Maritime Robotics: Boeing and Liquid Robotics Work on Maritime Solutions

09/24/2014

2014-09-24 According to a piece published by our partner AUVSI, Boeing and Liquid Robotics have signed a Multiyear Agreement for Maritime Defense Solutions.

Aviation giant Boeing and unmanned maritime company Liquid Robotics have signed a global multiyear agreement to collaborate on product development, maritime services and operational deployment.

Wave Glider SV3 Photo courtesy Liquid Robotics Inc.
Wave Glider SV3 Photo courtesy Liquid Robotics Inc.

First priorities for the companies include developing total integrated solutions for antisubmarine warfare, maritime domain awareness and other maritime defense applications, according to a company press release.

“Together, Boeing and Liquid Robotics will provide customers an integrated, seafloor-to-space capability for long-duration maritime defense,” says Gary Gysin, president and CEO of Liquid Robotics.  

Boeing will help propel Liquid Robotics’ Wave Glider autonomous ocean vehicle lineup with its experience in multilayered intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance solutions both in development and in the field, says the release.

“This relationship allows the Boeing-Liquid Robotics team to solve maritime security and surveillance challenges in entirely new and highly effective ways and provides highly unprecedented capability and value to customers worldwide,” says Boeing Defense, Space and Security President and CEO Chris Chadwick.

 

 

An Update on Airpower in Iraqi and Syrian Operations

2014-09-24 The first use of the F-22 in combat has garnished a fair share of attention.

But the F-22 is part of an integrated air operation and only the anomalies of a politically motivated Secretary of Defense kept it on the sidelines in Operation Odyssey Dawn.

Enter a new Sec Def without the anomalies of trying to make political points about a core combat asset, and the F-22 can enter the battlespace.

The broader point is simply that the F-22 is a key element in providing overall force protection for the air combat fleet.

F-22A Raptor pilots with the 94th Fighter Squadron at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, fly in 10 ship aircraft formation on Aug 17 in Celebration of the squadron's 90th Birthday. The 94th Fighter Squadron is the second continuously-active fighter squadron in the United States. Formed on Aug 20, 1917, at Kelly Field, Texas, it is the first all-American squadron to fly a patrol in France during World War I. (United States Air Force Photo by Staff Sgt Samuel Rogers)
F-22A Raptor pilots with the 94th Fighter Squadron at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia, fly in 10 ship aircraft formation on Aug 17, 2007 in Celebration of the squadron’s 90th Birthday. The 94th Fighter Squadron is the second continuously-active fighter squadron in the United States. Formed on Aug 20, 1917, at Kelly Field, Texas, it is the first all-American squadron to fly a patrol in France during World War I. (United States Air Force Photo by Staff Sgt Samuel Rogers

The use of airpower in an unfriendly nation’s airspace will always enhance the threats to the operational force, and in the case of Syria, the presence of SAMs and other air systems provides enough of a threat that ensuring the safety of the overall operational fleet is important.

If you have declared a “red line” against the head of state of a country, presumably when you decide to operate in that state’s airspace you can not count on the automatic acquiescence of the redlined state!

One should note that the Air Combat Command has focused on air operational integration, within which the F-22 is a key element which means that the inclusion of the F-22 would be the norm, not an anomaly.

Again, no surprise, but the operational force working to attenuate the ISIS threat and presence in the region includes the F-22.

Not only the question of force protection, but with the ability to use the latest variants of the small diameter bomb, precision targeting on the fly is a reality fr the F-22 as well.

As Lt. General (Retired) Deptula commented in a Breaking Defense piece about the appearance of the F-22 in the Iraqi and Syrian air operations:

“Effective planning requires the use of the right force at the right place at the right time,” Dave Deptula, the man who ran the air war in Afghanistan, says in an email.

“The F-22 is the world’s most advanced combat aircraft and has the ability to negate the effectiveness of threat air defense systems.

That’s why it was used in this case.

There was no ‘dry spell’; rather, the previous operations in the permissive airspace of Iraq and Afghanistan did not require their capabilities.”

In an interview with ABC news Australia, Lt. General (Retired) Deptula provided an overview on how to look at the overall air campaign in Iraq and Syria.

Deptula emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach which was focused on a multi-faceted effort to destroy ISIS targets and to significantly attrite their ability to operate.

STEVE CANNANE: What kind of air operation is required to destroy Islamic State’s capability in Iraq and Syria?

DAVID DEPTULA: Well, it’s an excellent question, but the answer shouldn’t just be focused on air power alone.

For the use of force to be effective, it has to be part of a cohesive, comprehensive and realistic strategy and campaign.

So, this is a long way of answering your question, but instead of just focusing on one type of medium for the application of force, we need to understand that it’s all about using the right force at the right place at the right time. Now, with that preface, I would tell you that air power is in fact the coalition’s asymmetric advantage in this particular case.

And it will be exceedingly effective in accomplishing the strategic objectives.

What we don’t want to do is get into a situation where coalition forces introduce large numbers of boots on the ground, because in fact, that’s what ISIL exactly wants us to do.

They’ve stated, right up front, in many instances, that they believe that the coalition use of air power is cowardly and that real men fight on the ground.

Well of course that’s exactly what they want to say and they want to goad us into doing because they understand that a critical coalition vulnerability are casualties and they’d like to have the opportunity to induce those casualties.

They can’t be effective against air power.

And so those are a couple of considerations right up front.

STEVE CANNANE: OK. So, they can’t be – necessarily take on the air power of the US and the coalition, but what if the boots do go on the ground?

Is that a likely scenario, because we’ve heard Tony Blair say that he doesn’t think that ISIS can be defeated without a ground offensive of some sort?

DAVID DEPTULA: Well, again, all the elements of power need to be involved.

The question is: in what amount, in what sequence and for what purpose?

And by the way, don’t forget, this cohesive, comprehensive strategy that I’m talking about, and that the President has laid out, involves not just the military use of force, but all elements of power – the economic peace, the diplomatic peace and the informational peace.

So, what air power brings to the equation right up front is the ability to project power vice vulnerability.

And this operation needs to start with 24/7 oversight and then the use of air power to prevent and halt the movement, number one, of ISIL – these would be the operational objective of the campaign – number two to paralyze ISIL leadership and command and control, and then number three, begin to render ISIL ineffective.

Now if those are your three operational objectives to support the strategic outcome, one can see that there will be varied amounts of air and surface forces involved.

But principally upfront, you’re going to use – and you need to use, if you’re going to be effective – large amounts of air operations.

And to be effective, we need to apply air power like a thunderstorm, not a drizzle.

You know, so far we’ve applied four or five strike sorties a day. Let me remind you that the first day of Desert Storm, there were over 2,500 sorties executed.

So, I’m not calling for that kind of an amount of force, but we have to stop applying the tenets of how we used force in the last conflict in today’s conflict.

And ISIL can be paralyzed from the air rapidly. That doesn’t mean that special operations forces, intelligence from the ground isn’t useful, because it clearly is.

But it’s not a matter of either-or, it’s a matter of optimizing air and surface forces in conjunction with one another to achieve the overall objectives.

STEVE CANNANE: So whose surface forces will be used? Because on the weekend President Obama once again repeated his promise that no US ground troops would be deployed against ISIS.

DAVID DEPTULA: Well, again, I would suggest to you that you – one always wants to induce the greatest amount of uncertainty into an adversary’s mindset.

So, I would not recommend someone telegraph what kind of forces will or will not be used.

But leaving aside the political implications here, one has to recognize that it’s the indigenous forces on the ground who are directly affected, it’s the indigenous personnel on the ground in the area that are affected, that need to take ownership of ground force operations.

And that doesn’t mean that the coalition shouldn’t take effective measures to train them and to assist them and to help them.

But the brunt of the activity to recapture towns and villages needs to be done with indigenous forces. Not unlike what we did in Afghanistan.

People forget the first three months of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, by introducing the use of ground – or air power in conjunction with indigenous forces – at the time, the Northern Alliance – allowed us to remove the Taliban regime from power, assure the conditions where a government friendly to the coalition could come into place and we destroyed the al-Qaeda terrorist training camps.

We did that by 31st December, 2001.

STEVE CANNANE: Now that policy may work …

DAVID DEPTULA: Where we got into trouble was by introducing large numbers of boots on the ground in an attempt to do nation-building and to try to change a collection of 16th Century tribes into a modern Jeffersonian democracy.

That’s not what we want to do….

The key to a successful operation against ISIS forces on the ground is to do so without laying down a land grid which could become its own target for ISIS.

The F-22 dropping weapons. Credit: USAF
The F-22 dropping weapons. Credit: USAF

In other words, keep ISIS as the target, and not make the US and allied forces a target on the ground within reach of ISIS forces, capabilities and approaches, and giving them a chance to capture US or allied soldiers and make them pawns in an information warfare effort.

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/its-not-airpower-vs-boots-on-ground-any-more/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/prevailing-in-21st-century-conflicts-leveraging-insertion-forces/

But another key development in the operations against ISIS has been the engagement of Arab Air Forces.

GCC states have been investing and upgrading their air combat capabilities for some time, and with the addition of advanced fighters, weapons and tankers, certainly they make a significant contribution to any joint effort to provide precision strike against ISIS fighters on the ground.

This may have been the first use of the A330MRTT tanker in combat as well, given its prevalence in the GCC states as the tanker of choice, but that will have to be confirmed.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-air-tanker-contribution-to-gulf-security/

The potential for Arab states which are participating in the operation was laid out in The Daily Telegraph in an article published September 23, 2014 and the discussion of the UAE highlights as well that the UAE already has participated in a coalition air strike, namely in what the US calls Odyssey Dawn:

The UAE has 201 combat aircraft organized into three squadrons of US-supplied F-16s and three of French Mirages. Last month, the country showed its ability to carry out air strikes when the UAE bombed Islamist militias in Libya’s capital, Tripoli. In 2011, the UAE also joined Britain and France in the campaign that toppled Col Gaddafi’s regime.

But the UAE shares the traditional Arab reluctance to join Western-led military offensives. Whether its air force is carrying out combat sorties in Syria is unclear. If not, the UAE’s role may be confined to opening its air space and allowing the US to use al-Minhad military air base near Dubai.

And the UAE foreign ministry has clearly confirmed the use of their combat aircraft in the strikes against ISIS:

The United Arab Emirates air force took part in US-led air strikes on Islamic State targets in Syria overnight, the country’s official WAM news agency reported.

The operation took place “in coordination with participating forces in the international efforts against Da’esh”, the foreign ministry said in a statement, using a widely-used term for Islamic State militants.

And a story in the UAE based The National noted that:

Of the five Arab countries involved in the operation, the UAE, Bahrain and Jordan said their jets carried out strikes.

“A formation of Bahrain royal air force aircraft, joining brotherly air forces from the Gulf Cooperation Council and other friendly and allied forces … bombed and destroyed several positions and selected targets belonging to terrorist organizations,” a Bahraini defense official said.

A Jordanian government official said its air force took part, and accused ISIL of trying to infiltrate Jordan through its border with Syria.

Editor’s Note: It is likely that the F-22s delivered SDBs against targets as well in Syria. The USAF has been working and exercising this capability for some time.

On the F-22 and SDBs see the following piece published on 8/6/12 by Tech. Sgt. Dana Rosso, 477th Fighter Group Public Affairs:

During a Combat Hammer exercise Alaska F-22 Raptors became the first operational F-22 unit to drop GBU-39 small diameter bombs.

Although small diameter bombs have been employed by test pilots, Combat Hammer, a weapons system evaluation program sponsored by the 86th Fighter Weapons Squadron, provided an opportunity for an operational unit to employ them in a realistic tactical training environment.

Staff Sgt. Brandon Vice, 477th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron weapons load crew member, guides a GBU-39 small diameter bomb into the main weapons bay of an F-22 during Combat Hammer. Combat Hammer is a weapons system evaluation program sponsored by the 86th Fighter Weapons Squadron, which provides an opportunity for an operational unit to employ them in a realistic tactical training environment. (U.S. Air Force Photo/Tech. Sgt. Dana Rosso).
Staff Sgt. Brandon Vice, 477th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron weapons load crew member, guides a GBU-39 small diameter bomb into the main weapons bay of an F-22 during Combat Hammer. Combat Hammer is a weapons system evaluation program sponsored by the 86th Fighter Weapons Squadron, which provides an opportunity for an operational unit to employ them in a realistic tactical training environment. (U.S. Air Force Photo/Tech. Sgt. Dana Rosso).

“The Utah Test and Training Range is the only location in the United States where the F-22s can employ SDBs at speeds and altitudes unique to the Raptor,” said Maj. Wade Bridges, a Reserve F-22 pilot assigned to the 302nd Fighter Squadron.

The 3rd Wing F-22s that have the upgraded increment 3.1 software were able to drop the GBU-39 SDB. The GBU-39 SDB is a 250 pound precision-guided glide bomb that is intended to provide aircraft with the ability to carry a higher number of bombs and to employ with greater stand-off.

“The employment of the GBU-39s was very successful,” said Bridges. “The ammo and weapons personnel that built and loaded the weapons did so with amazing professionalism and technical expertise. They were evaluated during the entire process and received nothing but praise for their work. The pilots who employed the weapons did an excellent job delivering the weapons in a tactical environment. The entire process from building to employing the weapons was a tremendous success resulting in 100% of the SDBs being released successfully.”

This training event allowed for Total Force Integration across the F-22 fleet. The 302nd Fighter Squadron led a Total Force team from Joint Base Elmendorf Richardson. Pilots from both the 302nd and the 525th Fighter Squadrons and maintainers from the 3rd Maintenance Group and the 477th Fighter Group filled the deployment roster making it a true total force effort from Alaska.

In addition to the Alaska based effort, pilots from the 199th and 19th Fighter Squadrons and their associated maintainers participated in this Combat Hammer. This was the first time operations and maintenance personnel from the 199th and 19th Fighter Squadrons stationed in Hawaii have deployed.

“The successful deployment experience and delivery of air-to-ground weapons is a major milestone for the Hawaiian Raptor operations and maintenance team towards declaration of Initial Operational Capability,” said Lt. Col. Robert Jackson, 19th FS commander.

This video was posted in 2007.

 

 

Malaysia and the A400M: First Plane in Final Assembly for Malaysia

09/23/2014

2014-09-23 The A400M program is an international program with core partners involved from the beginning, notably Turkey and Malaysia.

South Africa is involved in the production process but remains to buy the aircraft, but the prospects seem good for them to do so.

The extensive areas to be covered for the defense and security of Malaysia have been highlighted by recent events in the region, and the A400M will become an important part of enhancing Malaysian security and defense forces to operate in the region.

The first A400M for Malaysia as seen on the final assembly line in Seville Spain, September 2014. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space
The first A400M for Malaysia as seen on the final assembly line in Seville Spain, September 2014. Credit: Airbus Defence and Space

In an earlier interview on Second Line of Defense, M. Ghazemy Mahmud, the editor of the Malaysian based Asian Defence Journal highlighted the importance of the Malysian engagement at the outset of the entry into service of A400Ms worldwide.

How important is it for Malaysia to be on the ground floor for the launch of this new European aircraft program?

Very important.  And both ways, for the European program to operate in Asian conditions and for us to be part of a new global program.

Airbus is certainly not new to us.  We are buying the A380 and other planes on the commercial side with Airbus.

According to an Airbus Defence and Space press release dated September 23, 2014:

The first Airbus A400M new generation airlifter for the Royal Malaysian Air Force is rapidly taking shape at the Airbus Defence and Space final assembly line in Seville, Spain.

All the fully equipped major sections including the wing, tailplane, cockpit, fuselage and landing-gear have been joined ready for ground-testing.

This aircraft will be delivered in the first quarter of 2015, followed by two more later in the year and the fourth and final aircraft in 2016.

The A400M can carry heavy and outsize loads over intercontinental distances at jet-like speeds while retaining true tactical capability to use short and unprepared runways, and can also act as an air-to-air refueler.

The first group of Malaysian pilot trainees are already undergoing instruction at the Airbus Defence and Space International Training Centre and will be joined by maintenance engineers and technicians in the coming weeks.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The First US Soldiers to Participate in Valiant Shield 2014: The 94th AAMDC Plays Its Part

09/22/2014

2014-09-22

In a Story by Sgt. 1st Class Jaquetta Gooden, 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command Public Affairs published on 9/17/14:

ANDERSON AIR FORCE BASE, Guam – Soldiers from the 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command Headquarters; Battery C, 1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery (Regiment) and Task Force Talon come together for Valiant Shield 2014. The exercise began on Sept. 15 and concludes on Sept. 22.

U.S. Forces from around the Pacific Rim take part in this annual exercise. Valiant Shield enables joint forces to work together and gain real world proficiency in detecting, locating, tracking and engaging threats at sea, in the air, on land, and in cyberspace.

The Soldiers of the 94th AAMDC, C/1-1 ADA and Task Force Talon will make their mark in history as the first U.S. Soldiers to participate in Valiant Shield. This marks the sixth exercise in the Valiant Shield series since it begun in 2006.

The 94th AAMDC, which serves as the higher headquarters to C/1-1 ADA and Task Force Talon, will test out its Air/Missile Defense Planning and Control System during this war-gaming exercise.

“The AMDPCS system supports air defense operations, it allows the army air and missile defense command to consolidate and coordinate with all the army air defense assets in the region” said Capt. Lee C. Humphrey, battle captain, 94th AAMDC.

“This impressive technology enables the joint services to work together, to sharpen our collective ability to provide organized command and control, and data links, needed by our joint partners, and to respond to any contingency where it matters, when it matters” said Humphrey.

Valiant Shield is the largest biennial exercise that focuses on integration of joint training between U.S. Forces, bringing together an estimated 18,000 service members from the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

Battery C, 1-1 ADA, a patriot battery out of Okinawa, Japan will be able to test their interoperability with other services during Valiant Shield.

“We are here as an expeditionary force, to improve our ability to rapidly deploy, and to integrate into the joint capabilities in the Pacific” Said 1st Lt. Samuel Bjorkman, fire control platoon leader, C/1-1 ADA.

Valiant Shield allows the U.S. military to develop regional and global power projection capabilities that provide a full range of options to defend our national interests and those of our allies and partners around the world.

This training allows the services to work together as a Joint force and collectively test tactics, techniques and procedures by demonstrating the ability to project power.

“Our joint counterparts have been extremely helpful to us during this training, the Soldiers have been faced with multiple challenges throughout the exercise, however they used their initiative outside their area of expertise to ensure mission success” said Sgt. 1st Class Gustavo A. Arguello, Battle NCOIC, 94th AAMDC.

The Soldiers of the 94th AAMDC, C/1-1 ADA and Task Force Talon will exercise a wide range of capabilities that enables the joint services to work together and help sustain overall readiness of the command.

“These systems ensure that our combat forces can “fight tonight” while assuring our allies, partners, and friends that we stand ready and capable of delivering on our commitment to security” said Humphrey.

The Valiant Shield series is aimed at developing a pre-integrated joint force built from habitual relationships. This force builds interoperable and complementary cross-domain capabilities and benefits from shared realistic training, techniques, and procedures as operational conditions dictate.

 http://www.army.mil/article/133911/94th_AAMDC_Soldiers_Make_History_at_Valiant_Shield_2014/

For our look at the US Army and its missile defense contribution in the Pacific see the following:

http://www.sldforum.com/2014/03/94th-aamdc-warriors-second-nuclear-age/

https://sldinfo.com/the-evolving-contribution-of-the-army-missile-defense-force/

https://sldinfo.com/a-key-army-contribution-to-pacific-defense-the-evolving-missile-defense-mission/

https://sldinfo.com/a-missile-defense-commander-in-the-second-nuclear-age-an-interview-with-the-thaad-commander-on-guam/

https://sldinfo.com/us-and-allied-missile-defense-rma-thinking-leaders-and-their-technological-and-con-ops-counterpunch/

 

 

Acquisition Innovation in the Department of Defense: Breaking the Logjam

2014-09-22 In our series looking back at the achievements of Secretary Wynne in DOD, we are highlighting key aspects of acquisition innovation.

We are both highlighting specific accomplishments, but highlighting more general lessons to be learned about how to foster innovation.

In this interview with “Raleigh” Durham, a veteran of the Pentagon acquisition “wars,” this senior acquisition official discusses the challenges of innovations and provides a specific case study of how Secretary Wynne’s insights, experience and vision aided and abetted the process.

In his interview, Durham highlighted Wynne’s role in breaking the logjam surrounding shaping a joint USN-USAF JUCAS program, and getting the program back on track.

Durham focused on several key elements in shaping innovation.

One has to start with the innovators themselves.

With regard to the UCAV effort, innovation started with “the pure innovators, a couple of bright folks working in Air Force advanced research.

As the process began, they focused on the task of neutralizing mobile SAMs deep in enemy territory.

They came up with the concept of a highly survivable unmanned combat aircraft along with the concept of cooperative autonomy in attacking the SAMs because the required level of survivability was difficult to achieve.”

According to Durham,

Air Force and DARPA ran cooperative autonomy tests simulating an attack on a mobile SAM with regard to X-45 before Mike Wynne came into the Department.

The UCAV was designed as a deep SAM killer.

If sent it in as part of a 3-ship wolf pack they knew how to autonomously, cooperate, develop time to target, and determine which UCAV would jam over the target, which would attack the target and which would cover retrograde or re-attack.

You did not need a lot of power to jam from the UCAV because of its proximity to the target, which is also why the F-35 will be a highly capable in-close EW capable platform as well.

Durham highlighted that the capability was evolving but could not find a program home within the services. OSD PAE had supported the UCAV program with funding but it needed a service home to fully develop the capabilities. And this is when Wynne entered the picture.

X-45A in flight with F-18 #846 chase aircraft, during first GPS-guided weapon demonstration flight April 18, 2004. Credit: NASA, 6/10/10
X-45A in flight with F-18 #846 chase aircraft, during first GPS-guided weapon demonstration flight April 18, 2004. Credit: NASA, 6/10/10 

Sec Def Rumsfeld decided to support the program but how do you get the program to the next step, shaping requirements for the services? Someone like Wynne was needed to see the promise of the innovation, assemble a team and press. There were many subjects worthy of Wynne’s touch and this is one of them.

“History will record that Mike Wynne became the guardian angel of highly survivable, fully autonomous unmanned combat air vehicles.”

Even though Durham was working at PA & E at the time, and Wynne was at A T & L, Wynne reached into the system to heist the program forward. The challenge was how to transfer the program to the services from DARPA.

“If it is going to live, it needs to be transferred to the services.”

A joint program office was set up between the USN and the USAF with a Navy captain initially in charge.

“We had been given money to provide for the joint program office, but we needed to know what they were going to do with the money. Wynne’s leadership at this point proved essential.”

The initial response from the office was less than enthusiastic and to ensure that the program did not deliver a combat capability too quickly, the office focused on the range issue and postured that without air refuelability, the UCAS as then conceived and operational, would not have the range to be useful.

The Joint Program Office focuses on putting their money up against the challenge of making the vehicle refuelable at the expense of anything else.

Development of the vehicle was to stop, until the challenge of refuelability was solved.

This position was conveyed at what Durham called the “high noon” meeting with regard to the program itself.

We were seated around a large table in the AT and L work area, and Marv Sambur (the AF Acquisition Executive at the time) was there with John Young, the Navy acquisition head, expected.

The JCS was there, the program manager, and senior officers and OSD officials.

The briefing officials did not provide us with pre-brief materials and had placed a brief on the table in front of the participants.

Durham then described Mike Wynne’s entrance into the room, providing his often-gregarious entrance to meeting participants. In front of him is a three-ring binder, an inch thick, which provides the brief which he now sees for the first time.

The briefer launches into his brief, and as he does so, Wynne is flipping through the briefing book.

Wynne stops the briefer and asks: let me get this straight: you guys are going to stop development of the vehicle while you spend our money trying to figure out how to do air refueling?

The briefer responded that Wynne was essential correct, and this was being done because air refueling was that important.

After further attempts to “correct” Wynne and explain while solving refueling was more important than evolving air vehicle and its systems, Wynne stands up to his full height, grabs the one-inch binder, now folder, and throws it down on the table and it moves along the table Frisbee style and bumps into one of the principals.

And Wynne states: Come back when you have something to say, and walks out of the room.

The story underscores the importance of not letting normal Departmental processes simply bury an innovation when it is more about processes than capabilities.

According to Durham:

Wynne functioned as a protector of innovation, and the lengths to which an innovator sometimes has to go to protect the effort and overcome the process.

Wynne certainly did that in many cases, and he also represents the kind of leadership one needs to ensure that innovation can succeed.

This was part of breaking the logjam to clear the way for the success of the AF/DARPA/Boeing team to develop and fly the X-45.

Editor’s Note: During the period discussed in this article, J.M. “Raleigh” Durham was working as Director Joint Advanced Concepts in AT&L.

Currently, he is the Director, PMO (Production Management Office) in December 2010. As the “Supply Chain Chief Operating Officer”, the Director of PMO provides Navy Total Force (NTF) wide visibility into the enlisted accession supply chain and develops, collects and displays standardized corporate level enlisted accession metrics.

As Director of Joint Advanced Concepts (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) he was the senior AT&L representative to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and had purview over a broad portfolio of defense programs with responsibility for identifying system-of-systems impacts on potential acquisition decisions.

“J-UCAS is a key transformational program within the Department of Defense’s portfolio. The capabilities offered by this family of systems can have profound implications on the Department’s future warfighting capability and force structure.” Mr. Michael W. Wynne, USD(AT&L) (Acting), 23 June 2003

This is the fifth part in the series. For the previous parts see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-wynne-legacy-generating-and-diffusing-innovation/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/michael-w-wynne-i-hate-logistics/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/innovation-inside-the-bureaucracy/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/innovation-in-the-usaf-a-look-back-by-dr-mark-lewis/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Prevailing in 21st Century Conflicts: Leveraging Insertion Forces

09/21/2014

2014-09-22 By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

As the crises in Europe and the Middle East heat up, the debate quickly turns on which path is crucial to deal with evolving threats: boots on the ground or airpower with no boots on the ground.

The B-2 bomber can drop a significant number of independently targeted small diameter bombs. A key part of the SDB II is a technology called a “tri-mode” seeker — a guidance system which can direct the weapon using millimeter wave radar, uncooled imaging infrared guidance and semi-active laser technology. “The really transformational thing about this product is the fact that our seeker, our tri-mode seeker, allows us to prosecute both those moving and stationary targets from standoff distances to exceed 40 nautical miles both on land and at sea,” said Mike Jarrett, vice president, air warfare systems, Raytheon. Credit Photo: USAF
The B-2 bomber can drop a significant number of independently targeted small diameter bombs. A key part of the SDB II is a technology called a “tri-mode” seeker — a guidance system which can direct the weapon using millimeter wave radar, uncooled imaging infrared guidance and semi-active laser technology. “The really transformational thing about this product is the fact that our seeker, our tri-mode seeker, allows us to prosecute both those moving and stationary targets from standoff distances to exceed 40 nautical miles both on land and at sea,” said Mike Jarrett, vice president, air warfare systems, Raytheon. Credit Photo: USAF

The specter of responses to the 9/11 attack and the various engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq naturally shade perspectives.

Yet changing capabilities and concepts of operations are overcoming the classic distinction as the USMC has become the only tiltrotar enabled force in the world, as the USAF and USN have shaped highly integrated air grids, and advances in both the lethality and effectiveness of manned and unmanned aviation have grown.

And the past decade’s experience of the need to shape a very large and expensive ground grid from which to feed Special Forces and ground operations is not one the US is going to repeat anytime soon.

At the same time, conflict is evolving as well.

The evolving pattern of 21st century conflict is emerging. 

It is a pattern in which state and non-state actors are working to reshape the global order in their favor by generating conflicts against the interests of the democracies but which the democracies are slow to react.

The assumption of ISIS terrorists and Putin’s Russian Ukrainian adventure and the Chinese leadership relying in part on the PLA to expand the domain of Chinese sovereignty is that the slow decision making cycles of democracies can be exploited to make gains.

And gains can be achieved on a piecemeal basis, rather than going for the big grab which can provide a dramatic event usable by democratic leaders to mobilize public opinion and generate resources to respond.

A mix of non-kinetic, kinetic and information warfare elements are blended into an assertive adversary political-military policy against democratic interests.

Russia and the Ukraine

A good case in point is that of Putin and his ongoing efforts to control Ukraine. The actions in Ukraine have included seizure of territory, the use of Special Forces, information war, the use of indigenous Russian armed and trained “separatists,” and other techniques.

Vladimir Putin was a young KGB Officer who was active when President Reagan won the IW against the Soviet Union trying to stop the US and NATO successfully placing tactical nuclear cruise missiles in Europe as a major deterrence move.

In the Euromissile Crisis he learned how not to lose an Information War. Consequently he is shaping a 21st century blend of combining military moves with successful propaganda.

An Emergencies Ministry member walks at a site of a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 plane crash near the settlement of Grabovo in the Donetsk region in this July 17, 2014 file photo.  Credit: REUTERS/Maxim Zmeyev/Files
An Emergencies Ministry member walks at a site of a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777 plane crash near the settlement of Grabovo in the Donetsk region in this July 17, 2014 file photo. Credit: REUTERS/Maxim Zmeyev/Files

By seizing Crimea, Russia set in motion internal pressures aided by direct support to continue map writing in Ukraine and to reduce the size of the territory under the country of the government in Kiev.  The Crimean intervention was destabilizing, and the enhanced role of Russian “separatists” aided and abetted by Moscow within the remainder of Ukraine is part of the Russian 21st century approach to warfare.

The shoot down of the Malaysian airliner by Russian “separatists” and the absence of any Western response to secure the site and work with the Ukrainians to bring the separatist operation to a halt was a key element of his successful strategy.

The US and NATO lost a significant opportunity to do a very good thing in protecting the victims bodies and rolling back literally drunken separatists that could have been achieved by the President of Ukraine calling in an insertion force of MV-22 enabled Marines.

Sadly an opportunity was missed, the US could have responded to the Malaysian shoot down in Ukraine by working with the Ukrainian government to bring in forces to secure the crash site.

If this was the pre-Osprey era, an insertion might be more difficult, but with the tiltrotar assault force the USMC can be put in place rapidly to cordon off the area. Had this occurred it would have signaled a credible global response to the disinformation campaign of Russia and its state-sponsored separatists.

Airpower dominance over Ukraine coupled with the Marines on the ground, and forces loyal to Kiev could have secured the crash site without becoming a permanent US military base. It is about using flexible military insertion forces in ways appropriate to the political mission.

The Emergence of ISIS

The 2014 USMC MV-22 insertion forces can also respond to ISIS threat. The emergence of ISIS is a political force challenging the US President on how to respond with an extremist group aggregating power, trying to build an army and shaping a leadership role in a volatile region. The ISIS rejection of all groups other than their own, a join us or die mantra had been proven to be a very powerful IW weapon.

ISIS is dedicated to the violent destruction of those who object to their leadership of a mythical Middle Ages dream which is directly opposed to any Western values of religious freedom, secularism and tolerance. When you have a group grabbing for power that Al Qaeda finds extreme the United States, Europe and many countries in Middle East, from Israel to Saudi Arabia have a major problem.

ISIS is shaping a brand via its military successes and its ability to eliminate religious opponents; it is a kinetic force using information war to spread the murderous fanatical brand to shape their evolving influence in the region.

The leader does not dress in black or fly a black flag by accident; it is part of the branding effort and the religious information war against their enemies.

https://sldinfo.com/isis-and-information-war-shaping-the-battlespace/

ISIS is a rapidly moving target and needs a response that is not measured in the months and years of a return of the US Army to Iraq to re-start training an Iraqi Army which the Obama Administration has already clearly recognized as part of the problem not the solution. The total collapse of the Iraq Army after a decade of US investment is a testimony to failure, regardless of who is at fault in US planning and execution of Iraq Nation Building.

An ISIS fighter holds a US M-16 rifle as captured Iraqi soldiers lie face down on the ground. ISIS Twitter feed.
An ISIS fighter holds a US M-16 rifle as captured Iraqi soldiers lie face down on the ground. ISIS Twitter feed.

For defenders of COIN, it would have to be explained why time and continued effort would overcome what are clearly deeply rooted fissures within the political texture of Iraq: namely the Sunni-Shite cleavage, the role of Iran and the use of the military by Prime Minister Malki for his own political purposes?

In effect, Maliki has used his Shia-dominated military in ways similar to how Saddam Hussein used his Sunni-dominated military, namely to prop himself up in power and to shape domestic political outcomes to his benefit. Simply changing the name of the leader is not likely to change power realities.

And when the ISIS were able to aggregate forces, the absence of an air enabled ground force, demonstrated a fundamental fact often forgotten: it is not about airpower versus boots on the ground.

As Lt General (Retired) Dave Deptula has pointed out it is about an air dominance enabled ground force versus ones that are not, especially with a 21st Century ISR grid in the air not on the ground.

Consequently in addition to new tiltroter MV-22 technology, a notable political difference between Iraq in 2014 and 2003 is the politics of the Turkish-Kurdish relationship and the ability of the US to build upon that relationship. Kurdistan with their Peshmurga fighting force is one area of Iraq that has immediate promise of thwarting, rolling back and to begin the process of destroying ISIS.

With respect to success in IW, the leaders of Kurdistan deserve great praise because of the tolerance and lifesaving physical sanctuary they provided to the Christians and others. The Kurds can now play a key role in shaping a relatively stable island in a violent region, and provide an important focal point for the United States and its allies. Working with the Kurds and augmenting their autonomy within Iraq, including control of critical oil infrastructure, is a clear objective for the operation of US forces.

Successfully employing airpower to destroy visible items of war such as ISIS captured, tanks, major artillery, rockets, and other road mobile transportation Humvees, MRAPS and their pick-up trucks with automatic weapons can be done.

Destroying this captured US military hardware, which enables ISIS to operate and maneuver, is a key priority.

Sailors launch aircraft from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77). George H.W. Bush is supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Joshua Card/Released)
Sailors launch aircraft from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77). George H.W. Bush is supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Joshua Card/Released)

If the ISIS forces loses their maneuver ability and their crew-served weapons and armored vehicles, especially tanks, to seize terrain and key choke points, they will be forced back into the cities or be forced hide in small units in the countryside.

If US forces can see them outside of cities they can kill them. City fights should be left to what is remaining of the Iraq Army.

ISIS was well on the way to fielding an Army when the US finally engaged.

Focusing upon what is needed to pulverize military capabilities of ISIS to move rapidly and lethally, can buy some strategic maneuver space to sort out what kind of aid the Kurds might really need to protect their augmented territory within a fragmenting Iraq.

Because the US has the option of leveraging our seabase in conjunction with whatever force capabilities might be shaped to support the Kurds, the US is NOT forced to have agreements with a collapsing regime to influence events. The sea-based force can function as the foundation for a force able to operate without the need for specific territorial agreements on basing with fractious factions of Baghdad.

And when they depart, they do not have to leave their equipment behind which can become later seized by hostile forces and used against the United States and its allies.

Leveraging both our sea base aviation strike assets throughout Iraq, and combined with the global strike reach, outside of Iraq of the USAF fighter, bomber and tanker fleet in support of US tactical jets, ISIS will encounter death from above delivered by Air Force and Navy combat pilots. This is war-tipping capability. We don’t need to write a blank check for the insertion of forces of COIN-determined size packages and prop up an ally who is not; we have already done that one.

Buying strategic maneuver space for the immediate period ahead, and pulverizing ISISs military capabilities – trucks, cars, artillery pieces, etc. — are the crucial objectives and is an airpower strike mission. It is about the ISR strike grid in the air rather than relying on the previous US Army way of war building an extensive and expensive operational grid on the ground.

Overcoming the Boots on the Ground Versus Airpower Dichotomy

In both the Ukrainian and Iraq cases, the ability to insert force empowered by airpower is crucial. What is often forgotten about Drones and Special Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan is the need for very large ground-based grid of support necessary to move the ground forces (helicopters) , feed ground forces, provide medical assistance to ground forces to support Special Forces and also the vast targeting appetite for the Drone fleet.

By contrast, the ability to station and supply a Navy Marine Team anywhere around the globe, ready for immediate combat, demonstrates, yet again, why the US Navy Fleets of Carrier Battle Groups and ARG/MEUs are invaluable assets for American military power projection.

Marines and Sailors assigned to Maritime Raid Force, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embark from the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), at sea, on MV-22B Ospreys assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 266 (Reinforced), for a simulated night raid, Feb. 09, 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Kyle N. Runnels/Released)
Marines and Sailors assigned to Maritime Raid Force, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embark from the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), at sea, on MV-22B Ospreys assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 266 (Reinforced), for a simulated night raid, Feb. 09, 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Kyle N. Runnels/Released)

The USMC can easily setup a TEMPORARY FOB for 22nd MEU with their MV-22s somewhere in Kurdistan to conduct missions into Iraq proper to rescue Christians and eliminate any ISIS fanatics in the way in the process and then leave. USS Bush CBG could provide a real combat punch when ISIS mass their forces-or SOCOM/CIA identifies isolated groups. Just like they could have secured the crash site in Ukraine.

This is not about long term occupation and training; this is about ready now USMC sea based tiltrotar MV-22 assault forces coming to the aid of the Kurds and Christians, and setting up a forward operating base that can influence events in the Nineveh plain, helping move threatened minorities to Kurdish protection, all the while working with SOF in country, and then returning aboard ship.

The U.S. has insertion forces able to engage and withdraw, rather than setting up long-term facilities and providing advisers as targets. The ability to establish air dominance to empower multi-mission USMC insertion force able to operate effectively, rapidly and withdraw is a core effort that now exists in US way of war for emerging 21st century conflicts

The classic dichotomy of boots on the ground versus airpower really does not capture the evolving capabilities of either airpower or the evolving capabilities of ground forces capitalizing on those evolving capabilities to provide for more effective and more lethal insertion forces.

A version of this piece has appeared on Breaking Defense:

http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/its-not-airpower-vs-boots-on-ground-any-more/

 

China and Russia: The New Axis

2014-09-21 By Gordon Chang

The United States has not had to confront two peer competitors since the end of the Second World War.

We have not faced a united China and Russia since the last days of the 1950s. Today, however, Beijing and Moscow, standing together, challenge us.

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping refer to the “uniqueness of China-Russia relations.”

Their ties, as both now perceive them, are truly one-of-a-kind. They view themselves in the same terms; they see their interests converging; they are, in short, like-minded.

As a result, the Russians and the Chinese have embarked on a grand project, challenging the American-led international system. They are grabbing territory from neighbors and taking on America at sea and in the sky.

They are both threatening nuclear war and thinking of waging conflicts they believe will stay limited, even if they use nukes.

Many say they will remain wary of the other and will never form a durable partnership, but even if these propositions prove to be correct, the Dragon and the Bear, acting provocatively at the same time, can nonetheless shake the world and make it worse.

The Russian Dynamic

We begin with the junior partner in this dangerous combination, Russia.

Russia is fundamentally a weak state. Its economy last year underperformed every estimate, growing only 1.3%, well down from 2012’s 3.4%. Growth rates have been falling for three years, signaling structural problems. Consumption is sagging as is manufacturing.

And there is one more negative factor. The mild sanctions imposed on Russia are already causing a major disruption to the economy, with money hemorrhaging out of the country, so far more than $200 billion this year.

No surprise then that the economy is near recession. The official forecast is for 0.5% growth this year, but even that is unlikely. This year, Russia will be lucky to stay above zero.

Russia sustains itself by selling oil and gas, but thanks to the fracking revolution in the good ole USA, we, not the Russians, are the world’s top energy producer and energy prices should, absent geopolitical turmoil, trend lower.

Vladimir Putin may have outsized ambitions, but he does not have the means, at least over the long run, to implement them.

Yet as we know, he can invade his neighbors and remain a disruptive force in the short run because he has the will to exert Russian power.

That’s why he came in at No. 1 in the most recent Forbes ranking of the most powerful figures in the world.

But to make matters worse, it almost does not matter that Russia is fundamentally a weak state.

The China Dynamic

Putin, after all, has another regime behind him. The People’s Republic of China backs his troublesome ambitions, giving the Russian leader the strength to do at least some of what he wants.

According to the global narrative, Beijing is the owner of the 21st century. It is only a matter of time before China has the largest economy in the world. Analysts used to talk about the Chinese overtaking us in the 2030s or at the end of the 2020s. Now, however, the date is two years away according to some.

A fast-expanding economy, according to this storyline, will allow China’s leaders to achieve their ambitions. So many Americans and others think the West and the rest of the world must either accede to Beijing’s wishes or at least accommodate the Chinese.

I disagree. In reality, China has a sluggish economy, growing at about 2%.

The country looks to be on the edge of a debt crisis and property meltdown.

China’s technocrats are postponing a reckoning. They are preventing the inevitable correction with massive amounts of stimulus, but now stimulus is not working well, so the economy is slowing.Because they are preventing the economy from adjusting, the underlying imbalances have become too large to unwind without a crash. We are almost at that critical point when the Chinese economy goes into freefall.

At the same time, China’s political system is showing signs of distress, torn by infighting at the top of the Communist Party. At a June 26 meeting of the Politburo, Xi Jinping talked about how his signature initiative—his anti-corruption campaign, which is really nothing more than an old-fashioned political purge—was stalemated. Then, in melodramatic fashion he talked about his own death.

Given all the coup rumors in the last three years—including some of very recent vintage—maybe he was being serious.

But in any event, while Xi struggles to consolidate control, flag officers are gaining political influence, becoming powerbrokers in the Communist Party’s faction-ridden system. They may not make policy on their own, but they are undoubtedly gaining latitude to do what they want nonetheless.

And we can see that senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army are squaring off against each other. There have been the purges of generals and the series of public loyalty oaths made to Xi this year, a sure sign that China’s supremo knows that not all flags are loyal.

Chinese leaders would never admit this, but I think they know they are playing a weak hand.

And that’s why they are, at this moment, lashing out, taking on many nations—including us—at the same time. That makes no strategic sense, but it is an understandable tactic for desperate leaders.

Fragility and Global Disruption

So Russia and China are fragile.

Does this mean we don’t have to worry about them? No. It means we have to worry about them more.

In decline, Russia and China are finding the alliance that has long eluded them.

Last decade, when both nations looked hardy, it appeared as if the “strategic partnership” they talked about was mostly a mirage. Then, China and Russia thought they did not need each other. Moreover, in both capitals, there were thinkers who perceived the other to be the “ultimate strategic threat in the long-term.”

Putin, on his way to establishing the Russian Federation as a major power, made it clear there was little room for the Chinese at the heart of the global order as he conceived it. After all, in late 2011 he proposed the “Eurasian Union,” a grouping of nations once comprising the Soviet Union. He spoke of it as only “one of the poles of the modern world,” but in reality he saw it as closer to the center of the international system, “serving as an efficient link between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region.”

China, in effect, would be merely one part of one end of the world, at least as Putin imagined it.

High prices for Russia’s hydrocarbons gave its willful leader the resources to pursue his great ambitions, and the resulting geopolitical competition with China essentially ensured that relations with Beijing remained troubled. Not only did the two countries intensify their rivalry in Central Asia and the Middle East, they faced off on Russian territory, in Moscow’s Far East, the most fundamental irritant in Sino-Russian relations.

Moscow’s deep-seated insecurity over the border with China is why the tie-up between

Russia’s state-owned Rosneft with China National Petroleum Corporation, reached last October, was truly the “breakthrough” dealit was announced to be. Putin, after years of intransigence, broke down and agreed to Beijing’s demand for an equity stake in a lucrative oil field in Eastern Siberia. It was not the first time that Russia had agreed to give the Chinese an ownership interest in an energy field—that occurred in 2006—but it was by far the most significant. The Rosneft-CNPC arrangement, in all probability, will accelerate China’s penetration of the sparsely settled Far East and perhaps give Beijing a platform to reach into the Russian heartland itself.

Why the Russian change of heart?

The Wall Street Journal reported that the arrangement was “a sign that Moscow is overcoming its fear of Chinese encroachment on Russia’s Far East.” That could be true, but it’s more likely the Kremlin saw it had no alternative but to give the Chinese what they wanted. In short, the Rosneft-CNPC oil contract and the subsequent Gazprom-CNPC gas deal signal a turning point in which Beijing has gained, now and for the foreseeable future, the upper hand.

Russia realizes it has to work with China.

Significantly, Moscow and Beijing, at the time of the announcement of the Rosneft deal in October, agreed to greater diplomatic coordination, best symbolized by the signing of 21 cooperation agreements.

At the same time, the Chinese, for their part, will value the Russians more as time progresses.

A China that finds it hard to form alliances nonetheless realizes it needs friends. President Obama’s critics may see his “pivot” to Asia as “unresourced” and “hollow,” but for the Chinese it is real and an unmistakable warning that Washington is beginning to re-assess overly generous China policies.

In the Russian strongman, Beijing’s policymakers see not only someone who shares their general outlook and a fighter willing to take on Washington, but also a pliable junior partner.Beijing can see that Putin no longer keeps them at arm’s-length. In the last couple years, the Russian leader has adopted a far more conciliatory attitude. As he said in April 2012 about Beijing, “We do not have a single irritating element in our ties.” It appears that Chinese leaders are beginning to believe they can, when it counts, control Putin.

We may think China should seek to fortify its relations with us and not a sinking Russia, but that is not in fact how Chinese leaders see the world or calculate their interests.

And we should not forget that they are choosing Russia over America because their internal politics are inhibiting better relations with us. There is a strain of anti-Americanism in current Chinese Communist political thought, unmistakably evident in the pages of People’s Daily, the Communist Party’s flagship publication, and in the writings of senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army.

As nationalism replaces prosperity as the Party’s primary basis of legitimacy, it becomes increasingly difficult for its leaders to embrace their counterparts in either the liberal democracies or the many neighbors with which China has territorial disputes. Beijing maintains expansive land and sea claims against an arc of nations from India in the south to South Korea in the north.

Furthermore, its ambitions to close off the international waters of the South China Sea bring it into conflict with seafaring nations, especially the U.S., which has for more than two centuries protected freedom of navigation.

On the other hand, there is virtually no strand of anti-Russian political thought in Beijing. With Xi Jinping’s public campaigns promoting both Marxism and Maoism, the fashion is to lament the passing of the Soviet Union and express pity for a Russia that has, in the view of the Chinese elite, fallen from superpower status to a power of second- or third-rank.

Shaping Cooperation

With America essentially identified as China’s geopolitical opponent, it is only natural that Beijing’s recent foreign policy initiatives show increasing coordination with the Kremlin.

On Syria, for instance, the pair cooperated on four vetoes of Security Council resolutions.

They are also working together to protect the theocratic Iranian regime, a sign that in the

Middle East and Persian Gulf the pair is moving from competition to cooperation.

In Central Asia, Moscow and Beijing are still engaged in their version of the Great Game, but that rivalry is increasingly taking place within the confines of the Beijing-launched Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which the Chinese see as their own NATO or, more to the point, as their own anti-NATO.

Moreover, it is in East Asia where Beijing and Moscow are beginning to cement their loose alliance. Last October, Xi Jinping asked Moscow, in the words of the official Xinhua News Agency, to help China “guarantee security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.”

At a time when Russia is in obvious long-term decline, the invitation to play a broader role is significant. Xi’s overture, even if insincere, is noteworthy because Beijing has almost never asked others to cooperate in such a way. If nothing else, it reveals that China sees Moscow as “the ideal candidate” to be its “global partner.”

As a sign of partnership, Russia is helping China build an air force significantly larger than the one the Pentagon foresees. The 2014 Pentagon report on China noted that country is pursuing “unprecedented” modernization. It mentioned that 600 of China’s combat aircraft are “modern.”

Not everyone agrees with the estimate of 600. Jane’s ran an article putting the current number of Chinese 4th generation aircraft at 946.

By 2020, you will face 1,562 of them, according to analyst Rick Fisher, who has a far better track record than the Pentagon when it comes to matters Chinese. Included in Fisher’s 2020 figure are 24 Su-35s.

And soon China will have the S-400 air-defense system.

Russia appears set to begin a whole new round of weapons sales to China, something apparently agreed at the time of the Rosneft-CNPC deal. China, according to what some believe are secret side agreements made then, will not only get the good stuff, it will get the rights to manufacture it at home.

This suggests to me that ending the production of the F-22 was a mistake of the first order. We are headed to an era where we have to assume that, at least in the first days of Asia’s next conflict, Russia and China if acting together will control the skies.

To many people, region-wide conflict seems unlikely, impossible even.

But as Enoch Powell remarked, “History is littered with wars which everybody knew would never happen.”

But we don’t need to rely on left-wing British politicians for geopolitical advice. A year ago, who in this room thought that, in just the space of months, Russian tanks would cross a national border; Moscow would annex the territory of a neighbor; and Russian allies, using Moscow’s missiles, would shoot down a civilian jetliner.

And who here would have thought that Putin would publicly threaten to use nuclear weapons to hold onto his conquests, as he did at the end of last month, on August 29?

We have to view these words in the context of his promise on August 14 to unveil what he called offensive nukes; Moscow’s clear violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a cornerstone of the Post-Cold War peace; the large-scale Russian strategic nuclear exercises this month; and Russian long-range bombers practicing cruise missile attacks on the U.S. a few weeks ago.

At this moment, some of the worst trends of 1914 and 1939 Europe and 1937 Asia are evident.

This time, however, the weapons in the hands of aggressors are so much more destructive. And at the same time, the concept of nuclear deterrence, which kept the peace since the Cuban Missile Crisis, is breaking down.

A Russian analyst recently wrote that Putin thinks he can employ a limited nuclear strike on a Baltic capital and get away with it.

And if Putin manages to intimidate the West with his not-so-veiled promises to incinerate Ukraine’s defenders, other aggressors may think they too can employ his threatening tactics. For instance, both North Korea and China have recently talked about unleashing Armageddon.

Perhaps we can ignore the ranting of the Kim regime, but Chinese nuclear threats are particularly worrisome.

China’s flag officers have, for two decades, been issuing belligerent warnings about Beijing’s willingness to use nukes to seize Japan’s outlying islands and Taiwan. And in August 2011 a retired Chinese general, still working for Beijing, inadvertently blurted out that his country was planning surprise missile attacks on the U.S.

Chinese threats took on an especially belligerent tone last October.

With no apparent provocation, the main outlets of Chinese state media—People’s Daily, China Central Television, and PLA Daily, among others—ran identical articles about how Chinese submarines launching ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear warheads could kill tens of millions of Americans in Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Portland in Maine, and the Navy towns of Annapolis and Norfolk. Those Chinese reports also talked about radiation deaths in Chicago.

Let me point out that these articles were not the work of rogue journalists. They were splashed across state media at the same time, a clear indication they were directed from the top of the Chinese political system, the Politburo Standing Committee.

A nuclear exchange is, at least for most people, inconceivable. For more than a generation, nukes were thought to be defensive in nature, instruments of deterrence.

Today, they look like just another appliance of aggression.

Today, two men, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Xi Jinping of China, are makers of history, with grand ambitions and the will to pursue them.

These ambitious figures are now disturbing peace and tranquility, one in Asia and the other in Europe. American policymakers are loath to call this a new Cold War, but this we can say: Russia and China are now acting at the same time, challenging us, making this moment especially consequential.

So if we want to continue living in a world that is free, we will have to defend it against them.

They are the New Axis.

History, from time to time, picks men and women to fight for all that is good. Due to the challenge from Russia and China, we are at one of those moments.

Editor’s Note: Gordon Chang made this presentation at the US Air Force Association at their 2014 Air & Space Conference and Technology Exposition held at the Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center in National Harbor, Maryland on September 16, 2014.

It is republished with the permission of Gordon Chang and AFA.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Reluctant Ally in the Fight Against Isis: Turkey in Play

Turkey lives in the neighborhood which means that its role in Afghanistan is more constant than the Western players currently deploying force in the country. (Credit Image: Bigstock)

2014-09-21 By Julien Canin

President Obama has laid down another “red line,” this one against Isis.  And in this effort he seeking to forge a coalition.

As we have written earlier, one difference between Iraq 2014 and 2003 is the clear possibility of an allied effort against threats emanating from Iraq.

One ally and indeed the most affected one is not rushing to help, certainly not overtly.

Turkey is a hesitant ally, and as such, one wonders about its role more generally in the region.

Turkey Directly Affected

Turkey has announced their non-participation at any military operation.

As the only NATO country directly under the threat of ISIS, and by his geographical position, 750 miles of border with Iraq and Syria, Turkey is the gateway to these states and could have been the outpost of these operations.

Rather than playing a direct role, Turkey will limit its operations at the humanitarian dimension as stated by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan:

Nothing other than humanitarian assistance can be expected from Turkey.”

"Turkey will not be involved in any armed operation but will entirely concentrate on humanitarian operations," the official said on condition of anonymity. Credit Photo ALI EKEYILMAZ (30.08.2012-ANKARA
“Turkey will not be involved in any armed operation but will entirely concentrate on humanitarian operations,” the official said on condition of anonymity. Credit Photo ALI EKEYILMAZ (30.08.2012-ANKARA

In practical terms, this stance means the establishment of a buffer zone along its border, although details were not specified.

Furthermore, as an official said, “Incirlik has and continue to be used for humanitarian operations, not for military operations.”

Located fewer than 100 miles from the Syrian border, this air force base could have been used for U.S and allied logistical and reconnaissance missions.

Through recent history, the right to use Turkish territory had been leverage for Ankara. The most recent example was when the Turkish government declined to permit the movement of U.S. troops through its territory during Iraqi Freedom. During Provide Comfort (1991-1996), Incirlik was used by American aircraft but periodically Turkish parliament hinted it would not renew the privilege of overflight.

Even if the Pentagon has announced that “armed and manned” aircraft would be positioned to Erbil, capital of the autonomous Kurdish region, solving thereby partly the concern about Incirlik AFB, Turkey’s decision to stay behind the scenes does not eliminate the problem of determining Turkey’s role.

The Obama administration wants to cut off the oil revenue that has made the ISIS a wealthy terrorist group.

Quoted by the New York Times, James Philips, the senior fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs at the Heritage foundation, explained, “Oil is a huge part of the financing equation.”

But until now, Turkish authorities have been unwilling to cooperate in efforts to target the smuggling networks. They are in fact well rooted, through individuals, families, and organizations, some dating for decades, when Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq.

Allied Concerns

For European countries, the concern is placed on the level of the flow of fighters who transit Turkish territory toward Syria and Iraq.

Using the same path to go back in their country, Turkey becomes a conduit for terrorist attacks.

The borders were wide open. We used to get in and out of Turkey very easily.

No questions were asked.

Arms shipments were smuggled easily to Syria” told a non-Syrian Islamist fighter.

And the Kurdish authorities who are central to the battle against Isis are concerned as well.

Fuad Hussein, chief of staff to the Kurdistan Region presidency, stated,

Turkey did not meet our expectation…

There are extensive economic, trade and political ties between Turkey and the Kurdistan Region.

If you analyze the extent of our relations with Turkey you would assume that Turkey would be heavily involved in this issue.

Turkey consistently reiterated that if the security of the Kurdistan Region is threatened they would intervene.

Well, our security was under threat, but still we did not receive any support from Turkey…

Every single Kurd is upset with Turkey’s position.

How would President Barzani not be upset about it?

We are upset, because they did not help us when we needed them.

Turkey Remains Behind the Scenes

Turkish’s decision is determined by three reasons.

The first, and most visible, is the Turkish hostages.

Our hands and arms are tied because of the hostages” recently admitted Ismet Yilmaz, Turkish Ministry of Defense.

Indeed, since the fall of Mosul in June 11, IS detained 49 Turks, captured in the Turkish consulate, including diplomats, especially the consul general, Special Forces’ soldiers and children. Military operation risks to threaten their lives, IS using them as bargaining chip.

But this reason is no longer relevant since the release of the hostages on September 20.

But as Gonul Tol explained in a recent conference at the Wilson Institute and through an article in The New York Times,

The Turkish government thinks the rise of ISIS is the result of Shia government discrimination against the Sunnis in Iraq.

If the United States keeps beefing up the Iraqi army, which is dominated by Shia, the Sunnis could become further marginalized and receptive to ISIS ideology.

Shia support could also strengthen Iran’s hand in Iraq, an outcome Turkey wants to avoid.

In Syria, Turkey has been at the forefront of the anti-Assad coalition.

Syrians approach the Turkish border after fleeing Isis attacks on 60 Kurdish villages. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Syrians approach the Turkish border after fleeing Isis attacks on 60 Kurdish villages. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

Ankara turned a blind eye to weapons transfers to groups linked to Al-Qaeda (like Jabhat al-Nusra group) in hopes of hasten Assad’s fall.

Islamists are until now the most capable force against the ruler of Damascus, an effective strike on them indirectly serving Bashar al-Assad.

Even if Turkish intelligence services have been forced more recently to recognize the growing threat that these groups posed, it didn’t lead to an active implication.

As Sinan Ulgen, a former Turkish diplomat, recently stated, “The fundamental reason the behavior changed, is the fact that Ankara realizes much more clearly that (the Islamic State group) is a security threat to Turkey.”

Indeed, as one Islamic State fighter told to Reuters, “The Islamic State is here to establish the law of God … Turkey is not being ruled based on God’s law but as a secular state. Right now the priority is Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Saudi Arabia, then Turkey.”

Such kind of menaces, beyond the security concerns, could undermine the image of Turkey for international tourism, experiencing a crisis like in Tunisia and Egypt.

Finally, ISIS also controls the area around the tomb of Suleyman Shah, grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire, in northern Syria.

The group has destroyed several tombs sacred to Shi’ites, stirring fears that their next target might be Suleyman Shah.

A similar wipe attack was recorded after the fall of the holy city of Tombouctou in North-Mali in 2012.

As described by Reuters, “Ankara regards the tomb as sovereign Turkish territory under a treaty signed with France in 1921, when Syria was under French rule, and has said it will defend the mausoleum.”

The “Solution Process” between Turkey and the PKK

But, beyond the reasons stated above, an addition one can explaini the Turkish low profile role when ISIS is becoming a clear threat to stability in the Middle East, and that is the lingering challenge of the Kurdish question.

Born in 1974 as splinter group from the Turkish Revolutionary Younth Party, the Workers Party of Kurdistan (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan– PKK) formally announced its existence as a separate party in 1978, after it moved its headquarters and base of operations from Ankara into Kurdistan.

Founded as a Marxist-Leninist party, its mainly aim is the freedom of Kurdistan. PKK conducted terrorist attacks against Turkish militaries and installations, and Kurdish citizens thought to have cooperated with the government.

Some 40,000 people have been killed in the conflict since the 1980s Turkish government reacted through a rough repression: martial law in Kurdish regions, military policing and limitations of fundamental rights.

Since his creation, the PKK has always been led by Abdullah Ocalan, affectionately known as “Apo”, PKK party members being best known in Turkey as the “Apocu”, Turkish for “Apo’s folks.”

Even if his capture in 1999 in Kenyan by Turkish services, helped by US and Israeli intelligence, denied him of all practical roles, he continues to be the major figure of the PKK.[ref] Mehrdad R. Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook, Taylor & Francis, 1992, pp. 215-217. [/ref]

Since 2012, real progresses have been made through the “Solution process”, leading in March 2013 to a cease-fire including disarmament and withdrawal from Turkish soil.

This landmark is the result of more than 20 years of evolution from both sides towards a compromise.

Turkey authorized in 1991 the use of Kurdish in public, in 1999 the Kurdish teaching, in 2002 the broadcasting in Kurdish and in 2003, parents were allowed to give their children Kurdish names.

For its part, the PKK has moderated theirdemands, mainly through the abandonment of a separate state for an autonomy within Turkey’s borders.

The most recent step forward, in July 10, was the approval by Turkish parliament on a legal framework would assure immunity for state officials who engage in talks with the PKK.

PKK’s Ambiguous Relations with al-Assad’s Regime

But with the major role played by the PKK in the struggle with ISIS, Turkey has expressed concern about arms delivery.

Indeed, numerous states have supplied weapons and ammunition for Peshemergas – U.S. France, Germany, United Kingdom, etc. – in order to rebalance power against an IS equipped with moderns and heavy weapons looted in Iraqi military bases.

And Turkey is afraid that weapons will end up in the hands of the PKK, ally of Peshmergas.

For the Foreign Turkish Minister Melvüt Cavusoglu,

The weapons sent (to Iraq) should not end up in the hands of terrorist organizations. They should not end up in the hands of the PKK. It may not be possible to control where these weapons will go.

Other source of concerns for Turkish regime change policy in Syria, is the de facto alliance between Damascus and PKK.

The PKK set up bases in Syria and the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon until 1998, and during a long time, it was an open secret that Ocalan was living in Damascus under the quiet protection of President Hafez al-Assad.

And since the Syrian uprising began, reports surfaced that Assad was allowing the PKK, the PYD (the PKK’s Syrian branch), and the YPG (the military arm of PYD)to move its members to Syria from Qandil enclave.

If PKK is not an open ally to al-Assad, he’s not part of the combat against him, in a neutral stance.

Therefore, in the Turkish view, strikes against ISIS and help to PKK in terms of weapons, training, and intelligence, is an indirect help to maintaining Assad regime.

How the War Might Bolster the PKK

Nevertheless, these previous Turkish concerns seem far from being resolved, the Syrian-Iraq wars bolstering the PKK in terms of international, regional and national perspective.

From an international perspective, PKK is gaining strength, both in military capabilities and international legitimacy. Largely dormant since the cease-fire in Marsh 2013, operations against IS activists and in protection of Christians and Yazidi refugees have restored PKK’s image.

With the insistence of US and other Westerns states to limit the role of military units on the ground, PKK became a significant and welcomed ally.

Further military cooperation seems, in that scheme, a valuable option.

Already, the Western media, politicians and public are discussing to de-list PKK from terrorist’s organizational register.

The September 19 ISIS attacks against Kurdish’s positions in north Syria should provide an opportunity for coalition’s first strikes over this state.

From a regional perspective, ISIS, as a common enemy, has gathered the various Kurdish militias in a kind of national alliance. Thereby the PKK has put aside his disagreements with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

In a way, we have to thank the Islamic State.

They’ve united us, reviving the great Kurdish cause. Our struggle is reborn,” explained Seyid Narin, a municipal mayor in Diyarbakir.

From a national perspective, August 10’s Turkey presidential election has seen Selahattin Demirtas, the candidate of the People’s Democracy Party (HDP), an offshoot of the Kurdish movement, scored a major success. With 9.8%, where Kurdish parties have traditionally mustered 5 or 6%, Demirtas has paved the way for the HDP to grow into a nationwide party.

With this result, HDP representatives are raising the possibility of surpassing the 10% needed to obtain parliamentary seats in 2015.

With his focus about rule of law, freedom of expression and for a no-discriminate society, Demirtas has gathered Kurdish and left-leaning Turks (women, young, worker, minority), both excluded from political system.

His entry in Turkish parliament would be a landmark and a challenge for Erdogan in his project to revamp the Turkish Constitution from the parliamentary system into a presidential system.

As Gonul Tul said:

Judging by the results of presidential elections — and the expected challenges ahead for AKP when Erdogan steps down as party leader later this month — it seems unlikely that AKP will substantially increase its votes in 2015.

This makes the Kurds the kingmaker in Erdogan’s drive to introduce an executive presidency. The Kurds must play their hand wisely and capitalize on this window of opportunity by pushing the government to carry out reforms and address Kurdish demands in the run-up to the 2015 general elections.

Uncertain Impact on the “Solution Process”

No PKK declarations or movements indicate a radical change in his positioning toward the peace process.

This kind of stances would provoke an immediate and violent reaction from Turkey, while PKK units are currently completely engaged in Syria and Iraq.

Furthermore, PKK could lose his takeover on the Kurdish cause in Turkey, Ankara would have the room for promote the rising of young leader, born from recent combat.

This choice would isolate PKK from the democratic process in Turkey and his hopeful results during last elections. HDP would be forced to make a choice between the fidelity to the PKK and the resulting illegality in relation to Ankara; or completely turn with PKK and embrace the democratic process.

Turkish soldiers stand guard as Syrians wait behind the border fences near the southeastern town of Suruc in Sanliurfa province, September 18, 2014. (REUTERS/KADIR CELIKCAN)
Turkish soldiers stand guard as Syrians wait behind the border fences near the southeastern town of Suruc in Sanliurfa province, September 18, 2014. (REUTERS/KADIR CELIKCAN)

Finally, the PKK would loose all support, credibility and legitimacy acquired through his fight against ISIS terrorists.

In the long term with the hypothesis of ISIS’s collapse, incentives to respect the peace process could be weaker face at a new armament obtained during fights side by side with Western powers. PKK troops would be more effective with combat experiences and West’s training.

At the symbolic level, narratives about the fights, campaign and others exploits, could built new legends around some war leader, contributing to make possible for them a successful guerilla against Turkey.

Finally, the combat side-by-side with Iraqi Kurds in a kind of sacred union might be the cradle of a new transnational independence wave, prompting the PKK to abandon an autonomic solution in Turkish’s borders toward a maximalist stance.

Clashes with Turkish army might resume and PKK’s actions would occur against Kurds who might be in favor of negotiations with Ankara.

It would then be the return of the “Kurdu Kurde Kirdimak” times, when Kurds break Kurds.

Such fears drive Turkish reluctance to play a greater role.

Editor’s Note: Turkey might we fear such an outcome, but the ability of ISIS to prevail ought to play a greater role in Turkish calculations and at some point simply taking counsel of one’s fears should not be the driver of Turkish policy.

Julien Canin has received a French law degree and a master’s degree from the Universite Libre de Bruxelles (Belgium).

He has worked with both the French Political Party UMP on foreign and defense issues and with the Ministry of Defense recently at the Eurosatory conference.

Apparently our characterization of Iraq of 2014 is not the Iraq of 2003 which we introduced in early August has become popular:

See for example the following:

http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2014/06/18/The-Iraq-of-2014-is-not-the-Iraq-of-2003.html

http://theconversation.com/project-iraq-2014-isnt-like-2003-coalition-and-labor-say-31139

http://ncronline.org/news/global/2014-airstrikes-iraq-offer-contrast-2003

http://news.yahoo.com/iraq-coalition-not-2003-redux-us-insists-224149603.html