story published on December 2, 2014:
Dramatic footage has emerged showing a Norwegian air force pilot being forced into an emergency manoeuvre to avoid a mid-air crash with a Russian fighter jet.
In the video, released by Norway’s military, one of its pilots shouts ‘What the hell?!’ before veering away sharply as the Russian MiG-31 flashes into view, just 65 feet from the F-16.
‘The Russian pilot’s behaviour was not quite normal,’ said Norwegian armed forces spokesman Brynjar Stordal about the 26-second film clip released on Sunday.
The close encounter occurred in international airspace ‘north of Norway’ but the armed forces did not say when.
Unlike neighbouring non-aligned Sweden, Norway – a NATO member – has not reported any airspace incursions by Russia in recent years and gauges the level of Russian air force activity in the area as ‘pretty normal or a little more’ than usual.
So far this year, Norway has scrambled its air force 43 times to identify 69 Russian planes, compared to 41 incidents involving 58 planes in 2013.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said last month that the alliance had reported 400 intercepts of Russian military flights so far this year – a 50 per cent increase compared to 2013.
He complained that Russian jets flying without sharing their flight plans posed a danger to commercial air traffic.
U.S. Ambassador to NATO Douglas Lute also revealed ‘multiple incidents’ where Russian military aircraft had not filed flight plans nor spoken to civilian air traffic controllers and had turned off transponders that send information about the plane.
This made the planes virtually invisible to air traffic controllers, he told a news conference.
‘These Russian actions are irresponsible, pose a threat to civilian aviation and demonstrate that Russia is flagrantly violating international norms,’ he said. ….
In this Special Report, Richard Weitz looks at the role of Kazakhstan in pursuing and promoting nuclear security.
Since 1991, the Republic of Kazakhstan has been a leading force for eliminating nuclear weapons while supporting the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear energy.
In line with this policy, President Nursultan Nazarbayev and other Kazakhstan officials have destroyed or removed all the nuclear weapons that they inherited from the Soviet Union.
They have also joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state.
The have worked to keep Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.
They have promoted a Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (CANWFZ), and are now leading a global movement against nuclear weapons testing while offering to host the world’s first “nuclear fuel bank” in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Meanwhile, though Kazakhstan closed its only nuclear power reactor a few years ago after decades of service, the government and nuclear industry has decided to take advantage of Kazakhstan’s natural and technological resources to develop civilian nuclear power as an additional energy source, for both itself and other countries.
Through its contributions to the March 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague and other means, Kazakhstan has strived to make civilian nuclear power production more safe and secure.[1]
Several factors explain why Kazakhstan’s government has made nuclear nonproliferation and security a major foreign-policy objective.
First, Kazakhstan suffered from the Soviets’ use of Kazakhstan’s territory to conduct hundreds of nuclear weapons tests, leaving horrific environmental and human damage. More than one million unprotected people were exposed to radioactive fallout, while some parts of Kazakhstan remain seriously contaminated to this day.
Second, Kazakhstan faces a genuine threat from possible terrorist or criminal efforts to acquire the nuclear material and technologies that are located on or near its territory.[2]
Finally, foreign governments regularly praise Kazakhstan’s commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament achievements, even those foreign government’s critical of the country’s other policies.
12/13/2014 With the delivery of the first A400M to the RAF and with the standing up of the first French squadron of the A400M, more information will come from the services about their use of the aircraft.
The promise of the aircraft is to provide greater payload, speed and range for delivering men and materiel in support of operations.
The A400M features C-130-like ability to use a wide variety of airfields with the capability to carry oversized loads of the sort that the C-17 currently carries.
The aircraft will be able to deliver equipment and personnel closer to the point of attack than the C-17 with C-17 type loads.
It will not be difficult to see how this aircraft will initially be used.
In the current Mali operation, the French had significant challenges in delivering the capability necessary for their forces.
When the A400M many years ago was first thought of, lift was considered somewhat equivalent to a truck or a greyhound bus.
With the last decade of experience and the revolution in air dropping, the air lifter is an integral part of the kind of expeditionary logistics, which insertion forces clearly need to operate with for 21st century operations.
In reporting from Mali, the French military made it clear to Murielle Delaporte that they were eagerly waiting for the A400M to join the fleet in order to facilitate the kind of operation which Mali represented. As Murielle Delaporte underscored about the Mali operation:
Air support has been crucial in the areas of more intense engagement. Forward air controllers or FACs were important members of the ground forces. And air assets –Air Force (fighters), Army (helos) and Navy (Atlantique 2) – have been drawn upon in the operation. More generally, and as far as the air component goes, one should also stress that the demands on the old tactical transport aircraft Transalls or the C-160s are very high. This would be a good time to have the new A400Ms in play. French Air Force officers all agree that it will be beneficial in the near future to have a plane which could fly straight from France and have the capability to land on the short, tough airfields characteristic of the Mali operation.
The logistics side of the Mali operation was inextricably intertwined with the combat forces in the combat operation.
The first steps moving in this direction have begun with the French Air Force.
The A400M was able in a single mission to support two operations: the first in Barkhane (under way in the Sahel-Saharan Africa since the summer of 2014) and the Sangaris operation (underway since December 2013 in the Central African Republic).
MSN-8 named the City of Toulouse left the Orleans airbase for Africa in the morning of December 4th and stopped over in Italy to deliver 5.5 tons of cargo and 25 Italian soldiers involved in the European operation EUFOR RCA. This task was performed within the framework of the European Air Transport Command pooling of resources of which both France and Italy belong.
Then the plane continued to Africa delivering a total of 50 passengers and about 18 tons of cargo. The load consisted of a mixed load, including technical and medical equipment, aerospace equipment to support the six Rafales stationed in N’Djamena and rotors for helicopters involved in the Sangris operation.
According to the commander of the transport squadron, “The Atlas allows us to carry loads which the CASA, Transall and Hercules could not. We are relying on our experience in operating these other aircraft to learn how to use the new one. We are aligning our profession with the new aircraft.”
As a strategic airlifter, the A400M Atlas has a capacity, speed and range which allows France to operate from its mainland bases to support operations….For example, the A400M can carry four times the load of a C-160 Transall in half the time.
Since the official activation of the A400M squadron in September 2014, the plane has been used for logistical support. Eventually, the aircraft will be able to execute all of the core air transport missions, such as air assault (i.e. delivery of men, materials or paratroopers at the point of attack), air delivery, in-flight refueling and medical evacuations.
Translated from the original French by Second Line of Defense
Kazakhstan has played a prominent role in the global efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism.
For example, Kazakhstan has played a leading role in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, hosting important meetings and supporting other projects.
In April 2008, Kazakhstan’s Mazhilis (lower house of parliament) ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which obliges its States Parties to take steps to avert and punish attempts to use nuclear materials in terrorist acts.[1]
Kazakhstan has also supported UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), which requires all states to refrain from supporting non-state actors seeking to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their delivery systems.
It further obliges all governments to establish domestic controls to avert the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate export controls over related materials and by criminalizing WMD-related proliferation activities. In 2011 and 2014, Kazakhstan hosted seminars on applying these requirements within its region.[2]
Kazakhstan ranks 15th (ahead of Russia and China) on the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Nuclear Materials Security Index, which assesses the safety and security of the nuclear materials of various countries.[3]
The country has been updating more domestic laws on nuclear security to comply with IAEA standards.
For example, Kazakhstan has created a national register of ionizing radiation sources through a Law “On the Use of Nuclear Energy.”
Kazakhstan also passed legislation to place more controls on the import and export of radiological sources and has drafted a law on handling radioactive wastes.[4] I
AEA members are not legally obliged to follow Agency guidelines regarding the protection of nuclear materials, but countries can make them binding by incorporating them into their domestic legislation. Kazakhstan has pledged to incorporate these guidelines into its national laws.[5]
Since 1995, the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), based in Moscow, has supported projects with Kazakhstan’s former weapons scientists and other technical personnel with WMD-relevant expertise.[6] For example, the ISTC Scientific Advisory Committee organized an energy security seminar in Almaty in October 2013.[7]
The ISTC is an intergovernmental organization connecting scientists from Kazakhstan and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States with their peers in Western countries.
According to the ISTC, as of 2012, almost 5,000 Kazakhstan scientists have received more than $35 million through ISTC projects.[8] After the Russian Federation indicated that it would end its participation in the ISTC, the Center’s Governing Board accepted Kazakhstan’s offer, made in response to a U.S. request, to relocate its headquarters to Astana.[9] In June 2014, the ISTC formally began operating at a facility provided by Nazarbayev University.
In 2012, moreover, Kazakhstan joined the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Map of Soviet test site at Semipalatinsk within Kazakhstan. Image source Autonavi / Basarsoft / Google via Belfer Center Plutonium Mountain report.
In 2002, the Group of Eight (G8) Industrial States pledged to provide a total of $20 billion over the following decade to support the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and invited non-member governments to join as partners. The United States offered $10 billion to the Partnership over a 10-year period.
The other G8 members, including Russia through in-kind contributions, promised a comparable sum (‘10+10 over 10’).
More than 20 additional partners have since joined this multinational institution. Most of this money has funded projects in Russia, though in recent years the Partnership has also supported non-proliferation projects in Ukraine. At Moscow’s insistence, the Russian government has directed most Global Partnership funding toward destroying its obsolete chemical weapons stockpiles and nuclear-powered attack submarines.
At their May 2011 summit in Deauville, France, the G8 summit agreed to continue the Global Partnership after 2012, indicating that their priorities were enhancing nuclear/radiological security, bio-security, scientist engagement, and implementation of UNSRC 1540.
It is unclear how the June 2013 expiration of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in Russia (also known as the Nunn-Lugar Program after its original Senate sponsors) or the 2014 Russia-West confrontation over Ukraine will affect the future scope and activities of the Global Partnership.
Kazakhstan has become a leading supporter of the global movement against further nuclear weapons testing.
At Astana’s initiative, the UN General Assembly has recognized August 29, the day on which Kazakhstan in 1991 closed the Semipalatinsk test site, as the official International Day against Nuclear Tests.[10]
To mark the 20th anniversary of its closing, Astana hosted an International Forum for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World in 2011.
The following year, more than 200 participants from over 75 countries, including parliamentarians from 46 countries, joined representatives from some two dozen international organizations, including the United Nations and the IAEA, at an international conference entitled, “From a Nuclear Test Ban to a Nuclear Weapon-Free World.”[11]
The Astana conference was jointly organized by several groups in Kazakhstan (the Mazhilis, the Foreign Ministry, the Nazarbayev Center) as well as the international organization of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.[12]
The focus of the conference, like the initiative to establish the International Day against Nuclear Tests, aimed to generate momentum for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and other nuclear disarmament measures. Kazakhstan was one of the first states to sign the CTBT, but the treaty has yet to be ratified by all the countries which are listed in Annex 2 of the treaty and whose signature and ratification is mandatory for for the treaty’s entry into force.
Representatives of Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers hold nuclear talks in the Kazakh city of Almaty, April 6, 2013.
The Astana conference participants called for universal support for the CTBT, an end to any further nuclear weapons production, decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines, creating new nuclear weapons-free zones, and conducting no further nuclear tests. They further proposed regulations banning investments of state funds in companies producing or delivering nuclear weapons.
The conference participants also advocated creating new regional zones free of nuclear weapons, in particular in the Middle East, in North East Asia and the Arctic.[13]
Kazakhstan has extended this campaign against nuclear weapons testing to the grassroots level through a global education campaign and an Internet-based ATOM Project, “Abolish Testing – Our Mission”.
Its website has a petition that any individual can sign that calls on governments to adopt the CTBT. The ATOM Project uses social media like Facebook and Twitter to promote dialogue among survivors of nuclear explosions as well as NGOs and other Internet users.[14]
It also aims to spread knowledge about the negative effects of nuclear tests and mobilize the international community against them by staging events internationally.
In his opening address to the conference, Nazarbayev called on participants “and all the people of the world to support [the] ATOM Project and make building of a nuclear weapons-free world our most important goal.”[15] He called having nuclear weapons “absolute blasphemy” since their use would be equivalent to committing global “suicide,” which Nazarbayev noted “is condemned by all global religions.”[16]
Like President Obama and many other advocates of nuclear abolition, Nazarbayev stressed that a “nuclear-weapons free world isn’t achievable overnight.
But we should proceed towards it and encourage all nations to support the cause.”[17]
In his speech, Nazarbayev identified several urgent challenges in the areas of nuclear disarmament and arms control.[18]
First, he called on the remaining few states that had not ratified the NPT (Israel, India, and Pakistan) to do so.
Second, while praising the recent New START Treaty adopted by Russia and the United States, Nazarbayev noted that other nuclear weapons states need to follow their example and begin reducing their own nuclear forces.
Third, he called on all countries to sign and ratify the CTBT.
Fourth, he advocated establishing a global anti-nuclear parliamentary assembly.[19]
Fifth, the Kazakh president called on all nuclear powers to accept all the various regional nuclear-weapon free zones that have been established.
Finally, Nazarbayev called for more effective international regulation of nuclear energy programs. Despite the March 2011 disaster at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, Nazarbayev lamented the lack of clear and explicit nuclear security standards, which increases the dangers of nuclear terrorism. He singled out the need to secure more national ratifications of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ensure that it can enter into force.[20]
Left to right, UN Sec Gen, US President Obama, and Kazhakistani President Nazarbayev at Nuclear Security Summit, the Hague, March 25, 2014
In support of this latter objective, Kazakhstan has used the biannual Nuclear Security Summits to launch various nuclear nonproliferation initiatives and highlight the country’s contributions in this area.
Kazakhstan has endorsed all Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) goals, including promoting the safe use of nuclear energy, augmenting the IAEA’s role and authority in nuclear safety and security, adopting stronger measures to secure radiological sources that terrorists can use in “dirty bombs,” and encouraging commercial nuclear power producers to stop using highly enriched uranium.[21]
Kazakhstan also favors creating new international instrument and stronger UN measures to encourage countries to comply with nuclear security rules and conventions.[22]
Kazakhstan’s expansive nuclear disarmament vision supports its NSS-related policies.
Its officials and experts argue that the only way to guarantee long-term nuclear security is through comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In the interim, they have called for ending nuclear weapons testing through the CTBT, establishing nuclear-weapons-free zones, strengthening security assurances for countries that renounce nuclear weapons, and securing adoption by all five nuclear weapon states of the protocol on negative security assurances to the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty.[23]
A highpoint of the March 2012 NSS in Seoul was the Kazakhstan-Russian-U.S. initiative to enhance the security of the former Semipalatinsk nuclear test site.
Although the site was closed in 1991, scavengers were finding contaminated scrap materials at the site.
The secret trilateral effort to clean and secure the site was launched in 2004 and was completed in 2012.
At the summit, President Obama praised “the outstanding leadership of President Nazarbayev and the people of Kazakhstan” for their contributions to global nuclear materials security.[24]
Another element of this effort was Nazarbayev’s concurrent op-ed in the New York Times on “What Iran Can Learn From Kazakhstan.”
Recalling how Kazakhstan has prospered since renouncing the nuclear weapons capabilities it inherited from the USSR, the president wrote that, “Kazakhstan has used its close diplomatic relations with our neighbor across the Caspian Sea to urge Tehran to learn from our example.”
The commentary also called for more nuclear-weapons-free zones and other nonproliferation measures.[25]
At the most recent 2014 NSS, which took place March 24-25 at The Hague in the Netherlands, Nazarbayev called for a variety of measures to strengthen nuclear security: strengthening the authority and the role of the IAEA; increasing nuclear transparency, bolstering negative security assurances, legally binding nuclear safety standards, adopting uniform measures for rapidly responding to nuclear accidents, and, eventually, complete nuclear disarmament.[26]
Nazarbayev affirmed Kazakhstan’s “moral right” to request that the next NSS be held in Kazakhstan due the country’s leadership on global nuclear nonproliferation.[27]
Of the 53 countries participating at the 2014 NSS, 33 states, including Kazakhstan, pledged enhanced cooperation on nuclear security through such means as submitting themselves to period peer reviews of their nuclear security procedures.[28]
At the same time, Nazarbayev launched a sharp critique of the existing nuclear order at the summit and also in a Washington Times newspaper article published the day before the summit began.
He criticized the United States, Russia, and the other nuclear weapons states for not making greater progress in nuclear disarmament and for not fulfilling their assurances to countries like Ukraine and Kazakhstan that eliminate their own arsenals.
In addition to recalling Kazakhstan’s earlier contributions to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as well as renewing Kazakhstan’s proposals to strengthen nuclear safety and security, Nazarbayev used the occasion to make a broader critique of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
In particular, he expressed dissatisfaction with the protection the great powers provide countries that, like Kazakhstan and Ukraine, renounce nuclear weapons.
He called the NPT “unfair” and unbalanced and wanted to revise the treaty so that the original five nuclear weapon states must also provide the IAEA with “with complete information regarding their civilian nuclear projects, programs, and plans.”[29]
In his summit speech, Nazarbayev proposed creating an international office under the UN to monitor how the five nuclear weapons states fulfill their security assurances to countries that abandon nuclear weapons and join regional nuclear weapons free zones.[30]
Kazakhstan’s newly adopted Foreign Policy Concept for 2014-2020 commits the government to strive for a world free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.[31]
In 2013, Kazakhstan had a prominent role in the negotiations designed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Almaty hosted two rounds of talks involving the “P5+1” group (all five permanent UN Security Council members and Germany plus Iran).
In his December 16, 2013, letter congratulatory letter to President Nazarbayev on the occasion of Kazakhstan’s Independence Day, President Obama wrote that, “Kazakhstan’s hosting of the P5+1 discussions was key in making progress on the international community’s concerns with Iran’s nuclear program.”
During his February 2014, annual meeting with the senior foreign diplomats accredited to Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev recalled how “Kazakhstan voluntarily abandoned nuclear weapons, was recognized by the world community for this and became a good ‘beacon’ for countries such as Iran.”[32]
Last year, Kazakhstan’s nuclear diplomacy imparted critical momentum toward bringing the long-stalled Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Agreement (CANWFZ) into force.
World’s Five Nuclear Power signed a Protocol on Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty and Recognize as Central Asia Nuke-Free Zone. May 2014.
At a signing ceremony on the margins of the May 2014 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee Meeting in New York, the governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States reversed their long-standing opposition and joined China and Russia in signing the protocol to the CANWFZ, which was established in March 2009, following ratification by the five Central Asian governments — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan–of the Treaty of Semipalatinsk, which they signed in 2006.
The CANWFZ is the world’s fifth such Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ).
Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) guarantees the right of states to establish NWFZs. The United Nations, which has a precise definition of a NWFZ, has developed generic principles and guidelines for their authors. The five treaties establishing regional NWFZs all oblige their States Parties not to research, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise try to obtain any nuclear explosive devices in the territory specified by the texts. They further require parties to avoid assisting other countries from undertaking such activities in the region covered by the zone.
Conversely, the treaties typically affirm the right of States Parties to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful purposes such as research and commerce, providing all their nuclear material and installations are placed under the full-scope safeguards of the IAEA, which allow the Agency to verify that all activities at declared nuclear sites have peaceful purposes.
The Semipalatinsk Treaty and the CANWFZ, which covers an area of more than 3.8 million square kilometers, contain some unique features. It is the first NWFZ solely in the Northern Hemisphere (where most existing nuclear weapons states are located), it adjoins proliferation-prone South Asia and the Middle East as well as two NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states (China and Russia), and it includes all five Central Asian countries (whose governments typically pursue divergent foreign policies).
One member, Kazakhstan, is the first former nuclear weapon state to adhere to a NWFZ.
For the first time, the members agree to work to help restore the ecological damage caused by earlier nuclear tests in the region, support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, adopt the so-called IAEA Additional Protocol (which gives the Agency expanded authorities and access beyond those in the standard full-scope safeguards), and adhere to international standards for the physical protection of nuclear and radiological materials.
NWFZ treaties typically have at least one Protocol specify the rights and obligations of states outside the zone.
The five countries (Britain, China, France, Russia, and the United States, which are sometimes collectively termed the “P5” since they hold the five permanent seats on the UN Security Council) defined under the NPT as nuclear weapon states (NWS) may sign them.
One protocol usually commits the NWS to refrain from stationing or testing nuclear weapons in the zone or otherwise violate the treaty.
Another protocol allows the NWS to offer legally-binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NWFZ Treaty parties. The non-nuclear states value these so-called “negative security assurances” as compensation for their abstaining from developing their own nuclear weapons and abiding by their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”
France, Great Britain, and the United States have supported the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Asia but objected to the CANWFZ Protocol. Their concerns ranged from the Semipalatinsk Treaty’s seeming to allow Russia to move nuclear weapons in or through the zone within the Collective Security Treaty (CST) created before the treaty was written.
Since becoming chair of the CANWFZ Treaty in June 2012 and receiving the authority to hold negotiations on behalf of all five Central Asian governments on the Protocol, Kazakhstan held some two dozen meetings, consultations, and negotiations to reach an understanding on the issue, which resulted in a joint position document entitled, “On the position of the signatories of the Treaty on the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia on providing negative assurances to the Treaty.” [33]
The five Central Asian states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
On May 6, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States reversed their long-standing opposition and joined China and Russia in signing the protocol at a ceremony on the margins of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee Meeting in New York.
According to a Kazakhstan diplomat in Washington interviewed on the day of the signing, his country’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Actively pursued the issue, reinvigorating the negotiations process through presenting a strong legally substantiated arguments to alleviate the concerns of P5 with the regard to the Treaty. Our lawyers made a strong case on which all P5 had to agree.
Again it was Kazakhstan’s MFA that spearheaded the effort with other [Central Asian] states to accept our approach to get P5 to sign the Treaty with their interpreting statements but to operationalize it eventually after five year delay.
We started the process in 2012 when Kazakhstan got its chairmanship in C5 CANWFZ and all the countries in the region agreed to prolong our leadership in the grouping for another year in 2013 for us to lead the negotiations to its successful finalization, what actually happened today.[34]
Speaking on behalf of all five Central Asian governments on May 6 Kazakhstan’s U.N. Ambassador, Kairat Abdrakhmanov, called the signing “a historic event” that will provide Central Asian states with “security, stability and peace in the region with a view to create the necessary conditions for the development and prosperity of their peoples.”[35]
Signing for the United States, Thomas Countryman, assistant secretary of state for international security and nonproliferation, said that the Obama administration supports NWFZs as contributing to nonproliferation, peace, and security. In its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the administration decided to extend negative security assurances to any state that lacked nuclear weapons, was a member of the NPT, and adhered to its nonproliferation obligations, which the Central Asian states do.
Countryman added that the Obama administration had decided that the CANWFZ would not disrupt U.S. security arrangements or military operations, installations, or activities.[36]
Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s U.N. Ambassador, noted that this was the first occasion that all five NWS signed a NWFZ protocol simultaneously.[37] The Central Asian governments hope that the P5 ratify the protocol so that the treaty can enter into force before next year’s NPT Review Conference.
When the CANWFZ enters into force, approximately half the earth’s landmass will be covered by NWFZs. Treaties have created other zones in Latin America and the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, the South Pacific, and Africa.
Champions of these mechanisms consider them effective arrangements to curb the nuclear weapons proliferation throughout large regions of the globe and hope their spread will promote nuclear disarmament.
Governments, NGOs, and individual experts have called for creating more zones in other regions, especially Northeast Asia and the Middle East.
[2]“Working to ensure nuclear security and promote global nuclear nonproliferation,” Astana Times March 12, 2014, http://www.astanatimes.com/2014/03/working-ensure-nuclear-security-promote-global-nuclear-nonproliferation/.
[6]“Head office of the International Science and Technology Center to move to Almaty,” Tengrinews, September 27, 2011, http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Head-office-of-the-International-Science-and-Technology-Center-to-move-to-Almaty-4709/.
[7] The 16th SAC Seminar ‘Energy Security, How To Further The Technology’ was held in Almaty on October 22-23, 2013,” International Science and Technology Center, http://www.istc.ru/istc/istc.nsf/va_WebPages/16SAC_Seminar%20%20Eng.
[8]International Science and Technology Center Annual Report 2012: 18 Years Supporting International
[9] “U.S.-Kazakh Nonproliferation Cooperation,” Remarks Simon Limage Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Programs, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation Al-Farabi University Almaty, Kazakhstan October 16, 2012, http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/199215.htm.
[23] “Remarks by President of the Republic of Kazakhstan NursultanNazarbayev At the first plenary session of the Nuclear Security Summit The Hague, the Netherlands,” March 24, 2014,
[24] Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “2012 News Bulletin No.14,” www.kazakhembus.com, April 2, 2012, http://www.kazakhembus.com/archived_article/2012-news-bulletin-no-14.
[25] Nursultan Nazarbayev, “What Iran Can Learn From Kazakhstan,” New York Times , March 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/opinion/what-iran-can-learn-from-kazakhstan.html?_r=0
[26] Nursultan Nazarbayev, “Prepared extended remarks by President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev at the first plenary session of the Nuclear Security Summit,” March 24, 2014, The Hague, the Netherlands.
[27] Nazarbayev’s remarks on KazakhTV, “Nuclear Security Summit 2014,” kazakh-tv.kz, March 25, 2014,
[30] “Remarks by President of the Republic of Kazakhstan NursultanNazarbayev At the first plenary session of the Nuclear Security Summit The Hague, the Netherlands,” March 24, 2014,
[31] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Policy Concept for 2014 – 2020 Republic of Kazakhstan,” approved Jan 29, 2014, Embassy of Kazakhstan in the USA, http://www.kazakhembus.com/page/foreign-policy-concept.
[36] “Remarks by Thomas M. Countryman, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, at the Signing Ceremony of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone In Central Asia,” U.S. Department of State, May 6, 2014, http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/225682.htm.
[37]Lederer, “Central Asian nations get assurances.”
This is the second of a three part series which will culminate with the publication of a Special Report entitled:
Promoting Nuclear Energy and Non-Proliferation: The Contribution of Kazakhstan.
Editor’s Note: The Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan, H.E. ErlanIdrissov, recently visited Washington and co-chaired the third U.S.-Kazakhstan Strategic Partnership Dialogue.
For an update on that visit and the joint statement issued during the visit see the following:
During my recent visit to the European Air Group, I had a chance to sit down with one of the Royal Air Force officers in charge of the aircraft’s entry into service.
Group Captain Paul Godfrey, OBE has extensive experience of a range of combat aircraft through Harrier, F-16 and Typhoon.
A Harrier weapons instructor, he was the first non-US national to fly the F-16 CJ operationally in the SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) role whilst on exchange with the USAF and has spent the last 10 years in the Typhoon program with two flying tours including 4th/5th generation fighter training with the F-22.
After his current tour working on the Initial Operating Capability of the UK F-35B, he will become Station Commander RAF Lossiemouth, where two Typhoon squadrons are now located and a third will stand up in 2015.
With his range of combat air experience, Godfrey is well positioned to understand the next generation capability which 5th generation aircraft can provide for the Royal Navy (RN) and RAF.
And with the intersection of the RN operating a large deck carrier and the two services jointly operating F-35Bs, the cross-domain transformation is a dynamic one as well.
Godfrey has been involved with Typhoon training with the F-22.
Based on that experience, Godfrey commented
The F-22 has unprecedented situational awareness.
And working with Typhoon, the F-22 enhanced our survivability and augmented our lethality.
The F-22 functions is a significant Situational Awareness (SA) gap filler for the operation of a fourth generation aircraft.”
He underscored that, as good as the F-22 is, the enhanced fusion engine and advanced combat systems of the F-35 are a significant force for overall defence transformation.
“Indeed, the impact of the F-35 will be felt on the total UK defence force; not just on the RAF. It is a force multiplier, and can be used to help transform our combat forces, to do what you have called force insertion.”
Godfrey emphasized that managing the force mix was an essential part of introducing the F-35 into the UK service.
We will be using 4th and 5th generation aircraft for a long time in what we believe will be an incredibly potent force mix;
And on the Queen Elizabeth carriers will be mixing rotorcraft with fast jets and other combat capabilities as well to further enhance our power projection capabilities.
Question: What is striking is how little public discussion has occurred about the cross-domain modernization of the RN and RAF by bringing a large deck carrier with regard to the F-35B.
This clearly is an exciting aspect of force transformation.
What is your take on this cross-domain effort?
Group Captain Paul Godfrey: That is an excellent point, and it’s exactly what we’re doing at the moment.
I’m attending a maritime warfare conference next week to look at how we would employ the range of capabilities we will embark upon and with the carrier because, of course, it’s not just F-35 and the Queen Elizabeth Class Carriers operating by themselves.
I think we (the UK) have a huge advantage as both of these capabilities — F-35 and Queen Elizabeth Class — were designed with each other in mind from the very beginning.
Having visited NAS Fallon with the RN last week, it is clear from the US Navy that live virtual constructive training will be crucial to understand both transformations and exploit the next generation capabilities that they bring.
The First Flight of the UK F-35B. For a look at the video version of the flight on April 13, 2012 see https://sldinfo.com/first-flight-of-uk-f-35b/
The USN were very interested in our purchase of DMRT, the deployed mission-ready trainers, essentially a portable full mission simulator, one of which is already in place at Edwards AFB to support our Operational Test and Evaluation effort.
Two containers are will be ‘hung’ in the hangar deck of the Queen Elizabeth Class Carriers, which allows us to practice any number of scenarios from carrier flying to high-end training to our heart’s content on board the ship.
The ability to be able to mission rehearse or even problem solve with this capability is a step into the next generation of warfare.
The next step will be connecting that across to the Typhoon simulators off the ship in order to be able to remotely participate in 4th/5th gen training.
There’s work in progress at the moment in terms of connecting a range of different simulators in the UK and not just in the air domain.
We have been very successful with our Air Battle Training Centre (ABTC) at RAF Waddington, a large percentage of which is funded by the British Army due to its ability to train for Joint Fires.
We are currently rehearsing the RED FLAG 2015 missions in there prior to deployment to Nellis AFB training Typhoon and E3-D Sentry crews and other exercises have linked in RN fighter control assets.
We will then next connect to Queen Elizabeth, and then clearly, the ultimate goal of that live virtual construct where the person in the cockpit sees the same things as the man or woman in the simulator, allowing us to train to the absolute high end, if that’s what we need to.
Question: The flexibility of the carrier deck where the F-35B can be used to help manage deck space to use a variety of other combat assets is quite impressive. What is your take on the flexibility aspect?
Group Captain Paul Godfrey: Flexibility is the key theme.
The Queen Elizabeth is a moving airfield, and with the F-35B we can load up on combat aircraft, or offload them to land bases created on necessity not having to stand up a permanent base.
We shaped various concepts of operations for the Harrier in the 1980s and 1990s which we can employ with the F-35B in terms of leveraging air bases created on need or in terms of enhanced survivability of the aircraft, being able to operate from a diversity of launch points.
This allows us to employ other combat assets aboard the ship.
And being a ship we can move to the objective area, and move from objective area to objective area based on need and the need identified by the Commander.
And the flexibility of the ship is that it can support a wide variety of operations from Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) to high-end combat.
Question: How will F-35 work with Typhoon?
Group Captain Paul Godfrey: The F-35 has unprecedented situational awareness and ability to provide information dominance.
It can handle the 360-degree battlespace and manage the gaps which the Typhoon may not see.
It is also a question of the ability to manage information, which the F-35 excels in doing.
The F-35 is designed to be able to show the pilot situational awareness in a large single display, which is essentially the single version of the truth, if you like.
Clearly, other aircraft have different displays that show you what’s out there, and a certain level of fusion, but there are always gaps; I think it’s key that we use the F-35 to fill those gaps.
As demonstrated with the Typhoon/F-22 synergies, we will be able to get closer to the threat with the F-35 and to enhance the probability of kill for the entire combat air fleet.
Question: You are moving forward with F-35 as a key piece for UK defence transformation, but to look at much of the aerospace literature one would think that the F-35 is a tentative program?
Group Captain Paul Godfrey: There are 115 F-35s flying now.
We are focused on how we are going to use the capability, not whether it will exist.
There is a huge gap between the users of the aircraft and the broader puzzlement over the future outside of the warrior community.
We are just getting on with it.
We just need to encourage thinking that isn’t tied to whatever we’ve done in the past.
The F-35 fleet is different and can be used for force transformation; unless you don’t.
We are lucky in that we have a pooling agreement with the US Marine Corps, the service at the leading edge of operationalizing F-35 and they clearly get it.
When they hit IOC, those Marines are off and running. and I think we’ll see some revolutionary methods of bringing high-end combat forces together.
The Marines understand the importance of the aircraft for the warrior on the ground and it’s role in revolutionizing 21st Century warfare.
We are talking with the British Army based upon our joint lessons within the ABTC because there is little doubt that the SA, which this aircraft possesses and can be used to enhance the SA of the soldier, battlefield commander or general and will therefore be a crucial element for the British Army to transform the way they operate.
Because the Marines work on the sea, the ground and in the air and work to integrate their capabilities, we see distinct parallels to the way ahead as we combine Queen Elizabeth with the F-35B and use it as a catalyst to transform UK Defence over the next decade.
The video at the beginning of the article is from March 2014 and shows the first RAF pilot to execute a short take-off and vertical landing in an F-35B.
Royal Air Force pilots are currently undergoing training on the UK’s next generation stealth combat aircraft at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida.
Squadron Leader Hugh Nichols is the first UK instructor pilot to perform a vertical landing in the F-35B Lightning II – the UK’s next generation stealth combat aircraft.
Delivery of the operational UK fleet is planned to start in 2015 after a two-year period of training in the US.
The first land-based operational flights from the Main Operating Base at RAF Marham are expected in 2018. Flight trials onboard the Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carrier will also begin in 2018, in order to provide a carrier strike capability by 2020.
Lightning II will deploy from Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers as well as from land bases.
Credit: 33rd Fighter Wing
Published on Sep 12, 2013: Squadron Leader Jim Schofield performs the first short takeoff at sea in a F-35B aircraft onboard USS Wasp (Credit: UK MOD)
The Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers will be the biggest and most powerful surface warships ever constructed for the Royal Navy and will represent a step change in capability, enabling the delivery of increased strategic effect and influence around the world.
The Queen Elizabeth Class will be utilised by all three sectors of the UK Armed Forces and will provide eight acres of sovereign territory which can be deployed around the world. Both ships will be versatile enough to be used for operations ranging from supporting war efforts to providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief.
Delivery
With its complement of embarked aircraft the QE Class will be the centre piece of Britain’s military capability in circumstances where we cannot, or do not wish to base our aircraft on land. The ships will act as a rapidly deployable sovereign base to deliver expeditionary air operations at a time and place of the UK’s choosing, but will also be highly capable and versatile vessels which will deliver a high profile and coercive presence worldwide to support peace-keeping, conflict prevention and other strategic aims.
Design
The HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales will have increased survivability as a result of the separation and distribution of power generation machinery throughout each ship. The class has been designed with twin islands, which separates the running of the ship from the flying operations resulting in greater visibility of flying operations. The Highly Mechanised Weapon Handling System enables a streamlined crew to operate a vessel much larger than the carrier which it replaces, meaning that each ship will have a total crew of 679, only increasing to the full complement of 1,600 when the air elements are embarked.
Affordability of through life support has also been a key driver in adopting a commercial design. Key operational spaces can be readily reconfigured and additional equipment inserted in a cost effective and timely manner to suit the future requirements of the Armed Forces and the nation.
The ships will use an electric propulsion system that enables the prime movers to operate more efficiently and therefore burn less fuel, saving running costs.
Crew Facilities
There will be four galleys on board and four large dining areas which will be manned by 67 catering staff. The largest dining room has the capacity to serve 960 crew members in one hour.
Each ship will have an eight bed medical suite, operating theatre and dental surgery, which will be managed by 11 medical staff. These facilities can also be augmented to suit the requirements of every individual mission.
Crew facilities on board both ships will include a cinema and fitness suites in order to provide crew members, some of whom will be away from home for months at a time, a good range of recreational activities. Crew members will have personal access to e-mail and the internet (when satellite communications equipment is not being used for operational purposes!).
Mission Systems
The ships will each have a fully integrated command system, which has three functional areas:
Information System – The computing hardware, internal Networks and C4I software applications to support effective command and control on the carrier. E.g. – Considerable work has been done with Royal Navy and Royal Air Force Information Defence Lines of Development to understand how the data repository on board will be accessed by new and legacy systems and how that repository will be configured in the future.
Communications – The communications equipment to support the required voice and data services. E.g. – an emulation of the Communication Control Management System and the Tactical C2 Voice system have been procured to exercise the business process of configuring the carrier for internal and external communications.
Air Management and Protection System – The on-board sensor and weapon systems for the management of aircraft in the air and on deck and the defence of the ship.
What’s in a name?
HMS Queen Elizabeth
There have been more than twenty ships named Elizabeth, the list of Battle Honours for which extends from the Armada in 1588 to Guadeloupe in 1810. However, only one ship by the name HMS Queen Elizabeth has served with the Royal Navy – as the lead ship of an important and innovative class of battleships which served with great distinction in both World Wars.
With 15 inch guns as her principal armament, the first HMS Queen Elizabeth was a 33,000 ton battleship. Built in Portsmouth, she was launched in 1913 and was completed the following year. Her service history during the World Wars included the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet during World War I. Despite damage from torpedoes during World War II, she went on to take part in operations in the Indian Ocean before returning home.
HMS Prince of Wales
The Royal Navy’s first ship named HMS Prince of Wales was originally a French privateer, commissioned on behalf of the ex-King James, then taken as prize by HMS York in 1693 and brought into service as a Sixth Rate ship, armed with 14 guns.
There have been a further seven Royal Navy ships called Prince of Wales. The most recent a ‘King George V’ Class battleship, built by Cammell Laird in 1939. The service history of this ship included the Battle of the Denmark Straight during which the German battle ship, The Bismarck, was destroyed.
In 1941 HMS Prince of Wales transported Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Newfoundland where he met with the then President of the United States, Franklin D Roosevelt, to agree the Atlantic Charter.
