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During our visit to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, we had a chance to discuss the approach to strike integration being pursued in the training process at the Center with CDR Charles “Scotty” Brown, current STRIKE XO, previous TOPGUN Instructor. Brown is the N-5 assistant to the department head at Fallon.
“We have an unusual N-5 structure here — we are not about plans and policies.
We are the department charged with strike training and some other miscellaneous pieces as well.
I have been in the Navy for about 21years now and grew up as an F-14 Top Gun pilot.
After doing that for a decade I made the transition to the Super Hornet. And here I am now flying the F-16 as well in the aggressor role.”
“Scotty” explained that many pilots at Fallon are F-16 qualified pilots as well as Super Hornet pilots.
He explained that they do not have full time aggressor pilots and members of NSAWC play that role on a case-by-case basis.
CDR Charles “Scotty” Brown after the Second Line of Defense interview. Credit Photo: SLD
He emphasized that the focus of “Air Wing Fallon is upon integration.
It is about taking all the point nosed squadrons as well as the E-2, the rotary wing, everyone in the air wing, as well as representatives from the air defense commanders from the surface fleet.
Having his OS controllers join us allows us to see a wider range of capability to shape the integration process.
So its about 28 planes working together to put ordinance on target.
At the same time, we seek every opportunity to build in joint assets, such as AWACS, and JSTARS, whether non organic or organic and work to fuse those assets into an integrated operational whole.
He underscored as well that the Fallon model was being replicated elsewhere in the Navy notably with regard to the surface fleet, and as that happens training among the various Navy communities would be facilitated as well.
We are following a stair-step approach.
For example, initially it’s us being able in-house at this location to try and simulate or tie in the surface side to to command-and-control UAS type aircraft or platforms.
But down the road we will be able to tie in potentially with a ship that’s pier-side down in San Diego with the same group that’s up here, and then fuse a picture that allows us to train to a problem set that you we would not be able to otherwise.
He expressed concern about the need to have realistic adversary training and has the threat goes up, “we need to be sure that we can realistically prepare for the threat environment we will face in the years to come.”
“I don’t think flying F-5s will be enough to replicate what an adversary stealth aircraft is going to pose as a challenge.”
Along with others in the command, “Scotty” highlighted the importance of live virtual constructive training in terms of better understanding both the threat as well as the blue assets, which need to be integrated in the fight.
And he argued that as other parts of the Navy established their own LVCT centers, tying these centers together would facilitate the kind of integrated training, which was necessary for 21st century operations.
Delivery Crew from MSAWC, LCDR Charles “Scotty” Brown and RIO Lt Natalie “JJ” Good. Credit Photo: Craig Kaston 10/17/03
He highlighted as well the importance of folding in innovations coming to the fleet as part of shaping the training process.
For example, we work closely with VMX-9 at China Lake to work with them in connecting their testing efforts with how those efforts might integrate with the strike force.
They will come up on a routine basis and support NSAWC where we can take a look at some of the newer systems that they have in developmental or operational testing and see what kind of results you get with using those systems.
He noted that in contrast to his last tour at Top Gun, the Center was doing a better job of getting fleet representative aircraft in the flying inventory.
When I was stationed over at the Top Gun side when I was last here, we did not have fleet representative airplanes here.
We did not have the same type of software, and same capability as the planes in the fleet.
And this gap is important to close for realistic training for strike fleet integration.
We will close with a bit of history from “Scotty’s” past.
Two of the most famous F-14 headline making events occurred during the Reagan Presidency. On 8/18/81, early in President Reagan’s 1st term, two F-14s from the VF-41 Black Aces flying off the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) shot down two Libyan Su-22 “Fitters” over the Gulf of Sidra.
The second event had a similar outcome. In the final days of the Reagan administration, two F-14s from the VF-32 Swordsmen shot down two Libyan MiG-23 “Floggers” on 1/4/89. To honor these events in the Reagan Presidency, the Reagan Presidential Library obtained an F-14 for display on the library grounds.
Unfortunately, the actual aircraft involved in the shoot downs were not available so the F-14 obtained by the Library was painted to represent BuNo 160403 flown by the late CDR Hank Kleeman and LT David Venlet in the 1981 event. The actual Tomcat displayed at the Library is BuNo 162592.
The delivery Crew that brought the aircraft to the museum on October 17, 2003 was from MSAWC, with LCDR Charles Scotty Brown and RIO Lt Natalie JJ Good.
2014-11-06 VMX-22 flew to USS AMERICA and worked with the crew in shaping an initial maintenance regime aboard the ship.
The ship has a hanger bay below the flight deck where maintenance is performed, unlike legacy large deck amphibs.
The AMERICA class ship has a much larger hangar bay that conducive to conducting maintenance that otherwise would have to be conducted on the flight deck..
This graphic focuses upon the USS America deck synergy and the workflow thereby facilitated. Credit: Second Line of Defense
This means among other things, when the weather gets dicey, aircraft can be put below deck to protect them from natural elements, avoiding the risk for repair due to damage from the weather as compared to remaining on the flight deck on legacy amphibs.
As we wrote earlier:
A major change in the ship can be seen below the flight deck, and these changes are what allow the assault force enabled by new USMC aviation capabilities to operate at greater range and ops tempo.
The ship has three synergistic decks, which work together to support flight deck operations. Unlike a traditional large deck amphibious ship where maintenance has to be done topside, maintenance is done in a hangar bay below the flight deck
And below that deck is the intermediate area, where large workspaces exist to support operations with weapons, logistics and sustainment activities.
In an interview with the ship’s Captain, Robert Hall, just prior to the departure in mid-July from the Ingalls Huntington shipyard in Pascagoula Mississippi, the CO highlighted some of the ship’s capabilities:
VMX-22 operated aboard the USS America working on ship integration with the Osprey. Credit: USS America
The ship has several capabilities, which allow us to stay on station longer than a traditional LHA and to much better support the Ospreys and the F-35Bs which will be the hallmark of USMC aviation to enable long range amphibious assault. These aircraft are larger than their predecessors.
They need more space for maintenance and this ship provides it.
We have two high-hat areas to support the maintenance, one of them located behind the aft flight deck elevator to allow movement through the hangar.
We have significantly greater capacity to store spare parts, ordnance and fuel as well. We can carry more than twice as much JP-5 than a traditional LHA.
The ship has three synergistic decks, which allow for a significant enhancement of the logistical or sustainment punch of the amphibious strike force.
According to Captain Hall:
I like the synergistic description.
The flight deck is about the size of a legacy LHA. But that is where the comparison ends. By removing the well deck, we have a hangar deck with significant capacity to both repair aircraft and to move them to the flight deck to enhance ops tempo.
With the Ospreys, we will be able to get the Marines into an objective area rapidly and at significant distances. And when the F-35B comes the support to the amphibious strike force is significantly enhanced.
And we will be able to operate at much greater range from the objective area.
With the concern about littoral defenses, this ship allows us the option to operate off shore to affect events in the littoral.
In an interview with the CO of VMX-22, Col. Robert L. “Horse” Rauenhorst, the CO provided an update on the experience about the USS America.
Question: How was your time aboard USS AMERICA, especially maintenance-wise?
Col. Rauenhorst:
Maintenance wise, the hangar bay provided two dedicated spots to perform maintenance with the wings spread, as compared to legacy amphib ships with only one dedicated spot in the hangar bay.
Additionally, when we encountered heavy sea states, freezing rain and snow in and around the Straits of Magellan, we were able to hangar all 11 aircraft, including four CH-46s from HMM-364 and three SH-60s from HSC-21, to protect them from the elements.
Once clear of the weather, the Air Boss was able to quickly return the aircraft to the flight deck and resume normal flight operations, that otherwise would have been delayed in de-icing the aircraft.
The Marines onboard were really impressed with the size of the hangar bay and being able to do maintenance in protected spaces, rather than having to do it on the flight deck as before on legacy large-deck amphibs.
Question: How is the berthing and comfort level for the crew?
Col. Rauenhorst: “It is very similar to legacy large-deck amphibs.”
Question: Clearly, then the difference is in the capability of the ship and the ability to operate aircraft off of the ship?
Col. Rauenhorst:
It is.
The fuel capacity onboard the ship far exceeds the legacy amphib ships.
As Captain Hall mentioned, USS AMERICA has the capacity to carry a lot more JP fuel as compared to legacy amphibs with a well deck.
And with the efficiencies of the USS AMERICA’s generators and not operating off of the turbines, the ship was still able to operate at 12-13 knots while conducting flight operations and ultimately saving money in operational terms of efficiency.
Question: What was it like to work with Captain Hall?
Col. Rauenhorst:
Bob was really good to work with.
He was really excited to have Marines come onboard because he had never deployed with Marines before.
It was a very good working relationship and am very proud to have served with him and his crew.
Question: The crew included some veterans but many were newbies. I would guess that the crew over all found the trip around South America and operating the ship really a great experience?
Col. Rauenhorst:
The crew was super motivated to the get the aircraft onboard the ship and to operate it.
We did a crawl, walk and run set of phases as we were settling into the flight operations, starting off with day and night Carrier Qualifications (CQ) off the coast of Pensacola.
And then by the end of the deployment, Captain Hall had a very seasoned crew there that were doing both tilt rotor and rotary-wing day and night operations without a flaw, from launch and recovery of aircraft that included air traffic control in international airspace throughout the Caribbean, Central, and South America.
Question: What kind of reception did you get during your port visits in South America?
Col. Rauenhorst:
It was the first time that the MV-22 has deployed to the Caribbean, Central, and South America, except for the VMM-365 deployment Belize a couple of years ago.
But all the countries that we went to, it was the first time that the Osprey touched soil in Columbia, Trinidad and Tobago, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, Peru, and El Salvador.
The reaction was of real interest, and as one person put it to me “it is like an airplane out of the movie the Transformers!” Referring to the MV-22 transitions from helicopter to airplane mode and vice versa.
Senior leaders in the region were very interested in the time/distance equation in terms of how quickly the aircraft could take off, transit, and then land in difficult terrain.
Notably, the Brazilians were very interested in the airplanes because of the scope of their country, and the need to operate into the Amazon regain.
It takes them a long time to get their logistics resupply and fuel out there to use helicopters in the Amazon as their means of transportation.
And in practical terms for us, we were able to fly in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) teams 350 miles prior to the ship arriving as well.
It gave the Marines from the Special Purpose Marine Ground Task Force-South (SPMAGTF-South) an additional day on the front and back side of USS AMERICA’s visit at each country in building partner nation’s capacity and conducting subject matter exchanges that otherwise would have been shorter in duration with legacy aircraft.
Question: How would you sum up what you see as the advantage of the tiltrotar enabled USS AMERICA as an assault ship?
Col. Rauenhorst:
We have a lot more flexibility.
When you get into that 1200-mile range or less, and you combine with the organic capability of the KC-130s, you have a powerful moving forward-operating base that can extend the operational reach for the Marine Corps.
Question: Is VMX-22 moving to Yuma this summer, and you are in the throes of getting your F-35Bs. So what are the next steps?
Col. Rauenhorst at the change of command ceremony for VMX-22 held at Cherry Point earlier this year. Credit Photo; Second Line of Defense
Col. Rauenhorst:
We are on schedule to receive four F-35Bs by this summer at Edwards AFB, and eventually 6 when the detachment moves to Yuma.
We are supporting the digital interoperability across all type model series of aircraft to include Unmanned Aerial Systems and Marine Air Command and Control Systems.
The priorities of Lieutenant General Davis, the DCA are current readiness, future readiness, and then digital interoperability.
What we are working now is how do we integrate and share information with the F-35, MV-22, CH-53, UH-1, AH-1, MQ-21, and A/NTPS-80 through a common operational picture while supporting the Marines on the ground with real-time or real-near time information.
We are working experimentation, tactical demonstrations, and operational testing and evaluation of those digital interoperability systems.
We are basically refining how we share and move information.
Not only amongst the aviation platforms, but determine how do we get that information to the Marines on their tablets, whether they are in the back of an assault support aircraft or in the objective area so that everyone’s working from a common operational picture with increased situational awareness.
Note: The photos provided in the initial slideshow have been by the CO of VMX-22. The second slideshow shows the USS America during its visit to Chile and the photos are credited to the USS America.
2014-11-08 When a country has joined the F-35 global enterprise, whatever variant they start with they can clearly mix and match going forward.
The commonality of the combat systems and the cockpit makes flexibility an inherent capability.
Australia has made a clear commitment to the F-35 and to reshaping its airpower approach as expressed in the Chief of Staff of the RAAF’s Plan Jericho.
Air Marshal Brown has set in motion an effort to reshape the RAAF around its modernization efforts designed to become inextricably intertwined with the overall transformation of the Australian Defense Force.
Notably, Australia has made its basic air platform modernization decisions for the period ahead. This means that for defense industry working with Australia it is not about selling the next platform; it is about the ability to connect and enable the force.
Air Marshall Brown speaking at the Fort Worth based event July 24, 2014. Credit Photo; Lockheed Martin
This is how the COS of the RAAF put it in a presentation on May 29, 2014:
I intend to release Plan Jericho, the RAAF transformation plan, in early 2015. It will guide our force transformation, enabled by our new 5th Gen capabilities, over the next decade.
I will also be engaging closely with industry in the development of the plan.
It is the technology that is being developed by industry that affords us the opportunity to transform our force. It is essential that we partner with industry to explore how we can maximize the opportunity offered by 5th Gen systems. I ask you to consider how you can work with us, not just at the platform level … but in helping us think through and design our overall future force using the 5th Gen capabilities you develop and will help us sustain in the future.”
In other words, industry working with the Australian MOD is expected to shift its approach from selling the next platform to shaping capability enhancers.
In an input to the Defence White Paper process, David Baddams has had his paper on F-35Bs published on the Australian Ministry of Defence website.
The title captures the core argument about operating F-35Bs off of the Canberra-class LHDs: Proximity Means Capability.
This paper has explained some of the merits of embarked air power. It is stressed that it does not argue that embarked air power is a substitute for, or superior to, land-based air power in all circumstances.
Rather, it seeks to establish the fact that embarked air power has unique qualities that are ideally suited to the ADF and GoA.
It would also deliver air power that is more immediately usable. The UK’s experience may be considered. Since the end of WWII the RAF has not destroyed – or even engaged – an aircraft in air-to-air combat. Every air-to air kill has fallen to embarked fighters.
This is not because embarked aircraft or pilots were better. The simple fact is that in nearly all the UK’s post war operations, geography has meant that embarked strike-fighters were the first and closest to the battle.
The GoA, ADF and their advisers need to consider this fact.
Ed Timperlake has provided a number of focal points on the role and impact of F-35Bs, which reinforce Baddams paper but expand on it as well.
The F-35B and Empowering Flexible Insertion Forces
In the not two distant future the US Navy/Marine and USAF team may have to establish presence from the sea in a potential combat theater. The threat will be great: friendly forces can be intermixed with opponents who will do what ever it takes to win.
From placing IEDs, to employing small unit ambushes, to spotting for artillery and Multiple Launch Rockets, the enemy will be unforgiving and aggressive. In addition there is a large land Army with armor and land-based precision weapons nearby to attack.
The opposing forces also have a tactical aviation component of Fighters and Attack Aircraft, along with Unmanned Aerial Systems and some proficiency in offensive “cyber war” ready to engage. To make it even more difficult the enemy has located and identified potential airfields that could be occupied and has targeted them to be destroyed by terminally guided cruise and intermediate range ballistic missiles.
Italy is buying Bs, As and has built a FACO facility which can be used as a sustainment facility. Credit: Italian Navy
Finally, the fleet off shore is vulnerable to ship-killing missiles.
The problem for US war planners is to secure a beachhead and build to victory from that beginning.
Traditionally, the “beachhead” was just that on a beach but now it can be seizing territory inland first and attacking from the back door toward the sea to take a port and also grab an airfield.
But the Marines do the unexpected and land where the enemy does not have ease of access –a natural barrier perhaps, mountain range, water barrier, very open desert or even on the back side of urban sprawl.
Once established, logistical re-supply is a battle-tipping requirement.
Once ashore the one asset that can tip the battle and keep Tactical Aviation engaged in support of ground combat operations if runways are crated is the F-35B, because every hard surface road is a landing strip and resupply can quickly arrive from Navy Amphibious ships by MV-22s and CH-53K.
When most military authors write about amphibious operations they do not focus at all on the “withdrawal” dynamic, and certainly with no consideration of coalition engagement and “leave-behind” obligations to support allies shaped within engagement operations.
Normally, analysts of amphibious operations tend to focus on the offensive or the insertion of force. Some describe historical failures such as Gallipoli, Zeebrugge and Dieppe. While the majority go into great detail appropriately describing unbelievable courage and, at times, costly success, Guadalcanal, and all USMC island hoping campaigns in the Pacific and USMC landing at Inchon in the Korean war are excellent historical examples.
In the World War II European Theater, the U.S. Army, British, Canadians, Free French and other allies liberated a continent from Nazi tyranny starting with one of the most successful amphibious operations in history at Normandy.
Offensive operations from the Sea are complex and dangerous, because you literally begin with one Marine or Trooper and build from that person. “Defensive” operations are even more complex and dangerous because your forces are declining as you withdraw, not building up for insertion.
Historically, “the Miracle at Dunkirk” is often looked at as the epic operation to evacuate a force to the sea while under fire. The saving of the British Army be Royal Navy and civilian ships was a key building block for the eventual return to Europe and to the defeat of the Nazis. Dunkirk would not have been possible without two elements coming together: sealift and air superiority provided by the RAF over the withdrawal area.
It is clear that the future for insertion forces is expanding, not contracting.
It is also clear that Australia wants to have both a self-deployed force and one that can operate effectively with allies.
This has already been demonstrated in the ongoing engagement against the ISIL, where the RAAF flew with a tanker, lift, fighter contingent based on their own organic capabilities.
The F-35B added to the fleet would provide an additional tool in the toolbox.
The strategic deterrence, with tactical flexibility, of the F-35B is in the recovery part of an air campaign when they return from a combat mission, especially if the enemy successfully attacks airfields.
Or is successful in hitting the carrier deck when the deck is damaged. The enemy does not have to sink the Carrier to remove it from the fight just disable the deck.
War is always a confused messy action reaction cycle, but the side with more options and the ability to remain combat enabled and dynamically flexible will have a significant advantage.
With ordinance expended, or not, the F-35B does not need a long runway to recover and this makes it a much more survivable platform — especially at sea where their might be no other place to go.
A call by the air battle commander-all runways are destroyed so find a long straight road and “good luck!” is a radio call no one should ever have to make.
But something revolutionary now exists which enables the pilot to sustain operations.
In landing in the vertical mode the Marine test pilot in an F-35B, coming aboard the USS Wasp during sea trials put the nose gear in a one square box.
Thee unique vertical landing/recovery feature of landing anywhere provides an option to save the aircraft to fight another day.
People were running around the Pentagon, and I exited the main door to the parking lot.
General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld passed me going back into the building.
I got into my car to drive home to our house which is close to the Pentagon.
We were stopped on Interstate 395 by the police as fire trucks and related equipment rushed to the Pentagon.
As I sat in my car, I looked over to see the plane fitted inside the Pentagon.
Unfortunately, I did not have a camera with me, for much more of the plane survived the initial impact than was later reported.
When I got home, I found my wife and children more than upset by developments.
It turns out that the plane had flown low over our house on the way to strike the Pentagon.
And my little girl, who was 3 at the time, kept talking about the plane which “almost hit me.”
Of course, for this generation of Arlington children, this would be a traumatic event they would never forget.
When Ed Timperlake and I came to the christening of the USS Arlington, we were struck by how many relatives of those who had died in the Pentagon were in attendance.
The SLD team had a chance to meet a man and his wife who symbolized the American experience.
He was a Vietnam combat veteran, with eight close friends whose names are forever on The Vietnam Veterans Memorial.
Tragically he and his wife were present to honor lost family members including two very young children when they were aboard the fatal American Airlines jet.
Seeing such a man brought home the loss, which Americans had that day.
Indeed, this man symbolized for us the need and importance of American global engagement to reduce threats to the American homeland and to the continued American engagement to work with friends and allies to contain the terrorist challenge.
We were shocked to find no major Washington media in attendance.
Ed contacted the ombudsman of the Washington Post and pursued the issue finally getting some recognition that they should have done a better job!
And especially because of the age of my third daughter, I was quite moved by a young girl sitting on her father’s lap in the Navy band and shot this picture:
This picture symbolized for me the generations of Americans willing to serve their country and to remember what is really all about – protecting the freedom of this country and its citizens.
During my visit to the USS Arlington, I had the privilege to meet a young sailor who clearly represents this tradition.
During my visit to the Arlington, I had the chance to talk with Boatswain’s mate — Anthony Richardson — of the Arlington,
According to Wikipedia, a boatswain’s mate is as follows:
The United States Navy occupational rating of boatswain’s mate (abbreviated as BM) is a designation given by the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) to enlisted members who are rated or “striking” for the rating as a deck seaman.
The colloquial form of address for a boatswain’s mate is ‘Boats’.
Boatswain’s mate of the Arlington, Anthony Richardson. Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
The rating of Boatswain’s Mate dates from the American Revolutionary War and is one of the oldest U.S. Navy rates still in continuous existence.
Boatswain’s mates train, direct, and supervise personnel in ship’s maintenance duties in all activities relating to marlinspike, deck, boat seamanship, painting, upkeep of ship’s external structure, rigging, deck equipment, and boats.
Boatswain’s mates take charge of working parties; perform seamanship tasks; act as petty officer-in-charge of picketboats, self-propelled barges, tugs, and other yard and district craft.
They serve in, or take charge of damage control parties.
BMs also operate and maintain equipment used in loading and unloading cargo, ammunition, fuel, and general stores.
BMs take charge of and supervise UNREP (Underway Replenishment) procedures and equipment.
They are integral to ship’s navigation and serve as ship’s Helmsman and the ship’s Lee Helmsman.
In addition they also serve as RHIB (rigid-hulled inflatable boat) coxswains.
After explaining to a landlubber like me what he did aboard the ship, he indicated that this was his first ship, and had been aboard for two years.
But with enthusiasm he indicated that he has been able to extend his time aboard the ship as it moved into its first deployment phase of operation.
It was clear that the esprit de corps of the ship crew was important to Anderson in his desire to continue to serve on this ship.
I asked him why he was so dedicated to his service aboard this ship other than his enthusiasm to work with a new crew on a new ship:
“We are doing our missions every day in memory of what happened on September 11th. It is that simple. That is the greatest thing.”
I think I can speak for many, and to take my hat off to the crew, troops and leadership of the USS Arlington and thank them for their service.
2014-11-03 The Marines this year are celebrating their 239th birthday.
A good way to honor the Marines would be not only to remember the battle of Dong Ha, Vietnam, but to honor the men who fought there.
The entire Second Line of Defense team wishes to support the suggestion of Lt. Col. (Retired) Jack Deichman, a veteran of the battle, that a Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) would be an appropriate and deserving award for the members of 2/4 participating in the Dai Do battle.
Deichman makes a convincing case in the article below.
The Battle for Dong Ha, Vietnam, April 30-May 2, 1968: DAI DO Revisited
by Lt Col Jack Deichman USMC (ret)
For 3 days in April and May of 1968, a beleaguered battalion of 652 Marines (BLT 2/4) fought what was arguably the most tenacious and significant battle of the Viet Nam War.
The stakes were extremely high. The odds against them were even higher.
They were facing a formidable enemy, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 320th Division of between 8,000-10,000 men just 1 ½ miles from the sprawling Marine Combat Base at Dong Ha. This was the main logistical outlet for all the units in Northern I Corps and was controlled and run by Marine support personnel.
Failure to defeat the NVA 320th would open a direct corridor to Dong Ha with no combat infantry to stand in their way.
The 3rd Marine Division Reserve was committed elsewhere leaving Dong Ha exposed and vulnerable to being overrun.
Failure to win this battle was not an option.
The entire war effort was in jeopardy of being compromised if Dong Ha fell and would result in a major strategic and political victory for the NVA.
The objective of this article is not to offer the reader a blow-by-blow description of what transpired over those 3 days in Apr-May 1968.
That has been done very well in other articles and books previously written.
The intent herein is to reveal information that was not well understood or available at or around the time of the Dai Do action and consequently precluded the full understanding of the battle’s significance and its rightful place in the archives of Marine history.
Disposition of Forces
1968 was the peak period of the United States commitment of troops to Viet Nam. It also was the high point of our casualties for the war.
Prior to the Dai Do battle, major actions were fought throughout the country during the Tet Offensive and again at Hue City to the north and Khe Sanh in the west. The lack of an uprising by the South Vietnamese people in support of the many NVA attacks was a blow to the North’s strategy and may have been a large factor in the NVA looking for another area to bring the fight to the South using the NVA regular troops.
To combat this threat, the Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam (MACV), commanded by Gen Westmoreland, had ordered its forward command (MACV FWD) to take charge of the northernmost operations in South Viet Nam and in March 1968 retitled that organization as Provincial Corps (Prov Corps).
It was commanded by an Army 3 star (LTG William Rosson) and had as its Deputy, Marine MGen and Medal of Honor (MOH) recipient Ray Davis who later relieved the then CG 3rd Mar Div, MGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins.
Prov Corps had significant forces under their command consisting of major Army units, the Marine 3rd Marine Division and some Navy units, ie Task Force Clearwater, who was primarily responsible for keeping supplies moving between the coastal base at Cua Viet and the combat base at Dong Ha.
Prov Corps had only one reserve infantry battalion available during the Dai Do period and it was deployed in support of the 3rd Marine Regiment under the operational control of its CO, Col Milton Hull. The Army unit took the place of Golf Company, 2/4 when they were moved from their positions northeast of Dai Do to the main battle area. Col Hull’s units were all committed but he did release one of his rifle companies to aid 2/4 in their attack on Dai Do and its surrounding villages.
BLT 2/4 had moved into the area east of Dai Do in March of 1968 and immediately began an active patrolling campaign that extended north to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and east to the South China Sea.
The photo shows about nine NVA shells hitting our Marine/Army positions in Nhi Ha. The NVA artillery was on tracks and it rolled out of the shelter of the hillsides. When they fired, the USS Boston (Cruiser) would track it by radar and alert our aircraft to get away.
Unfortunately, the area in and around Dai Do was actually part of the Area of Operations (AO) belonging to the South Viet Nam Army (ARVN) and they were not aggressive in keeping the enemy at bay. This contributed significantly to the consistent distrust regarding the ARVN loyalties.
This concern was driven home during the Mar-Apr 1968 time frame as the NVA 320th began their incursions into the South. Their route of ingress took them directly by the “A-2 Dyemarker “ position at Gio Linh which was part of the so-called McNamara Line.
It also was manned by ARVN personnel who were loath to initiate actions outside of their perimeter. From there, the enemy intruders skirted the 2/4, AO and had a direct shot unopposed to the Dai Do area.
This buildup of the 320th NVA Division continued unabated until the first shots were fired by the NVA on a Navy patrol boat navigating the Cua Viet River early in the morning of April 30, 1968. The 2nd ARVN Regiment, who had responsibility of this AO, took little or no action to patrol or report any activity in the Dai Do area and then were conveniently diverted to another action to the west a day before Dai Do began. They were not available to assist during any part of the battle.
While the buildup of these enemy forces continued, Lt Col Bill Weise, the CO of BLT 2/4, had all his rifle companies aggressively patrolling his AO. Initially, the contact with enemy forces was minimal but picked up significantly at the end of March and throughout the month of April.
Weise was a master at predicting where the enemy was as well as their intentions. He rightfully thought that the enemy was concentrating to his west but having hard facts was another thing altogether. Any intelligence forthcoming was almost always late and not actionable but there was enough info to sense that something big was coming.
It just wasn’t clear how big.
MGen McTompkins was fixated on a major attack coming from the West near Khe Sanh which was strongly opposed by Col Hull from the 3rd Marines. Maj Dennis Murphy (MGen ret), who was the 3rd Marine’s S-3 at the time, has related that Hull and McTompkins almost came to blows over the threat analysis and strategy regarding the NVA 320th and it wasn’t until late on the 1st day of Dai Do that McTompkins relented and swung his support to the East to give priority to 2/4 and the Dai Do Battle.
In fairness to McTompkins, he had rigid requirements that he had to fulfill such as the McNamara Line and he could not be positive that the 320th wasn’t going to pass up Dong Ha and attack South at the new base of Quang Tri. There was some evidence that McTompkins had a “swing” battalion available at this time but this could not be verified. Records including Command Chronologies for 3rd Mar Div during this period have never been located.
Intelligence
The lack of real intelligence was a major problem, not only for Weise but also for the 3rd Marine Regiment and 3rd Marine Division.
Intelligence comes in many forms and at Dai Do the only form that was available and reliable was what the combat troops were able to muster up. This proved to be a severe disadvantage to all in the chain of command. Not only was the disposition of enemy forces unclear but their intentions and strategy were also unknown.
Colonel Al Gray (later CMC) had gone to great lengths to establish a Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) system that covered all of I Corps. He was revered as the Intel guru of the Marine Corps and had been working on getting a viable SIGINT capability for the Marines since he was a Captain and the SIGINT Ops Officer at HQMC. As a Colonel in Viet Nam, he had ensured that SIGINT would play a roll and had 1st Radio Bn deploy many different detachments throughout the combat area.
Much of the intel was being processed for the Marines at Phu Bai.
In fact, the National Security Agency (NSA) had delegated SIGINT Operational Tasking Authority (SOTA) for the first time to a field combat organization, which enabled Commanders to get their requirements acted upon directly.
When the author checked with NSA as well as the historical archives to see how well SIGINT supported Dai Do or other combat operations, it was discovered that the files were still classified and could not be accessed. At the 2013 2/4 reunion, General Gray himself indicated that SIGINT in Viet Nam was not allowed below the Division level but that all major engagements since TET (early 1968) were known in advance.
It is unclear if MGen McTompkins had intelligence concerning Dai Do but even if he did, he may have decided that it was not reliable enough and kept his focus initially on the western areas toward Khe Sanh.
Both Bill Weise and Dennis Murphy have told the author that Intel Support for Dai Do was virtually non-existent. The intelligence deficiencies experienced by unit commanders in Viet Nam received a great deal of attention subsequent to the war with the emphasis on pushing the information down to the lowest levels.
Radio Battalion detachments now routinely accompany all deployed units.
The Battle
It is now known what the enemy disposition of forces were at Dai Do, what the deficiencies were in the intelligence but none of this was very evident at the time of the battle.
While it was clear that elements of the NVA 320th were involved, it was not clear which ones or how many there actually were.
Our casualties were known but enemy casualties were not available.
Even as late as the awarding of the Naval Unit Commendation (NUC) to BLT 2/4, the numbers were far from being correct. The NUC Citation alluded to 6 enemy units (no size given) and the number of enemy killed was in the hundreds, as indicated in Lt Col Weise’s Navy Cross Citation.
On the third day of battle, while personally leading in a fierce assault on the enemy’s furthermost portion of the heavily defended objective, Colonel Weise was seriously wounded, but actively directed the orderly withdrawal of his forces to supporting positions.
Steadfastly maintaining control of his battalion, he tenaciously continued to direct the evacuation of casualties to the secondary positions until he collapsed from his critical wound. During this period, the battalion accounted for hundreds of North Vietnamese casualties and four enemy prisoners
It wasn’t until some 30 years later when BGen Weise (ret) went to North Viet Nam and met with the NVA General who commanded their forces during Dai Do that Weise found out the NVA had committed the entire 320th Division (approximately 8,000-10,000 men).
DONG HA, SOUTH VIET NAM: Bearing a heavy load, a Marine carries a wounded buddy away from scene of battle as a fellow Leatherneck (rear) lends a hand, 9/17. Marine was wounded in an engagement with Communists some 20 miles northwest of Dong Ha.UPI TELEPHOTO BY JOHN SCHNEIDER
Additionally, Weise found out that we killed over 2300 NVA. When wounded enemy soldiers are factored in, the combat power of the 320th was rendered totally ineffective as a result of the battle.
These new numbers have dramatically increased the initial estimates at and around the time of the action and are based just on the 3 day battle at Dai Do and not a 3 month period alluded to in the NUC.
A significant difference that certainly reflected the ferocity of the fight and what was at stake.
Additionally, when reading the previously aforementioned NUC awarded to BLT 2/4, one doesn’t come away with anything close to capturing the tenacity and ferociousness of the Battle.
Not only were these heroes fighting against insurmountable odds, outnumbered 15/1, they were directed by higher headquarters to get “belly to belly” with the NVA and keep the pressure on.
BLT 2/4 did that and more but at a cost.
By the end of the 3rd day of continuous fighting, 2/4 had 125 men left from the 652 that began the fight.
The others had been killed or wounded seriously enough to require evacuation.
The remnants of the NVA 320th went back across the DMZ to reconstitute and Dong Ha was again safe, for now.
MGen McTompkins said at the end of this fighting that this was the most awesome battle by the standards of the Vietnamese War.
A compliment well deserved indeed.
An Opportunity To Honor the Warriors
Lack of adequate intelligence on the balance of forces and the closeness of the units precluded much of the Marine traditional supporting arms advantage and meant that small unit leadership and individual courage were the keys to the dramatic victory.
While this was recognized partially at the time by the awarding of two Medals of Honor and other valor awards, there were many other courageous Marines at Dai Do who were never honored for their service due to the many casualties and unavailability of those who may have witnessed their achievements.
While late in the game, a Presidential Unit Citation (PUC) would be an appropriate and deserving award for the members of 2/4 participating in the Dai Do battle.
One can rightfully assume that had higher headquarters known the actual numbers associated with this action, the ferocity of the engagement and the significance of the battle, they would have proposed a higher award from the start.
The criteria for upgrades of unit awards falls under the guidance of 10 USC, para 1130.
It is a tough standard but if any unit deserves that recognition, it would be the “Magnificent Bastards” that fought at Dai Do.
Additionally, the criteria for the PUC changed dramatically in General Conway’s Green Letter of 2-10 which puts more emphasis on awards to smaller units.
The lack of a PUC for the men who fought at Dai Do is an injustice whose time has come to remedy.
A correction is warranted now while these warriors are still alive and can be properly recognized for their valiant contributions to Corps and Country.
LtCol Deichman was the XO of Golf Company, BLT 2/4 during Dai Do and was awarded the Silver Star and Purple Heart for his actions. His final assignment before retiring in 1986 was as the Commanding Officer of Marine Support Battalion which provided SIGINT support to the Naval Security Group and NSA worldwide.
We started our visit to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station with the outgoing and incoming commanding officers of Plans, Programs and Tactics, or STRIKE (N5) in the Center.
Plans, Programs and Tactics, or STRIKE (N5) is involved in tactics development and assessment for tactical aircraft and SH-60 helicopters, program management and participation, mission planning, and inter/intra service liaison.
They are also the primary trainers for visiting air wings during their “Air Wing det. Fallon” phase of training, prior to deployment.
CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin: Outgoing STRIKE CO
Our introduction to The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center was provided by CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin, outgoing STRIKE CO, previous TOPGUN CO, and Instructor.
He highlighted a number core dynamics involved in the Center as well as discussing a number of key “work aheads” for Naval Aviation.
Clearly, training must focus on fighting with the force you have, but this force evolves over time and one needs to be prepared to incorporate joint capabilities and new capabilities coming the USN and USMC as well.
“Proton” discussed some of those aspects as well.
MEDITERRANEAN SEA (June 14, 2013), an F/A-18F Super Hornet assigned to the Jolly Rogers of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 103 approaches the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) for an arrested recovery
For an outsider, the presence of TOPGUN would suggest the fundamental meaning of Fallon; but this would be clearly incorrect.
As “Proton” explained:
We have a number of core training programs for graduate level proficiency of the primary platforms, such as TOPGUN, for example, with regard to fighters.
But that is for training at the individual level.
The next round of training is for what we call ARP or Advanced Readiness Phase, which is primarily focused at the squadron level.
While the Fallon Ranges are used for ARP’s, the primary instructor cadre comes from the weapons schools located at the fleet concentration centers. Again, using the F-18 example, the weapons schools at Naval Air Station Oceana and at Naval Air Station Lemoore are primarily responsible for ARP training.
The final strata are at the integrated level, which is what we do here at STRIKE. This involves not only all the squadrons in a given air wing, but external naval and joint assets as well.
Question: There is a close interactive process of training between the weapons schools and the wings?
Captain McLaughlin:
There is.
For the F-18 side of the house, TOPGUN is at the top of the training pyramid and the weapons schools basically work for TOPGUN.
TOPGUN develops the tactics, techniques and standardization procedures for the strike fighter aviation and then those TTP’s are pushed to the fleet via the respective weapons schools in Oceana and Lemoore.”
CSG-9 Strike personnel integrate with Fallon air wing training monitoring locally planned TLAM strike packages and exercising Tomahawk Authority (TA) communications requirements with TTGP SLAMEX white cell. {photo: NSAWC public affairs MC1(SW/AW) R. David Valdez}
Question: With regard to the strike integration phase, you both provide the training for integration but are in regular dialogue with the deployed carriers to both support them and to learn from their deployment experiences?
Captain McLaughlin:
That is correct.
We support the Combatant Commanders as well as prepare strike integration ashore so to speak.
For example, we have had daily contact with the USS BUSH via email, phone calls and VTCs.
This is an aspect of connectivity, which folds nicely into reshaping the impact and meaning of the training function.
Question: In other words, at Fallon you are operating in a highly interactive combat learning process rather than doing stove-piped training?
Captain McLaughlin:
That is correct.
During the month they’re here, the STRIKE team rolls up their sleeves, and we are with them 24/7 shaping and evaluating the integrated training process with them.
It’s kind of a crawl, walk, run process.
It starts at what we refer to MLT, mission level training, such as a 12 to 16 ship integrated strike against a low-level threats in both the air-to-air and surface-to-air regimes.
The threat capabilities gradually ratchet up and eventually leads to the advanced training phase, which is an A2AD 24-30 plane strike in GPS denied environments, Link-16 denied environments, et cetera, whatever that A2AD for that specific mission set is.
And in that phase we are also working with the USAF, and other non-organic assets because, in the real world, we would be working together against that sort of threat.
Question: Training to A2AD is a major challenge given range limitations and the need to tap a variety of non-carrier resources in conducting that fight.
How are you training to that environment?
Captain McLaughlin:
The current Fallon ranges – although large – are too small to train against an advanced threat, which can shoot longer than the ranges.
We need to train to a 21st Century Plus type of threat with very long-range missiles in the mix.
It is not about succeeding; it is about how are we going to do this with highest probability of success.
We are rolling in Live Virtual Constructive training to provide the extenders for our operators to work in that threat environment and to reach out to other assets – Navy and joint – which can allow us to fight in an expanded battlespace.
U.S. Navy aircraft assigned to Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5 fly over the guided missile destroyer USS Preble (DDG 88), not pictured, in the Pacific Ocean Aug. 20, 2013.
Question: And this approach allows you to fold in over time new blue force assets as well, for example with the Navy the F-35C or the UCAS?
Captain McLaughlin:
It does but F-35C will be much easier to integrate than UCAS as we have a very defined capability set with the JSF but are still unclear about UCAS.
Correspondingly, we have been preparing for the introduction of the F-35C for some time, and have many involved in preparing for its introduction into the fleet.
Question: Certainly, the fight against ISIL has reminded the nation once again of the flexibility of the sea base and how that flexibility really compliments other air power capabilities, which can be brought to the fight?
What is your take on the role of the sea-base in the expanded battlespace?
Captain McLaughlin:
A key advantage of the carrier and sea-basing more generally is the ability to move to the fight with logistics support onboard.
We do not need long lead times and delicate diplomatic negotiations to move to the fight; we just sail to the fight, and given forward presence, we are probably not too far away in any case.
Moreover, as we add new capabilities like the F-35, and enhance our ability to leverage joint and coalition assets we are going to be more effective in the expanded battlespace with the sea base a central element, if not the central C2 capability for the joint or coalition force.
CDR James “Cruiser” Christie: Incoming STRIKE CO
We then had an opportunity to continue the conversation about the strike integration process and challenges with “Proton’s” successor, CDR James “Cruiser” Christie, incoming STRIKE CO, and previous TOPGUN CO
Question: How do you view the function of the STRIKE Command, which you are about to lead?
CDR Christie:
The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center really is an umbrella organization that brings together several schools of excellence with regard to core combat capabilities, TOPGUN for fighters, CAEWWS (Carrier Airborne Early Warning Weapons School), HAVOC (Airborne Electronics Attack Weapons School), JCAS (Joint Close Air Support), and the rotary wing training school or RWWS.
At STRIKE we focus on the integration of these various core competencies into an integrated strike force, which will operate off of the carrier.
Question: Clearly, a key aspect of integration is that it is not fixed but is reworked as new assets come into the fleet.
As we understand it, the latest assets might go to the fleet and then after initial deployments come to Fallon for the learning curve into the integration effort?
PATUXENT RIVER, Md. (July 16, 2013) Aviation Structural Mechanic 1st Class Stephen Swett, assigned to the Pioneers of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 1, signals for the start up of an E-2D Hawkeye on the flight line. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kenneth Abbate/Released)
CDR Christie:
That certainly can happen, but isn’t ideal.
For example, our first air wing with E2-D, the new Hawkeye, is coming here in a couple of weeks.
We have been working with them over the past year in various parts of their workup because the rollout of the E-2D platform has been accelerated.
We’ve sent TOPGUN instructors, and CAEWWS instructors, and STRIKE instructors down to work with CVW-1 and VAW-125 supportive of that effort.
Typically, the Fleet won’t get a platform or capability until it has been thoroughly tested and validated by our test pilot community.
At Fallon, we focus the bulk of our work on Tactics, Training and Procedures (TTPs) for the fleet.
We’re chartered to create the tactics of the future, and to be able to do that we need to know where revolutionary advances are happening, and to understand those new capabilities thoroughly.
So with regard to the new Hawkeye, we sent staff members with either an E-2D or fighter integration background to meet with the squadron and air wing team during their workups to help them work through optimal tactical implementation of their new assets.
Question: Another key aspect is building an evolving understanding of the threat from more advanced adversaries as well.
How do you do that?
CDR Christie:
We have threat specific subject matter experts who maintain close connections with various intelligence agencies, and with our allies, to better understand the evolving threat environment.
Our subject matter experts convey that knowledge to tactics instructor students in class.
And clearly, you want to train to the high-end threat, the most capable potential threat out there — their hardware, their assessed pilot capabilities, their integrated air defense networks.
You train against that as best you can, or something generically mimicking a high-end threat.
Combat is a complex environment that does not suffer fools.
Question: The upgraded Hawkeye is a new asset and presumably you are preparing for the F-35 becoming an integral part of the strike package.
How are you preparing for the introduction of the F-35 into your strike integration thinking?
F-35C on approach to a landing aboard the USS Nimitz. Credit Photo; Breaking Defense
CDR Christie:
We are preparing for sure.
TOPGUN has a team of instructors working with MAWTS and Nellis to shape common TTPs.
And we have been doing that for three years.
We have already written the initial employment documents with how to integrate the F-35 into the fight.
And to be clear, the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force are all working together on this.
We’re not simply waiting for the plane to come to Fallon, and of course, we have our Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) training and instructing at Eglin AFB.
We maintain a close working relationship with Nellis.
We have an Air Force exchange pilot on staff at TOPGUN and STRIKE, and a former TOPGUN instructor pilot is assigned to Nellis.
Most recently, the Air Force exchange officer at TOPGUN was an F-16 pilot.
We see this as an important trade space for intellectual ideas on how to succeed in 21st century air combat.
In order to conduct a truly joint operation with symbiosis, it is important for both weapons schools to send their best tacticians and aviators to each other’s facilities.
This is how you realize fully integrated capabilities operating in the joint realm. And this exchange has been going on for more than a decade.
Question: What you are describing is shaping a cadre of tacticians and operators who can actually think about convergent operations?
CDR Christie:
That is a good way to put it.
To operate jointly, you cannot do it from a book or simply be handed directives.
You need to understand how the other service operates, how it is different and where commonalities can actually yield capabilities.
Biography of CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin
A native of Newport Beach, CA. CDR Kevin McLaughlin enlisted in the Navy in 1989 and was named Navy League Outstanding Recruit for his graduating cadre. Following ET ‘A’ School and Navy Nuclear Power School in Orlando, FL., the then ET3 McLaughlin transferred to Nuclear Power Training Unit (NPTU) in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Upon completion of prototype, he was en route to the USS Helena (SSN 725) when he was accepted into the Naval Aviation Cadet program.
CDR McLaughlin graduated from Aviation Officer Candidate School as the class Distinguished Naval Graduate and proceeded to Primary flight training in Corpus Christi, TX. Upon completion of primary flight training he received a jet slot and subsequent training in Kingsville, TX. Following Intermediate and advanced jet training, and newly commissioned, CDR McLaughlin received orders to the F/A-18 Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) at MCAS El Toro, CA. During his FRS tour he was awarded the 1993 David McCampbell Award as the top Air Combat Maneuvering student pilot in the Navy. Following completion of the FRS, CDR McLaughlin was assigned to NAS Lemoore, CA. and VFA-146.
CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin, outgoing STRIKE CO, previous TOPGUN CO, and Instructor at The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station. Credit: Second Line of Defense
CDR McLaughlin served in VFA-146 from December 1994 to December 1997 and had various duties including Line Division Officer, Quality Assurance Officer, Schedules Officer, Communications Officer, Landing Signals Officer, and Air-to- Air Weapons Training Officer. During his tenure he made two deployments on board the USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW) in the Arabian Gulf. He was named as the Charles H. Bryant Leadership Award winner for 1997.
Upon completion of CDR McLaughlin’s tour in VFA-146, he was assigned to NAS Fallon, NV. as an instructor at Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center and Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) where he taught graduate level tactics to both F/A-18 and F-14 combat aircrew. While assigned, CDR McLaughlin served as the Maintenance Officer and the Fleet Training Officer.
Completing his TOPGUN tour in February 2001, CDR McLaughlin transferred back to NAS Lemoore for duty as the Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor and Training Officer aboard VFA-151. During this tour, he made another six-month deployment in support of OSW onboard the USS CONSTELLATION (CV 64) and was named the VFA-151 Junior Officer of the year for 2001. In 2002, CDR McLaughlin was selected as a Washington DC Intern Fellow where he received a Masters in Organizational Management from George Washington University while interning on both the Navy and Joint Staffs.
Upon completion of his tour in Washington, CDR McLaughlin returned to Lemoore for his Department Head tour assigned to VFA-94. During his two-year tour he made another six-month deployment, this time in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM aboard USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) and served as the Safety, Maintenance, and Operations Officer.
In November of 2006 he was assigned as the Organizational Policy Officer to the J-5 Plans and Policy directorate of the United States Northern Command in Colorado Springs. He was selected for Operational Command in 2008 and completed training in the FA-18E Super Hornet, for eventual assumption of duties as Executive Officer of VFA-14 in 2010. CDR McLaughlin then assumed the duties as Commanding Officer of VFA-14 in July 2011 and led the squadron through a combat deployment in support of Operations NEW DAWN and ENDURING FREEDOM aboard the USS JOHN C STENNIS (CVN 74). While in Command, VFA-14 was selected as the 2012 RADM Wade McClusky recipient for outstanding Attack Squadron in the US Navy. Upon completion of his Command tour, CDR McLaughlin was assigned to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center to assume duties first as TOPGUN and then STRIKE Department Head.
He has over 3500 hours and 850 carrier landings aboard eight different carriers. Personal awards include the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal, Strike-Flight Air Medal (3), Navy Commendation Medal (3), Joint Staff Achievement Medal, Navy Achievement Medal (4), Good Conduct Medal, and various other unit awards.
Biography of Commander James D. “Cruiser” Christie
Commander James Christie graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1994 with a degree in Mechanical Engineering and then commissioned an Ensign. Winged a Naval Aviator in Kingsville, TX in 1997, he received orders to the “Sharpshooters” of VMFAT-101 to commence training in the FA-18 Hornet. He subsequently reported to the VFA-137 “Kestrels” in May 1998 at NAS Lemoore and deployed twice in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH aboard USS Constellation (CV 64).
In 2001, Commander Christie reported to the VFA-122 Flying Eagles at NAS Lemoore, CA as an FA-18E/F Super Hornet flight instructor and Landing Signals Officer. After one year at VFA-122, he attended Navy Fighter Weapons School (TOPGUN) with follow on orders to Strike Fighter Weapons School Pacific as a Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor (SFTI) specialized in FA-18 Combat Systems.
CDR James “Cruiser” Christie, incoming STRIKE CO, and previous TOPGUN CO at The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center at Fallon Naval Air Station. Credit: Second Line of Defense
Commander Christie was next assigned to the VFA-2 “Bounty Hunters” in 2004 as the Pilot Training Officer and completed a deployment in support of Operation Unified Assistance to provide tsunami relief for Indonesia.
In 2005 he joined the VFA-22 “Redcocks” as a department head and completed a combat deployment aboard USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) in support of Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and Pacific Command’s inaugural Valiant Shield Exercise, shortly followed by a surge deployment in support of 7th Fleet operations.
In January 2009, Commander Christie graduated from the Naval War College in Newport, RI with a Masters of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies. He then completed an Individual Augmentee assignment to the Force Strategic Engagement Cell, Multi-National Force Iraq (MNF-I) in Baghdad as the lead strategist for Shia insurgent reconciliation.
In January 2011, Commander Christie reported to the Black Knights of VFA-154 as Executive Officer. He immediately deployed for CVW-14’s sunset eight-month deployment in support of Operations TOMODACHI, NEW DAWN and ENDURING FREEDOM aboard USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76).
Upon return and decommissioning of CVW-14, the Black Knights transferred to CVW-11. Commander Christie took command of VFA-154 in May 2012 to lead the Black Knights through work-ups and another deployment in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM aboard the USS Nimitz (CVN 68).
In September 2013, Commander Christie reported to Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) as TOPGUN’s Commanding Officer. In October 2014, he transferred from TOPGUN to STRIKE within NSAWC. He has logged 3000 flight hours in the F-18A-F and has accumulated more than 800 arrested landings.
His awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (2 awards), Strike Flight Air Medals (3 awards), Navy Commendation Medals (2 awards), Navy Achievement Medals (2 awards) and numerous other campaign and unit awards.
Earlier pieces from our Fallon visit in October 2014:
2014-11-06 Training for Electronic Warfare: Shaping a Combined Arms Approach
By Ed Timperlake and Robbin Laird
During our visit to Fallon, we had a chance to discuss the role of Airborne Electronic Attack with CDR Mike “Beaker” Miller, Naval Strike and Warfare Center, Airborne Electronic Weapons School (HAVOC).
CDR Miller has an extensive background in electronic warfare and has worked with the US Air Force, US Army, USMC as well with USN forces in providing electronic warfare support.
He was the commander of the first carrier-based EA-18G Growler squadron and has done two deployments on Growlers operating in the Med, the Arabian Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Western Pacific .
And as will become clear in the interview his time working with the US Army on the ground and in air in both Iraq and Afghanistan was an important part of his combat learning process as well in understanding the nature of fighting electronic warfare with a reactive enemy.
Question: What is the key function of electronic warfare capability?
CDR Miller:
It really should be understood as spectrum warfare, or what the Navy is labeling as Electronic Maneuver Warfare (EMW).
EMW is essentially all about creating warfighting advantages in and through the electromagnetic spectrum by disrupting the adversary’s kill chain while optimizing our own.
The goal of Blue Electronic Warfare is to create tactical advantage for Blue forces and Blue kill chains by delaying, degrading, denying, or deceiving the Red kill chain.
The target for Blue EW is the Red kill chain – always has been.
In the real world, every kill chain is different, even those with similar equipment, doctrine, and training, which is why EW mission success is heavily dependent upon mission planning.
An EA-18G Growler assigned to the Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 129 lands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71. Navy Media Content Services, 11/3/14
Upon identification/nomination of the applicable Red kill chain, Growler aviators, intelligence officers, and cryptologists perform EW targeteering to identify vulnerabilities in that kill chain – vulnerabilities to screening, saturation, deception, stimulation, or destruction.
We then do weapon-to-target pairing, matching the best EW weapon available against each of those high payoff vulnerabilities.
Those weapons can be jammers, receivers (for warning/localization/avoidance), anti-radiation missiles, decoys, or other tools in the EW/SEAD toolbox.
Using AEA-specific weaponeering tools, we then determine the weapon delivery parameters required to achieve the desired effects for each of those weapons.
These weapon (and sometimes sensor) employment parameters drive Growler positioning and maneuvers in the battlespace.
We then employ EA-18G survivability tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve the Growler combat survivability required to achieve valid EW employment parameters with a high degree of probability.
Question: This means that the role of the squadron in doing non-kinetic strike is significant?
CDR Miller:
That is true, because in effect no one else is trained and experienced to perform the EW targeteering function in the Navy.
An EA-6B Prowler, attached to the Garudas of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 134 launches from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77). Navy Media Content Services. 7/7/14
At the AEA Weapons School here at NSAWC, we run a Growler Intelligence Officer course in parallel with our Growler Tactics Instructor (aircrew) course to provide the Fleet with a select group of Naval Intelligence Officers that have a graduate-level understanding of tactical non-kinetic mission planning and employment.
We absolutely need these individuals to help tighten the bonds between EA-18G operators and the Navy’s Information Dominance Corps.
I would add that EW is an undervalued capability until you actually fight.
Nobody really cares about electronic warfare until the shooting starts; and then you cannot get enough of it.
Question: How important was your time working with the US Army?
CDR Miller:
It was very significant.
We flew carrier planes – the Prowler – out of a former Soviet base, that was an Army base, as part of an Air Force Air Expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan (one of the most land-locked places on earth) in support of the ground scheme of maneuver.
We had not really focused on that mission before Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, but the red side was leveraging commercial technology to create an asymmetric advantage against the ground forces.
We were tasked to disrupt and deny those advantages, by providing supporting non-kinetic fires to protected entities (mounted and dismounted troops).
Navy Commander Ed Fischer (left) and Air Force 1st Lt. E.J. Wong inspect an Warlock equipped Humvee in Iraq, 11/8/08.On a day-to-day basis, electronic threats to the U.S. military change; therefore, the solutions or the means of fighting that threat change. For the ever changing electronic threat, the Army looked to the Navy and Air Force for their expertise. 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division.
Following my deployments with the Navy to Afghanistan, I had the opportunity to embed directly with the Army as a Brigade EWO with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Air Assault Division in Iraq.
That experience helped me understand the synchronization and employment of non-kinetic fires from the supported commander’s perspective.
In effect, our effort became part of a broadened notion of close air support (CAS) or “fires.”
If one thinks of what we have done as part of refined CAS so to speak one can understand better what we were about.
The Army, after experiencing what we could do to support the ground scheme of maneuver began to reconsider investments in this area.
And for future operations in a permissive environment, both the Army and the Marines are building out vehicle based and UAV based systems to provide the non-kinetic fires capabilities that Prowlers, Growlers, Compass Call, and other EW platforms supported them with in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Question: You did this in communication with a ground based JTAC.
But could we not do this from the air in support of an ally without one, if we are looking to deliver a broad based attack such against ISIL?
CDR Miller:
I would prefer to not to it that way although it could be done.
By having someone on the ground, you can get a better outcome.
It enhances your ability to provide the effect which most closely meets the supported ground commander’s intent.
It is important to de-conflict non-kinetic first in the same manner as kinetic fires.
The doctrinal definition of CAS is integration of fires when in close proximity to friendlies which means that detailed integration is required for the proper effect.
Question: How do you view the Growler in the scheme of joint EW or what one might call Tron Warfare?
CDR Miller:
It provides an important capability.
I take a combined arms approach to capabilities in this area.
By having a variety of capabilities you take away the red side’s ability to achieve mission success by targeting a single platform type or blue capability.
History indicates that “silver bullet” solutions or gameplans devised in peacetime often do not have the adaptability, resiliency, or redundancy required to be successful in combat.
For example: mobile targets present a major challenge for EW and the ability to disrupt and exploit the red kill chain.
MEDITERRANEAN SEA (Aug. 15, 2013) An EA-18G Growler assigned to the Zappers of Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 130 lands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75).
And target mobility includes their agility in the spectrum, not just the physical location of the threat sensor, weapon, or network.
Tactics and training predicated on “exquisite” knowledge of enemy locations, signatures, and reactions leave us vulnerable to surprise in the fog and friction that will likely dominate the opening hours of the next fight.
We operate our Growlers on a mission expecting to need to shift among various types of targets and to calibrate our weapon against a diversity of targets.
We train our Growler Tactics Instructors “how” to think tactically and not just “what” to think tactically.
The tactics of today will someday be countered – not if, but when.
The human element of warfare, and electronic warfare is warfare, is as important as it has ever been.
The men and women that employ the amazing capabilities of the EA-18G remain our “asymmetric advantage” in today’s and tomorrow’s fight.
Question: So what you are saying is that the blue side needs enough diversity of toolsets that the enemy cannot overly commit to one identified strength or vulnerability for that matter?
CDR Miller:
That is correct.
Commander Miller’s Biography
Commander Miller grew up overseas and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1994.
He earned his Wings of Gold as a Naval Flight Officer in March 1996 and was selected to fly the EA-6B Prowler.
Commander Miller’s operational assignments include the “Gauntlets” of VAQ-136 deploying aboard USS Independence (CV 62) and USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), Carrier Air Wing NINE (CVW-9) staff deploying aboard USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70), and the “Garudas” of VAQ-134 deploying twice to Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan.
Commander Miller. Credit: USN
Commander Miller also deployed to Baghdad, Iraq as the Electronic Warfare Officer for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) (the “Rakkasans”) as an element of Joint CREW Composite Squadron ONE (JCCS-1).
He reported to the “Shadowhawks” of VAQ-141 in May 2010 as Executive Officer following transition training in the EA-18G, deploying in May 2011 aboard USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) for the first carrier deployment of the Growler. Commander Miller took command of VAQ-141 in July 2011.
He led VAQ-141 through the first two carrier deployments of the EA-18G Growler, operating in 2nd, 6th, 5th, and 7th Fleets as a component of Carrier Air Wing EIGHT (CVW-8) and Carrier Air Wing FIVE (CVW-5). Commander Miller relinquished command in February 2013.
Ashore, Commander Miller instructed at VAQ-129, the EA-6B Fleet Replacement Squadron and pursued post-graduate education at the USAF Air Command and Staff College at Maxwell AFB, AL. He reported to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fallon, NV in March 2013.
Commander Miller’s personal decorations include seven Air Medals (Strike/Flight) and Commendation Medals from the Navy, Army and Air Force.
He’s been NATOPS-qualified in the EA-6B, S-3B and EA-18G, accumulating 3,500 flight hours, 217 operational missions, and 800 carrier arrested landings.
A final issue, which we discussed with a Prowler pilot in the room, was the whole challenge of transitioning the Prowler experience into the UAV squadron and the F-35B squadron.
Clearly with the migration of electronic warfare to what Ed Timperlake has called “Tron Warfare” change is under way.
The USMC clearly understands this.
As Col. Orr, then the CO of VMX-22 put it in a presentation to the Air Force Association Mitchell Aerospace Institute:
The RQ-21 Blackjack as seen at USMC Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina. The RQ-21 is part of the USMC reset with regard to Tron Warfare. Credit: Second LIne of Defense
Col. Orr also discussed the USMC effort to merge the complementary capabilities of two traditionally separate, very separate communities.
We have signals intelligence professionals, primarily ground-based radio battalions who report back up through Title 50 authorities.
And then we have a separate group that does electronic warfare, notably the EA-6B Prowler conducting tactical electronic warfare.
Those two communities traditionally haven’t really talked much.
We are bringing them together in the same facility called the Cyber/Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell (CEWCC).
That Cyber/Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell provides the MAGTF commander the ability to deconflict and conduct operations within the electromagnetic spectrum at a tactical level.
At a tactical level, the CEWCC allows us to be able to combine cyber and electronic warfare effects and have the commander make decisions ranging from listening to deception to jamming.
Prowler experience as well as infrastructure needs to be folded into the way ahead, a subject, which we hope to pursue in the near future.
As Lieutenant Colonel Faught put it: “We need to find ways to exploit the analytical infrastructure which has supported Prowler and take that forward into the 21st century approaches we are now shaping.”
In a recent interview, Lou Kratz, underscored the core strategic point concerning what the F-35 deployed as a fleet can contribute:
When the program that we recognize today as the F-35 was first conceived, there was a national and international recognition of the need for rapid coalition response capabilities. And that drove both the air system and the sustainment system designed to enable that capability.
The joint and coalition force is not looking for interoperability; we were looking for force integration.
And the current ACC Commander, General Hostage, has underscored how important Lighting IIs working together are for understanding how the aircraft will operate and enhance their lethality as a weapons system.
Question: One of the concepts we’ve played with was what we called the S Cubed, which is the tradeoffs between sensors, stealth, and speed. And how you played them off against one another. Does that make sense?
General Hostage: It does. I think an excellent portrayal of the value of looking at the interaction of those parameters is to examine Raptor versus the Lightning. A Raptor at 50-plus thousand feet at Mach 2 with its RCS has a different level of invulnerability than a Lightning at 35,000 at Mach .9 and it’s RCS.
The altitude, speed, and stealth combined in the two platforms, they give the airplanes two completely different levels of capability. The plan is to normalize the Lightning’s capability relative to the Raptor by marrying it up with six, or seven, or eight other Lightnings.
The advanced fusion of the F-35 versus the F-22 means those airplanes have an equal level or better level of invulnerability than the Raptors have, but it takes multiple airplanes to do it because of the synergistic fused attacks of their weapon systems.
And that’s the magic of the fifth gen F-35, but it takes numbers of F-35s to get that effect, that’s why I’ve been so strident on getting the full buy. Because if they whittle it down to a little tiny fleet like the Raptor, it’s not going to be compelling.
A key element shaping integrated air-enabled combat capability for the evolving F-35 fleet is clearly the communications and data link system built into the aircraft.
One of the core combat capabilities built into the aircraft is the CNI system or the Communications, Navigation and Identification system.
According a press release from Northrop Grumman in early 2013 as flight tests validated the CNI system, its role was highlighted:
The Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) waveform developed by Northrop Grumman Corporation was successfully demonstrated in a Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter program flight test, validating an eight-year development effort to advance communication among fifth-generation aircraft.
MADL is a high-data-rate, directional communications link. It allows coordinated tactics and engagement to bring significant operational advantages to fifth-generation aircraft operating in high-threat environments. MADL is a key capability provided by Northrop Grumman’s F-35 integrated communications, navigation and identification (CNI) avionics.
The F-35 CNI avionics flying onboard two Lockheed Martin F-35 aircraft established the MADL link between two airborne platforms for the first time. Data passed between aircraft via MADL was correlated with data from other F-35 sensors by Lockheed Martin’s fusion system to form a simplified situational awareness picture on the cockpit displays.
“During the flight tests, MADL functioned reliably with excellent range at multiples of required specifications while demonstrating ability to network fifth-generation fighters,” said Mike Twyman, (former) vice president and general manager of the Defense Systems division for Northrop Grumman Information Systems. “This success is a significant achievement for the F-35 program and enabling joint aerial concept of operations.”
The MADL flight test is an important element of Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Block 2 software release, which provides advanced mission systems capability at Edwards Air Force Base, Calif., and other training and operational locations.
To get an update on the MADL data link within the CNI system, an interview was conducted in late July 2014 with two former USAF pilots and officers, who now work with Northrop Grumman, where MADL has been developed, to discuss its status and evolution and the approach to moving forward.
Fred Cheney is now a director of business development for Northrop Grumman Information Systems Communications Division, and formerly served with the USAF in the Pacific and Iraq operations.
Mike Edwards, a former USAF commander as well, is a director on staff with Northrop Grumman Corporation.
Question: What is MADL?
Fred Cheney: MADL stands for Multi-Function Advanced Data Link.
It operates in what is now being called anti-access and area denial operations where low observable capability is clearly crucial to mission success and you are linking those elements most central to shaping an entry and dominance strategy.
Its origins are from the communications and data links built for the F-22.
The IFDLlink has been designed to allow F-22s to work with other F-22s to enhance low observable performance.
It is designed to have Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) and Low Probability of Detection (LPD).
The F-35 and F-22 are seen flying together at Eglin AFB. These photos were shot on September 9, 2012 and are credited to Major Karen Roganov, Team Eglin PA, 33rd FW and Sgt. Jeremy Lock.
When the F-35 was being designed, designers were looking for that same kind of LPI and LPD capability but wanted to correct some of the shortfalls identified.
It is also the case that the F-35 was designed from the ground up to share data among the fleet and to operate in the combat environment in an integrated manner to deliver combat effects.
MADL is a different system than that carried by the F-22 and has longer-range, better throughput, and shares more data to support both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.
The point though is that MADL has been built on experience with the F-22; it is not just a system that was built simply from briefing charts.
And when the F-35 was first conceived, the legacy high-low mix was in the forefront.
Question: The F-35 and its combat systems have evolved and the impact of an integrated fleet of F-35s contemplated, the F-35 has emerged as a foundational 21st century capability.
You are not thinking high-low mix anymore; you are really thinking in terms of fleets, F-35, F-22, and legacy and the way to provide for better force integration going forward.
This means that clearly you are looking at ways to work on cross-linking as well?
Fred Cheney: We are. On the Gulfstream II, we were able to connect F-35s and F-22s, because the new terminal actually has both Intra-Flight Data-Link (IFDL) and MADL in it.
Using that airplane, we were able to connect to both types of airplanes at the same time and transfer data between F-22s and F-35s.
In fact, MADL was designed based on prior experience with the F-22 to shape an integrated waveform for low observable operations, and can be leveraged for working to support combat operations throughout a joint or coalition force.
Question: But it seems clear that because the F-35 is an air-to-ground platform, MADL has been thought of differently, I would assume?
It seems clear that one is looking to leverage data and information for combat effectiveness via MADL.
Fred Cheney: It is. In fact, it is best to think of the integrated impact of an F-35 fleet to be understood best as an information superiority combat capability.
And one is looking to ways to leverage its evolution as an information superiority fleet – versus simply an air platform providing situational awareness.
A way to look at the way ahead is to focus on the fleet working with joint or coalition C2 nodes to inform the leadership of the joint and coalition force of the evolving combat situation and to deliver effects throughout the rapidly evolving combat situation.
We are not thinking here in terms of information going to a centralized Air Combat Operations Center; we are thinking in terms of evolving distributed approaches, which allow combat to be directed and supported by resilient networks.
Clearly, an F-35 fleet can deliver integrated combat capability with the MADL sharing tool set; and then the question is how best to connect C2 nodes with that fleet, and how best to move relevant information from the fleet to appropriate combat elements.
There is no reason you cannot put MADL on ships, on other planes or on ground receivers.
In fact, as I mentioned before we recently tested a MADL radio system aboard a Gulfstream II and with F-35s, demonstrating one can now have a MADL-to-MADL link to other platforms.
OSD has deemed MADL to be the anti-access waveform, so finding ways to operate the waveform among forces will be important going forward.
It can also be overlooked that with MADL and the global F-35 enterprise we have created a coalition sharing integrated capability, which has never been done before.
It may be through the evolution of C2 nodes that MADL will be linked to the legacy fleet as well.
With the emergence of an initial MADL system, why wouldn’t you reuse that?
Why wouldn’t you start to pull that MADL waveform into other nodes, given that it is already paid for by the F-35 program, as well as inherently coalition common?
Question: Clearly putting the F-35 fleet into the hands of the war fighters will see significant change and probably more rapidly than people anticipate?
How do you think of the role of the USMC in all of this and the positive impact of the USMC being a lead service in deploying the first F-35 squadrons?
Mike Edwards: It is very positive in one very important way: the Marines are a smaller and more tightly integrated force.
They will work very hard to draw every capability they can out of a combat system, and in this sense, the F-35 will be no different.
But given its integrated combat capability, figuring out how to leverage it for the overall integrated Marine Corps force will be a high priority for them.
And this can also see a similar process with coalition partners.
Because with a smaller force, they will be looking at how are they going to reapply what they have in their tool kit to solve those problems?
And that’s where the new think starts to occur.
Question: We have been looking at how the Marines have evolved their KC-130Js and have deployed Harvest Hawk.
One USMC pilot highlighted that in his mind, there is no reason that they could not have MADL on board and distribute what is relevant to the ground forces as part of their approach to close air support.
Would the system you are testing be relevant to this possibility?
Mike Edwards: Indeed, it would, and it gets to the most fundamental point – where the C2 node is can vary; but having a robust data and communications link which is empowered by an integrated fleet of combat aircraft, provides significant possibilities for innovation.
And we are on the cusp of significant innovations.
Three F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 121, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, and two AV-8B Harriers with Marine Attack Squadron 211, 3rd MAW, fly in a “V” formation during fixed-wing aerial refueling training over eastern California, Aug. 27. The F-35B joint strike fighters practiced refueling with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Michael Thorn)
We are the period of discovery with what we can do with MADL and an integrated air combat fleet of F-35s can deliver to the combat force.
We don’t even know yet what the full potential is.
And we may not know for a while until we hit one of those hard problems.
And then some young, bright person says hey, you know what? If we did X, Y, and Z, we could actually solve this problem.
And we have cases of that occurring all the time in combat situations.
And that’s one of the things that I think makes our military so great.
Fred Cheney: There is another aspect of the way ahead which is important to highlight as well, and that is logistics costs.
The Link 16 experience demonstrates how quasi-commonality limits supportability.
There are many vendors of Link 16 terminals all around the world, and you then lose the advantage of having economies of scale.
And you think logistics isn’t very exciting or interesting, but it takes a lot of dollars that you would rather spend on combat capabilities if you do not leverage commonality and global sourcing of common parts.
And commonality is both important and a continuing challenge.
Commonality is built into the aircraft; the challenge will be keep commonality built in, for there will be the temptation to think this is a replacement aircraft and data system, and there will be tendency to think in terms of interoperability rather than integration provided by an F-35 fleet where the various services and partners can seamlessly share data and provide information to the C2 nodes, which will evolve appropriate to 21st century operations.
You’ve got to be careful, however, that you don’t develop a problem like Link 16 has with interoperability.
People started to tinker with it, and all of a sudden we lost track of being able to talk with every coalition partner, and the Air Force being able to talk to Navy.
It’s very important to do improvements, but they must be done as a fleet.
Editor’s Note: In the slideshow above, in photos provided by the 33rd Fighter Wing, F-35As are being tanked by a KC-135, in the summer of 2013.
The photos were shot from the tanker during the tanking operation.
