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The impact of the war on the European front-line states is very significant. It also one of the most underreported aspects of the dynamics of change within Europe. Much of the U.S. coverage is upon European solidarity, NATO, and the arming of the Ukrainians. Yet the challenges within the continent are leading to significant change, and the fault line between those states who build their approaches around national identities embodying the importance of self defence and alliance solidary and those who do not has deepened.
Poland is clearly a state which has suffered from the war and in which Polish national identity enhanced and with it the priority on co-operation with like-minded states in Europe and more broadly in the liberal democratic world.
To assess these changes, I recently spoke with my friend and colleague Robert Czulda.
I met him when visiting Poland in the Fall of 2021 and attending a Defence 24 conference in Warsaw. We have continued our conversation on a regular basis since that time.
We started by discussing the question of the impact of the war on life in Poland.
He argued that the war came as a shock but perhaps not as a surprise. Poles have a culture that has faced war many times, but now a lethal conflict was unleashed directly on their border. Unlike for Americans where is somewhere you send troops, for the Poles war is where they live.
Poland has become a transit route and home to millions of Ukrainians. Czulda cited statistics from the Polish Border Guard that since 24 February 2022, 9.4 million Ukrainians have crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border. This represents a number which is 25% of the Polish population.
The out-migration has been accompanied by worsening economic conditions.
Czulda pointed out that inflation is about 18% with tremendous demand for housing, food, goods, and services driving up costs.
When I was in Warsaw in the Fall 2021, I talked with several analysts about the path of military modernization being taken by Poland. This path was breaking the Warsaw Pact legacy of Poland and was seeing increased emphasis on air-ground integration and on modernizing the ground maneuver forces.
And when I was there, Poland was dealing with the Belarusian migrant battering ram, and did so in part by strengthening the border guard and policies to deal with migration.
So what is the situation now?
Professor Czulda underscored that Poland was facing a national emergency. The focus was on getting enough capability to hold off the Russians, and this meant that the government was buying new equipment as rapidly as they could and putting off the challenge of integration of all of these diverse pieces of kit until a future day.
There was a clear strategic shift as Poland sheds itself of legacy Warsaw Pact equipment and transferred that to Ukraine. In its place, they were buying American, European and South Korean equipment.
The South Korean piece is most interesting, and Czulda has written a comprehensive piece on this development.
Poland is buying main battle tanks, and training/combat aircraft the T-50 aircraft, and other pieces of ground combat equipment. Although the rather large question remains of how Poland will pay for what its contracting to buy, the impact on the Polish military is significant.
As Czulda noted in his article: “Massive procurement in South Korea have not gone unnoticed abroad. According to Dmitruk’s financial analysis, in the absence of industrial ‘Polanization,” South Korean companies would be responsible for 28% of Polish modernization efforts, while U.S. share would drop to 33%. European involvement would be just 12%.”
In my discussion, he highlighted one consequence of the Russian invasion which worsens considerably the Russian military position in Europe.
Virtually all of Russia’s geographical neighbors have looked at Russian atrocities against Ukrainians and have included they cannot trade or space for time.
They need to defend their border regions against any Russian incursion which can only lead to a desire to have capabilities to attack the Russians on their side of the order.
With regard to partners in allies in Europe and in NATO, Czulda noted that the war has had a significant impact or a reinforcing impact on Polish attitudes.
“For Poles, it is NATO, not the EU, who is a security provider in Europe – the EU can be only a secondary provider. Poland has a limited confidence in European partners (particularly France and Germany) which also impacts on Polish approach towards European defense industrial cooperation. Of course, Poland does not reject such cooperation, but it has rather a secondary meaning.
“The Americans once again have demonstrated that they are a leader of Europe. On the one hand this is good, but on the other it is not – European leaders failed to take a leadership and do more. Once again, we had to look at the White House.
“Germany has lost much of its reputation as the legitimate leader of Europe. Many people understood that they are pro-Russian, and many people believe that they want to go back to business as usual. There are many negative comments about Germany nowadays in Poland coming from people who previously did not have a negative attitude towards Germany.
“On the one hand this is not good, because a crisis in Germany will impact us, but on the other hand it has a positive side. Germany wants to neutralize Polish sovereignty and Germany’s position is exposed.
“We still have strained relations with the EU. This is a battle of two concepts – federal Europe and a Europe of sovereign nations. Also, it seems that the EU has been failing to pay Poland for the arms we deliver to Ukraine.
“We need to build deterrent capabilities. What are they and how to do them will be debated.
“But for Poles, the need for deterrence rather than believing that Russia has any interest in a real partnership is obvious. For Germany it is not.”
During the first week of January 2023, I had the chance to travel to San Diego to visit Camp Pendleton and various U.S. Naval commands.
The visit to Pendleton was to MAG-39. The history of MAG-39 can be found at the end of the article.
I had a chance to talk with LtCol Nelson, the MAG-39 XO who is an experienced Osprey operator. He started as a CH-46 aviator but has flown the Osprey for more than a decade and has about 2100 flight hours on the aircraft to date.
Interestingly, his Osprey experience is largely aboard MEUs. He is not a desert rat but has extensive experience in expeditionary operations from the sea.
The next day I was going to visit the CMV-22B team at North Island and talked to him about the MAG’s role in helping the CMV-22B team standup. It has been significant in the standup process as Marine maintainers and operators have worked closely with the Navy team standing up the aircraft. That standup period has ended, but as the Navy works the con-ops of an Osprey focused on logistics in the distributed battlespace and as the Marines work their expeditionary basing, there will be significant cross-learning through the operational lens.
The Navy is focusing on the key role which the CMV-22B can provide in terms of contested logistics.
But as LtCol Nelson pointed out: “The Marines have from the beginning in their use of the Osprey experienced the challenge of contested logistics. That is our bread and butter. The Navy is focused on a different architecture in terms of the distributed maritime battlespace but contested logistics support by the Osprey has been part of our bread and butter operational experience for some time now.”
LtCol Nelson emphasized that the Navy and USMC working together on logistics in a common enterprise was a clear possibility.
As he noted: “I do see a distributed maritime logistics network being used interchangeably for the benefit of the whole in a naval aviation enterprise. That’s logical and attainable.”
When I visited 2nd MAW in 2020, I had a chance to discuss the Deep Water exercise, in which the Osprey played a very interesting role, one which I discussed with LtCol Nelson. In that exercise, the Osprey played the C2 role.
As I noted in assessing the event: “The planning and execution focused on bringing a disaggregated force into an objective area that required integrated C2 with Ground, Aviation and Logistics Combat Elements. This C2 functionality was delivered in part by an Osprey operating as an airborne command post with a capability delivered by a “roll-on/roll-off” C2 suite.
“The use of MAGTF Tablets (MAGTAB) provided a key means of digital interoperability that allowed for real-time information sharing to ground elements and aviators. The MAGTAB provided the visual representation of the integrated effects and outcomes to the command element. ISR was provided by USMC assets and by a USAF JSTARS aircraft. They used their Network-on-the-Move Airborne (NOTM-A) system to provide interoperability for the commander and assault force.
“As Major Rew put it, “I think having the NOTM-A kit on the Osprey is a big win because it provides so much situational awareness. With the Osprey as a C2 aircraft, there is added flexibility to land the aircraft close to whatever operational area the commander requires. There are many capable C2 platforms across the DoD but not all of them also have the ability to immediately land adjacent to the battlefield like the Osprey does.”[1]
What LtCol Nelson suggested that when focusing on the Osprey in its logistics role not only could you encompass a C2 role but think of it as a platform which can do “information logistics.”
As he put it: “We are not just moving things around the battlespace but information as well.”
This role could be of increasing importance as the naval forces use unmanned surface vessels as a key element for deployed ISR.
Not only could the Osprey drop USVs out of the aircraft and deploy them, but could have ISR/C2 teams to work the data.
If one looks at the Navy’s Resolute Hunter exercises, one sees the shift from ISR operators collecting data to becoming C2 decision makers with the ISR data that they collect onboard the aircraft.[2]
This could well the information logistics role which LtCol Nelson was underlining.
In short, as the Osprey looks towards the next decade of innovation, the interactive efforts of the Navy and the USMC open up new vistas.
The land wars constrained the innovative tiltrotor aircraft.
Now looking at the Pacific with its vast areas in which to operate and to sustain those operations, the Osprey becomes the indispensable aircraft, and a driver for further change in shaping the capabilities of the distributed kill web force.
The History of MAG-39
The 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (3rd MAW) was commissioned on the 167th anniversary of the Marine Corps, November 10, 1942, at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Cherry Point, North Carolina with a personnel roster of 13 officers, 25 enlisted men and one aircraft-a trainer.
The Wing’s combat history began with the World War II deployment of a bomber squadron on December 3, 1943. A little more than a year later, the Wing deployed a night fighter squadron in support of the war effort.
On April 21, 1944, the Wing boarded three carriers for a voyage to Hawaii and arrived May 8, where it assumed the functions of Marine Air, Hawaii Area. When the Japanese surrendered, 3rd MAW was decommissioned and its personnel were assigned to other units. The Wing had played an important, but behind-the-scenes, role in defeating the Japanese by giving the best training available to Marine pilots and support personnel.
In 1952, as the Corps again fought in the Far East, the Wing was reactivated at Cherry Point for the Korean War. The main portion of the Wing began moving to the new MCAS Miami, Florida- the Marine Corps’ first “flying field.”
In September 1955, the Wing left Miami for MCAS El Toro, California. 3d MAW was rebuilt again, with the addition of Marine Aircraft Groups (MAG) 15, followed by MAG-36 with its helicopter squadrons at a nearby Air Station in Santa Ana, California. Wing squadrons were detached and deployed to Vietnam as combat action in Southeast Asia flared. At the end of the Vietnam War several units were brought back to the United States and deactivated or re-designated, creating the 3rd MAW of today.
The Wing saw action again as part of I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), conducting operations in Iraq and Kuwait during Operation DESERT SHIELD, Operation DESERT STORM, and Operation SABER. After the end of hostilities, 3rd MAW aircraft provided support in Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH over Iraq. The Wing was once more called into service in Somalia for Operation RESTORE HOPE.
The fall of 2001 would reveal a new type of challenge, the Global War on Terror, and 3d MAW answered the call again by deploying units in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM both in Afghanistan and neighboring countries. Beginning in the fall of 2002, 3rd MAW deployed forces to Kuwait in preparation for combat operations in Iraq. 3rd MAW provided decisive aviation fires for I MEF and coalition forces in liberation of Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDON and subsequent stability operations. 3d MAW continued to deploy in support of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to include the 3rd MAW (Forward) Aviation Combat Element
Headquarters at Camp Leatherneck, Regional Command Southwest, Afghanistan in 2010, 2012, and 2014, the latter of which planned and executed the withdrawal of Marine Aviation Forces from the Helmand Province and subsequent end to Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.
Marines and Sailors of 3rd MAW deployed and conducted combat operations in support of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE in Iraq and Syria and Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT in Afghanistan.
3rd MAW Marines and Sailors are forward deployed in special purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces and Marine Expeditionary Units alongside joint U.S. forces, Allies and partners, ready to respond to any ongoing or emerging crisis or contingency. The 3rd MAW has a well-proven, colorful battle history. As part of the nation’s force in readiness, the Marines and Sailors of 3rd MAW stand prepared to meet any and all challenges the future may bring. PREPARED IN PEACE AND WAR- SEMPER FIDELIS.
Featured Photo: Four MV-22B Osprey’s with 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW) are staged in preparation for the loading of Marines from 1st Marine Division during exercise Steel Knight on Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec. 10, 2019.
12.10.2019
Photo by Warrant Officer Justin Pack
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
[1] Robbin Laird, The U.S. Marine Corps Transformation Path: Preparing for the High-End Fight (pp. 215-216). Kindle Edition.
[2] “At Naval Air Station, Fallon, in November 2020, the U.S. Navy hosted the third iteration of a relatively new exercise called Resolute Hunter. This exercise is about how to shape a new paradigm for 21st century so that Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities can be worked to provide enhanced mission execution. Much like how NAWDC has added two new warfighting competencies to its program, namely, dynamic targeting and Maritime ISR.” Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the 21st Century (p. 194). Kindle Edition.
U.S. Marines with 1st Battalion, 2d Marines and members of the Self-Defense Force Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade participate in training during Keen Sword 23 at Tsutara, Japan, Nov. 16, 2022.
Keen Sword is a biennial training event that exercises the combined capabilities and lethality developed between 3d Marine Division, III Marine Expeditionary Force, and the Japan Self-Defense Force.
This bilateral field-training exercise between the U.S. military and JSDF strengthens interoperability and combat readiness of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.
“Retired army general, Petr Pavel, has been elected the next president of Czechia. Mr. Pavel won the runoff against former prime minister Andrej Babiš, by the biggest margin ever in the history of Czech presidential elections. With all votes counted, Petr Pavel got over 58.3 percent of the vote, his contestant received 41.6 percent.
“General Pavel, whose election motto was “order and stability” received strong backing from the unsuccessful contenders in the first round of elections held a fortnight ago. He also received support from Prime Minister Petr Fiala and the leaders of the other parties in the ruling coalition.”
As one source commented on the election: “As the scale of his triumph became clear, Pavel, 61, a former army chief of staff and Nato second-in-command, was greeted by ecstatic chants of “president, president” from champagne-drinking supporters as he mounted the podium at his campaign headquarters in Prague’s Karlín district.
“He called his win a victory for “truth, dignity, respect and humility” and vowed to seek national unity after an election campaign widely denounced as bitterly divisive. “We have different views on many things, but that doesn’t mean we are enemies,” said Pavel. “We have to learn to communicate with each other.”
While the mainstream press has stayed at this level of analysis, we have been fortunate to have interviewed Pavel last summer. We are re-publishing that interview again due to the importance of Pavel’s election.
On July 3, 2022, General (Retired) Petr Pavel, the former head of NATO’s Military Committee, and now candidate for President of the Czech Republic, agreed to be interviewed by a team led Joël-François Dumont. Joining the interview team were Françoise Thom, the noted French Russian expert, Colonel (Retired) Joel Bros, former French Special Forces and former military attaché to Czech Republic and by myself.
In this article, a number of takeaways from the discussion are highlighted (with the biography of the General to be found at the end of the article), but for the complete discussion readers need to go to the European Security website.
Pavel underscored that what is unfolding in Ukraine today is a product of the long-range perspectives and policies of President Putin. He noted: “Russia still believes that the very possession of nuclear arsenal makes it a superpower, and enables it to dictate to other countries how to live and how to arrange their international relations.”
The Russians take no blame for their actions, but argue that the West is the trigger of their actions. He underscored that “They believe that they’re perfectly right. All the moves they do are well justified and the vast majority of Russian population stands behind President Putin in this belief. For all of us, it means that the situation international and security situation has fundamentally changed.
“Russia is no longer just a strategic competitor. It’s a direct threat to our security. President Putin, went so far by declaring a possible use of nuclear weapons against United Kingdom, France and other countries, threatening sovereign countries, including nuclear powers. It’s not an issue for us to think if Russia is bluffing or if they are just posing threats, they are determined to use these weapons and they expressed their determination several times pointing to existential threats, but without being very specific.”
“When we look at the breadth of Russian strategic thinking, we have to understand that anything that would harm Russian perception of being a global power could be taken as existential threat to Russia and as a justification for using nuclear weapons, tactical or any other level.
“But I believe that any use of nuclear weapons, even smallest tactical nuclear weapon would be breaching the threshold and would fundamentally change the whole paradigm of our security thinking.
“We don’t have to necessarily defeat Russia but we face the challenge of dealing with Russian thinking that whatever we do in terms of coming closer to them would be understood as our weakness and sooner or later, we would see them attack another country.”
He argued that the war in Ukraine was having a significant impact on a “reshuffling in Europe” whereby the states most directly familiar with Russia and closest to Russia have views different from key states like France and Germany.
He argued that “we see a new, I wouldn’t call it fraction line, but potential division within Europe where countries bordering Russia such as Bulgaria, Romania, Baltic countries, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic are almost of the same opinion on how to handle the crisis. That means being very tough within the framework of sanctions against Russia, being extremely helpful to Ukraine in terms of humanitarian assistance including military assistance.”
The exceptions to this are the states of Hungary and Turkey, as he noted, which form “special cases” as he noted.
He added that one outcome of the war in Ukraine could well be Ukraine becoming part of the European Union, which if this was to happen would enhance the weight of the Russian threat focused countries within the European Union.
He very clearly underscored the importance of working relationships in Europe so that new fault lines do not open up on the continent when facing the Russian challenge, as this would only aid the Russians in the long-term competition.
“That’s why I believe that one of the most important tasks of our current presidency, which Czech Republic took over the 1st of July, would be to keep Europe together and find ways to handle the crisis in Ukraine and relationships with Russia. Because if we let ourselves become divided then Russia would prevail and that was their primary objective from the very beginning. We need to bring our understanding of situation to the same foundation so that we don’t take different conclusions and potentially wrong decisions.”
He was asked about the impact of Finland coming into NATO and triggering a broader European rethink on the direct defense of Europe. He felt that Finland and Sweden coming into NATO could very much aide the kind of rethinking necessary both in NATO and in Europe.
“NATO over the years has become probably too politically correct in our own way that we were circling around the problems without being able to identify true nature. I was facing that situation even in a military committee when I asked my colleagues to come back to the basics and speak as soldiers, not as politicians or diplomats. At least around the table so that we understand each other.
“I believe that Fins and Swedes will bring a lot of direct language, not necessarily politically incorrect, but very direct language. And especially with regard to Russia, the Fins are very well respected. Because even though Russians won the Finnish War in three months war, it cost them such huge losses that they, remember the war with Fins up to present days.
“So even though Finland is a small country by geography, it’s a big country by their heart and approach and I believe that it may change the atmosphere in NATO for better because we would probably come back to calling problems by their proper names and finding straight and direct solutions to current problems.”
Europe certainly could strengthen conventional defense capabilities and shape enhanced horizontal conventional defense escalation options, notably with the possibility of an integrated Nordic defense.
But the nuclear challenge remains significant, and an open question of how NATO’s nuclear countries would address this challenge in more than a declaratory sense, such as was done at the recent NATO summit, where we learned yet again that NATO is a nuclear alliance.
That is good, but what modernization and training efforts will be generated to convey to the Russians that their strategy of “escalate to de-escalate” will not work?
This is how General (Retired) Pavel handled this challenge:
“Russians have developed the principle escalate to deescalate. We know it. They are very skillful in using it. I believe that we haven’t done good job facing Russian deterrents by using nuclear weapons because when President Putin and Minister Lavrov are starting talking on increasing level of readiness of Russian strategic nuclear forces and so on and potential strategic strikes to Western cities or even blowing the whole countries out of the surface, our reaction was a little bit scared.
“I believe that we should remind Russia that we have a nuclear weapons too and we are also determined to use them if we have to and that Russian cities are on our target list as well. But we are reasonable enough not to do it and not to threaten any country by using our nuclear weapons, but we only remind Russia that they are not the only country with nuclear weapons and with target lists.
“The Russians only understand our strength. And I’m always trying to explain in our debates with the Czech public, when I speak on deterrence, that the deterrence is not about frightening anyone, it’s not threatening. It’s simply reminding that we have the capacity and making our adversaries of our proficiency and willingness to use our capabilities. That’s the very substance of deterrence and we haven’t used it in such a way to answer Russian threats.”
We discussed the recent decisions made at the NATO Summit in Madrid to increase both force size and shift force deployments forward. Pavel welcomed these developments but cautioned that they will take time but must also actually be done and not just remaining as a summit declaration.
He was very clear that whatever the outcome of the war in Ukraine after that outcome is sorted out, the task of rebuilding Ukraine including its defense capabilities would remain as a priority for Europe and NATO. “Once this war is over Ukraine military will have to be consolidated and provided with the equipment that will be interoperable, that would be manageable in logistic terms, but also in training terms.
“As we aid Ukraine now, we will have to think of for future, how to equip and how to handle Ukraine and their capabilities in future. It’s clear that their accession to NATO will not be in question for time, but at the same time it’ll be in our interest that Ukraine has a strong enough military, capable to deal with their security issues on their own but it’ll also in our interest that Ukraine remains our partner now that it is interoperable with our own forces.”
He was then asked about his own country, the Czech Republic, and shaping their way ahead in light of the current defense and security situation in Europe. He commented that “the Czech Republic went too far in reducing our defense expenditures after the end of the Soviet Union. At one point, and it was in times when I was Chief of Defense, we went even below 1% of GDP and the deficiencies in our capabilities were so serious that I confronted that time President Vaclav Klaus, because I saw that the capacity of military was so insufficient that we wouldn’t be able to meet even basic tasks.
“Since then, number of problems have been dealt with, but still the pace of modernization is not fast enough to meet the challenge. Now with new government, it seems that we will be able to finalize some modernization projects but given the pressure of state finances because of COVID crisis and now the war, I have some concerns that this government will be able to meet these commitments.
“Our primary goal must be to meet our capability target from NATO defense planning. And that’s heavy brigade equipped with tracked APCs ready by the end of 2025. Because this is our main contribution to NATO collective defense and also our contribution to increasing the capacity of NATO forces.
“Czech Republic contributes beyond its weight to the battle groups formed in our Eastern border, both in the Baltic countries and we are also taking command and significant contribution to Slovakian battle group.
“We also have contributed to air policing to multi countries and a number of other activities. And from what I hear from our government, it remains a priority, they are determined to keep the pace of our contributions and to meet also commitments made within NATO defense planning. However, I see that it’ll be a great challenge to succeed fully.”
The photos show General (Retired) Petr Pavel’s time in service as Chief of Staff of the Czech Republic armed forces or his time as Chairman of the NATO military committee. We credit the provision of these photos to @Anna Šolcová.
From July 2012 to May 2015 General Petr Pavel served as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, the highest ranking officer in the Czech Army and the principal military adviser to the Czech Government. In September 2014, General Pavel was elected Chairman of the NATO Military Committee.
General Pavel graduated from the Army College in Vyškov, Czech Republic in 1983 and since then has spent a large part of his military career holding positions in Special Forces, Operations and Intelligence divisions. Throughout his career, General Pavel has held a range of positions from Deputy Military and Air Attaché of the Czech Republic in Belgium to Commander Special Forces to Deputy Director Operations Division at the Ministry of Defence,
In addition, General Pavel has also held his share of positions in International and National joint staffs representing the Czech Armed Forces as the National Military Representative to the US Central Command, as well as National Military Representative of the Czech Republic to SHAPE in Mons, Belgium.
Furthering his education in the United Kingdom, General Pavel has studied at the Staff College, Camberley, the Royal College of Defence Studies, London and obtained an M.A. in International Relations from King’s College, London.
And here was an article in CZ Defence published July 20, 2019 which described his career from the standpoint of his memoirs:
The book brings a subheading “In the front line”. The Czechs loved General Pavel when he was the Chief of the General Staff. The world has known him as the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. He found a way to soldiers’ hearts a long time ago thanks to his heroic action in former Yugoslavia. But nobody could suspect that he, as a kid, was suffered from ADHD. So primary school teachers cursed him. And much more…
This all has been written in a compact form not only by Petr Pavel, but also by his farther, sister, wife, sons and comrade-in-arms. His father, also an army officer, brought up his son in military style – he continually entrusted him with the tasks, which exceeded the boy’s age by demandingness. And sent him to play hockey and to train gymnastics. On the threshold of adolescence, Petr went to a Military gymnasium and ensured a parental consent to jump with parachute.
He got here the best preparation so that he was able to assert himself in prestige reconnaissance units. At that time Czechoslovakia was part of the Warsaw Pact, but the ice was starting to melt. Young Petr Pavel did the right think when – apart of obligatory study of Russian – studied English as well.
Thus, at the beginning of the ‘90s, he was one of the first, then Czechoslovakian, soldiers who participated in a foreign mission. Together with a unit consisting from volunteers, he set off to rescue French soldiers from captivity. In the middle of a ragging battle between the Serbians and Croats. The popular Czech slogan “We can come to an arrangement” didn’t work so much as the rescue team wished. In spite of this, all were survived, the prisoners were rescued.
And only in the memoir the fans of General Pavel have a chance to find out all details of this adventure. For completeness’ sake, these details are additionally described in separate chapter by Colonel Karel Klinovský, a participant of the mission and the best friend. Not less interesting is to look at the general’s family life. He is relatively self-critical and admits that he hasn’t always had enough time for his loved ones. In spite of this, from our conversation with his family, it is evident mutual respect, tolerance, love and never-dying support.
General Pavel also does a big favour in the closing chapters, which describe his service in NATO, and, thus, functioning of this organization, its attitude towards different recent or actual conflicts. We can even say that a reader acquires two books at one stroke – a biography and a textbook of the global security policy.
Just two questions remain now: When a big foreign entertainment company shoots a picture about a rescue of the French contingent by an underestimated Czechoslovak unit? And when the memoires of General Peter Pavel can be issued at least in English translation for foreign readers?
And in the video below, General Petr Pavel is seen closing out his tenure as Chairman of the NATO Military Committee on June 29, 2018,
Munitions Systems Specialists with the 332d Expeditionary Maintenance Squadron build MK-84 Conical Bombs in a Munitions Storage Area at an undisclosed location, Southwest Asia, Oct. 28, 2022.
Munitions Systems Specialists are responsible for: providing small arms to Security Forces, demolitions explosives to Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and bombs and missiles to fighter aircraft.
Paris – A project for a future combat air system (FCAS) backed by France, Germany, and Spain has sparked close interest elsewhere in Europe, the French armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, said Jan. 23.
“There are other European nations knocking at the door,” he told the Association des Journalistes de Défense, a press club, when asked about the FCAS project.
A next generation fighter jet is a key part of FCAS, with Dassault Aviation working as prime contractor, and Airbus Defence and Space as industrial partner. Other core FCAS elements include remote carrier drones and a combat cloud for extended network communications.
The next day, the minister told parliamentarians there could be “good news soon on FCAS,” as other countries “see the program is advancing and want to join,” OpexNews, a specialist newsletter, said on social media.
A spokesman for the minister declined to give further details. Dassault declined comment.
Le Monde ran Jan. 20 an interview with Lecornu, who told the afternoon daily that European nations had shown interest in FCAS, and the project was on the agenda for the Franco-German summit and joint cabinet meeting held Jan. 22, here.
Britain was clearly the highest value potential partner for France, a defense analyst said.
The “real question” is whether the U.K. teamed up with France on FCAS, with other nations ranking on lower standing, the analyst said.
“Dassault would dream of that,” the analyst said. The U.K. had capability that made it the natural partner for France, although the industrial restructuring would be difficult.
The FCAS fighter demonstrator might well be built and flown, but the real question was what happened afterwards – whether the FCAS program will be launched, the analyst said.
The demonstrator will cost relatively little, but the real cost will fall in the following years, running into 10s of billions.
“Of course,” a second analyst said when asked if the U.K. would be a good FCAS partner, pointing to a 1996 fighter project pitched by BAE Systems and Dassault.
The two companies announced plans to work together to build a replacement for the Mirage 2000 and Tornado fighters, but their respective governments went separate ways, leading to the Rafale and Typhoon.
Meanwhile, Britain, Italy, and Japan announced last month their partnership in the global combat air programme (GCAP), opening the way for British companies in the U.K. Tempest project to work with Japanese firms in the F-X fighter program.
“Like minded countries” can buy into GCAP or collaborate on wider capabilities, boosting the export outlook for the fighter, the U.K. government said Dec. 9.
That agreement between London and Tokyo on a new fighter opened up a new area of cooperation, as the two countries have worked together over 10 years on military technology, including missiles, the second analyst said.
Spain joined FCAS after Macron and the then German chancellor, Angela Merkel, launched the project in July 2017 in a bid to boost European strategic autonomy.
On The Mend?
There appeared to be a thawing of relations between Paris and London, following the distinctly frosty Brexit departure from the European Union.
A long awaited Anglo-French summit is due to be held March 10, with French president Emmanuel Macron inviting U.K. prime minister Rishi Sunak to come to France. Defense and security are on the agenda.
However, the French commander in chief said in a Jan. 20 keynote speech at the Mont de Marsan airbase, he was also seeking to deepen “structural partnerships” with Germany, Italy, and Spain. France has just signed a cooperation treaty with Spain, renewing defense ties which dated back to the 1980s, he said.
Britain and France are signatories of the 2010 Lancaster House treaty, intended to boost military and industrial cooperation.
One of the projects under that agreement was a project for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle, dubbed future combat air system – demonstration program, but London cancelled that some time after the 2016 vote for Brexit.
Potential Partners
Lecornu’s parliamentary remarks sparked discussion on social media on which countries might join the FCAS project, with Sweden seen as prime suspect.
Saab was the Swedish industrial partner on the demonstrator for a French unmanned combat aerial vehicle, dubbed Neuron, led by Dassault. Other industrial partners were the Spanish Airbus unit, Greek company HAI, Italian firm Leonardo, and Swiss company Ruag.
Sweden has also been a partner on the British Tempest fighter project, but Swedish interest appears to have faded.
Sweden could be a partner with France on submarines, the first analyst said.
In FCAS, there is both a “mutual” cooperative approach between France and Germany in phase 1B, and a more “national” aspect in phase 2, when production gets under way, a senior defense official said. The French air force and Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office are drawing up technical requirements, as phase 1B gets under way.
Work is ramping up on phase 1B, which includes architecture studies for the demonstrator for the fighter, drones and the cloud, an industry executive said. The planned phase 2 includes development and in the later stage, production of the fighter demonstrator.
The fighter demonstrator is expected to fly 2028/2029, a couple of years later than intended, delayed by tough talks on the phase 1B contract.
At the Franco-German summit, Airbus DS displayed a life-sized model of a concept for a remote carrier drone.
The director of the Airbus FCAS program, Bruno Fichefeux, presented the model to Macron and chancellor Olaf Scholz.
That drone model was presented at the 2019 Paris air show.
The total budget for FCAS phases 1B and 2 is close to €8 billion ($8.7 billion), split between France, Germany, and Spain, comprising €3.2 billion for phase 1B, running some three and a half years, with the balance for phase 2, which is under option.
France and Germany said Jan. 23 in a joint statement in English they would pursue cooperation in capabilities, namely “to complete the major NGWS (next generation weapon system) and MGCS (main ground combat system) capability programmes.
“To continue joint efforts, on a bilateral basis and within the E.U., to support the development of a sovereign and innovative European DTIB (defence technology industrial base), with a special focus on the space domain.”
The summit marked the 60th anniversary of the Franco-German Elysée cooperation treaty.
1st Cavalry Division participated in Project Convergence 2022, an experiment offering opportunities to access future warfighting strategies, including how the All-Service and Multinational Force can work together to detect and defeat threats Sep. 29 through Nov. 9 at Fort Irwin, California.
Of the four Nordic countries, Sweden faces the longest journey towards a new regional defense approach — but also has an opportunity to undergo significant, smart transformation for a modern era that sees it finally join the NATO alliance.
It has the longest journey due to its unique and long tradition of neutrality in European defense, and its subsequent historical experience in navigating political blocs in Europe. It has a significant chance for innovation because it can rebuild its defense forces within a wider context and perspective while relying heavily on domestic defense companies that the country has not yet tapped to its full benefit.
The legacy of Swedish neutrality was seen in the Swedish experience in World War II. In John Gilmour’s insightful book, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin, he concluded about the Swedish approach: “Sweden prudently looked after its own interests and spurned the tutelage of the self-interested and evidently untrustworthy combatants. The responsibility for Sweden rested in Stockholm and nowhere else.”[1]
What has changed is that Stockholm now sees its own interests as being best served by enlightened participation and leadership in the two key alliances shaping modern Europe, the European Union and NATO. It is by accident of timing, but perhaps a sign from history, that Sweden will take over presidency of the European Union in 2023 — the same year that should see them formally entering NATO.
Sweden faces a double challenge. How can it lead an effort for a significant strategic rethink about the defense of the region and Europe as a whole? And can it do so by being bold in thinking through what this really means in terms of a redesigned force structure?
Following the end of the cold war, Sweden let its forces draw down to very low levels. As Stefan Hedlund noted in a 2019 article about Swedish defense: “The end of the Cold War brought severe downsizing. Funding for defense dropped to merely one percent of GDP in 2018, the lowest level of all the Nordic countries excluding Iceland. The rationale for these cuts was derived from abandoning the traditional doctrine of territorial defense. Armed invasion was no longer viewed as a credible threat.
“Although Sweden continued making significant military contributions to international peacekeeping, its ability to defend its territory has seriously degraded. Sweden’s elaborate system of hardened defenses, once erected to protect the very long coastline, was demolished. Air force bases with hardened bunkers were closed. The navy lost its anti-submarine warfare capabilities. The ground forces were slashed, with artillery and air defense units almost entirely eradicated.”[2]
Despite that historical slowdown, Sweden began its rethink in defense posture and structure in the wake of the initial Ukraine crisis in 2014. And it was clear that the Swedish leadership woke up to the fact that being neutral does not mean that can avoid being dragged into any conflict between Russia and other European states, given the nature of the new combat systems, and the Russians lowering the nuclear threshold in their declaratory strategy and force acquisition. Neutrality may be nice — but not if your society is nullified by military action going through the region.
Notably, since 2014, Sweden has had an increasingly robust international/partner-engaged strategy tied to the NATO members, even prior to its formal membership application earlier this year. For example, in 2017, the Swedes held the exercise Aurora 17, which was the largest Swedish military exercise in more than 20 years and was clearly intended as an exercise of Swedish defense capabilities against a larger, more sophisticated opponent. France, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Germany, and the United States — all NATO members — joined Finland in participating in the exercise.
The Aurora 17 exercise involved triggering a revival of Sweden’s approach to total defense, and involved around 40 Swedish agencies other than their Ministry of Defense. And in the runup to applying for NATO membership, a key element has been an emphasis on evolving their total defense or whole of nation approach, including the return of conscription. The total defense concept includes cyber defense, mobilization enhanced approaches, and working how reinforcements might operate from Swedish territory.
There are several areas of innovation which Sweden will be key player in going forward in a more integrated approach to Nordic defense.
The first will clearly be operations with Norway and Finland in the High North, working as well with non-Nordic allies. Notably, during recommendations by the Swedish Armed Forces Supreme Commander Gen. Michael Bydén on Nov. 1, among them was to enhance Swedish presence in the High North and find innovate ways to support force operations with allies in the region.
One of his recommendations underlay any serious Swedish defense rethink: “Developing a Nordic dimension is especially important because the conditions in Northern Europe require joint and coordinated defense concepts. Sweden must accept a special regional responsibility since NATO’s defense concept is based on regionally existing capabilities. The Swedish Armed Forces stipulate that the Nordic countries belong to the same operational area and are led by the same command structure (Joint Forces Command.)”[3]
A second area of focus is clearly force mobility. Simply having a ground force that operates as a hedgehog on its own territory is not enough – how will the ground forces operate with allies in forward defense of the region, notably the Baltics?
A third is to change how the Air Force and Navy work together. The Air Force has historically provided the air defense for a small naval force. As the Air Force and Navy operate at greater distance, how will the combat air and combat ships be outfitted differently, or platforms developed differently in the future? (Here Saab’s participation in the UK led Project Tempest could lead not only to changes in the Swedish Air Force but in allies as well.)
The Swedish Navy has been focused on operating in the Swedish archipelago, forward leaning operations in the Baltic Sea and along on their west coast focused on control of the inlets/outlets to the Baltics Sea. As it is built out to play a broader role in providing strategic depth to the region, the Navy will share more maritime defense interests with Denmark and Norway and could look to collaborate in their approaches to shipbuilding.
And as the Baltic Sea sees greater cooperation among the NATO allies who would now surround the area (Finland, Sweden, the Baltic states, Poland, Germany, and Denmark), how will they work together to deal with the Russians operating from the Gulf of Finland and Kaliningrad? How will Sweden approach maritime and defense and security in this contested sea bordering Russia and directly confronting Russian maritime interests in the North Atlantic? Here the potential cross-national cooperation on joint ISR and command and control could lead to significant innovation involving maritime unmanned systems, both USVs and UUVs, plus even more significantly working ways for the two types of maritime unmanned systems to work together.
There’s a lot to consider, and Sweden must do so while balancing the need for careful thought with speed. If managed correctly, Sweden can draw on its unique location and strengths to help shape a broader kill web defense and security structure with its allies in the region. Finding ways to innovative in connecting land, air and maritime assets in a cross border, and cross cutting force able to operate from security operations to high-end ones could bring significant innovation to the region, while also demonstrating the kind of multi-domain innovation that could serve as a model for other NATO states.[4]
[1] John Gilmour. Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: The Swedish experience in the Second World War (Societies at War) (Kindle Locations 5989-5991). Edinburgh University Press. Kindle Edition.
[4] For an examination of how to understand the nature and promise of a kill web force, see Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century, 2022.
This article was first published by Breaking Defense on January 5, 2023.
