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It has been a year since I first sat down with Lt. General Preziosa at his office in Rome to discuss the evolution of Italian and coalition airpower.
I had a chance to both discuss with the COS of the Italian Air Force at a meeting in his office on October 1, 2014 and then to listen to him present at a seminar held by Airpress in Rome on October 3, 2014.
At that session, my colleague Air Vice Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn and I presented a joint briefing on how to prevail in 21st century conflicts and the practical approaches, which the USMC and the RAAF are taking to deal with these conflicts.
After our brief, Lt. General Preziosa presented at the Seminar and engaged both of us in terms of the presentation and addressed the broader audience about the future of air and space power.
This article draws upon both the office meeting and the public presentation to provide a sense of how Lt. General Preziosa looks at the evolving threats to Europe and ways to shape responses in a fiscally challenging environment where insecurity in the strategic environment is on the rise.
Lt General Preziosa. Credit: Italian Air Force
While I was in Rome, the debate over the F-35 program continued, with the lines drawn between those who wished to cut the program (its elimination is no longer on the table in practical political terms) and those who want to leverage it for overall force transformation within Italy and as a means to enhance coalition collaboration and combat power.
During our discussion last year, Lt. General Preziosa discussed at some length the F-35 and its role in Italian and coalition defense. This time we focused on the evolving strategic context and the role of air and space power as providing crucial means to allow Italy to defend its interests and to work more effectively with allies.
During the Seminar, the COS discussed the F-35 directly in response to the presentation of Air Vice Marshal (Retired) Blackburn who had focused upon the RAAF approach to leveraging the F-35 acquisition to generate a force transformation effort.
This effort labeled as Plan Jericho was clearly an approach with which Lt. General Preziosa found congeal to his own thinking about the way ahead for Italian airpower.[1]
The Context
Italy in common with other members of the Euro zone is in the midst of a financial crisis. This crisis is fundamental and puts real pressure on the ability of governments to govern effectively and to shape a way ahead economically. This as well puts pressure on defense, foreign and security policy by reducing the means available to deal with external crises as well as forcing very difficult trade offs for decision-makers and government strategists.
As Preziosa put it: “Maslow’s first need must be met in order to deal with the second need. That is to say providing for the basics of life is crucial in order to enable citizens to be engaged in the broader challenge of providing for their security.”
Yet while the Euro Zone countries are sorting through ways to navigate the economic crisis, the crisis zone around Europe has heated up.
General Chief-of-Staff of the Kuwaiti Armed Forces Lieutenant General Abdulrahman Al-Othman and Italian Chief of Staff of Military Aviation Lieutenant General Pasquale Preziosa meeting in Kuwait, December 2013.
And because the crises which Italy and Europe are facing are not as “geopolitically focused as during the Cold War, there is a difficulty to identify the nature of the threats and how best to respond.
There is threat confusion and lack of clarity which create challenges for leaders to define the most effective ways to approach dealing with external crises while dealing with the fundamental economic one.”
“Instability is increasing around us; and questions we thought were closed open up again. We do have a financial crisis, but the instability which threatens us also affects that crisis and needs to be dealt with as well.”
Preziosa characterized the nature of the crises facing Europe and the industrial democracies in three key ways.
First, “strategic surprise is becoming a norm for governments to deal with.
This makes the preparation for dealing with the strategic surprise difficult and assembling the means and shaping an approach also difficult.”
Second, there is a global quality to the threat facing the industrial democracies.
“Terrorists do not travel on the passport of the country for whom they really fight. They use those passports to generate resources and ways to promote their ideologies. Obviously, terrorist organizations need money, recruits and arms. And they operate from territories, so that although global they operate locally. And when they operate locally that is when they provide the targets against we can act.”
He added: “Terrorists act without boundaries; we need to not be constrained by boundaries either in dealing with them as a threat. Sharing of information and intelligence is important for the industrial democracies.”
Third, he also focused on what he believed was the relative agility of the information networks of terrorists.
“Western democracies have a ponderous intelligence gathering and assessment system; terrorists do not; and they act rapidly based on what they believe to be the relevant information or intelligence. This means that we have a gap as well with regard to having the core information and intelligence within which to act rapidly.”
It is also the case that Western democracies will react not act.
“We are not proactive; we respond to threats when they become very evident. This puts a premium on the ability to act quickly when the threat is recognized and the need to respond agreed upon.
Put in other terms, proactive mindset would allow one to shape forces and power approaches to provide for a shaping capability to prevent crisis; but by and large, democracies naturally follow a process that does not allow for that kind of proactive engagement.”
The Approach
Strategic surprise coupled with the difficulty for democracies to shape strategic environments or to react quickly means when decisions are taken to engage force, those forces need to be able operate rapidly. And the need to operate with coalition partners, to share risk and cost, also places a challenge on national forces in engaging against threats.
Preziosa argued that the central role of air and space power really flowed from the nature of the operational environment embodied in the above paragraph.
“Only air and space power have the flexibility, speed and reach” to enable democratic leaders to insert force rapidly enough to make a difference.
By air and space power the General clearly meant both the nature of these capabilities in and of themselves, and as enablers of air, ground, and sea power.
“Air and space power are the backbone of shaping the forces able to operate effectively enough to deal with the strategic surprises and rapidly of threat developments which we face.”
An example of the nature of the threat, which he provided, was that of ISIS. When he visited Kuwait earlier this year, ISIS had about 3,000 followers. He was told that this threat was capable of being handled by normal military means. But rapidly ISIS has become more than 30,000 followers and is making military impacts with equipment seized in Iraq and leveraging the money of seized oil fields.
All of this happened rapidly and requires creating a response capability in the flow of events AFTER the terrorists have passed crucial mass.
With regard to terrorists, Preziosa argued: “if you can avoid them one should do so, but when in contact with them there is no alternative but to neutralize them. Committed terrorists are not going to be drawn from their cause.”
But the use of force against “surprises” needs to be calibrated with a clear understanding of goals and objectives, and what can be achieved.
Conflict termination concepts need to be married with the use of force.
“We need to think through what is realistic for us to accomplish. We need a clear sense of what end states are realistic and those that are not. And the complete elimination of terrorism, as an assigned end state for air power intervention, is beyond our means. What we can do is to reduce the direct threat and to that with attacking them as they become mobile and work to seize the territory from which they hope to operate, govern or leverage economic assets, like oil fields.”
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The Way Ahead
Dealing with strategic surprise and 21st century threats means that we need to have forces up to and relevant to the challenges.
“To be effective today democratic political and diplomatic power needs to have instruments which are flexible, agile, credible and scalable.”
Because of the limits of economic resources, shaping and sustaining such forces is a challenge, which means that we have to think in terms of cost effectiveness when working with coalition partners.
“The cost of a fully modern 21st century force that democracies need is beyond even the reach of the richest industrial democracy. We need to share in terms of capabilities, and in order to do so we must ensure that these forces can work effectively together.”
Modernization is essential and Preziosa sees somewhat similarly to Air Marshal Brown of the RAAF, the opportunity to leverage the F-35 as a transformation asset.
“We need to think beyond the F-35 as a platform, and to think of the overall system capabilities, and in this case the system of systems within which modern combat forces are designed, built and employed.”
And the heart of the transformation is to achieve “an effective C4ISR enterprise within which the forces can operate with information superiority. Because we deploy only relatively late, our forces need to be much more effective in being linked together to provide for information superiority.”
For Preziosa, an effective C4ISR enabled force is one, which can be used “to intervene as rapidly as possible with the greatest effectiveness possible.
Frank Kendall greeted by Italian Air Force COS Preziosa at the F-35 Cameri Facility.
By so doing, one can reduce the escalation of the conflict.
Airpower provides crucial tools to control the fire and reduce its threat to spread (deterrence nature of air power).”
He highlighted the important of fusing information and delivering appropriate information to the right level of combat action or decision-making.
For Preziosa, again not unlike the RAAF leadership, the F-35 needed to be part of what he called “a fifth generation communication architecture” capability whereby the air enabled ground and naval forces can work more effectively with one another to concentrate on opponents Centre of Gravities, i.e. “strategic surprises” which are coming in the pop-up strategic environment of the 21st century.
The Chief of Staff used a simple analogy to explain the situation.
“You secure your apartment against those who would seek to steal from you. You do not know the name of the burglars or what means they will use, you just know they might come. And you need to prepare your defense.”
In both the office meeting and the seminar, Preziosa underscored the importance of air and space power to enable the democracies to defend their interests in dealing with “strategic surprises,” but there is a clear need for leaders to define what can and cannot be achieved by such actions.
In other words, he underscored what I like to call the necessity for fairly clearly defined conflict termination strategies and managing expectations of what can be achieved through a military operation. In effect, he highlighted that we can attenuate a threat from terrorists, not completely eliminate it; but do nothing will only see the threat become much larger.
“And to act too late, or too little will hardly save resources for then we will have to shape a much larger response or choose to do nothing at all.”
Logo of the European Air Group.
Working within a coalition is central for Italy. Indeed, with regard to the F-35, it is as a coalition aircraft that the Italian Air Force and Navy are players in the program and with a clear expectation that allies will share in the sustainment of coalition fleets, as it will operate in future contingencies.
Preziosa highlighted two other important sharing efforts in Europe, which are designed to enhance capability. “The point of sharing is not simply to share; it is to shape a greater capability to act and with greater and more effective means.”
The first is Italian participation in the European Air Group, located at High Wycombe in the United Kingdom.
Here Italian Air Force aircraft – such as the Tornados and Eurofighters – work to be more effectively integrate in coalition operations, as happened with the UK and Italy operating from an Italian base during operations during what the US called Odyssey Dawn.
The second is Italy entering into the European Air Transport Command (EATC) and committed to EPRC (European Personnel Recovery Centre).
“We are contributing our transport aircrafts and new tankers to the EATC”. Besides Italy is engaged with EAG nations to establish a Personnel Recovery (PR) Centre, based in Italy, in 2015. This centre is addressing a very important operational function (PR), in order to foster joint-combined interoperability through common approaches and common procedures, under a lead service approach. I believe those are simple and tangible examples of what is commonly known as pooling & sharing initiatives.”
The insignia of the European Air Transport Command.
Italy also performs a number of NATO air policing functions, which are not widely recognized outside of Italy. With Greece, Italy provides air policing for Albania. For Slovenia, Italy provides air protection for that country. And Italy provides rotational support for the Iceland and Baltic air policing missions as well.
As we deal with “strategic surprises” in the period ahead, the industrial democracies will face the challenges of force modernization, effectively use of forces, shaping more capability for effective conflict termination and better coalition interoperability and collaborative con-ops.
These are major challenges but central ones to the way ahead as viewed from the perspective of the Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force.
He concludes that “airpower needs broader and more effective public support; we need to do a better job of explaining the direct relationship between effective airpower – notably in coalition – and the ability of the democracies to defend our values and way of life.”
Background:
European Air Group (EAG)
The European Air Group (EAG) is the only independent Air-minded organization in Europe. It comprises the Air Forces of 7 European nations: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom. The EAG has links with many other organizations and nations.
The EAG undertakes projects and studies in order to identify realistic ways to improve the interoperability between member nations.
On 1st September 2010 a new chapter in the book of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was opened, as the EATC was inaugurated in Eindhoven, the Netherlands.
The establishment of this new multinational command represents a significant step on the way to pooling and sharing national military assets and truly marks an unprecedented level of European defense cooperation.
The Netherlands, Belgium, France and Germany have put major parts of their air transport- and air-to-air refueling fleets under the operational control (OPCON) of the EATC. On 22 November 2012 Luxembourg officially joined the EATC, Spain followed on 03 July 2014.
Now the missions of almost 150 aircraft are planned, tasked and controlled out of Eindhoven. In addition to that the EATC runs a nationally defined level of responsibility for aircrew training, coordination of training and exercise objectives as well as the harmonization of appropriate air transport regulations of the participating nations. The overall objective is to manage the scarce resource air transport as effectively and efficiently as possible.
It was an open secret for some time now, until Italian Air Chief Lieutenant General Pasquale Preziosa sent a formal letter asking for Italy to join the European Air Transport Command. The letter marks the first formal step on Italy’s way to become a full member of the EATC organization – in accordance of the “EATC Enlargement Principles and Procedure”.
LTG Preziosa mentioned that “a broader Pooling & Sharing implementation of Air Transport and Air to Air Refueling assets in Europe would be beneficial to the whole (European Air Transport-) community, bringing together national assets, human resources and valuable expertise”.
As a next step, the Italian AF Staff will present in a formal written document to the MATraC – the Airchiefs committee of the EATC Participating Nations – Italy’s Air Transport, Aero-medical Evacuation & Air-to-Air Refueling (AT, AE & AAR) capabilities and the Italian Air Force’s added value in order to justify a possible membership to the EATC. Based on this document and the recommendation of the Commander of the EATC the MATraC will decide whether to start the assessment process.
The assessment will help to evaluate the fulfillment of requirements and criteria. After a successful assessment the MATraC then may establish a working group to negotiate the detailed terms of accession. Finally, subsequent to the formal invitation of the Candidate State to join the EATC, signatures of legal documents will conclude the accession process and future Italian personnel will take up duty within EATC premises and assets.
The first ever European Air-to-Air Refueling Training (EART14) taking place at the Eindhoven Air Base in the Netherlands starts today. Between 31 March and 11 April aircraft and crews from Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands will participate in realistic Air-to-Air Refueling training scenarios within a modern air combat environment.
EART14 offers participants a unique opportunity to plan and execute missions within a multinational framework. The exercise has been developed by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in close cooperation with the European Air Transport Command (EATC) and the Dutch armed forces.
Critical force enabler
As most transport and fighter aircraft are not able to cover intercontinental distances in just one sortie, Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) is a critical force enabler and is a requirement for sustained air combat operations. Despite the importance of AAR, European armed forces have suffered from both a lack of equipment and a lack of interoperability in this field. This has led EU countries to rely heavily on US assets in past operations.
In 2011, Defence Ministers tasked the EDA to propose measures to mitigate the capability gap in European military AAR-matters. The EDA has since developed and implemented a global approach to tackling the shortfall of AAR capabilities, which involves increasing the overall AAR capacity, reducing fragmentation of the fleet, and optimizing the use of assets.
This approach was endorsed by the European Council in December 2014, where Heads of State and Government approved the Agency’s roadmap on AAR.
Dedicated AAR scenarios
Eindhoven Air Base will be used as Tanker Forward Operating Base (FOB) during the exercise period. The exercise will be done in cooperation with the Dutch Frisian Flag 2014 to provide crews with the opportunity to take part in dedicated AAR scenarios embedded in a highly recognized fighter exercise. EART14 will be developed gradually with exercises becoming increasingly complex in nature over the two weeks, starting from single ship missions and evolving to become part of COMAO missions within Frisian Flag.
Background
The EDA has a comprehensive plan to improve the AAR capabilities in Europe. Mandated by Defence Ministers, EDA is engaged in four work strands in this domain: short-term gap filling; optimization of existing assets; optimization of AAR capacity offered by the future A400M fleet and enhancement of Europe’s strategic tanker capability by creating a multinational Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) capability.
As part of this global approach, the EDA, Italy and the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) jointly organized the first collective European Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR) clearance trial on the Italian KC767 in September 2013. This enhanced AAR capabilities, as technical and operational clearances are mandatory to provide or receive fuel and they are thus a prerequisite to interoperability in multinational operations. Aircraft from France and Sweden participated in the campaign to obtain technical and operational AAR clearances against the Italian strategic airlift tanker.
The photos in the slideshow were provided by the Italian Air Force.
The first shows the COS in an Italian Eurofighter. The rest of the photos highlight the Italian 767 tanker.
[1] This is how the COS of the RAAF put it in a presentation on May 29, 2014:
I intend to release Plan Jericho, the RAAF transformation plan, in early 2015. It will guide our force transformation, enabled by our new 5th Gen capabilities, over the next decade.
I will also be engaging closely with industry in the development of the plan.
It is the technology that is being developed by industry that affords us the opportunity to transform our force. It is essential that we partner with industry to explore how we can maximize the opportunity offered by 5thGen systems. I ask you to consider how you can work with us, not just at the platform level … but in helping us think through and design our overall future force using the 5th Gen capabilities you develop and will help us sustain in the future.”
As Admiral Nimitz confronted the last century’s challenges he concluded a core lesson for this century’s Pacific warriors:
“Having confronted the Imperial Japanese Navy’s skill, energy, persistence, and courage, Nimitz identified the key to victory: ‘training, TRAINING and M-O-R-E T-R-A-I-N-I-N-G.’ as quoted in Neptunes’s Inferno, The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal (James D. Hornfischer)”
The budgetary pressures on training will only impede combat success and put warriors at needless risk.
It is hard enough to fight and win; it is even more difficult when training gets cut to the bone and threatens to take away a core combat advantage which a well trained force has compared to opponents who are not as well trained.
It is also the case that the pilots and maintainers of today’s and tomorrow’s force are flying more complex aircraft, and in the case of the Navy Super Hornets and then F-35Cs.
This requires significant proficiencies, which go beyond simply being a competent “flyer” of an airplane; pilots are becoming key C2, ISR and strike assets all in one.
Clearly, training is crucial to dealing with the growth in complexity.
As General Hostage, the Commander of ACC, put it into a recent interview with us:
What we’re asking a young lieutenant to do in her first two or three years as a fighter pilot is so far beyond what they asked me to do in my first two to three years, it’s almost embarrassing.
The things we require of her, the things she has to be able to do, the complexity of the system that she operates are so much more taxing, and yet, they make it look easy. They’re really, really good.
Training, training, training comes to mind as a requirement for dealing with today’s and the coming air systems which are managed by the fighter combat managers in their cockpits.
It is also the case that politicians are requiring the execution of stringent Rules of Engagement for pilots in combat; this can only demand more training, not less.
The importance of training and its role in preparing a carrier strike package for see was highlighted in a recent interview with CDR (S) Jayson “Plato” Eurick, current Air Wing Training Officer, at Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fallon Naval Air Station.
During our visit to Fallon, it became very clear that the term training can confuse more than clarify.
Training sounds a bit like a nice to have preparatory drill, rather than what it is for the air power community – the shaping of core instincts for competent execution of missions.
Air Wing Training Slide from NSAWC Command Brief, July 2014
Plato put it well:
Training can be conveyed in a couple different ways, depending how you look at it.
The way we try to teach training is we work to the end state.
What is the end state right now?
For example, we have an air wing that’s coming through Air Wing Fallon here starting Monday.
They’re coming here for their four-week exercise.
In our training, we will convey to the air wing the importance of training, and that is not just daily routine training, I’m doing this, I’m doing that.
You are doing that training for a certain reason.
In this case look at what the USS Bush is doing.
That is what we will convey, the overall end state of what the training is going to eventually lead to.
And the mention of the USS Bush is not by accident.
Cdr. “Plato” Eurick after the SLD interview. Credit: SLD
What we learned from Plato was that the CAG on the USS Bush is in daily contact with Fallon to both provide input with regard to operations and their impact on preparing the next air wing out as well as to get help when needed with regard to altering tactics and training WHILE on deployment.
We discussed at greater length with the Commander of Fallon, Admiral Scott Conn and will circle back to this core point in that forthcoming interview.
Training is about getting ready for deployment and supporting deployment, which is certainly a broad concept of training.
We ensure that they (the air wing) get up to speed on all of the information that is currently taking place in theater.
We don’t train Air Wing Fallon for a specific theater or country, we give them a broad brushed training, but we ensure that they get the information that is coming directly back from the guys overseas, in this case, the USS Bush.
And then we train them.
Question: You have described the CAG talking regularly with Fallon. Is this largely a one-way transmission?
Plato: “It is highly interactive. It is daily. And we provide inputs when asked to improve tactics and training for ongoing operations.”
What Plato highlighted was that his team worked at the end of the workup cycle where the various elements of the air wing come together and prepare to execute the complex ballet at sea which is what a carrier air wing has to do to be successful. After a four week training period, the air wing then goes to its at sea pre deployment exercise and then on to deployment.
So Plato and his team are at the end of the preparatory cycle, so the ability to input the latest operational information is central to mission success.
A key element of the discussion with CDR Eurick was about the central importance of the training officer aboard a carrier.
Pilots are coming in throughout the period of deployment and the training officer is focused on the integration of the pilots cycling through into an integrated airwing.
The various components of the air wing train to the ARP (Advanced Readiness Program) prior to coming to work with Plato and his team.
The entire air wing comes to Fallon for what’s known as Air Wing Fallon Detachment.
That’s four weeks long, and that’s the program that I run and coordinate.
When they come here to Air Wing Fallon, this is the last real opportunity for the air wing to prepare for their sea deployment.
And this is both the first opportunity, and the last opportunity for the air wing to integrate and work together without the other strike group assets.
Up until this point, they’ve been working as five or six different units of excellence with regard to their respective platforms.
Question: How do you structure the four-week cycle?
Plato:
We start out week 1 and 2 which is kind of like the first quarter, second quarter, we’re getting the flow, feeling the other team out, and what we’re going to do.
We train the air wing on basic integration.
We teach these nine squadrons how to operate together as an air wing.
And it’s a learning process.
And now as we head into our week 3 and 4, basically, second half, we incorporate all of those lessons learned that have come back from overseas and theater.
For example, we incorporate lessons learned from the air wing deployed on the USS Bush and what they are telling us they are seeing over there, what they are doing.
We also seek feedback on what they were deficient in, and what they were very good at.
Question: When the four weeks are over, you then provide your evaluation to the CAG?
Plato:
We do.
After every phase, what I referred to as the first quarter, second quarter, third quarter, I as the air wing training officer, we get in a room with CAG, DCAG, NSAWC admiral, the deputy commanders here, the skipper here, Proton (CAPT (S) Kevin “Proton” McLaughlin, outgoing STRIKE CO, previous TOPGUN), all squadron COs and XOs, and I give them a phase debrief at the end of each one of their phases.
We tell them, here’s the areas where you’re good, but more importantly, here’s where you’re deficient.
This is where you need to focus further attention.
And then at the very end of the detachment, we’ll do a final debrief, and we’ll tell CAG, here’s where you guys are solid in the air wing, keep it up.
But here’s where you’re deficient, and this is what’s going on in theater, if you’re deficient in some of these areas, you need to focus your training on your integrated exercises, during COMPTUEX, focus in these areas because these are going to be your critical areas of concern when you go out on deployment in three months.
We will provide CAG with evaluation data throughout the Air Wing Fallon process.
Here are the targets you had assigned, and how many targets you actually destroyed.
These are the weapons you employed.
This is why you didn’t hit the target.
So we give CAG the information, and just tell him the areas NSAWC thinks that they’re deficient and need to work on, and then we let CAG make his own decision on how they did during Air Wing Fallon.
Question: Obviously training as we are discussing it here – the end state of going into preparation for combat – is crucial to mission success.
How do shortfalls like reduced flight hours affect the process?
Plato:
The guy who has been on combat deployment for nine months is comfortable because he’s been doing carrier operations.
The guy that has very little flight hours or flight time over the last six months during the first month or two of deployment, he’s not very comfortable doing carrier operations.
And it definitely raises the hair on the back of your neck.
And the longer you go, from being away from the ship, whether that’s due to reduced flight hours, shore duty, whatever, it takes a lot more time and money to get the pilot back up to speed where he is comfortable to get on or off the Carrier.
We need to be strike fighter pilots, fighter pilots, weapons officers, whatever it is.
You have to be very good at operating your sensors, the integration in the cockpit, the weapons that are onboard your aircraft.
But you can’t focus on that part of your training or your job until you are very good at the basics of flying the airplane.
You have to be comfortable flying the airplane, and operating all your button pushing, your takeoffs, your landings, all of that has to be second nature.
You have to be able to do that in your sleep because you need to be able to focus on the more advanced and complex systems in the airplane.
And when you don’t fly that airplane on a regular basis, even though a simulator can account for some of that time, but you got to be able to get into the air, and experience the effects of the airspeed, the Gs, you know, just the ground rush that’s associated with the airplane.
When you get to that point where you’re comfortable, and you’re doing that on a daily basis because you have flight hours, all of that basic stuff is second nature.
Now you can focus on more advanced and complex systems associated with the airplane.
Question: As you train to deploy, clearly the joint aspect is important as well. How do you factor that in?
Plato:
Once the Carrier goes out on deployment, yes, it is self-sustained, it is a global force wherever you want it, when you want it.
However, if you look at what’s going on, everything’s becoming joint integrated, e.g. Joint strike fighter.
Everything is going joint.
Air Wing Fallon training is now opened up to joint integration.
So when the air wing is here in Fallon, they do three weeks of strictly Navy air wing training.
And then the last week, we bring in joint assets to participate with the air wing during large force strikes.
So the Navy gets a look at how the Air Force does business.
The Air Force gets to look at how the Navy does business. I think communities are going to continue to evolve the more we interact and integrate with each other.
Editor’s Note: The video above shows the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) relieving USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) in the Arabian Gulf, 10/18/14 and is credited to Navy Media Content Services.
The Command brief describing the command and its role can be seen below:
In considering the future of airpower, the inevitable return of air to air combat faces US and allied pilots.
The uncontested skies of Afghanistan are not the definer of the future, but dealing with the dangers and threats from enemy defenses whether launched from the sea, the ground or operating in the sky is clearly on offer
But one really has to go back to the Vietnam War to appreciate fully what air-to-air combat is all about.
To gain a sense of what is entailed in this experience, Ed Timperlake, a Marine F-4 Pilot who flew out of Nam Phong Thailand AKA “The Rose Garden” led a discussion with Col. DeBellevue about his experiences and his thoughts about the foundational elements of successful air combat.
Chuck was a key victorious warrior in the last peer air-to-air combat engagements that the American Air Force was engaged in.
Chuck can tell all about his experiences, from command and control systems, crew coordination, situational awareness, electronic war, radars in the cockpit, weaponry, formations to see how air combat evolves to today.
This is not about simulation; this about real world experience.
“In 1972, DeBellevue became one of only five Americans to achieve flying ace status within the Vietnam War and the first Air Force Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) to earn ace status.
He was credited with a total of six MiG kills, the most earned by any U.S. aviator during the Vietnam War and is a recipient of the Air Force Cross.”
Captain and then Col. Chuck DeBellevue in his combat days in Vietnam. Credit: USAF
Question: How did you get to Vietnam and start your combat career?
Answer: Flying combat is not always easy. You’re never sure what you’re going to do until you get there.
And it is – well, you grow up pretty fast if you walk in as a young kid.
My experiences in fighters – well, before I got to Southeast Asia, I was assigned to 335th squadron and flying F-4s at Seymour Johnson. And I spent 18 months doing that and I got pretty good. Because of what I had done there – and I was a brand new captain when I left – because of what I’d done there, one of the flight commanders from Udorn, and the Triple Nickel squadron wrote the commander, a guy named Joe Kittenger to tell him that I was a keeper and don’t trade me; make sure I stay in the squadron.
And because of that I did.
Otherwise, all my buddies who were in a 13th squadron – the other squadron at Udorn and they wanted to trade me for another guy when I arrived at Udorn with. We both had about the same experience about 18 months in the airplanes and roughly 556 hundred hours.
Question: You were very proficient in the F-4 before you went to Vietnam?
Answer I was.
Question: What is the difference between intense training and intense combat?
You go into combat, you’re prepared, you train, which is obviously important. But what’s your first experience about – the training is nice, but combat’s a little bit different.
Answer: Well, at the time I was in the F-4 as a new guy, we weren’t allowed to fly any air combat against other airplanes. You could only fly against F-4s.
F-4D Phantom II marked as 555th TFS 66-7463, flown by Ritchie and DeBellevue for their first of 4 kills together and Ritchie’s 5th kill which was DeBellevue’s 4th killAn F-4D owned by the Collings Foundation taxis at Selfridge ANGB, Michigan in May 2005. The plane has the markings of the Steve Ritchie / Chuck DeBellevue fighter from the Vietnam War.Credit: Wikepedia
Well, you get pretty good at that because it’s not the airplanes that are making a difference; it’s the pilots.
And you don’t have to worry about the airplane because it’s just like yours.Well, you get pretty good at that because it’s not the airplanes that are making a difference; it’s the pilots. And you don’t have to worry about the airplane because it’s just like yours.
You put another type of airplane in there, now you got a different situation. You’re not just flying against the pilot; you’re flying against a different fighter with different capabilities.
You have to understand where your jet is, the better airplane. And where you have to be careful, when you get into an area where he’s the best, his airplane can beat yours.
So now you got a different equation there. And it makes a big difference knowing his airplane, what he’s good at, and then knowing what kind of pilot he is.
Question: When you went into that situation, did you feel that you’re getting your information about say the MiG-21 or your peer adversary was it word of mouth; was it intelligence? How did you as an aircrew understands the nature and the dynamic advantages and disadvantages of flying against a very capable aircraft was it just trial and error?
Answer: It’s a combination.
One, we know about the jets. The MiG-21s, the MiG-17s, MiG-19s, they’re capable. They’re old but still very capable and flown by the right pilot were very deadly. That came from a combination of Intel, self-study, and then flying in North Vietnam, in the environment.
Initial Combat
Question: Chuck, can I start kind of you’re now with Triple Nickel but you get fragged – I guess that’s what you guys called it. Right. You have a mission. When you guys all went out as a squadron were all the airplanes all up and out? How was the material readiness of the aircraft that you flew into combat?
Did the systems all work or did a lot go down?
The general environment of getting a strike package airborne and into a combat engagement how did you feel about the maintenance the aircraft – how did that work for you?
Answer: When I first got over there, all the maintenance belongs to the op squadron commander so everybody worked for the old man – the squadron commander. And things were pretty good.
Now, when I first got over there, it was mainly an air-to-ground war. What I did in the states was a lot of air-to-ground. So I was very comfortable in an airplane doing that.
I arrived in country at about 1:00-1:30 in the afternoon. I walked into the squadron, introduced myself to the squadron commander, and then walked in and talked to the scheduler. He needed to know who I was if he doesn’t know you don’t get on the schedule. And the only question he asked was how much time do you have in the airplane because all coming in were so brand new out of training.
And here I was instead of having 80 hours in the jet; I had 600 hours in the jet.
And he looked at his watch and said damn, the afternoon we have already have the schedule, you can’t fly today.
And I said well, I wasn’t planning on it. Where do I process in? He said are you getting paid? I said yes. You got a year if you live.
So I was in the air the next morning.
And that was the first of December, my first flight. By the end of December I had 28 combat missions; I had seven missions or eight missions in North Vietnam; I had taken a flight check on– we had to take a combat readiness check on the tenth mission.
Well I took mine on my 25th mission. I just couldn’t find a seat. And that was Christmas morning.
At that point I was certified in the airplane to do anything we could do and also certified as an instructor.
Question: Chuck, when you planned your strikes and then launched, was it four-ship, two-ship – how did you all think through the process of formations?
Answer: Our primary formation is a four-ship formation, so the air-to-air; in fact everything we did was four ships. If it was a big strike, a big push in the North Vietnam, then we flew in four ships.
The strikers did that with the bombs. The escorts that escorted the strikers in were in four ships. Us as the air-to-air guys always flew in four ships.
The only time we went in two ships was at night guarding the Buf (B-52).
We used two-ships doing that.
Question: I don’t want to jump ahead of you. I will walk through the whole process of the mission but once an engagement started, did the formations break up and then kind of develop mutual support by just finding another F-4 to team up with or how did you guys handle the complexities of a swirling really confusing engagement process?
Did your formations break up and you just grabbed a wingman?
Answer: In flying our formations we found that early on everybody could shoot. Everybody tried to and nobody checked six. And we were getting hammered. We were starting to lose guys.
We changed our formation. We went to a Navy loose duce type formation in a four-ship. One and three were the shooters. One was a primary shooter; two was supporting three was a shooter and two and four checked six.
They went on a welded wing position – fighting wing about 1,500 feet back. And their job was to make sure nobody got between him and me.
And so we went to the Navy system.
We hard-scheduled our crews and consistently married them up. For about eight weeks we had the same eight guys flying with us. We didn’t have to worry about them. We knew exactly what they were going to do. They knew what we were going to do. It made life a lot easier and it made our combat flying a lot better.
Question: So using the Navy formation philosophy it was useful to have kind of the services reinforcing each other in combat learning from this point of view?
Answer: It was. Now, you have to realize we were doing air traffic management (OJT) in air-to-air.
The older guys had experience, especially if they went to fighter weapon school in the Air Force, but for us young guys, I’ve never seen another airplane until I saw a MiG-21 behind me and I wasn’t smart enough to be scared, at least not in the solo fight.
But usually when we went into a fight everybody was supporting us. The lead would fly in and we had a code word, we called it “honeymooning, “ which meant press on your six is clear, I’ve got you
Question: Chuck, as you flew the engagement, when you’re going into a potential hostile engagement, there was always a discussion on the way in which the Air Force and the Navy even used command and control.
You got “bogey dope” to the your headset. But your radars would also show your aggressor coming at you whereas the opponent was originally slaved to a ground control system but indications were that the Vietnamese tended to break away from that a little bit.
Could you discuss that dynamic?
Answer: The more experienced Vietnamese pilots had more experience and more liberty. The young kids did not.
So that was one of the keys. When you merged with them, if it felt very aggressive, it was an old guy. If weren’t very aggressive it was an inexperienced pilot.
Combat Tool Sets, Tactics and Instincts
Question: When you all were flying in was “com jamming” and you’re on the scope and you also got your head out of the cockpit. It’s a very demanding workload, and you’re also getting information from ground control.
How did that all work for you?
Answer: We worked with Red Crown. USS Chicago and Chief Knowles was a controller– we knew him by voice.[ref] “On PIRAZ duty for the May 1972, aerial mining of Hai Phong harbor, USS Chicago’s air controllers guided Navy and Air Force fighter pilots to intercepts downing 12 MiG fighters while a RIM-8 Talos missile destroyed a 13th MiG fighter.” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PIRAZ[/ref]
But we didn’t take close control.
They didn’t control us like they would an interceptor; they functioned as another sensor.[ref] “When Operation Linebacker began on 10 May 1972, Disco was one of two principal GCI radars used by U.S. forces,[N 1] although it continued to be handicapped by poor radio communications. In addition, its slow turning radar limited its value as a controller of fighters during MiG engagements, while the size of USAF raids during Linebacker nearly saturated its capabilities. However the improvements made in the systems since 1968 enabled the radar operators to distinguish MiG types, and a color code system for them entered the air operations vernacular: “Red Bandits” (Mig-17s); “White Bandits” (MiG-19s); “Blue Bandits” (MiG-21)s, and “Black bandits” (MiGs low on fuel).” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_EC-121_Warning_Star[/ref]
Usually when I flew I had a combat tree bird, which was a modification to the radar on the old F-4D that allowed us to interrogate the MiG-21. And that worked in standby.
So I could turn the radar to standby and I would have been able to get information. And for long-range work, that’s what I did.
As we got in closer I’d turn the radar – I flipped the radar to operate and affect the control of the intercept.
Question: Chuck, when you were engaging could you discuss the issue of BVR shots (Beyond Visual Range) versus VID (Visual Identification) shots.
What was the quality assurance that allowed a missile leaving the aircraft that you really did have an enemy bogey targeted?
How did you guys handle that?
Answer: We had three different MiG caps and it all centered on time of the strike.
We would send in a four-ship 15 minutes early to sweep the skies before the strikers came in.
At that point, since we were the first guys into the area, or wherever we were going, we had a high level of confidence that anything we saw was enemy.
And if I picked up something that came back as an enemy return I didn’t have to talk to anybody. That was my clearance to shoot.
We shot BVR, yes but it was with a high level of confidence in what we had.
And during my first combat mission we shot BVR and got three kills.
Question: I assume that they were all Sparrow shots.
You didn’t shoot the Sidewinder BVR in those days.
They were all Sparrows.
Answer: The range of the Aim-9 (Sidewinder) was limited if, you couldn’t see the target it did not have the range. You had to be in pretty close – or a lot closer and to use always in visual range.
But for the Aim-7 (Sparrow) yes, my first kill actually we shot BVR, and the guy saw the missile.
One of the bad things about the A7 was that it smoked. One of the good things about the A7 was it smoked.
If he’s in range– if he’s just outside of range turning, shoot the first missile at him. He has to react to it.
He is going to react – now instead of being one aircraft you’re now two. And he’s going to commit to that missile. The next missile is in range.
Or if for example he’s at max range, and all you’re seeing is contrails, and he looks under his cockpit, which is what happened, his contrail did a 180. But at max range we hadn’t even seen him.
All we saw was the contrail and it did a 180 and he put the missile out of range.
It’s good and it’s bad.
Question: As you got into this situation and say you got a merged plot, would you all blow through that or reverse turn back into the fight?
What were your tactics as they started to merge into the process where now you have VID problems and you have crew coordination problems?
You have the whole instantaneous few seconds to make life and death decisions.
Was it tactics; was it instincts?
What worked for you?
Answer: Yes it was; you got it.
It’s tactics, it was instincts, and it was crew coordination.
It was knowing the situation.
We were intercepting – we were – going into Hanoi we were early so we were just killing time most of the ways. Two guys – the strikes were in Hanoi. Two guys called with “fire lights.”-aircraft on fire.
One of the things you don’t want to do is to draw attention so I just got the SAR (Search and rescue) ready, hear a fire light, get the rescue forces moving.
We had Blue (MIG-21) bandits 30 miles northeast of Hanoi and 30 miles east of Hanoi. They’re heading in for the kill. So we start heading east. And we ended up 35 miles southwest of Hanoi and all of a sudden, DISCO – our controller on DISCO says you’re merged.
So on his scope, he can’t help us anymore. The F-4 is easy to see. If you’re not [in afterburner it smokes bad. So we’re moving around, there are eight of us for about two minutes with heads on swivels looking for two little-bitty MiGs – at least we thought there were two.
We turned south and at that point I had a premonition that they were in front of us. Didn’t know for sure, but I had a premonition and I looked to the left. Being in the back seat, you got to look around the front seat.
So I looked at about 11:00 from the airplane and there was a black fly speck on a white cloud. That was our visual. I called it out to Steve. He changed a little left to align with that – I think he saw it about the same time I did. Our announcement to the flight that we were getting ready to fight was when we blew the tanks off the airplane and jumped out in front.
It didn’t take long when you’re closing at 1,200 miles an hour. You’re close with this guy. We come close aboard with the MIG. It’s a MiG-21. It’s a brand new shiny MiG.
And as we cross, instead of turning in behind us like we would have done to get to -He’s got to see my engines to shoot.
Instead of turning into us like we would have done, he made a level turn away from us.
Now the F-4 is not an F-16. It is not a nimble airplane and you’re low on gas. We always were low on gas.
You can roll the airplane over to 135 degrees at 500 knots, put the stick in your lap and 17 seconds later you’re doing 500 knots in the opposite direction, if you know how to fly it well.
But we did not do that because we knew this guy didn’t fly solo. This was a classic Soviet tactic. I read his book. He was the bait. His job was to get us to follow him.
And then the shooter comes by behind us and shoots us now.
We knew that and we waited.
And pretty soon here comes the second MiG, turns away from us on a level turn. Well, the Delta wing, which is essentially what a MiG-21 is, bleeds air speed in a level turn.
So he’s slowing down in this tight turn. We cut the circle. Instead of having to go all the way around the circle to get in – had he turned into us, we’d now cut the circle.
Ritchie and Debellevue Aces
And the radar has to have two seconds once you lock onto the target. Settle down and have good data. It takes more than two seconds for the missiles to get programmed. If you fire that Aim-7 at two-and-a-half seconds from lock-on it has no brain. So you’ve got to be careful about timing.
Timing was extremely important in a fight like that because timing has no meaning. The planes are going so fast, you’re so full of adrenaline; time doesn’t mean anything.
As soon as we locked onto the guy, what you heard from in the back seat was 1001, 1002, 1003, and I screamed 1005. And Steve fired two missiles.
The first one cut the airplane in two and burned both ends. This was the shooter.
And the second missile went through the fireball.
At that point we rolled out of the fight because usually if it was a two-ship and one of them blew up the other one did roll out of the fight and left.
This guy stayed – he’s now bring guns to bare on our number four guy, Tommy Piesel . So Tommy calls out that’s he on him.
We come back into the fight. We ended up 4,000 feet from the MiG. We fired one A7 at him, it exited our wingtip area and I think the missile motor have still been burning when it hit him.
It hit him right behind the cockpit, cut him in two and burned both ends. That flight took one minute and 29 seconds.
At that point they would not commit the two MiGs coming down from the north to help out and two coming up from the south to help out.
We found out later that these are green bandits, red, white, and blue, a 17, 19, 21; a black bandit was bingo bandit was an ace. We were going to make them aces. These guys had come together every day for a month to meet us. And they trained.
Question: What you’re really describing is a peer-to-peer air war.
They were as accomplished and had – different type of aircraft with wing loading and all that – but it was peer-to-peer every – even though it was a third-world country, this is a first world peer-to-peer air war.
Answer: The MiGs they were using were brand new MiG-21Js, which were very capable.
Question: And they were as good as us from an equipment point of view?
Answer: They were.
The Air-to-Air War
Question: You said when you first got there, you were doing air-to-ground missions and you trained a lot on air-to-ground missions.
When did this become an air-to-air battle for you?
How long – in December you were describing your robust combat December, which is largely air-to-ground.
When did this transition for you?
Answer: On the 16th of April.
Now we were shooting – we were flying intercept missions.
We were flying escort for the BUFs and staying on air-to-air alert, but there wasn’t a lot of action.
For us to escort the bus they’re up at 38 or 40,000 feet flying at 230 or 240 indicated, and we’re down at probably 20,000 feet flying at 350 and “S” turning on them so we keep air speed on the airplane.
And as soon as a Bufs went into a turn, it was its own; we couldn’t cut the turn unless you planned the S turns so you could– you were heading in that direction. They never told us when they were turning so we didn’t know.
Around the 16th of April when President Nixon put us back in North Vietnam, that’s when we started our integrated strikes and got better after that as we became more experienced.
But it was around the 16th of April 1972 the air war heated up again and we started attacking targets in North Vietnam.[ref] April 1972 was the Easter Offensive when the North Vietnamese tried the first time to come south[/ref]
Question: Not only did it evolve back into an air-to-air engagements but you also had a ground-to-air threats, SA2s slamming through your flight, and maybe even “triple A” reaching you if you got low enough.
Could you describe the complexity that that both AA and Sam threats added to your mission and your need for SA, the stuff coming off the ground to kill you just like a MiG-21 slashing out of the sun or the cloud.
Answer: They had a very good integrated air defense system that included triple A, and SAMs. And if there were MiGs in the area that included AAA or SAMs they recognized that didn’t want to get one of their own guys shot down.
But as soon as the MiGs flew out of the picture, then it’s a different story. The triple A – they used tracer in their guns so you could see that a little bit during the day.
At night it got scary.
Question: Chuck, did your raw gear and did your “tron” warfare (short for all electronic warfare capabilities) in those early days, useful both for a warning and in other ways such as disabling SA-2s and other missiles as far as a tracking solution?
Can you talk a little bit about that and what you had available in those days?
Answer: In the F-4 D model we had a 107. It provided good warning and it also saved my life a couple times.[ref] “There were two F-4Ds modified for the Wild Weasel mission under Project Wild Weasel IV-B. Both aircraft (65-657 and 65-660), were used to test the Bendix APS-107 Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW) system with an ER-142 panoramic receiver. Although the APS-107 gear was more sophisticated and accurate than the APR-25/-26 units and finally gave the (E)F-4 the ability to use the AGM-78 Standard ARM, it proved unreliable and erratic under combat conditions – at least for the Wild Weasel mission.
Several standard F-4Ds were used to test other programs relative to the Wild Weasel mission. One aircraft (65-0644) was used to test the AGM-78 Standard ARM missile, and several F-4Ds were used to perfect the AGM-65 Maverick missile”
Answer: On the raw gear, it was yes. Audio gave me a rattlesnake in my headset.
If the missile was in the air the raw gear itself would start flashing at you.
And then we had a scope and if it was a missile in the air, you’d get a moving break in the strobe.
Question: All of this was coming into your eyes and ears. And then did you have to physically do something in a cockpit to activate any kind of countermeasures or was it just visual – calls to make turns break hard, break – how did you handle the engagement process?
How did the airplane handle it?
How did the “trons” handle it?
Answer: We usually kept our jamming pods in standby. There were repeater pods and they would talk if they heard anything. I didn’t want anybody to know where I was. So we kept them in standby.
We had an occasion to go up to Yen Bai about 70 miles north of Hanoi. We used that as a holding point because Intel said there were no SAM sites there so you could see – on a clear day you could see the river.
One night, there was loop in the river that you could see it pretty easy. So we used to use that as our holding fix. And we loosened up the formation a little bit for me to kill ten minutes. So we loosened up the formation in this holding pattern and as soon as you rolled out going away the raw gear lit up – when I was sitting down in the cockpit doing something – probably planning on the next moves into Hanoi.
And all of a sudden I got a rattlesnake in my headset, raw gear was flashing, and instead of looking up I reached down and turned both jammers from standby to on as I’m looking up.
And had I done it the other way around looking up first I wouldn’t have been here, in between me and three, and there was just about enough room to put a missile between us.
It was an SA2; and that missile was followed by his buddy. And you know how things slow down in combat–Well, I could see their designation on the side of the missile. I couldn’t read it but I could see it.
Question: Are you saying you’re over an area that Intel said that there were no active SAMs?
Answer: Yes but they had mobile SAMs back then. They moved two mobile SAM sites in the bay area and they locked them optically and kept them close to the ground. The missile is non-guided for the first six seconds.
After that the booster falls off and then the antenna is now able to receive signals. And at that point, they fished them up into us. And at that point they were right under us too.
But the decision time was in nanoseconds.
Question: And that made the difference between life and death and it was the sequence in how your warning came. You did the right thing.
By the way, is the jamming pod airframe limited? It didn’t hurt your flight performance or was it something that you guys debated carrying?
Answer: We didn’t care what these limits were on it.
Question: It went with the airplane.
Answer: The guys that dropped chaff– and some of the guys in the squadron they would go in and “drop” chaff bombs. They were in pods but you didn’t drop them. When you wanted to drop chaff you’d open up orifices in the front and the back of the pod and just the air would just come through and take out all the chaff.
So the guys were walking up to the jets we were told the limits on the pods are 3Gs and 500 knots or something like that. Only half the pods came home.
The rest of them got yanked off the airplanes.
Question: You had to do what you do.
Answer: In combat? YES- Back on my first combat mission, we came out of Hanoi – chased out of Hanoi by the 21Js we figured out later, and we were above 1,000 miles an hour.
Last time I looked at the airstream indicator we were passing 850. The limit on the airplane was 714.
We were just clearing the trees and the plane was so hot we couldn’t touch – I couldn’t touch the sides of it. And you didn’t have to look at the airspeed and computer to listen to the shrill noise as we cut through the air.
The Combat Learning CurveL The Key Role of the Ready Room
Question: Could you describe the combat learning curve for the pilots and the combat crew?
Can you discuss the importance of the ready room and the pilots talking to each other to adapt tactics and training?
How important is that?
Answer: One of the things we noticed is if they got a kill, they always flew the next day. They had done something right. If they got a kill, we’d always fly with the A team the next day.
If we got a kill, you could send the B team in because they’re going to sit down and try to figure out what the hell went wrong – even if the only thing that went wrong was they took off.
I think the ready learning is crucial. I don’t think we have that as much today. It’s over a beer, usually, talking about what happened and how to make it better – what mistakes were made – what things worked well – and that cross tell – since we were going to Hanoi every day, intel wouldn’t talk to us very much.
We might get shot down, you know. Most of our intel was self-discovered. Our cross tell between each other was very important to keeping everybody up to speed on what was going on.
That all started, for me, when I started F-4 training at Davis-Monthan – because every Friday night, on a Friday afternoon, we’d have a flying safety meeting at the bar. That’s where we learned the comradery and the bonding that we acquired.
As a young nav going into the F-4, that’s where I learned about crew coordination and being part of a crew – because I had a student front-seater who spent three and a half years in the pit of the F-4. I had to be close to him because I had to learn all of his techniques – because that’s all he understood.
Then I had to learn the book answers to pass the test, which is – might be why I did so well over there, because I had adapted all that to Chuck DeBellevue’s way of flying the airplane.
I think the camaraderie, the cross tells – and the ready rooms – the bar – you might think, “You’re just getting drunk” – you’re not. You’re going over there – it’s a bunch of very boisterous, very aggressive guys talking and learning from one another.
Question: What we discovered when were at Yuma is that the F-35B pilots are working with the F-35A pilots at Nellis exactly this way – how should we fly the plane?
How do we do air-to-air?
How do we do air-to-ground?
These are the guys who are going to shape this new fleet – not the non-aviators inside the beltway.
Answer: Having flown the F-35 sim just a couple times, I was impressed at how easy that airplane was to land on a ship. Even hovering in the Marine Corps version I found was extremely easy. Granted the sim doesn’t give that ability to kill yourself, but it’s a good learning environment.
One of the things that Sims can’t simulate is the possibility of dying. That’s when push comes to shove, it’s a good procedural trainer, but in the end game, if you don’t have the cojones to go against the enemy in a gray, dense air defense environment – where your chances of getting shot down are 100%, and you do that day after day, you got to have that perception of the ability to understand what fear is – to understand how the adrenaline affects you, because it will.
When they fire a SAM at you, what are you going to do – freeze?
You do that, and you’re dead. You got to look at the missile. If it’s a dot on your canopy, it’s yours. You got to do something. If it’s moving on your canopy, you can relax – it’s not yours. That’s hard to train.
Question: I think the point is that we’re going from simulation to actual operations – and the good news for the country is that those B pilots are going to Japan – those A pilots are going to Japan – and they’ll be flying missions in the Pacific. I think they can find some bogies out there.
Answer: There’ll be plenty of them. I’m not sure if they have enough airplanes to focus to the Pacific, but it’s one of those things.
Question: The point is that those pilots that are going to be teaching – showing people how to use the aircraft – that’s the point.
Answer: I agree – and because there’s a lot of cross tell, they’re going to see different ways of employing the airplane – different ways of making sure they stay alive.
Question: Chuck, one of the things we tried to do in the Vietnam era, in the Navy Marine team, was as individual came back successful, we’d get them in a TOPGUN or they’d get them out to our – what we called “gun squaderns” – even though we didn’t have guns – guys like Duke Cunningham and Bear Lasseter came back – and they would personally brief and brief, and brief.
Did you have a chance – because you were the most experienced guy living– how did you – when you returned, how did they capture your experience?
What did you do?
Answer: I had a unique situation.
When I first came in the service in ’68, I went to pilot training. I was at Craig in Selma, Alabama. They looked at their numbers – I think I was on the wrong side of the personnel curve – and to dig it up, they had too many pilots, I think – because they were getting ready to get rid of the pilots in the backseat of the F-4 and all of a sudden, I went from all good grades – and all of a sudden, a week later, I was in a different school. I wasn’t even sure what happened.
I get in the F-4 when I come out of Southeast Asia. My first assignment out of Southeast Asia was the Soesterberg – flying with the air defense guys out of Soesterberg.
They were going to send me to weapon school, which is what I wanted to do. In fact, I volunteered to leave Southeast Asia early – go to weapon school – then come back and spend another year.
But they closed our weapon school and shipped all the guys to Southeast Asia when the big war started up north.
My first assignment was the Soesterberg. My second assignment was at the request of General Dixon, who was commander of TAC at the time, to go to analysis of air-to-air instructor. I was in hog heaven.
When Steve and I came back to the States, we had to go see General Ryan, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. They went in there with – there was four of us in there – General Ryan – Steve – I and General Gainsburg, two-star.
Steve says, “I’d like to go fly with the Thunderbirds, they’re doing their tryouts right now.” Ryan looked over at the two-star and said, “Make a note on that.”
Not bad when you’re the two-star note-taker and you got two captains in the room.
And then Ryan looked at me and said, “How would you like to go back to pilot training?” I go, “I didn’t think I could.” Well apparently, I could do anything the chief of staff said I could do.
I told him I wasn’t sure.
As I’m walking out, Gainsburg said, “Don’t wait too long. He retires in nine months.” I finally figured out that they were right. If I wanted to really be an instructor for the navs, I had to be in the front seat of the F-4. I sat down and wrote the chief a letter – “Dear Chief” – and by that time, I’d already called up the lady at air training command that made the pilot training assignments – “what base are you going to?”
I don’t know.
I told her I was leaving Southeast Asia on the 20th of November and when’s her next class starting after that? She said, “Williams Air Force Base and the class started in November.” I said, “I’ll take it.”
She said, “Don’t you want more time?” No – I was ready to get on with it. I get to Willy. I get there early – a few days early just to get settled in before pilot training started – and they go, “where the hell have you been?”
I said, “I’m not supposed to be here for a few days” – “the orders have been changed.
You’re going to the Navy Fighter Symposium at Miramar.
I get to go with my roommate from Southeast Asia. He had three kills and spent 23 days on the ground Hanoi when they got shot down.
He was in the class ahead of me.
He flew us out and back in a 237 to Miramar also with his instructor. We got the instructors into all the briefings, which were classified. Bear Lasseter was there (USMC Mig Killer) – Cunningham (USN ACE) was there – Steve and I were there – all talking about our engagements. That’s November of ’72.
Question: That is ’72 – just before the Christmas bombing? They called you guys together to really, really learn from your experiences?
Answer: Right – just before the Christmas one. Cunningham was back in the States – Driscoll (USN RIO ACE) were back in the States and so were we. This was a weapons symposium to discuss tactics it was pretty interesting.
Looking Forward and Looking Backward
Question: What are the lessons learned for this generation of Fighter Pilots in air combat?
The air-to-air missions are going to get more important over this decade ahead – I know what the lessons are – what could we highlight, do you think, from all the experiences you had and clearly the operational realities – the fear factor – and allowing the pilots to shape where this air combat capability goes is crucial.
But what thoughts do you have about that that we might convey?
Answer: One of the things – you get into a tactics discussion – maybe at the bar – maybe in the ready room – whatever. You do ideas. You talk them out, seeing what works – you put flying in a training environment.
With the simulators we have today, you put them in this – program the Sims to look at things. You get to do some laps in a sterile environment so that when you get into a high-density air-to-air environment, going after people that are going after you; you’re better prepared for that.
It’s guys that have either been in there – expressing unhappiness with what’s going on or talking about some things that they did right – most experience comes from, living through your mistakes – so talking about your mistakes – trying to make sure you learn.
The F-22 is the greatest thing since sliced bread until it isn’t; now you got a problem.
The F-4 is a barn door on the radar set. You can see it with the radar set turned off.
How do you employ that in combat?
One of the jobs I had – when I came out of pilot training, I was in Holland. I went ahead to Europe – deployed to Europe nuclear – while the European squadrons got their conventional training, you’re sitting on the bomb, you figure, “it’s probably a one-way trip, but I’m not sure. I’ll give it a good shot.” Coming back through, what’s my biggest danger? It’s the Army Hawk batteries.
The Army is going to do a ground start, shoot them all down, and slow down on the ground attack. Instead of coming through the inner German border at a medium altitude – a slow air speed – I’m going to be on the deck going at the speed of stink trying to get through those guys. I run out of gas –I was going to die anyway.
It’s one of those things.
But you have to have that mentality. In fact, I’ll tell you what – what allowed me to survive – one, I was considered lucky – everybody considered to be lucky – everybody.
It’s always better to be lucky than good. Good guys have bad days. When you’re lucky, you’re lucky.
I guarantee you there was somebody looking out for me. I would not have turned the jammers on in time when those two missiles came into the formation – even the missile had a better even chance of just running into us – and both of them missed.
They threaded the needle. They couldn’t have been more perfect, being in the center of that formation – had they been a gnat’s ass off one side or the other, they’d have gotten either me or three – or both of us.
We took a 57-millimeter shot in the wing. The airplane rang when it hit. When I looked up, all I saw was yellow, long bolts of lightning going by the cockpit. 57 millimeters – that’s about the size of a Coke can. If that thing hits the airplane, you’re dead.
But we weren’t. As the last slug went by, I asked the guy I was flying with – Eddie Picrusson– “Eddie, are you OK,” in a very low voice – and he said, “yeah.” Come right you need to get out of there.
Question: It was the outer wing panel?
Answer: Yes. It was in the lead hinged flap.
I don’t know if we were so close to the shell getting on her – or it didn’t hit anything hard enough to stall – it made the airplane look like Swiss cheese. It riddled the airplane with holes.
Nothing critical was touched. As far as the airplane was concerned, it was almost normal. We flew it all the way back to Udorn, and went back to Udorn, primarily because we knew the bar was open.
Question: Was that the golden BB or did you know you were in a flack trap?
Answer: No, we were going after 100 millimeter AAA.
I was the high-speed target at the time.
Question: You were going after him?
Answer: Yes. And we lost enough guys to kill the program. And then in, I think it was March, they reconstituted it with three back seaters and three front seaters.
And then I was in the initial cadre.
And we would operate in North Vietnam for a six-hour or so time period, and then four to six hours going after the tanker, back in until we ran out of rockets and then we’d go home.
So, operating in North Vietnam, if you do it only once in awhile, it’s very scary.
And fear has a big part of that.
If you live in the air over North Vietnam, you know what to look for; you’re always on the lookout. You’re watching out for everything.
You don’t have that same fear factor.
And somebody asked me how much time I spent inside the cockpit on my missions. 85 percent of the time is spent inside. “How much do you spend outside?” 85 percent of the time spent outside.
You’re multitasking; you’re doing everything all the time.
We had one radio frequency for in the air, all of us, one radio frequency for the ground. And so, if you had to use the radios to make your mission a success, you just failed.
You had to be able to operate in a high-density calm environment, visually.
We had our four ship when Richie wanted to maneuver the formation we became two elements, two “two ships”. He would roll into a weave; three would roll into the weave, which rolled out on a heading, three rolled out on a heading. He was with them. It was like a mind meld between the two of them.
And we never had to ask. We never had to ask, where are you? He was there.
The Final Combat Mission
Question: Could you describe your last combat mission?
Answer: We were up by, and I didn’t know it in my last combat mission until we were on the way home. We were up by Thud Ridge. “T-Ball” said go down.
Nobody in his right mind would do that.
Of course, being sane was not a requirement for us.
Being a little crazy was.
If you’re a little crazy and you’re flying fighters, it’s probably better.
So we started heading down toward Hanoi. We ended up just north of Hanoi. And Brian Tibbets , the number three back seater called up SAM lock-on inbound.
And we look over there and it’s not a Sam. It’s a Mig 21. We knew there was a black bandit, a bingo fuel airplane coming into boot camp, that’s what they sent us down there for. There’s the airplane.
I locked onto it with the radar. We fired two aim sevens. Now, we were above the target, looking down at him. And this is analog radar. It automatically gained to the biggest return it saw. And we got two kills.
But earth kills don’t count.
Now, by that time, we’re getting ready to turn final with the Mig. So, like I said, being sane was never a requirement for what we did.
As we turned final, the F4, if you’re below 200 knots in an F4, with the gear up close to the ground, that’s not good. And we slipped past this guy. He was geared, flaps down, on glide slope, on glide path.
On air speed, everything, he had it wired. And when we passed him at 180 knots, it was like he was standing still. And as we passed him, I realized, I saw the black dial electric on top of the rudder and the vertical vent.
And I knew, we had the latest type Mig-21 in our sites and that scared me because the Mig had four pylons and he had on missile left and his gas tank, that was gone. He had a 30-millimeter cannon in the nose.
All this – and we ended up out in front of him at 200 – at 180 knots trying to get behind him in.
And all he had to do was level the airplane over to me and pull the trigger.
And I wouldn’t be talking to you guys today.
He didn’t do that. He turned into us. So now we’re in a horizontal rolling scissors, which in training, they told us if you try that in an F4, it would kill you.
But we’re going to die anyway, so might as well try it.
We were in harm’s way in a big way.
So we’re in this horizontal rolling scissors with this guy and we hear “honeymoon”. It’s Brian Tibbets, our number three guy talking the flight thing, thinks it’s clear, press on, I got your back.
Tell me when you’re ready.
North Vietnamese pilots run towards their MiG-17s to take off and engage US aircraft. Credit Photo: Acepilots.com
We do about three leaves, the MIG driver pulls up, now I’ve got enough air speed and he now pulls up out of the flight and we clear Brian’s in. And Brian had an F-4E with a nose gun in it; at 100 feet behind him he empties the gun into him.
If I had a camera with me, that picture would’ve been worth a million dollars. Because it was a blue sky, F-4 right behind him with shells coming out of the gun. And all of a sudden, the canopy comes up and the MIG driver punches out and the F4 almost hit him, he was that close.
At that point, we’ve got our air speed back.
We now circle up towards the bridge again, to get the four ships back joined up, you cross the river of a valley, 15 miles for us to Hanoi.
And I get one radar blip. Had I not been looking at the radar at the right time, I never would’ve seen him. He was eight miles away, eleven o’clock.
And we’re cruising out about 500 or so. As we get to where they should be. We see them before they see us. And we get a call – we actually didn’t have gas to run, we had to fight, kill them quick and then go home.
So we turn on, we’ve got many ways to turn on them before they see us. And we know they saw us when they and did a break turn into us.
The airplane (MIG 19) can turn on a dime.
We fired two Aim-9Js at the trailer. One of them got close enough to work. All of a sudden, he wasn’t there. But the other guy was a threat.
He was making angles on us. I figured about 15-20 seconds he was going to be bringing guns to bear.
And we had a growl in the headset, the Aim-9J had just come out of developmental test and instead of sending it to operational test, they sent it to us.
We did the operational test in combat.
We had no tech data on it. All we had was a tech rep and missiles. So we asked him, how do you tell when you’re in range? He said, if you can track the guy with six g’s or less from the airplane, you’re in range.
And it had 40g capability with a four to one guidance system on it. So if he was only pulling 10 g’s, he was in range.
And I don’t know about the six g’s. There’s some discussion on when we pulled it, we get nine and a half g’s on the jet, somewhere during that flight.
The first thing the missile did was look like it went for the sun. And we go, “This is not good.” We’re in harm’s way, and John was pulling on the stick a lot. He was trying to get his nose to bear on us.
And the missile comes up, pulls lead, the next thing and goes out of our peripheral. And the next thing you see, it’s inbound. It hits the midnight team in the eyelids. And I could see them, the midnight team above the Kennedy boat in the backseat.
Question: Could you see any of the puffs from the canyon? Was he starting to get a tracking solution?
Answer: He was not quite to a tracking solution yet.
The missile hit him – he went from his high G turn, low wings level, rolled inverted, and did a split S, a very nice split S At least the first 90 degree. And then it hit the ground.
We were flying about, at 1200-1500 feet, something like that. It wasn’t very high.
And as soon as he was out of the picture, the triple A came up, 23s, 37s, 57s, 85s, you could tell. Three of us were low enough to get under it. Number four was not. He took a hit in the fuel cells and left head on. It was 1800 pounds. Didn’t destroy him, but he was leaking gas.
And he left with 1800 pounds. And we had about five, I think. And – but nearest base was 285 miles away or thereabouts. And so we went three and four straight ahead.
And when four got to 1000 pounds, by that time, you had cleared off everything you can get rid of. And at 1000 pounds, you level the airplane out and you ran down the gas.
But these two guys in the airplane had a fight in the airplane. If the front seater punches out, the back seater goes first.
The back seater has the option He can either punch himself out or have the pilot follow him out. And they had a fight in the cockpit because both of them wanted to pull the handle.
So they made individual injections. And John and I went to combat spread and we did weaves behind them so that nobody could follow them out. And then when we got out of the target area, we went to the heavens and just went to men fuel flight heading to Udorn. We weren’t going to try for a tanker.
We had enough gas, just enough gas to get home. So we went to 40,000 feet. And therefore, when you’re ready for your descent, if you pump up the nozzles, the engines are pulling back, actually pulling back to where the nozzle is half of this area.
You can come out of the heavens. You’ll glide two miles for every thousand feel altitude and you’ll burn a couple hundred pounds of fuel.
Question: The F-4 bingo profiles really worked.
Answer: Yes, because if you ran your fuel down too much, they got a kill.
We turned final in Udorn on that mission with the gear up. And threw a sharp final, drop the gear, landed.
And I think John had to cut an engine off, not sure. Just to keep the other one running. I mean we were on fumes. The most important gauge in the airplane was the gas gauge. I mean, the F-4 is just a gas hog.
And so, if you’re not watching, paying attention to the gas gauge, you could be in harm’s way in a heartbeat. And that happened to a couple friends of mine when they ran out of gas.
Let me tell you what allowed me to fly into Hanoi everyday. I knew who my replacement was tomorrow. I knew who his replacement was the day after. The missions could go on with or without me.
The only reason I go to do what I did, because my roommate got shot down. He would’ve been the first ace, but they got shot down. They had three kills going out to kill number four on the 10th of May.
What allowed me to go up there every day was I was immortal. I couldn’t be killed.
And the golden BB, if it had my name on it, it was mine. Didn’t matter what I did. If it didn’t have my name on it, you could blow it off and not worry about it.
And fighter pilots as you know, we’re very focused and we operate in bins. So when those two missiles went through the formation, we were just killing time before we went downtown. That bin is over with; throw that aside, now we’re going to the attack bin.
You focus on what you have to do.
Some lost it in a fetal position, crying, “Oh God, I just got almost shot down.” Hell no. What are you worried about, they missed.
And I saw a guy that I thought was very macho when I first got to Udorn and he had been missed by a missile and there he is, in the bar, drunk, in the corner, in the fetal position crying.
I would not fly with him. I was very picky about who I flew with.
You got up that morning and you said, I don’t feel lucky today. You’re not going with me.
Or you said, you had a bad feeling, no, I ain’t flying with you. Or you were nervous about the mission, I ain’t going with you.
I’m sorry.
You had to be totally focused on what we were doing. Whether you came home or not, that depends on how well you do on your mission.
But don’t start the mission with the perception that you’re not coming back. I don’t need that. I never took off, thinking I was going to get shot down. Now halfway through the mission, it is a different story.
I always knew, my wing commander was Charlie Gabriel. And Gabe retired as Chief in the Air Force. And I always knew he would do his damndest to get us back.
In fact, he was one of the few colonels I didn’t mind flying with.
And he was a gentleman, and a great fighter pilot, he had our back all the time. He had some senior officers from our headquarters there were some things that they wanted to try that wore not worth much.
And our captain, weapons off just said, it’s not going to work.
They said if the general calls, Gabriel would convince them to do it. And Gabriel told him, well if my captain weapon’s officer says it’s going to kill people, we’re not going to do it. We ain’t doing it.
You couldn’t ask for a better guy.
Let me tell you, flying the F-4 is not an easy air thing to fly. It’s got a lot of mechanical parts in it that break. And so, the biggest part of a team was not just necessarily 8 guys flying the four airplanes; it’s all the maintenance guys.
The Key Role of Maintainers
Question: How important was the integration between the flight crews and the maintainers to your mission success?
F-4Cs and F-4Ds did not have an internal gun. Some were equipped with an external gun pod. Here, armorers load 20mm cannon rounds into an F-4 gun pod. In the upper right corner are several complete gun pods. (U.S. Air Force photo)
Answer: The maintenance guys keep everything tweaked. I could walk up to my jet and right up to the airplane, for the inspection. They would still inspect, but it wasn’t center spec. I could write it up and they could center spec the airplane for me again. But there was no reason to work on it, because there’s still intolerance.
But I’d center spec. Because I flew the same airplane all the time, I could do that. The rear, I could get little things tweaked on it. And I’d walk through the airplane with the maintenance guys. The ammunitions guys got the missiles working.
The missiles got downloaded, they went to back to ammunitions maintenance, and they tweaked it up and put the same missiles back on my jet. And they were always guaranteed.
When I first got over there, all the maintenance work was with the Squadron commander. Every two weeks, we had a steak dinner–You get your steak, your pear, your salad or whatever. And you go sit down with your crew chief.
Here you are, talking to the guy – they didn’t call that fraternization. They called that taking care of business. It was part of the mission. Everybody had to understand what the focus of this mission was.
The Key Role of Search and Rescue
Question: One last point you made that I want to dwell on as we fade into the end of the interview is, you talked about flying and the confidence in the SAR coming to get you. That was the other very, often times, talked about, but not to the degree it should be appreciated.
The courage of the jolly greens and the Air Force SARs who were fearless provided a significant confidence factor gave to the aircrews.
Answer: You know, when my roommate got shot down on the 10th of May, there were no shoots out of the airplane, we didn’t see anything.
All I saw was the airplane turn on the side of the hill.
Three days later he calls up, his game plan was to walk 90 miles in 45 days to end of the ridgeline so he could get picked up. And about three weeks later, he calls up. We have a flight flying in that same area, finally again. And he calls up and says, “Where in the hell have you guys been?” SAR goes to pick him up. There was no decision to make, it was a given. The helicopter went to pick him up.
An HH-3E being refueled by an HC-130. Aerial refueling enabled the helicopters to rescue downed aircrew from any location in the Southeast Asia theater of operations. (U.S. Air Force photo)
Dale was the aircraft commander. He had two minutes radio time, two minutes. So they had to know everything about him. Roger had picked out an IP for the Sandy’s. It was a 57 or 85 millimeter in the air, nice visuals. And so, they took that out.
All the guys, now Bob had to cancel the days he has strikes, the two days to do this. All the guys carrying bombs went up – still went up to Hanoi, I mean, up to North Vietnam. And they were waiting for targets to come up so they could dump on them. All the guys went in holding patterns around the helicopters.
And any MIGs that came up, they were going to play. It was a very coordinated, defensive rescue.
And when they got him in the airplane, the – PJ gave him a can – a coffee can. What the hell do I want a coffee can for? Cookies. The can was full of cookies. He opens it up, eats a few, and puts the rest of them in his flight suit. The PJ says, what the hell are you doing that for?
You can’t guarantee we’re getting out of here that was his food supply.
Somebody asked, why are you spending so many resources to get one guy, to rescue one guy from deep inside North Vietnam?
And the answer was, because, there was nothing you could do to us, worse than putting us on the schedule. We went to Udorn every day. We were afraid of nothing. We were – my job was to make sure we got the prisoners out.
And the only way to do that was to be the very best at what you do. I was afraid of no man and no beast. The fact that we got him out, that’s a plus. What was really important was the fact that he went after him. And that shows commitment to what we were doing.
Background:
Chuck DeBellevue was born in 1945 in New Orleans, Louisiana.
He was commissioned through the Air Force ROTC program at the University of Southwestern Louisiana on January 26, 1968, and graduated from Undergraduate Navigator Training in July 1969.
After completing combat crew training as a Weapons System Officer in the F-4 Phantom II and a tour with the 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina, DeBellevue was assigned to the 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Udorn Royal Thai AFB, Thailand in October 1971.
Col. Charles B. DeBellevue, USAF, Ret., a member of the famed “Triple Nickel” 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron during the Vietnam War, is credited with downing six North Vietnamese MiGs. Here is seen as one of the honored guests Memorial Day 2010 in Columbia Mo.
He flew 220 combat missions as a Laredo High Speed Forward Air Controller and was credited with the destruction of 6 enemy fighters in aerial combat as a WSO during the Vietnam War.
He was awarded the MacKay Trophy for the most notable aerial achievement in 1972.
In November 1973, DeBellevue graduated from Undergraduate Pilot Training and was then assigned to the 8th Tactical Fighter Squadron of the 49th Tactical Fighter Wing at Holloman AFB, New Mexico.
He next served as the assistant operations officer for the 43rd Tactical Fighter Squadron at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, and then served with the 335th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Seymour Johnson AFB again.
Col DeBellevue held a variety of staff assignments including service with Alaskan Air Command, Headquarters Air Force at the Pentagon, and as Chief of Staff for Fifth Air Force at Yokota AB, Japan.
He served as commander of the 432nd Combat Support Group at Misawa AB, Japan, and the 95th Air Base Wing at Edwards AFB, California. His final assignment was as commander of Air Force ROTC Detachment 440 at the University of Missouri from 1995 until his retirement from the Air Force on February 1, 1998.
Col DeBellevue wears Command Pilot Wings and the Air Force Maintenance Badge, and accumulated over 3,000 flying hours during his Air Force career.
He was the highest scoring ace of the Vietnam War and the last American ace on active duty. Chuck is married to the former Sally Kanik of Rancho Cordova, California, and they have three children and two grandchildren.
His Air Force Cross Citation reads:
The Air Force Cross is presented to Charles B. DeBellevue, Captain, U.S. Air Force, for extraordinary heroism in military operations against an opposing armed force as an F-4D Weapon Systems Officer, 555th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, on 9 September 1972.
On that date, while protecting a large strike force attacking a high priority target deep in hostile territory, Captain DeBellevue engaged and destroyed a hostile aircraft.
Through superior judgment and use of aircraft capabilities, and in complete disregard for his own safety, Captain DeBellevue was successful in destroying his fifth hostile aircraft, a North Vietnamese MIG-19.
Through his extraordinary heroism, superb airmanship, and aggressiveness in the face of the enemy, Captain DeBellevue reflected the highest credit upon himself and the United States Air Force.
The Legends Of Homestead Air Force Base! Robin Olds the “TRIPLE ACE” Olds had 16 confirmed kills ( 12 in world war 2 and 4 in Vietnam).
Vietnam MiG Killers! Chuck Debellevue is the first Air Force Weapon Systems Officer (WSO) to become a flying ACE.
Flying in a F-4D as the WSO with pilot Steve Ritchie. He and Ritchie scored four MiG kills together.
During Linebacker strikes. Pilot John A. Madden and his WSO during this operation was Debellevue they shot down Two MiGs together!
Making Debellevue the leading MiG killer of the war making him an “ACE”!
These pilots aircraft were all once stationed at Homestead Air Force Base. Robin Olds 93rd TFS, 482nd TFW. Steve Ritchie assigned to the 309th TFS, 31st TFW.
The Aircraft in which Debellevue flew when he got his sixth MiG kill and John Madden his two MiG kills is on display at Homestead ARB, Florida. F-4D AF serial No. 66-0267
In an article provided by the National Museum of the USAF entitled “Countering MIGS: Air-to-Air Combat Over North Vietnam”:
The key mission for U.S. Air Force fighter escorts (or MiGCAPs) over North Vietnam was to prevent enemy MiG fighters from interfering with American strike aircraft. The MiG pilots’ primary goal was to force strike aircrews to jettison their bombs early, thereby disrupting the bombing mission.
In 1965, the small North Vietnamese Air Force (also known as the Vietnam People’s Air Force or VPAF) was equipped with somewhat outdated, gun-armed MiG-17s. The entry of missile-armed, supersonic MiG-21s in early 1966, however, dramatically increased the VPAF threat. The USAF’s primary counter to the MiG was the F-4 Phantom II fighter.
Gun camera image of the MiG-17 victory by F-105 pilot Maj. Ralph Kuster Jr. on June 5, 1967. (U.S. Air Force photo)
Though outnumbered, VPAF MiGs had some significant advantages. Guided by ground controllers using early warning radar, MiG pilots only attacked under ideal circumstances, such as when USAF aircraft were bomb-laden, low on fuel, or damaged. The small, hard-to-see MiGs typically made one-pass attacks at high speed, then escaped to a sanctuary (either their airfields, which were not bombed until mid-1967, or to nearby communist China). Since they were always over friendly territory, MiG pilots could be back in action quickly if they survived being shot down.
USAF fighter pilots had better training and superior aircraft, but they endured several disadvantages. One serious issue was missile reliability and performance. Over one-half of the missiles fired by the USAF during the SEA War malfunctioned, and only about 1 in 11 fired scored a victory. The USAF rules of engagement dictated visual identification of an enemy aircraft before firing, which negated using the Sparrow missile at long range. USAF F-4s flown during ROLLING THUNDER did not have an internal gun to use when missiles failed. Although some F-4s carried external gun pods, it was not until the F-4E arrived in late 1968 that USAF Phantoms finally had an internal gun. Lastly, USAF pilots had to combat MiGs, SAMs and AAA over hostile North Vietnam, and if shot down, they were not always rescued.
Even so, enemy MiGs failed in their primary mission to stop US air attacks over North Vietnam during OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER. In fact, the VPAF fighter force sometimes retreated to China and stood down from combat operations due to heavy losses suffered at the hands of American fighter crews.
MiG pilots did little better in December 1972 — by the end of OPERATION LINEBACKER II, USAF B-52s and tactical aircraft hit targets at will, forcing the North Vietnamese to sign a peace treaty. At the end of the Southeast Asia War in 1973, the VPAF had lost nearly 150 MiGs in combat to USAF fighter crews, while the USAF lost about 70 aircraft (of all types) to MiGs.
Last week, the Japanese and U.S. governments released an interim report on their progress in revising the guidelines for their militaries’ roles and missions in the joint defense of Japan.
The interim report does not identify specific threats or discuss detailed scenarios for joint military operations, but it does provide principles to guide the revisions and some examples of these cooperative activities.
Key principles include “seamless, robust, flexible, and effective bilateral responses; the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; cooperation with other regional partners; synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; and a whole-of-government Alliance approach.”
The two governments are still negotiating the text of the final guidelines.
In addition, the Abe administration has not yet submitted to the Diet the laws needed to implement the Cabinet’s July 1 decision to reinterpret the constitution and permit the expanded use of the SDF for collective defense missions outside Japan.
Even so, these terms already make clear that the new guidelines will expand both the geographic and the functional scope of the contingencies for possible joint military action.
Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Pinckney (DDG 91) and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) ships conduct tactical maneuvers during GUAMEX 2014 in waters near Guam. Pinckney and JMSDF ships Kongo (DDG 173), Murasame (DD 101), Ikazuchi (DD 107), Akebono (DD 108), Ariake (DD 109), Akizuki (DD 115) and Shimakaze (DDG 172) are participating part in GUAMEX 2014, an operation aimed at enhancing the interoperability of the U.S. Navy and JMSDF and strengthening personnel ties between the respective forces. US 7th Fleet, 7/8/14
Citing the major changes in the global security environment during the almost two decades since the guidelines were last revised in 1997, the October 2013 meeting of the Japanese and U.S. foreign and defense ministers decided to upgrade the guidelines by the end of this year.
Although the threat from North Korea has changed somewhat, with its less experienced and more unpredictable leader and with Pyongyang’s having tested three nuclear explosive devices, the main destabilizing driver has been China’s increasing power and resulting growing assertiveness.
Transnational terrorism has also become more threatening, while Japanese and U.S. cyber and space assets have become less secure due to the diffusion of these capabilities to many other actors, some with malign intentions.
The interim report states that, “Discussions have ranged from operational-level deliberations to consider appropriate roles and missions for the respective forces, to policy-level dialogues focusing on defense cooperation.” The State Department said that the guidelines would be revised further as circumstances warranted.
The interim report indicates that the new guidelines will likely change how they address the geography of Japanese-U.S. military cooperation. Noting that international threats anywhere can affect Japan’s security, and that a rapid response is often required to address these threats, “the two governments will take measures to prevent the deterioration of Japan’s security in all phases, seamlessly, from peacetime to contingencies.”
Japan will still have primary responsibility for self-defense against an armed attack on its national territory, but the Pentagon will explicitly commit to render assistance “in the case of a large-scale disaster in Japan.” We will need to await the wording of the final guidelines to determine if this assistance will include domestic terrorist incidents as well as 2011-like natural disasters.
Furthermore, rather than limit joint operations to certain types of contingencies in Japan’s vicinity, the report says that the revised guidelines will describe how the two militaries will collaborate in cases of an “armed attack to a country that is in close relationship with Japan.”
The phrase “close relationship” could cover countries with extensive economic and other ties with Japan—such as a major oil provider–as well as those physically close to the Japanese islands.
When asked what air and sea zones the two militaries would seek to keep open for international use, Assistant Secretary Daniel R. Russel responded “planet Earth,” elaborating that these are global principles… [designed to allow] all trading nations to utilize international waters, international airspace, and increasingly international cyberspace.”
An urgent Japanese concern is its territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Last December, Japan’s own national defense guidelines made defending these and other remote islands a higher priority.
For example, the country’s Self-Defense Forces is enhancing its capacities for rapid reinforcement and to conduct amphibious operations to expel any enemy forces that have occupied them.
Few expect the Chinese Navy to try to seize the islands through a conventional invasion, but the Chinese may pursue non-military hybrid tactics, for example, sending paramilitary or even unarmed people to occupy the islands, which are currently administered by Japan. China has already displayed such “salami slicing” in by unilaterally declaring an air defense identification zone over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and by occulting several islands dispute with the Philippines.
Chinese coast guard ships as well as PLA Navy submarines have also expanded their presence in Japan’s vicinity.
Although threatening, these kinds of activities do not constitute “an armed attack against Japan,” so the current guidelines offer no guidance regarding how the Japanese and U.S. militaries should respond.
Traditionally, Japan has relied on its coast guard to counter these challenges, but China has made a major effort to strengthen its own maritime forces and combine them into a single structure independent of the People’s Liberation Navy, enhancing’s its paramilitary portfolio.
To address what the Japanese media describe as these “grey area issues,” the new guidelines will allow the U.S. and Japanese militaries to respond rapidly in cases even when an armed attack against Japan is not involved.
In terms of functional areas, the interim report lists “peacekeeping operations; international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief; maritime security; capacity building; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; logistics support; and noncombatant evacuation operations” as possible fields for defense cooperation.
Some functional issues go beyond those covered in the current guidelines. Whereas cyber and space issues were not mentioned in the 1997 guidelines, the revisions place priority on joint measures to protect “the safe and stable use of space and cyberspace including improving the cyber security of critical infrastructure.”
Combined, the expanded geographic and functional sway of the guidelines could represent a major enlargement in potential Japanese-U.S. military cooperation.
For example, the SDF would no longer be restricted to providing primarily logistical assistance for U.S military forces in operations not involving Japan’s direct defense.
Instead, the SDF can collaborate with U.S. forces in a wider range of missions and places.
For instance, they could use Japanese assets to help protect U.S. forces under missile attack, as well as help defend U.S territory from missile strikes, even when the aggressor was not also attacking Japan.
The interim report lists a range of possible cooperative military activities:
• Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance;
• Training and Exercises;
• Use of Facilities and Areas;
• Logistics Support;
• Asset Protection;
• Air and Missile Defense;
• Protection of Facilities and Areas;
• Search and Rescue;
• Activities for Ensuring the Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions;
• Noncombatant Evacuation Operations;
• Measures to Deal with Refugees; and
• Maritime Security
The guidelines also call for greater defense industrial collaboration between the two countries as well as more “whole-of-government” security cooperation to extend beyond the two governments’ armed forces.
It is clear that Germany is under stress from the Euro crisis, the Ukrainian crisis and the crisis in the Middle East.
It is also clear that Germany needs to rebuild its defense capabilities in the face of global developments and the return of both direct defense challenges associated with Russia and the coalition engagements necessary to protect German and Western interests in the Middle East.
Recent press reports have underscored that the atrophy of German defense capabilities has been significant.
In part it is a question of providing for the parts for the existing defense equipment and ensuring that the well-deserved German reputation for maintenance of their military equipment does not become an historical memory.
Atrophying the supply chain is not a good way to have effective defense or defense industry for that matter.
“The defense equipment issue is the first major crisis Ursula von der Leyen faces since taking over the defense portfolio at the end of 2013. Her predecessors are to blame, however, for cutting costs for spare parts. Von der Leyen refers to a “phase of drastic change” in the airplane sector and “shortages” due to repairs.”
The question for Germany is not simply about its role in the Western Alliance but the overall capability, which the Alliance itself can deliver against multiple challenges at the same time.
It is no longer an abstract question of the % contribution of Germany to Alliance defense; it is increasingly about the viability of the Alliance’s ability to operate in direct defense of Europe as well as in operating to meet the “strategic surprises” which Lt. General Preziosa, the Chief of Staff of the Italian Air Force in a forthcoming interview refers to as the challenge facing Europe in the period ahead.
“Pop up” crises requires an ability to respond rapidly and to shape collaborative insertion forces able to move rapidly against a threat.
Put bluntly, this is really about air and naval power and the ability of a coalition to put together rapidly an effective C2 capability.
How capable is Germany of providing such forces?
Certainly not capable enough, and the question is not only the readiness of forces due to absence of parts, supplies and maintainability of equipment, but the existence of enough core capability to shape, participate and contribute to crisis management.
What this means is not simply an inability to contribute, but a failure to execute national missions determined important by the German government.
The recent German decision to support the Kurds against the ISIL assault is rooted in both values held deeply by Germans of revulsion against the actions of ISIL but a strategic interest as well concerning the impact of the ISIL expansion on Turkey and the GCC states, as well as Israel, all allies of Germany.
First German Air Force A400M makes its maiden flight October 14, 2014. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space.
Chancellor Merkel took a timely and courageous decision that Germany should act to assist the Kurds.
The only problem is that arms delivery requires just that — DELIVERY — as well as training and the need to shape as much as possible a custodial role with regard to those arms delivered and the training provided to the Kurdish forces.
It is clear that a key element for executing such a mission is air lift, air refueling and escort aircraft to protect those planes lifting and refueling.
Here the reality of the inventory catches up with 21st century objectives: the airlift fleet is too old to play the role, which it needs to play in 21st century operations.
There have several recent incidents which highlighted the clear gap in airlift which affects overall operational capabilities.
According to a piece by Anton Troianovski published in The Wall Street Journal on September 29, 2014:
A German military transport plane delivering medical aid to Ebola-stricken regions spent the weekend grounded by technical problems in the Canary Islands, further highlighting the country’s poor state of military readiness.
Coming less than a week after a leaked government report to lawmakers showed that some of the German military’s oldest hardware is falling into disrepair, the incident is piling pressure on Chancellor Angela Merkel‘s government to fix the country’s defenses.
One of two aging Transall C-160 transport planes scheduled to arrive in Dakar, Senegal, on Saturday couldn’t take off from an airport on the Atlantic island of Gran Canaria because of a mechanical defect, a spokesman for the German Air Force said.
A substitute airplane en route from Germany Monday afternoon was expected to drop off spare parts for the stricken plane and bring its medical payload to Dakar in the evening, two days behind schedule.
The problem came days after equipment problems delayed German weapons and trainers being sent to Kurds fighting Islamist militants in Ira
Another example was a recent case of an inability to simply transport German troops home from Afghanistan.
A military blog Augen geradeaus! posted that 150 Bundeswehr soldiers currently waiting (since last Saturday) to fly home from Masar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan simply had to sit and wait, because there weren’t any Airbus A310 transport planes fit to take them home.
The blogger, Thomas Wiegold, wrote that Berlin was considering using the personal airplane of Chancellor Angela Merkel to get the soldiers home. The defense ministry has confirmed that report, stating, however, that there wouldn’t be enough room on Merkel’s “Air Force One” for all of the soldiers. Other options are currently being considered, Wiegold quoted the ministry as saying.
Fortunately, a solid step forward in dealing with the airlift gap problem is the coming of the A400M.
The program is now delivering planes and Germany has an opportunity not only to sort through its airlift problem but to shape a re-set of the overall air combat capability challenge as well, by properly supplying their Eurofighters and by augmenting their tanker fleet as well.
The first Airbus A400M new generation airlifter for the German Air Force has now been painted in its new colours at the Airbus Defence and Space facility in Seville, Spain. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space, 10/10/14
Australia has recently self deployed from Australia to the Middle East, with its new lifters, and tankers to be able to engage in what the Australian Government believes is a mission of national import – the defeat of the ISIL.
ISIL has posed both an internal and external challenge to Australia, and Chancellor Merkel of Germany has highlighted the role of German citizens in fighting for the ISIL as well.
It can be done, and it is difficult to see why Australia can do what Germany can not.
Military air lifters have become a core combat capability, and not just military equivalents of civilian transport.
In a 2013 piece on the role of military airlift, a number of the key changes which airlifters are both contributing to and enabling for combat operations were underscored:
At the recent Trade Media Briefing 2013, journalists who attended were given the opportunity to fly the aircraft for more than an hour. Francis Tusa, the well-known British journalist and hardly a Euro hugger, underscored what we all felt:
The lack of noise within the aircraft was noticeable compared to the C-17, C-130 or other aircraft. The seats are more comfortable as well. I did not hear the engines start up, and so was surprised when the aircraft took off. And then the incredibly rapid takeoff demonstrated its capability to lift from very, very short fields. The plane had a very stable performance in flight. And all of this in a very large cargo aircraft.
The A400M features C-130-like ability to use a wide variety of airfields with the capability to carry oversized loads of the sort that the C-17 currently carries.
The aircraft will be able to deliver equipment and personnel closer to the point of attack than the C-17 with C-17 type loads.
It will not be difficult to see how this aircraft will initially be used.
In the current Mali operation, the French had significant challenges in delivering the capability necessary for their forces. When the A400M many years ago was first thought of, lift was considered somewhat equivalent to a truck or a greyhound bus.
With the last decade of experience and the revolution in air dropping, the air lifter is an integral part of the kind of expeditionary logistics, which insertion forces clearly need to operate with for 21st century operations.
In my colleague’s reporting from Mali, the French military made it clear to her that they were eagerly waiting for the A400M to join the fleet in order to facilitate the kind of operation which Mali represented.
As Murielle Delaporte underscored about the Mali operation:
Air support has been crucial in the areas of more intense engagement. Forward air controllers or FACs were important members of the ground forces. And air assets –Air Force (fighters), Army (helos) and Navy (Atlantique 2) – have been drawn upon in the operation. More generally, and as far as the air component goes, one should also stress that the demands on the old tactical transport aircraft Transalls or the C-160s are very high. This would be a good time to have the new A400Ms in play. French Air Force officers all agree that it will be beneficial in the near future to have a plane which could fly straight from France and have the capability to land on the short, tough airfields characteristic of the Mali operation.
The logistics side of the Mali operation was inextricably intertwined with the combat forces in the combat operation.
Murielle Delaporte, based on interviews with the French forces in Mali, has emphasized that the French are re-inventing the Caravan concept but in the context of 21st century operations. They are deploying into combat areas the forces they need but correlated with the support they need as well.
They are not creating mobile Walmarts that need to be defended. And in this effort, various transport means are being used, including convoys (on which she travelled for several days in Mali) as well as airlift of various types.
In other words, the Germans are about to receive the right kind of airlift for 21st century operations, rather than just repairing a gap.
The A400M can help shape a strategic rethink of the kind of military operations, which Germany needs to contribute to ensure European security and defense for 21st century threats.
Not surprisingly, critics have emerged which harp on what are argued are shortcomings of the initial A400Ms in the hands of the French.
But there seems to be a point missed by German critics: compared to what?
Non-existent airlifters versus a new airlifter begin its life quite successfully in France.
We will soon publish the findings of our colleague Murielle Delaporte from her visit in June 2014 to the first operational squadron of A400Ms based in Orléans.
The planes at Orléans are clearly just the beginning of the long life of the operational A400M fleet and the French Air Force is a foundational operator of the A400M.
As such, the FAF is in a position to suggest changes to the coming A400Ms based on their initial experiences with the plane and their support of the aircraft.
The good news for Germany is that the A400M is not just a plane but a long-term enterprise.
Unlike the Transall experience, France and Germany will not start with a common plane and end up with two very different planes.
The commonality inherent within the aircraft can allow the users to end up with the capability to support one another in common operations.
The Airbus A400M new generation airlifter has successfully demonstrated its ability to airdrop multiple containers of the kind typically used in military and humanitarian operations. In tests conducted at Cazaux, France, the aircraft dropped 24 x 1 ton Container Delivery Systems (CDS) in a single pass. The 48 x 48 inch containers are loaded in two rows inside the cargo hold and released by gravity. This test demonstrates the maximum capacity of the A400M for this type of container and is a key contractual requirement for the A400M. Credit: DGA 10/10/14
If done properly, there is no reason that German maintainers could not support other A400M aircraft operating in an area of interest where Germans are deployed.
There is common training as well which has proven its validity already in how the French drew upon the training in Seville and applied it to the standup of the squadron at Orléans. The experience of the various users of the plane will be shared in the common training body of knowledge and the stand up of a core user group.
Common parts can be pooled as well as the plane is shaped around common unique identification numbers (UIDS) stamped on the parts. Common inventory control across national inventories is enabled by such an approach. It is up to the nations to leverage this capability and to share parts.
Already a number of agreements are in place to shape common practices and approaches, which can both, enhance cost and combat effectiveness.
An airlifter is bought to deploy; and any approaches, which allow for that aircraft at the point of engagement to be sustained more effectively is a crucial point in its favor, and certainly this can be true for the A400M, understood as an enterprise and not as single point of entry aircraft.
For example, the European Air Transport Command provided a news update on October 7, 2013 highlighting a French-German agreement on common training.
On 30 September 2013 French Air Chief General Denis Mercier and his German counterpart General Karl Müllner signed a Technical Agreement (TA) about the future A400M training. The agreement was signed at the French Air Base Orléans-Bricy – quite after the official welcome of the first A400M aircraft at its first operational home, the French MEST (Multinational Entry into Service Team).
The TA enables the training of pilots, loadmasters and technicians in mixed classes. One example: While the basic flight training on the A400M will take place at the German Air Transport Wing 62 in Hannover-Wunstorf, the tactical training follows at Orléans-Bricy, where the French training facilities are located.
While the basis for the training on this brand new aircraft is now settled, EATC’s Functional Division can start developing contents for the training itself. Therefore “the signatures below this treaty may challenge the EATC” states Major General Pascal Valentin, Commander of the EATC, “but surely also underline the EATC‘s key role in the employment of this new aircraft. We are looking forward to service the best to benefit the EATC Participating Nations (PN).”
As future operator of the Airbus A400M the EATC will run – via its hubs at the national wings – up to at least 100 A400M of all EATC PN.
Another example is a joint UK-French agreement on support for the A400M.
In an article by Andrew Chuter published in Defense News on July 5, 2014:
A British MoD spokeswoman said the slot swap was part of an Anglo-French drive to cooperate on the program.
“Collaborative opportunities between Great Britain and France aimed at delivering further financial savings, program efficiencies and/or operational effectiveness benefits, are already being exploited,” she said.
A French Air Force spokesman said the two nations are close to extending cooperation efforts on spares and for a single support contract management arrangement.
“Cooperation with the UK on spare parts and maintenance is a strong common objective within both MoDs,” said the spokesman.
“A lot of work has been done so far and much progress has allowed us to reach a common concept. Negotiations with Airbus Defence and Space are now converging and a common contract has been prepared in order to have the support services ready in September for when the UK receives their first aircraft. This relatively short duration contract, around two years, will allow both nations to measure the benefit of pooling spares and managing only one contract,” said the spokesman.
France, which already operates the aircraft, has a full in-service support arrangement with Airbus. Britain has a similar agreement in place as the first RAF delivery flight nears.
The September delivery was made possible after Britain and France agreed late last year to swap production slots on two aircraft. That swap will see the British receive aircraft slots previously earmarked by the French for September this year and April 2015, while France takes over British slots in 2018 and 2021.
In short, for Germany the A400M is not just a crucial gap filler, but a step forward in crafting the kind of 21st century military capabilities Germany needs to execute its national defense missions and to contribute to core coalitions crucial to Germany as well.
And it should be noted that the first German A400M also flew today as well.
According to an Airbus Military press release dated October 14, 2014:
The first Airbus A400M new generation airlifter ordered by the German Air Force has made its maiden flight, marking a key milestone towards its delivery. The aircraft, known as MSN18, took off from Seville, Spain today at 14:30 local time (GMT+1) and landed back on site 4 hours and 58 minutes later.
Experimental Test Pilot Thomas Wilhelm, who captained the flight, said after landing: “It is a great privilege to have conducted the first flight of the German Air Force’s first A400M. I am absolutely confident that the combination of strategic range with true tactical capability that it brings will contribute enormously to the service’s air mobility capability for military and humanitarian missions.”
The aircraft is the first of 53 ordered by the German Air Force and will be known in-service as the A400M Atlas.
Initial A400M Operations:
First A400M Operational Mission Flown Into Africa:
An A400M operated by the French Air Force (Armee De L’Air) has become the first of type to perform an operational flight delivering 22 tons of supplies in support of France’s Operation Serval in Mali.
The new generation airlifter, the second to be taken into service by the French Air force, flew out of Orleans air base in December 29 on a close to seven hour mission that also involved taking French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian to Mali as well as Chad and Niger Flight International reports.
The mission was flown by the second A400M to be delivered to the European nation’s air force and was “carefully planned in order to overcome all eventualities” according to mission commander, identified only as Lieutenant Colonel Creuset.
This included using a newly installed full mission simulator at the Orleans air force base.
Although the German Air Force will receive the first own A400M “Atlas” planned in November 2014 – and Belgium in 2018 – both nations can already use the services of the new European transport aircraft: On 09 August 2014, the A400M flew for the first time German part load out of Cologne military airport towards Washington Dulles airport. MSN008 (military 0008/F-RBAB) returned today from the Canada with first Belgian and additional French part load on board – having since then crossed some international borders…
Crossing new borders
The original mission – led by two French crews on board – was to carry out French aircraft equipment out of Orléans, where all three EATC assigned (and French) A400M are actually stationed.
Flight overview of A400M international flight. Credit: EATC
When also air transport requests from Belgium and Germany found their way to the EATC, it turned out, that all three nations could be serviced with one combined mission.
This mission was consequently designed in a way that the aircraft was first to land in Cologne-Wahn. The aircraft then turned over to Shannon (Ireland) for a fuel stop. Crossing the Atlantic the Atlas entered Washington Dulles Airport in the late evening, where the aircraft lifted its cargo bay – the German partload was addressed to the German detachment at Holloman Air Force Base (New Mexico).
The planned flight path sent the aircraft further to Calgary (Alberta, Western Canada), where it took up the Belgian as well as additional French partload. After a planned fuel stop at Quebeck City (Quebeck, Eastern Canada), the aircraft again headed over the Atlantic towards Brussels military airport at Melsbroek, where MSN008 arrived at 10.15 local. Finally reaching its home base, the “Atlas” had covered a total distance of more than 10.000 nautical miles, nearly 20.000 kilometers.
Always in the starting blocks
Watching this remarkable aircraft diving through the skies is also due to many EATC impulses within its Functional Division, where aircraft specialists of the EATC Participating Nations created successfully a number of concepts to accelerate the aircrafts introduction into the national Air Forces.
“We have made our homework yet”, remarks EATC Commander, Major General Christian Badia, as EATC provides guidance and know-how, e.g. by enhancing many interoperability measures around the new aircraft – thus decreasing later expensive harmonization procedures.
“When in a few months the first German A400M touches the ground of Air Transport Wing 62 in Hannover-Wunstorf, the German Air Force can rely on us when it comes to functional and operational issues on this very modern aircraft. By the way, this first complex A400M mission with international payload indicates, that EATC gathers all the momentum, taking action and care to make the A400M introduction a success – in functional as well as in operational matters. And it (EATC) has to, because in less than one decade we run a hundred of this remarkable aircraft.”
The fifth Airbus A400M delivered to the French Air Force flew its first real operational sorties the first week of October in support of Operation Barkhane, the combined name of the previous French operations Serval (Mali) and Epervier (Chad) and extended to cover all the former French colonies in the region that also include Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger. Barkhane’s primary target is to fight armed terrorists and rebel groups in the Sahel / Sahara Region.
Having completed 50 hours of flight, the A400M Atlas left French Airbase BA123 Orléans on 1 October with 3 pilots, 3 crew and 2 mechanics on board for N’Djamena in Chad.
It made stop-overs in Istres, Niamey, Ouagadougou, Kinshasa and – on the return flight – in Brussels before returning home on 3 October. To Niamey it took 20 tons of cargo, to N’Djamena another 19 tons divided over 9 pallets.
Before the arrival of the A400M an Armée de l’Air’s C160 Transall would have done the job, but with a lesser load and a mission that would last 5 days in stead of three.
2014-10-13 For the United States, the land wars of the past decade led to a significant redirection of its military forces and highlighting key role for the US Army and the USMC playing its ground operations role and to the support of those forces by the US Air Force and the US Navy. A large logistics operation via land, sea, and ground along with significant expenditures to civilian contractors such as Maersk to support the effort was entailed as well.
It has led to a significant bulging of the Department of Defense toward the US Army and its leadership with the other forces largely in a support role.
A major centerpiece of this effort has been Counter Insurgency Operations and the training of local forces to support local governance or a significant role highlighted for national building.
Stability operations were highlighted over traditional conventional operations, and the nuclear dimension of the force structure reduced and largely de-emphasized.
This bulging makes no sense going forward.
A forthcoming article in Front Line Defence discusses a number of the issues presented in the Rome briefing. Credit: Front Line Defence
The U.S. has insertion forces able to engage and withdraw, and several core allies are shaping similar forces, rather than setting up long-term facilities and providing advisers as targets.
The ability to establish air dominance to empower multi-mission USMC insertion force able to operate effectively, rapidly and withdraw is a core effort that now exists in US way of war for emerging 21st century conflicts.
The classic dichotomy of boots on the ground versus airpower really does not capture the evolving capabilities of either airpower or the evolving capabilities of ground forces capitalizing on those evolving capabilities to provide for more effective and more lethal insertion forces.
2014 with a vengeance has challenged this agenda of the last decade and laid down the grounds for shaping a new one.
An evolving pattern of 21st century conflict is emerging.
It is a pattern in which state and non-state actors are working to reshape the global order in their favor by generating conflicts against the interests of the democracies but which the democracies are slow to react.
In a briefing delivered in Rome on October 3, 2014, Robbin Laird and John Blackburn discussed the challenges of dealing with 21st century conflicts and the approaches being taken by the USMC and the RAAF to dealing with these challenges. The seminar was sponsored by Airpress and held at the Centro Alti Studi per la Difesa (CASD).
The briefing was followed by a presentation by the Italian Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Lt. General Preziosa.
We will publish an interview with Lt. General Preziosa in the near future.
L’evoluzione dei conflitti militari nel ventunesimo secolo e il ruolo della Nato sono gli argomenti di un seminario a porte chiuse organizzato il 3 ottobre a Roma dalla rivista Airpress presso il Centro alti studi per la difesa.
Speaker saranno il capo di Stato maggiore dell’Aeronautica militare, il generale Pasquale Preziosa, il cofondatore di Seconde line of defense, Robbin Laird e l’Air vice-marshal della Raaf australiana, John Blackburn. Parteciperà al dibattito una platea ristretta composta da diplomatici, think tanker, rappresentanti del mondo accademico, dell’impresa e delle Istituzioni, mentre i lavori saranno introdotti da una relazione scritta “a quattro mani” dai due ospiti stranieri.
Laird è uno dei più autorevoli commentatori americani di fatti della difesa (collabora anche con Defense News e Breaking Defense) ed è autore di numerosi volumi tra i quali il più recente «Rebuilding american military power in the Pacific: A 21st century strategy».
Blackburn invece ha mosso i primi passi della sua lunga carriera nel settore aeronautico come pilota da combattimento, per poi scalare le gerarchie militari del suo Paese. Oggi è consulente per dossier di sicurezza nazionale e membro dell’Australian strategic policy institute council, con il quale lavora a una riorganizzazione della Difesa di Canberra.
L’incontro sarà un’occasione per confrontare differenze e “best practice” nei settori di aerospazio e difesa di Usa, Italia e Australia e per uno scambio sulle strategie internazionali in questi campi fra Alleanza atlantica ed Europa, tanto più dopo il vertice in Galles e alla luce delle scelte che saranno prese in Italia nel Libro Bianco. L’obiettivo è lavorare a un nuovo approccio della sicurezza dell’Occidente e dei suoi alleati che tenga conto dei mutati scenari globali, a cominciare dai maggiori investimenti militari di Paesi ormai non più emergenti.
Il riferimento è al tema del burden sharing e cioè dell’assunzione di responsabilità condivise tra gli Usa e l’Ue nell’ambito delle crisi regionali e delle comuni esigenze di difesa tra le due sponde dell’Atlantico, non ultime quelle relative a programmi strategici, come il caccia di quinta generazione F-35.
From September 20 to September 24, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted its first port visit to Iran and its first entry into the territorial waters of Iran and the Persian Gulf.
Two vessels belonging to the PLAN East Sea Fleet, the Changchun and the Changzhou, docked at Bandar Abbas, the capital of Iran’s Hormozgān Province located in southern Iran.
The Iranian navy has its main base in the city’s port, which is strategically located on the Strait of Hormuz, which ships traverse when entering or leaving the Persian Gulf. The province’s Governor General, Jassem Jadari, described the encounter as “indicative of solidarity between the two nations and armies.”
PLAN ship Type 052C Luyang II destroyer Changchun enters the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas on Sept. 20, 2014. Fars News Agency
Commissioned in early 2013, the Changchun, a Type 052C Luyang II guided-missile destroyer, is one of China’s newest ships. It is equipped with an active phased array radar and medium-to-long-range ship-to-air missiles. The Changchun is 155 meters long and 17 meters wide, with a displacement of 5,700 tons. The Changzhou is a Type 054A Jiangkai II guided-missile frigate.
Both ships have been serving in the PLAN’s 17th Escort Task Force as part of China’s rotating counter piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden.
The Iranian media broke the story and Iranian sources have provided most details regarding the exercise, which Iran termed “Velayat 3.”
Admiral Amir Hossein Azad, commander of Iran’s First Naval Zone, and Iran’s Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari said that the sailors exchanged intelligence and technical information, practiced fighting pirates, simulated search and rescue drills, and rehearsed coordinating tactical operations and avoiding and managing maritime disasters.
Iran’s Fars News said that the drills occurred in both Iran’s territorial waters and in the international waters of the Gulf off Iran’s coast.
The Iranian media also reported that the two PLAN warships had 650 sailors on board, who engaged in cultural and sports activities with their Iranian counterparts. The ships’ officers met with their Iranian naval counterparts but also provincial officials.
Azad said that Iran’s ambassador and military attaché in Beijing organized the port visit and exercise.
After a meeting with the Chinese commanders, he announced that the two navies would conduct larger drills in the future.
Following media inquiries, the China’s Ministry of National Defense confirmed the port visit and that the ships would practice exchanging data and “joint operational capabilities” with Iranian warships.
The Chinese Navy website later posted comments by Rear Adm. Huang Xinjian, commander of the 17th Escort Task Force and deputy chief of staff of the PLA’s East Sea Fleet, who said that the PLAN visit to Iran was intended to “deepen mutual understanding, and to enhance exchanges between our two countries’ navies.”
According to the Iranian press, the PRC Ambassador to Iran Pang Sen said that “this visit by the fleet of China is part of our joint efforts to strengthen the good relationship of cooperation between our two countries.”
The Chinese ships stayed 4-5 days and then conducted a similar port visit and naval drills with Pakistan, a long-standing Chinese ally and the main purchaser of Chinese naval vessels.
A Chinese company runs major facilities in Pakistan’s Indian Ocean port of Gwadar, which could provide the PLAN with a key naval base near the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.
In announcing their arrival, one Chinese journalist broke with the general PRC line of downplaying the military dimension of the Iran visit and stated that the Chinese and Iranian ships had “carried out drills on anti-access and aerial denial strategies against the United States.”
Even disregarding this sole source, the visit was a natural evolution for both navies. The Chinese Navy, though still primarily focused on defending the seas around China, has been venturing on longer patrols in recent years.
In addition to sustaining a de facto permanent presence in the Gulf of Aden since late 2008, where several Chinese ships have been fighting pirates alongside warships from dozens of other countries, the PLAN has been conducting many more foreign port visits and exchanges.
Meanwhile, the Iranian Navy has also deployed ships to fight pirates in the Gulf of Aden since 2008. The Iranian media cited several cases when Iranian warships helped rescue Chinese commercial vessels under attack by pirates, who attack ships of any nationality.
Iran has been striving to develop security ties with foreign countries, especially great powers like China, to break out of its regional isolation.
Iran’s navy commander Habibollah Sayyari (C) points while standing on a naval ship during Velayat-90 war game on Sea of Oman near the Strait of Hormuz in southern Iran, Jan. 1, 2012. (photo by REUTERS/Fars News/Hamed Jafarnejad)
With both fleets expanding their range of operations, Chinese and Iranian ships naturally encounter each other more frequently, so they would understandably want to develop procedures to govern these encounters and to improve their interoperability.
Yet, the direct Chinese-Iran military partnership has been growing.
For decades, China’s main defense-related activity with Iran consisted of selling weapons to Iran but also its potential Middle eastern adversaries like Saudi Arabia. But in 2010 Chinese warplanes refueled in Iran on their way to participate in exercises in Turkey (also an unprecedented Chinese military engagement in Europe with a NATO member). This stopover marked the first visit to Iran by a foreign air force since that country’s 1979 Islamic revolution.
Then, in early March 2013, an Iranian flotilla that included the Sabalan destroyer and the Kharg helicopter carrier became the first Iranian warships to visit China. They docked in China’s port city of Zhangjiagang following a 13,000 kilometers, 40-day voyage. In May of this year, Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan visited China to discuss military cooperation.
Although the Chinese Ministry of Defense downplayed the importance of the exercise as a routine “friendly visit” and counterpiracy drill, Tang Zhichao, a research fellow with the Institute of West Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, cited China’s growing “security interests in the Middle East and strategic maritime passages such as the Persian Gulf.”
Looking ahead, one reason for the Chinese deployment may be to prepare the PLAN to conduct more extensive missions in the Middle East and South Asia in coming years. China’s vital energy supplies traverse these waters and many Chinese nationals have been working in the Middle East.
China has been seeking naval access facilities in the region as part of a strategy that has been described as building a “string of pearls.”
In 2011, the PLA Navy had to evacuate thousands of Chinese expatriate workers and their families caught in the Libyan Revolution. Now the rise of ISIL is presented a new threat to the Chinese nationals working in Iraq and Syria.
For now, China has no choice but to rely on the U.S. Navy, whose main naval base in Bahrain is not far from the site of the PLAN port visit in Ira, to keep these waterways open for Persian Gulf oil exports.
But Chinese strategists may be looking decades ahead to a time when the PLAN may need to replace or compete with the U.S. Navy.
On the one hand, the Chinese are naturally uncomfortable about the ability of the U.S. Navy to intercept their oil imports from the Persian Gulf. China has been building land-based pipelines and other transportation links to Iran to minimize this vulnerability.
On the other hand, Chinese commentators have been increasingly questioning the U.S. will and ability to main global security, pointing to how many countries have defied U.S. red lines while Iraq and Afghanistan remain in turmoil despite a decade of U.S. military occupation.
Tang Zhichao, a research fellow with the Institute of West Asian and African Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, explained that, “as the West’s capability and will to maintain regional security weakens, Gulf regions are looking to other world powers such as China to step in.”
But while the West might welcome a greater security role for China in Afghanistan or Iraq, the Persian Gulf is a more complex region where Western governments would view a major Chinese military presence less favorably.
Editor’s Note: Here is how an Azerbaijani source looked at the exercise:
While heading a high-ranking military delegation, the commander of Iran’s Navy Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari arrived in China Oct. 19 for an official visit at the invitation of his Chinese counterpart.
Seeking grounds for boosting mutual cooperation between the two sides’ armed forces, as well as naval cooperation will be touched during the visit, Sayyari said, Iran’s official IRNA news agency reported.
The commander said that providing Iran’s navy with some technical requirements by Chinese side will be also discussed during the visit.
An Iranian delegation is expected to visit China’s naval training centers, Sayyari added.
Earlier in May Iran’s defense minister, Hossein Dehghan visited China and discussed military cooperation issues with Chinese officials.
The two sides stressed expansion of mutual military and security cooperation between the two countries.
During a meeting with his Chinese counterpart Chang Wanquan Dehghan underlined that the two countries can expand their military cooperation to eliminate “common concerns on extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking and piracy.”
China is believed to have helped Iran in various military fields including training of high-level officials on advanced systems, providing technical support, supplying steel for missile construction, providing control technology for missile development, building a missile factory and a test range.
American combat veterans, from fighting an enemy or a disease, should always be concerned about a grateful nation not protecting them.
A generation of Vietnam Veterans were ignored and allowed to die alone waiting in the dark during their end of life years.
So active duty military and their families have every right to be concerned when the Government finds a new mission for them involving new risks.
With respect to putting the US Government front and center in helping the troops who were exposed to Agent Orange and environmental factors causing Gulf War illness one visionary DVA Secretary said not on his watch.
On May 11, 1989 DVA Secretary Derwinski held a news conference and sided with America’s Veterans; he stopped the US Government legal case that was denying disability compensation to Vietnam in-theater veterans based on exposure to Agent Orange (AO). The Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) were very appropriately aggressive in support of USG taking full responsibility to address the adverse health effects of Agent Orange.
Consequently, prior to his action there was little to no motivation for Vietnam Veterans to apply for disability compensation based on exposure to Agent Orange because the VA rejected AO service-connected disability requests. Also, many in those days had justified distaste for the government.
The Washington Post in Secretary Derwinski’s obituary acknowledged his vision and leadership.
Siding with the veterans, Mr. Derwinski reversed the government’s position and authorized payments to some veterans who had suffered from a rare form of cancer linked to Agent Orange.
Secretary Derwinski corrected an historic violation of the social contract between those who protect us and all other citizens.
Now, for younger veterans, tragically, the environmental effects of the battlefield are now being seen.
Starting with Desert Storm veterans and continuing for those serving in our current wars, the Government has learned from AO.
This time the VA has created an early registry motivated by Secretary Derwinski. The American Legion was very aggressive in leading the effort to create a Gulf War registry.
I noted in an article written in 2009, that the Iraq War introduced problems of its own.
For our next generation of veterans, one cause of the growing problem of “Gulf War Illness” is exposure to Iraq chemical munitions inside bunkers that were blown up in Desert Storm.
Even today, some residual chemical munitions (yes, WMDs) have been found.
Unfortunately, the impact of chemical weapons in Iraq followed a similar pattern to AO: the US Government and Military again reverted true to form in covering up deadly agents on the battlefield. It took five more years for the New York Times to break the story:
In all, American troops secretly reported finding roughly 5,000 chemical warheads, shells or aviation bombs.
The American government withheld word about its discoveries even from troops it sent into harm’s way and from military doctors. The government’s secrecy, victims and participants said, prevented troops in some of the war’s most dangerous jobs from receiving proper medical care and official recognition of their wounds.
Jarrod L. Taylor, a former Army sergeant on hand for the destruction of mustard shells that burned two soldiers in his infantry company, joked of “wounds that never happened” from “that stuff that didn’t exist.” The public, he said, was misled for a decade. “I love it when I hear, ‘Oh there weren’t any chemical weapons in Iraq,’ ” he said. “There were plenty.”
There was one senior political appointee in the Bush Administration who did try and bring “sunlight” on Chemical Munitions in Iraq.
In 2004, Dr John “Jack” Shaw Deputy Under Secretary Defense for International Technology Security/OSD focused on Chemical munitions in Iraq, and he was fired.
Documents shown to U.S. officials in 2004 revealed that among the weapons removed by the Russians were chemical agents used in making poison gas.
Mr. Shaw was removed from his position shortly after going public with the disclosures.
The Defense Intelligence Agency dismissed the claims of covert Russian-Iraqi weapons transfers to Syria and Lebanon as Israeli propaganda, officials said at the time.
Consequently, for another decade troops were being exposed to chemical munitions and the Department of Defense covered it up.
Now the President, as Commander-in-Chief has ordered US military into one of the most dangerous Ebola hot zones in the world.
To be fair to President Obama he gave the order with full transparency, and has had some very public Congressional support.
But it is a good idea to “trust but verify” when dealing with exposing troops to new risks.
Learning from the ugliness of Agent Orange and Chemical Munitions in Iraq it is very important to ask some very hard questions up front.
And checking official US Government publications on Ebola can provide significant insight into exactly how much a risk Ebola is to our troops.
The entry for Ebola designates it as a Bio Safety Level (BSL) 4 agent.
The definition of what “Bio Safety Level 4 Agent” is:
Biosafety Level 4 is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections and life-threatening disease that is frequently fatal, for which there are no vaccines or treatments, or a related, agent with unknown risk of transmission.
In dealing with Ebola, the Government has prepared guidelines for dealing with “Selected Agents.”
The select agent program requires adherence to the BMBL for any entity registered with the CDC Division of Select Agents and Toxins.
Select agents and toxins are a subset of biological agents and toxins that the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Agriculture (USDA) have determined to have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety, to animal or plant health, or to animal or plant products.
The protective regulations covers industry, although diagnostic clinics may be exempt. Note that it says “should consider” the BMBL. There is some flexibility in implementation, but significant variance from the BMBL can get a lab put on a “Performance Improvement Plan” or have their registration suspended or revoked.
42 C.F.R. §73.12 Biosafety.
(a) An individual or entity required to register under this part must develop and implement a written biosafety plan that is commensurate with the risk of the select agent or toxin, given its intended use. The biosafety plan must contain sufficient information and documentation to describe the biosafety and containment procedures for the select agent or toxin, including any animals (including arthropods) or plants intentionally or accidentally exposed to or infected with a select agent.
(b) The biosafety and containment procedures must be sufficient to contain the select agent or toxin (e.g., physical structure and features of the entity, and operational and procedural safeguards).
(c) In developing a biosafety plan, an individual or entity should consider:
(1) The CDC/NIH publication, “Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories.” This document is available on the National Select Agent Registry Web site at http://www.selectagents.gov.
(2) The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations in 29 CFR parts 1910.1200 and 1910.1450. This document is available on the National Select Agent Registry Web site at http://www.selectagents.gov
(3) The “NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules,” (NIH Guidelines). This document is available on the National Select Agent Registry Web site at http://www.selectagents.gov
(d) The biosafety plan must include an occupational health program for individuals with access to Tier 1 select agents and toxins, and those individuals must be enrolled in the occupational health program.
(e) The plan must be reviewed annually and revised as necessary. Drills or exercises must be conducted at least annually to test and evaluate the effectiveness of the plan. The plan must be reviewed and revised, as necessary, after any drill or exercise and after any incident.
[70 FR 13316, Mar. 18, 2005, as amended at 77 FR 61114, Oct. 5, 2012]
Remembering the Agent Orange and currently breaking Chemical Munitions health impact, the military is preparing for engaging against Ebola.
Sweeping under the rug the effects the government does not like, and putting the burden on the troops is not acceptable.
And the approach being taken to deal with Ebola seems to be falling into this historical pattern.
The adverse health effects of Ebola can move at light speed compared to toxin exposure in previous wars.
As the U.S. military rushes to combat Ebola in West Africa, soldiers are receiving on-the-fly instructions on how to protect themselves against the deadly virus.
So a key question–Where is the Military published Ebola “Bio-Safety Program?”
And if the US Army can spend $52 Billion on building 22,000 MRAPS mostly abandoned and rusting off shore where are the protective suits for all troops actually having even a remote possibility of being exposed.
They call these space suit labs, in part because Dover makes both space suits for NASA and protective suits for maximum-security bio facilities.
Any pundits, reporters and Pols in favor of engaging Ebola in Africa relying on what is being reported about protecting the troops should have no problem being embedded with the front line troops-or would they?
How does the Army medical protocol bible get rewritten to support an insertion of troops into an Ebola contagion zone?
Clearly, the US Army “protocol’s” should be compared with other USG procedures, guidance and protocols to see Army comportment with other written guidance along with actual employed training, practice and actions in Africa.
In addition, a publicly available inventory of gear available with the troops going into Ebola infested territory should be made known and any difference between level 4 pathogen treatment research and exposure gear and battlefield Chem/Bio gear be presented.
Essentially do the troops have enough of what is best for their protection and how are all being trained?
If National Guard Units are called up Governors are also responsible for safe pattern and practices to protect their troops.
Let’s get this right and not make Ebola the third strike after AO and chemical weapons in violating the sacred trust of protecting those who has borne the battle to his widow and orphans.
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